willingly enter upon so flat a contradictiō to such a discourse of Kinge Iames in the dayes of Kinge Charles and that so soone after his death If you write only concerning men of ripe yeares you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly and not to give them longer wings then is fitt In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of and as much advanced by some as cryed downe by others Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him an orthodoxe interpretation therof though neyther suitable to the minde of Damascen commonly reputed the Father of it Yet looke what in this kind is wanting in them is supplyed by Arminiensis who gives both an orthodoxe construction thereof and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodoxe interpretation and the more orthodoxe the more opposite to theire constructions who with greate cry of words draw it to the countenancing of theire Arminian Tenets without cause Love you say is the fruite of Gods antecedent will wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent will Fruite and effect you make all one as with good reason you may Now what I pray you is this effect which you call love You seeme to intimate that they are the effects of creation as when you say Every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted of Gods love Yet faculties of soules and bodyes are found in beasts but Gods antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men Neyther doth Damascene at all referre it to the worke of creation but makes it to be that wherby God will have all to be saved Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxius unto damnation as well as capable of salvation Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of Gods consequent will what doe you meane by wrath Is it eyther a resolution to take vengeance or the execution of vengeance it selfe I think you take it for the execution of vengeance it selfe Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speake of it became you to expresse so much or whether you conceave it to be different yet it were fit you should take notice of it and acknowledge that this is a fruite of Gods consequent will as well as wrath that as effectually presupposing obedience as this disobedience and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time how well you performe it we may in good time consider with Gods helpe Next you enter upon another forme of the same distinction as you pretend and you suffer it to fly with one winge For you talke of Gods absolute will which you seeme to confound with Gods antecedent will but as touching the member congruously opposite you leave us to seeke for that But as it is we are to consider it Gods absolute will was you say to have men capable of Heaven and Hell of joyes and miseryes immortall This cannot be understoode of Gods consequent will for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of eyther but his consequent will is not so indifferent For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity and this presupposeth rather then causeth capablenesse Neyther can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning For the antecedent will in Damascene is only referred to the will of God wherby he wills mans salvation but this absolute will is you say to have men capable of Heaven and Hell To helpe this you tell us That this absolute will whose possible objects are two is in the first place set on mans eternall joy But you doe not proceede to shew on what it is set in the next place as if by such like incongrueties you desired rather to confounde your reader then to satisfie him Yet by the tenour of your discourse you leave it to us to guesse that in the second place to witt upon the dispising of Gods love it is set upon a mans damnation So that by this your doctrine both Gods antecedent will and consequent will is all one and that is Gods absolute will But no such thinge is founde in Damascene from whome such as you are doe usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God and will consequent And indeed you doe well to make one as absolute as another for like as wrath the fruite of this will of God in the second place as you imply hath not its course but upō presuppositiō of disobedience so in like manner the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruite of this will of God in the first place hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience And that you may know what this fruite I speake of is I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience as well as the other presupposeth disobedience And thus shall God as truly be sayed absolutely to wish a mans damnation as his salvation and no more conditionally will the one then the other And like as if God be absolutely sayd to will a mans salvation it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibilitie which unto man he had appointed so though God be sayd absolutely to will a mans damnation yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility It is I confesse a possibility to the contrary but not a contrary possibility Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evill are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners but yet they are no contrary liberties so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation which are consequent upon the use of this liberty though they are possibilities to contrary things yet are they not contrary possibilities And as Gods anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up but upon the dispising of his love alluringe unto good so Gods love signifying the execution of reward doth never rise up but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good But if you take Gods wrath for his will to punish I say that looke by what reason Gods wrath as it signifies his will to punish doth not arise in God
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
teach when we make the work of faith a worke of power 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power and is not the worke of grace such a worke Eph. 2. 2 But you doe ill under colour of magnifying the love of God to dishonour both his love and his power his love in confining it onely to promises and threatnings as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance his power in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe and that ardently And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme as wel'l as we doe In the next place you tell us We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him but constraines no mans will to love him But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint why did you not expresse your minde on this point you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse the author and finisher of our faith of our repentance of our obedience Did you acknowledge this there should bee no difference betweene us For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us by way of constraint And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes that which was pleasing in his sight you shall never finde in any of our Divines that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God I know no power in God but infinite and seeing what worke soever he workes is by the exercise of his power it cannot be denied but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite Againe is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts It is not as I presume you will confesse why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts and making us to love him be accounted a worke of power infinite And Austin divers times professeth that God doth convert our hearts omnipotenti facilitate by an almighty facility and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite as when Bernard confesseth of God saying Bernâ—n circumcis Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God it is no article of our Creed but a tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts whereby wee are brought to love him Neither doe we say that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us according to that of Iohn 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him because he loved us first and to that of S. Paul The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature and not to a seed of grace though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly as it were fit you should And no marvell For they which doe evill hate the light As for constraint we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained As for the will that non potest cogi cannot be constrained And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity whereof others doe not should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite as if they maintained that the will of man may be constrained yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him would this breed in God a loathing of him Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you Yet I have read My soule loathed them and their soule abhorred mee but I never heard the contrary My soule loathed them and their soule loved mee for while we abhorre God as enemies unto him yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love will he continue to love us and not turne his love into loathing as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes as being satisfied and disdaining to be scorned by them whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts yet could not winne their loues But God never makes us unwillingly to love him it is a thing impossible but as Austine saith Ex nolentibus volentes facit T is true God loves a cheerefull giver but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne Like as it is said of him that Corâ—nat non merit a nostra sed donasua he crownes not our works but his owne And where there is a willing minde there it is accepted not according to that which a man hath not but to that which he hath but whose worke is this willing minde Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us but makes us willing and ready and cheerefull in the performing of it not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth but in suffering what hee inflicteth or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse though with much a doe yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse will hee love his childe or his obedience or dutifulnesse the worse for this yet God more effectually and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts even omnipotente facilitate as Austine speaketh and shall hee love our obedience our thankfulnesse our repentance the lesse for this 5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme to wit In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard All
hands and keepe us from falling into the hands of men yet if God calleth us thereunto to commit our selves unto God when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him certainly They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence but the revealed will of God For whatsoever Gods nature is hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us but hee hath revealed that he will never faile them that put their trust in him And this is that loving kindenesse of God as much as to say his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature why God should give them a being neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature as you superficially use to discourse but meerely the love of himselfe For he made all things for himselfe And the creature before God made him was just nothing neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus It is a strange conceit to say that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being who is the Creator For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut between an horne and a bagpipe an harp and an harrow Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator and the creature Certainly all do not love God whom he loves for he loved us when we were his enemies Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him as all shall either sooner or later it will not follow that all should bee saved For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase and such as Esau are hated rather And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine as denying Gods omnipotency then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it The apprehension of Gods love to us is the cause morall of our love to him though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love how dare you professe God loves the reprobate and that ardently and with excessive and infinite love Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption and not rather unlovelinesse throughout Neither will it serve your turne to say that he loves them as his creatures For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads yea and the Devills and damned Spirits 3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill as brethren in evill do love one another and our Saviour hath taught us as much Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have doe not the Publicanes even the same I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable The doing of things otherwise unlawfull in some cases may be dispensed with but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with it may be remitted but that is not to dispense with it I take your meaning and leave your words you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation I no way like such extravagant assertions though frequent in your writings as if you would innovate all both naturall reason and divinity I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost and finall impenitency which God will not pardon in his elect Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe as you doe of your selfe Be God never so louely yet if a man know him not how can hee love him And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God Suppose we doe know him to be most wise most powerfull yet if he be our enemie how should this move us to love him or put our trust in him If we know him to love us and to be our friend yet are not the best backward enough from loving him when we are easily drawne to sinne against him And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable what an uncomfortable doctrine is this and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements Ioh. 14. 5. Againe what is the love of God Is it not to love him above all things even above our selves as Gerson expresseth it Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui Is this naturall long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake is this sinne unpardonable You are a valliant Champion I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ. But alas what should become of poore Peter that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ denied that he knew him and that with oath and imprecation Yet Christ looked back upon him â—s before he had praied for him that his faith might not faile and Peter looked back upon himselfe and went forth and wept bitterly and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order that Peter by name should be acquainted with the first with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead that as he died for his sinnes so hee rose again for his justification The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate who take notice of it chiefly as touching blessings spirituall As for temporall blessings Gods love therein to man how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud comming to passe onely by course of nature But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life which hee never meanes to performe is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes To the children of God there is
A DISCOVERY OF D. IACKSONS VANITIE OR A perspective Glasse wherby the admirers of D. IACKSONS profound discourses may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them in sundry passages and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received Written by William Twisse Doctor of Divinitie as they say from whom the Copie came to the Presse Iob 38. 2. Who is this that darkeneth counsell by words without knowledge Imprinted ANNO M. DC XXXI To the understanding Reader TWo sorts of men there are to passe by the meer Politicians ready to serve the times and their owne turnes without any fear of God or man which now undermine that doctrine of grace which formerly they themselves have beleived and by the preaching wherof they have receyved the grace wherby they are what they are in any true good Some under a shew of modestic and simplicity hold off themselves and others from admitting so high poynts as not willing to beleive that which is above their comprehension But others take up the cause a clean contrary way and would bear the World in hand that the failings of our divines in this doctrine came from shallownesse and want of profound knowledge in Metaphysicall speculations Of this later ranke Mr. D. Iackson is the ringleader This man doubteth not to professe that he hath found no character of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence no not in the Holy Prophets and Apostles writings from which he hath receyved so full instruction or reaped the like fruits of admiration as from one of Trismegist an Egyptian Priest part 1. pag. 55. So that the sentence which he passeth upon Vorstius whom he seemeth more to aemulate in overturning the divine attributes then any other doth shreudly reflect upon himselfe The evaporations of proud phantastick melancholy hath ecclipsed the lustre of glorious presence in this prodigious Questionists braine which would bring us out of the Sunne-shine of the Gospell into old Egyptian darknesse From the same Aegyptian learning thorough Plato and Plotinus he taketh his draught of the divine decrees For he acknowledgeth no decree of God concerning humane actions good or bad no not of those which God promised to effect either concerning his mercy in Christ and Christians or concerning his judgements to be effected by the wicked but onely disjunctive that is by his owne instances part 2. Sect. 2. cap. 17. Aut erit aut non erit it shall eyther raine all day tomorrow or befaire all day tomorrow in which example of a false disjunction he may seem to teach that Gods decrees may also be false the Sunne will eyther shine or not shine this day at twelve of the clocke Surely from this character of a divine decree though we can receyve no good instruction yet have we as much fruit of admiration as D. Iackson himself receyved from the former of ubiquity For what Christian can satisfie himself in wondering how erit illa die which is the usuall expression of Gods decree in the Prophets phrase can be interpreted by erit aut non erit how all the promises which declare Gods decree of dispensing his grace upon all nations by the ministery of men as ra ne or dew upon hearbs should be so glossed it shall eyther raine or not raine or how all the decreed promises concerning the prevayling course of the Sunne of righteousnes in by his his servāts activitie should be flouted with this disjunction it shall shine or not shine It would bring some fruit of admiration if any Prince or Law maker should make no other decree about such things as concerne their and their subjects good but meerly disjunctive eyther men shall doe so or not so eyther they shall doe good or suffer evill For though men have not power of determining absolutely future actions yet they come neerer to that then the indifferencie of an even-weighing disjunction doth import They putte so much weight as the efficacie of their will can bear to that scale wherin they place this shall be But Plato and Plotinus conceyved or rather in some of their discourses expressed no more then this All Christians therfore are by D. Iackson called back agayne to this as if by the Prophets and Apostles they had been caried too farre It can not indeed be denied but the Platonists did commonly so decipher their humane ideas of divine decreeing as D. Iackson doth For Alcinons de doctrina Platonis cap. 12. hath the same relation in plaine termes which D. Iackson hath turned into his strong lines of Oxford Sic fatum ex sententia Platonis pronunciat quaecunque anima talem vitam elegerit hujusmodi quaedam commiserit consequenter talia patietur Libera ergo est anima in ejus arbitrio vel agere vel non agere ponitur quod autem sequitur actionem ab ipso fato perfinitur Veluti ex eo quod Paris Helenam rapiet quod quidem in ejus erat arbitrio sequetur ut Graeci de Helena decertent Indeterminatum atque indifferens natura sua libertate nostra in utram placuerit statere lancem quodam modo declināte mox aut verum aut falsum ex possibili sit But if D. Iackson had not too much been caried away with admiration of these ideas he might have receyved a double inctruction from this Alcinons 1. That Plato did overthrow his owne idea by granting a fatall decree of the Grecians fighting against Troye in which warre were conteyned so many thousands of humane actions as there were soldiers in the Grecian army in exemplifying the liberty of humane actions from fatall decree 2. That Plato went before Aristotle of whom he was forsaken in better notions in denying upon that libertine ground any contingent especially free actions to come to be true before they be acted Which Swarez himselfe in his Metaphysicks confesseth to be no lesse an error then the overturning of Christian faith doth amount to libertate nostra mox aut verum aut falsum ex possibili sit Had not the same passion of admixation stood in the way he might have learned out of Marsilius Ficinus to whom he is beholding for other Platonicall notions that Plato himself was by fits of another minde For so sayth this Author de Theol. Platon cap. 13. Deus naturarum omnium temperator dum regit cuncta singula pro singulorum regit natura Quoniam vero motor primus praevalere debet dominari ideo sic animos ut Plato vult quasi cogit ad bonum ut bonum ipsum nolle non possint And that these secōd thoughts of Plato were more agreeable to Christian faith the same Marsilius Ficinus is witnesse Epist. lib. 2. Epist. cui tit Homo quam difficile extra habitum naturalem posilus felicitatem sequitur tam facile hanc in naturalem habitum restitutus assequitur where treating of the like question he saith Quid respondebimus Magi Pythagoraei Platonici Peripatetici forsan sic
bene betweene vs for as much as I have learned bothe of my great Mr. in knowledge naturall Amicus Socrates amicus Plato amicior veritas And of my farre greater Mr. in knowledge spiritual to whose blessing allso I cheifly owe my progresse in knowledge naturall that he who loveth his Father or Mother more then him is not worthy of him whose peremtory voyce is this also If any man come to me hate not his Father Mother Wife Children Bretheren Sisters yea his owne life allso he cannot be my disciple God forbid the mayntenance of truthe shoulde be interpreted to proceede from hatred or want of love to a mans person thoughe in the manner of cariage offense may be given bothe to God man For he is a perfect man that sinneth not in word Luther was conscious of this when before the German Princes in a meeting at Woormes a part of his protestation was this that he was not a man that made profession of holynes acknowledginge that as a man he might erre but I am verily persuaded he was conscious off a good heart towards God The cause that mooveth me herunto is partly the profession which you make in your Epistle Dedicatory that diverse passages in your discourse doe manifest that what I accoumpt the â—ower leven of Arminianisme is very tastfull unto you which nowe you beginne to sett a broach in print as hertofore you have uttered them in the pulpit afterwards by writing communicated unto others wherof diverse particulars have lately come unto my handes which have put me to some paynes to the spending of some precious time in the scanninge of them As for the passages tending that way in this booke of yours I reserve them to be considered in their place But as for the profession which you make in your praeface I purpose here to take that into consideration before I passe on farther in my way It is not so unusuall you say nor so much for you to be censured for an Arminian as it will be for his Lordship to whome you dedicate it to be thought to patronize Arminianisme Herby you seeme praepared to stand upright not couched under the burthen of this censure as Isachar was by Iacobs prophecy to couche under his withall you doe imply that that honourable Lord to whose patronage you inscribe this your Treatise may herby be thought to patronize Arminianisme And you doe well to signifie that his Honour is not like to take it well to be so conceaved off as who hath ever hitherto bene accoumpted both orthodoxe himselfe a Patron of those that are such Yet these insinuations of yours seeme to me some thâ—nge strange on your part For I have founde by experience in other writings of yours that you hertofore have affected to be the inventor of a midle way soe the report goeth of you though I confesse I never founde the issue of your discourses answerable which hathe made me conceave that practise of yours to have bene but a praetence herin I am confirmed by this your praesent profession For ought I perceave you are more foule then Arminius himselfe bothe as touchinge your Tenets the manner of maynteyninge them they more voyde of truthe this more voyde of Scholasticall argumentation to proove what you undertake It may be you take more boldnes to professe your opinions nowe then hertofore allthough I see no reason for it nor can believe that Arminianisme is like to finde more countenance under the reigne of King Charles then it did under the reigne of King Iames who professed Arminius to be the enimy of the grace of God as I have heard King Charles himselfe hath taken notice of his Fathers distast that way sometimes made profession of it But satisfaction you endeavour to give unto his Lordship which you say you are not bound to give to others Yet it is well that for his Honours sake your reader is like to pertake of this courtesie in the way of satisfaction unto many as well as unto one For my part I desire not to oblige you unto any thinge but rather to entreate you that you would be pleased to take notice of those morall obligations that belong vnto all in the way of honesty namely that you would undertake lesse proove more as in this particular when you professe that all other contentions in the point of Gods Providence Praedestinatâ—on betweene the Arminians their opposites will be only about wordes in case they doe all agree in this That your Allmighty Creator hath a true freedome in doing good Adams ofspring a true freedome of doing evill I thinke since the beginninge of these differences never any neyther Papist nor Protestant neyther Lutheran Calvinist or Arminian was of this opinion besides your selfe but the more transcendent and supereminent shal be your sufficiency in being able to perforforme this And indeede I have founde you wonderously conceyted of the force of consequence which these propositions as you imagine doe conteyne in two treatises of yours you have spent a great many wordes in dilatinge upon them shaping consequences from them but as inconsequently as an Adversary coulde expect abusing your selfe with the confusions of those thinges which being distingnished the consequences you frame woulde streite-way vanish into smoke proove to be no better then mere imagination of a vayne thinge And this confusion of yours dothe appeare in that opposition which you make of other positions to these as when you say If any in opposition to Arminius will maynteyne that all thinges were so decreed by God before the creation of the world that nothing since the creation coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done or that nothing can be amended that is amisse then you must crave pardon of every good Christian to oppugne his opinion that not only as an errour in Divinitie but as an ignorance In which wordes of yours I doe observe first that you doe not herin oppose Gods decreinge all thinges but only a certeyne manner of decreinge all thinges as in denyinge that all thinges were soe decreed by God Secondly you doe not well to couple your selfe which Arminius in this For I never founde that Arminius maynteyned that God did decree contingency but not any thing contingent which is your Tenet in diverse pieces both printed manuscript He excepts I grant against Perkins for saying God did will that sinne shoulde be Yet he himselfe professeth that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere wheras the Iewes went farre enoughe in their ignominious handlinge of Iesus Christ he confessethe that Deus voluit Judaeos progredi quousque progressi sunt Thirdly I woulde this were all to witt sinne that you are pleased to exempt from being the object of Gods decree But the case is apparent that you deny faithe repentance every
generations as of thâ— Sonne by the Father the progresse upwardes cannot be infinite Therfore at lengthe we must ascend to thâ— first of Men as Adam who was not borne by generation of Man for then he had not bene thâ— first but otherwise and in like sort of the generations of all other thinges that they had their beginninge from some superior cause to their owne natures which supreame cause of all we accoumpt to be God But yet I thinke you are not ignorant that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge and that by creation in which case there shoulde be an infinite progressâ— in generations unles as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle to praevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge devisethe that thoughe the World had bene from everlastinge yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased because saythe he God coulde have praeserved the first Man from generation propagation of his like untill some five or sixe thousand yeares agoe so you shoulde take some such course to praevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations But I meane not to put you to any such shifts For I holde creation from everlastinge to be a thing impossible and that the impossibility therof may be made evident by demonstration and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned to be of a thing merely impossible allso So that in fine this argument of yours though with litle accuratenes proposed by you is drawne from the creation which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of till another time yet in the first place you have fallen upon it ere you are aware Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians layethe downe two suppositions as the ground of all wherof this is the second that there is no infinite progresse in entities but that in every kinde there is one supreame The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more And least he should seeme to suppose this without all proofe one argument but one he produceth to prove this And the proofe is to this effect It implyeth no contradiction to say such a one there is therfore it is necessary that such a one have beinge it is impossible there shoulde be no God If any Man deniethe the Antecedent it behooveth him to shewe wherin the contradiction dothe consist And it is very strange so strange as incredible that for the best nature to have existence it shoulde imply contadiction As for example we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall Some liave only beinge some have beinge life allso some have beinge life and sence some unto all these adde reason allso Nowe that nature which includes bothe being life is of greater perfection then such as have beinge without life and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge life and sense is of greater perfection then that which includes only beinge and life without sense and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist Agayne that nature which besides all these in the notion therof includes reason allso is of farre greater perfection then the former and it implyeth no contradiction for natures of such perfection to existâ— Lastly there are besides all these natures purely spirituall which we call Angells or Intelligences of farre greater perfection then natures materiall corporall it implyethe no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist as the Philosopher hathe demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection even able to make a World out of nothinge and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves For if possible not to be howe is it possible they shoulde atteyne to beinge Not of themselves For that which is not hathe no power to give being to it selfe Nor of any other whether of a nature superior or inferior Not of any of inferior nature For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell neyther by generation nor by creation If by a superior this is to acknowledge that there is a nature existent superior in perfection unto Angells And if Angells had a necessary being then seinge they are of a certeyne number their number allso must be necessary Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction that God shoulde be it is most necessary that he is and must necessarily be granted that he is For being supposed to include greatest perfection if he had no being it were impossible he shoulde have beinge seing nothinge can bring it selfe from nothinge to beinge neyther can ought els produce him For if any thinge coulde then that whatsoever it were shoulde be of greater perfection then he This is the argument of Bradwardin And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before and but one of the five wayes which he takes in the proofe of this The first way more manifest as he saythe is that which is taken from the consideration of motion wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe and is not mooved that is the first moover which saythe he all understand to be God The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient For saythe he we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes one subordinate to another wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse secondly that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe Hence it followeth saythe he we must ascend rest in one supreame efficient which acknowledgethe no efficient of it and that all understand to be God The third way is that which hathe bene allready prosecuted from the consideration comparison of thinges possible with thinges necessary The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges as some thinges are more or lesse true more or lesse good more or lesse noble whence he concludes that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true most good most noble that to be the cause of truthe goodnes perfection in all others as fire is the cause of all heate And that which is the cause of all others we acknowledge to be God The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves whence he concludethe there is some thinge that orderethe them and that must be God This last argument is that which Raymund Sebond dothe so much dilate insist upon And wherof he is very confident like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine within the space of a monthe and that without any knowledge to
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
to say that our will is contingently free seeing this is as much as to say it is possible that the will of man should not be free But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end to every antecedent possible a correspondent consequent which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility granted by his decree into act For what way soever of many equally possible mans will doth encline Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and deede that hath passed from you this yeere like as he had beene the cause as you say of every thought and action that might have passed from you if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto Gods will which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherin you pretend to give a reason of the former But this performes nothing lesse If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeare had beene altered and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therin And the reason is this For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed a determinate end But I pray you consider are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of somethinge that you did the last yeare Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne The last yeare many a man was a formall professour this yeare it may be he is turned Papist or Turke is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent Yet many continue formall professours still wiâ—hout any such alteration some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers silthy lust and this yeare is advanced by it Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God Some have prospered by impoysoning of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more without controll In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end correspondent consequents you meane only the good and evill that doe befall men according to their former workes according to that God will rewarde every man according to his workes But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts and actions For what Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare What a ridiculous conceyte in this Well still we holde you engaged to maintayne that which you have plainely avouched namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action and thought of man for a yeare together yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past which you have delivered without any explication I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse in generall In particular consider further you say that mans will is necessarily subject unto God this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the sentence before going but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding proportionably unto former actions whether good or bad But by your leave it is not mans will but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished but his person rather Agayne suppose God decreeth not the actions of men but the rewards of them yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man the true explication whereof that I know is only this that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to witt in rewarding or punishing but not the will of God himselfe Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man neither are you able to performe it Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible For many cogitations are possible which shall never be And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent you understand rewardes or punishments But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment For to the evill thoughts and words and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them but his purpose is to pardon them Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel was slayne by the sword of his owne children Davids adultery was punished by the filâ—hy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes and correspondent consequents and everlastingly decreed by God what hindereth but that in your opinion actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends needsno other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie granted by his decree into acte Which is plaine gibrish you instance in nothing for illustration sake not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not but rather it is so unsound that you might well feare it And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light I will give instance for you Absalons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife for God punished David hereby and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon Inserviit castigandâ— Davidi Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place needed no other cause or meanes to produce it but onely the reducing of possibilitie granted by Gods decree into act Now what possibility doe you meane the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba
contradict you provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this and if you had used the like warinesse in everie sentence he had need rise betime that would goe beyond you in this kâ—nde of warinesse and circumspection yet to make all sure you give a reason of it saying For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty And herein you say verie true for if it were absolutelie necessarie for him to decree this surelie it were not absolutelie free for him whether to decree it oâ— no. Yet I finde some in opinon have transgressed in this later but never any in the former For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent and conceived him to be a necessary agent yet never beleeved that it was necessarie for him to decree the deposition of Elies house or ought else And therefore you doe not well to prove a more plaine thing by that which is lesse manifest We have as good stuffe in the next To say that before Elies dayes God past any act that could constraine his eternall libertie of honouring Elies family as well as any others were impiety because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability Herehence are certaine Aphorismes to be selected worthy our consideration 1. God is not to be charged with any thing that is impotent but there is a kinde of immutability that is impotent therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability Now to attâ—bute unto God â—hat which doth not become him is a kinde of blasphemy The contradâ—ctorie hereunto doth become God and must be attributed unto him to wit immutability For mutabâ—lity and immutability are termes contradictorie and it is one of the most generall principles that are that one of two contradictorie termes may be attributed to any thing therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable And in haec Amphâ—arae sub terram abdâ—tae Old Prophet Maâ—achy dost thou heare this that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God I the Lord am not changed And thou Iames the Apostle how hast thou deceived us in llâ— that with God there is no variablenesse nor shadow of change Yet now we are taught that it is no lâ—le then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable yea it is to ascribe impotencie unto him Hee must be mutable that he may be potent Well let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist to wit in not being able to reverse his owne act so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his owne act Here by the way it is acknowledged that Gods decrees are acts past otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no colour of mutability Yet hitherunto it hath beene denyed that Gods decrees were acts past And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty For so you thought better to discourse then at the first to professe any revocable nature of Gods decrees But now that conceyte not fadging and your selfe as it seemes not throughly satisfied you plainely breake forth and adventure to mainteyne that notwithstanding Gods decrees are acts past yet he can change them and thus farre he is mutable and to say that God is immutable herein is to charge him with impotency From the first I looked for this and at length the partridge is sprunge But you will say otherwise his liberty is restrayned I answere this is a vayne fiction proceeding from the vayne consideration of mans infirmities and attributing them unto God For man after he hath promised a thing afterwards would fayne break his promise either because he made it improvidently or because he is of a fickle disposition and therfore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will But no such improvidence is found in God no such fickle disposition is incident to him And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause his liberty is the same still For liberty extends no farther then to doe what we can or will Now though God can doe otherwise absolutely yet he will not doe otherwise and supposing that he hath decreed to doe this it is impossible that he should doe otherwise For God cannot change his will for as much as all change of will in the creature proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God as namely improvidence or forgetfullnes or sicklenes or the like and yet doe not we say that the deposition of Elies race or the death of his Sonnes were absolutely necessary But God had ordained them to come to passe contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage If you rest your selfe upon such a decree of God They that dishonour me them will Jâ—dishonour what need you trouble the World with such distastfull speculations as to affirme that to say God is immutable is to charge him with impotency But this is an indefinite proposition and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God you must deny that the will of God to depose Elies line in particular from the Preisthood was eternall and affirme thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty but not to doe it untill Ely had dishonoured God And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations and these doe farre better suite with your first course namely as touching reservation of liberty and suspension of resolution then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past But the common and generall opinion of making Gods decrees eternall made you to shuffle in that a long time and at length plainely to fall fowle upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise Gods liberty should be restrayned Of Cicero Austin sayth that dum homines fecit liberos fecit sacrilegos And you to make God free make him immutable and think to helpe it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceave 4. In conclusion you tell us that to think of Gods eternall decree without admiration voyd of danger we must conceive it as the immediate axis or center upon which every successive or contingent act revolves And I professe I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration And the object of my admiration is upon what axis or center your witt did revolve when you pleased your selfe with this resemblance Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an hereticke For it had neede be understood first And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this For like as he
Overbury saw manifestly that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower which he had bought with a great summe of money This temptation prevailed with him wee commonly say The greater is the temptation the lesse is the sin So where small meanes of contentments are the greater is the temptation to discontent and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof But I doe not finde that the particular instances following doe any way savour of this member of your distinction You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit Wit is a naturall faculty I confesse I never heard it called a naturall propension till now But as for wealth it is neither propension nor faculty naturall nor at all naturall It is true I confesse that some mens wealth gets the start of wit as he observed that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors When I behold your wealth I wonder at your wit againe when I behold your wit I wonder at your wealth I confesse willingly that to abound in wealth is to abound in temptations unto sinne that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome that when Jeshurun waxed fat he spurned with the heele But the temptations herehence arising prevaile onely on them that want wit is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before neither am prone to beleeve it I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians or of Xerxes who as I remember it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure nor to Heliogabalus among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough I never heard it proceeded from want of wit for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole Hercules servivit Omphale was it for want of wit That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses had his honesty beene answerable to his wit he had kept his reputation with the best And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke I never heard defamed for want of wit Yet we commonly say many men have good wits but they are in fooles keeping And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave And it is most true that such are most unwise as appeares by the issue for by such courses they shorten their dayes and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves there to grow greene before their heads bee gray and after they are gone their remembrance rots and they leave a very ill savour behinde them But I should thinke that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses nor of so active spirits to prosecute them as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable But I should thinke it is their pride rather then their wit that instigates them to injurious courses For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes this must needs expose them to lewd courses Yet a good wit I confesse to maintaine a bad cause may animate some more to molest and vexe and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses Though mens bodies overgrow their soules yet if they have not a spirit answerable they will prove but lubbers though great lubbers as great as Gog-Magog whom Corineus met withall at Dover when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie over and over And it is a common saying that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare though he that is weake had neede to be witty yet it is not alwaies true or for the most part that weake persons are wily and where wilinesse is found it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse to move men to practise unlawfull policy where grace is wanting But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft is as much as to say it shelters it selfe with it selfe and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within and wily crafty courses without well something else to wit mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby yet wilines cannot For like as wisdome is not sheltered but rather discovered laid open by wise courses folly by foolish courses so also wilines craftines by wily and crafty courses I see no reason to justifie that saying men love their wits more strongly when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good And I give a reason for my negation though you give none for your affirmation for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite the more strongly doth the appetite affect it and the more convenient things are unto us the more wee love our selves for affecting them Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite then objects temperate and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person then courses of liberality and generally to all men in the state of corruption the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses Nay a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good as the wicked are in their affections unto evill my reason is because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the spirit which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good whereas on the contrary in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury rather of their affection unto evill especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them Againe to doe good to the poore is not good in it selfe as you suppose we were wont to say in the Vniversity that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias and as I remember it was a saying of Bernard that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity And how can that bee a good will to the poore that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore â—o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul that robbeth Peter to pay Paul yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul I confesse but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul it may well proceed from other intentions No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare or his owne either no
nor the glory of God by ungodly courses no nor doth the obligation rest in generall but it concludes in speciall all good courses that lie in his power so to tender it a man is bound and not otherwise You have discoursed of divers enormities in the close you open the cause of them unto us and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence this you say is the cause not why such enormities are but of the possibility of them Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression Therefore the infinite capacitie of finite existence is the cause why sinne is possible I thought it had beene satisfaction enough in this point to conceive that because wee are in subjection to a Lord who can give us a law and are free agents therefore we may either obey a law given unto us or transgresse it And because looke what is the cause why disobedience is possible the same is the cause why obedience also is possible It followeth that the cause why obedience is possible must be the infinite capacity of finite existence And because by finite existence you meane a reasonable creature your meaning a little more plaine is this The reason why a man may sinne or abstaine from sinne is his infinite capacity Wee say it is the libertie of his will being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny nor any sober man herehence it followeth that this infinite capacitie you cant of is but the libertie of mans will in subjection to the law of a superiour Lord. For man being free may overcope as you speake that is to expresse in a small and still voice without thundring or fire or mightie winde to doe that which he should not And thus having attained to your plaine meaning wee bid farewell to your mysticall expressions of so plaine a truth by comparing this infinite capacity you speake of to too wide a sphere and finite motions to a slarro fixed in that sphere and thereby exposed to excentricall and irregular motions which I think neither Copernicus nor Ticho Brahe were they alive could well tell how to expound unto us or to their selves either We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible as for the life and improvement of this possibility for so you are pleased to bestow the being and life and improvement upon it by the inequality of internall propensions never fitly matching outward occurrences that we reasonably well understand and have discoursed thereof what wee thought fit enough if not more then enough 7 At length you are come to the house it selfe of your present discourse according to the title of this Chapter hitherto we have beene complementally entertained in the porch But in God you say there is no place for exorbitancy hee being an incomprehensible sphere which hath omnipotency for his axis ubiquity for its center if you had added nusquam for his circumference the illustration according to your former subtleties had beene more compleat We say that God in doing what he will cannot sinne because hee hath no superiour Lord to give him lawes to binde him his owne wisdome alone can and doth direct him and it becomes his wisedome to manifest his owne glorious nature and therefore whatsoever hee can doe in case hee doth it it shall be wisely done for as much as his power therein is manifested You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this that his capacities cannot overcope though the Angels did One branch of being in him you say cannot missway or overtop another what your meaning is I know not but looke unto it that you doe not contradict your selfe in maintaining that God can doe some things by his omnipotency which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him which is as much as to say that he can do that which is unjust And if this bee not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope I doe not know what is To say that God possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have is to say that hee possesseth nothing for it is impossible that God should desire to have any thing for this implies a want of something belonging to the deitie It is directly false and foule to say that God is whatsoever possible can be for if it be true then it ever was true seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time and consequently before the world was it was true wherehence it will follow that God is an Angell a man and every vile thing as wee account them amongst the creatures for all these were possible to be before the world was neither will it salve this foule sore to say that God is a man or an oxe infinitely for he is no bodily substance at all neither can any bodily substance be infinitely We say that God is all things eminently whereby we meane no more then this God is the cause of all things and better thus in plaine tearmes to expresse our meaning then by affecting curious straines and formes of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn derision amongst atheists God is of necessary being and therefore of himselfe eternall without beginning and without end To perfect himselfe or to be greater or better then he is is to suppose that he is imperfect and not Optimus maximus which is a thing impossible and therefore not subject to nor the object of Almighty power nay it destroyes it as one part of contradiction destroyes the other for Almighty power were formally destroyed if it were imperfect or lesse then Almighty Therfore all outward imployments are for the good of his creature but how not as tending to the good of the creature as Gods end but both his imployments for the creatures good and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much that both from him and for him are all things and the Prophet also God hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked for the day of evill and that for good reason as many hundred yeares ago hath beene acknowledged in these termes Qui dedit esse quo sine essent habui potestatem If Gods will to have creatures when they were not was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are The scripture tells us that God worketh all things according to the counsel of his owne will so he did when he made the world so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it so he should if hee should set an end to all and returne them to the gulfe of nothing from whence they came It is false to say that the continuance of being is desired by all as the stampe of Gods goodnesse for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation
warnes Timothy to cary himself gently towards them that are without waiting the time when God will give them repentance that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill by whom they were led captive to doe his will By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation when you say Wheresoever God hath laid the one to wit naturall being it is to all that rightly consider his wisedome truth and goodnesse and assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other Why the truth of God is directly against it professing that he hath mercy on whom he will and heardeneth whom he will and that the same word of God is a savour of life unto life to them that are saved hee doth not say to them that are carefull to prepare themselves and a savour of death unto death unto them that perish and a good savour unto God in both he doth not say to them that do not prepare themselves And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation for they believed as there the Apostle professeth as much as to say the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them and wot you the reason hereof Why surely because they were ordained to salvation like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that God added to the Church day by day such as should be saved You might with as much modesty professe that in as much as God hath made every man It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to give every man repentance before he drops out of the world Gods gifts are without repentance it is true of the gifts of sanctification but it is as true that God repented that he made man That the current of Gods joyfull benificence can admit no intermission is most untrue for he dispenseth it freely so he continueth it as freely For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne will that is nullo necessitatis obsequio as Ambrose expoundeth it Nay it doth admit intermission in this world In the world to come indeed it shall admit no intermission in this it doth both in respect of blessings temporall and in respect of motions spirituall For as touching blessings temporall God sheweth the back sometimes and not the face Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse My God my God why hast thou forsaken me but the intermission of these It is true sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow And though the woman by reason of sinne hath ever since conceived in sorrow yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause yet all sorrow proceeds from God in the way of an efficient cause Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some as well as hee causeth joy to others 9. The comparison is most absurd For illumination proceeds from the Sunne as from a naturall cause working by necessity of nature but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought or send forth any influence is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith they were sowne in their first creation for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall as well as the Angels of light And all the influence that God sends forth you say is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse whence it followeth that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the verie Devils And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels is a part of that influence that proceeds from God and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits without hope of recovery in concurring to this assurance God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them Besides this with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinfull actions this your selfe have often acknowledged and this concourse of his is a part of his influence and no influence you say can proceed from him but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinfull actions doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also Now proceed we along with you God you say doth inspire all that are conformable to his will with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them This is a bone very well worth the picking I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it You doe not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will but as many as are conformable to his will hee inspires with other good desires whence I pray then comes conformity to his will if not from the inspiration of God doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world or of the devill Yet S. Paul saith that it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed not by any necessary emanation as light issueth from the Sunne but according to his owne good pleasure Againe this very desire of doing others good is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will why not also with another And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God as the cause of them The mystery of your meaning in this the next sentence serves as a key to open when you say that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestiall influence become creators of their owne woe and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish So then Gods influence is to all like as the light of the Sunne onely the difference ariseth herehence that some resist it others yeeld unto it As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe So then it is not God that ex nolentibus volentes facit but mans free will And in spight of St. Paul it shall be volentis currentis and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speake of can be no other then
that he had cursed them already And equally and indifferently as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient and therefore calls heaven and earth to witnesse that hee hath set before them life and death blessing and cursing So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God as the Author of them like as life and blessing and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man as it is found either in the way of obedience or in the way of disobedience And in this respect perhaps you may say that man is the cause of cursing not God To this I answer 1. By the same reason man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing and not God 2. If in this respect cursing be to be derived from sin it is onely in the way of a meritorious cause so doth not fruit proceed from trees but onely in the way of an efficient cause God and none but God can be the Author as of happinesse so of misery as of eternall life so also of everlasting death And as none is truly blessed but whom God blesseth so none is truly accursed but whom God curseth Yet no man I thinke that hath his wits in his head will say that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love but rather from his hatred Gods love towards the creature is essentiall his love to the creature is not so no more then to be a creator is of Gods essence And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged belong to God onely as a Iudge to execute the one by way of reward and the other by way of punishment Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing though you love not to distinguish but to consound rather as all that maintaine bad causes love darknesse rather then light I come to the second point wherein you insist In that he is the Author of being he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are And this is very true for God saw all that he had made and lo it was very good And as it is very true so it is nothing at all to the purpose For when we enquire whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations And secondly we speake of a love proper to mankinde which consisteth not in giving them their being for God hath given being unto Angels even unto Devils as well as unto men and as to men so to all inferiour creatures be they never so noysome and offensive unto man And it is a strange course of yours to magnifie the love of God to man in giving him being which is found in the basest creature that breathes or breathes not I have heard a story of a great Prince when one of the prime subjects of the land being taken in a foule act of insurrection and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince presuming of ancient favour whereof hee had tasted in great measure and which upon his presence might haply revive he found nothing answerable but imperious taâ—ts rather and dismission in this manner Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner when you say that hoe hath given us being which wee well know God hath given to lyons rigers and beasts of prey yea to snakes and adders to frogges and toads and fiery serpents Herehence you proceed to the third point and do inferre That because he hath made us therefore hee loveth us for He hateth nothing that he hath made as saith the wise man and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you you use an introduction of strange state for you say The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived that He hateth nothing that he hath made But to what purpose tends all this pompe Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all and can neither deceive nor be deceived May not fooles speake of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived as well as wise men and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this If the author of that sentence had beene such a one as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Iew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull take the author of it for such a one as could neither deceive nor be deceived If you did this were very foule play and no better then a trick of conicatching Yet we except not against the sentence but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours taken from the same ground above two hundred yeares ago You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes where his first objection is this Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet Nullus enim reprobat quem diligit sed Deus omnem hominem diligit secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt nihil odisti eorum quae secisti Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat It seemes that God reprobates no man For no man reprobates him whom hee loveth But God loves every man according to that Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are and hatest nothing that thou hast made Therefore God reprobateth no man And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner Adprimum dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diliget etiam omnes creaturas in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod est vita aeterna dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare To the first is to be answered that God loves all men yea and all creatures for as much as he willeth some good to them all but yet he willeth not every good to all There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good which is life everlasting he is said to hate them or to reprobate them And you might have beene pleased to take notice not onely of that wise man though as wise as Philo who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived but of that wise God who is wiser then men and Angels and can neither deceive nor be deceived and affirmeth openly that He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau as also of the Apostle Saint Paul who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne
every one I would I knew once what forme would satisfie you for I am apt to entertaine a resolution to gratifie you therein But to say that we must pray for all not in an indefinite but in an universall consideration if you could make me understand it I would soone come to capitulation with you In the meane time I appeale to your conscience did you ever pray in this stile for all and signifie that your meaning was to pray for them not in an indefinite but in an universall consideration I professe unto you if God should leave me unto my selfe and to follow mine owne desires I should desire not onely that all that now live but that all that ever lived might have beene converted and saved yea the Angels that fell might have been kept from sin or having sinned might have beene brought to repētance saved I see no cause why I should desire the contrary But considering the wil of God wherby the angels that fell are bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day I dare not pray for their salvation And to pray that every one that now lives might be saved with submission to the will of God I see no incongruity but we have better grounds of faith and those sufficient to take up our thoughts especially in these daies wherein we live whereupon to proceed in the ordering of our prayers And I would be loath you should put upon us any course or forme of prayer for all which you practise not your selfe And if I knew your practice in this kinde I would soone give in mine answer whether I thought good to subscribe to your forme or no. In the next place you tell us that the reason why we are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men universally considered is because we must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect Here againe you bewray your jealousie of the weaknesse of your owne cause as when you content not your selfe in saying we must pray for all men but adde hereunto that we must pray for all men universally considered the opposite member wherto before you signified to be this To pray for all men indefinitly considered Now the Apostle is farre from these scrupulosities He simply exhorts us to pray for all men hee doth not adde as you doe We must pray for all men universally considered and not indefinitely Yet in no other sense you think it will serve your turne That reason of yours drawne from the conformity to the courses of our heavenly Father whereon you so much insist I have already shewed how little it serves your turne Now I will shew you how in another respect it is rather repugnant then consonant to your Tenet For that example of conformity is onely in an indefinite consideration thus Wee must pray not onely for our friends and them that love us but also for them that are our enemies and hate us and persecute us like as God doth good unto the just and wicked and not onely to the just and good To our desires you say wee must adde our endeavours that saving truth may be imparted to all It seemes you have not failed herein Now I would gladly know what those endeavours of yours have beene hitherto whereby you have endeavoured that saving truth may be imparted to the inhabitants of terra Australis incognita or to the Negroes or to the Tartarians yea or the Turkes Saracens or Arabians Hitherto you have seemed to dispute thus God will have it our duty to pray for the salvation of all therefore God willeth the salvation of all but now you dispute in a quite contrary manner thus God wils that all should come to the knowledge of his truth therefore wee must desire and endeavour that his saving truth may be imparted unto al. The consequence of your former argument is utterly untrue as I have already shewed and as Austin long agoe discoursed mans will in an holy manner may be contrary to the will of God and againe in a most unholy manner may the will of man be concurrent with the will of God As it is the duty of the childe to pray for the life of the father though God will have the father to dye and not live On the other side a wicked childe wisheth the death of his father in an ungracious manner yet it may bee that herein he concurreth with the will of God supposing as it may well be that God willeth the death of the father at the same time that the sonne wisheth it As for the second argument we deny therein the antecedent if you understand it of all and every one For the case is cleer that God doth not bring all and every one to the knowledge of his truth not because he cannot for doubtlesse he could bestow his Gospell upon them that want it as well as upon us that enjoy it therefore the reason must needs be because he will not As he plainly professeth he will bring a famine of his word upon a Land Amos 8. 11. Behold the dayes come saith the Lord God that I will send a famine in the land not a famine of bread nor a thirst of water but of hearing the word of the Lord. vers 12. And they shall wander from sea to sea and from the North even to the East shall they runne to and fro to seeke the word of the Lord and shall not finde it So the Lord threatens the Church of Ephesus to remove her candlesticke out of his place Revel 2. and long before threatned the Iewes to take his vineyard from them and let it out to others that should bring him the fruit thereof in due season And it is very strange that these and such like judgements should come to passe and God should not will them This is the reason whereupon Austin is moved to enquire into a commodious construction of that place left otherwise we should fall upon a direct contradiction to the prime Article of our Creed and therefore after he hath given two constructions of the place the last whereof is this which you impugne but not answer his reasons which are two the one drawne from the analogie of Scripture phrase as where our Saviour saith unto the Pharises you tithe Mint and Rue and every herbe which phrase cannot be understood otherwise then of every kinde of herbe the other reason is that formerly spoken of as if we say That God willeth such a thing to come to passe which yet doth not come to passe we shall thereby deny Gods omnipotency Yet see the ingenuity of this worthy father hee gives any man leave to give any fair construction of the place provided that God bee not made unable to bring to passe whatsoever hee will have to come to passe Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest dum tamen credero non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem statutum voluisse fieri factumque non esse qui sine ullis
for him to repent I know no such state nor any rule that God hath given to himselfe to confine his grace Nay to the contrary we reade that neither continuance in sinne nor greatnesse of sinne doth preclude the grace of God but that Gods grace as it can so it doth many times prevaile over both But you love not to speake distinctly but to carie your selfe in the clouds of generalities They that maintaine a weake cause had need play least in sight wee say plainly that God well knowes no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance the Scriptures in divers places expresly testifying that repentance is the gift of God though you love not to heare of that eare nor are well pleased as it seemes with the musique that riseth upon the touching of that string On the other side God knowes that every man at any time can repent if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance yea and that he shall repent also the habituall grace serves for the one and the actuall and effectuall motion of Gods Spirit is requisite to the other I come to the second parallell of Iesuiticall equivocation or rather the deification of it as you are pleased out of glorious spleene to calumniate your opposites The protestation is on Gods part I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth the reservation with purpose to make this part of my will knowne unto him But where I pray doe you finde any such protestation on Gods part Ezekiel hath none such In him it is said I will not the death of him that dieth But no where doth he say I will not the non repentance of him that dieth This is a tricke of your owne device as if you followed the counsell of Lysander and where the Lyons skinne will not reach you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skinne Wee professe in plaine termes that as God hath mercy on whom he will so he hardneth whom he will and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministery of his word I meane all those that heare it To repent and beleeve the Gospel So he did bid the Iewes and that with great earnestnesse to keepe the covenant Deut. 30. 19. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you that I have set before you life and death blessing and cursing therefore chuse life that both thou and thy seed may live By loving the Lord thy God by obeying his voice and cleaving unto him for hee is thy life and the length of thy daies that thou maiest dwell in the land which the Lord did sweare unto thy fathers ' Yet I hope you will not say this could be done without grace though of the nature of grace what you thinke and of the universall extention thereof I should be very glad to understand and that therein you would speake your minde plainly As for the reservation here it is most ridiculous neither is any equivocation of Iesuites I trow answerable hereunto for by reservations a sense is raised contradictious to the sense of the protestation but by this reservation no contradiction ariseth to the former as it lieth but onely it denyeth a certaine purpose to be joyned with it but be it that Iesuits allow such artifice what Divine of ours doth Did we say that God wills not the non repentance of any we would say hee willeth it not in as much as hee forbiddeth it And Gods prohibitions and commandements are usually though improperly called the will of God And here voluntas signi hath proper place enough Like as God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne yet his determination was that Isaac should not be sacrificed Some may have said that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth in case he repent But was ever any heard to affirme that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth to wit with purpose to make it knowne unto him What madnesse possessed you to ascribe so incredible a thing to your opposites so contrary to the rule of fiction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Callimachus hath set it downe Your addition here likewise which drawes a long taile after it hath no conformity to the patterne And as for the substance of it as touching Gods resolution never to grant some repentance or the meanes of it if thereby you meane the Gospel we acknowledge it to be truth for the arme of the Lord is not revealed unto all neither doth he give repentance or faith to all but hath mercy on some onely even on whom hee will and hardenneth othersome even whom he will that is denieth them repentance and consequently they cannot repent which interpretation of obduration your selfe make in the seventh section following and consequently they cannot live this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end you proceed to talke of Gods oath in giving assurance that he will not the death of them that are damned built meerly upon a translation which you follow different from the most authorized translation of our Church and that contrary to evident reason for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent so hee must needs will it for hee doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will Ephesians 1. 11. And yet according to your reading of it a good construction may be given without all reservations as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God it selfe And what God hath manifested unto us in his word I hope is not to bee accounted a reservation but a revelation rather I am not of your minde to thinke that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection or to keepe a mans word either which yet is a better point of morality then to keepe an oath Such justice is to bee found amongst heathen men yet workes of mercy go beyond workes of justice yet no great perfection neither but to be mercifull to our enemies When they are hungry to feed them when they are thirsty to give them drinke this is the perfection that our Saviour calleth us unto and sets before our eyes the goodnes of our heavenly Father in suffering his raine to fall and his sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good And here withall how well your calumniation hath sped imputing to us the deification of Iesuiticall equivocations let the indifferent Reader judge 6 Here you proceede learnedly to distinguish betweene somethings determined by oath and somethings else and in the accomodation of your distinction you tell us that Voluntas signi and beneplaciti can have no place in things determined by divine oath but well it may in other things What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by
man or what is the effect of this love and I doubt not but when you say God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne your meaning is that God wills their damnation and that for this measure of their sin In proportion your answer should be this That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men yet here is very great disproportion for when you say God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate the elect as touching the cause of damnation and that on mans part namely the making up the full measure of their sin which is found onely in reprobates not in the elect But when you say on the contrary side God wills the salvation of all men as they are men I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation either on mans part or on Gods part for as touching Gods will that passeth you say upon the salvation of all without difference then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all if they are considered onely as men for the reprobates are men as well as the elect To help this you rest not in this consideration of them as men but adde a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the forme thus Or at having made up the full measure of their sinne Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent which is untrue for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helpes and thereupon you confound things that differ for in some cases the first consideration usually hath place as when t is said God hateth nothing that hee hath made therefore he hateth not man true say some he hateth not man as man and this distinction seemes plausible to some and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way for it might stirre some propitious effection in a pliable reader But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon you added by way of disjunctive another consideration which is this As not having made up the full measure of sinne And because you rest upon it I thinke good to consider it Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates and in the particular of Pharaoh and argued that then Pharaoh had beene saved had he died before the seventh wonder for till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne yet we doe not finde that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne for if he had then had hee beene a reprobate but hee was an elect therefore if hee had died immediately after the sâ—oning of Steven hee had beene saved though accessary to his death For he kept the garments of them that slew him as himselfe confesseth In a word all the elect though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance should notwithstanding bee saved also My third exception is against the disproportion that neverthelesse is found in these propositions for when t is said God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne the filling up the measure of sinne is noted here as the cause of their damnation but in saying God willeth the salvation of all not having filled up the measure of their sinne the not having filled up the measure of their sinne cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation And therefore to mend this foule disproportion the Genius of your tenet drives you in conscience to proceede and professe plainely that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinn Now herein wee agree with you namely in justifying the truth of both these propositions But like as from the latter it followeth not that God willeth the damnation of all but of some onely namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance so from the former it followeth not that God willeth the salvation of all but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent And if you please further to infer that because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former that seeing faith and repentance yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation that is of our election also And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper coulors not an haires breadth different either from the Arminian heresie of late or from the Pelagian heresie of old 8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions As for moderne Catechismes you are not the first that nibble at them it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances But to speake as a free man the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them the lesse shall they differ from the truth As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements which you glorie of now a second time In this place it is hard if not impossible to discerne by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome In the close of the second Section of this chapter you told us That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love and withall that this was observed by Bishop Hooper But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter which is this present section Yet concerning that sentence I see a good construction may bee made of it taking love quoad effectum as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God and not quoad affectum and the chiefest effect of Gods love is salvation Now it is most true that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation of glory nothing but finall perseverance in sinne stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject Now albeit in that which followeth it
to be angry But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe And Gods hatred of Esau is in Scripture made suitable to Gods love of Iacob and if this love be the will of election then hatred must be the will of reprobation And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory be deservedly accoumpted Gods love why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory be as deservedly accoumpted Gods hatred You undertake to shew how Love and anger being passions or linkt with passions are rightly conceaved to be in God but I hope you will not attribute them unto God either a◠passibus or linkt with passions For albeit love and joy mans formally be attributed unto God because they include no imperfection yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him CHAP. XXI How Anger Love Compassion Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature II is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative not because this includes rationem dati accepti but rather because it includes aequalitatem dati accepti Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety then justice commutative as may be seene in Vasque 1. in 1. part disput 86. Likewise I know none that thinke mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God as voluntas miserandi that being as easily abstracted from greife as this from compassion As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward To say that affections or morall qualities may be contayned in the divine essence eminently is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God For to be eminently in God is no more as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect 2. then God to be the Author of them and produce them Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God and say God is such or such a thing is God to wit eminently But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitly different from the will of man No passion as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man may be truely verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion So there is a will and understanding in God but nothing like to the will and understanding of man For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God Our anger at the best as being displeased only with such things that displease God though in some litle thing it be like Gods anger yet in many things it is very unlike For it is a passion in us not in God it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so but only in case we are his ministers For vengeance is myne I will repay sayth the Lord. I cannot justifie you in so speaking when you say that mercy is more reall and truly affectionate in God then his anger For taking them sequestred from theire imperfections each is formally attributed unto God though not as passions and not eminently only as you have delivered it As for the execution of each more or lesse that receaveth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will For he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardneth and farre more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men then vessells of mercy though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis Mercy consists in pardoning sinnes and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God but passion enough even unto death upon the crosse in the nature of man person of the Sonne of God The better use men have of reason the lesse are they subject to perturbation but no whit lesse doe they participate of affection for vertues are not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle hath taught us but the right ordering of them Christs soule was heavy unto the death at the approaching of his passion and wept often before this yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason For all this But no passion at all can be in God for passions rise and fall upon new occasion but no such alteration is incident unto God I know not what you meane by devouring affections They may be concealed or restrained not in a vertuous manner but vitious only to keepe the rankor of theire hearts from discovery as Absolon a long time sayd nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had defloured his sister Thamar he was not any whit the more charitable in that but playd the foxe in waiting opportunity to doe mischeife Likewise when Haman saw Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor mooved for him then was hee full of indignation at Mordecai Neverthelesse Haman refrayned himselfe though hee had plotted the destruction both of him and all his natiō To say that passions are moderate in matters which men least affect is as much as to say that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect And indeede affections must needes be moderate when they are least in motion But perpetuall minding of a thing should argue strength of passion in my judgement rather then moderation To my thinkinge now you are in a vaine of writing essayes Yet I find no greate substance of truth in them How secret cariages can be violently opposed I conceave not For if opposed then no longer secret And the more cunning men are the more notice I should thinke they take of violent opposition unlesse they doe apparently see such opposites are like to overshoote or come short which is a very race case and comes ofter into a schollars fancy then into reall practise I finde no greate passion in Achitophel but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himselfe To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a greate poynt of pollicy undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity not allwayes to restraine them but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinkes of them As Moses in the cause of God was mooved so farre as to breake the
from temptations And indeede lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes Yet the Poet tells us also of one Qui nunquam visae slagrabat amore pâ—ellae So then it had beene a mercy of God that their eies had beene pulled out of their heads in your divinity I doe not deny but the greatest temporall blessings may bee cursed unto a man by the power of God and the greatest temporall â—nrses blessed unto him But I never heard or read before that blindenesse should bee considered onely as a mercy and such a mercy as whereby wee are guarded from temptation But were a man never so lustfull yet I thinke in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eies then to lose them that so hee might be partaker of Gods word by private reading which hath more power to his salvation then the sight of any Cocatrices to his destruction And if Democritus had beene acquainted with this word of God I doe not believe hee would have pulled out his eyes in pretence as if they hindred his meditations Alas what had the Sodomites beene the better for the blindenesse of their eyes if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknowne object For a man can fancie him as hee lusteth Say rather God could not in justice change their hearts seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodnesse and abused his long suffering and loving kindenesse Yet this saying of yours should bee farre enough off from truth and sobriety Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodnesse and abused his long suffering All out of the state of grace doe so for Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia Yea and too often wee doe so in the state of grace also Then againe a yeare before this sinne of the Sodomites was not so obstinate lesse a yeare before that and so the farther we descend to times passed they were lesse and lesse obfirmate Why did noâ— God then change their hearts or if you wil have this to be a fruit of mercy why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keepe them from these temptations But you put it out of question that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindnesse did imply contradiction to his goodnesse and eternall equity A most unreasonable assertion For I demand Hath God prevented your wilfull contempt of his goodnesse yea or not your abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse yea or not If he hath not prevented it then either your selfe have prevented it without his grace or you are guilty or have beene guilty of wilfull contempt of his goodnesse and abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse which if it be so what would become of you if God should deale with you according to these immutable and eternall rules according whereto you professe he deales with all I perswade my selfe you have a good opinion of your owne sufficiency to prevent these foule symptomes of humane corruption otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning The reason you give to enforce this assertion is in part nothing for you in part against you For though all his wayes are truth yet this is nothing for you unlesse you can prove that in such a state of sinne as the Sodomites God hath determined to use no effectuall meanes to the curing of them But how will you prove this for hitherto you have not You might as well say God could not cure â—he sin of those Iewes to whom our Saviour said It shall be easier for Sodome and Gomorrah in the day of judgement then for you If this were granted you yet herehence it followes onely that God cannot cure them because he will not for hee hath determined the contrary But you undertake to prove that God cannot doe it in point of justice although hee would doe it out of his love to mankinde But when you say that all Gods waies are mercie that is directly rather against you then for you For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sinne then not to pardon it and withall we are given to understand that as touching the execution hereof God will have mercy on whom hee will and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he wll You talke after your fashion of an eternall rule of goodnesse appointing his justice to debarre the fruits of his mercy But you are a meere talker and prove nothing Who is not wilfull in the state of nature in contemning Gods goodnesse Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit ex nolentibus volentes facere Doth not Austin professe that God hath converted not onely aversos à vera fide but adversus verae fidei voluntates also and bindes it with a Novimus we know it to have beene so Was it not so in Saul Doth not God professe of his wilfull and stubborne people that he will rule them with a mightie hand and make them passe under the rod and bring them under the bond of his covenant Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first some not till the last houre of the day Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason that because a creature cannot be impeccabilis from his creation therefore God cannot cure mens wilfulnesse in the way of his mercy towards them as you most incoherently discourse as if you were in potting verses rather then upon meditating a coherent and methodicall course of argumentation yet the maxime here mentioned though brought in with some state of selfe conceit is very preposterously contrived by you We commonly say a reasonable creature cannot be impeccabilis per naturam uncapable of sinne by nature he may be impeccabilis per gratiam uncapable of sinne by grace as the elect Angels are elect men shall be in the state of glory but of being so some while after the creation and not immediately from the creation of being so absolutely and of being so not absolutely I know no sobriety in these conceits neither doe I thinke you have any authority to countenance them The Sonne of God I doubt not but you will confesse that hee was impeccabilis from the first So might Angels have beene so might men have beene by grace had it so pleased God to make them I see no reason to the contrary yet had not this beene absolutely impeccable but meerly upon the supposition of the will of God Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present such shall bee ours in the world to come God indeed without supposition out of his own absolutenesse is no way obnoxious unto sinne If Angels are or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition it is and shall be by the meere will and good pleasure of God whereby yet I meane not to exclude all
second causes in the way of Gods glorious qualification of our natures And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certaine manner to wit by way of reward of our obedience therefore he could not make us immutable at first For thus to discourse is to professe that God could make them so upon supposition to wit upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable but to prove that God could not make them impeccable onely upon a certaine supposition Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse If to decline to evill implyes no contradiction but only to omnipotent being then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have nor the Saints of God for the time to come shal have any omnipotent being it followes that to decline from evil is neither contradictorie to the present state of the elect Angels nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God God is impeccabilâ—s per naturam the creatures some are others shal be impeccabilis per gratiam to decline to evill implyeth contradiction to them both To say that to decline to evill is possible to all creatures is true onely in men in the confirmed Angels t is not true It was once of them also I confesse but now it is not It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven it ever was false of the manhood of Christ which yet was and is a creature yet iâ— Christ as man more like to his Creator then either Angell or any other Saint of God If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evill doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned or else he was never truly and inherently good Further if the elect Angels from within few dayes after their creation have continued truly and inherently good notwithstanding their impeccability from that time forward why they should not have beene altogether as truly and inherently good if their impeccability had begunne a few daies sooner even with their creation I see no reason For did not God make them good yea truly and inherently good Surely he did therefore if immediately they had beene impeccable by grace they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truely and inherently good Gods goodnesse is his happinesse this happinesse of his being increate cannot be communicated unto us subjectively but objectively onely Yet there is a goodnesse created called Gods goodnesse because it proceeds from God which is our happinesse of grace shall be our happinesse of glory not the foundation of it but it save that the happinesse of grace is the foundation of our happinesse of glory but to this manner of foundation you seeme to have no reference Neither is there any colour of reason to inferre as you do that therefore Gods justice and loving kindnesse did remove all necessity from mans will because that had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in creation And you may as well say that Christ also might have sinned for necessity to keepe him from sinne would have utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for his manhood being a creature to expresse his Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Sonne of God Nay the truth is if from the beginning wee had beene necessarily enclined unto good wee had more lively expressed Gods goodnesse then now wee doe being freely good For God himselfe is good necessarily not freely It is a senslesse speech to say that mans goodnesse expresseth Gods goodnesse communicative for mans goodnesse is the very goodnesse communicative of God For Gods goodnesse communicative is no goodnesse formally in God but Gods formall goodnesse is uncreate and therefore incommunicable unto creatures Therefore it must be goodnesse create which is Gods goodnesse communicative and that is the verie goodnesse of man it selfe For God is the author of it in genere causae efficientis Create in mee a new heart and renew a right spirit within me And therefore the distinction of the goodnesse of God communicative and communicated is very absurd like as your similitude resembling it to a seale and the stampe thereof Onely the Sonne is the image and character of his Father we are made after the image of God His goodnesse increate is that which doth communicate goodnesse unto us in genere causae efficientis And our goodnesse is the worke of Gods goodnesse But no more proportion betweene them then is betweene nature increate and nature create But it is your usuall course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety Yet you have found out a proportion betweene Gods goodnesse and ours but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented For you compare Gods working freely with mans being freely most incongruously God communicates his goodnesse freely that which duly answereth unto this is mans communicating his goodnesse freely But seeing Gods being good is as a being necessarily if God had made us to bee good necessarily that is impeccable by his grace herein had wee better exprest the manner of his goodnesse And if otherwise we could not be like unto God it followes that the Angels now for many thousand yeares have not been good like God because they have beene good by necessity and not freely So neither Gods Saints in heaven are good like God because they are good by necessity and not freely T is untrue which you adde that man could not be confirmed in such goodnesse as hee had or translated unto everlasting happinesse but by continuing freely good for some space For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception yet this never hindred his confirmation in his goodnesse or translation to everlasting happinesse And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodness which man had from the beginning even from the creation For if God made him good and withall impeccable how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein hee was created And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely For I hope your selfe will not deny but that Christ was impeccable and that what good soever he did he did it freely For like as the wicked in state of nature cannot but sinne in generall that is one way or other yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sinne therefore there is no particular evill that they doe but they doe it freely In like sort though Christ could not but doe good in generall so that whatsoever he did should be good yet seeing he was not necessitated to