Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	great_a	place_n	see_v	2,893	5	3.1798	3	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A81488	An oration of Agrippa to Octavius Cæsar Augustus, against monarchy. Taken out of the LII. book of Dion the philosopher, Cælius, S.C. being the interpreter. Printed at Basil after the end of Nichol. Machiavels Prince, anno M.D.XXC. / And now put into English by A.R.	Cassius Dio Cocceianus.; A. R.; Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius.	1658 (1658)	Wing D1503B; Thomason E972_3; ESTC R207746	8,407	12

thou seemest no way to repose thy confidence in them Beside in doing this thou errest in thy greatest affairs of State for what can an unexperienced person and a man of an abject fortune do What enemy is there that will not dispise such a person Which of his companions will obey him What true Souldier but will with indignation scorn to be under his command But there is no need for me to enumerate all these evils which thou thy self knowest right-well this onely I must say that if such persons manage not thy affairs well they being more detriment to thee than to the enemy and if they do by reason of their ignorance they are blown up with pride which may afterwards prove terrour to thee But in a Commonwealth none of these things do happen Sect. 7. but the richer and more valiant men are the more are they desirous of honour and therefore by all good ways labour for the prosperity of the State and so profit with joy and cheerfulnesse comes in both upon themselves and upon the whole Unlesse any one amongst them make a step toward Tyranny and then they severely mark his paths and punish him accordingly That these things are so in truth and that the Government of a Commonwealth is to be prefer'd far before that of a single Person is most demonstrable from the examples of Greece For whilest all things were Governed by the will of One they never did any great matter but after that they fell into the form of a Commonwealth they became most famous The same thing is also manifest from the examples of other places of which some living under Tyrants are alwayes slaves and so always treacherous to their Lords Others having often change of their chief Magistrates using their own laws continue in their Liberties But why do I seek examples from abroad when we abound with enough at home For we Romans our selves after we had been broken to pieces and suffered very hard things by our Monarchicall Lords a desire of liberty sprang up in us which when we had attained relying onely upon the good ways of a Common-wealth we are arrived at the greatness which you see For the Senate or grand Council first of all proposeth after that the people decreeth and commande●h then is the Army ready to obey and their Commanders desirous of Honour in the execution of which there hath not been found the like in the Domination of a single person And for these causes our Ancestors so exceedingly hated that kinde of Government that they established it execrable by a law and for ever to be detested But to passe by these things Sect. 8. and speak of what concerns thy own person how canst thou endure the management of these affairs day and night especially if thou enjoyest not thy perfect health And if thou beest deprived thereof what content canst thou receive And wherewithall canst thou be delighted And when art thou like to be without the greatest trouble For it is impossible but he that hath so large an Empire must have both the care and fear of many things but the sense of very few which do delight and always and in every place must both hear and see do and suffer things that are most grievous For which cause I suppose certain both of the Greeks and Barbarians have refused such principalities when they were offered to them These things being foreseen consider well before thou doe attempt for being once entred thou canst not easily go back beware lest the greatness of the Power the largness of thy possessions the multitude of thy guards and the throng of thy servants do deceive thee for they which can doe much have also much businesse to do and they which possesse much have also many expences The troops of guards were invented by reason of the many treacheries Princes are subject too yet these flatterers are oft the causers of their destruction more than of their safety And for these reasons no man that is truly wise can desire to be made a King But if any think it is to be desired because he findes riches there and that he hath power to preserve some and that he may do many good things and some evill too if it seem good unto him this man doubtlesse doth mistake the truth for to be wicked and to hurt other persons how hatefull is it both to God and men and how dangerous it is I need not speak because thou art not such a one neither to effect such things wouldst thou desire to be a Prince Neither is it my purpose at present Sect. 9. to tell how great evills he must doe who covets not most earnestly ●o reigne righteously but rather what things are to be done and suffered also even by such who use their power best And to that which is said that by such power great benefits may be conferred upon poor Mortall Creatures this I confesse is most desirable but sith this thing in a private person is both Honest Commendable Glorious and Secure but in the Government of a single-person that good is not comparable to the other evills that attend and that for this good those evills must be chosen for the fruits of this Bounty shall redound most of all to others but the greif of all the Evill must return upon himself Besides it is not so easy a matter as some think that one person should suffice to supply the necessities of so many for those that account themselves worthy to receive a Benefit are in a manner all sorts of men although they have deserved nothing from him for even every man by nature is apt to be well conceited of himself and is willing to receive a benefit from him who is able to bestow it But now those things that can be given viz Honours Preferments and sometime Monie's also are but a very few being compared to so great a multitude of men which thing since it is most true more hatred will arise from such who cannot obtaine the things which they desire than good will from those which do receive them For these reckon themselve● to have received but their due and so believe they are not much engaged to him that hath conferred the Benefit having nothing given but what they did expect beside they are slow in rendering thanks lest hereby they may seem unworthy of that which is bestowed upon ●hem but now in those who shall not obtain the things which they desired are troubled upon two accounts first because they are deprived of that which is their own for all men reckon that to be theirs which they have deserved and then if they bear patiently the repulse they seem to him to acknowledge themselves unworthy of such a benefit Again he who justly distributes those favours appeares to have diligently considered the merrits of each person and to have rewarded some and disregarded others whereupon pride springs up in the Conscience of the one but greife and vexation in the other And if any fearing this would therefore distribute his favours without choise he would not mend the matter at all because wicked men and undeserving being honored doe become the worse thinking themselves either praisworthy because they are good or flattered because formidable but now the good men being no more valued than the worst and seeing these to be made equall with them would rather grieve for this under-valuing than rejoyce in the benefits received whereupon they would leave off the prosecution of better things and by degrees become as bad as they Therefore that which is most desirable in King-ship you see is the hardest to be put in practice These things and what else I have here mentioned consider well Sect. 10. whilest there is yet an opportunity and being wise Restore again to the People their Militia their Territories their Government and their Monys which if thou shalt now willingly and of thine own accord perform thou wilt excell all mortall men in fame and honour and wilt be in thy Person most secure but if thou shalt Deferre till some power shall compell thou wilt doubtlesse with disgrace and shame sustain some evill Thou mayest take examples from Marius and Sylla Metellus and Pompey who when they might would not King it amongst the People by which they did receive no damage But Cinna and Strabo the other Marius Sertorius and Pompey himself after they were once inflamed with a desire of Reigning did perish basely It will be difficult to make this people who have so many years been free and ruled over others subject to the will of One Camillus who triumphed gloriously was banished by our Ancestors And they spoiled Scipio when they perceived him to grow too big And remember thy own Father who but for suspition to affect the Kingdome was miserably destroyed by them And there were never any that were better than these men Yet do I not perswade thee so speedily to lay aside the Government that thou shouldst not provide for the blessings of the people and after the example of Sylla take care for what shall be convenient by good constitutions for although many of them were afterwards abbrogated yet a great and the better part of them remain Neither would I have thee object and say that new troubles and tumuls will arise for I must answer that the people opprest with Tyranny will much sooner attempt new matters and if we will rightly consider things the fears of discords which we think are wont to arise from a Popular Government rather than from the government of a single Person are without any shew of reason at all of the greatnes of which troubles I shall not speak at all lest I should seem to be desirous to make that appear evill which is so evill in it self And that this Government by One is such this one thing is sufficient to convince that the very nature of it is to turn honest men into Knaves FINIS