according to his good pleasure he may either delegate a dispensation of either power to another or he may reserve it to himself Therefore it would not be absurd if any man should grant that God in some measure hath delegated a Legislative power to the Magistrate of obliging Consciences but hath reserved the Judicial power over them entire unto himself But there is no necessity that compelleth us to grant 〈◊〉 or to use any expressions that may be helped although by never so gentle an interpretation For we do not say this that God hath given to the Magistrate a power to oblige by his Laws the Consciences of those that be under him but this rather which is a more wary and a more commodiouâ— kind of speaking that God hath given to the Magistrate a power of making Laws which but by the only Authority of God himself do oblige the Consciences of his Subjects For to speak properly the Magistrate doth not oblige the Conscience to obey the Law but God obligeth the Conscience to obey the Magistrate XL. And by this a way is made for an 〈◊〉 to the last objection I do grant indeed 〈…〉 effects of Actions ought not to be extended 〈…〉 the intention of the Agents nevertheless where there are more Agents subordinate there is 〈◊〉 hindreth but that the effect may be extended beyond the intention of the inferiour Agent provided it doth not exceed the Intention of the principâ—â— Agent As in the generation of a Monster which being but boyes we have learned from Aristotle the effect which is the production of the Monster is besides the intention of the second cause or as they speak it of Nature natured that is to say of the person that begets or brings it forth but it is not besides the intention of the first Cause or of Nature naturing that is Almighty God Therefore although the Magistrate in the making of a Law hath no explicit intention of obliging the Consciences yet by instituting the Law he doth institute that which by the intention ordination of God hath an implicit force of obliging them which necessarily is conjoyned to him And this may suffice to be spoken of the obligation of Humane Laws in general I will shortly proceed to the Questions or particular doubtful Cases if God shall permit and my health be more constant to me THE SIXTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in reference to their material Cause PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree Justice I Have reduced to two general Questions or to two heads what I have propounded to be spoken concerning the obligation of humane Laws The first is whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences of Subjects Concerning which in the former Lecture I have expounded to you what was my Judgment of it The other Question is How they oblige To which question I have told you there belongeth the deâ—â—ding of some Cases and Doubts which meeâ— in this â—ubject And because they are 〈◊〉 few noâ— of one kind therefore to avoid Confusion and that we may proceed in some Order and Method to that which is to be spoken I have thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Representative of the whole Treatise now in hand And that Method which most of you do remember I observed in those my former exercitations concerning the obligation of an oath I here conceive it very necessary for me to use again that those things may all of them be reduced to the four kind of Causes which I conceive may commodiously be referred to them But because I do find many things to remain which cannot easily be included in those bounds we will assigne them their several â—lasses And they are chiefly two the first of Persons who are under the obligation of those Laws and the other in the comparing of the obligatory Vertue which is in Humane Laws with that which ariseth from the Judgement of the Conscience by Vowes Oaths Promises Contracts and from the Law of Scandal or if there be any thing else which elsewhere obligatory for these two obligations do seem to be in a contestation and justling for precedency to strive which of them should give place unto 〈…〉 To add the third Classis for some certain species of Laws which seem to contain in themselvs somthing singular to themselvs such as are Ecclesiastical Laws Penal Laws the local statuâ—es of Colleges and lesse societies will not peradventure be very necessary seeing in some manner they may be reduced to somthing in the four kinds of Causes and though not so aptly as to satisfy the curious yet so fully as to serve our present purpose for whilst our hearers understand what it is we speak of we have never taken any great care in what method we have gone We will in the first place therefore if God shall grant life health and opportunity to accomplish what we have propounded speak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four kinds of Causes In the second place of the persons who are obliged to the observation of those Laws And lastly of the comparison of the obligations which quarrel amongst themselves giving you before-hand one or two distinctions which will be of great concernment in the whole management of this discourse II. We must understand therefore in the first place Seeing that to the end of Political Government and order there is a two-fold power in those who are invested with Soveraign Authority A directive power by which the Subjects may understand what they have to do and a Power Coactive or Coercitive for by reason of the Analogy it is better so to call it than Coercive by which the Subjects may be compelled to the performance of those things that are commanded if of their own accords they shall refuse to give obedience to them both which are so contained in the Laws that the one consisteth most in precepts and the other is most to be seen in punishments there ariseth from this double power of the Magistrate a double duty of the Subject which answereth to that double power The duty of Obedience in reference to the Directive power and the duty of Subjection in reference to the power Coercitive I here understand subjection as it is properly so called by an appellation Generical which as elsewhere it often comes to passe is restrained to one certain Species For obedience also is a Species of Subjection largely taken The Apostle comprehends both those duties Heb. 13. 17. and signifies them in those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obey them that have the oversight of you and submit your selves The first whereof pertaineth to the Duty of obedience or of performing that which is commanded by a lawful Superior the other to the Duty of Subjection or of induring what by him shall be inflicted Furthermore As from a double Power there ariseth a double
NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT SERO SED SERIO The Most honble William Marquiss of Lothian TEN Lectures ON THE OBLIGATION OF Humane Conscience READ In the Divinity School at OXFORD In the Year 1647 By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson Bishop of Lincoln c. Translated by Robert Codrington Master of Arts. LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Alâ—stry and Tho. Dicas at the Sâ—gn of the Bell in St. Pâ—uls-Church Yâ—rd 1660. SEVERAL CASES OF CONSCIENCE Discussed In Ten Lectures IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL AT OXFORD By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson now Lord Bishop of Lincoln LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Allestry and Tho. Dicas at the Sign of the Bell in St. Pauls-Church-Yard 1660. To the most Noble Robert Boyle Son to the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cork deceased and Brother to Richard Earl of Cork now living Honourable SIR THis small present whatsoever it is coveteth to preferre it self to your Trust and Patronage and to come abroad into the world under the protection of your name Most willingly therefore I do here make a tender of it unto you who as I understand by Fame and in Subjects of worth Fame is seldom found a Liar are not only Illustrious by the splendor of your Birth but far more Illustrious by the nobility of a generous mind by your love to Learning your Humanity Piety and all manner of Virtue howsoever to me living privately and contentedly in a smal Cottage and not much solicitous what is done abroad especially as the times noware never known by your face nor by your name until within these few Months no nor as yet known unto me but only by your MUNIFICENCE Nevertheless I hope this poor gift will find some acceptance with you because having already obtained my Rod of Liberty you endeavour to enclose me again in my antient circle and to draw me back to my discontinued exercise by proposing to me some honest Salary by the excellently learned Mr. Thomas Barlow chief Keeper of Bodleys Library in the famous University of Oxford It is indeed wellâ—done that in this deplorable state of Civil and Ecclesiastical affairs if we may call 〈…〉 and a hideous confusion of all things there are peradventure found one or two of a more refined clay who either by their encouragment or their bounty are careful to comfort the sad Muses and the Retainers to them of whatsoever condition those especially who being Professors of true and Christian Philosophy are every where neglected and dispised as the refuse of the world Iâ— any thing therefore by the permission of the Almighty shall hereafter be undertaken and published by me in this kind of writing which pertaineth to moral Philosophy that may be either profitable to the Publick or useful to any private man for the better Institution of his life and the framing of his manners by the prescript of the Divine Law and Gospel whether it be in the Latin tongue or in the English which I perceive to be more acceptable of to many of our Nation I do here willingly acknowledge and freely professe that for the greatest part it is due unto you who were both the Author to me to undertake it and an Assistant cheerfully to proceed in it And do you most wâ—râ—hy Sir proceed to do good that is to do that which you do already to adorn Learning to favour learned men to advance Piety to procure you faithful friends at the charges of unfaithful Mammon that so ouâ— of the abundance of good works sowed in this world there may redound unto you a most fruitful Harvest of eternal blessednesse in the world to come Amen From Botheby Pannel◠〈◊〉 Lincolnshirâ— 10 Cal. Decemb. 1659. To the Courteous READER Friendly Reader whosoever you are BEfore you advance into the House it self you are â—ere in the first entrance to be encountred and desired in some few things to suffer your self to be informed of the cause that chiefly compelled us to the publishing of these papers which here we represent unto you I had rather indeed if others had been of the same mind with me that they should never have seen the light for the proof whereof this may be one Argument and of force enough that part of these Lectures written by me some yâ—ars since were never for the space of ten years and more reserved in any Desk but lay in corners up and down amongst my rejected as mâ—ch as neglected papers had I not another Argument of far greater force than the former viz. The Imperfection of the worke which of it self doth betray it self For a Writer that understands himself and makes provision for his Reputation and Dignity mâ—st carefully finish the work he hath begun Lib. 2. de Natur. deorum and not so much as think of sending it abroad before to speak with Cicero it be every where apt and polished and made compleat and perfect in all the parts and numbers of it For in vain from thence you may look for Praise where you may think you come off very handsomely if for Praise you deserve Pardon What â—hâ—â—…fore Were friends the cause of it Who are accustomed to encourage and give more rains to those who of their own accord are running into those hazards and to spur on others who draw back I will not affirm this neither for although I may grant that the exhortations and desires of friends the common refuge of the greatest part of Scriblers may serve oftentimes for an honest excuse yet they could never seem to me to be the just and allowable grounds for such a Cause Nevertheless as most frequently it is seen there were not wanting some ergodioctists some Brain-Exacters who demanded of me and that I may use the words of Fabius with daily and reproaching Importunities did efflagitate that I would present those things to the eys of all men to be read which heretofore in reading were so grateful to their ears but I who was not ignorant how acuter was the judgement of the eye than of the ear did constantly deny it They on the other side were more instant with me and more vehemently did urge me and as oft in like cases it comes to pass they did gently chide me But I who was resolved to be obstinate stood fixed to my self for whatsoever they could object unto me I was ready always to answer them that a work begun and not half of it nor the third part of it peradventure hardly accomplished was not rashly to be communicated to the publick But they again were as ready to reply Why cease you then Why do you not set your self close unto your study and put your last hand unto that work which your first hand hath so happily begun What shall I say for my self in this case I am ashamed to confesse and I may not be
shall be examined and discussed at this time The first doubt is De materia impossibili of a matter in it self impossible concerning which I say in the first place That no Law ought to be made concerning a matter altogether impossible If such a Law be made it is tyrannical and by right null and obligeth no man in Conscience The first reason is because that Laws are made in relation to Acts as to be acted by a man who is a free Agent now liberty speaketh a power unto both but in things impossible there is no such liberty of power as by it self is manifest Secondly No man by right can be obliged to the performance of that the omission whereof cannot be imputed as a fault unto him nor ought to be imputed to him for punishment for every obligation is either to a fault or to a punishment or to both but the omission of a thing impossible cannot be imputed to any man for a fault nor ought it to be imputed to any one for a punishment Ergo c. But that there is no obligation of a thing impossible whether it be impossible by the Nature of the thing or by circumstances Praelect 2. Sect. 12. or any other way hath already by me been proved in my treatise of the obligation of an oath and there is no need of repetition VII I say in the second place A Law which is possible to some but seemeth to any other or to but few or peradventure but to one or two to be impossible may lawfully be made if it be useful to the Common-wealth but not unless there be some extraordinary great cause and a manifest necessity doth require it but being made it doth oblige all those who are able to keep it but not those who cannot keep it as if some great Tribute were commanded for the necessary use of the Common-wealth for the payment whereof some of the Subjects are nothing so able as others Those who are so poor that they cannot pay the sum which the Law lays upon them are not bound in Conscience to do that which they are unable to perform as is already apparent by the proposition above mentioned Neverthelesse they are obliged to make their addresses to those who are over them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nazianz. Orat. 9. Debeone omittere quod possum quoniam quod debeo minime possum Bernard and openly and sincerely and without the least falshood to professe the slendernesse of their Estate and unless they can prevail to be quite exempted from the Law or to procure a remission of some part of the sum with which they are taxed they are to bring into the publick as great a part of it as possibly they can for he who cannot do what he ought to do he yet ought to do what he is able to do VIII The second doubt is concerning a thing commanded by the Law not impossible but very grievous and very burthensome and which the Subject cannot perform without great inconvenience losse danger of life and the ruine of hiâ— whole Estate I say in the first place That in this case the Law-giver if he foreseeth this will come to passe ought to use some caution in the clauses of that Law and as conveniently as he can he is to provide a remedy for this Evil And if it cannot so well be done in the form of the Law it self leâ—t subtile and deceitful Knaves and too much intent to their own profit may thereby find a hole to escape 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Isae â—s ap Stob. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so elude the force of the Law yet what possibly in him lyeth he ought to provide that in the execution of that Law some qualification may be had leâ—t a Law otherwise profitable and necessary may become a snâ—re or a detriment to any honest man I say in the second place That the Subject though so heavily taxed is neverthelesse bound in Conscience to obey that Law although with the ruine of his whole Estate if any evident or necessary Cause for the good of the Common-wealth doth so require For example suppose a hostile Army be invading the Kingdom if a Law be made that all the corn in the Fields for some miles not far from the Shore be spoiled and all the Corn in the Barnes or Ricks which cannot be carried away be burned and that all the Houses in the Suburbs be pulled down and that all the Sluces thereabouts shall be opened and the Fields be drowned every Citizen and Subject is directly bound to obey this Law and cheerfully and willingly to obey the Commands thereof and with the loss of his own goods to redeem the publick safety not only upon that account that his Country being betrayed to his Enemies by his unseasonable parsimoniousness it is sure enough that every private person will be suddenly sensible of the ensuing calamity but especially out of the Conscience of his duty because that every good man is to preferâ— the publick above all private interests I say in the third place That a Subject unlesse some remarkable necessity doth appear or fear of publick danger is ordinarily not obliged to obey a Law that is so extremely burthensome as to bring with it the certain ruine of his whole Estate or the imminent danger of his life But he is bound as generally hath been already spoken and which almost in all cases I would have you to observe that we may need not any more to repeat it to you to make not the least resistance but patiently to endure whatsoever injury or contumely shall be brought upon him by the superiour powers IX The third doubt is concerning things necessary as if the Law of men should command any thing which was necessary before and commanded by the Law of God or forbid any thing which was before unlawful and prohibited by the Law of God What is the obligation in this case I answer briefly That the Subject by this Law is absolutely obliged For first the obligation which was in force before the Law of God doth not hinder the effect of the Law of man by excluding a new obligation for a man by many bonds may be obliged to the performance of one and the same duty as I have already declared in the former Lecture to which reason we may also adde another which is that oftentimes the Law of man doth adde something to the Law of God to wit by determining the Act as to the substance of it commanded by the Law of God and therefore necessary as to the manner quantity or some other circumstanceâ— of it which was free before or by adding some determination to the Law of God prohibiting a thing unlawfull as to the degree of the Crime or the manner of the punishment or the measure of it or other things of the like nature for examples sake it is by Divine right that there should be publick congregations to perform
in a threefold consideration And first of all the worship of God properly so called and the chiefest is that inward wordship of the mind which consisteth in the exercise of inward Vertues as of Faith Hope Love Invocation Confidence c. Secondly those outward Acts by which that inward worship of the mind is partly expressed and partly helped and fostered such as are publick Prayers Singing of Psalms the Hearing of the word and the participation of the Sacraments c. may reducibly and lesse properly be called and oftentimes are called the worship of God as they are the outward Testimonies and Helps of that worship which so properly is called Thirdly Seeing it is impossible that any outward action especially if it be a solemn one should be performed without some Circumstances either more or lesse of Time Place and Gesture from whence it comes to passe that the very same Circumstances which if established by Laws or Customes are called also Rites do sometimes receive the appellation of worship although very improperly and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worship which it self also is improperly called a worship It is therefore to be affirmed That the inward primary worship properly so called doth only so acknowledge God to be the only Author of it that it is not lawful for any man either to institute a new worship or being instituted by God to exhibit it to any other besides God himself We are to affirm also That the outward worship according to its substantials is instituted only by God but there is a far different account to be made of the circumstances which are accessary to this outward worship and those which do accompany it If there be any who will Honor them also with the Name of worship For seeing that the outward worship of God cannot be performed without Circumstances and God in the Gospel hath not given any certain particular Circumstances perpetually to be observed in sacred Assemblyes but only hath lay'd down some Generals as may conduce to Order Honesty and Edification it must necessarily follow that the Determination of the said Circumstances which are but Accidental to the worship it self and mutable according to the respect of Times Places and Occasions must pertain unto those who under Christ have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches which that they may be imposed by those who in the several Churches are invested with publick Authority and being imposed may Religiously be observed by all the Members of the said Churches the nature of Holy worship doth not forbid but Solemnity rather Decency doth require We observe also that even those Men themselves who so Lordly bitterly do inveigh against the Canons and Ecclesiastical Constitutions yet as often as they please do use those Rites in the outward worship of God no where prescribed by Christ or his Apostles as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath the uncovering of the Head in the Holy Conventions and many other things which because we dayly observe to be done it is unnecessary to rehearse them XXX In the fourth place they object that Moses the pattern of the old that is of the Jewish Church who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver did not only by his Law define the Substantials of the Jewish worship but according to that fidelity which was in him he omitted not the least Circumstances and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Christian Church he most compleatly and perfectly finished all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount And now if Christ the-Lawgiver of the new Testament should not have prescribed all things and every thing even to the least Circumstances which are to be performed in the Ecclesiastical worship it may justly be believed to suspect which is near to Blasphemy that he was lesse faithful in the House of God than Moses and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Christ if any new Rites never instituted by him should by humane Authority be brought into the Church or be received by the Christian common people But they who do object these things ought in the first place to have considered that by this Argument all humane political Laws are no lesse everted than Eclesiastical for Moses by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Israel a certain and a defined Law not only of those Rites which belonged to the worship of God but also of those Decrees and Judgments which belonged to the Administration of Civil Government XXXI In the second place it is a wonder moreover that they observed not that by this comparison of that fidelity which was in both Law-givers Moses and Christ that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cause or more strongly have confirmed ours For as from that that Moses both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews we do truly collect it was the will of God that the people of the Jews should be so restrained in their duties under that paedagogy and Mosaick Discipline as under a Yoak of servitude so that very few things should be free unto them so from that also that Christ the most faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will did give unto the Christian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies we do truly collect that it is the will of God that the Magistrates and Christian people should be permitted in those things to their own Liberty so that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord no command or prohibition of a superior intervening to do as shall seem in his own Judgement to be most expedient and to the several Churches and their Governors to prescribe those things which according to the condition of the time and place shall seem to them to be most subservient to Order Honesty Edification and Peace XXXII Moreover Those who do make use of this Argument ought in the third place to have considered that under that Paedagogy of Moses the Jews themselves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worship of God so take away that it was not lawful for them by their own Authority to observe and to institute those things which it is manifest were never commanded either by God himself or by Moses his Servant Of many take these few instances First the solemn feast of the Passover which by the Law of Moses was commanded should be observed but seaven dayes was by a special Law of Hezekias who received a singular testimony of his piety from God himself and by the consent of the people continued seaven dayes longer The History is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Esther and Mordecay did institute that the seast of Purim should be yearly celebrated in memory of
intention but unprofitable to the publick nay in some sence obnoxious yet the Subject is bound to obey it provided it be made by just Authority and the matter of the Law or the thing commanded be such that it may be done without Sin The reason is because every man ought to be careful and diligent in the performance of that which belongs to his own part Gal. 6. 5. and not too scrupulous of what concerns another For every man shall bear his own Burthen If a Law-giver shall be wanting in his Duty what is that to you Do you perform your Office howsoever As for his intentions whether they be right or not let himself look to it for he must give to God an account of all his actions and intentions And do you look to your self for if you shall refuse to obey him you shall give to the same God an account of your disobedience XII The fourth Dout of the Changing of Laws if they seem to be unprofitable or obnoxious to the Common-wealth whether and how far the Change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be required and urged by the People The reason of the Doubt in one respect is because in a body Civil as in a body natural every change especially if it be sudden and great is dangerous and on the other side because it concerns the Common-wealth that the Laws be accommodated to the Times and Customes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 4. Phys text 128. and if the one doth change that the other be changed with them For answer to this I say in the first place it is certain that the Laws may be changed yea and sometimes that they ought to be changed for they have heretofore been changed with great profit to the Common-wealth therefore they may now be changed again and may be so in all future times if occasion shall require it shall be found profitable to the Commonwealth And why may not that be lawful to be done again which hath been lawful heretofore There are every day new emergencies new inconveniencies new evils and if there are not new Laws made to redresse them there will be no remedy Arist 2. And all men saith Aristotle seek not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. 8. And if heretofore it were expedient that a Law should be made because it was profitable to the Commonwealth it being found afterwards by the change of the conditions of Times and manners to become unprofitable why is it not expedient that it should be taken away again XIII I say in the second place That the change of particular Laws is not without danger and therefore not to be attempted unlesse it be upon some great and urgent necessity Aristotle acutely and briefly as his custom is produceth divers reasons 2. Poli. 8. These three are the chiefest 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These often changes do very much derogate from the authority of the Law and the Law-giver As we conceive that person to be of a very slender and weak judgement who for no sound or evident reason is easily enduced to change his Opinion Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It maketh the people wanton and petulant This is true enough we not long since have had the experience of it and apt to fly at any thing if they shall find their Law-giver easy on this account and departing from his own right to humour the Votes and unsatisfied desires of the people Therefore the chief Philosopher most gravely and deservedly doth reprove the Law of Hippodamus a Law-maker of Miletum viz. That whosoever had discovered or found out something profitable to the City should be recompenced for his good service with a publick reward This Law was specious enough at the first sight and plausible to the people but look throughly into it and you will find nothing in it either of prudence or safety or Advantage For what could be found more dangerous to disturb the publick Peace than that factious men and of a turbulent and cunning Spirit under the shaddow of a publick good should not only occasion the subversion of the Laws but also call in question the Form of the whole Civil Government and obtrude unto the State a new Idaea of Government according to the humour of their own Invention Do you hear I beseech you a Philosopher famous in his times or rather a Prophet and a foreteller of the manners and the times in which now we live Gravâ—ora inserre vulnera dum minoâ—â—bus medeâ—i defidâ— amus Ambros 2. Oâ—sic 2. Thirdly the Innovation of Laws being ordained for the removing of some present Inconvenience and being it may come to passe and oftentimes it doth so come to passe that from this suddain Immutation many and more grievous Inconveniencies may arise though not peradventure at the first discovered the most grave Philosopher did judge it to be far safer to tolerate endure some Inconveniencies and those not slight ones neither in a Common wealth which may be avouched of the Church also which is a kind of a Common-wealth than in pretence of Reformation either Ecclesiastical or Political to cancel old Laws Statutes turn all things upside down Of a far different judgment to those of our times were the wise men of former Ages whose Rules Principles were as are here these folowing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Malum benè positum non est movendum Imperiti medici est pejus malo remedium adhibere an Evil well placed is not to be removed It is the part of an unskilful Physician to apply a Remedy worse than the disease XIV I say in the third place That although the changing of Laws may seem to be necessary by reason of some great and evident Cause yet it is not to be attempted by the people without the consent of the Prince but modestly they are to crave and patiently to expect it of him and this may aptly be collected from the Analogy of the Head and the Members for how like a monster were it and destructive to the whole body if the Arms the Breast or the Feet should assume unto themselves the office of the Head This is abundantly enough demonstrated in those things which not long since we declared to you when we spake of the efficient Cause of Laws viz. That the principal Act of Jurisdiction cannot be exercised but by him only who is the Head and chief of the whole Commonalty Therefore the Constitution the abrogation and any Immutation of Laws whatsoever which are all of them the principal Acts of the chiefest Jurisdiction cannot pertain unto the people unless where the people are Prince as in a State Democratical but to him only who doth exercise a Soveraignty of Dominion over the whole Commonalty in a State Monarchical and who hath the undoubted power of a transcendent Command by himself In a businesse of so great an importance the duties of the people are these
any good end VIII Moreover it is opposite to the nature of sin to produce of it self any good effect as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit Mat 7. 18. nor darknesse produce light of it self 2 Cor. 4. 6. but the same great and glorious God who out of his omnipotence brought forth light out of darknesse can also out of our sins take an occasion to illustrate his infinite wisdome his righteousnesse and his goodnesse But these are the effects of a divine power as of a cause working properly and of it self to the production whereof there needs no assistance nor strength from our sins which as to those effects are but meerly contingent and but by accident Those words therefore of David Psalm 5. which St. Paul alleageth Rom. 3. 4. I have sinned against thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest are not so to be understood that David for that end committed murder and adultery or that it was lawfull for him so to do that God might be justified in his words but the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and some other Greek particles of the same signification in many places of Scripture are to be understood according to the interpretation of St. Chrysostome not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to denote and inferre the event only and not the true cause of the thing For as he who is in a serious argumentation can inferr a true conclusion from the false praemises which before were granted by another and yet the same Disputant would show himself ridiculous if to prove a true conclusion should willingly make use of some salse assumptions for Truth doth not stand in need of the patronage of Falshood so Almighty God and we also in some respect may do the like can dispose of things that are ill done into good but it is neither congruous to the divine Justice and Goodness neither is it any ways lawfull for us to will and to do evil that good may come thereby IX The third argument is taken a naturâ boni Actus from the nature of a good Act to the complement whereof the concurse of all requisite conditions is so necessary that if one be but absent amongst so many of them although all the other be present and subservient yet that Act shall not be morally good Most remarkable is that Axiom Bonum ex causa integra malum ex quolibet defectu Good proceeds from an upright and an entire cause but evil from any defect And it is besides manifest in all kind of things that there are more required to raise up than to throw down or to destroy The defect of a good Intention is enough to prove any Action evil for that the end whereof is evil must of necessity be evil it self but it is not enough it is not sufficient that a good end or a good Intention should prove the Action good unless all the other requisite conditions be conjoyned Now that any Action whether the internall of the will or the externall of the work may approve themselves to be good we are to understand that there are three distinct goodnesses viz. the goodness of the object the goodnesse of the end and the goodness of the circumstances The quality of every Act doth first of all and principally depend on the quality of the object or of the matter about which it is conversant so that from thence every Act may indefinitely and according to the whole species of it be denominated either good or evil in this respect we affirm that Theft and Adultery are evil in the whole Species of them and that Prayer and the giving of Alms are good in all their severall respects and the acceptations of them but with this difference that things which in themselves are simply evil are so evil that neither upon the account of the end although good nor yet on the account of their circumstances although never so promising they can ever be made truly good But things which are good in their own nature may yet be so corrupted by the end or by undue circumstances that they may leave off to be good and become evil The pravity therefore of the object being presupposed we are altogether to abstain from the Acts of Theft or of adultery as being simply evil in themselves But the goodnesse of the object being presupposed it is not safe for any one at the first either to undertake to do it or to approve it being done unless he hath diligently weighed before hand the end to which it is directed and the severall circumstances with which it is attended and cloathed In these things therefore in which it is said that the Goodness of the Act doth depend on the end and that the end doth discriminate and crown the actions they may be said so for to be true if the Acts be good in consideration to the object or the matter or at the last if they be of a middle nature and indifferent but not if they are evil For the goodness of the object being supposed the Act doth chiefly take its goodness or its evilnesse from the end For examples sake the Act of giving a poor man an alms though it be a good Act in respect of the matter or the object yet if it be done for vain-glory it is morally an evil Act because it is not ordinated to a good end The same Act if it be to relieve the necessities of a neighbour is an Act so far good that it hath a lawfull matter and a right Intention and so partaketh of both the goodnesses above mentioned to wit of the object and the end but it cannot yet be affirmed to be simply good unlesse it be moreover duely circumstanced for to this complement of a good work besides that goodness of the object and the end there is required the goodnesse of circumstances And from hence it is that commonly it is spoken that the goodnesse of the Act doth depend upon its circumstances not primarily and principally but ultimately and for the accomplishment of it the goodness of the object and the end being first laid down seeing therefore these three things are required to the goodness of every moral Act and they are all to be conjoyned to wit the matter lawfull the intention right and the circumstances due it is most manifest that a right intention cannot alone suffice by it self and by consequent that nothing can be performed out of a good Conscience whatsoever the Intention be that is either unlawfull in the object or defective in the circumstances X. But some there are who peradventure will object unto this those words of our Saviour Mat. 6. 22. If thy eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light but if thy eye be evil thy whole body shall be full of darkness Where if the intention be undesstood by the eye which is the judgment of almost all the Interpreters upon
the duties of Divine worship but at what hour the people shall meet and in what place what form of words are to be used and what must be the gesture of the body the several parts of the service and other things of the same nature are all of them to be determined by Humane constitutions In the same manner the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertised against with such a punishment and what with another punishment is from the Laws of man From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God the Law of man hath this privilege that it can induce a new obligation on the Conscience of the Subject not only different from the first obligation in number and in respect of the Term because it is of another dependency but also diverse in the Species and in respect of the matter because it is exercised on another object for the first obligation which ariseth from the Law of God is to the thing it self as it is a substance but this obligation which the Lawes of men do super-induce is to the manner of the thing or to the circumstance of it X. The fourth Doubt is of a thing that is foul and unlawful which is indeed a Doubt of great moment and containeth many cases for almost all the Conditions which are required to the right Constitution of Lawes a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Justice alone And not only for that reason that universal Justice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues but especially for this reason that particular Justice and more specifically that Justice which is called Legal Justice is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies Concerning this Doubt In the first place it is questioned Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel who affirmed that the due matter of Laws whether just or unjust was that which was most commodious for the preserving the encreasing of a politick State for when in his opinion the end of Civil Power is the preservation of it self and the encrease of Soveraignty which Power cannot vigorously be preserved much less the Soveraignty enlarged if all the Lawes and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Justice and Honesty It concerned those who sate at the Helm so to bend as occasion should require the Rule of Honesty as to make it subservient to the publick advantage for the end in all things is to know how best to measure those things that are of a middle nature what so ever was the opinion of Machiavel this was certainly the Judgment of a personage of great account amongst the Lacaedemonians who openly pronounced that was most honest to the Spartans which was most profitable to them To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged Ipsa utilitas justi propè mater et aequi Hor. 1 â—aâ—yr 3. Profit almost the very mother of Justice and Equity And how thriving a Principle this is may be proved by the Example and successe of the Turks who relying on this Foundation most happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Asia Africa and Europe And to speak the truth had not some men who above all others do professe themselves to be Christians nay the only Christians and delight to be called the Reformers and the Restorers oâ— the purer Religion made a great use of this most wicked principle the Christian World had not every where groaned under so many Sacrileges Perjuries Seditions Warrs Tumults and Tyrannies XI But on the other side Princes on earth ought not to abuse that power which they have received from God against his will or otherwise than he intended for this power is not given them so much as to Lords as it is intrusted to them by God as his Ministers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 4 6. It is intrusted to them upon that account that they should work righteousnesse and not exercise Tyranny and an unjust Domination And this is manifest by the very words of the Text By me Kings Reign and Princes decree just things As if to Reign and truly to be a Prince were nothing else but to decree those things which are just and righteous And the Prophets do every where denounce the most severe anger Esai 10. 1. and vengeance of God against those Kings Princes who had decreed unjust Judgements Psal 94. 20. and had meditated iniquity as a Law Neither is the inlargement of Empire the â—nd of Civil Power as the Politicians of this world do affirm but the preservation of the people in Tranquillity and peace with all Godlinesse and Honesty 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Justice if there be any other is the best preserver of the publick peace And as the Righteousness of Faith doth procure and conserve the inward peace of the Conscience so legal Justice doth preserve the outward peace of the Common-wealth Esai 32. 17. the fruit of Justice saith the Prophet Pindaâ— shall be Peace and the Theban Poet calleth Quietnesse the Daughter of Justice Neither is that the meaning of Horace as if Honesty were meerly to be measured by profit the scope of his sense is far otherwise to wit that men wild at first and wandring by the observation of the publick profit and the common good were brought at the last to draw together into one Body and maintain Societies and by just Laws and Punishments to restrain injuries and wickednesse The Arguments drawn from the Turks whom it appears that God especially had raised up and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiousnesse and other Sins of the Christians or from any others to maintain a bad Cause by the prosperous successe that did attend it do favour rather of the Alcoran of some abhominable miscreant than of the Purity of the Gospel of our Saviour Christ XII The second Question is Whether an unjust Law though it ought not to be made yet being made may oblige the Conscience of the Subject so far as to be bound to observe it For many things there are which ought not to be done yet being done are valid And it may so come to passe that what could not without sin be commanded yet without sin may be performed as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going Lectures The reason of this doubt is Because that true obedience is no Disputresse for the practice of obedience doth properly consist in this to subject ones self to the will of another without the least murmur or dispute Nimis delicata est obedientia saith Bernard quae transit in genus causae deliberativum That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be so deliberate as to inquire after the Cause thereof But I answer briefly the Conscience of the
obliged to the punishment I mean a temporal punishment for the account is far otherwise of the Spiritual and Eternal punishment For examples sake suppose a man hath committed a fault as he hath told a lye or betrayed the secrets of his friend or hath privately detracted from the good name of his Neighbour for which the Laws of men do appoint no punishment he therefore cannot be punished by man with any temporal punishment neither is it necessary that God should temporally afflict him But that no man may too boldly flatter himself assume unto himself hereby a greater liberty of sinning because he thinks himself free from temporal punishment he ought duly to call to mind that he is nevertheless obliged to a far more grievous punishment which is a Spiritual and an Eternal punishment Both which punishments are so necessarily and so reciprocally conjoyned with every fault that the punishment doth alwayes presuppose a fault going before it for God punisheth no man that deserves it not and at the last the deserved punishment must necessarily follow the fault unless it be prevented by the mercy of God remitting the fauâ—t in Christ by Faith and by Repentance XV. These things thus premised to answer to the propounded Doubt I will inferre some Conclusions And in the first place we must judge How the penal Law doth oblige the Subject in Conscience by the mind and Intention of the Law-maker If it be manifest that there is any certainty of it that is if it be certain that the Law-maker did intend to oblige the Subjects not only to the penalty but to the fault also they are undoubtedly obliged to observe that which is commanded by the Law and do not satisfie their Duty if they are prepared to undergo the Penalty ordained by the Law But if it be manifest that he intended not to oblige them but only to the Penalty it is certain that the Subjects are not bound beyond that Penalty The Reason is because the Foundation or Ground of the Obligation of the Law as elswhere is shewed is the manifested will of the Law-maker invested with a Lawful power Therefore where the Will of the Law-maker which is the adaequate Measure of that Obligation which the Law induceth is manifest we need not to make any further doubt concerning the extent of the Obligation XVI Peradventure you will demand what assurance may suffice that a Subject may be secure in his Conscience that sufficiently he understands the mind and intention of the Law-maker I answer that a mathemat calcertitude which is manifest by Demonstration and impossible to be false is in vaâ—n to be expected in morals by reason of the infinite variety of Circumstances and uncertainty of Humane affairs nevertheless a certain logical certitude may oftentimes be had of the Intention of the Law-maker which is to be collected from the words of the Law it self from which his Intention may so perspicuously appear that there needeth not any further Evidence The mind of the Legislator may be manifested partly by the form and manner of the Precept he enjoyneth and partly by the greatness of the Punishment that is to be inflicted but especially from the Preface of the Law it self in which that it may be more acceptable to the people he useth to declare the causes and reasons that do induce him to the making of that Law as also how just it is and necessary for the taking away of abuses and for the advantage of the Common-wealth From all which being rightly weighed together by comparing of the circumstances it will be no great difficulty for a wise and apprehensive man so to learn the meaning and intention of the Lawgiver and to have such a sufficient moral certitude thereof for in morals a moral certitude is sufficient as to conclude that undoubtedly he intended such a thing in the making of it But if the Subject be not of so great an apprehension and Judgment as duly to examine all the importances of the reasons or if he be afraid since every man is not a Competent Judge in his own Cause left he might interpretate the mind of the Law-giver more favourably on his side than he ought to do it would be his best course if it be a business of so great Importance that it will be very uncommodious or troublesome to him to observe that which by Law is commanded to addresse himself to some man of approved Piety and Prudence and plainly and sincerely to declare his mind unto him and to acquiesce in his opinion and his judgment XVII But because it may be and oftentimes it so comes to passe that after all diligence there can be obtained but little certainty of the mind of the Law-maker from the Law it self or not so much as the Conscience of a good man may safely acquiesce therein We must seek further in so doubtfull a case examine what interpretation we are to follow in so doubtfull a case whether that which is the more large favourable as many will have it or as others the stricter interpretation Martin Navar a man of great authority amongst the Canonists is said to be of an opinion that he thought no penal Law did oblige to the fault by it self but only to the penalty Other Authors have been of another judgment and have taught that every penal Law unless by the mind of the Law-maker it was manifest to the contrary did oblige to the fault also I must confess that the extremes of both opinions have been always suspected by me it may so come to pass that as some have spoken too favourably so others too severely That therefore in a thing So dubious we may have something to follow which is certain let this be the second Conclusion A Law purely penal doth by it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty and not unto the fault I say in the first place a Law purely penal whether it be categorically taken or disjunctively I say in the second place by it self for by accident and by the supposition of a former obligation it may oblige to the fault also for a penal Law is made to that end that Subjects by fear of punishment be compelled to their Duties to which they were bound before by a former Law divine natural or humane so those penal Laws he that killeth a man let him suffer the pains of Death He that transporteth Merchandize beyond the Seas let him either pay the Custom or lose his Merchandize do oblige to the fault so that whosoever shall undergo the punishment shall not clear his Conscience thereby unless he shall obey the precept of the Law but they do not bind so by themselves and by their own virtue but by the force of a precedent obligation that taketh its rise from the command of a former Law For the Subject was obliged before that Law according to our supposition was made both by the Law of God not to commit murder and
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred