pl. 41. and Hob. 205. in Pie and Lovels Case and there was no limitation of time for the Informer Qui tam c. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. until the said Statute of 23 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 2. which limits him to a year after the offence committed and not a year and a day and altho this offence of Recusancy cannot in strictness be said to be committed for that in truth it is but a bare omission as hath been said supra 62. and therefore there needs not any place alledged yet in common parlance it it will pass well enough for an offence committed and seems to be within the meaning of 31 Eliz. 5. § N. 2. and in 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. it s said the third part of the forfeiture for Recusancy shall be to the poor in the Parish where the offence is committed Infra 116. N. 2. 7. Now if it be objected that if the Recusancy be not an offence which is to be laid in the proper County by 31 Eliz. 5. § 2. N. 1. because it is not an offence that can be properly said to be committed by the same reason the Informer who is restrained by 31 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 1. to a year after the offence committed is not restrained in the Case of Recusancy nor the poor of any Parish can take any benefit by 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. as to the third part of the forfeiture for that there is no Parish wherein Recusancy can be said to be committed I answer there is a great difference betwixt the Cases for in the Cases of limitation of time when the offence must be prosecuted 31 Eliz. 5. § 5 N. 1. and that of the poor of the Parish 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. where the forfeiture is to be distributed the word committed is no part of the substance of the matter and t is no more than if the Statute had said within a year after the offence and to the Parish where the offence was and there committed may be taken well in that sense but it cannot be so in that other Case supra 62. about the proper County for 31 Eliz. 5. § 2. N. 1. makes the Commission of the offence matter of substance and whither it were committed or not in the County where it is laid in the Information or popular suit goeth not to the merits of the Cause for if it were not committed in that County and the defendent alledg and traverse it and it be found for him the Plantiff shall be barred and those words That he may traverse that it was not committed shew clearly that offences which consist only in omission were not intended for otherwise neither Recusancy nor any other offence of that nature could be punished by any Information or popular Action for the Jury upon their Oaths must of necessity find that it was not committed in any County for that in truth and property of Speech it was not committed at all 8. By 31 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 3. If the Informer Qui tam c. doth not prosecute within a year after the offence yet the King may at any time within two years after that year ended and therefore it was resolved in 2 Co. 366 in Syvedale and Sir Edward Lenthalls Case where an Information was brought in the Court of Exchequer Tam quam c. Upon 3 Jac. 4. § 3. N. 3. for three years forbearance to receive the Sacrament after Conformity that altho it was not good for the Informer yet it was well enough as to the King 9. Alien A natural born Subject or a denizen being defendent in any suit upon a penal Law in B. R. C. B. or Exchequer is not Compellable to put in special Bail but may appear by Attorny 29 Eliz. 5. § 21. N. 2. and 31 Eliz. 10. § 20. N. 3. Telverton 53. Saint Georges Case Bar. Feme 10. An Action of debt or Information Tam pro c. lieth upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife and the Husband in that case is lyable to pay the twenty pound per month notwithstanding he himself be no Recusant 3 Bulstrode 87. The King and Law 1 Rol. 93. pl. 41. Dr. Fosters Case Hob. 97. Moore and Hussey Savile 25. pl. 59. Infra 119. N. 2. But the Wife cannot appear by Supersedeas alone without her Husband for both must appear or both be outlawed Hob. 179. Lovedens Case Infra 173. N. 2. Nor can she plead or joyn issue without her Husband 2 Rol. 90. Sir G. Curson and Vxor's Case and therefore where in an Information brought against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife the Record was entred praedict J. M. veniunt praedicta M. dicit quod ipsa non est inde Culpabilis de hoc ponit se super Patriam this was alledged to be ill for the Husband pleads not at all but in this Case the Docket being Quod J. C. M. uxor ejus c. placitant non culp and it being manifest that they both appeared the record was amended by the Docket after verdict for it was but the mis-prision of the Clerk in drawing the plea 2 Cro. 530. the same Case with 2 Rol. 90. Crompt 14. a. At the end of the Case in 2 Cro. 530. a note is added that if Sir J. C. and his Wife had pleaded quod ipsi non sunt culpabiles it had been ill but yet it seems that the Law is Contrary to that opinion for where an Action or Information is brought against the Husband and Wife for an offence or wrong done by the Wife there the Husband is charged quoad poenam tho not quoad culpam and when they both plead quod ipsi non sunt culpabiles the meaning is that he is not chargeable quoad poenam and she is not Guilty quoad culpam and therefore it was resolved addition to Bendloes 148 in the Case of Brown and Audley and his Wife Trin. 22 Jac. in Action sur le Case for scandalous words by the Wife that where they both plead non culp and the Jury found the Feme guilty the Plantiff should have Judgment for the issue was good for the reason aforesaid and the finding of the Jury was a good ground for the Judgment for if the Wife were guilty quoad culpam as the Verdict must necessarily be understood she being the wrong doer the Husband by consequence was chargeable quoad poenam and Judgment shall be against both And the resolution 1 Cro. 417. in the Case of Needler versus Symnell and his Wife Mich. 11. Car. 1. is directly contrary to that opinion in the end of 2 Cro. 530. for 1 Cro. 417. it s adjudged that Ipsi non sunt culpabiles by Baron and Feme is a good issue altho the wrong were by the Wife alone 11. Alien An Information of Recusancy lyeth
that the Indictment was good enough notwithstanding it is not said of what Parish the Recusant was for the whole penalty of twenty pound per month is at first 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. given to the Queen and the Inhabitants of the Parish where the offence was are by 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. to sue in the Exchequer for their third part and surmile in their Bill that the offence was in their Parish and if it were so it shall be delivered to them as the Act directs LXXVIII Exchequer Page 71. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. the principal Officers of the Court of Exchequer are the Treasurer and Barons but the principal Officers of the receit of the Exchequer are the Treasurer and Chamberlains Savile 38. pl. 87. LXXXIX Information Page 71. c. 82. on 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. upon a penal Statute where part of the forfeiture is given to the King and part to him that will sue the Informer or Plantiff qui tam c. sequitur tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso and so it must be said in the Information or declaration and not only there but in the Joyning of Issue and the Venire facias it must be entred qui tam pro Domino Rege c. or the omission of it is Error 1 Cro. 336. pl. Mich. 9. Car. 1. 2. In an Information upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. the usual way is that the Informer for himself petit inde tertiam partem juxta formam Statut ' 11 Co. 56. Dr. Fosters Case but then the Statute must be named for in an Information 2 Cro. 142. Mich. 4. Jac. by Broughton Qui tam c. against Moâ—re for the forbearing to come to Church Contra formam Statuti without naming which Statute in which Case the Informer demanded the third part for himself it was adjudged by the Court of B. R. to be ill for there are several Statutes against Recusancy and it did not appear which of them was meant 3. But if this Statute of 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. 1. be named in Certain and the party who sueth demands the whole forfeiture for the King and himself and Judgment be given that the King shall recover one moity and the Informer or Plantiff Qui tam c. the other moity in that Case the Judgment is well enough for the Information or declaration being Quod actio accrevit Domino Regi praefat A. ad habend ' exigend ' the full forfeiture the Judgment doth not vary there from when it saith that a moiety shall be to the King and a moiety to the Plantiff or Informer and altho the Statute 23 Eliz. 1. § 11. N. saith that he which will sue shall have but a third part yet thâ—t is by way of distribution only and such distribution if the penalty is an act subsequent to the Judgment and is to be made as well out of the moity given by the Judgment to the Informer or Plantiff Qui tam c. as out of the mony thereby given to the King and this I conceive to be the reason of the resolution in Chambers Case 2 Roll. 437. pl. where such a Judgment in Case of Recusancy upon this Statute was allowed to be good But if the whole forfeiture be not demanded in certain there altho the party who sues demands his own share 't is ill and so it was adjudged in an Information upon a poenal Statute 5 Eliz. 5. § 16. N. 1. which concluded Vnde petit advisamentum Curiae quod forisfaciat 5 l. pro qualibet offensunde ipse petit medietatem For the Informer doth not make his demand certain but leaves it to the Court or Jury to cast up the sum it Amounts to Hobart 245. Pie and Westly 4. If there be several Statutes Information and each of them prohibit one and the same thing and Inflict a penalty and give an Information for recovery of it the Information may conclude contra formam Statuti and good because the best shall be taken for the King 5 H. 7.17 So if one Statute make the offence and another Inflicts the penalty or forfeiture and the Information be for the offence only it may conclude contra formam Statuti which is to be understood of that Statute which makes the offence But if the Information both lay down the offence and demand the penalty there both Statutes must be recited or at least the Information must conclude contra formam Statutorum Owen 135. Wests Case supra 72. § 6. 5. In the late additions to Dalt 547. cap. 191. § 6. N. 3. it s said that Informations and saiâ—s on penal Statutes are stricti juris and excepted out of all the Statutes of Jeofailes which is a mistake for they are not excepted out of 32 H. 8.30 It s true they are out of 18 Eliz. 14. § N. and 21 Jac. 13. § N. and that as it seemeth in all Cases within those two Statutes see Styles 307. Theoballs against Newton And in the Case of Scot and Lawes Hob. 328. It seems to be intimated that they are excluded out of all three Where the Case was debt by an Informer Qui tam c. upon a penal Statute 21 H. 8.13 § 2. N. 4. the defendent pleads non debet praefato J. meaning the Informer and not the King and the Issue was found against the defendent in that Case it was resolved that this was a good Cause to stay Judgment and there it s said that it being upon a penal Statute the Statute of Jeofailes 32 H. 8.30 would not help it but that reason was Ex abundanti for 32 H. 8 30. seems to extend to all popular suits whatsover and in Wallers Case Dyer 346.347 in an Information brought against him 18 Eliz. by Topcliffe Qui tam c. upon 37 H. 8.9 of Usury it was adjudged that the mis-conveying of Process and mis-joyning of Issue in the said Information Dayes were aided by 32 H. 8.30 6. By 31 Eliz. 5. § 5. N. 2. an Informer Qui tam c. must begin his suit within one year after the offence committed otherwise he shall not have any part of the penalty 2 Co. 366. Hill 12 Jac. Godbolt 158. pl. 216. Sivedale versus Sir Edward Lenthal But popular suits upon the Statute 39 Eliz. 2. § N. of Tillage are excepted and not upon the Statute of Tallage as is mistaken in the the late additions to Dalt 546. cap. 191. § 3. In Dr. Fosters Case 11 Co. 65. it s said that the Informer hath no Remedy for recovery of the forfeitures for Recusancy after the year and day is expired for that time is limited in certain by 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. but yet with submission it seems that 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. relates to Indictments only and so it was held in this very Case of Dr. Foster 11 Co. 60. and 1 Rol. 93.
she be an Offender within 3 Jac. 5. § 10. N. 1 and conform not within the year next before her Husband's death she shall forfeit the profits of two parts of both But otherwise it is where an Estate is given or limited by the Husband to the Wife and it 's neither expressed nor can be averred and proved to be given or limited for her Joynture or in recompense of her Dower and therefore if any of the Estates before-mentioned which are not within 27 H. 8.10 § 6. N. 1. be granted or limited to the Wife by the Husband or any other Estate for her life or otherwise which would be a good Joynture within the said Statute if it were intended for a Joynture as if a man before or after Marriage covenants to stand seised of Lands to the use of himself for life the remainder to his Wife for her life and it is neither expressed in the deed nor can be averred and proved that it was for her Joynture Or if a man devise Lands by his last Will to his Wife generally and there is no mention in the Will that 't is for her Joynture for in this Case an Averment that it was so intended will not serve unless there be express words in the will to that purpose These Estates so gained by the Wife as they do not barre her Dower out of the Residue of her Husband's Estate but that she shall enjoy both the one and the other 4 Co. 4. So they are not within the meaning of this Act 3 Jac. 5. § 10. N. 1. because not made for her Joynture and she shall not forfeit the Profits of two parts of them altho she may forfeit the Profits of two parts of her Dower which she hath out of the residue of her Husband's Estate If Lands be conveyed to the Wife before Marriage for part of her Joynture and other Lands are conveyed to her after Marriage in full satisfaction of her Joynture and she refuse those conveyed after Marriage in this Case she may retain those conveyed before marriage and yet be endowed of the residue of her Husband's Estate for that the Lands first settled on her were not for her whole Joynture 1 Inst 35. and 4 Co. 3. And if she be a Popish recusant convict and her Husband none and she conform not within the year next before his Death she shall forfeit the Profits of two parts both of such Dower and of the Estate so conveyed to her before her Marriage And as the Wife shall have her Joynture and Dower both in such Cases where the Joynture is not pursuant to 27 H. 8.10 § 6. N. 1. So in some Cases likewise where she hath a Joynture pursuant to that Statute as where she hath such a Joynture made to her by the Husband before Marriage and he afterwards endow her ad ostium Ecclesiae or if she hath a Joynture made by the Husband in his life-time and after his death his Heir or Feoffee assigne other Lands to her in Dower or the Heir plead to her in a Writt of Dower ne unques seisie que Dower c. or nient accouple in Loyal Matrimony or any other plea save Joynture in Barre of Dower and it be found against him in these Cases the Wife shall hold her Joynture and yet be endowed and if she be an Offender within 3 Jac. 5. § 10. N. 1. shall forfeit the profits of two parts of her Joynture and Dower both But if a Widow who is endowed of the Lands of her deceased Husband takes a second Husband who is no Popish Recusant convicted by whom she hath a Joynture and she becomes a Popish Recusant convict and the second Husband dyeth and the Wife is Offender within 3 Jac. 5. § 10. N. 1. In this Case she shall not by force thereof forfeit the profits of two parts of such Dower and Joynture both but only of her Joynture for that her Dower is not out of the Lands of her said Husband that is of the Husband in whose life-time she stood convicted and after such conviction forbore to conform c. within the year next before his death CCXXXIII Judgment Page 216. Convicted of Popish Recusaney 3 Jac. 5. § 11 N. 1. The conviction mentioned here and in the other Branches of this Statute seems to be intended not only of a Conviction according to 26 Eliz. 6 § 5. N 5. or 3 Jac. 4. § 7. N. 2. upon Proclamation and default of appearance but of a judgment likewise upon an Indictment or popular suit on 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. and 11. N. 1. for Conviction in relation to these three last mentioned Remedies is to be taken for adjudged or attainted supra 63. N. 2. and the Popish Recusant who is either convicted upon proclamation and default of appearance or against whom Judgment is had upon an Indictment popular suit or action of debt c. at the King's suit is hereby disabled as an excommunicate person and liable to all other the penalties and incapacities inflicted by this Act 3 Jac. 5. on a Popish Recusant convicted CCXXXIV Excomgent Page 216 Reputed to all intents and purposes disabled as a person c. excommunicate 3 Jac. 5. § 11. N. 1. and not reputed to all intents as an excommunicate person as Wingate Coron 135 mis-recites for as it seems by the words of the Statute the Popish Recusant convicted is not to be reputed as a person excommunicate in any other respect or to any other intent but as to his Disability only infra 243. and yet 2 Bulstr 145.155 the opinion of the Court in B. R. Mich. 11. Jac. Griffith's Ca. seems to be to the contrary that a Popish Recusant convicted may by force of 3 Jac. 5. § 11. N. 1. be attached upon a Writ de excommunicato capeindo Tamen quaere whether this statute being a penal Law and speaking only of the point of disability shall be extended by equity to other Cases or the Recusant be attached upon an excommunicato capiendo unless he be first actually excommunicated A Popish Recusant convict is disabled as an excommunicate person to be a witness in any Cause between Party and Party by Coke Ch. Inst 2 Bulstr 155. Page 216 217 218. CCXXXV May plead the same in disabling of such Plaintiff 3 Jac. 5. § 11. N. 2. this disability in the Popish Recusant convicted is but Quousque c. untill he conform c. and take the Oath of Allegeance and the Defendant must in this Case plead the Conviction at large and must as in a plea of Excommengement demand if the plaintiff shall be answered Hetley 18. which is the Legal Conclusion of a Plea in disability of the person The Defendant in debt upon an Obligation pleads that the Plaintiff is a Popish Recusant convict who replyeth nul tiel record such plea in disability of the person is peremptory and nul tiel record is an issue and judgment shall be given
against the Defendant upon failer of the Record Hetley 18. But yet if there be a Plea of a Conviction of Recusancy had before the Justices of Gaol delivery and the Defendant mistakes Certiorari and takes out a Certiorari to the Justices of Peace this shall not be a failer of the Record altho the Defendant hath it not at the day for that the issuing of a Certiorari was the Award of the Court but a Certiorari shall be awarded de novo to the Justices of Gaol delivery before whom the Plaintiff was convicted Hob. 135. Pye and Thrill Note If the Defendant be sued in C. B. or any other of the Principal Courts at Westminster and he plead a Conviction of Recusancy before the Justices of Gaol delivery or Justices of Peace he need not take his Certiorari out of the Chancery and so bring it by Mittimus but the Court may send a Certiorari immediately to that inferiour Court where the Plaintiff was convicted as was held Hob. 135. See 19 H. 6.19 And the Justices themselves before whom the Conviction was had must certify and therefore if the Conviction was had before Justice of peace the Certificate cannot be by the Custos Rotulorum alone though he keep the Records for the Certiorari is in such Case directed to the Justices of peace Hob 135. A Popish Recusant is convicted of recusancy in a popular suit and after such Conviction sues the Informer qui tam c. upon some other matter or cause of action arising between them Quaere whether the Desendant may plead such Conviction in disability of the Recusant by 3 Jac. 5. § 11. N. 2. for this Conviction disables the Recusant to sue as if he were excommunicated and no otherwise Now if a Bishop excommunicate any one and the Bishop be afterwards sued at Law for any other matter or cause by the person so excommunicated the Bishop cannot plead this Excommunication in disability of the plaintiff who sueth 1 Inst 134. Swinborn 305. part 5. sect 6. and the reason given for this 8 Co. 68. in Trollop's Case is because the Bishop was a party to the Excommunication and therefore shall take no advantage by it Which reason seems to hold likewise in the case of an Informer Qui tam c. who is a party to the Conviction of the Recusant upon the popular suit which conviction renders the Recusant disabled to all intents as an excommunicate person and therefore he being a party to it by the same Rule shall not take advantage of it in disability of the Recusant in any action brought by the Recusant against him But yet notwithstanding I conceive the Informer qui tam c at whose suit the Recusant was convicted may well take advantage of this Conviction and plead it in disability of the person of the Recusant and that the true reason why the Bishop shall not be admitted to plead an Excommunication pronounced by him in disability c. is not because he is a party to the Excommengement but because in matters of Excommunication the Bishop acts as judge and 't is by his Sentence and Authority that the party is excommunicated and he shall not take advantage in another suit of a sentence given by himself judicially and this will not hold in the case of an Informer c. 14. H. 4.14 If an Executor or Administrator becomes a Popish recusant convict it seems he is disabled by this Act 3 Jac. 5. § 1. N. 1. to sue in either of these capacities for 3 Jac. 5 § 11. N. 1. saith he shall be disabled to all intents as an excommunicate person Now a person actually excommunicated can not sue as Executor or Administrator as is held 21 Ed. 4.49 21 H. 6.30 and 14. H. 6.15 and 1 Inst 134. altho there are some opinions to the contrary Finch 27. Page 219 CCXXXVI 220. Which are not to be seized or taken into the King's hands c. 3 Jac. 5 § 12. N. 1. these words are not restrained to such Lands c. as cannot be seized into the King's hands for recusancy for then the Recusant could in no case sue for more than the third part for that the King may if he please make his Election and seize the other two parts in lieu of the XX. lb per Month But they are intended of all Lands c. of the recusant which neither the King hath seized nor are by Law to be seized by vertue of any thing which the king hath already done or in respect of what the recusant after his conviction hath omitted to do And therefore if a man be convicted of recusancy upon a popular suit or an action of debt at the King's suit alone in which cases the penalty of XX. lib. per Month is not appropriated to the King for the time to come and he payeth the penalty recovered or if he be convicted upon Indictment and after such Conviction duly payes the XX. lib. per Month into the Exchequer and the King makes no Election to take the two third parts of his Estate in lieu thereof such Recusant may by this Proviso 3 Jac. 5. § 12. N. 1. in either of those Cases sue or prosecute for any of his Lands Tenements Leases Rents Annuitys or Hereditaments whatsoever notwithstanding his conviction for when the penalty recovered is satisfied or the forfeiture appropriated to the King is duely paid into the Exchequer his lands c. are not to be seized by force of any Law for recusancy unless the King make his Election to have the two parts and untill that Election they cannot in the sense of this Proviso 3 Jac. 5. § 12. N. 1. be said to be Lands to be seized or taken into the King's hands for that the King cannot have the two parts and the XX. lib. per Month both But if the King make no such Election and the XX. lib. per Month be duely paid into the Exchequer the Recusant is to hold and enjoy all his Lands Tenements c. as if he had never been convicted and during that time there can be no distinction made between the two parts and the Recusants third part so that in this Case the recusant must either be enabled to sue and prosecute for all his Lands c. or none and and to think the latter of these were to render this Proviso 3 Jac. 5. § 12. N. 1. nugatory and vain But when once the King hath seized the two Thirds for Recusancy either by way of Election or for non-payment of the XX. lib. per Month penalty then the Recusant is enabled to sue only for the other Third part whether in the hands of the King or of a common person CCXXXVII Marriage Page 220 221. Every man being or which shall be a Popish Recusant convicted 3 Jac. 5 § 13. N. 2. A man who is no Popish recusant convicted marrieth a Woman who is a Popish recusant convicted in other form than is here
and the authority hereby given them to go and seck the party 12 Co. 130. But the Constable cannot by vertue of such Warrant break the House where the party is for he is no Offender before he refuse the Oath or commit some contempt to the King Page 246. If any Person or Persons of or above the said Age and Degree CCLXI 7 Jac. 6. § 26 N. 3. that is of the said Age and above the said Degree of a Baron or Baroness for so the words must be taken viz conjunctively and not of such who are of the Degree of a Baron or Baroness and no more For the precedent words 7 Jac. 6. § 26. N. 1. appointed that the Oath may be tendered to such by any Privy Counsellour or the Bishop of the Diocess in all Cases altho they were never Convicted Indicted or Presented but to such Noblemen or Noblewomen as are above that Degree it cannot be tendered by vertue of this Act 7 Jac. 6. § 26. N. 3. unless they have been before convicted indicted or presented for not coming to Church or not receiving the Sacrament and in those Cases no less than three Privy Counsellours Quorum nuus c. can tender it 12 Co. 130 131. CCLXII Dignity Page 247. If any Person or Persons whatsoever c. under the said Degree 7 Iac. 6. § 26. N. 4. A Baroness or any Woman above that degree who is not of noble birth but only by Marriage becomes a Widow and takes a second Husband under the Degree of Nobility and is convicted indicted or presented of Recusancy or complained of by the Minister c. to a Justice of Peace who finds cause of Superstition the Justice of Peace may require her to take this Oath altho she were once Noble for by her second Marriage she hath lost her Nobility and Name of Dignity together with the Priviledges of her Nobility Quando mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili desinit esse nobilis which is to be understood of Nobility acquired by Marriage supra 212. For that which was gotten by Marriage may also be lost by Marriage Eodem modo quo quid constituitur dissolvitur and in such Case she shall not be tryed by Noblemen for they are no longer her Peers 2 Inst 50. But if a Woman be Noble by Birth or descent whomsoever she marries yet she remaineth Noble for Birthright is Character indelebilis 4 Co. 118. Actons Case and 6 Co. 53. Countess Rutland 6 and 7 Ed. 6. Dyer 79. Rosin Br. 31.69 and 1 Inst 69. And 't is observable that 21 H. 8.13 § 33. N. 1. provides that a Dutchess Marquess Countess or Baroness Widows which take a second Husband under the degree of a Baron may notwithstanding such second Marriage take such number of Chaplains as if she were a Widow which she could not have done if it had not been expressly provided for by the Statute and the reason given 4 Co. 118. is because by such Marriage her Dignity is determined but hkre 7 Iac. 6. § 26. N. 4. there being no such provisional Clause she shall not have the priviledge of Nobility but may be tendred the Oath of Allegiance by the Justice of Peace as in the Case of a common person Page 247. Shall stand and he presented indictid or convicted CCLXIII 7 Iac. 6. § 26. N. 4. These words being in the Disjunctive it is not necessary that the party be convicted but if he stand presented or indicted for not coming to Church or not receiving the Sacrament and be under the degree of a Baron the Justice of peace ought to tender him this Oath CCLXIV Intendment Page 247 248. And the said Iustice shall find cause of Suspicion 7 Iac. 6. § 26. N. 4. and not if the party be suspected as Wingate Coron 159. mistakes for the bare suspicion of the Justice of peace or any other Person is no sufficient ground to require the Oath or committ the party for the refusal but there must be some good cause for that Suspicion and the same must be alledged in Justice of peace his Plea or justification if he be Sued for committing him so Prison for such refusal So if a Man be arrested on Suspicion of Felony and brings his Action for false Imprisonment the Defendant ought to shew some Matter in fact to induce his Suspicion for in these and the like Cases a bare Suspicion is no justification sufficient it being a Matter secret and not traversable but the Cause of Suspicion is traversable 3 Bulstr 28.4 Weale versus Wells 7 Ed. 4.20 and 17. Ed. 45. and 5 H. 7.4 And whether the Suspicion be just and lawfull shall be tryed and determined by the Justices 2 Inst 52.11 Ed. 4.4 CCLXV. Justices Page 248. That then any one Iustice of Peace 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. What was said by Coke Chief Justice in Griffiths Case 2 Bulstr 155. that any one Justice of Peace may minister this Oath is to be understood of some Cases only 12 Co. 130. which are no others than those here mentioned as he explains his meaning 12 Co. 132. that one Justice of Peace cannot committ any for Refusal of his Oath unless they be prosecuted indicted or convicted and according to 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. supra 184. Page 248 CCLXVI. 249 250. Within whose Commission or Power such Person or Persons shall at any time hereafter be 7 Iac. 6. § 26. N. 4 A person complained of and against whom Cause of Suspicion is found by the Justice of Peace flyeth into another County Quaere whether a Justice of Peace of that other County can require the Oath of him and committ him upon Refusal for he seems to be impowered thereunto by express words of the Statute for that the Party is fallen within his Commission or Power c. But yet I conceive that 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. By these words Any one Iustice of peace within whose Commission or Power c. is designed or intended no other Justice than a Justice of that County where the Party was complained of and suspected and that if he fly into another County no proceedings can be there upon the Complaint and Suspicion in the County whence he came nor any one Justice tender him the Oath or committ him for Refusal without a new Complaint and Cause of Suspicion in the County whither he flyeth For where the Party cannot be Indicted of a Praemunire for Refusing the Oath upon the second Tender at the Assizes or Sessions by 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 6. There the Justice or Justices of Peace out of Sessions cannot tender the Oath or commit for Refusal for the Commitment is in order to a second Tender and an Indictment of Praemunire thereupon but in this Case the Party can not be Indicted of a Praemunire in the County where he flyeth for refusing it upon the second Tender for the Offence for which the Party must be indicted is a
AN Explanation OF THE LAWS AGAINST RECUSANTS c. ABRIDGED By JOSEPH KEBLE Of GRAYES-INNE Esq LONDON Printed for SAMUEL KEBLE At the Turks Head in Fleet-street over against Fetter-lane-end 1681. TO THE READER Reader THe Usefulness of the LAWS concerning Recusants c. Explained which is here referred to in Pag. 7. occasioned the Paines in suiting this Abridgement to the several Editions of the Statutes by Quotations directed to the Particular Statute Paragraph and Number or distinct Sentence of each Paragraph which is most proper to the last Edition now in the Press and to evince the Necessity or great Convenience of those several Wayes of Section without which I could not without some Difficulty discover the Meaning of any Cases of the least Variation And therefore what I wrote for my own Ease I hope will not be thought uneasy to others my Design not intending this Publick when wrote But to pleasure a Particular Friend I have permitted it to be so Some things of weight are here added particularly Pl. 251. and other things of less moment are added or omitted as seemed fit and that it be but as kindly received as I intended is the utmost Desire of Grayes Inne 27 March Anno 1681. JOSEPH KEBLE AN EXPLANATION OF THE LAWS AGAINST POPERY ABRIDGED Stat. 1. Eliz. 1. Of SVPREMACY PAge 2. The Statute of 1 2 Phil. and Mar. 8. mentioned 1 Eliz. 1. § 2. N. 1. repealed 26 H. 8.1 and 35 H. 8.3 by both which King H. 8. his Heirs and Successors were declared Supream Head of the Church of England and by repeal of 1 and 2 Ph. and Mar. 8. those other Statutes 26 H. 8.1 and 35 H. 8.3 were revived and are again in force III. 4 Inst 325. Page 5. By the abrogation of the Jurisdiction of any forreign Prelate 1 Eliz. 1. § 16. N. 2. all Jurisdiction derived from such Forreigner is abrogated likewise IV. and therefore the concurrent Jurisdiction which the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury is supposed to have in the inferiour Dioceses ought not now to be exercised by him but is utterly taken away by this Act for he had it not as Arch-bishop but as Legatus natus to the Pope Hob. 17. Dr. James Case Lamb. 224. V. High Commission Page 8. The Jurisdiction and authority by 1 Eliz. 1. § 18. N. 1. given to the late Court called the High Commission Court are now taken away by 17 Car. 1 cap. 11. § 4. N. 1. But the power given by 1 Eliz. 1. § 18. N. 1. to the Queen to constitute such Commissioners was no more than she had before by ancient prerogative and the Laws of the Land for thereby she might have made such an Ecclesiastical Commission if 1 Eliz. 1. § 18. had never been made 5. Co. 8.9 Cawdries Case and 2 Cr. 37. Page 13. If a man had done any deed or act VI. or executed any thing which amounted to the holding standing with or maintaining the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdictiction of any foreign Prelate c. he might before the Statute of 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. have been indicted for it after the year expired for the restraint here 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 1. in point of time extends to offences committed by preaching teaching or words only and not to all Cases within this branch as Wing Crown 10. mistakes But now by the Statute 23 Eliz. 1. § 8. N. 1. It seemeth that the prosecution must be within a year and a day for all offences whatsoever against this Act. VII Dayes Page 13 14. The half year here mentioned 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 2. is not to be understood of six months as Wingate Crown 10. mistakes which is in Law to be accounted secundum numerum singulorum dierum allowing XXVIII dayes to every month and not according to the Solar month nor according to the Kalendar unless it be on 13 Ed. 1. W. 2. cap. 5. § N. for the lapse in Quare Impedit and by 2 and 3 Ed. 6.13 § N. of proving a suggestion 1 Inst 135. and 2 Crook 166 167. B. of Peterborough vers Catesby Yelverton 100. Catesby vers Baker and Hob. 179. Copley against Collins But the halfe year in 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 2. is to be understood according to the Kalendar Infra pl. 65. Page 14. Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst 331 in his Construction of 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 2. saith that no persons shall be impeached for any of the offences by preaching teaching VIII or words unless they be lawfully indicted within the space of half a year but yet it seemeth that the words of the. Statute will not bear such a Construction neither if they did is it Law at this day nor was then when the Institutes were wrote 1. For that 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 2. refers only to the Case of Imprisonment that where the Offender by preaching teaching or words is imprisoned and is not indicted within half a year after the offence committed he shall be set at liberty and shall be no longer detained in Prison for any such cause or offence and this was done in favour of liberty and to prevent a long imprisonment upon a malicious and groundless accusation but there is no colour to extend the words to the Offender who was never imprisoned altho the offence was by preaching teaching or words only 2. Put the Case that an Offender by preaching teaching or words had been imprisoned within the half year yet it seems very questionable whether at the half years end when he was set at liberty as he ought to be by 1 Eliz. 1. § 31. N. 2. if he be not in the mean time indicted he should have been clearly discharged by this Act from any prosecution during the half year then next following for altho it be said he shall be no longer detained in Prison for any such cause or offence yet that seems to refer only to his imprisonment before conviction and detained imports as much Viz. That he should not be continued or remain in the same imprisonment which he suffered within the first half year before any Indictment was found against him but not that he should not be indicted afterwards within the compass of the year and if found guilty suffer the imprisonment and other penalties inflicted by this act and it might so have happened that an Offender by preaching teaching or words might have been accused taken and imprisoned a day or two before the half year next after the offence expired in which Case it cannot be thought to be the meaning of the makers of the Law that by his imprisonment for a day or two he should escape the penalties of the Law and could not be afterwards indicted within the compass of the year and yet in that Case he ought to be set at liberty by the express words of the Act which saith he shall be set at liberty if not indicted within half a year after the offence
pleasure 1 Inst 129 130. Rast Entr. 466. Tit. Judgment 3. Inst 218. 2. But his intalled Lands he shall forfeit only during his life for this forfeiture must be understood of such an Estate as he may lawfully forfeit and the general words of the Statute of Praemunire 16 Rich. 2. § 2. N. 7. scil Lands and Tenements shall not take away the force of the Statute de donis conditionalibus 13 Ed. 1. W. 2. cap. 1. § N. 1 Inst 130 131. Godbolt 308. pl. Lord Sheffeild and Ratcliffe 11 Cook 63. 3. And the person Attainted in a Praemunire is disabled to be a witness in any Cause 1 Inst 6. or to sue for Attainder in a Praemunire is a good Plea in disability of the Plaintiff according to Littleton 41. 4. By the Statute of 25 Ed. 3. St. 5. cap. 22. § 1. N. 2. which saith that a man attainted in a Praemunire shall be out of the Kings Protection and 25 Ed. 3. St. 5. § 1. N. 3. It may be done with him as with the Kings Enemy It seemeth that any man might have lawfully slain such a person as was held 24 H. 8. Coron Br. 196 2 Bulstrode 299. Sir Anthony Mildmayes Case and this Sir Edw. Cook 7 Cook 14 in Calvine's Case and 12 Cook 38. seemeth to allow for Law before this Statute of 5 Eliz. 1. § 21. N. 1. and positively affirms it to have been the Law in 1 Inst 130. and yet in the same Case of Calvin 7 Co. he saith that 25 Ed. 3. St. 5. cap. 22. § 1. N. 2. is intended only a legal Protection according to Littleton 41 and so likewise he expounds it in 3 3 Inst 126. But yet that the Party attainted was still under that Protection which the Law of Nature giveth to the King which he explains to be such a Protection as a Person attainted of Felony or Treason is under notwithstanding his Attainder so that if any man had kill'd him without warrant he should have been punished by Law as a man slayer and this sort of Protection by the Law of Nature saith he is indelibilis immutabilis which the person could not take away but yet under favour if a man attainted in a Praemunire were before 5 Eliz. 1. § 21. N. 1. under that indelible and immutable protection of the King given by the Law of nature then the opinion Coron Brook 196. and allowed by himself was not Law but if that opinion Coron Brook 196. were Law and any man might before 5 Eliz. 1. § 21. N. 1. have killed a man attainted in a Praemunire and that by force of 25 Ed. 3. Sta. 5. cap. 22. § 1. N. 3. It followeth that the Protection which the Law of Nature giveth is not Indelebilis or Immutabilis but that an Act of Parliament might in a particular Case take it away but there is now no further need of this question in the Case of a Praemunire for if this protection by the Law of Nature were taken away by 25 Ed. 3. Stat. 5. cap. 22. § 1. N. 3. It is now restored by this Statute 5 Eliz. 1. § 21. N. 1. And no man can lawfully slay a person attainted in a Praemunire no more than he can without Warrant a man attainted of Felony or of Treason 13 Eliz. 2. Of BVLLS PAge 50. LI. Upon 13 Eliz 2. § 2. N. 1. a man absolves or reconciles or is absolved or reconciled to the Pope or See of Rome without any Bull writing or Instrument to that purpose This Case seemeth not to be within the meaning of this Statute for there must be some Bull Writing or Instrument to Authorize such Absolution or Reconciliation or the person who gives or receives it is not punishable by this act altho he may be by 23 Eliz. 1. § 2. N. 1. and 3 Jac. 4. § 22. N. 1. LII Accessary Page 51. Note all concealers of this offence are not within the danger of this Law 13 Eliz. 2. § 5. N. 1. as Wingate Crown 35. misrecites and therefore if a man be present at such offer motion or perswasion and conceal it he shall not incur Misprision of Treason unless he be the party to whom any such Bull c. or Absolution c. was ofered LIII Ouster le mere Page 52. Upon 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 1. A man brings into the Kings Dominions such Agnus Dei or other like superstitious things and another offers and delivers them It seemeth that neither he that brings them in nor he that offers or delivers them is within this Act or lyable to the penalty for 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 2. By the express words it must be the same person So that neither the bringer in unless he offer and deliver them or Cause them to be delivered nor he who delivers them or offereth them to be delivered unless he be the person who brought them in is an offender within this Act. LIV. Alien Page 52. Vpon 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 2. The offer or delivery of such Agnus Dei or other superstitious things to any sort of person is not an offence within this act as Wingate Crown 37. supposeth it to be but to make it an offence it must be delivered or offered to a subject of this Realm or of the Dominions of the same LV. Intendment Page 52.53 Upon 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 3. The intent is material in this Case and therefore if a man be indicted upon the Statute for bringing in and offering or delivering such Agnus Dei c. or receiving the same the intent must be mentioned in the Indictment as it must be in Indictments upon all Statutes where the intent as here is made part of the offence so in an Indictment upon 5 6 Ed 6.4 § 3. N. 1. It is not enough to say the party drew his Dagger in the Church against I. S. but it must be averred that he did it with an intent to strike him as was resolved by the Court of B. R. 33 Eliz. in Penhalls Case 4 Leonard 49. pl. 127. It seemeth by the words of 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 3. That to make the Receiver of such superstitious things an offendor within it there must be a Concurrence of intentions for the using or wearing them both in the giver and receiver and that therefore if a person coming from beyond the Seas brings into this Realm any such superstitious things but with no intent they should be worn or used and gives them to his friend at his request who receives them with an intent to wear or use them this is penal to neither Not to the giver for he had no superstitious intent and the intent is material nor to the receiver for that the offering or delivering them to be worn or used is expresly made in the Statute 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 2. a condition precedent to the obliquity of the fact in receiving them for the Statute 13 Eliz. 2. §
7. N. 3. saith then as well the person so doing as also every other person receiving thm to that intent shall incurre a Praemunire so that then only when the person delivering them so doth that is delivers them to be worn or used the person receiving them to that intent shall incurre a Praemunire But yet there needs not any such concurence of intentions in the giver and receiver to make the giver an offender and therefore if a man brings into the Realm such superstitious things and delivers them to be worne or used tho the party receive them not to the intent to use or wear them but defaces burns or otherwise destroyes yet he that gave or delivered them incurrs a Praemunire for the words in the act 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 2. relating to the offerer or deliverer are intire in themselves and have no dependence on the subsequent words 13 Eliz. 2. § 7. N. 3. relating to the receiver but generally make all offenders who bring them in and either offer or deliver them to a superstitious intent without any respect to the intent of the party who receives or is offered them LVI Justices Page 54. Upon 13 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 1. If the person to whom such Agnus Dei c. Is offered do bring the offender to any Justice of Peace of the County where the offer is made altho he be not the next Justice yet it is good enough and satisfieth the intent of this act for the word next is put in such cases into acts of Parliament but for conveniency and the more speedy Execution of Justice Styles 246. pl. Maine and Sergeants Case LXVII Justices Page 54. The Statute 13 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 1. provides for the discovery of the offender in order to his punishment in three Cases 1. If any such superstitious thing be offered and the party be able to apprehend him that offers it he must bring him to the next Justice of Peace of the County where the offer is made 2. But if he cannot apprehend him he is to disclose his name and place of abode or resort to the Ordinary of that Diocese or a Justice of Peace of that County where the person to whom the offer was made is resident and that within three dayes after such offer made 3. But 13 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 2. If he receives the thing offered then he is not to apply to the Ordinary but is strictly tyed to deliver it within a day after to some Justice of Peace of that County where he who received it shall then be Resident or happen to be and in this last Case if he receives it with an intent to use or wear it and keeps it above a day or delivers it to any other person or Justice of Peace or any other County he incurrs a Praemunire But these Justices of Peace are strangely confounded as well in Dalt 229. cap. 89 tit high Treason as in Wingate Crown 37 Lambert 194. 195. Page 56. LXVIII Upon 13 Eliz. 2. § 10. N. 1. As is aforesaid So that if the offence be not declared as is aforesaid that is to such Justice of Peace as is appointed in 13 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 1. but it shall be declared to any oother Justice of Peace of a wrong County that other Justice of Peace shall not incurre a Praemunire if he doth not signifie or declare it to a Privy Counsellor Here 13 Eliz. 2. § 10. N. 1. 'T is plain that any one Privy Counsellor sufficeth and the Justice of Peace is not bound to signifie the offence to the Privy Council as Wingate Crown 138. misrecites the Statute 23 Eliz. 1. Of CHVRCHES PAge 58. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 2. N. 1. LXXIX Conspiracy It was held Mich. 12 Jac. in Loult and Faulklands Case 2 Cro. 357.358 and 2 Bulstrode 271. 253. and 1 Rol. 209. pl. 49. that if a man were indicted for endeavouring and practising voluntarie felonice proditorie to perswade and withdraw any of the Kings Subjects from his obedience unto the Romish Religion and was afterwards debito modo acquietatus yet an Action upon the Case in Nature of a Conspiracy would not lie a-against the party who procured him to be Indicted and the main reason given was that sorasmuch as every man is bound to discover Treason and 't is dangerous to conceal any thing which may tend to Treason therefore the procuring one to be Indicted concerning it was no Cause of Action And Coke Chief Justice said that such an Action was never brought before that time But later Resolutions have been to the contrary of this opinion and 't is held for Law at this day that if a man procures another to be Indicted of High Treason an Action upon the Case in nature of a Conspiricy lieth against him that procures it as well as if it were for Felony the first leading Case of this nature which was resolved upon solemn argument or debate was that of Hil. 1. Car. 1. of Smith and Crashaw c. addition to Bendloes 152. Latch 79.80 Jones 93.94.95 Where it was adjudged upon great deliberation by all the four Judges of B. R. that an Action in nature of a Conspiracy doth well lie in such Case and that not only in Case of acquital upon Tryal but upon the Exhibiting a Bill of Indictment for High Treason to the Court or Jury if the Jury bring in Ignoramus altho in this last Case a Writ of Conspiracy lyeth not and Lovets Case was denyed to be Law and Justice Dodderidge who concurred 2 Bulstrode 271 253 changed his opinion in Smiths Cas◠and held the Action maintainable so that whosoever of meer malice without probable cause causeth any to be Indicted on 23 Eliz. 1. § 2. N. 1. or on 3 Jac. 4. § 22. N. 1. for endeavouring or practiceing so to perswade or withdraw any Subject or prefers a Bill to the Court or Jury for that purpose is lyable to an Action upon the Case for so doing if the party be acquitted or the Jury bring in Ignoramus as in other Cases of Felony LX. Accessory Page 59. These words And shall not within twenty dayes c. disclose the same 23 Eliz. 1. § 3. N. 1. have no reference to those who are aiders and maintainers of the offender but only to those who have barely a knowledge of the offence without aiding or maintaining the party And therefore if such as are aiders or maintainers of the person offending discover the offence within twenty daies yet such discovery shall not free them from the guilt of Imprisonment of Treason as Wingate Crown 42. mistakes but if they once aid or maintaine the party knowing him to be an offendor they are guilty whither they disclose or conceal the offence and shall have no benefit of the twenty dayes LXI Enfant Page 60. Upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. N. 1. Moor 606. pl. 838. Talbot was Indicted quod existens aetatis 16
this is not like the Case of Jurors upon 2 H. 5. § 2. cap. 3. § 1. N. 2. where t is said that the Juror shall have Lands of the clear yearly value of 40 s. if the debt or damage declared amount to 40 marks in which Case altho it be in the disjunctive debt or damage yet it hath been adjudged that where the debt and damages doth amount to 40 marks it is sufficient and the Juror must have 40 s. per Annum 1 Inst 272. For in that Case the word or is cumulative and debt or damage both amount to no more than one intire thing viz. The value of the Cause or Action depending And it appears plainly to be the intent of the makers of the Law 2 H. 5. Sect. 2. Cap. 3. § 1. N. 2. that no Cause declared to be of the value of 40 Marks shall be tryed by Jurors of a less Estate But in our Case the Lands and Goods are things of different natures one real and the other personal and cannot be regularly reduced under one and the same head and therefore shall not be valued together unless 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 2. had expresly appointed such a valuation 2. But yet if a Popish Recusant hath a lease for years and personal Goods and both do amount in value to above 40. l. he shall be out of the danger of abjuration for altho the lease is in the realty and the goods are personal yet they shall in this Case be valued together For that by this Copulative and 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 2. expresly so appoints without distinguishing between the values of either but makes it sufficient if both of them be of that value 3. Mony secured upon a Mortgage of Lands is within the meaning of these words Goods and Chattels 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 2. And if the Popish Recusant hath above 40. l. owing to him upon such Mortgage he cannot be required to abjure CXXXIII Days Page 137. Within three months next after such person shall be apprehended or taken 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 3. Wingate Crown 80. clearly mistakes the meaning for he saith that a Popish Recusant whose Estate is under value must make the submission prescribed by this Act within three months next after his arrival at his place of abode which is a complicated Error for he quites leaves out him who is to repair to the place where he was born or his Father or Mother dwells he makes the party lyable to such submission before he becomes an offendor by not repairing or not presenting himself and giving in his true name or Travelling above five Miles He speakes nothing of his being apprehended whereas by the Act he cannot be required to abjure until three months after his apprehension and he turns the three months after his apprehension into three months after his arrival all great mistakes and fit to be taken notice of by Justices of Peace whose part it is to require the submission and abjuration that they may not be misled in the Execution of this part of their office by trusting to that abridgment Page 138. CXXXIV Being thereunto required by the Bishop c. 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 3. If the offendor be not before the end of the three months next after his appreliension required by the Bishop a Justice of Peace or the Minister or Curate to make such submission he cannot be required afterwards nor be compelled to abjure by force of this Act but if he be required within the three months to make submission and refuse he may be at any time afterwards warned or required to abjure CXXXV Exile Page 138 139. The Oath of abjuration 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 4. may be in this form or to this effect You shall Swear that you shall depart out of this Realm of England and out of all other the Kings Majesties Dominions and that you shall not return hither or come again into any of his Majesties Dominions but by the licence of our said Soveraign Lord the King or of his heirs So help you God 3 Inst 217. Stamford 119.120 Wilkinson 66. hath set down another form c. resembling that of a Felon c. This hear you Sir Coroner that I J M. of H. in the County of S. am a Popish Recusant and in the contempt of the Laws and Statutes of this Realm of England I have and do refuse to come to hear Divine Service there read and exercised I do therefore according to the intent and meaning of 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 4. c. abjure the Land and Realm of King Charles now King of England Scotland France and Ireland and I shall hast me towards the Port of P. which you have given and assigned to me and that I shall not go out of the high-way leading thither nor return back again c. If I do I will that I be taken as a Felon of our laid Lord the King and that at P. I will diligently seek for passage and I will stay there but one flood and Ebb if I can have passage and unless I can have it in such space I will go every day into the Sea up to my knees assaying to pass over So God me help and his holy Judgment But in alluding to the old Oath for Felony c. Wilkinson is mistaken in the very Offence for which the Popish Recusant is to abjure by force of 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 4. For the Offence is not his Refusal to hear Divine Service for that is but one of the precedent qualifications of the person but the Offence it self is of another nature viz. his not repairing to the place the Statute appoints him or his removal from thence contrary to the Statute or his not presenting himself and delivering his true name as aforesaid Either of these if he be a Popish Recusant within the meaning of this Act is a Crime for which he ought to abjure unless he prevents his abjuration by a timely Submission Nor is the Popish Recusant bound to swear that he will not go out of the high way or return back or will tarry but one Flood and Ebb or go into the Sea up to his knees Nor ought the Coroner or Justices of Peace to require any such Oath of him for this is a new Offence made by a Statute Law which doth not require the strict form of Abjuration as in Case of Felony and altho the Felon were tied to these Circumstances yet the Recusant is not nor shall be a Felon for omitting them but 't is sufficient if he simply abjure as 35 Eliz. 2. § 8. N. 4. directs and go from the appointed Port within the time limited and not return without Licence into any of the Kings Dominions He that thus abjures the Realm doth yet owe the King his Ligeance and remaineth within the Kings Protection Qui abjurat Regnum amittit regnum sed non Regem amittit Patriam sed
without any cause shewn or oath made but he who is not convicted is barred of that priviledge and can apply himself only to the Justices of peace for a licence clogged with divers circumstances which are not required in a licence granted by the King or the three privy Counsellours 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 1. Much less shall this recital 3 Jac 5. § 6. N 1. of the Statute 35 Eliz. 2. § 3. N. 1. impeach the express words of that Statute 35 Eliz. 2. § 4. N. 1. as if no other Popish Recusants were intended to be confined thereby but only such as are convicted because no other are mentioned in the recital for the recital of an Act of Parliament in another Act of Parliament being only by way of Preface or Introduction cannot add to or diminish the Act recited or make it liable to any other construction than what shall naturally flow from the Act it self 4. Inst 331 Page 208. CCXXII Without any other cause to be expressed 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 1. here is one difference between a licence by the King or three of the privy Counsel and a licence by Justices of peace for by these 3 Iac. 7. § 5. N. 2. it ought not to be granted unless the Popish rcusant hath necessary occasions or business but the King 's or privy Counsellours licence may be granted in any case at the Recusants request Page 208 Vnder the Hands and Seals CCXIII. 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 2. An Indictment was brought upon 35 Eliz. 2. § 3. N. 1. for travelling out of the compass of five miles the recusant pleaded a license under the Seals of four Justices of peace and exception was taken to the plea for that the license ought to have been under their hands as well as their seals 2 Cr. 352. Mich. 12. Jac. Maxfield Case And this is a good exception for a license by Justices of peace altho in writing 't is not sufficient without Seals and subscription both 1 Roll 108 Pl. 47 Mucclefields Ca. CCXXIV. Recusantis Of four of the Justices of Peace 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 2. and a license from less than four will not now serve since the repeal of 35 Eliz. 2. § 12. N. 1. and therefore 1 Roll 108 is misreported in that particular for there mention is made of a license from two Justices of peace as if no more were then requisite and that Case could not be grounded upon the Proviso in 35 Eliz. 2. § 12. N. 1. which required only two Justices as well for the distance of time being nine years after the repeal of that Proviso by 3 Jac. 5. § 6. N. 4. As for that in Roll 108 there is mention of a licence under the Seals of the Justices of Peace and of the oath to be taken by the recusant neither of which was appointed by 35 Eliz. 2. § 12. N. 1. but by this Statute 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 4. which must therefore necessarily be there intended and Page 208 CCXXV. 209. With the privity and assent in writing of the Bishop c. the Lieutenant or of any Deputy Lieutenant 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 2. An information was brought against a Popish recusant convict for removing above five miles from the place of his confinement who pleaded a licence from four Justices of peace but the plea was disallowed Mich. 12 Jac. Moor 836. Pl. 1127. Mansfields Ca. But yet if it had been granted with the assent of any Deputy Lieutenant residing in the County there is no doubt but it had been good enough The Bishop Lieutenant or Deputy Lieutenant who gives his assent must be a distinct person from the Justices of peace who grant the licence by 3 Jac. 5. § 7 N. 2. and therefore if one and the same person be a Justice of peace and Deputy Lieutenant he can not act herein in both capaciteis for una persona non potest supplere vicem duorum and if he sign and seal the licence as a Justice of peace the assent of some other Deputy Lieutenant or of the Bishop or Lieutenant must be had thereto or the licence is void Mich. 12. Jac. Maxfield's Ca. 2 Cr. 352. and Mansfield's Ca. Moor 836. Pl. 1127. and Mucclefield's Ca 1 Roll 108. and that Rule Quando duo jura concurrunt in una persona aequum est ac si essent in diversis holds not in such Cases where distinct persons are necessarily required by Law 7 Co. 14. Calvin's Ca. and here four persons 3 Jac. 5. § 7 N. 2. are necessarily required to grant the licence and another person to assent to it In 2 Cr. 352. one exception to the license in Maxfield's Ca. was that the assent of the Deputy Lieutenant was contained in the license granted by the four Justices of peace and was not separate and distinct by it self But to this the Court made no answer and it seems that such an assent is well enough by 3 Iac. 5. § 7. N. 2. tho in the same writing with the license if it be expressed that the four do license and the Deputy Lieutenant doth assent and such writing be under the Hands and Seals of all five Page 209 210. residing within the said county or liberty 3 Iac. 5. § 7. N. 2. these words seem to refelr as wel to the Bishop Lieutenant as to the Deputy Lieutenant so that if a Bishop's Diocess extends into divers Counties and he resides in one of them his assent can be good only for the Popish recusants of that County where he resides and not for those of any other part of this Diocess CCXXVI Licence So if a Lieutenant resides out of the County whereof he is Lieutenant his assent to such license is void and that these words Residing within the County or Liberty 3 Iac. 5. § 7. N. 2. cannot be restrained to the Deputy Lieutenant only appears by those next before-going viz of the same County which clearly relate to the Lieutenant as well as to the Deputy Lieutenant and by consequence so must the word immediately subsequent viz Residing and as to the Bishop the inconvenience is the same as in the Case of the Lieutenant 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 2. for by their remoteness they are disabled to judge of the condition and behaviour of the Recusant to be licensed and of the circumstances wherein he stands and whether such license may be granted to him without hazard of the publick safety which seems to be the reason of this restriction to the County or Liberty where the party who is to assent resides and holds as well the case of the Bishop or Lieutenant as of any Deputy Lieutenant residing out of the County Page 210 The particular Cause of the said License CCXXVIII 3 Jac. 5. § 7. N. 3. in Maxfield's Ca. 2 Cr. 352 another exception to the license granted by the four Justices was that it was said to be granted for certain urgent causes
complicated Offence consisting of several Particulars 1. In giving just cause of Suspicion without which the Party complain'd of according to this Act 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4 cannot be tendered the Oath by one Justice of Peace Then 2. In refusing the Oath before the Justice of Peace who tendered it And lastly 3. In refusing it upon the second Tender at the Assizes or Sessions all which must be comprized in the Indictment So that the cause of Suspicion is pars communis and that arising in the County where the Party dwelt and was complained of cannot be punished in another County unless the Statute 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. had expressly made it examinable there supra 184. True it is that some Statutes do enable Justices of Peace to punish an Offence done in another County but that is where they enable them likewise to examin the truth of the Fact and take Process and Evidence thereof So 1 Iac. 27. § 5. n. 2. and 7 Iac. 11. § 8. n. 3. and supra 255. impower the Justices of Peace where the Party is apprehended to examin and punish the Offence but in our Case the cause of Suspicion arising in one County is not made examinable and consequently not punishable in another County and if not punishable there no Justice of Peace of that other County can proceed upon that cause of Suspicion notwithstanding the Party happen to be within his Commission or Power But yet the Party so flying into another County may without any Complaint or cause of Suspicion be tendered the Oath and proceeded against there by two Justices of Peace Quorum unus c. by vertue of the fore-going words of this Clause 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. Altho he dwell in another County and that for the reason before given viz because this Oath sequitur personam non locum But Wingate Coron 150. saves the labour of this Question for he erroneously restrains the pawer of tendring the Oath in this Case to the Justice of Peace to whom the Complaint is made as if no other Justice of peace of that County could proceed therein which is contrary to the express words as well as the meaning of 7 Iac. § 26. n. 4. Note That Dalton 107. Cap. 45. saith it seems requisite that the Justice or Justices of Peace do make like Certificat as 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. at the next Assizes or Quarter-Sessions of such Persons as have taken this Oath before them by force of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 4. But upon what ground Master Dalton thought this requisite to be certified at the Assizes I know not seing there is no such Certificate to be made by 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5 but only to the General or Quarter-Sessions of the Peace And as for the Sessions I conceive neither the Justices of Peace if they proceed on 7 Iac. 6. § 26 n. 4. and not upon 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. are bound to make such Certificate nor the Clerk of the Peace or Town-Clerk to record it for it is not here required to be done But yet in such Cases where the same persons are impowered by both these Statutes to require and minister this oath as where the Party is convicted of Recusancy in which Case two Justices of the Peace Quorum unus c. may require the Oath by the Special words in this Clause of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. or of the General words in this Clause of 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 2. And it doth not appear upon which of these Statutes they proceed as it may sometimes so happen there if the Party take it will be fafest for the two Justices to make such Certificate to the next General or Quarter-Sessions as is appointed 3 Iac. 4. § 13. n. 5. and for the Clerk of the Peace or Town-Clerk to record it Page 250. CCLXVII If any Person or Persons this Clause 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 5. is General and extends to all before So that if any of the Nobility refuse this Oath they may be committed to the Common Gaol c. by such as are by this Act Authorized to tender it 12 Co. 131. Page 251. CCLXVIII Shall refuse to take the said Oath duly tendered to him or her 7 Iac. 6. § 26. n. 5. If the Persons authorized to tender this Oath ask the Party whether he will take it and he saith he will not quaere whether this be such a Tender and Refusal as shall make the refuser liable to be imprisoned proceeded against by force of this Act unless he or they who tender it have in readiness both the Form of the Oath and the Book to swear on for it is to be presumed that the Act intends all requisite Circumstances ready to enable the one to minister and the other to take the Oath And 't is held that before there can be any such Refusal of this Oath as is here intended it ought to be read or offered to be read to the Party especially if he be illiterate or if he be not yet that at least it ought to be offered to him for himself to read it for perhaps the Party never saw or heard it And in such Case it would be against Reason that the Refusal should be penal and therefore in 9 Iac. upon the Tender of this Oath at Sarjeants-Inne in Fleet-Street it was read by Order of the Judges there Page 251. CCLXIX To the Common Gaol 7 Iac. 9. § 26. n. 5. The Justices of the Court of B. R. used to tender this Oath in Court as Justices of Peace of Middlesex and upon Refusal the Party is to be committed to the Prison of the Marshalsey which is the Ordinary Prison of that Court untill the next Sessions 2 Bulstr 155. Dyer 297. Page 252 253 254. CCLXX. Being lawfully Convicted as a Popish Recusant 7 Iac. 6. § 28 n. 1. That is upon Indictment at the King's Suit or a Popular Action or Information upon 23 Eliz. 1. § 5. and 11. or Debate at the King's Suit alone by 35 Eliz. 1. § 10. n. 2. supra 119 In which two last Cases the former Laws are somewhat altered by this Statute For by the former Laws 23 Eliz. 1. and 35. Eliz. 1. If a Person had been convicted of Recusancy any other way than by Indictment no more could have been demanded either by the King or Informer than for the Months mentioned in the Information or Count and the Penalty should not have run on in such Case for that 29 Eliz. 6. § N and 3 Jac. 4 § N. which appropriate the Penalty to the King after Conviction intend no other Conviction than by Indictment as hath been there said But by this Act 7 Jac. 6. § 28. N. 1. If a Popular Action or Information or Action of Debt c. at the King's Suit alone be brought against the Husband and Wife for the Recusancy of the Wife and Judgment be had