examinâ—â— Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas La. You deny not but by the Antient Law of England the Kings-Bench may examine the Judgment given in the Court of Common-Pleas Ph. 'T is true but why may not also the Court of Chancery do the same especially if the fault of the Judgment be against Equity and not against the Letter of the Law La. There is no necessity of that for the same Court may examine both the Letter and the Equity of the Statute Ph. You see by this that the Jurisdiction of Courts cannot easily be distinguished but by the King himself in his Parliament The Lawyers themselves cannot do it for you see what Contention there is between Courts as well as between particular Men. And whereas you say that Law of 4 Hen. 4. 23. is by that of 27 Eliz. cap. 8. taken away I do not find it so I find indeed a Diversity of opinion between the makers of the former and the latter Statute in the preamble of the latter and Conclusion of the former The Preamble of the latter is forasmuch as Erroneous Judgments given in the Court called the Kings-Bench are only to be reformed in the High Court of Parliament and the Conclusion of the former is that the contrary was Law in the times of the Kings Progenitors These are no parts of those Laws but Opinions only concerning the Antient Custom in that Case arising from the different Opinions of the Lawyers in those different times neither Commanding nor Forbidding any thing though of the Statutes themselves the one forbids that such Pleas be brought before the Parliament the other forbids it not But yet if after the Act of Hen. 4. such a Plea had been brought before the Parliament the Parliament might have Heard and Determin'd it For the Statute forbids not that nor can any Law have the force to hinder the Law of any Jurisdiction whatsoever they please to take upon them seeing it is a Court of the King and of all the People together both Lords and Commons La. Though it be yet seeing the King as Sir Edw. Coke affirms 4 Inst. p. 71. hath committed all his power Judicial some to one Court and some to another so as if any Man would render himself to the Judgment of the King in such case where the King hath committed all his power Judicial to others such a render should be to no effect And p. 73. he saith farther That in this Court the Kings of this Realm have sitten on the High Bench and the Judges of that Court on the Lower Bench at his feet but Judicature belongeth only to the Judges of that Court and in his presence they answer all Motions Ph. I cannot believe that Sir Edw. Coke how much soever he desir'd to advance the authority of himself and other Justices of the Common-Law could mean that the King in the Kings-Bench sate as a Spectator only and might not have answered all motions which his Judges answer'd if he had seen cause for it For he knew that the King was Supream Judge then in all causes Temporal and is now in all Causes both Temporal and Ecclesiastical and that there is an exceeding great penalty ordained by the Laws for them that shall deny it But Sir Edw. Coke as he had you see in many places before hath put a Fallacy upon himself by not distinguishing between Committing and Transferring He that Transferreth his power hath deprived himself of it but he that Committeth it to another to be Exercised in his name and under him is still in the Possession of the same power And therefore if a Man render himself that is to say Appealeth to the King from any Judge whatsoever the King may receive his Appeal and it shall be effectual La. Besides these 2 Courts the Kings-Bench for Pleas of the Crown and the Court of Common-Pleas for Causes Civil according to the Common-Law of England there is another Court of Justice that hath Jurisdiction in Causes both Civil and Criminal and is as Antient a Court at least as the Court of Common Pleas and this is the Court of the Lord Admiral but the proceedings therein are according to the Laws of the Roman Empire and the Causes to be determin'd there are such as arise upon the Marine Sea For so it is ordain'd by divers Statutes and confirm'd by many Precedents Ph. As for the Statutes they are always Law and Reason also for they are made by the Assent of all the Kingdom but Precedents are Judgments one contrary to another I mean divers Men in divers Ages upon the same case give divers Judgments Therefore I will ask your Opinion once more concerning any Judgments besides those of the King as to their validity in Law But what is the difference between the proceedings of the Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common-Law La. One is that the Court of Admiralty proceedeth by two Witnesses without any either Grand-Jury to Indict or Petty to Convict and the Judge giveth Sentence according to the Laws Imperial which of old time were in force in all this part of Europe and now are Laws not by the Will of any other Emperor or Forraign Power but by the Will of the Kings of England that have given them force in their own Dominions the reason whereof seems to be that the causes that arise at Sea are very often between us and People of other Nations such as are Governed for the most part by the self same laws Imperial Ph. How can it precisely enough be determin'd at Sea especially near the mouth of a very great River whether it be upon the Sea or within the Land For the Rivers also are as well as their Banks within or a part of one Country or other La. Truly the Question is difficult and there have been many Suits about it wherein the Question has been whose Jurisdiction it is in Ph. Nor do I see how it can be decided but by the King himself in case it be not declar'd in the Lord Admirals Letters Patents La. But though there be in the Letters Patents a power given to hold Plea in some certain cases to any of the Statutes concerning the Admiralty the Justices of the Common-Law may send a Prohibition to that Court to proceed in the Plea though it be with a non-obstante of any Statute Ph. Methinks that That should be against the Right of the Crown which cannot be taken from it by any Subject For that Argument of Sir Edw. Coke's that the King has given away all his Judicial Power is worth nothing because as I have said before he cannot give away the Essential Rights of his Crown and because by a non-obstante he declares he is not deceived in his Grant La. But you may see by the Precedents alledged by Sir Edw. Coke the contrary has been perpetually practised Ph. I see not that perpetually for who can tell but there may have been given other Judgments in such cases
words in their Letters Patents Constituimus vos Justitiarium nostrum Capitalem ad Placita coram nobis tenenda durante beneplacito nostro That is to say we have made you our Chief-Justice to hold Pleas before our self during our pleasure But this Writ though it be shorter does not at all abridge the power they had by the former And for the Letters Patents for the Chief-Justice of the Common-Pleas they go thus Constituimus dilectum Fidelem c. Capitalem Justitiarium de Communi Banco Habendum c. quamdiu nobis placuerit cum vadiis foedis ab antiquo debitis consuetis Id est We have Constituted our Beloved and Faithful c. Chief-Justice of the Common-Bench To have c. during our pleasure with the ways and Fees thereunto heretofore due and usual Ph. I find in History that there have been in England always a Chancellour and a Chief-Justice of England but of a Court of Common-Pleas there is no mention before Magna Charta Common-Pleas there were ever both here and I think in all Nations for Common-Pleas and Civil-Pleas I take to be the same La. Before the Statute of Magna Charta Common-Pleas as Sir Edw. Coke granteth 2 Inst. p. 21. might have been holden in the Kings-Bench and that Court being removeable at the Kings will the Returns of Writs were Coram Nobis ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia whereby great trouble of Jurors ensued and great charges of the parties and delay of Justice and that for these causes it was Ordain'd that the Common-Pleas should not follow the King but be held in a place certain Ph. Here Sir Edw. Coke declares his Opinion that no Common-Plea can be holden in the Kings-Bench in that he says they might have been holden then And yet this doth not amount to any probable proof that there was any Court of Common-Pleas in England before Magna Charta For this Statute being to ease the Jurors and lessen the Charges of Parties and for the Expedition of Justice had been in Vain if there had been a Court of Common-Pleas then standing for such a Court was not necessarily to follow the King as was the Chancery and the Kings-Bench Besides unless the Kings-Bench wheresoever it was held Plea of civil Causes the Subject had not at all been eased by this Statute For supposing the King at York had not the Kings Subjects about London Jurors and parties as much trouble and charge to go to York as the People about York had before to go to London Therefore I can by no means believe otherwise then that the Erection of the Court of Common-Pleas was the effect of that Statute of Magna Charta Cap. 11. And before that time not existent though I think that for the multiplicity of Suits in a great Kingdom there was need of it La. Perhaps there was not so much need of it as you think For in those times the Laws for the most part were in setling rather than setled and the old Saxon Laws concerning Inheritances were then practised by which Laws speedy Justice was Executed by the Kings Writs in the Courts of Barons which were Landlords to the rest of the Freeholders and Suits of Barons in County-Courts and but few Suits in the Kings Courts but when Justice could not be had in those Inferior Courts but at this day there be more Suits in the Kings Courts than any one Court can dispatch Ph. Why should there be more Suits now than formerly For I believe this Kingdom was as well Peopled then as now La. Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 76. assigneth for it six Causes 1. Peace 2. Plenty 3. The Dissolution of Religious Houses and dispersing of their Lands among so many several persons 4. The multitude of Informers 5. The number of Concealers 6. The multitude of Attorneys Ph. I see Sir Edw. Coke has no mind to lay any fault upon the Men of his own Profession and that he Assigns for Causes of the Mischiefs such things as would be Mischief and Wickedness to amend for if Peace and Plenty be the cause of this Evil it cannot be removed but by War and Beggery and the Quarrels arising about the Lands of Religious Persons cannot arise from the Lands but from the doubtfulness of the Laws And for Informers they were Authorised by Statutes to the Execution of which Statutes they are so necessary as that their number cannot be too great and if it be too great the fault is in the Law it self The number of Concealers are indeed a number of Couseners which the Law may easily Correct And lastly for the multitude of Attorneys it is the fault of them that have the power to admit or refuse them For my part I believe that Men at this day have better learn't the Art of Caviling against the words of a Statute than heretofore they had and thereby encourage themselves and others to undertake Suits upon little reason Also the variety and repugnancy of Judgments of Common-Law do oftentimes put Men to hope for Victory in causes whereof in reason they had no ground at all Also the ignorance of what is Equity in their own causes which Equity not one Man in a thousand ever Studied and the Lawyers themselves seek not for their Judgments in their own Breasts but in the precedents of former Judges as the Antient Judges sought the same not in their own Reason but in the Laws of the Empire Another and perhaps the greatest cause of multitude of Suits is this that for want of Registring of conveyances of Land which might easily be done in the Townships where the Lands ly a Purchase cannot easily be had which will not be litigious Lastly I believe the Coveteousness of Lawyers was not so great in Antient time which was full of trouble as they have been since in time of Peace wherein Men have leisure to study fraud and get employment from such Men as can encourage to Contention And how ample a Field they have to exercise this Mystery in is manifest from this that they have a power to Scan and Construe every word in a Statute Charter Feofment Lease or other Deed Evidence or Testimony But to return to the Jurisdiction of this Court of the Kings-Bench where as you say it hath power to correct and amend the Errors of all other Judges both in Process and in Judgments cannot the Judges of the Common-Pleas correct Error in Process in their own Courts without a Writ of Error from another Court La. Yes and there be many Statutes which Command them so to do Ph. When a Writ of Error is brought out of the Kings-Bench be it either Error in Process or in Law at whose Charge is it to be done La. At the Charge of the Clyent Ph. I see no reason for that for the Clyent is not in fault who never begins a Suit but by the advice of his Council Learned in the Law whom he pays for his Council given Is not
which have either been not preserv'd in the Records or else by Sir Edw. Coke because they were against his opinion not alledged For this is possible though you will not grant it to be very likely therefore I insist only upon this that no Record of a Judgment is a Law save only to the party Pleading until he can by Law reverse the former Judgment And as to the proceeding without Juries by two sufficient Witnesses I do not see what harm can proceed from it to the Common-wealth nor consequently any just Quarrel that the Justice of the Common-Law can have against their proceedings in the Admiralty For the Proof of a Fact in both Courts lyeth meerly on the Witnesses and the difference is no more but that in the Imperial-Law the Judge of the Court Judgeth of the Testimony of the Witnesses and the Jury doth in a Court of Common-Law Besides if a Court of Common-Law should chance to Incroach upon the Jurisdiction of the Admiral may not he send a prohibition to the Court of Common-Law to forbid their proceeding I pray you tell me what Reason there is for the one more than for the other La. I know none but long Custom for I think it was never done Ph. The Highest ordinary Court in England is the Court of Chancery wherein the Lord Chancellour or otherwise Keeper of the Great Seal is the only Judge This Court is very Antient as appears by Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 87. where he nameth the Chancellors of King Edgar King Etheldred King Edmund and King Edward the Confessor His Office is given to him without Letters Patents by the Kings delivery to him of the Great Seal of England and whosoever hath the keeping of the Great Seal of England hath the same and the whole Jurisdiction that the Lord Chancellour ever had by the Statute of 5 Eliz. cap. 18. wherein it is declar'd that such is and always has been the Common-Law And Sir Edw. Coke says he has his name of Chancellour from the highest point of his Jurisdiction viz. a Cancellando that is from Cancelling the Kings Letters Patents by drawing strokes through it like a Lattice Ph. Very pretty It is well enough known that Cancellarius was a great Officer under the Roman Empire whereof this Island was once a Member and that the Office came into this Kingdom either with or in Imitation of the Roman Government Also it was long after the time of the 12 Caesars that this Officer was created in the State of Rome For till after Septimius Severus his time the Emperors did diligently enough take cognizance of Causes and Complaints for Judgments given in the Courts of the Praetors which were in Rome the same that the Judges of the Common-Law are here but by the continual Civil Wars in after-times for the choosing of Emperors that diligence by little and little ceased and afterwards as I have Read in a very good Author of the Roman Civil Law the number of complaints being much increased and being more than the Emperor could dispatch he appointed an Officer as his Clerk to receive all such Petitions and that this Clerk caused a partition to be made in a Room convenient in which partition-Wall at the heighth of a Mans reach he placed at convenient distances certain Bars so that when a Suitor came to deliver his Petition to the Clerk who was sometimes absent he had no more to do but to throw in his Petition between those Bars which in Latin are called properly Cancelli not that any certain Form of those Bars or any Bars at all were necessary for they might have been thrown over though the whole space had been left open but because they were Cancelli the Clerk Attendant and keeping his Office there was called Cancellarius And any Court Bar may properly enough be called Cancelli which does not signifie a Lattice for that is but a meer Conjecture grounded upon no History nor Grammar but taken up at first as is likely by some Boy that could find no other word in the Dictionary for a Lattice but Cancelli The Office of this Chancellour was at first but to Breviate the matter of the Petitions for the easing of the Emperor but Complaints encreasing daily they were too many considering other Businesses more necessary for the Emperor to determine and this caused the Emperor to commit the Determination of them to the Chancellor again what Reason doth Sir Edw. Coke alledge to prove that the highest point of the Chancellors Jurisdiction is to Cancel his Masters Letters Patents after they were Sealed with his Masters Seal unless he hold Plea concerning the validity of them or of his Masters meaning in them or of the surreptitious getting of them or of the abusing of them which are all causes of Equity Also seeing the Chancellor hath his Office only by the delivery of the Great Seal without any Instruction or Limitation of the Process in his Court to be used it is manifest that in all Causes whereof he has the hearing he may proceed by such manner of hearing and examining of Witnesses with Jury or without Jury as he shall think fittest for the Exactness Expedition and Equity of the Decrees And therefore if he think the Custome of proceeding by Jury according to the Custome of England in Courts of Common-Law tend more to Equity which is the scope of all the Judges in the World or ought to be he ought to use that method or if he think better of another proceeding he may use it if it be not forbidden by a Statute La. As for this Reasoning of yours I think it well enough but there ought to be had also a reverend respect to Customs not unreasonable and therefore I think Sir Edw. Coke says not amiss that in such Cases where the Chancellor will proceed by the Rule of the Common-Law he ought to deliver the Record in the Kings-Bench and also it is necessary for the Lord Chancellor to take care of not exceeding as it is limited by Statutes Ph. What are the Statutes by which his Jurisdiction is limited I know that by the 27 Eliz. cap. 8. He cannot Reverse a Judgment given in the Kings-Bench for Debt Detinue c. Nor before the Statute could he ever by virtue of his Office Reverse a Judgment in Pleas of the Crown given by the Kings-Bench that hath the Cognizance of such Pleas nor need he for the Judges themselves when they think there is need to relieve a Man opprest by ill Witnesses or power of great Men prevailing on the Jury or by Error of the Jury though it be in case of Felony may stay the Execution and Inform the King who will in Equity relieve him As to the regard we ought to have to Custome we will Consider of it afterward La. First in a Parliament holden the 13th of Rich. 2. the Commons Petitioned the King that neither the Chancellor nor other Chancellor do make any order against the Common-Law
ascribe to Custome I deny that any Custome of its own Nature can amount to the Authority of a Law For if the Custom be unreasonable you must with all other Lawyers confess that it is no Law but ought to be abolished and if the Custom be reasonable it is not the Custom but the Equity that makes it Law For what need is there to make Reason Law by any Custom how long soever when the Law of Reason is Eternal Besides you cannot find in any Statute though Lex Consuetudo be often mentioned as things to be followed by the Judges in their Judgments that Consuetudines that is to say Customs or Usages did imply any Long continuance of former time but that it signified such Use and Custom of proceeding as was then immediately in being before the making of such Statute Nor shall you find in any Statute the word Common-Law which may not be there well Interpreted for any of the Laws of England Temporal for it is not the singularity of Process used in any Court that can distinguish it so as to make it a different Law from the Law of the whole Nation La. If all Courts were as you think Courts of Equity would it not be incommodious to the Common-wealth Ph. I think not unless perhaps you may say that seeing the Judges whether they have many or few causes to be heard before them have but the same wages from the King they may be too much inclin'd to put off the Causes they use to hear for the easing of themselves to some other Court to the delay of Justice and dammage of the Parties suing La. You are very much deceiv'd in that for on contrary the Contention between the Courts for Jurisdiction is of who shall have most Causes brought before them Ph. I cry you Mercy I smelt not that La. Seeing also all Judges ought to give their Sentence according to Equity if it should chance that a Written Law should be against the Law of Reason which is Equity I cannot Imagine in that Case how any Judgment can be Righteous Ph. It cannot be that a Written Law should be against Reason For nothing is more reasonable than that every Man should obey the Law which he hath himself assented to but that is not always the Law which is signified by Grammatical Construction of the Letter but that which the Legislator thereby intended should be in Force which Intention I Confess is a very hard matter many times to pick out of the words of the Statute and requires great Ability of understanding and greater Meditations and Considerations of such Conjuncture of occasions and Incommodities as needed a new Law for a Remedy for there is scarce any thing so clearly written that when the Cause thereof is forgotten may not be wrested by an ignorant Grammarian or a Cavilling Logician to the Injury Oppression or perhaps Destruction of an honest Man And for this Reason the Judges deserve that Honour and Profit they enjoy since the Determination of what particular Causes every particular Court should have Cognizance is a thing not yet sufficiently explained and is in it self so difficult as that the Sages of the Law themselves the Reason Sir Edw. Coke will leave to Law it self are not yet agreed upon it how is it possible for a Man that is no professed or no profound Lawyer to take notice in what Court he may Lawfully begin his Suit or give Council in it to his Client La. I confess that no Man can be bound to take notice of the Jurisdiction of Courts till all the Courts be agreed upon it amongst themselves but what Rule to give Judgment by a Judge can have so as never to contradict the Law written nor displease his Legislator I understand not Ph. I think he may avoid both if he take care by his Sentence that he neither punish an Innocent nor deprive him of his â—ammages due from one that maliciously â—â—eth him without reasonable Cause which â—o the most of Rational Men and unbiassed â—s not in my Opinion very difficult And though a Judge should as all Men may do Erre in his Judgment yet there is always such power in the Laws of England as may content the Parties either in the Chancery or by Commissioners of their own choosing Authorized by the King for every Man â—s bound to acquiesce in the Sentence of the Judges he chooseth La. In what Cases can the true Construction of the Letter be contrary to the meaning of the Lawmaker Ph. Very many whereof Sir Edw. Coke nameth 3 Fraud Accident and Breach of Confidence but there be many more for there be a very great many reasonable Exceptions almost to every General Rule which the makers of the Rule could not foresee and very many words in every Statute especially long ones that are as to Grammar of Ambiguous signification and yet to them that know well to what end the Statute was made perspicuous enough and many Connections of doubtful reference which by a Grammarian may be Cavill'd at though the Intention of the Lawmaker be never so perspicuous And these are the difficulties which the Judges ought to Master and can do it in respect of their Ability for which they are chosen as well as can be hoped for and yet there are other Men can do the same or else the Judges places could not be from time to time supplyed The Bishops commonly are the most able and rational Men and obliged by their profession to Study Equity because it is the Law of God and are therefore capable of being Judges in a Court of Equity They are the Men that teach the People what is Sin that is to say they are the Doctors in Cases of Conscience What reason then can you shew me why it is unfit and hurtful to the Common-wealth that a Bishop should be a Chancellor as they were most often before the time of Hen. 8. and since that time once in the Raign of King James La. But Sir Ed. says that soon after that a Chancellor was made which was no Professor of the Law he finds in the Rolls of the Parliament a grievous Complaint by the whole Body of the Realm and a Petition that the most wise and able Men within the Realm might be chosen Chancellors Ph. That Petition was Reasonable but it does not say which are Abler Men the Judges of the Common Law or the Bishops La. That is not the great Question as to the Ability of a Judge both of one and the other there are Able Men in their own way but when a Judge of Equity has need almost in every Case to consider as well the Statute-Law as the Law of Reason he cannot perform his Office perfectly unless he be also ready in the Statutes Ph. I see no great need he has to be ready in the Statutes in the hearing of a Cause do the Judges of the Common-Law Inform the Council at the Bar what the Statute is or the
contraries of these CHAP. VI. Of the Colours or common opinions concerning Good and Evil. IN Deliberatives the Principles or Elements from whence we draw our Proofs are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Absolute or Comparative And those that are Absolute are either Disputable or Indisputable The Indisputable Principles are such as these Good is that which we love for it self And that for which we love somewhat else And that which all things desire And that to every man which his reason dictates And that which when we have we are well or satisfied And that which satisfies And the Cause or Effect of any of these And that which preserves any of these And that which keeps off or destroys the contrary of any of these Also to take the Good and reject the Evil is Good And to take the greater Good rather than the less and the lesser Evil rather than the greater Further all Vertues are Good And Pleasure And all things Beautiful And Justice Valour Temperance Magnanimity Magnificence and other like habits And Health Beauty Strength c. And Riches And Friends And Honour and Glory And Ability to say or do also Towardliness Will and the like And Whatsoever Art or Science And Life And whatsoever is Just. The Disputable Principles are such as follow That is Good whose contrary is Evil And whose contrary is Good for our Enemies And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of And of which there cannot be too much And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed And that which many desire And that which is praised And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise And what good we prefer And what we do advise And that which is possible is Good to undertake And that which is Easie. And that which depends on our own Will And that which is proper for us to do And what no man else can do And whatsoever is Extraordinary And what is suitable And that which wants a little of being at an end And what we hope to master And what we are fit for And what evil men do not And what we love to do CHAP. VII Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil comparatively THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives 1. More is so much and somewhat besides 2. Less is that which and somewhat else is so much 3. Greater and more in number are said only Comparatively to Less and Fewer in number 4. Great and Little Many and Few are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind So that Great and Many is that which exceeds Little and Few is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are these Greater Good is Many than fewer or one of those many And Greater is the kind in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind And greater is that Good than another good whose kind is greater than another's kind And Greater is that from which another Good follows then the Good which follows And of two which exceed a third Greater is that which exceeds it most And that which causes the greater Good And that which proceeds from a greater Good And Greater is that which is chosen for it self than that which is chosen from somwhat else And the end greater than that which is not the end And that which less needs other things than that which more And that which is independent than that which is dependent of another And the Beginning than not the Beginning Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good or Evil than that which is not the Beginning and the End than that which is not the End One may argue from this Colour both ways as Leodamas against Chabrias would have the Actor more to blame than the Advisor and against Callistratus the Advisor more than the Actor And the Cause than not the Cause And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause And the Beginning or Cause of a greater Good or Evil. And that which is scarce greater than that which is Plentiful because harder to get And that which is Plentiful than that which is scarce because oftner in Use. And that which is easie than that which is Hard. And that whose Contrary is greater And that whose Want is greater And Vertue than not Vertue a greater Good Vice than not Vice a greater Evil. And greater Good or Evil is that the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful And the effects of greater Vertues or Vices And the Excess whereof is more tolerable a greater Good And those things which may with more honour be desir'd And the desire of better things And those things whereof the Knowledg is better And the Knowledge of better things And that which wise men prefer And that which is in better men And that which better men chuse And that which is more than that which is less delightful And that which is more than that which is less Honourable And that which we would have for our selves and Friends a greater Good and the contrary a greater Evil. And that which is Lasting than that which is not Lasting And that which is Firm than that which is not Firm. And what many desire than what few And what the Adversary or Judg confesseth to be greater is greater And Common than not Common And not Common than Common And what is more Laudable And that which is more Honour'd a greater Good And that which is more Punish'd a greater Evil. And both Good and Evil divided than undivided appear greater And Compounded than Simple appear greater And that which is done with Opportunity Age Place Time Means disadvantagious greater than otherwise And that which is natural than that which is attained unto And the same part of that which is great than of that which is less And that which is nearest to the end designed And that which is Good or Evil to ones self than that which is simply so And Possible than not possible And that which comes toward the end of our Life And that which we do really than that which we do for shew And that which we would be rather than what we would seem to be And that which is good for more purposes is the greater Good And that which serves us in great necessity And that which is joyned with less trouble And that which is joyned with more delight And of the two that which added to a third makes the whole the greater And that which having we are more sensible of And in every thing that which we most esteem CHAP. VIII Of the several kinds of Governments BEcause Hortation and Dehortation concern the Common-wealth and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract so we must speak of them also in the Concrete
that is of what is Good or Evil to each sort of Common-wealth in special The Government of a Common-wealth is either Democracy or Aristocracy or Oligarchy or Monarchy Democracy is that wherein all men with equal right are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot Aristocracy is that wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those that had the best education according to what the Laws prescribe for best Oligarchy is that where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth Monarchy is that wherein one man hath the Government of all which Government if he limit it by Law is called Kingdom if by his own will Tyranny The end of Democracy or the Peoples Government is Liberty The end of Oligarchy is the Riches of those that Govern The end of Aristocracy is good Laws and good ordering of the City The end of Monarchy or Kings is the safety of the People and conservation of his own Authority Good therefore in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends And because belief is not gotten only by proofs but also from manners the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade or diswade in matter of State Their manners may be known by their designs and their designs by their ends and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in But of this more accurately in the Politicks CHAP. IX Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable IN a Demonstrative Oration the subject whereof is Praise or Dispraise the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable and Dishonourable In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief which is from the manners of the Speaker For Praise whether it come in as the principal business or upon the by depends still upon the same Principles Which are these Honourable is that which we love for it self and is withal laudable And that Good which pleaseth us only because 't is Good And Vertue Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good and the faculty of doing many and great things well The kinds of it are these 1. Justice which is a Vertue whereby every man obtains what by Law is his 2. Fortitude which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself Honourably and according to the Laws in time of danger 3. Temperance which is a Vertue whereby a man Governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law 4. Liberality which is a Vertue by which we benefit others in matter of money 5. Magnanimity which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to do great benefits 6. Magnificence which is a Vertue by which a man is apt to be at great cost 7. Prudence which is an Intellectual Vertue by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity And Honourable are the Causes and effects of things Honourable And the Works of Vertue And the signs of Vertue And those actions the reward whereof is Honor. And the reward whereof is rather Honor than Money And that which we do not for our own sakes And what we do for our Countries good neglecting our own And those things are Honourable which good of themselves are not so to the Owner And those things which happen to the dead rather than to the living And what we do for other men especially for Benefactors And bestowing of Benefits And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of And those things which men strive for earnestly but without fear of Adversary And of the more Honourable and better men the Vertues are more Honourable And more Honourable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit than those which tend to ones own And Honourable are those things which are Just. And Revenge is Honourable And Victory And Honour And Monuments And those things which happen not ot the living And things that excell And what none can do but we And Possessions we reap no profit by And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places And the signs of praise And to have nothing of the servile mercenary or Mechanick And that which seems Honourable Namely such as follow Vices confining upon Vertue And the extreams of Vertues And what the Auditors think Honourable And that which is in estimation And that which is done according to custom Besides in a Demonstrative Oration the Orator must shew that he whom he praiseth did what he praiseth unconstrainedly and willingly And he does so who does the same often Praise is speech declaring the magnitude of a Vertue Action or Work But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker is a circular proof To Magnifie and to Praise differ in themselves as Felicity and Vertue For Praise declares a mans Vertue and Magnifying declares his Felicity Praise is a kind of inverted Precept For to say Do it because 't is good is a Precept But to say He is good because he did it is Praise An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of Amplification such as these He was the first that did it The only man that did it The special man that did it He did it with disadvantage of time He did it with little help He was the cause that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions Further he that will praise a Man must compare him with others and his actions with the actions of others especially with such as are renowned And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration than to any other For here the Actions are confess'd and the Orators part is only this to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster CHAP. X. Of Accusation and Defence with the Definition of Injury IN a Judicial Oration which consists in Accusation and Defence the thing to be proved is that Injury has been done and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn are these three 1. The causes that move to Injury 2. The Persons apt to do Injury 3. The Persons obnoxious or apt to suffer Injury An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledg and without compulsion The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable As the Covetous man does against the Law out of an intemperate desire of Money All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition or not Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance by Compulsion or by Natural necessity Those that proceed from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Custom or upon Premeditation or in Anger or out of Intemperance By Chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the Cause nor the Scope is evident and which are done neither orderly nor always nor most commonly after the same manner By Nature are said to be done those things the Causes whereof are in
he shall displease Men If he speak falsely he shall displease God Here is to be noted that sometimes this argument may be retorted as thus If you speak truth you shall please God if you speak untruth you shall please Men therefore by all means be an Orator A Fourteenth from the quality that Men have to praise one thing and approve another as We ought not to War against the Athenians upon no precedent injury for all Men discommend injustice Again We ought to War against the Athenians for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy that is is no Liberty but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will approve A Fifteenth from Proportion as seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues why should we not Banish this stranger for his vices A Sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents as He that denies the immortality of the Gods is no worse than he that has Written the generation of the Gods For the same Consequence follows of both that sometimes there are none A Seventeenth from that that Men change their mind as If when we were in Banishment we fought to recover our Countrey why should we not fight now to retain it An Eighteenth from a fained end as that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him not as more Valiant than another but as one that would partake less of the Glory A Nineteenth from the Cause as if he would infer he did it from this that he had cause to do it A Twentieth from that which is Incredible but True as that Laws may need a Law to mend them as well as Fish Bred in the salt Water may need salting CHAP. XXV Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Iâ—possibility LEt the first Place be from inspection 〈◊〉 Times Actions or Words either of the Adversary or of the Speaker or Both. Oâ— the Adversary as He says he loves the People and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty Of the Speaker as He says I am contentious and yet I never began Suit Of Both as He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Money A Second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused as The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen Imbracing her Son was absolved as soon as she made appear that she imbraced him upon his arrival from far by way of Salutation A Third from rendring of the cause as Leodamas to whom it was objected that he had under the Thirty Tyrants defaced the Inscription which the People had set up in a Pillar of his Ignominy answered He had not done it because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred A Fourth from better Counsel as He might have done better for himself therefore he did not this But this Place deceives when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact A Fifth from the Incompatibility of the things to be done as They that did deliberate whether they should both Mourn and Sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea were told that if they thought her a Goddess they ought not to Mourn and if they thought her a Mortal they ought not to Sacrifice A Sixth which is proper to Judicial Orations from an Inference of Errour as If he did it not he was not wise therefore he did it Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility please more than Ostensive for they compare and put contraries together whereby they are the better set off and more conspicuous to the Auditor Of all Enthymemes they be best which we assent to as soon as hear For such consent pleaseth us and makes us favourable to the speaker CHAP. XXVI Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes OF seeming Enthymemes one Place may be from the Form of speaking as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences he brings in his Conclusion as if it follow'd necessarily though it do not A Second from an ambiguous word A Third from that which is true divided to that which is false joyned as that of Orestes It was justice that I should Revenge my Fathers death and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father therefore I justly killed my Mother Or from that which is true joyned to that which is false divided as one cup of Wine and one cup of Wine are hurtful therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful A Fourth from Amplification of the Crime For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies nor does the Accuser seem when he is Passionate to want ground for his Accusation A Fifth from signs as when a Man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life A Sixth from that which comes by chance as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparthus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius a Man should conclude that in a free Commonwealth loving of Boyes were profitable A Seventh from the Consequence as Banishment is to be desired because a Banish'd Man has choice of places to dwell in An Eighth from making that the cause which is not as In Demosthenes his Government the War began therefore Demosthenes Governed well With the Peloponnesian War began the Plague therefore Pericles that perswaded that War did ill A Ninth from the Omission of some circumstance as Helen did what was Lawful when she ran away with Paris because she had her Fathers consent to choose her own Husband which was true only during the time that she had not chosen A Tenth from that which is probable in some case to that mhich is probable simply as 'T is probable he fore-saw that if he did it he should be suspected therefore 't is probable he did it not From this Place one may infer both ways that he did it not For if he be not likely to do it it may be thought he did it not again if he were likely to do it it may be thought he did it not for this that he knew he should be suspected Upon this Place was grounded the Art which was so much detested in Protagorâ—â— of making the better cause seem the worse and the worse the better CHAP. XXVII Of the wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme or by an Objection The Places of opposite Syllogismes are the same with the Places of Syllogismes or Enthymemes for a Rhetorical Syllogisme is an Enthymeme The Places of Objections are four First from the same as To the Adversary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme may be objected that no want is good and yet Love is want or particularly thus The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good The Second from Contraries as if the Adversary say A good Man does good to his friends an
Propositions and Proof which are as it were the Probleme and Demonstration The Proposition is the explication or opening of the Matter to be proved And Proof is the Demonstration of the Matter propounded To these necessary parts are sometimes added two other tho Proeme and the Epilogue neither of which are any proof So that in some there be four parts of an Oration the Proeme the Proposition or as others call it the Narration the Proofs which contain Confirmation Confutation Amplification and Diminution and the Epilogue CHAP. XIII Of the Proem THe Proem is the Beginning of an Oration and as it were the preparing of the way before one enter into it In some kinds of Orations it resembles the Prelude of Musicians who first play what they list and afterwards the Tune they intended In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play that contains the Argument Proems of the first sort are most proper for Demonstrative Orations in which a Man is free to fore-tell or not what points he will insist upon and for the most part 't is better not because when a Man has not obliged himself to a certain matter Digression will seem Variety but if he have ingaged himself Variety will be accounted Digression In Demonstratives the matter of the Proem consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or Custom or in Exhortation or Dehortation or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose Proems of the second kind are most proper for Judicial Orations For as the Prologue in a Dramatick and the Exordium in an Epique Poem setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poem so in a Judicial Oration the Orator ought to exhibit a Model of his Oration that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended and for want of fore-sight err or wander Whatsoever else belongs to a Proem is drawn from one of these four From the Speaker From the Adversary From the Hearer or from the Matter From the Speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proems such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause To the Defendant 't is necessary in the Proem to answer to the accusations of his Adversary that those being cleared he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration But to the Plaintife 't is better to cast his Criminations all into the Epilogue that the Judge may the more easily remember them From the Hearer and from the Matter are drawn into the Proem such things as serve to make the Hearer favourable or angry attentive or nor attentive as need shall require And Hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good to things that are of great Consequence or that concern thomselves or that are strange or that delight But to make the Hearer attentive is not the part of the proeme only but of any other part of the Oration and rather of any other part than of the proeme For the Hearer is every where more remiss than in the beginning And therefore wheresoever there is need the Orator must make appear both the probity of his own person and that the matter in hand is of great Consequence or that it concerns the Hearer or that it is new or that it is delightful He that will have the Hearer attentive to him but not to the Cause must on the other side make it seem that the matter is a trifle without relation to the Hearer common and tedious That the Hearer may be favourable to the Speaker one of two things is required that he love him or that he pity them In Demonstrative Orations he that praises shall have the Hearer favourable if he think himself or his own manners or course of life or any thing he loves comprehended in the same praise On the contrary he that dispraises shall be heard favourably if the Hearer find his Enemies or their courses or any thing he hates involv'd in the same dispraise The Proeme of a Deliberative Oration is taken from the same things from which are taken the Proemes of Judicial Orations For the matter of a Deliberative Oration needeth not that natural proeme by which is shewn what we are to speak of for that is already known the proeme in these being made only for the Speakers or Adversaries sake or to make the Matter appear great or little as one would have it and is therefore to be taken from the persons of the Plaintif or Defendant or from the Hearer or from the Matter as in Orations Judicial CHAP. XIV Places of Crimination and Purgation 1. ONe is from the removal of ill Opinion in the Hearer imprinted in him by the Adversary or otherwise 2. Another from this That the thing done is not hurtful or not to him or not so much or not unjust or not great or not dishonourable 3. A Third from the Recompence as I did him harm but withal I did him honour 4. A Fourth from the Excuse as It was Errour Mischance or Constraint 5. A Fifth from the Intention as One thing was done another meant 6. A Sixth from the Comprehension of the Accuser as What I have done the Accuser has done the same or his Father Kinsman or Friend 7. From the Comprehension of those that are in Reputation as What I did such and such have done the same who nevertheless are good Men. 8. From Comparison with such as have been falsly accused or wrongfully suspected and nevertheless found upright 9. From Recrimination as The Accuser is a man of ill life and therefore not to be believed 10. From that the Judgment belongs to another Place or Time as I have already answered or am to answer else-where to this Matter 11. From Crimination of the Crimination as It serves only to â—eâ—vert Indgment 12. A Twelfth which is common both to Crimination and Purgation and is taken from some sign as Teucer is not to be believed because his Mother was Priam's Sister On the other side Teucer is to be believed because his Father was Priam's Enemy 13. A Thirteenth proper to Crimination only from praise and dispraise mixt as To praise small things and blame great ones or to praise in many words and blame with effectual ones or to praise many things that are good and then add one evil but a great one 14. A Fourteenth comming both to Crimination and Purgation is taken from the interpretation of the fact for he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense and he that Criminates always in the worst as when Vlysses said Diomedes chose him for his Companion as the most able of the Grecians to aid him in his exploit but his Adversary said He chose him for his cowardize as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honour CHAP. XV. Of the Narration THe Narration is not always continued and of one Piece but sometimes as in Demonstratives interrupted and dispersed through the whole Oration For there being in a Narration
something that falls not under Art as namely the Actions themselves which the Orator inventeth not he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may As for Example if being to praise a Man you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning and without interruption you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again while from some of them you praise his Valour and from others his Wisdom whereby your Oration shall have less variety and shall less please 'T is not necessary always that the Narration be short The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open In the Narration as oft as may be 't is good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self and blameable in ones Adversary As I advised him but he would take no Counsel In Narrations a Man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose as Vlysses in Homer relating his Travels to Alcinous to move compassion in him is so long in it that it consists of divers Books but when he comes home tells the same to his Wife in thirty Verses leaving out what might make her sad The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners that is some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak although it be not exprest As setting his Arms a kenbold he answered c. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered In an Oration a Man does better to shew his affection than his Judgment this is 'T is better to say I like this than to say This is better For by the one you would seem wise by the other good But favour follows Goodness whereas Wisdom procures Envy But if this Affection seem incredible then either a reason must be rendered as did Antigone For when she had said She loved her Brother better than her Husband or Children she added for Husband and Children I may have more but another Brother I cannot my Parents being both dead Or else a Man must use this form of speaking I know this affection of mine seems strange to you but nevertheless it is such For 't is not easily believed that any Man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good Besides in a Narration not only the Actions themselves but the Passions and signs that accompany them are to be discovered And in his Narration a Man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such and such as soon and as covertly as he can A Narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning In Deliberative Orations that is where soever the question is of things to come a Narration which is always of things past has no place and yet things past may be recounted that Men may Deliberate better of the future But that is not as Narration but Proof for 't is Example There may also be Narration in Deliberatives in that part where Crimination and Praise come in But that part is not Deliberative but Demonstrative CHAP. XVI Of Proof or Confirmation and Refutation PRoofs are to be applyed to something Controverted The Controversie in Judicial Orations is Whether it has been done whether it has been hurtful whether the matter be so great and whether it be Just or no. In a question of Fact one of the Parties of necessity is faulty for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be insisted on In Demonstratives the Fact for the most part is supposed but the honour and profit of the Fact are to be proved In Deliberatives the question is Whether the thing be like to be or likely to be so Great or whether it be Just or whether it be profitable Besides the application of the proof to the question a Man ought to observe whether his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause For 't is a sign he does the same in the Cause The Proofs themselves are either Examples or Enthymemes A Deliberative Oration because 't is of things to come requireth rather Examples than Enthymemes But a Judicial Oration being of things past which have a necessity in them and may be concluded Syllogistically requireth rather Enthymemes Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer Nor ought a Man endeavour to prove every thing by Enthymeme least like some Philosophers he collect what is known from what is less known Nor ought a Man to use Enthymemes when he would move the Hearer to some affection For seeing divers Motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another he will lose either the Enthymeme or the affection that he would move For the same reason a Man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would express Manners But whether he would move affection or insinuate his Manners he may withal use Sentences A Deliberative Oration is more difficult than a Judicial because 't is of the future whereas a Judicial is of that which is past and that consequently may be known and because it has principles namely the Law and it is easier to prove from principles than without Besides a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary of speaking of himself of raising passion He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party let him praise or dispraise some body else as his Father or Kinsman or the very vertues or vices themselves He that wants not Proofs let him not only prove strongly but also insinuate his Manners but he that has no proof let him nevertheless insinuate his Manners For a good man is as acceptable as an exact Oration Of Proofs those that lead to an absurdity please better than those that are direct or ostensive because from the comparison of Contraries namely Truth and Falsity the force of the Syllogisme does the better appear Confutation is also a part of proof And he that speaks first puts it after his own proofs unless the Controversie contain many and different matters And he that speaks last puts it before For 't is necessary to make way for his own Oration by removing the Objections of him that spake before For the mind abhors both the Man and his Oration that is damned before hand If a Man desire his Manners should appear well least speaking of himself he become odious or troublesome or obnoxious to obtrectation or speaking of another he seem contumelious or scurrilous let him introduce another person Last of all least he cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes let him vary them sometimes with Sentences but such as have the same force As here is an Enthymeme If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may
Court of Equity in that to which belong such Causes as are to be determined by Equity that is to say by the Law of Reason Ph. You see then that the difference between Injustice and Iniquity is this that Injustice is the Transgression of a Statute-Law and Iniquity the Transgression of the Law of Reason was nothing else but the Law of Reason and that the Judges of that Law are Courts of Justice because the breach of the Statute-Law is Iniquity and Injustice also But perhaps you mean by Common-Law not the Law it self but the manner of proceeding in the Law as to matter of Fact by 12 Men Freeholders though those 12 Men are no Court of Equity nor of Justice because they determine not what is Just or Unjust but only whether it be done or not done and their Judgment is nothing else but a Confirmation of that which is properly the Judgment of the Witnesses for to speak exactly there cannot possibly be any Judge of Fact besides the Witnesses La. How would you have a Law defâ—n'd Ph. Thus A Law is the Command of him or them that have the Soveraign Power given to those that be his or their Subjects declaring Publickly and plainly what every of them may do and what they must forbear to do La. Seeing all Judges in all Courts ought to Judge according to Equity which is the Law of Reason a distinct Court of Equity seemeth to me to be unnecessary and but a Burthen to the People since Common-Law and Equity are the same Law Ph. It were so indeed If Judges could not err but since they may err and that the King is not Bound to any other Law but that of Equity it belongs to him alone to give Remedy to them that by the Ignorance or Corruption of a Judge shall suffer dammage La. By your Definition of a Law the Kings Proclamation under the Great Seal of England is a Law for it is a Command and Publick and of the Soveraign to his Subjects Ph. Why not If he think it necessary for the good of his Subjects For this is a Maxim at the Common-Law Alledged by Sir Edward Coke himself 1 Inst. Sect. 306. Quando Lex aliquid concedit concedere videtur id per quod devenitur ad illud And you know out of the same Author that divers Kings of â—ngland have often to the Petitions in Parliament which they granted annexed such exceptions as these unless there be necessity saving our Regality which I think should be always understood though they be not expressed and are understood so by Common Lawyers who agree that the King may recall any Grant wherein he was deceiv'd La. Again whereas you make it of the Essence of a Law to be Publickly and plainly declar'd to the People I see no necessity for that Are not all Subjects Bound to take notice of all Acts of Parliament when no Act can pass without their Consent Ph. If you had said that no Act could pass without their knowledge then indeed they had been bound to take notice of them but none can have knowledge of them but the Members of the Houses of Parliament therefore the rest of the People are excus'd or else the Knights of the Shires should be bound to furnish People with a sufficient Number of Copies at the Peoples Charge of the Acts of Parliament at their return into the Country that every man may resort to them and by themselves or Friends take notice of what they are obliged to for otherwise it were Impossible they should be obeyed And that no Man is bound to do a thing Impossible is one of Sir Edw. Cokes Maxims at the Common-Law I know that most of the Statutes are Printed but it does not appear that every Man is bound to Buy the Book of Statutes nor to search for them at Westminster or at the Tower nor to understand the Language wherein they are for the most part Written La. I grant it proceeds from their own Faults but no Man can be excused by the Ignorance of the Law of Reason that is to say by Ignorance of the Common-Law except Children Mad-men and Idiots But you exact such a notice of the Statute-Law as is almost Impossible Is it not enough that they in all Places have a sufficient Number of the Poenal Statutes Ph. Yes If they have those Poenal Statutes near them but what Reason can you give me why there should not be as many Copies abroad of the Statutes as there be of the Bible La. I think it were well that every Man that can Read had a Statute-Book for certainly no knowledge of those Laws by which Mens Lives and Fortunes can be brought into danger can be too much I find a great Fault in your Definition of Law which is that every Law either forbiddeth or Commandeth something 'T is true that the Moral-Law is always a Command or a Prohibition or at least Implieth it but in the Levitical-Law where it is said that he that Stealeth a Sheep shall Restore four Fold what Command or Prohibition lyeth in these words Ph. Such Sentences as that are not in themselves General but Judgments nevertheless there is in those words Implied a Commandment to the Judge to cause to be made a Four-fold Restitution La. That 's Right Ph. Now Define what Justice is and what Actions and Men are to be called Just. La. Justice is the constant will of giving to every Man his own that is to say of giving to every Man that which is his Right in such manner as to Exclude the Right of all men else to the same thing A Just Action is that which is not against the Law A Just Man is he that hath a constant Will to live Justly if you require more I doubt there will no Man living be Comprehended within the Definition Ph. Seeing then that a Just Action according to your Definition is that which is not against the Law it is Manifest that before there was a Law there could be no Injustice and therefore Laws are in their Nature Antecedent to Justice and Injustice and you cannot deny but there must be Law-makers before there was any Laws and Consequently before there was any Justice I speak of Humane Justice and that Law-makers were before that which you call Own or property of Goods or Lands distinguished by Meum Tuum Alienum La. That must be Granted for without Statute-Laws all Men have Right to all things and we have had Experience when our Laws were silenced by Civil War there was not a Man that of any Goods could say assuredly they were his own Ph. You see then that no private Man can claim a Propriety in any Lands or other Goods from any Title from any Man but the King or them that have the Soveraign Power because it is in virtue of the Soveraignty that every Man may not enter into and Possess what he pleaseth and consequently to deny the Soveraign any thing necessary to
it and breaks his Neck but by the same chance saveth his own Life Sir Edw. Coke it seems will have him Hanged for it as if he had fallen of prepensed Malice All that can be called Crime in this Business is but a simple Trespass to the dammage perhaps of sixpence or a shilling I confess the Trespass was an Offence against the Law but the falling was none nor was it by the Trespass but by the falling that the Man was slain and as he ought to be quit of the killing so he ought to make Restitution for the Trespass But I believe the Cause of Sir Edw. Coke's mistake was his not well understanding of Bracton whom he cites in the Margin For 1206 he saith thus Sed hic erit distinguendum utrum quis dederit operam rei licitae vel illicitae si illicitae ut si bapidem projiciebat quis versus locum per quem consueverunt homines transitum facere vel dum insequitur equum vel bovem aliquis ab equo vel a bove percussus fuerit hujusmodi hoc imputatur ei i. e. But here we are to distinguish whether a Man be upon a Lawful or Unlawful business if an unlawful as he that throws a stone into a place where Men use to pass or if he chase a Horse or an Ox and thereby the Man be stricken by the Horse or the Ox this shall be imputed to him And it is most reasonable For the doing of such an unlawful Act as is here meant is a sufficient Argument of a Felonious purpose or at least a hope to kill some body or other and he cared not whom which is worse than to design the death of a certain Adversary which nevertheless is Murder Also on the contrary though the business a Man is doing be Lawful and it chanceth sometimes that a Man be slain thereby yet may such killing be Felony For if a Car-man drive his Cart through Cheapside in a throng of People and thereby he kill a Man though he bare him no Malice yet because he saw there was very great danger it may reasonably be inferr'd that he meant to adventure the killing of some body or other though not of him that was kill'd La. He is a Felon also that killeth himself voluntarily and is called not only by Common Lawyers but also in divers Statute-Laws Felo de se. Ph. And 't is well so For names imposed by Statutes are equivalent to Definitions but I conceive not how any Man can bear Animum felleum or so much Malice towards himself as to hurt himself voluntarily much less to kill himself for naturally and necessarily the Intention of every Man aimeth at somewhat which is good to himself and tendeth to his preservation And therefore methinks if he kill himself it is to be presumed that he is not compos mentis but by some inward Torment or Apprehension of somewhat worse than Death Distracted La. Nay unless he be compos mentis he is not Felo de se as Sir Edw. Coke saith 4 Inst. p. 54. and therefore he cannot be Judged a Felo de se unless it be first proved he was compos mentis Ph. How can that be proved of a Man dead especially if it cannot be proved by any Witness that a little before his death he spake as other men used to do This is a hard place and before you take it for Common-Law it had need to be clear'd La. I 'le think on 't There 's a Statute of 3 Hen. 7. c. 14. which makes it Felony in any of the Kings Houshold-Servants under the degree of a Lord to Compass the Death of any of the Kings Privy-Council The words are these That from henceforth the Steward Treasurer and Controuler of the Kings House for that time being or one of them have full Authority and Power to inquire by 12 sad Men and discreet Persons of the Chequer-Roll of the King 's Honourable Houshold If any Servant admitted to his Servant Sworn and his name put into the Chequer-Roll whatsoever he be serving in any manner Office or Room reputed had or taken under the State of a Lord make any Confederacies Compassings Conspiracies or Imaginations with any Person to Destroy or Murder the King or any Lord of this Realm or any other Person sworn to the Kings Council Steward Treasurer or Controuler of the Kings House And if such Misdoers shall be found Guilty by Confession or otherwise that the said Offence shall be Judged Felony Ph. It appears by this Statute that not only the Compassing the Death as you say of a Privy-Councellor but also of any Lord of this Realm is Felony if it be done by Any of the Kings Houshold Servants that is not a Lord. La. No Sir Edw. Coke upon these words any Lord of this Realm or other Person Sworn of the Kings Council infers 4 Inst. p. 38. that is to be understood of such a Lord only as is a Privy-Councellor Ph. For barring of the Lords of Parliament from this Priviledge he strains this Statute a little farther in my Opinion than it reacheth of it self But how are such Felonies to be Tryed La. The Indictment is to be found before the Steward Treasurer and Controuler of the Kings House or one of them by 12 of the Kings Houshold Servants The Petit Jury for the Tryal must be 12 other of the Kings Servants and the Judges are again the Steward Treasurer and Controuler of the Kings House or 2 of them and yet I see that these Men are not usually great Students of the Law Ph. You may hereby be assur'd that either the King and Parliament were very much overseen in choosing such Officers perpetually for the time being to be Judges in a Tryal at the Common-Law or else that Sir Edw. Coke presumes too much to appropriate all the Judicature both in Law and Equity to the Common-Lawyers as if neither Lay-Persons Men of Honour nor any of the Lords Spiritual who are the most versed in the Examination of Equity and Cases of Conscience when they hear the Statutes Read and Pleaded were unfit to Judge of the intention and meaning of the same I know that neither such great Persons nor Bishops have ordinarily so much spare time from their ordinary Employment as to be so skilful as to Plead Causes at the Bar but certainly they are especially the Bishops the best able to Judge of matters of Reason that is to say by Sir Edw. Coke's Confession of matters except of Blood at the Common-Law La. Another sort of Felony though without Man-slaughter is Robbery and by Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 68. defined thus Robbery by the Common-Law is a Felony committed by a violent Assault upon the Person of another by putting him in fear and taking away from him his Money or other Goods of any value whatsoever Ph. Robbery is not distinguished from Theft by any Statute Latrocinium comprehendeth them both and both are Felony and both
Punished with Death And therefore to distinguish them aright is the work of Reason only And the first difference which is obvious to all Men is that Robbery is committed by Force or Terror of which neither is in Theft for Theft is a secret Act and that which is taken by violence or Terror either from his Person or in his Presence is still Robbery but if it be taken secretly whether it be by day or night from his Person or from his Fold or from his Pasture then it is called Theft 'T is Force and Fraud only that distinguisheth between Theft and Robbery both which are by the Pravity only of the Intention Felony in their Nature But there be so many Evasions of the Law found out by evil Men that I know not in this Predicament of Felony how to place them For suppose I go secretly by day or night into another Mans Field of Wheat Ripe and standing and Loading my Cart with it I carry it away Is it Theft or Robbery La. Neither it is but Trespass But if you first lay down the Wheat you have cut and then throw it into your Cart and carry it away then it is Felony Ph. Why so La. Sir Edw. Coke tells you the Reason of it 4 Inst. p. 107. for he defineth Theft to be by the Common-Law a Felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any Man or Woman of the meer Personal Goods of another not from the Person nor by night in the House of the owner From this Definition he Argues thus p. 109. Any kind of Corn or Grain growing upon the ground is a Personal Chattel and the Executors of the owner shall have them though they be not severed but yet no Larceny can be Committed of them because they are annexed to the Realty So it is of Grass standing on the Ground or of Apples or of any Fruit upon the Trees c. So it is of a Box or Chest of Charters no Larceny can be committed of them because the Charters concern the Realty and the Box or Chest though it be of great value yet shall it be of the same nature the Charters are of Omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus Ph. Is this Definition drawn out of any Statute or is it in Bracton or Littleton or any other Writer upon the Science of the Laws La. No it is his own and you may observe by the Logick-Sentences dispersed through his Works that he was a Logician sufficient enough to make a Definition Ph. But if his Definitions must be the Rule of Law what is there that he may not make Felony or not Felony at his Pleasure But seeing it is not Statute-Law that he says it must be very perfect Reason or else no Law at all and to me it seems so far from Reason as I think it ridiculous But let us Examine it There can says he be no Larceny of Corn Grass or Fruits that are growing that is to say they cannot be stolen but why Because they concern the Realty that is because they concern the Land 'T is true that the Land cannot be stolen nor the right of a Mans Tenure but Corn and Trees and Fruit though growing may be cut down and carryed away secretly and Feloniously in Contempt and Despight of the Law And are they not then stolen And is there any Act which is Feloniously committed that is not more than Trespass Can any Man doubt of it that understands the English Tongue 'T is true that if a Man pretend a right to the Land and on that pretence take the Fruits thereof by way of taking Possession of his own it is no more than a Trespass unless he conceal the taking of them for in that one Case he but puts the Man that was in Possession before to exhibit his complaint which purpose is not Felonious but Lawful for nothing makes a distinction between Felony and not Felony but the purpose I have heard that if a Man slander another with stealing of a Tree standing there lies no Action for it and that upon this ground To steal a standing Tree is impossible and that the Cause of the Impossibility is that a Man's Free-hold cannot be stolen which is a very obvious Fallacy for Free-hold signifieth not only the Tenement but also the Tenure and though it be true that a Tenure cannot be stolen yet every man sees the standing Trees and Corn may easily be stolen and so far forth as Trees c. are part of the Freehold so far forth also they are Personal Goods for whatsoever is Freehold is Inheritance and descendeth to the Heir and nothing can descend to the Executors but what is meerly Personal And though a Box or Case of Evidences are to descend to the Heir yet unless you can shew me positive Law to the contrary they shall be taken into the Executors hands to be delivered to the Heir Besides how unconscionable a thing is it that he that steals a shillings worth of Wood which the Wind hath blown down or which lyeth Rotten on the ground should be Hang'd for it and he that takes a Tree worth 20 or 40 shillings should Answer only for the Dammage La. 'T is somewhat hard but it has been so practised time out of mind Then follows Sodomy and Rape both of them Felonies Ph. I know that and that of the former he justly says it is detestable being in a manner an Apostacie from Humane Nature But in neither of them is there any thing of Animus Felleus The Statutes which make them Felony are exposed to all Mens reading but because Sir Edw. Coke's Commentaries upon them are more diligent and Accurate than to be free from all uncleanness let us leap over them both observing only by the way that he leaves an Evasion for an impotent Offender though his design be the same and pursued to the utmost of his Power La. Two other great Felonies are breaking and Burning of Houses neither of which are defin'd by any Statute The former of them is by Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 63. Defined thus Burglary is by the Common-Law the Breaking and Entring into the Mansion-house of another in the night with intent to kill some reasonable Creature or to commit some other Felony within the same whether his intent be executed or not and defineth Night to be then when one Man cannot know anothers Face by day-light And for the parts of a Mansion-house he reckoneth all Houses that belong to Housekeeping as Barns Stables Dary-Houses Buttery Kitchin Chambers c. But breaking of a House by day though Felony and Punished as Burglary is not within the Statute Ph. I have nothing to say against his Interpretations here but I like not that any private Man should presume to determine whether such or such a Fact done be within the words of a Statute or not where it belongs only to a Jury of 12 Men to declare in their Verdict whether the Fact laid
open before them be Burglary Robbery Theft or other Felony for this is to give a leading Judgment to the Jury who ought not to consider any private Lawyers Institutes but the Statutes themselves pleaded before them for directions La. Burning as he defines it p. 66. is a Felony at the Common-Law committed by any that maliciously and voluntarily in the night or day burneth the House of another And hereupon infers if a Man sets Fire to the House and it takes not that then it is not within the Statute Ph. If a Man should secretly and maliciously lay a quantity of Gun-Powder under another Mans House sufficient to Blow it up and set a Train of Powder in it and set Fire to the Train and some Accident hinder the Effect is not this Burning or what is it What Crime It is neither Treason nor Murder nor Burglary nor Robbery nor Theft nor no dammage being made any Trespass nor contrary to any Statute And yet seeing the Common-Law is the Law of Reason it is a sin and such a sin as a Man may be Accused of and Convicted and consequently a Crime committed of Malice prepensed shall he not then be Punished for the Attempt I grant you that a Judge has no Warrant from any Statute-Law Common-Law or Commission to appoint the Punishment but surely the King has power to Punish him on this side of Life or Member as he please and with the Assent of Parliament if not without to make the Crime for the future Capital La. I know not Besides these Crimes there is Conjuration Witch-craft Sorcery and Inchantment which are Capital by the Statute 1 of King James cap. 12. Ph. But I desire not to discourse of that Subject for though without doubt there is some great Wickedness signified by those Crimes yet I have ever found my self too dull to conceive the nature of them or how the Devil hath power to do many things which Witches have been Accused of Let us now come to Crimes not Capital La. Shall we pass over the Crime of Heresie which Sir Edw. Coke ranketh before Murder but the consideration of it will be somewhat long Ph. Let us defer it till the Afternoon Of Heresie La. COncerning Heresie Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst. p. 39. says that 5 things fall into consideration 1. Who be the Judges of Heresie 2. What shall be Judged Heresie 3. What is the Judgment upon a Man Convicted of Heresie 4. What the Law alloweth him to save his Life 5. What he shall forfeit by Judgment against him Ph. The principal thing to be considered which is the Heresie it self he leaveth out viz. What it is in what Fact or Words it consisteth what Law it violateth Statute-Law or the Law of Reason The Cause why he omitteth it may perhaps be this that it was not only out of his Profession but also out of his other Learning Murder Robbery Theft c. Every Man knoweth to be evil and are Crimes defined by the Statute-Law so that any Man may avoid them if he will But who can be sure to avoid Heresie if he but dare to give an Account of his Faith unless he know beforehand what it is La. In the Preamble of the Statute of the 2d Hen. 4. cap. 15. Heresie is laid down as a Preaching or Writing of such Doctrine as is contrary to the determination of Holy Church Ph. Then it is Heresie at this day to Preach or Write against Worshipping of Saints or the Infallibility of the Church of Rome or any other determination of the same Church For Holy-Church at that time was understood to be the Church of Rome and now with us the Holy-Church I understand to be the Church of England and the Opinions in that Statute are now and were then the true Christian Faith Also the same Statute of Hen. 4. Declareth by the same Preamble that the Church of England had never been troubled with Heresie La. But that Statute is Repeal'd Ph. Then also is that Declaration or Definition of Heresie repeal'd La. What say you is Heresie Ph. I say Heresie is a singularity of Doctrine or Opinion contrary to the Doctrine of another Man or Men and the word properly signifies the Doctrine of a Sect which Doctrine is taken upon Trust of some Man of Reputation for Wisdom that was the first Author of the same If you will understand the truth hereof you are to Read the Histories and other Writings of the Antient Greeks whose word it is which Writings are extant in these days and easie to be had Wherein you will find that in and a little before the time of Alexander the Great there lived in Greece many Excellent Wits that employed their time in search of the Truth in all manner of Sciences worthy of their Labour and which to their great Honour and Applause published their Writings some concerning Justice Laws and Government some concerning Good and Evil Manners some concerning the Causes of things Natural and of Events discernable by sense and some of all these Subjects And of the Authors of these the Principal were Pythagoras Plato Zeno Epicurus and Aristotle Men of deep and laborious Meditation and such as did not get their Bread by their Philosophy but were able to live of their own and were in Honour with Princes and other great Personages But these Men though above the rest in Wisdom yet their Doctrine in many points did disagree whereby it came to pass that such Men as studied their Writings inclined some to Pythagoras some to Plato some to Aristotle some to Zeno and some to Epicurus But Philosophy it self was then so much in Fashion as that every Rich Man endeavour'd to have his Children educated in the Doctrine of some or other of these Philosophers which were for their Wisdom so much renown'd Now those that followed Pythagoras were called Pythagoreans those that followed Plato Academicks those that followed Zeno Stoicks those that followed Epicurus Epicureans and those that followed Aristotle Peripateticks which are the names of Heresie in Greek which signifies no more but taking of an Opinion and the said Pythagoreans Academicks Stoicks Peripateticks c. were termed by the names of so many several Heresies All Men you know are subject to Error and the ways of Error very different and therefore 't is no wonder if these Wise and diligent searchers of the Truth did notwithstanding their Excellent parts differ in many points amongst themselves But this Laudable Custom of Great Wealthy Persons to have their Children at any price to learn Philosophy suggested to many idle and needy Fellows an easie and compendious way of Maintenance which was to Teach the Philosophy some of Plato some of Aristotle c. Whose Books to that end they Read over but without Capacity or much Endeavour to examine the Reasons of their Doctrines taking only the Conclusions as they lay and setting up with this they soon professed themselves Philosophers and got to be the School-Masters to the
Youth of Greece but by Competition for such Employment they hated and reviled one another with all the bitter Terms they could invent and very often when upon Occasion they were in Civil Company fell first to Disputation and then to Blows to the great trouble of the Company and their own shame Yet amongst all their reproachful words the name of Heretick came never in because they were all equally Hereticks their Doctrine not being theirs but taken upon Trust from the aforesaid Authors So that though we find Heresie often mentioned in Lucian and other Heathen Authors yet we shall not find in any of them Haereticus for a Heretick And this Disorder among the Philosophers continued a long time in Greece and Infecting also the Romans was at the greatest in the times of the Apostles and in the Primitive Church till the time of the Nicene Council and somewhat after But at last the Authority of the Stoicks and Epicureans was not much Esteemed only Plato's and Aristotle's Philosophy were much in Credit Plato's with the better sort that founded their Doctrine upon the Conceptions and Ideas of things and Aristotle's with those that reasoned only from the names of Things according to the Scale of the Categories Nevertheless there were always though not New Sects of Philosophy yet New Opinions continually arising La. But how came the word Heretick to be a Reproach Ph. Stay a little After the Death of our Saviour his Apostles and his Disciples as you know dispersed themselves into several parts of the World to Preach the Gospel and converted much People especially in Asia the less in Greece and Italy where they Constituted many Churches and as they Travelled from place to place left Bishops to Teach and Direct those their Converts and to appoint Presbyters under them to Assist them therein and to Confirm them by setting forth the Life and Miracles of our Saviour as they had receiv'd it from the Writings of the Apostles and Evangelists whereby and not by the Authority of Plato or Aristotle or any other Philosopher they were to be Instructed Now you cannot doubt but that among so many Heathens converted in the time of the Apostles there were Men of all Professions and Dispositions and some that had never thought of Philosophy at all but were intent upon their Fortunes or their Pleasures and some that had a greater some a lesser use of Reason and some that had studied Philosophy but professed it not which were commonly the Men of the better Rank and some had Professed it only for their better Abstinence and had it not farther than readily to talk and wrangle and some were Christians in good earnest and others but Counterfeit intending to make use of the Charity of those that were sincere Christians which in those times was very great Tell me now of these sorts of Christians which was the most likely to afford the fittest Men to propagate the Faith by Preaching and Writing or Publick or private Disputation that is to say who were fittest to be made Presbyters and Bishops La. Certainly those who caeteris paribus could make the best use of Aristotle's Rhetorick and Logick Ph. And who were the most prone to Innovation La. They that were most confident of Aristotle's and Plato's their former Masters Natural Philosophy For they would be the aptest to wrest the Writings of the Apostles and all Scriptures to the Doctrine in which their Reputation was engag'd Ph. And from such Bishops and Priests and other Sectaries it was that Heresie amongst the Christians first came to be a Reproach For no sooner had one of them Preached or Published any Doctrine that displeased either the most or the most Leading Men of the rest but it became such a Quarrel as not to be decided but by a Council of the Bishops in the Province where they Lived wherein he that would not submit to the General Decree was called an Heretick as one that would not reliquish the Philosophy of his Sect the rest of the Council gave themselves the name of Catholicks and to their Church the name of Catholick Church And thus came up the opposite Terms of Catholick and Heretick La. I understand how it came to be a Reproach but not how it follows that every Opinion condemned by a Church that is or calls it self Catholick must needs be an Error or a Sin The Church of England denies that Consequence and that Doctrine as they hold cannot be proved to be Erroneous but by the Scripture which cannot Err but the Church being but men may both Err and Sin Ph. In this Case we must consider also that Error in it's own Nature is no Sin For it is Impossible for a Man to Err on purpose he cannot have an Intention to Err and nothing is Sin unless there be a sinful Intention much less are such Errors Sins as neither hurt the Common-wealth nor any private Man nor are against any Law Positive or Natural such Errors as were those for which Men were burnt in the time when the Pope had the Government of this Church La. Since you have told me how Herefie came to be a name tell me also how it came to be a Crime And what were the Heresies that first were made Crimes Ph. Since the Christian Church could declare and none else what Doctrine were Heresies but had no power to make Statutes for the punishment of Hereticks before they had a Christian King it is manifest that Heresie could not be made a Crime before the first Christian Emperor which was Constantine the Great In his time one Arius a Priest of Alexandria in Dispute with his Bishop Publickly denyed the Divinity of Christ and Maintained it afterwards in the Pulpit which was the Cause of a Sedition and much Blood shed both of Citizens and Souldiers in that City For the preventing of the like for the time to come the Emperor called a General Council of Bishops to the City of Nice who being met he exhorted them to agree upon a Confession of the Christian Faith promising whatsoever they agreed on he would cause to be observed La. By the way the Emperor I think was here a little too Indifferent Ph. In this Council was Established so much of the Creed we now use and call the Nicene Creed as reacheth to the words I believe in the Holy Ghost The rest was Established by the 3 General Councils next succeeding By the words of which Creed almost all the Heresies then in being and especially the Doctrine of Arius were Condemn'd So that now all Doctrines Published by Writing or by Word and repugnant to this Confession of the first four General Councils and contained in the Nicene Creed were by the Imperial Law forbidding them made Crimes such as are that of Arius denying the Divinity of Christ that of Eutiches denying the 2 Natures of Christ that of the Nestorians denying the Divinity of the Holy Ghost that of the Anthropomorphites that of the Manichees that
Suit in the Spiritual Court here in a Temporal Cause there lay a Premunire and if perhaps some Judge or other hath since that time judged otherwise his Judgment was erroneous La. Nay but by the Statute of 16. Rich. 2. cap. 5. it appeareth to the contrary as Sir Edw. Coke here will shew you The effect saith he of the Statute of Rich. 2. is That if any Pursue or cause to be Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any thing which toucheth the King against him his Crown or Regality or his Realm they their Notaries c. shall be out of the Kings Protection Ph. I pray you let me know the very words of the Statutes as they ly La. Presently The words are if any Man Purchase or Pursue or cause to be Purchased or Pursued in the Court of Rome or elsewhere any such Translations Processes and Sentences of Excommunication Bulls Instruments or any other things whatsoever which touch the King against him his Crown and his Regality or his Realm as is aforesaid c. Ph. If a Man bring a Plea of Common-Law into the Spiritual Court which is now the Kings Court and the Judge of this Spiritual Court hold Plea thereof By what Construction can you draw it within the compass of the words you have now read To sue for my Right in the Kings Court is no pursuing of Translations of Bishopricks made or procur'd in the Court of Rome or any place else but only in the Court of the King nor is this the suit against the King nor his Crown nor his Regality nor his Realm but the contrary Why then is it a Premunire No. He that brings in or setteth out a Writing in any place whatsoever wherein is contained that the King hath so given away his Jurisdiction as that if a Subject be condemned falsly his Submission to the Kings Judgment is of none effect or that the King upon no necessity whatsoever can out of Parliament time raise Money for the defence of the Kingdom is in my opinion much more within the Statute of Provisors than they which begin suit for a Temporal Matter in a Court Spiritual But what Argument has he for this Law of his since the Statute Law fails him from the Law of Reason La. He says they are called Courts either because they proceed by the Rules of other Laws as by the Canon or Civil Law or by other Tryals than the Common Law doth Warrant For the Tryals Warranted by the Law of England for matter of Fact is by verdict of 12 Men before the Judges of the Common Law in matters pertaining to the Common Law and not upon Examination of Witnesses as in the Court of Equity so that Alia Curia is either that which is govern'd per aliam Legem or which draweth the Party ad aliud Examen For if Ph. Stop there Let us consider of this you have read for the Tryal warranted by the Law of England is by Verdict of 12 Men. What means he here by the Law of England Does it not warrant the Tryals in Chancery and in the Court of Admiralty by Witnesses La. By the Law of England he means the Law used in the Kings Bench that is to say the Common-Law Ph. This is just as if he had said that these two Courts did warrant their own way of Tryal but other Courts not so but were warranted by the King only the Courts of Common Law were VVarrants to themselves You see that alia Curia is this way ill expounded In the Courts of Common Law all Tryals are by 12 Men who are Judges of the Fact and the Fact known and prov'd the Judges are to pronounce the Law but in the Spiritual Court the Admiralty and in all the Courts of Equity there is but one Judge both of Fact and of Law this is all the difference If this difference be intended by the Statute by alia Curia there would be a Premunire for suing in a Court being not the Kings Court The Kings Bench and Court of Common Pleas may also be different kinds of Courts because the Process is different but 't is plain that this Statute doth not distinguish Courts otherwise than into the Courts of the King and into the Courts of the Forraign States and Princes And seeing you stand upon the name of a Jury for the distinguishing of Courts what difference do you find between the Tryals at the Common-Law and the Tryals in other Courts You know that in Tryals of Fact naturally and through all the World the Witnesses are Judges and it is impossible to be otherwise What then in England can a Jury judge of except it be of the sufficiency of the Testimony The Justices have nothing to judge of nor do but after the Fact is proved to declare the Law which is not Judgment but Jurisdiction Again though the Tryal be in Chancery or in the Court of Civil Law 1. The Witnesses are still Judges of the Fact and he that hath the Commission to hear the Cause hath both the parts that is to say of a Jury to judge of the Testimony and of a Justice to declare the Law In this I say lyes all the difference which is indeed enough to make a Dispute as the World goes about Jurisdiction But seeing it tends neither to the Disherison of the King nor of the People nor to the subversion of the Law of Reason i. e. of Common-Law nor to the subversion of Justice nor to any harm of the Realm without some of which these Statutes are not broken it cannot be a Premunire La. Let me read on For if the Freehold Inheritances Goods and Chattels Debts and Duties wherein the King and Subject have Right and Property by the Common-Law should be judged per aliam Legem or be drawn ad aliud Examen the 3 Mischiefs afore exprest would follow viz. the destruction of the King and his Crown the Disherison of his People and the undoing and destruction of the Common-Law always used Ph. That is to say of the Law of Reason From hence it follows that where there are no Juries and where there are different Laws from ours that is to say in all the World besides neither King nor People have any Inheritance nor Goods nor any Law of Reason I will examine his Doctrine concerning Cases Criminal no farther He no where defineth a Crime that we may know what it is An odious name sufficeth him to make a Crime of any thing He hath put Heresie among the most odious Crimes not knowing what it signifies and upon no other Cause but because the Church of Rome to make their usurped Power the more terrible had made it by long Preaching against it and Cruelty shown towards many Godly and learned Men of this and other Reformed Churches appear to common People a thing detestable He puts it in as a Plea of the Crown in the time of Queen Elizabeth whereas in her time there was no
Doctrine Heresie but Justice Stamford leaves it out because when Heresie was a Crime it was a Plea of the Mitre I see also in this Catalogue of Causes Criminal he inserteth costly Feeding costly Apparel and costly Building though they were contrary to no Statute 'T is true that by evil Circumstances they become sins but these sins belong to the Judgment of the Pastors Spiritual A Justice of the Temporal Law seeing the Intention only makes them sins cannot judge whether they be sins or no unless he have power to take Confessions Also he makes flattery of the King to be a Crime How could he know when one Man had flattered another He meant therefore that it was a Crime to please the King And accordingly he citeth divers Calamities of such as had been in times past in great favour of the Kings they serv'd as the Favourites of Hen. 3. Ed. 2. Rich. 2. Hen. 6. which Favourites were some imprisoned some banished and some put to death by the same Rebels that imprisoned banished and put to death the same King upon no better ground than the Earl of Strafford the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury and King Charles the first by the Rebels of that time Empson and Dudley were no Favourites of Hen. the 7th but Spunges which King Hen. the 8th did well Squeeze Cardinal Woolsey was indeed for divers years a favourite of Hen. the 8th but fell into disgrace not for flattering the King but for not flattering him in the business of Divorce from Queen Katharine You see his Reasoning here see also his Passion in the words following We will for some Causes descend no lower Qui eorum vestigiis insistunt eorum exitus perhorrescant this is put in for the Favourite that then was of King James But let us give over this and speak of the legal Punishments to these Crimes belonging Of Punishments ANd in the first place I desire to know who it is that hath the power for an Offence committed to define and appoint the special manner of Punishment for suppose you are not of the Opinion of the Stoicks in old time that all faults are equal and that there ought to be the same Punishment for killing a Man and for killing a Hen. La. The manner of Punishment in all Crimes whatsoever is to be determined by the Common-Law That is to say if it be a Statute that determins it then the Judgment must be according to the Statute if it be not specified by the Statute then the Custome in such Cases is to be followed But if the Case be new I know not why the Judge may not determine it according to Reason Ph. But according to whose reason If you mean the natural Reason of this or that Judge authorized by the King to have cognisance of the Cause there being as many several Reasons as there are several Men the punishment of all Crimes will be uncertain and none of them ever grow up to make a Custome Therefore a Punishment certain can never be assigned if it have its beginning from the natural Reasons of deputed Judges no nor from the natural of the Supream Judge For if the Law of Reason did determine Punishments then for the same Offences there should be through all the World and in all times the same Punishments because the Law of Reason is Immutable and Eternal La. If the natural Reason neither of the King nor of any else be able to prescribe a Punishment how can there be any lawful Punishment at all Ph. Why not For I think that in this very difference between the rational Faculties of particular Men lyeth the true and perfect reason that maketh every Punishment certain For but give the authority of defining punishments to any Man whatsoever and let that Man define them and right Reason has defin'd them Suppose the Definition be both made and made known before the Offence committed For such authority is to trump in Card-playing save that in matter of Government when nothing else is turn'd up Clubs are Trump Therefore seeing every Man knoweth by his own Reason what Actions are against the Law of Reason and knoweth what Punishments are by this authority for every evil action ordained it is manifest Reason that for breaking the known Laws he should suffer the known Punishments Now the person to whom this authority of defining Punishments is given can be no other in any place of the World but the same Person that hath the Soveraign Power be it one Man or one assembly of Men For it were in vain to give it to any Person that had not the power of the Militia to cause it to be executed for no less power can do it when many Offenders be united and combin'd to defend one another There was a Case put to King David by Nathan of a rich Man that had many Sheep and of a poor Man that had but one which was a tame Lamb The rich Man had a stranger in his House for whose entertainment to spare his own Sheep he took away the poor Mans Lamb. Upon this Case the King gave Judgment surely the Man that hath done this shall die What think you of this Was it a Royal or Tyrannical Judgment La. I will not contradict the Canons of the Church of England which acknowledgeth the King of England within his own Dominions hath the same Rights which the good Kings of Israel had in theirs nor deny King David to have been one of those good Kings But to punish with death without a precedent Law will seem but a harsh proceeding with us who unwillingly hear of Arbitrary Laws much less of Arbitrary Punishments unless we were sure that all our Kings would be as good as David I will only ask you by what Authority the Clergy may take upon them to determine or make a Canon concerning the power of their own King or to distinguish between the Right of a good and an evil King Ph. It is not the Clergy that maketh their Canons to be Law but it is the King that doth it by the Great Seal of England and it is the King that giveth them power to teach their Doctrines in that that he authoriseth them publickly to teach and preach the Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles according to the Scriptures wherein this Doctrine is perspicuously contained But if they had derogated from the Royal Power in any of their Doctrines published then certainly they had been too blame nay I believe that had been more within the Statute of premunire of 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. than any Judge of a Court of Equity for holding Pleas of Common Law I cite not this Precedent of King David as approving the breach of the great Charter or justifying the Punishment with loss of Life or Member of every Man that shall offend the King but to shew you that before the Charter was granted in all Cases where the Punishments were not prescribed it was the King only that could prescribe them
Kings of those times had not means enough and to spare if God were not their Enemy to defend their People against Forreign Enemies and also to compell them to keep the Peace amongst themselves Ph. And so had had the succeeding Kings if they had never given their rights away and their Subjects always kept their Oaths and promises In what manner proceeded those Ancient Saxons and other Nations of Germany especially the Northern parts to the making of their Laws La. Sir Edw. Coke out of divers Saxon Laws gathered and published in Saxon and Latine by Mr. Lambert inferreth that the Saxon Kings for the making of their Laws called together the Lords and Commons in such manner as is used at this day in England But by those Laws of the Saxons published by Mr. Lambert it appeareth that the Kings called together the Bishops and a great part of the wisest and discreetest Men of the Realm and made Laws by their advice Ph. I think so for there is no King in the World being of ripe years and sound mind that made any Law otherwise for it concerns them in their own interest to make such Laws as the people can endure and may keep them without impatience and live in strength and courage to defend their King and Countrey against their potent neighbours But how was it discerned and by whom was it determined who were those wisest and discreetest Men It is a hard matter to know who is wisest in our times We know well enough who chooseth a Knight of the Shire and what Towns are to send Burgesses to the Parliament therefore if it were determined also in those dayes who those wise Men should be then I confess that the Parliaments of the old Saxons and the Parliaments of England since are the same thing and Sir Edw. Coke is in the right Tell me therefore if you can when those Towns which now send Burgesses to the Parliament began to do so and upon what cause one Town had this priviledge and another Town though much more populous had not La. At what time began this custom I cannot tell but I am sure it is more ancient than the City of Salisbury because there come two Burgesses to Parliament for a place near to it called Old Sarum which as I Rid in sight of it if I should tell a stranger that knew not what the word Burgess meant he would think were a couple of Rabbets the place looketh so like a long Cony-Borough And yet a good Argument may be drawn from thence that the Townsmen of every Town were the Electors of their own Burgesses and Judges of their discretion and that the Law whether they be discreet or not will suppose them to be discreet till the contrary be apparent Therefore where it is said that the King called together the more discreet Men of his Realm it must be understood of such Elections as are now in use By which it is manifest that those great and general Moots assembled by the old Saxon Kings were of the same nature with the Parliaments assembled since the Conquest Ph. I think your reason is good For I cannot conceive how the King or any other but the inhabitants of the Boroughs themselves can take notice of the discretion or sufficiency of those they were to send to the Parliament And for the Antiquity of the Burgess-Towns since it is not mentioned in any History or certain Record now extant it is free for any Man to propound his conjecture You know that this Land was invaded by the Saxons at several times and conquered by pieces in several Wars so that there were in England many Kings at once and every of them had his Parliament and therefore according as there were more or fewer walled Towns within each Kings Dominion his Parliament had the more or fewer Burgesses But when all these lesser Kingdoms were joyned into one then to that one Parliament came Burgesses from all the Burroughs of England And this perhaps may be the reason why there be so many more such Burroughs in the West than in any other part of the Kingdom the West being more populous and also more obnoxious to invaders and for that cause having greater store of Towns Fortified This I think may be the original of that priviledge which some Towns have to send Burgesses to the Parliament and others have not La. The Conjecture is not improbable and for want of greater certainty may be allowed But seeing it is commonly receiv'd that for the making of a Law there ought to be had the assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal whom do you account in the Parliaments of the old Saxons for Lords Temporal and whom for Lords Spiritual For the Book called The mode of holding Parliaments agreeth punctually with the manner of holding them at this day and was written as Sir Edw. Coke says in the time of the Saxons and before the Conquest Ph. Mr. Selden a greater Antiquary than Sir Edw. Coke in the last Edition of his Book of Titles of Honour says that that Book called the Mode c. was not written till about the time of Rich. 2. and seems to me to prove it But howsoever that be it is apparent by the Saxon Laws set forth by Mr. Lambert that there were always called to the Parliament certain great Persons called Aldermen alias Earls and so you have a House of Lords and a House of Commons Also you will find in the same place that after the Saxons had received the Faith of Christ those Bishops that were amongst them were always at the great Mootes in which they made their Laws Thus you have a perfect English Parliament saving that the name of Barons was not amongst them as being a French Title which came in with the Conqueror FINIS The King is the Supream Judge
Enemies there is no end for the War will continue by a perpetual Subdivision and when it ends they will be in the same Estate they were before That they are often Abused by Men who to them seem wise when then their Wisdom is nothing else but Envy to those that are in Grace and in profitable Employments and that those Men do but abuse the Common People to their own ends that set up a private Mans Propriety against the publick Safety But say withal that the King is Subject to the Laws of God both Written and Unwritten and to no other and so was William the Conqueror whose Right it all Descended to our present King La. As to the Law of Reason which is Equity 't is sure enough there is but one Legislator which is God Ph. It followeth then that which you call the Common-Law Distinct from Statute-Law is nothing else but the Law of God La. In some sense it is but it is not Gospel but Natural Reason and Natural Equity Ph. Would you have every Man to every other Man alledge for Law his own particular Reason There is not amongst Men an Universal Reason agreed upon in any Nation besides the Reason of him that hath the Soveraign Power yet though his Reason be but the Reason of one Man yet it is set up to supply the place of that Universal Reason which is expounded to us by our Saviour in the Gospel and consequently our King is to us the Legislator both of Statute-Law and of Common-Law La. Yes I know that the Laws Spiritual which have been Law in this Kingdom since the Abolishing of Popery are the Kings Laws and those also that were made before for the Canons of the Church of Rome were no Laws neither here nor any where else without the Popes Temporal Dominions farther than Kings and States in their several Dominions respectively did make them so Ph. I grant that But you must grant also that those Spiritual Laws Legislators of the Spiritual Law and yet not all Kings and States make Laws by Consent of the Lords and Commons but our King here is so far bound to their Assents as he shall Judge Conducing to the Good and safety of his People for Example if the Lords and Commons should Advise him to restore those Laws Spiritual which in Queen Maries time were in Force I think the King were by the Law of Reason obliged without the help of any other Law of God to neglect such Advice La. I Grant you that the King is sole Legislator but with this Restriction that if he will not Consult with the Lords of Parliament and hear the Complaints and Informations of the Commons that are best acquainted with their own wants he sinneth against God though he cannot be Compell'd to any thing by his Subjects by Arms and Force Ph. We are Agreed upon that already since therefore the King is sole Legislator I think it also Reason he should be sole Supream Judge La. There is no doubt of that for otherwise there would be no Congruity of Judgments with the Laws I Grant also that he is the Supream Judge over all Persons and in all Causes Civil and Ecclesiastical within his own Dominions not only by Act of Parliament at this time but that he has ever been so by the Common-Law For the Judges of both the Benches have their Offices by the Kings Letters Patents and so as to Judicature have the Bishops Also the Lord Chancellour hath his Office by receiving from the King the Great Seal of England and to say all at once there is no Magistrate or Commissioner for Publick Business neither of Judicature nor Execution in State or Church in Peace or War but he is made so by Authority from the King Ph. 'T is true But perhaps you may â—â—ink otherwise when you Read such Acts of Parliament as say that the King shall â—ave Power and Authority to do this or that by Virtue of that Act as Eliz. c. 1. That your Highness your Heirs and Successors Kings or Queens of this Realm shall have â—â—ll Power and Authority by Virtue of this Act by Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England to Assign c. Was it not this Parliament that gave this Authority to the Queen La. For the Statute in this Clause is no more than as Sir Edw. Coke useth to speak an Affirmance of the Common-Law For she being Head of the Church of England might make Commissioners for the deâ—iding of Matters Ecclesiastical as freely â—s if she had been Pope who did you know pretend his Right from the Law of God Ph. We have hitherto spoken of Laws without considering any thing of the Naâ—ure and Essence of a Law and now unless we define the word Law we can go no â—arther without Ambiguity and Fallacy which will be but loss of time whereas on the contrary the Agreement upon our words will enlighten all we have to say â—hereafter La. I do not remember the Definition of Law in any Statute Ph. I think so For the Statutes were made by Authority and not drawn from any other Principles than the care of the safety of the People Statutes are not Philosophy as is the Common-Law and other disputable Arts but are Commands or Prohibitions which ought to be obeyed because Assented to by Submission made to the Conqueror here in England and to whosoever had the Soveraign Power in other Common wealths so that the Positive Laws of all Places are Statutes The Definition of Law was therefore unnecessary for the makers of Statutes though very necessary to them whose work it is to Teach the sence of the Law La. There is an Accurate Definition of a Law in Bracton Cited by Sir Edw. Coke Lex est sanctio justa jubens honesta prohibens contraria Ph. That is to say Law is a just Statute Commanding those things which are honest and Forbidding the contrary From whence it followeth that in all Cases it must be the Honesty or Dishonesty that makes the Command a Law whereas you know that but for the Law we could not as saith St. Paul have known what is sin therefore this Definition is no Ground at all for any farther Discourse of Law Besides you know the Rule of Honest and Dishonest refers to Honour and that it is Justice only and Injustice that the Law respecteth But that which I most except against in this Definition is that it supposes that a Statute made by the Soveraign Power of a Nation may be unjust There may indeed in a Statute Law made by Men be found Iniquity but not Injustice La. This is somewhat subtil I pray deal plainly what is the difference between Injustice and Iniquity Ph. I pray you tell me first what is the difference between a Court of Justice and a Court of Equity La. A Court of Justice is that which hath Cognizance of such Causes as are to be ended by the Possitive Laws of the Land and a