Countries which she at last subjugated assuming always greater and better courage as her Empire did encrease and her Military Discipline bettering by exercise as did also her worth by prosperous success Who will not then admire these so great and unparellel'd things Who can consider them without endeavoring to know the reasons thereof Polybius whilst he recounts some of these wonderful things terming the people of Rome invincible adds that he may in a manner give the reason thereof that these people brought whatsoever enterprise how hard and difficult soever after many and various successes to a good and desired end because they were modest in prosperous and constant in adverse fortune These two excellent vertues are certainly requisite to whosoever propounds true and perpetual Glory for his end and does aspire thereunto for the variety of humane affairs does not tolerate that man should arrive at the height of power and at supreme honors by a streight and short path of continued prosperity therefore constancy or let us rather term it Magnanimity or Fortitude is requisite for him to the end that he may persevere in the same gallantry and grandeur of spirit wherewith he did propound any great action to himself without being weary or quiet till he hath effected it And modesty is likewise necessary for him that is to say a temperate affection so as he may not lose himself in prosperous successes and being puft up with pride and vain glory may not think he is come to his journeys end when he is not gotten half way thither which is the cause why many have lost their good fortune and not reaped the true fruits of many worthy and well begun labors So as it may be numbred amongst those things which made great Kings amongst them and which brought them to so great an Eminency of power and command that they were endowed with these two excellent Vertues whereby they knew how to make use of both fortunes But these may peradventure be but general rules and not such as may give satisfaction for if we will look into the Commonwealth of Greece we shall find many eminent examples of both these vertues yet were they not able to carry them half the way so far towards the Goal whereat the Romans arrived therefore are not their actions worthy that high esteem which is deservedly put upon the Roman Affairs There have likewise been many famous Princes in several ages who neither wanted generosity of mind constantly to prosecute noble actions by them begun nor modesty and temperance in all other affections meerly out of a desire of glory and yet their enterprises have not alwaies succeeded well nor have they inlarged their Power and Dominions as did the Romans Let us pass on then to other considerations whâ—ch shall hereafter be looked upon how the Romans governed themselves and their counsels in their Militia what their military orders and institutions were what state they were at first possest of which served as it were for a ladder for them whereby to climb up to the height of such greatness and command and we shall find that these were such amongst the Romans as were not all of them together or in such excellency in other Principalities and Nations so as they were with reason to produce such effects as they did All the Offices of War were adminâ—stred amongst the Romans by their Citizens varying sometimes the condition of the persons together with the names and authority of those who commanded the Armies for they made sometimes use of Noblemen sometimes of Plebeians But they still kept amongst their own Romans all the degrees of the Militia and afforded occasion to many to exercise themselves therein so as there was not any witty Citizen or hopefull Young-man of noble extract who was far from them Nay it is seen that those who were more given to the study of speculative Learning when the places and Governments committed to their charge did so require betook themselves as others did to the managing of Arms and to warlike Affairs in such sort as even Cicero wholly given to Philosophie and the study of Eloquence when he went Pro-consul into Cilicia waged War with the Parthians Hence it was that they never wanted Commanders and if at any time the Roman Armies suffered any thing by the imprudency or infelicity of one Commander they knew quickly how to make amends by the worth and fortune of another as it fell out at all times For in that Commonwealth by reason of her orders and by her being still imployed in War the way was alwaies open to many Citizens to imploy themselves in Arms and in commands of the Armies Nor was the obedience which is due by Soldiers to their Commanders the less for this For a Consul or Dictator had the like authority in the Camp as the person of an absolute Prince could have had who commanded his Army personally Therefore by descending to more particulars the benefit may be the more easily discerned which redounded to that Commonwealth by means of these her good orders For if any disorder did at any time happen as usually there doth in any how well soever ordered Government through the fault of any particular Citizen whereby the Commonwealth suffered prejudice in the administration of War this might soon be amended and the prejudice received from the enemy might quickly be restored by the presence and worth of some other Citizen Thus it fell out that when the Roman Armies whilst the bounds of the Commonwealth were but smal were overcome by the Sabins by the Equi by the Capennati by the Falisci and by others of their neighbors with whom they waged War they could easily stop the course of that their bad fortune and shun runing into greater dangers The rout which was given by the Equi and Sabins and which was the greatest given in those times was known to be occasioned through the distaste which the Army took at Appius the Decemviri and at the injustice and cruelty which he used towards the Soldiery Wherefore returning to the former Government of Consuls Quintius the new Consul had the means given him of recovering the Militia's formerly lost honor and credit by giving a great overthrow to those very enemies who were grown so proud and insolent for their victories had over the Roman Army Thus likewise when the Roman Armies were shamefully put to slight another time by the â—qui â—idenates and Falisci first through the defeat of Papyrius Mugelanus and then by the like of Genutius and Titinius the military Tribunes who were mean and unexpert Plebeians and who without much authority had the care of the Army When Quintus Servilius was created Consul and after him Furius Camillus they won the most famous victories that the Romans had ever gotten till that time which was Three hundred and fifty years after the building of the City against the Aequi and other of their Enemies But this may be better conceived in greater
Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievements in Italy nor to stay long there 166 Francesco Foscari Duke of Venice said That the Republick could not much increase in power unless she made some enterprises by Land 115 Francis the First King of France how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes 152. For endowments of the mind and other qualities most eminent ibid. Though his fortune gave way to that of Charls the Fifth whom yet he put to much trouble 157. Why his furious endeavor to assault Spain prov'd bootless 159. and as much in vain his enterprises in Italy 161 G. GEnoeses conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians 118 The Goths famous for the destruction of the Empire and of many Provinces 76 Their original and why they fell down into Italy ibid. Other actions of theirs under divers Commanders 77. They also took pay under the Emperors ibid. Government how the quality of every one may be known 1-2 What the right Form of it is ibid. What it was in Rome 2. What in Sparta ibid. What in Venice 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State 2 The Form of the Government is as it were the soul of the State 131 From a Popular government men come to Tyrannie 54. The Change thereof in Rome occasioned so much the sooner the end of her Empire 90 and of the corruption of her Militia 92 Greece why the Romans strove to keep her from falling into Philips hands 45 Had a general Council called the Amphictiones like the Diets of Germany 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth 93 Not being at unity in herself could not compass any great atchievements abroad 95. By reason of her dissentions could not make use of her victories against the Persians 97. minded Arts more then Arms ibid. Whence her victories against the Persians proceeded 98. How she came to fall into the hands of the Macedonians 100. then of another Philip 101 lastly of the Romans ibid. Why after the death of Alexander she could not recover her liberty 100. For the same reasons having afterwards the Empire of Constantinople she could not preserve herself in that dignity 103 How highly her Soldiers were esteemed by Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great ibid. 104 Guido Ubeldo Duke of Urbin why he would allow of no Forts in his Dominions 170-171 H. HAnnibal upon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 34 What reasons should have removed him from that resolution 35 Honorius the Emperor his cowardise and simple saying 77 Hungary whence so called 77. The occasion of the Wars for her between the House of Austria and the Turks 195 I. ITaly how much she abounded in Soldiers 84. The Romans meetly out of their own Citizens and of their other Territories in Italy were furnish'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 62. Was long obedient to the Western Emperors yet withdrew herself from under their command and submitted to Lords of her own 184 Italy through her own Princes fault at present under the Command of Strangers 140. Her late Quietness and Peace and from what causes 164 When it began 165. How it may be continued 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Teath in great misery for thirty years 182 Italian Princes whether they were well advised in setting upon Charls the Eight King of France at his departing out of Italy 140 Iugurth with a bitter saying taxed the extreme grippleness and avarice of the Romans 13 Iulius Caesar what fierce people he conquer'd in France 91. Why it was difficult and troublesome for him to tame them 159. He would always charge his Enemy first 187 K. KIngdoms large and ample why apt and subject to Insurrections 72 L. LAws what benefit they bring 17. They ought to be confirmed by good Customs 11. Their aim ought to be to take away the abuse of things not the things themselves 109 Leagues or Confederacies why they are made their force and power 146 Made by the Christians against the Infidels 147-151-156-191 Which are the firmest 147. The defects which they may and use to have 148 For what causes they are made 154. How and when men may with reason expect benefit by them 154. Why they are no better esteemed ibid. That famous one of Cambray against the Venetians why made how soon dissolved and how unjust it was 154-155 Leonidas his famous victory against the Persians 98 Lewis the Twelfth King of France his nature and qualities of minde 135 Why he conspired against the Venetians and how injuriously 132 135 Lodowick Sforza Duke of Milain how fearful he shewed himself upon the League between the French and the Venetians 139. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy and then to his own great damage repents himself of it 140 Lycurgus why his Laws proved good 11. Had many means to help him in the setling of his Laws 12. Ordered his Republick so that it should not much increase its Dominions 47 M. MAgistracies the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 3 They ought to be of limited authority and for a short time 5 Malta why it preserved it self against the assaults of Bolyman 175 Marius by what ways he began his greatness 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth 10-47 His discreet carriage in the enterprise against the Cimbri which were come down into Italy 194 Medici how that Family got the superiority in Florence and kept it 105 The Militia of the Greeks or Macedonians what it was 21. Of the Carthaginians mercenary and incommodious 39. Of the Romans proved very profitable to the Commonwealth by being in the hands of many ibid. Well understood and practised by the Romans 38-49-61-80 Afterward grew corrupted and abject 69-73-74-75 Of the Turks how numerous well order'd and in continual Pay 186-193-195-196 Of the Christians much inferior to that of the Turks 186. Naval cannot of it self much enlarge the Dominion of a State 113. The Forces thereof are increased and maintained by those of the Land 114 N. NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choise of our actions 58 Nicolo Orsino Count of Pitioliano like Fabius Maximus and not like him 135 Nobles why aâ— first of little authority in Rome 2. Opposing the Communalty and hated by it 4. Authors of the destruction of Tyrannies 12 O. OCtavianus why easily entertained by the Army after Caesars death 52 P. PEace how it remains of it self being brought into States 164. How in these last times it is established in the minds of the Italian Potentates 165 How Peace Concord and Unity amongst Citizens ought to be preserved by Laws 121 Plutarch prefers Lycurgus before Numa 11 Pompey set up by the Senate to take down Caesar 47. His triumphs ibid. After the war with Mithridates quitted the
Northern Nations which wanted all manner of order and military discipline as well in their Commanders as in the Soldiers of their own Nations whereof the Roman Armies had been for a long time full insomuch as for above twenty years together before the Goths pass'd into Italy they put themselves into the usual pay of some of the Roman Emperors And when Theodosius the Second who was to make head in France against a valiant and numerous Army led on by Attila it was found that the Army which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a Roman Army being totally composed of Barbarians Vizigots Franks Burgonians Alani and others who notwithstanding bore away the victory for the Roman Emperor The like hapned in Gratianus his time who being set upon by Atalaricus King of the Goths was fain for the defence of Italy to make use of Goths Huns and other Soldiers of those Nations But the antient valor of the Romans was no less lost in their Soldiers then in their Commanders For so great an Empire was grown to so great a scarcity of valiant men and such as were fit to command the Armies which were to withstand the raging violence of these fierce and barbarous Nations as Honorius found none to whom he could commit such a charge but one Stilico who was himself a Barbarian a Hun by Nation and very perfidious who moved by his own interest and designs sought to maintain his authority and to the end that he might place his Son in the Empire whilst he commanded over those Forces which were raised to extinguish the Gothish Armies he did not only not beat them when he might have done it but sollicited other Northern people to assault divers Provinces of the Empire and so procured them more Enemies And Theodosius the Second having placed all authority and hope of defending the Provinces of the Empire from the fury of Attila in one Etius when he had lost that Commander he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge but was forced to leave the passage into Italy free unto him That which is reported of Attila doth greatly witness the weakness of the Empire and in what need it stood of valiant and faithfulnes that being fore told by his Southsayers that if he should come to a day of 〈◊〉 with the 〈◊〉 Army in France he should lose the day but that his losâ— would cost the Empirs dear for they should lose one of their best Commanders â—e did put so high 〈◊〉 esteem thereupon as notwithstanding such an 〈◊〉 he râ—fused 〈…〉 battel The Wars made by the Empire many years before the times of this greatest calamity and ruine were made against their own Roman Commanders who commanded over their Armies in several places and who being in far off Provinces rebelled against the Emperors hoping that they might usurp the Empire to the which every one of them did aspire since they saw that all ways even the most indirect lay open to a succession therein so as the Discipline and worth was alike in both the Armies and still the Romans got the victory that is to say those who had the greatest Power and Authorety in the Roman Empire But as soon as occasion was offered of trying the worth of those Soldiers who served the Empire against foreign Forces and that whatsoever the Roman Empire lost proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies the weakness thereof was soon seen and what a loss it had suffered by the total corruption of Discipline and good antient orders Which could not have happened if the Commonwealth had still continued for it is not likely that valiant Commanders would be found wanting in that City where by the vertue of good military Institutions Soldiers did so much flourish since those who had betaken themselves to other imployments when once they took upon them the Government of Provinces behaved themselves so in the Militia as they deserved commendations for there was a certain spirit of glory in them all and a desire of propagating the common good as also an aptness for all things which did befit Roman spirits But as soon as the Form of Government being changed the same Romans began to degenerate from their antient worth and that the chief imployments nay the Empire it self fell into the hands of foreigners all things else must likewise suffer alteration and in particular disorders in the Militia and the licentiousness of the Soldiers grew to be such as so great an Empire seemed sometimes to be governed by chance There not being any one therein who took care for the common good nor for the observance of good Orders neither at home nor abroad And the making of the Militia mercinary was cause of the going less in worth and discipline as also of treachery Insomuch as those very Soldiers who served the Emperors favored the Enemy as it happened in Theodosius his time when those who were to guard the Pirentian Mountains were bribed to let the Vandals and Sweeds pass into Italy without making any opposition which was the occasion of other mischiefs And the treachery of his Commander Gallus hindred the Emperor Decius from pursuing a famous victory gotten of the Goths when not being so well flesht as they were afterwards nor yet so powerful they might have been the easilier kept back But in time of the Commonwealth the Roman Commanders and Soldiers fought for their own Grandezza the Nobility grew famous and powerful and the people in whose name and in that of the Senate all Wars were made got honor and advantage by those things which by their Arms they added to that Dominion So as amongst other actions of the Commonwealth it is not without wonder to be considered how she could maintain so many and so numerous Armies as she did meerly out of Roman Soldiers But when these respects began to fail and that the Militia grew mercinary and that the Soldier grew past all measure insolent by reason of their Commanders leudness who permitted them to do all manner of foul things to the end that they might have their assistance in their usurping the Empire The Roman Empire which had formerly wont to be so formidable to their Enemies so obedient to their Commanders began to behave themselves poorly against their Enemies and insolently against their Lord and Master troublesome to their friends whom they were sent to assist and too unable to defend them against foreign Forces which things as they were begotten by the change of Government so is it most apparent that they were the occasion of bringing the Empire to a sooner and more miserable end So many and so heinous disorders could not have risen if the City had continued in a Form of Common-wealth or of Civil Government for though all the Citizens might not have peradventure proved good and valiant yet amongst so many there would still have some one been found of such excellent worth and charity towards his Country as
ultimate ruine depends â—y this means proceedings march a slower pace and all acquisitions become more difficult so this immoderate desire of having all things for thâ—r own service working a contrary effâ—ct to their intentions keeps the Confines of their Dominions more narrowly bounded and theâ—eby lessens that glory which they seem to aspire so much at If then our Princes and Chieftains will walk in the waies of the Antients they will finde that Justice Clemencie and moderate Empire are stronger and more secure Engins to take strong Holds then those whâ—ch they in these times make use of And if they be not faulty in the truâ—st worth they will find sufficient valor and discipline in their Soldiers to bring to pass whâ—tsoever great Enterprises and to exalt their name to such a height of glory and so illustrate themselves and their Age as they may in all things be deservedly compared to the famousest and most cried up of the Antients The Seventh DISCOURSE What the cause is why Italy hath enjoyed so long Peace and Quiet in these latter Times HE who shall call to mind what troubles Italy for a long time hath suffered under which after the passage of Charls the eight King of France till the Peace made at Bolognia was for the space of thirty five years continually infested with better Wars and subject to all those greater evils which the wickedness of man hath found out to his own undoing may justly think her very happy in this present and the last preceding Age wherein after so long a combustion she hath enjoyed so happy and quiet a Peace For though in this time some little sparkles may have broken forth yet have they not spread much nor lasted long but being confined within some small circuits the greater and more noble parts of Italy have remained safe and untouched by this flame Wherefore those Princes who this mean while have had the government of the several States of Italy are certainly much to be praised and the people of Italy are chiefly to acknowledg so great a benefit from their wisdom and vigilancie Yet because there have divers accidents happened which have opened the way to Princes wherein to walk directly on to this right end of Peace and Concord it may be worth the while particularly to examine from what causes this good hath proceeded for thereby it may likewise be known how the like may be preserved It is a Proposition sufficiently known and indubitably true that Sublata causa tollitur effectus Take away the cause and the effect which proceeds from thence will cease Wherefore by truly examining the causes from whence the Wars and molestations of Italy did proceed we may perceive how these ceasing she hath remain'd in that peace and quiet which may be said to be the true proper and most natural condition of a State all other workings in a good Government and even War it self being ordained for Peace whereby as Ciâ—ies and Kingdoms enjoy Civil felicity so must that State be most perfect wherein the perfectest workings are exercâ—sed to the most pâ—rfect end Peace is of it self introduced into a State by taking away the impediments which do disturb it just as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away those ill humors which keep them from their perfect and natural condition Now if we will take into our consideration whence as from the principal occasions that Hâ—rmony if I may so call it which the Concord of the Italian Princes had so long produced and preserved with such liking and consolation of all men was spoil'd and corrupted we shall find that two affectâ—ons which do usually accompâ—ny Empire and which at this time grew very powerful in some Princes were those roots from which so many mischiefs did afterwards put forth to wit Fear and Ambition Fear of losing ones own State Ambition of possessing what belongs to another The fear of the King of Aragons just indignation made Lodovic Storza think upon Novelties made him have recâ—urse for help to France and made him believe that was best for him which proved his ruine But it wâ—s ambitâ—on of addâ—ng new Territories to that Crown and glory to himself which made Charls the Eight King of France but young both in years and experience think upon nothing but how to effect his desires by acceptâ—ng of Sforzas proffâ—r of passing into Italy which proved the Sepulchre of so many Soldiers and of so many gâ—lant Commanders of that warlike Nation by the so many Wars which arose from that Spring-head and which brought no other advantage to the Authors But let us make a little further enquiry The so famous and as it may justly be termed so pernicious War to all Italy made by the League of so many Christian Princes who had all conspired the ruine of the Commonwealth of Venice whence did it arise but from these two wâ—cked seeds Fear and Ambition Many Princes apprehended the greatness of the Republick which was already much increased by the prosperous success in War wherein she was associated by the French whereby she was become very formidable especially to the Princes of Italy wherefore they all desired her abasement for their own security Nor was the Emperor Maximilian totally free from this fear who had learnt by late experience how powerful the Forces of the Commonwealth were grown which had bereft him of some Towns belonging to him But Lodovick King of France the thirâ—t after Empire being always uâ—quenchable growing still more desirous to possess the whole State of Milan whereof he had already gotten the greatest part and repenting himself that the Cities of Cremona and Giaradada were fallen to the Ventians was egg'd on by this spur of Ambition to join in conspiracie with the other Princes against the Commonwealth which had so lately and so many several ways deserved so very well at his hands After these ensued many long Wars though not equally grievous which had many various and uncertain events and which were fomented and maintain'd by these seeds of all discord fear and ambition When the greatness and power of the Emperor Charls the Fifth was increased and confirm'd in Italy the Commonwealth apprehended that her State in Terra firma would not by reason thereof be very safe she therefore willingly took up Arms accompaâ—ied by the French to secure herself from the danger she conceived she lay under by reason of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powerful neighbor by having a particular Prince of that State who might be Duke of Milan Francis King of France desired likewise to see the Emperor bereft of that State but out of other respects to wit because his ambition was such as would never suffer him to give way to the fortune of Charls the Emperor and to see Charls so much superior to him especially in Italy where his Predecessors the Kings of France and he himself with no less fervencie though with worse success had labored so long
interest in comparison of their own as Leagues and Unions being contentiously handled slowly concluded and untimely dissolved there comes no good of them Wherefore it cannot be said that they thought by delay to reserve occasions prepared for Victory to which the Cause which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them to wit the maintaining of King Ferdinand in his just pretences to the Kingdom of Hungary from whom without any right and unprovoked by any injury it was attempted to be taken Very shame should likewise have been able to have made them not suffer so miserable a spectacle of such devastations and ruines as were made by the Barbarians in Carinthia and Stiria whilst they stood looking on with so great an Army at which the Imperial Commanders being at last moved they went about though late to revenge these injuries and their boldness being assisted by fortune the Freebooters were routed and almost quite discomâ—â—ted in all places where they were assaulted So as it appears it may be pleaded by this late example that they might have done greater things if they had attempted it Moreover so many military men might very well have known what advantage might have been gotten by giving Battel since in this posture of affairs great rewards were to be expected from the Victory and but small loss had they been beaten For the Christian Army if victorious might have penetrated into the Turks Dominions where there are no strong Holds save some few upon the Frontiers and not meeting with any obstacles might have marched even to before Constantinople planting their Trophies in sundry places by one sole Victory Whereas on the contrary the Imperialists upon any adverse fortune had many strong Holds whereunto to have retreated and by maintaining them might have retarded the course of the Turks victories and have recruited their broken Forces But say I pray you who could assure the Imperialists that they should avoid the hazard of a Battel Was it not rather to be believed especially if we will consider the boldness of the Turks who are wont to meet but with weak resistances that answerable to what they gave out they would advance and force the Christians to give Battel as the Voyage taken by Solyman did promise who kept not within his Consines but was entred into the Imperialists Country so far as some of his Horse Troops made inrodes even to Newstat a Town standing in the same Champaine Country and not far from Vienna And say that being assaulted by the Enemy they had been forced to fight who can deny but that both before and after the conflict the business would have proved hazardous to the Imperialists since they were to fight at their own homes and in their own defence For great is that astonishment which is caused by the bold coming on of an Enemy and men are alwaies readier to run away there where they have best means of saving themselves and in case of adverse Fortune the danger is greater when the Enemy is in the bowels of the State and if the inhabitants overcome the less good redounds by the victory because the enemy hath time to rally and to defend himself These were therefore notable disadvantages which were unaviodable whilst the Imperialists Camp remained fixt before the walls of Vienna and thereby made themselves to depend upon the Enemies resolution Notwithstanding all this he who shall duely consider the present condition of the Affairs of the Empire of the Militia and of all other things which belongs to such a business may peradventure be of a different opinion and judge otherwise and if not commend at least excuse the resolution taken by the Imperialists of not parting with their Army from before the walls of Vienna and from the River Danubius That the Turkish Empire is very great and potent is a thing too well known by us to our cost but the care how to prevent the maladie and weakness into which Christendom is fallen by the greatness of such an enemy hath been so long in cogitatâ—on as to use violent means might bring ruine upon her rather then procure her safety Christian Princes have not in this age a setled well disciplined well ordered Militia and kept in perpetual pay as the Turks have and as the Romans and some other Empires have formerly had Whence it is that numerous Armes cannot be raised without length of time and much difficulty and for want of continual exercise by which the Soldiers of one and the same Nation have been known to be able to supply every military Office recourse must be had to several Nations for men fit for several actions in War so as it is thought that either by natural inclination or by antient Custom or by meer opinion every Nation is best some for one thing some for another as also because there are but very few in any place who are well instructed in Military affairs For no Militia is entertained except it be in time of need or some few who are kept in Garrisons with little or no exercise The charge also of assembling Soldiers from several and far distant Countries as also all things which belong to War is much the greater and whereof not any one State of our Princes is compleatly furnished So as put all these together it is from hence that when any enterprise hath been to be taken against the Turks in these times with numerous and powerful Forces they have not been able to be got together in any reasonable time nor well ordered which delay arising from necessity hath hindred our preventing the Enemy and our assaulting them at their own doors But particularly is it not very well known that at this time whereof we now speak Caesar was to assemble Soldiers from so many Nations subject to other Dominions and to joyn together the Auxiliary Forces of Germany and Italy as in doing thereof so much labor and time was spent as before the Imperial Army was mastered at Vienna Solyman was already come to Belgrade so as to have resolved upon preventing the Enemy and of assaulting his Confines before the arrival of his Army was impossible though it had been thought expedient to have done so nor ought reason to prevail over experience and this so much the less for that there wants not other reasons to prove that the Turks are readier at their counsel and speedier at their executions then we can be But let us suppose that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped and that it had depended upon the free will of the Imperial Commanders to assault the Turks within their Consines say I beseech you what design could the Imperialists have had to euer into the Enemies Country Should they perhaps have stood idly expecting the shock of the Turkish Army if it should advance towards them or if Solyman should not have advanced but have shunned the encounter should they have marched on and forced him to fight Or should
liberty of Rome recover'd by Caesars death 51. That he endeavored it when 't was too late 53 C. CArthaginians why they came to aid the Romans against Pyrrhus 23 For a long time friends to the Romans ibid. Should rather have been afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were stronger at Sea then they 36. Often subdued 45 Catâ— Major causing sigs to be brought from Carthage into the Senate-house gives counsel that that City should be destroyed 45. How such counsel might be useful 49 Cato Uticensis what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and the People 55. Did many times prevail against Caesar ibid. Founded his greatness upon nobler courses 57. What demonstrations he received from the People of their singular favour to him 58. Because his manners were not suitable to the form of that Republick he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmost 59 Charls the Great having freed Italy from the slavery of the Northern Barbarians made his son Pipin King of Italy 183 Charls the Eighth King of France his passage into Italy for the conquest of Naples 140. At his return assaulted by the Italian Princes and whether they were well advis'd in it discoursed upon at large ibid. Charls the Fifth Emperor compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with Francis the First King of France and his famous expeditions 157. Why his enterprises against the Kingdom of France proved vain 158. Why he shunn'd hazarding a set battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fell to him 165. Whether he was well advised in not parting from before the walls of Vienna when Solyman was come to assault it 185 A City well ordered how it should be qualified 10. For preserving of unity among the Citizens whether the courses which Caesar took or those used by Cato were more available 5â— When it is grown to a great height 't is a hard matter to order it aright 14. That which aspires to a large Dominion must have two things 1â—1 What is most necessary for its long continuance especially such a one as is cast into the form of a Republick 104 Of how great importance the situation is 114 Citizens of singular quality banish'd from Athens for ten years 3 104 To make them vertuous three things necessary 7. By what means they may acquire greatness 56. That quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the State and how it may be preserved ibid. 121 A Citizen very potent how to be corrected that he disturb not the common Quiet 95 Cleomenes King of Sparta accounted the riches of the Persians not worth the trouble they would stand his Soldiery 98 Colonies when first used by the Romans and how beneficial to them 63 172 Of the Venetians why sent into Candy ibid. Constantine the Great divided the Empire between his three Sons 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Constantinople 71 Constantine son to the above-named what part of the Empire fell to his share 67 Consalvo Ferrante why kept under by King Ferdinand 106 Consuls of what authority in Rome 2-4-5 Customs how profitable good ones are to Cities 10 D. DAlmatians with much difficulty subdued by the Venetians 119 Decemvirate held the form of a Republick 50. Why Rome was able to free herself from its tyrannie 51. Why driven out from thence 52 Docius Emperor of Constantinople routed by the Goths flieth and is drown'd in a Fen 75 Discords sprung up in Rome from War not from Peace 48 Dictator upon what occasions chosen by the Romans 12. Of what relief to Rome and who was the first 62. Esteemed necessary in times of great danger and what his dignity was 86 E. EDucation good how useful to a City or State 9 Elephants imployed by Pyrrhus in his wars against the Romans 26 Emperors of Rome favour'd assisted and maintained by the Soldiers and the People 69-72-73 Thirty at one time assum'd that title 70. Why some were chosen to be their Companions in their lives and their Successors after their deaths 72. When those of Caesars race ended ibid. Which were slain by the Soldiers for desiring to reduce them to good discipline 73 Empire of the Romans when it began 68. When it began to decline 6â— The causes of its declination and ruine 71. When it was void of worthy men and valiant Commanders 89. became tributary to the Goths 76 Equality or parity of goods why observed in Sparta 3. Of all the Citizens in government is not good 6. What equality is convenient for a Common-wealth that it may last long 104 Event the surest way to know what is likely to follow 19. That War is far more subject to divers unexpected events then any other actions of ours 31 That it is the master of Fools 38. Not the event of things but the advice wherewith they were done makes them either praise-worthy or blameable 132 F. FAbius Maximus his action and worth 29 c. Deserved to be praised not only for Prudence but for Courage 31. Feared by Hannibal ibid. overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror ibid. Why he took a contrary course to that of Scipio's 33 Fame and Reputation of great importance in all our actions but especially in War 85 Ferdinand King brother to Charls the Fifth why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour then to pull upon himself the Turks forces 196 Ferdinand King of Spain why he kept under Consalvo 106. Not just in his league with the Venetians 152 Florence why she could not keep herself in a firm state of Government free from civil dissentions 54 The Florentines succoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies hindred the Venetians in those enterprises 124. Not well thought of and indeed hated by the Italian Princes for the correspondence which they held with the French 128. How their Fortresses put them to much trouble and damage when they were seised upon by the French brought in by their King Charls the Eighth 171 Forts or Fortresses of how great furtherance to a State 148. The doubts for which it may seem they are not available 168. Other more certain and no less grievous 171. Why called i ceppi della Toscana ibid. Arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of Forts 172. How to be rightly disposed and regulated 176. The defence and praise of rearing Forts ibid. The doubts and arguments against them resolved ibid. Fortune what is to be understood by that name 18 The Fortune of the Romans overborn by Hannibal 41. Why she easily rose up again changing for the better 45. When she proved cross they still kept the same minds 48 Fortune very cross to the Venetians 106 France the Romans put sore to it ere they could take it in 48. Whence the late troubles and discords arose 106 The French oftentimes assaulted Rome 61-63 How timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in
Army 51. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities 65. The laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the Romans and facilitated his enterprises 163 The People of Rome of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How from the beginning it was of great power and increased it more and more 15 Loving liberty how it came to lose it 51. Sought by seditions to obtain from the Senate all things though never so unjust 52 The People That to curb it Severity prevails more then Meekness 16. That out of its natural fickleness it useth to favour a Forein Prince and by seditions and violent attempts to plot against the present Power 170 A Prince shall do well and wisely to have a care that no Subject of his grow to be suspected for his greatness 106. Must not for his own relief make use of Forein aids that he may be too strong for his Native forces 103 Princes what sort of Militia it is best for them to make use of in their expeditions and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of War and the choice of Commanders 145. Those of Italy have used to imploy foreign Commanders and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122 See more in States R. REpublicks how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known 18. How at last they grow to be Tyrannies 54. That a State deserves not the name of a Commonwealth or Republick where the Decrees of the People and not the Laws carry all the command 6. For the long preservation and quietness of them nothing more necessary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Dominion 112 Rome was a mixt but imperfect Commonwealth and why 3-11 Was too Popular 3. Why it could not free it self from many disorders 14 How long it held its greatness 68. When and how she might have freed herself from her many bad qualities and defects ibid. How she abounded in Soldiers and Commanders 39-64-74-80 How she made way for Monarchy 39. She scatter'd her corruptions amongst the Nobles and the Communalty 50. That those Citizens proved worst oppressors to her whom for the meer conservation of her Liberty she had too much exalted 51 Her first second and third Age 59. Her first seven Kings of what considerable benefit they were to her 60. At what time she deserved the praise of good Government 61 Romans why they refused the Carthaginians aid against Pyrrhus 26. Refused to have peace with Pyrrhus ibid. For what causes chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not so much present dangers as future 45. Out of one War they still framed another 46 Why they were invincible according to Polybius 78. The two pretences under which they made their most notorious acquisitions 161. How by Colonies they kept their new Subjects in loyalty and obedience 173 Romulus a man fierce ambitious and desirous to enlarge his Estate train'd up the People according to his genius 113 S. SCipio Africanus his worth and actions 29-33 Why he took a course differing from that of Fabius 33. His passage into Sicily of what benefit it was 35 Scipio Nafica when Carthage was taken disswaded the Senate from destroying that City 46. Whether that counsel of his were founded upon good reason ibid. The Senate of Rome what number it consisted of and when first instituted 14 Its authority 4. The generous answer she gave to the Ambassadors of Pyrrhus 26-89 Little esteemed of by Julius Caesar 46. Subject to corruptions 50. Severity in what sort of Commonwealth it doth good 57. Was very great in Cato ibid. Sylla brought into Rome licentious living 51. Increased the Order of the Senators to counterpoise the Communalty Gave honors and riches to his Favorites ibid. Soldan of Caire how and why he lost all his Kingdom in a short time 160 Solyman parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mind and fortune 157. His great atchievements 158. Why he made no great progress in Hungary 159. nor at Corfu against the Venetians ibid. Why he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four Empires and eighteen Kingdoms 196 Sparta a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11 That authority which the Kings had there not prejudicial to it 48. Many worthy men flourished in it by reason of the form of its government 58 For want of money could not enlarge her Empire 82 Spartans when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people followed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the rest in Land forces ibid. Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls 171 States whence their divers changes come 53. How men grow desirous of their change 72. Are augmented and preserved by the same things which gave them their beginning and corrupted by the contrary 73. Where they have been ruin'd by intestine discords the over-great height of some of their own hath been the cause 105. That they have their beginning increase stay declination and ruine 86 Sâ—ilico a Barbarian and by nation a Hun called to the command of the Roman Army betrays the Empire 89 T. THebans much esteemed of for the discipline of their Soldiers called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas famous Commanders of theirs ibid. Themistocles what his advice was and his Naval victory against the Persians 99 Tiberius Gracchus slain by the Nobles of Rome without any revenge from the People 17 Tribuneship in Rome of how great power and its insolence 6. Called Sacrosanctus 52 Triumph in Rome when first instituted and to whom first granted 62 Turks their assistance refused by the Venetians and yet sued for by other Christian Princes 136. Why they cannot so suddenly nor easily do any signal enterprises by Land 161. Are accustomed for their own security to destroy the inhabitants of such places as they take in especially those of the better and richer sort 172. Their chiefest strength consists in their Cavalry 187 Their Law promiseth everlasting reward in heaven to every one that loseth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194 V. VAlerius Publicola why in reforming the government of Rome he yielded many things to the People 14-15 That he might have order'd the City better ibid. Venice in time brought her Government to perfection 12. How she hath been able to preserve her Liberty thus long 54. What her Government is ibid. When it began 77-116 Her Founders lovers of Peace and of an intent and end differing from that of the Founders of Rome ibid. Her greatest and most difficult attempts have been either in their own Defence or for Religion or in Assistance of others 115. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations she at her first beginning underwent 117. Why she made use of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders 121. That for having accustomed to imploy Foreign Commanders she hath not been able by reason of their disloyalty to prosecute such Enterprises of hers as had been
the Magistracie of Consuls which occasioned many disorders which might easily have been corrected by a just fear as is cleerly seen by many examples but chiefly by this that the People being in insurrection and contumacious against the power of Consulship the creating of a Dictator a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult And what more manifest sign could there be given that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates then that which was given upon the occasion of Appius his Decemvirate For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny yet the authority of this Magistracie from which there was no Appeal to be made and the severity wherewith it was administred did so bridle the people as they patiently endured all injuries nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery till the Senate interposed it self and that Horatius and Valerius declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the Decemviri There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority or else if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be offâ—nded with the Nobles when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws this arising amongst many other beâ—efits from the Laws that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one being condemned by order of Law not by the Judge his will But what hath been noted of Publicola in this first beginning may also be known at all other times and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens who through ambition siding with the People were the cause of their pride and insolencie So the Consuls Valerius and Horatius not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate sought to have it from the People and the whole Senate not to multiply examples by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls Titus Quintus Cincinnatus and Geneus Iulius Mento who opposed them therein had recourse unto the Tribunes who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor But they were so blinded by Ambition as not knowing or not caring for such errors they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People by Presents Shews and submiss comportment And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of Rome themselves For it was ofttimes seen that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them And certainly amongst other things the Judgment which followed upon the cause between Menimiuâ— and Spurius Servilius was very remarkable who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes to wit that being Consuls they had opposed the Agrarian Law Menimius who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution was condemned but Spurius Servilius stoutly withstanding the Tribunes fury and speaking severely to the People was acquitted And Furius and Manilius who had both of them been Consuls being not long after accused the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them which did so affright his Colleagues and the People as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased all of them did willingly subscribe the Militia Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People and amongst other of his actions the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable for he made them be decimated very tenth man be put to death which was submitted unto without any the least tumult by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection Which was sufficient so far to curb them all as though they were all of them then in Arms every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends and of their own doubtful chance and which peradventure is a greater wonder and doth the better confirm this truth Appius being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes after he had laid down the Consulship using the same severity in defending himself he was not held less guilty for having been formerly Consul So as the People neither willing to absolve him nor daring to condemn him the cause was put off and he suffered to depart And in the latter times when the Peoples power was greatest Tiberius Gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the Licinian Law the Nobles changing their habits and shewing great humility labored to win favor from the People but since they saw they could do no good by this means they resolved for their last refuge to use force and kill'd the Author of those seditions Which action of theirs did so astonish the People as they suffered the Tribunes death whom they had so dearly loved and who had lost his life in defence of their cause to go unrevenged And soon after Caius Gracchus reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured the Nobles using the same cunning sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor making use of another Tribune to this purpose by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate But humility avail'd no more at this time then it had done formerly so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms they slew Caius Gracchus in the Aventine and after the death of two Brothers annull'd all the Laws made by them nor did the People ever seem to resent it Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate as hath been touched upon doubtless these ruder remedies as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth might have freed her from many mischiefs This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof threatening to create a Dictator it kept the Terentilla Law from being made of creating a Magistracie of five men who were to correct the Consuls power But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunities it did only invite them
advice was followed by the Venetians when they had their Enemies at their own own homes and were in the same danger and disorder by reasou of the rout given them by the Genuses as the City of Rome was in after the defeat at Cannae For they joyned in confederacy with Barnaby Vis Coute Duke of Millan and making a great Effort sent many Soldiers against the City of Genua and did so molest their affairs by Land as they kept off those succours which otherwise would have been sent to their men who had taken the City of Chioggia who missing of supplies and being fought withal and besieged by the Venetian Forces of Conquerors became conquered and fell into the hands of the Venetians Moreover the Romans considered that in the Wars which they made in Sicily and in Spain they had this great advantage that they fought not with Honnibal a Captain of singular and unparalleld valor It was likewise held that the Roman Commanders and Armies might more securely make trial of their worth and fortune in Wars made out of Italy as they had oftentimes done for when they had any loss abroad they lost nothing but those men which the fortune of War bereft them of but if they should overcome they got the Enemies Country just as it befel them in Spain Wherefore it being disadvantagious for them to fight in Italy it proved the better advice to temporize with Hannibal in Italy and at the same time to fight with Mago Asdrubal and other Carthaginian Commanders in Sicily and in Spain So as the losses in Italy were recompeased by acqusitions made in Spain the which of all other Countries was the first that was reduced into a Province and did much inlarge the Confines of the Roman Empire But if the Sea had been open for the Carthaginians as it would have been if the Romans neglecting their Fleet had not provided for the affairs of Sicily Hannibal might easily have been furnished with things necessary from the Carthaginians wherewith to reinforce his Army So as no part of Italy should have been free from his forces who unassisted or succored could notwithstanding keep his Army so long together and attempt so many enterprises they therefore thought they had done enough in entertaining Asdrubal a Captain of great authority and valor so as he could not as they knew his design was pass with a new Army into Italy to joyn with Hannibal as he did after the Scipio's death and after the rebellion of many of the Spanish Cities the Carthaginians being moved to do their utmost since they had lost Syracusa and Capâ—a which were both of them faln into the Romans power So as no assistance being given unto Hannibal all the labor was lost which he had so many years undergone in Italy On the contrary the Romans persevering in their first opinion when the two Scipio's were dead sent Pâ—blius Scipio into Spain to keep Asdrubal from making his passage diverting the Forces which were to pass over with him into Italy by keeping the Carthaginians molested at home It follows not therefore by a general rule that what was good for one of the enemies must be hurtful for the other so as it were good for the Carthaginians to wage War in Italy far from their own homes this very same thing must be harmful for the Romans But since they could not be the first Assailant Hannibal having faln upon them with such violence it was reason that the Romans taking the same course should assault the Carthaginians Territories We read also that the same Hannibal being still of the same opinion which once he was being with Autiochus in the time of his Exile whilst he was treating of making War against the Romans he perswaded him to pass over as soon as he could and with as great a strength as he could put together into Italy affirming that all other enterprises would be to no purpose whilst Italy was at peace and quiet and that the Romans had means to maintain War abroad This very same thing for the same respects diversly considered ought to have instructed the Roman Commanders and Senators in the Carthaginian war to wit that they were not to suffer their Enemies to rest quiet at home so as â—ree from all thoughts of defending themselves they might the better turn all their Forces upon Italy and the very City of Rome And if they had taken that resolution at first which they did afterwards by the advice of Publius Scipio who from the conquering of Africa took the name of African to wage War with the Carthaginians neerer their own home they might peradventure have freed Italy sooner from the so many troubles and dangers which she underwent by Hannibals long abode But it may be moreover said that many other things did force or at least perswade the Romans to undertake these Wars Sardinia was first assaulted by the Carthaginians with those very Forces which were destined for Italy to relieve Hannibal so as it behoved the Romans to march with their Armies thither not only to maintain and defend that Island which was of such importance to the Commonwealth but for that they therein defended the welfare of Italy by keeping so many Warriers afar off who if they were free were ready to assault her And this advice proved very fortunate for Quintus Fabius gave so notable a Rout to the Carthaginians in Sardinia as they lost about Forty thousand of their Soldiers The death of Hiere the Tyrant of Siracusa occasioned the War made in Sicily and the great commotions of that Island by which it was comprehended that if these their designs had not been hindred by the Romans that great and famous City would have faln into the power of the Carthaginians to the great prejudice of the Romans who for the same reason being assisted by the Mamertines undertook the first Carthaginian War judging that if the Carthaginians should be absolute Masters of Sicily it would be a step to pass into Italy But this would have been the more incommodious at this time for that by reason of the so many places which Hannibal had taken in Italy they might have had a more easie and secure receptacle there Moreover the Romans were invited to make War with the Carthaginians in Spain and to divert their Forces by reason that they understood how that Province was but ill satisfied with the Carthaginian government and that it was well inclined to the Romans which did much facilitate those enterprises which were boldly undertaken and fortunately atchieved The City of Saguntum was also the first rise of these Wars in Spain which they thought it did not become the generosity of Rome to leave in the power of the Carthaginians so as upon any other good success they might seem to have lost the chief cause in this contest Neither did they notwithstanding take Saguntum till after eight years War in Spain when the other affairs of Rome began to prosper very much as
of France into Italy had she been thereunto moved out of a desire of inlarging her Dominions and had not been thereunto compelled by the fraud and insufferable insolencies of Lodovico Sforza to suppress the which she was inforced to have recourse to forein Forces which afterwards turned themselves upon herself But in the defence of Pisa things were otherwise the end was very honest for the business was to comfort the oppressed not to oppress others and enterprise which was to be approved of for the common welfare of all the Italians whereby they onely were weakened who favored the affairs of forein Princes The reward if the War succeeded well was very great for it made much for the advantage and reputation especally at that time of having the City of Pisa either her Subject Friend Dependant or Confederate The Third DISCOURSE That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of War after the routing of the Venetian Army in the action of Giaradada HE who hath sought out an occasion to blame the Commonwealth of Venice out of envy to her glory and particularly to the excellency of her Government falling upon the times of her greatnest misfortunes says That when by her unfortunate success at the rout of Giaradada she lost her State by Land she witnessed that there was neither worth nor strength nor power in her orders to govern an Empire and that she had had her increase and had to this day maintained her greatness more out of a certain appearance and opinion then by any excellency of power of counsel I find these things written in some Authors but chiefly amplified and affirmed by Nicholas Machiavel a name which hath formerly been very famous for the curiosity of the matter which he took upon him to write on in his discourse but it is now so condemned to perpetual oblivion by the holy Apostolick Sea as it is not lawful to name him The misfortunes which the Commonwealth underwent in those days were certainly very great but such notwithstanding as ought rather to move compassion in all mens minds and shew the instability of humane affairs then to afford matter of blame and further oppression It is said that the imperfection of the Common-wealth was discovered by these publick adversities and that I may give the very words of some men that there was no true worth or excellency in her orders yet prove they not this by any other reason then what is taken from the action it self to wit because she lost the day to the French and that by the loss thereof the publick affairs were brought into exceeding great danger But he who shall penetrate more inwardly into the truth of these things will not rest satisfied with this judgement framed rather from the event then out of any reason and will speak much otherwise and will take many other things into consideration before he give his judgement And if we will by this our Discourse penetrate into the more inward considerations we shall find that the Form of Government is as it were the soul which gives a true being to a City For a multitude of men assembled together could not have whereof to live nor would their place of habitation deserve the name of a City were it not for certain Orders and Laws But as the sensitive soul which informs the animated body cannot always make equal use of all her sundry powers and faculties for though she preserve her self in her own purity and perfection yet needing the parts of the body and exâ—rinsecal objects for her operations she must oft times cease operating and sometime producâ—th imperfect operations so will it happen in a City that though the form of government which is as it were the soul thereof be of it self very vigorous and perfect yet can it not always nor in all things shew its force and excellency by reason of the need it stands in of instruments and by its encountring with many extrinsecal accidents so as it must sometimes rest wholly idle and other sometimes do but little good by its operating Whence I infer that though a City be exceedingly well ordered for Civil and Military Affairs yet cannot she promise herself to enjoy peace long nor long to keep herself in one and the same condition save onely as long as she shal be permitted so to do by the condition of other things which are out of the Legislators power So likewise the adverse fortune of a Commonwealth or Kingdom which may depend upon so many other occasions is not sufficient to infer that such States are ill ordered But rather as he may deserve the name of a good Orator who handles his cause so as he does perswade handsomly though he he do not always attain his end so ought not the Legislator to be accounted less wise nor those Laws less good by which the Government is well regulated as touching Peace and the preservation of the City or State though various accidents may produce the contrary effects These reasons and examples do cleerly shew how ill-grounded those oppositions are by which without any consideration of so many other circumstances men will conclude that the Orders of the Commonwealth of Venice were weak and of no worth because her Army was worsted in the Battel of Geradada and because after that Rout the loss of the State and so many other great losses did ensue It is not the Event but the Counsel by which things are done which ought to give the true praise or blame to our actions Let us then see in this Case which we are now upon what the counsels were what the hopes what the condition of times were and of Princes and let us look into other such circumstances and then we shall be able to give a better judgment The times are three and the affairs which upon this occasion may fall under our consideration are of three sorts to wit such as did precede the action those wherewith it was accompanied and those which followed after The Commonwealth before this unfortunate accident fell out was not only in a very prosperous condition by reason of her happy success in the last War against the Emperor Maximilian but also as it was thought in a condition of much safety being joined in league and amity with the powerful King of France when unexpectedly she understood that almost all the Princes of Christendom had conspired against her and almost at the same time she heard that the King of France had denounced War against her Where will you find a mind so constant as will not be much disturbed at such an advertisement as this The affection must needs be moved at the novelty of the action and Reason troubled by the greatness thereof What had the Venetian Senate reason to fear at this time less then this The King of France in league friendship and confederacie with the Commonwealth for many years out of observancie whereunto the Venetians had not only refused
and which may admit of divers considerations It is an antient and approved proverb That a Bridg of Gold ought to be made for an Enemy that flies And this is grounded upon solid reasons for no Battel can be fought without much hazard and uncertainty of success since there may happen many unthought of accidents wherein the use of wisdom is excluded Therefore where to join battel is to be thought a good advice the condition of affairs must be such as that a man be not necessitated thereunto but makes it his choice and comes to it with greater hopes of overcoming then fear of being worsted and likewise the advantage must be more that is to be expected from the Victory then the prejudice which depends upon the loss thereof By thus measuring the carriage of these affairs by these rules we may the better know what judgment to give thereof If we consider the state of affairs before the Armies drew near there appears no necessity of fighting at that time For the King of France led his men back over the Mountains to their own homes without prejudice or injury to any one so as the meeting him to stop his passage and give him battel proceeded from election and from the determinate counsel of the Princes that were Confederates against him But what the end of the combat was like to be and how the business was ballanced might be guess'd at by many particulars before a stroke was struck The King of France led along with him an Army consisting of French and Switzers the former excellent for the Horse-Militia and the latter excellently well disciplin'd in Foot-service So as the Italian Militia was confess'd by all men to be far inferior to both these for they had wholly lost all their antient excellent institutions and had wanted true discipline for many years being by Foremers bereft of their antient military glory But the much different impressions which were in the Soldiers themselves was of great importance upon this occasion The French were haughty and puffed up by their success at Naples they slighted the Enemy their very name seeming to have infused so much terror into all the Italians as that neither Princes nor People had dared to oppose them but afforded them free and safe passage every where On the contrary the Italians accustomed only to such Wars as were made in Italy wherein little valor was shewen and less discipline without almost any loss of blood as if it were for meer shew and sport were to fear the unusual encounter with the French and to boot with their valor to apprehend their prosperity which had made the way so easie to them to so great and so noble an acquisition The Kings party was likewise favored by the Kings own presence and the danger which his own person was in which occasioned no small daring in the French Soldiery some being thereunto stirr'd up by their natural love to their King others by hopes of reward and others for fear of punishment But of all things else the diversity of the cause ought to be of greatest moment For the French had no hopes of safety save what lay in their Arms being in an Enemies Country the way in their return home very difficult by reason of the craggy Mountains though they should meet with no impediment by the Enemy the Army of the Colleagues suffered not under the like necessity for being at its own home it might be sure upon any adverse fortune to have safe receptacle in every City Moreover the Italians were incited to fight onely out of a desire of honor or of revenge and this was much more in the Princes and Commanders then in the common Soldier which things being well considered might by reason of what is the usual issue of such actions cause rather doubt then hope of victory if they should come to a day of Battel or at least might make it appear that businesses were so equally balanced and so doubtful as where there was no inforcing necessity to pursue a business so full of danger was not worth the while We must now consider the advantage as also the disadvantage which might happen upon the good or bad success of the battel which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncertain yet out of the aforesaid respects it was now both those in extremity We will say that the then chief moving cause was to drive the French Army out of Italy and to restore those of Aragon to their Kingdom out of which they were driven by K. Charls The confederate Princes might in all liklihood have compast this their intention by other more safe and more secure means For what disturbance might they meet withal in the enterprise which they were to endeavor against the French in the very Kingdom of Naples from that Army which hasted to pass over the Mountains and was to dissolve of it self And say that those people should be routed and defeated should therefore the Kingdom of Naples be disposed of according to the pleasure of the Italian Victors No certainly for the King had already left strong Garisons there of his best Soldiers to secure it The victory could not be so great and favorable for the Italians but that they must have lost some of their men so as if they had a mind to attempt any thing upon the affairs of Naples it had been better for them to have gone with all their Forces upon that enterprise then to give battel to those who did not any waies oppose their design since when they should have overcome them they were to go with that Army lessened by the Battel and wearied with marching to the main business of taking the Kingdom of Naples where the things offered at by Ferdinand would have had easier success if he had entred the Kingdom with greater Forces and as he was willingly received by the City of Naples whither he might come at first with those few men he had so would the rest of the Cities willingly have revolted from the French and have put themselves under the obedience of Ferdinand if they had seen he had Forces sufficient to defend himself and to make good their rebellion But say that the Colleagues would have secured themselves yet better from the French to the end that their intentions upon the Kingdom of Naples might not be hindred or diverted had it not been better for them to go with the Army of the league to find out Monsieur d' Orleans who at the same time had possest himself of the City of Novara to drive him out of Italy together with those of his party who had setled themselves there then to follow those who did of themselves that which was most desired by the league to wit hasten back over the mountains Nay it may be further said that unless the French should be necessitated as seeing their King in danger as also that Army which was pursued by the Italians they would not peradventure
mans Country with an Army intending to possess himself thereof must first win all the Castles and strong Holds upon the Frontiers for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them since his victuals may be thereby hindred and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed Moreover to be â—aster of the field leave the Cities and strong Holds unreduced would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies which being founded only upon the Forces of a field-Army when that should be worsted all things formerly won must of necessity fall of themselves Hence it is that since much time must be spent in lying before a Fort or Citadel and that many men are requisite to take it and all this often-times in vain the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficulty are not so soon nor so sadly compast as they were by the Antients who met not with such obstacles And how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong Holds whereof we see many clear examples in the actions of the aforementioned Princes The Emperor Charls made War several times with numerous Armies against the King of France propounding great matters unto himself which proved all but vain at last by his having met with strong Cities well munited such as required much time and labor to take them wherefore though his success in War was sometimes prosperous yet it came so late as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby as was seen when after much time spenâ— and mâ—ny men lost before the Fort of St. Desir which was seaâ—ed in the midst of France whither he was fortunately advanced though he reduced it to his own power yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the Enemy as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquisition that he might fall upon another Enterprise The same and for the same cause befell Francis King of France who having sent his Son the Dolphin with powerful Forces to the Pyrenean Mountains to the end that he might break into Spain promising himself easier success therein by an unexpected assault and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of Caesars Dominions with other Armies The Dolphin being at the very first to take Perpignano a Fort placed upon those Frontiers he there met with such and with so many difficulties as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those Forces from penâ—trating any further Solyman being entred with a powerful Army into Hungarie intending to pass into Austria wasted so much time in expugning the strong Hold of Buda as it proved the safety of that Country and chiefly of Vienna before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security so as the City being of it self very renable it may be said that she did not onely save her self but by the preservation thereof all Austria and other Provinces of Germany were preserved then and several times since So likewise in the War which was made by the same Solyman against the Venetians though he was come thither himself in person with powerful Forces both by Sea and Land yet his Forces being repulst by the Fort of Câ—rfir which was forcibly but in vain attempted by the Turks he was forced to withdraw from before it whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong Hold both the Island of Câ—rfee and other places belonging to that State must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation By reason then of these difficulties and such occasions the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action then those of former daies When Alexander had overcome in Battel Darius the powerful King of Persia he soon made himself Master of his whole Kingdom and passing further into the Country even to the ocean Sea he found the way so opeâ— as the onely difficulty he met withal was the overcoming of those Fortresses of Rivers and Seas which nature had furnished the Country with Insomuch as those who writ his actions speak but of two strong Holds of any importance about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the Indians in his victorious over-running so many Countries But Pompey made such way in following Mithridates and in planting Trophies of victories in all places whereby he past in so many Eastern Provinces amongst people that he had rather march'd over then over-come as it may be easily conceived that he mâ—â— no where with any impediments by strong Holds which were able to stop the course of his victorious Forces Caesar found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of Europe with whom he was to fight but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified Cities yet in the space of Ten years he compleated so many victories as he subjugated There hundred several sorts of People It these though great Princes and most valiant Commanders had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort certainly their atchievements would have been fewer and their glory not so much cry'd up This was manifestly known by the example of other Ages For it may be observed that the so great progresses of War have been made chiefly in the Eastern parts where at all times peradventure by reason of the largeness of the Country the use of strong Holds hath been least had so as not only Alexander the Great and Pomâ—ey both of them more famous then all other Commanders but some of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains subjugated spacious Countries in a short time And in later times Selymus the Great Turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the Soldan of Caire's Empire For having had the better in many Battels and not meeting with any strong Hold to withstand him the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the Turks who were Victors and Masters of the Field But such acquisitions as they are very easie to be made so are they but seldom peacefully possest which was the cause why the Roman Emperors could never so govern those furthest Eastern parts but that either by the Inhabitants themselves or by their neighboring Kings â—umults were continually raised So as it behoved them to subjugate the same Provinces several times But if these difficulties of winning Forts and strong Holds did retard the course of Victories certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern Princes and Commanders but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry as great discipline cunning constancie and sufferance is discovered in this sort of Militia and as such acquisitions