she ought not to starve If a woman be of so haughty a stomack that she will chuse to starve rather then submit and be reconciled to her husband let her take her own choise The Law is in no default which doth not provide for such a wife If a man be taken in execution and lye in Prison for Debt neither the Plaintiff at whose suit he is arrested nor the Sheriff who took him is bound to find him Meat Drink or Cloathes but he must live on his own or on the Charity of others and if no man will relieve him let him dye in the name of God says the Law Plow 68. Dive Manningham so say I if a woman who can have no Goods of her own to live on will depart from her husband against his will and will not submit her self unto him let her live on Charity or starve in the name of God for in such case the Law says her evil demeanour brought it upon her and her death ought to be imputed to her own wilfulness As to my Brother Tyrrells Objection it were strange if our Law which gives relief in all cases should send a woman unto another Law or Court to seek remedy to have maintenance I answer It s not sending the wife to another Law but leaving the case to its proper Iurisdiction the case being of Ecclesiastical Conusance Is it any strangeness or disparagement to the Common-Pleas to send a Cut-purse or other Felon taken in the Court to the Kings-Bench to be Indicted or to the Kings-Bench to send a woman to the Common-Pleas to recover her Dower Why is it more strange for the Common Law to send a Woman to the Ordinary to determine differences betwixt her and her husband touching matters of Matrimony then for our Courts at Common Law to write unto the Ordinary to certifie Loyalty of Marriage Bastardy or the like where Issue is joined on these points in the Kings Courts for although the proceeding and process in the Ecclesiastical Courts be in the names of the Bishops yet these Courts are the Kings Courts and the Law by which they proceed is the Kings Law 5 Rep. 39. Caudries case but the reason in both cases is quia hujusmodi causae cognitio ad forum spectat Ecclesiasticum 30 H. 6. b. Old book of Entries 288. according to that of Bracton lib. 3. fo 107. Stamf. 57. Sunt casus spirituales in quibus Judex secularis non habet cognitionem neque Executionem quia non habet coercionem In his enim casibus spectat cognitio ad Judices Ecclesiasticos qui regunt defendunt sacerdotium Hereunto agrees Cawdries case 5 Rep. 9. As in temporal causes the King by the mouth of his Iudges in his Courts of Iustice determines them by the temporal Law so in causes Ecclesiastical and Spiritual the Conusance whereof belongs not to the Common Law they are decided and determined by the Ecclesiastical Iudges according to the Kings Ecclesiastical Laws And that causes of Matrimony and the differences between husband and wife touching Alimony or maintenance for the wife which are dependant upon or incident unto Matrimony are all of Ecclesiastical and not of secular Conuzance is evident by the Books and Authorities of our Laws de causa Testamentari sicut nec de causa Matrimoniali Curia Regia se non intromittat sed in foro Ecclesiastico debet placitum terminari Bracton lib. 2. cap. 20. fo 7. All causes Testamentary and causes of Matrimony by the Laws and Customs of the Realm do belong to the spiritual Iurisdiction 24 H. 8. cap. 2. The words of the Writ of Prohibition granted in such cases are placita de Catallis debitis quae sunt de Testamento vel Matrimonio spectant ad forum Ecclesiasticum In a suit commenced by a woman against he husband before the Commissioners for Ecclesiastical causes for Alimony a Prohibition was prayed and granted because it is a suit properly to be brought and prosecuted before the Ordinary In which if the party find himself grieved he may have relief by Appeal unto the superiour Court and that he cannot have upon a sentence given in the high Commission Court 1 Cro. 220. Drakes case But 't is objected by my Brother Tyrrell and Twisden that the remedy in the Ecclesiastical Court is not sufficient for if the husband will not obey the Sentence of the Ordinary it is but Excommunication for his Contumacy and will neither feed nor cloath the wife Are the Censures of the holy Mother the Church grown of so little Accompt with us or the separation a communione fidelium become so contemptible as to be slighted with but Excommunication hath our Law provided any remedy so penal or can it give any Iudgment so fearful as this With us the rule is committitur Marescal ' or Prison ' de Fleet. There the Sentence is traditur Satanae which Iudgment is more penal Take him Gaoler till he pay the Debt or take him Devil till he obey the Church And yet their Iudgment is warranted by the rule of St. Paul whom I have delivered unto Satan 1 Cor. 5. 5. whereupon the Coment says Anathema ab ipso Christi corpore quod est Ecclesia recidit Causa 3 quest 4 Cam ' Egell trudam and also Nullus cum Excommunicatis in oratione aut cibo aut potis autesculo communicet nec ave eis dicat Causa 2 quest 3 Can. Excommunicat ' Bracton lib. 5. cap. 23. fo 42. As much is said by our Law and it is to the same effect Excommunicat ' interdicitur omnis actus legitimus Ita quod agere non potest nec aliquem convenire cum ipso nec orare nec loqui nec palam nec abscondite vesci licet The second ground of the Law of Excommunication is the Law of England and it is a ground in the Law of England That he which is accursed shall not maintain any Action Doctor Stu. 11. Where a man is excommunicated by the Law of the Church if he sue any Action real or personal the Tenant or Defendant may plead that he is Excommunicated and demand Iudgment if he shall be answered Lit. 201. the Sentence is set forth at large in the old Statute Book of Magna Charta and is intituled Sententia lata super chartas namely Authoritate Dei patris omnipotentis filii spiritus Sancti Excom̄unicamus Anathematizam a liminibus Sanctae matris Ecclesiae sequestram ' omnes illos c. 12 H. 3. fo 146. He which by the Renunciation is rightfully cut off from the Vnity of the Church and Excommunicate ought to be taken by the whole multitude as a Heathen and a Publican until he be openly reconciled by Penance Act 33. confirm ' per 13 Eliz. cap. and this is grounded on the rule of our blessed Saviour dic ' Ecclesiae And if he neglect to hear the Church let him be as an Heathen and Publican Matt. 18. 17. Shall a
suffered him to go at large whither he would and at the day of Return he returned that he had his body ready Jones They have demurred to the Declaration which I conceive to be a good Declaration For take the case that there went a Latitat to the Sheriff and the Sheriff took the person upon it and let him go at large no body will deny but that an Action of Escape will lye against him and when he makes such a false Return as here that he has the body ready why will not an Action lie for a false Return and this is no new case but hath béen adjudged Moor. plac 596. 3 Cro. 460. ibid. 624. it is at the Plaintiffs Election to follow the Sheriff with Amercements or to bring his Action for the false Return And when this Action has been brought formerly they were forced to plead the Statute none ever demurred generally Twisden I remember a case in 21 Car. 1. Rot. 616. betwéen Franklyn Andrews where an Action upon the Case was brought against a Sheriff for such a false Return he pleaded the Statute and they held in that case that the Sheriff could not Return any thing else but Cepi corpus And old Hodson that sate here remembred the case of Langton Gardiner reported in 3 Cro. and said the Court did amerce the Sheriff for a bad Return but the Iudgment was given in that case for the Plaintiff because there was a Traverse aliter vel alio modo which could not be unless a false Return had been confessed and the Court ordered Iudgment to be entred for the Plaintiff for that cause In the case of Franklyn the Court held that upon Issue Not-guilty the Statute might be given in Evidence but upon a Demurrer you ought to plead the Statute and the general Demurrer cannot be help'd in this case unless you will say that it is a general Law Whelpdale's case is that the Statute must be pleaded because it is a particular Law but it concerns Extortion in all Sheriffs and the Statute of 13 Eliz. that concerns all Parsons touching Non-residency is held to be a general Law and it is not to be stirr'd now but if the point were to be adjudged again perhaps we might be of another Opinion Keeling They have relyed here upon the false Return and the general Demurrer I take to be well enough Morton Rainsford accorded wherefore Iudgment was given against the Plaintiff Lake versus King THe Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case for publishing a Libell in which he was defamed c. the publication was in delivering several Printed Papers wherein the Plaintiff was slandered to several Members of a Committée of the House of Commons Jones It is true if a man make a complaint in a Legal way no Action lyeth against him for taking that course if it be in a competent Court But that that we say is not lawful in this case is his causing the matter to be Printed and Published agreeable to this case are the common cases of Letters if a man will write a scandalous Letter and deliver it to the party himself this is no Slander But if he acquaints a third person with it an Action will lie So here since he will publish this matter by Printing it or if he had but written it it might have been Actionable for the Members ought not to be prepossessed King versus Standish AN Action upon the Statute of Praemunire for impeaching in the Chancery a Iudgment given in the Kings-Bench The Defendant demurred Bigland for the Defendant The question is whether the Court of Chancery be meant within the Statute of 27 Ed. 3. 3. This question has béen controverted formerly but has not béen stirr'd within these 40 years last past It concerns the Chancery as it is a Court of Equity Now the Statute cannot be applyed to the Chancery as such for it was not a Court of Equity at that time and if so then must the Statute be applyed to other Courts where the gravamen then was Mr. Lambert in his Iurisdiction of Courts says of this Court that the King did at first determine Causes in Equity in person and that about 20 Ed. 3 the King going beyond Sea delegated this power to the Chancellor And then he says several Statutes were made to enlarge the Iurisdiction of this Court as 17 Rich. 2. cap. 6. c. But the Chancellor took not upon him ex Officio to determine matters in Equity till Edward the Fourth's time For till then it was done by the King in person or he delegated whom he pleased So that the Gravamen of that Statute could not be in the Chancery 2. It is not possible that the King can be disinherited in his own Courts and therefore the Statute must be understood of Courts that stand in opposition to the Kings Courts and only forreign Courts But this Court is held by the Kings Seal and the Iudgments in it are according to the Kings Conscience Thirdly It is said in the Statute that the Offenders shall have a day given them to appear before the King and his Council or in his Chancery c. and it is strange that the Chancery should give the remedy if that were one of the Courts wherein the Offence were incurred My fourth reason is from the penalty the penalty is very rare and great for they must be put out of the Kings Protection their Lands forfeited and their bodies imprison'd at the Kings pleasure The penalty is fitted well for those that draw the Kings Subjects out of the Kings Iurisdiction but so great a penalty to be inflicted for suing in the Kings Courts is not so reasonable If a man sue in the Ecclesiastical Court for a matter Temporal shall he incur a Premunire An Action upon the Case may lye when a man is mistaken in the Court in which he ought to sue but to make it a Praemunire seems not so reasonable The Vsurpations of the Bishop of Rome were the cause of the making of this Statute and all other Statutes of Praemunire 28 Ed. 3. cap. 1. 16 H. 6. cap. 5. the complaint was all along of the Bishop of Rome's Vsurpations but not a word of the Chancery Sir John Davies in his case of Praemunire tells us that all the Statutes were made upon this occasion Of all the Attainders of Praemunire there never was one for suing in the Chancery The great Objection is from these words in the Statute or which do sue in any other Court now say they this last disjunctive must be applyed to this Court and not to the Court or Courts mentioned before But I answer there were other Ecclesisiastical Courts within this Realm besides that that was a standing Court and had a constant dependance upon the Pope here and they were aimed at by this disjunctive Those Courts derived their Iurisdiction from the Court of Rome and not from the King There is an Authority in the point in
pleasure of the Lords no doubt that would have been an illegal Commitment against Magna Charta and the Petition of Right There the Commitment had been expresly illegal and it may be this Commitment is no less For if it had been expresly shewn and he be remanded he is committed by this Court who are to answer for his Imprisonment But secondly The duration of the Imprisonment during the pleasure of the King and of the House is illegal and uncertain for since it ought to determine in two Courts it can have no certain period A Commitment until he shall be discharged by the Courts of Kings-Bench and Common-Pleas is illegal for the Prisoner cannot apply himself in such manner as to obtain a discharge If a man be committed till further Order he is bailable presently for that imports till he shall be delivered by due course of Law and if this Commitment have not that sense it is illegal for the pleasure of the King is that which shall be determined according to Law in his Courts as where the Statute of Westm ' 1. cap. 15. declares that he is not replevisable who is taken by command of the King it ought to extend to an extrajudicial command not in his Courts of Iustice to which all matters of Iudicature are delegated and distributed 2 Inst 186 187. Wallop to the same purpose he cited Bushells case Vaughan's Rep. 137. that the general Retorn for high Contempts was not sufficient and the Court that made the Commitment in this case makes no difference for otherwise one may be imprisoned by the House of Peers unjustly for a matter relievable here and yet shall be out of all relief by such a Retorn for upon a supposition that this Court ought not to meddle where the person is committed by the Peers then any person at any time and for any cause is to be subject to perpetual Imprisonment at the pleasure of the Lords But the Law is otherwise for the House of Lords is the supream Court yet their Iurisdiction is limited by the Common and Statute Law and their excesses are examinable in this Court for there is great difference betwéen the errors and excesses of a Court betwéen an erroneous proceéding and a proceeding without Iurisdiction which is void and a meer nullity 4 H. 7. 18. In the Parliament the King would have one Attaint of Treason and lose his Lands and the Lords assented but nothing was said of the Commons wherefore all the Iustices held that it was no Act and he was restored to his Land and without doubt in the same case if the party had been imprisoned the Iustices must have made the like resolution that he ought to have been discharged It is a Sollecism that a man shall be imprisoned by a limited Iurisdiction and it shall not be examinable whether the cause were within their Iurisdiction or no. If the Lords without the Commons should grant a Tax and one that refused to pay it should be imprisoned the Tax is void but by a general Commitment the party shall be remediless So if the Lords shall award a Capias for Treason or Felony By these instances it appears that their Iurisdiction was restrained by the Common Law and it is likewise restrained by divers Acts of Parliament 1 H. 4. cap. 14. No Appeals shall be made or any way pursued in Parliament And when a Statute is made a power is implicitely given to this Court by the fundamental constitution which makes the Iudges Expositors of Acts of Parliament And peradventure if all this case appeared upon the Retorn this might be a case in which they were restrained by the Statute 4 H. 8. cap. 8. That all Suits Accusements Condemnations Punishments Corrections c. at any time from henceforth to be put or had upon any Member for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any matters concerning the Parliament to be communed or treated of shall be utterly void and of none effect Now it doth not appear but this is a correction or punishment imposed upon the Earl contrary to the Statute There is no question made now of the power of the Lords but it is only urged that it is necessary for them to declare by virtue of what power they proceed otherwise the Liberty of every Englishman shall be subject to the Lords whereof they may deprive any of them against an Act of Parliament but no usage can justifie such a proceeding Ellismeres case of the Post-nati 19. The Duke of Suffolk was impeached by the Commons of High Treason and Misdemeanors the Lords were in doubt whether they would proceed on such general Impeachment to imprison the Duke And the advice of the Iudges being demanded and their resolutions given in the negative the Lords were satisfied This case is mentioned with design to shew the respect given to the Iudges and that the Iudges have determined the highest matters in Parliament At a conference between the Lords and Commons 3 Aprilis Car. 1. concerning the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject It was declared and agreed that no Freeman ought to be restrained or committed by command of the King or Privy-Council or any other in which the House of Lords are included unless some cause of the Commitment Restraint or Deteynor be set forth for which by Law he ought to be committed c. Now if the King who is the Head of the Parliament or his Privy Council which is the Court of State ought therefore to proceed in a legal manner this solemn resolution ought to end all Debates of this matter It is true 1 Roll 129. in Russells case Coke is of Opinion that the Privy-Council may commit without shewing cause but in his more mature age he was of another Opinion And accordingly the Law is declared in the Petition of Right and no inconvenience will ensue to the Lords by making their Warrants more certain Smith argued to the same purpose and said That a Iudge cannot make a Iudgment unless the Fact appears to him on a Habeas Corpus the Iudge can only take notice of the Fact retorned It is lawful for any Subject that finds himself agrieved by any Sentence or Iudgment to Petition the King in an humble manner for Redress And where the Subject is restrained of his liberty the proper place for him to apply himself to is this Court which hath the supreme power as to this purpose over all other Courts and an Habeas Corpus issuing here the King ought to have an accompt of his Subjects Roll tit Habeas Corp. 69. Wetherlies case And also the Commitment was by the Lords yet if it be illegal this Court is obliged to discharge the Prisoner as well as if he had been illegally imprisoned by any other Court The House of Peers is an high Court but the Kings-Bench hath ever been entrusted with the Liberty of the Subject and if it were otherwise in case of Imprisonment by the Peers the power of the King were
of ordinary Iurisdiction If this Commitment had been by any inferiour Court it could not have been maintained But the Commitment is by a Court tht is not under the comptroll of this Court and that Court is in Law sitting at this time and so the expressing of the Contempt particularly is matter which continues in the deliberation of the Court 'T is true this Court ought to determine what the Law is in every case that comes before them and in this case the question is only whether this Court can judge of a Contempt committed in Parliament during the same Session of Parliament and discharge one committed for such Contempt When a question arises in an Action depending in this Court the Court may determine it but now the question is whether the Lords have capacity to determine their own priviledges and whether this Court can comptroll their determination and discharge during the Session a Peer committed for Contempt The Iudges have often demanded what the Law is and how a Statute should be expounded of the Lords in Parliament as in the Statute of Amendments 40 E. 3. 84. 6. 8. Co. 157 158. a fortiori the Court ought to demand their Opinion when a doubt arises on an Order made by the House of Lords now sitting As to the duration of the Imprisonment doubtless the pleasure of the King is to be determined in the same Court where Iudgment was given As also to the determination of the Session the Opinion of Coke is good Law and the addition of Proviso's in many Acts of Parliament is only in majorem cautelam Jones Attorney General to the same effect As to the uncertainty of the Commitment it is to be considered that this case differs from all other cases in two circumstances First the person that is a Member of the House by which he is committed I take it upon me to say that the case would be different if the person committed were not a Peer Secondly The Court that doth commit which is a superiour Court to this Court and therefore if the Contempt had been particularly shewn of what Iudgment soever this Court should have been as to that Contempt yet they could not have discharged the Earl and thereby take upon them a Iurisdiction over the House of Peers The Iudges in no age have taken upon them the Iudgment of what is Lex consuetudo Parliamenti but here the attempt is to engage the Iudges to give their Opinion in a matter whereof they might have refused to have given it if it had been demanded in Parliament This is true if an Action be brought where priviledge is pleaded the Court ought to judge of it as an incident to the Suit whereof the Court was possessed but that will be no warrant for this Court to assume a Iudgment of an original matter arising in Parliament And that which is said of the Iudges power to expound Statutes cannot be denied but it is not applicable in this case By the same reason that this Commitment is questioned every Commitment of the House of Commons may be likewise questioned in this Court It is objected That there will be a failer of Iustice if the Court should not discharge the Earl but the contrary is true for if he be discharged there would be a manifest failer of Iustice for Offences of Parliament cannot be punished any where but in Parliament and therefore the Earl would be delivered from all manner of punishment for his Offence if he be discharged For the Court cannot take Bail but where they have a Iurisdiction of the matter and so delivered out of the hands of the Lords who only have power to punish him It is objected That the Contempt is not said to be committed in the House of Peers but it may well be intended to be committed there for it appears he is a Member of that House and that the Contempt was against the House And besides there are Contempts whereof they have cognizance though they are committed out of the House It is objected That it is possible this Contempt was committed before the general pardon but surely such Injustice should not be supposed in the supream Court and it may well be supposed to be committed during the Session in which the Commitment to Prison was It would be great difficulty for the Lords to make their Commitments so exact and particular when they are imployed in the various affairs of the Realm and it hath been adjudged on a Retorn out of the Chancery of a Commitment for a Contempt against a Decreé that it was good and the Decrée was not shewn The limitation of the Imprisonment is well for if the King or the House determine their pleasure he shall be discharged for then it is not the pleasure of both that he should be detained and the addition of these words during the pleasure is no more than was before imply'd by the Law for if these words had been omitted yet the King might have pardoned the Contempt if he would have expressed his pleasure under the Broad Seal If Iudgment be given in this Court that one should be imprisoned during the Kings pleasure his pleasure ought to be determined by Pardon and not by any act of this Court. So that the King would have no prejudice by the Imprisonment of a great Minister because he could discharge him by a Pardon the double limitation is for the benefit of the Prisoner who ought not to complain of the duration of the Imprisonment since he hath neglected to make application for his discharge in the ordinary way I confess by the determination of the Session the Orders made the same Session are discharged but I shall not affirm whether this present Order be discharged or no because it is a Iudgment but this is not the present case for the Session continues notwithstanding the Royal Assent given to several Bills according to the Opinion of Cooke and of all the Iudges Hutton 61 62. Every Proviso in an Act of Parliament is not a determination what the Law was before for they are often added for the satisfaction of those that are ignorant of the Law Winington Solicitor General to the same purpose In the great case of Mr. Selden 5 Car. 1. the Warrant was for notable Contempts committed against us and our Government and stirring up Sedition and though that be almost as general as in our case yet no objection was made in that cause in any of the arguments Rushworths Collections 18 19. in the Appendix But I agree that this Retorn could not have béen maintained if it were of an inferiour Court but during the Session this Court can take no cognizance of the matter And the inconveniency would be great if the Law were otherwise taken for this Court might adjudge one way and the House of Peers another way which doubtless would not be for the advantage or liberty of the Subject for the avoiding of this mischief it was agreed by
cannot deprive us of the benefit of the Common Law and in the Vice-Chancellors Court they proceed by the Civil Law If you allow this demand there will be a failer of Justice for the Defendants being a Corporation cannot be arrested they can make no stipulation the Vice-Chancellors Court cannot issue Distringas's against there Lands nor can they be excommunicated Presidents we find of Corporations suing there as Plaintiffs in which case the afore-mentioned inconvenience does not ensue but none of Actions brought against Corporations Maynard contra Servants to Colledges and Officers of Corporations have been allowed the priviledge of the Vniversity which they could not have in their own right and if in their Masters right a fortiori their Masters shall enjoy it The word persona in the demand will include a Corporation well enough Vaughan Chief Justice Perhaps the words atque confirmat ' c. in the demand of Conisance are not material for the priviledges of the Vniversity are grounded on their Patents which are good in Law whether confirm'd by Parliament or not The word persona does include Corporations 2 Inst 536. per Coke upon the Statute of 31 Eliz. cap. 7. of Cottages and Inmates A demand of Conisance is not in derogation of the Common Law for the King may by Law grant tenere placita though it may fall out to be in derogation of Westminster-Hall Nor will there be a failer of Justice for when a Corporation is Defendant they make them give Bond and put in Stipulators that they will satisfie the Iudgment and if they do not perform the Condition of their Bond they commit their Bail They have enjoyed these priviledges some hundreds of years ago The rest of the Iudges agreed that the Vniversity ought to have Conisance But Atkyns objected against the form of the demand that the word persona privilegiata cannot comprehend a Corporation in a demand of Conisance howsoever the sense may carry it in an Act of Parliament Ellis Wyndham If neither Schollars nor priviledged persons had been mentioned but an express demand made of Conisance in this particular cause it had then been sufficient and then a fault if it be one in Surplusage and a matter that comes in by way of Preface shall not hurt Atkyns It is not a Preface they lay it as the foundation and ground of their claim The demand was allowed as to matter and form Rogers Danvers DEbt against S. Danvers and D. Danvers Executors of G. Danvers upon a Bond of 100 l. entred into by the Testator The Defendants pleaded that G. Danvers the Testator had acknowledged a Recognisance in the nature of a Statute Staple of 1200 l. to J. S. and that they have no assets ultra c. The Plaintiff replied that D. Danvers one of the Defendants was bound together with the Testator in that Statute to which the Defendants demur Baldwin pro Defendente If this plea were not good we might be doubly charged It is true one of us acknowledged the Statute likewise but in this Action we are sued as Executors And this Statute of 1200 l. was joynt and several so that the Conisee may at his Election either sue the surviving Conisor or the Executors of him that is dead so that the Testators Goods that are in our hands are lyable to this Statute It runs concesserunt se utrumque eorum if it were joynt the charge would survive and then it were against us It is common for Executors upon pleinment administer pleaded to give in Evidence payment of Bonds in which themselves were bound with the Testator and sometimes such persons are made Executors for their security The Opinion of the Court was against the Plaintiff whereupon he prayed leave to discontinue and had it Amie Andrews ASsumpsit The Plaintiff declares that whereas the Father of the Defendant was endebted to him in 20 l. for Malt sold and promised to pay it that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would bring two Witnesses before a Iustice of Peace who upon their Oaths should depose that the Defendants Father was so endebted to the Plaintiff and promised payment assumed and promised to pay the money then avers that he did bring two Witnesses c. who did swear c. The Defendant pleaded non Assumpsit which being found against him he moved by Sergeant Baldwin in Arrest of Iudgment that the consideration was not lawful because a Iustice of Peace not having power to administer an Oath in this case it is an extrajudicial Oath and consequently unlawful And Vaughan was of Opinion that every Oath not legally administred and taken is within the Statute against prophane swearing And he said it would be of dangerous consequence to countenance these extrajudicial Oaths for that it would tend to the overthrowing of Legal proofs Wyndham Atkins thought it was not a prophane Oath nor within the Statute of King James because it tended to the determining of a controversie And accordingly the Plaintiff had Iudgment Horton Wilson A Prohibition was prayed to stay a Suit in the Spiritual Court commenced by a Proctor for his Fees Vaughan Wyndham No Court can better judge of the Fees that have been due and usual there then themselves Most of their Fees are appointed by constitutions Provincial and they prove them by them A Proctor lately libell'd in the Spiritual Court for his Fees and amongst other things demanded a groat for every Instrument that had been read in the cause the Client pretended that he ought to have but 4 d. for all They gave Sentence for the Defendant the Plaintiff appealed and then a Prohibition was prayed in the Court of Kings Bench. The Opinion of the Court was that the Libell for his Fees was most proper for the Spiritual Court but that because the Plaintiff there demanded a customary Fee that it ought to be determin'd by Law whether such a Fee were customary or no and accordingly they granted a Prohibition in that case It is like the case of a modus for Tythes for whatever ariseth out of the custom of the Kingdom is properly determinable at Common Law But in this case they were of Opinion that the Spiritual Court ought not to be prohibited and therefore granted a Prohibition quoad some other particulars in the Libell which were of temporal cognisance but not as to the suit for Fees Wyndham said if there had been an actual Contract upon the Retainer the Plaintiff ought to have sued at Law Atkyns thought a Prohibition ought to go for the whole Fées he said had no relation to the Iurisdiction of the Spiritual Court nor to the cause in which the Proctor was retain'd No Suit ought to be suffered in the Spiritual Court when the Plaintiff has a remedy at Law as here he might in an Action upon the case for the Retainer is an implied Contract A difference about the grant of the Office of Register in a Bishops Court shall be
Windham and Scroggs contr for that the Iury are the sole Iudges of the damages At another day it was moved in arrest of Iudgment That the words are not actionable And of that Opinion was Atkyns But North Windham Scroggs contr And so the Plaintiff had Iudgment Atkyns The occasion of the making of the Stat. of 5 Rich. 2. appears in Sir Robert Cotton's Abr. of the Records of the Tower fol. 173. num 9. 10. he says there That upon the opening of that Parliament the Bishop of St. Davids in a Speech to both Houses declared the Causes of its being summoned and that amongst the rest one of them was to have some restraint laid upon Slanderers and Sowers of Discord which sort of men were then taken notice of to be very frequent Ex malis moribus bonae Leges The Preamble of the Act mentions false News and horrible Lyes c. of things which by the said Prelates c. were never said done nor thought So that it seems designed against telling stories by way of News concerning them The Stat. does not make or declare any new Offence Nor does it inflict any new Punishment All that seems to be new is this 1. The Offence receives an aggravation because it is now an Offence against a positive Law and consequently deserves a greater Punishment as it is held in our Books That if the King prohibit by his Proclamation a thing prohibited by Law that the Offence receives an aggravation by being against the King's Proclamation 2. Though there be no express Action given to the party grieved yet by operation of Law the Action accrews For when ever a Statute prohibits any thing he that finds himself grieved may have an Action upon the Statute 10 Rep. 75. 12 Rep. 100. there this very Case upon this Statute was agreed on by the Iudges So that that is the second new thing viz. a further remedy An Action upon the Stat. 3. Since the Stat. the party may have an Action in the tam quam Which he could not have before Now every lye or falsity is not within the Stat. It must be horrible as well as false We find upon another occasion such a like distinction It was held in the 12 Rep. 83. That the High-Commission Court could not punish Adultery because they had Iurisdiction to punish enormous Offendors only So that great and horrible are words of distinction Again it extends not to small matters because of the ill consequences mentioned Debates and Discord betwixt the said Lords c. great peril to the Realm and quick subversion and destruction of the same Every word imports an aggravation The Stat. does not extend to words that do not agree with this Description and that cannot by any reasonable probability have such dire effects The Cases upon this Statute are but few and late in respect of the antiquity of the Act. It was made Anno 1379. for a long time after we hear no tydings of an Action grounded upon it And by reading it one would imagine that the makers of it never intended that any should be But the Action arises by operation of Law not from the words of the Act nor their intention that made it The first Case that we find of an Action brought upon it is in 13 H. 7. which is 120 years after the Law was made so that we have no contemporanea expositio which we often affect That Case is in Keil 26. the next in 4 H. 8. where the Duke of Buckingham recovered 40 l. against one Lucas for saying that the Duke had no more conscience than a Dog and so he got money he cared not how he came by it He cited other Cases and said he observed That where the words were general the Iudges did not ordinarily admit them to be actionable otherwise when they charged a Peer with any particular miscarriage Serjeant Maynard observed well That the Nobility and great men are equally coucerned on the Defendants part for Actions upon this Statute lie against them as well as against the meanest Subject Acts of Parliament have been tender of racking the King's Subjects for words And the Scripture discountenances mens being made Transgressors for a word I observe that there is not one case to be met with in which upon a motion in arrest of Iudgment in such an Action as this the Defendant has prevailed The Court hath sometimes been divided the matter compounded the Action has abated by death c. but a positive Rule that Iudgment should be arrested we find not So that it is time to make a President and fix some Rules according to which men may demean themselves in converse with great persons Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum Since we have obtained no Rules from our Predecessors in Actions upon this Statute we had best go by the same Rules that they did in other Actions for words In them when they grew frequent some bonnds and limits were set by which they endeavoured to make these Law certain The Actions now encrease The stream seems to be running that way I think it is our part to obviate the mischief So he was of Opinion That the Iudgment ought to be arrested but the Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff North. There are three sorts of Hab. Corp. in this Court 1. Hab. Corp. ad respondendum and that is when a man hath a cause of suit against one that is in prison he may bring him up hither by Hab. Corp. and charge him with a Declaration at his own suit 2. There is a Hab. Corp. ad faciendum recipiendum and that Defendants may have that are sued in Courts below to remove their Causes before us Both these Hab. Corp. are with relation to the suits properly belonging to the Court of Common Pleas. So if an inferiour Court will proceed against the Law in a thing of which we have Conisance and commit a man we may discharge him upon a Hab. Corp. this is still with relation to Common Pleas. A third sort of Hab. Corp. is for priviledged Persons But a Hab. Corp. ad subjiciendum is not warranted by any Presidents that I have seen Term. Pasch 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco Hall Booth NOrth In Actions of Debt c. the first Process is a Summons if the Defendant appears not upon that a Cap. goes and then we hold him to Bail The reason of Bail is upon a supposition of Law that the Defendant flies the Iudgment of the Law And this supposition is grounded upon his not appearing at the first For if he appear upon the Summons no Bail is required And this is the reason why it is held against the Law for any inferiour Court to issue out a Capias for the first Process For the liberty of a man is highly valued in the Law and no man ought to be abridged of it without some default in him A Church is in decay the Bishops Court must
to the second Twisd The Iury have found the Rent to be due for both years and we will now intend that he was in possession all the time for which the Rent is found to be due A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court at Chester to stay procéedings upon a Libel against one William Bayles for teaching School without Licence but it was denied Redman Edolfe TRespass and Ejectment by Original in this Court Sanders moved in Arrest of Iudgment upon a fault in the Original for a bad Original is not help'd by Verdict But upon Mr. Livesey's certifying that there was no Original at all the Plaintiff had Iudgment though in his Declaration he recited the Original In an Action of Assault and Battery and Wounding the Evidence to prove a Provocation was That the Plaintiff put his hand upon his Sword and said If it were not Assize time I would not take such Language from you The question was if that were an Assault The Court agreed that it was not for he declared that he would not Assault him the Iudges being in Town and the intention as well as the act makes an Assault Therefore if one strike another upon the hand or arm or breast in discourse it s no Assault there being no intention to Assault But if one intending to Assault strike at another and miss him this is an Assault so if he hold up his hand against another and say nothing it is an Assault In the principal case the Plaintiff had Iudgment Medlicott Joyner EJectione firmae The Plaintiff at the Trial offer'd in Evidence a Copy of a Déed that was burnt by the Fire the Copy was taken by one Mr. Gardner of the Temple who said he did not examine it by the Original but he writ it and it always lay by him as a true Copy and the Court agréed to have it read the original Déed being proved to be burnt Twisd Feoffée upon Condition is disseised and a Fine levied and five years pass then the Condition is broken the Feoffor may enter for the Disseisor held the Estate subject to the Condition and so did the Conizee for he cannot be in of a better Estate then the Conizor himself was Dawe Swayne AN Action upon the Case was brought against one for suing the Plaintiff in placito debiti for 600 l. and falsly and maliciously affirming to the Bailiff of Westminster that he did owe him 600 l. whereby the Bailiff insisted upon extraordinary Bail to his Damage c. The Defendant traverses absque hoc that he did falsly and maliciously affirm to the Bailiff of Westminster that he did owe him so much Winnington moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Action would not lie But the Plaintiff had Iudgment Keel If there had béen no cause of Action an Action upon the Case would not lie because he has a recompence by Law but here was a cause of Action If one should arrest you in an Action of 2000 l. to the intent that you should not find Bail and keep you from practice all this Term and this is found to be falsly and maliciously shall not you have an Action for this this Twisden said he knew to have been Serjeant Rolls his Opinion Morton Foxley's case is That if a man be outlaw'd in another County where he is not known an Action upon the Case will lye so an Action lies against the Sheriff if reasonable Bail be offered and refused Twisd If three men bring an Action and the Defendant put in Bail at the Suit of four they cannot declare but if he had put in Bail at the suit of one that one might declare against him Iudgment was entred as of Trinity Term for the Queen Mother and a Writ of Enquity of damages was taken out returnable this Term and she died in the Vacation-time Resolved that the first was but an interlocutory Iudgment and that the Action was abated by her death Twisd Some have questioned how you shall come to make the death of the party appear between the Verdict and the day in Bank and I have known it offer'd by Affidavit and by suggestion upon the Roll and by motion Troy an Attorney AN Information of Extortion against Troy an Attorney It was moved in arrest of Iudgment That Attorneys are not within any of the Statutes against Extortion and therefore the Information concluded ill the conclusion being contra formam Statuti Twisd The Statute of 3 Jac. cap. 7. is express against Attornies Keel I think as thus advised that Attornies are within all the Statutes of Extortion It was afterwards moved in arrest of Iudgment because the Information was insufficient in the Law for Sir Tho. Fanshawe informed that Mr. Troy being an Attorney of the Court of Common Pleas did at Maidstone cause one Collop to be impleaded for 9 s. 4 d. debt at the suit of one Dudley Sellinger c. and this was ad grave damnum of Collop c. but it is not expressed in what Court he caused him to be impleaded and that which the Defendant is charged with is not an offence for he saith that he did cause him to be impleaded and received the money the same day and perhaps he received the money after he had caused him to be impleaded Then it is not sufficiently alledged that he did illicite receive so much and Extortion ought to be particularly alledged Nor is there any Statute that an Attorney shall receive no more than his just Fées The profession of an Attorney is at Common Law and allowed by the Statute of Westm 1. cap. 26. and the Statute of 3 Jac. does not extend to this matter Non constat in this case if what he received was for Fees or no besides the suit for an offence against that Statute must be brought by the party not by Sir Tho. Fanshawe Keel If the party grieved will not sue for the penalty of treble damages given by that Statute yet the King may prosecute to turn him out of the Roll. Twisd I doubt that nor is it clear whether an Information will lie at all upon that Statute or not for the Statute does not speak of an Information Keel Whenever a Statute makes a thing criminal an Information will lie upon the Statute though not given by express words Twisd It appears here that this money was not received of his Client for he was against Collop But he ought to shew in what Court the impleading was for otherwise it might be before Mr. Major in his Chamber To which the Court agreéd So the Information was quash'd Burnet Holden THere were these two points in the case 1. If the Defendant dye after the day of Nisi prius and before the day in Bank whether the Iudgment shall be said to be given in the life of the Defendant 2. Admit it shall yet whether the Executor shall have the advantage taken from him of retaining to satisfie his own debt To the first
and therefore it is but just that the Law for this Offence should put her in the same plight in the petit Common-wealth of the Houshould that it puts the Subject for the like Offence in the great Common-wealth of the Realm and this according to the Civil Law namely Si Uxor propria fine Culpa mariti sit extra consortium viri nec tenet maritus extunc ei extra consortium suum existenti aliqualit ' subministrare videt ' enim virum alendi obligatione fore exempt ' quoniam Culpa sua extra viri Consortium est For Nuptiae sunt Conjunctio maris Foeminae Consortium ejus divini humani Juris Communicatio digest ' de ritu Nuptiarum Fleta speaking of Appeals hath this expression Foemina de morte viri sui inter brachia sua interfecti non alit ' potuit appellare l. 1. Ca. 33. Bracton is much to the same purpose li. 3. Chap. 24. fo 148. non nisi in duobos casibus femina appellum habeat sc non nisi de violentia corpori suo illata sicut de raptu de morte viri sui interfecti inter brachia sua and the words of the Writ of Appeal are suitable thereunto sc venit idem A. B. nequiter in felonia c. occidit ipsum virum suum inter brachia sua c. By the words inter brachia sua in those ancient Authors is understood the wife which the dead person lawfully had in possession at the time of his death for she ought to be his wife of right and also in possession Com' S. Ma. Char. fo 68. The words of the Writ are observable sc occidit virum suum inter brachia sua and prove that the woman ought to be inter brachia viri sui or otherwise she hath not the priviledge of a wife By an argument a pari as the wife shall not have remedy against the Murtherer of her husband after his death if he were not inter brachia sua at the time of his death pari ratione she shall not have support or maintenance from her husband in his life when she puts her self extra brachia sua against his will But 't is objected by my Brother Tyrrell It appears not in whose default this departure was whether in his or her default Thereto I answer that the Law doth not allow a wife to depart from her husband in any case or for any cause whatsoever of her own head An express command is laid upon her by the Law of God to the contrary Cor. 7. 10. To the married I command yet not I but the Lord let not the wife depart from her husband The provision which our Law hath made for the safeguard of the person of a woman in case of cruelty by her husband and for her maintenance in case the husband refuses to allow it proves that it is not lawful for the wife to depart from her husbad of her own head upon any pretence whatsoever If the wife be in fear or in doubt of her husband that he will beat or kill her she shall have a Supplicavit out of the Chancery against her husband and cause him to find Sureties that he will not beat nor intreat her otherwise then in civil manner and for to order and rule her c. F. N. Br. fo 179. The words of the Writ are Quod ipsum B. coram te corporaliter venire fac ' ipsum B. ad sufficien ' manucaption ' inveniend ' c. quod ipse praefat ' B. bene Honeste tractabit Gubernabit ac dampnum malum aliquod eidem A. de corpore suo alit ' quam ad virum suum ex causa regiminis castigationis uxoris suae licite rationabilit ' pertinet non faciat nec fieri procurabit And if the husband refuse to give or allow necessary and fitting maintenance unto his wife the Law hath provided a remedy for her by complaint to the Ordinary in the Ecclesiastical Court Next it is alledged by my Brother Tyrrell that the wife in our case did return and desire to cohabit with her husband again which he refused and so she is remitted to her former condition Admit that be true yet her return hath not put her in a better condition then she was in before her departure in which case she could not be her own Carver and have charged her husband according to her pleasure with Apparel but was to be clothed in such sort as her husband thought fit Besides in our case the wife departed from her husband and lived from him divers years after before the Wares sold or the Action brought then she desired to cohabit with him which he refused to admit and from that time she lived from him This is all that appears in our case and is this offence so easily purg'd with a bare desire to cohabit without any other submission and satisfaction given of the better carriage in futuro The Law of God says Wives be in subjection to your husbands as unto the Lord for the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is head of the Church 1 Pet 3 4. Ephes 5. 22. The Church declares that one of the principal ends for which Marriages was ordained is for the mutual society help and comfort which the one ought to have of the other in prosperity and adversity It is also there said the woman of her self in contracting of Marriage makes a solemn Vow in facie Ecclesiae to live together with her husband in the holy State of Matrimony to obey him and serve him to love him and keep him in sickness and in health till death them do part The wife in our case by departing from her husband against his will breaks all those commands and her own Vow she makes a voluntary separation and temporary Divorce between her self and her husband she deprives him of that mutual society help and comfort which she owes to him for divers years and are all these Offences washed away with a bare desire without submission or contrition No certainly Confession and promise of future Obedience ought to precede her remitter or restitution to the priviledges of a wife The Prodigal Son in the Gospel said I will arise and go to my Father and say I have sinned before the Indulgent Father did receive or Cloath him And this is according to the rule in the Civil Law Si Uxor quae Culpa sua recesserat poenitentia ducta ad virum rediens nolit admitti eam extunc Culpa purgatur in virum transfundit ' tenebitur quae ipsi seorsum habitanti alimenta praestare So that the wife ought to be a Penitentiary before the husband is bound to receive her or give her any maintenance And no such thing appears or is found in the Verdict in our case It s said by my Brother Twisden Although the wife departs from her husband yet she continues his wife and
Reversion to his own right Heirs after which Michael dyed leaving Issue Robert his Son and Heir by a first Venter and the said Ralph by Jane his second wife after the death of Michael Robert entred and from Robert by divers Mesne Conveyances a Title was deduced to the Heir of the Plaintiff Ralph had Issue Robert the Defendant And in this special Verdict the question was If any Vse did arise to Ralph by this Indenture 23 Jan ' 21 Jac ' Hales Rainsford and Wyld against the Opinion of Twisden Michael Mitford took an Estate for life by implication and consequence and so had an Estate Tail Hales 1 said it were clear if an Estate for life had been limited to Michael and to the Heirs males of the body of Michael to be begotten on the body of his second wife that had been an Estate Tail 2 Which way soever it be the Estate is lodged in Michael during his life 3 There is a great difference between Estates to be conveyeyed by the rules of the Common Law and Estates conveyed by way of Vse for he may mould the Vse in himself in what estate he will These things being premised he said This Estate being turned by operation of Law into an Estate in Michael is as strong as if he had limited an Estate to himself for life 2 A Limitation to the Heirs of his body is in effect a Limitation to the Vse of himself for his Heirs are included in himself 3 It is perfectly according to the intention of the party which was that his eldest Son should not take but that the Issue of the second wife should take His intent appears to be 1 Object that it should take effect as a future use When a man limits a Vse to commence in futuro Respons and there is such a descendible quality left in him that his Heirs may take in the mean time there it shall operate solely by way of future Vse as if a man Covenant to stand seized to the use of J. S. after the expiration of 40 years or after the death of J. D. there no present alteration of the Estate is made but it is only a future use because the Father or the Ancestor had such an Interest left in him which might descend to his Heir viz. during the years or during the life of J. D. But when no Estate may by reason of the Limitation descend to the Heir until the Contingency happen there the Estate of the Covenantor is moulded to an Estate for life This would be to create an Estate by implication 2 Object We are not here to create an Estate Respons but only to qualifie an Estate which was in the Ancestor before That the old Fee-simple shall be left in him 3 Object Yet the Covenantor had qualified this Estate Respons and converted it into an Estate Tail viz. part of the old Estate That the intention of the parties appears that it should operate by way of future use 4 Object for that of other Lands he covenanted to stand seised to the use of himself and his Heirs of his body It is not the intention of the party that shall comptroll the operation of Law Respons and to the case 1 Inst 22. though it be objected that it was not necessary at the Law to raise an Estate for life by implication yet my Lord Coke hath taken notice what he had said in the case of Parnell and Fenn Roll Rep. 240. if a man make a Feoffment to the use of the Heirs of his body that is an Estate for life in the Feoffor and in Englefields case as it is reported in Moore 303. it is agreed that if a man Covenant to stand seised to an use to commence after his death that the Covenantor thereby is become seised for life As to the second point Twisden Rainsford and Wyld held that no future use would arise to Ralph because he is not heir at Common Law and none can purchase by the name of heir unless he be heir at Common Law But Hales was against them in this point and he held that it Ralph could not take by descent yet he might well take by purchase 1 Because before the St ' de Donis a limitation might be made to this heir and so he was a special heir at Common Law 2 It is apparent that he had taken notice that he had an heir at the Common Law Litt. Sect. 35. 1 Inst 22. So his intent is evident that the heir at the Common Law should not take But on the first point Iudgment was given for the Defendant Term. Mich. 25 Car. II. in Communi Banco Anonymus IF a man be lyable to pay a yearly sum as Treasurer to a Church or the like to a Sub-treasurer or any other and dies the money being in arrear an Action of Assumpsit cannot be maintained against his Executors for these arrears For although according to the resolution in Slade's case 4 Report which Vaughan Chief Iustice said was a strange resolution an Assumpsit or an Action of Debt is maintainable upon a Contract at the parties Election yet where there is no Contract nor any personal privity as in this case there is not an Assumpsit will not lye And in an Action of Debt for these Arrears the Plaintiff must aver that there is so much money in the Treasury as he demands and in this case of an Action against Executors that there was so much at the time of the Testators death c. for the money is due from him as Treasurer and not to be paid out of his own Estate As in an Action against the Kings Receiver the Plaintiff must set forth that he has so much money of the Kings in his Coffers Magdalen Colledge Case INdebitat ' Assumpsit against the President and Scholars of Magdalen Colledge in Oxford for thréescore pounds due for Butter and Cheese sold to the Colledge The Chancellor of the Vniversity demanded Conisance by virtue of Charters of Priviledges granted to the Vniversity by the Kings Progenitors and confirm'd by Act of Parliament whereby amongst other things power is given them to hold plea in personal Actions wherein Scholars or other priviledged persons are concerned and concludes with an express demand of Conisance in this particular cause Baldw. Their priviledge extends not to this case for a Corporation is Defendant and their Charters mention priviledged persons only Their Charters are in derogation of the Common Law and must be taken strictly They make this demand upon Charters confirm'd by Act of Parliament and they have a Charter granted by King Henry 8. which is confirm'd by an Act in the Queens time but the Charter of 11 Car. 1. which is the only Charter that mentions Corporations is not confirm'd by any Act of Parliament and consequently is not material as to this demand For a demand of Conisance is stricti Juris But admitting it material the Kings Patent
also for that they sued the Plaintiff in another Court knowing that he was an Attorney of the Common-Pleas and priviledged there Per tot ' Cur ' there is no cause of Action For put the case as strong as you will suppose a man be retained as an Attorney to sue for a debt which he knows to be released and that himself were a witness to the Release yet the Court held that the Action would not lye for that what he does is only as Servant to another and in the way of his Calling and Profession And for suing an Attorney in an inferiour Court that they said was no cause of Action for who knows whether he will insist upon his priviledge or not and if he does he may plead it and have it allowed Fits al. versus Freestone IN an Action grounded upon a promise in Law payment before the Action brought is allowed to be given in Evidence upon non Assumpsit But where the Action is grounded upon a special promise there payment or any other legal discharge must be pleaded Bringloe versus Morrice IN Trespass for immoderately riding the Plaintiffs Mare the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff lent to him the said Mare licentiam dedit eidem aequitare upon the said Mare and that by virtue of this Licence the Defendant and his Servant alternatim had rid upon the Mare The Plaintiff demurs Serj. Skipwith pro Quer ' The Licence is personal and incommunicable as 12 H. 7. 25. 13 H. 7. 13. the Dutchess of Norfolk's case 18 Ed. 4. 14. Serj. Nudigate contra This Licence is given by the party and not created by Law wherefore no Trespass lyeth 8 Rep. 146 147. per Cur ' the Licence is annexed to the person and cannot be communicated to another for this riding is matter of pleasure North took a difference where a certain time is limited for the Loan of the Horse and where not In the first case the party to whom the Horse is lent hath an interest in the Horse during that time and in that case his Servant may ride but in the other case not A difference was taken betwixt hiring a Horse to go to York and borrowing a Horse in the first place the party may set his Servant up in the second not Term. Pasch 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Anonymus A Man upon marriage Covenants with his Wives relations to let her make a Will of such and such Goods she made a Will accordingly by her husbands consent and dyed After her death her Will being brought to the Prerogative Court to be proved a Prohibition was prayed by the Husband upon this suggestion that the Testatrix was foemina viro cooperta and so disabled by the Law to make a Will Cur ' Let a Prohibition go Nisi causa c. North. When a question ariseth concerning the Iurisdiction of the Spiritual Court as whether they ought to have the Probate of such a Will whether such a disposition of a personal Estate be a Will or not whether such a Will ought to be proved before a peculiar or before the Ordinary whether by the Archbishop of one Province or another or both and what shall be bona notabilia in these and the like cases the Common Law retains the Iurisdiction of determining there is no question but that here is a good surmise for a Prohibition to wit that the woman was a person disabled by the Law to make a Will the Husband may by Covenant depart with his right and suffer his Wife to make a Will but whether he hath done so here or not shall be determined by the Law we will not leave it to their decision it is too great an invasion upon the right of the Husband In this case the Spiritual Court has no Iurisdiction at all they have the Probate of Wills but a Feme-covert cannot make a Will If she disposeth of any thing by her Husbands consent the property of what she so disposeth passeth from him to her Legatee and it is the gift of the husband If the Goods were given into anothers hands in trust for the wife still her Will is but a Declaration of the trust and not a Will properly so called But of things in Action and things that a Feme-Covert hath as Executrix she may make a Will by her Husbands consent and such a Will being properly a Will in Law ought to be proved in the Spiritual Court. In the case in question a Prohibition was granted against the Hambrough Company THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt in London against the Hambrough-Company who not appearing upon Summons and a Nihil being returned against them an Attachment was granted to attach Debts owing to the Company in the hands of 14 several persons by Certiorari the cause was removed into this Court and whether a Procedendo should be granted or not was the question Serjeant Goodfellow Baldwin and Barrell argued that a debt owing to a Corporation is not attachable Serjeant Maynard Scroggs contra Cur ' We are not Iudges of the Customs of London nor do we take upon us to determine whether a debt owing to a Corporation be within the Custom of forrein Attachment or not This we judge and agree in that it is not unreasonable that a Corporation's debts should be attached If we had judged the Custom unreasonable we could and would have retained the cause For we can over-rule a Custom though it be one of the Customs of London that are confirmed by Act of Parliament if it be against natural reason But because in this Custom we find no such thing we will return the cause Let them proceed according to the Custom at their peril If there be no such Custom they that are aggrieved may take their remedy at Law We do not dread the consequences of it It does but tend to the advancement of Iustice and accordingly a Procedendo was granted per North Chief Justice Wyndham Ellis Atkyns aberat Anonymus PEr Cur ' if a man is indicted upon the Statute of Recusancy Conformity is a good plea but not if an Action of Debt be brought Parten Baseden's Case PArten brought an Action of Debt in this Court against the Testator of Baseden the now Defendant aâ—d had Iudgment After whose death there was a devastavit returned against the Defendant Baseden his Executor he appeared to it and pleaded and a special Verdict was found to this effect viz. that the Defendant Baseden was made Executor by the Will and dwelt in the same house in which the Testator lived and died and that before Probate of the Will he possest himself of the Goods of the Testator prized them inventoried them and sold part of them and paid a Debt and converted the value of the residue to his own use that afterwards before the Ordinary he refused and that upon his refusal administration was committed to the Widow of the deceased And the question was whether or no the
have the security given by the Defendant for his appearance it is all one to him whether it be good or no. Strode contra Why must the Sheriff always aver that he has taken sufficient Sureties if their sufficiency be not material Why is an Action allowed to lie if the Sheriff take no Sureties at all since according to my Brothers Opinion the party has no interest in them If the Law be as they argue the Statute has left the Plaintiff in a worse condition then he was at the Common Law for it has deprived him of the remedy that he had before and the Amercements belong not to him but to the King Cur ' The sufficiency of the bail is not material it is only for the Sheriffs own security If he take no bail at all an Action lies against him for then he does not act by colour of this Law Atkyns The Statute is not advantagious to the Plaintiff at all unless the Sheriff let go the prisoner without taking any bail and then he must render treble damages And by the Opinion of the whole Court Iudgment was given for the Defendant Moor versus Field A Custom was alledged that all persons in a Parish that had Shéep upon their ground on Candlemas-day should be discharged of Tythes of all Sheep that should be upon their ground after in that year upon payment of full Tythes for all the Sheep that were there upon that day and this was adjudged an unreasonable Custom Serjeant Turner argued for it and cited Rolls Abr ' 2 part 647 648. Term. Hill 28 29 Car. II. Communi Banco Strode versus l'Evesque de Bath Wells and Sir George Horner and Masters QUare Impedit the Plaintiff entitles himself by vertue of a Grant of the next Avoidance made by Sir George Horner and counts that Sir George was seized in fee of the Mannor of Dowling to which the advowson was appendant and presented J. S. who was admitted instituted c. and that then he granted the next Avoidance to the Plaintiff and that J. S. died and it belongs to him to present Serjeant Barton The Plaintiff has failed in his Count he says That Sir George was seized and presented but he does not say That he presented tempore pacis F. N. B. 33. Hob. 102. 6 Co. 30. 1 Inst 249. F. N. B. 31. 5 Co. 72. Vaug. 53. Strode When the Plaintiff makes his Title by a Presentation he ought to say That it was tempore pacis but Sir Georges Title is by reason of his being seized of the Mannor of Dowling to which the Advowson is appendant So that the difference as to that will be betwixt an Advowson in gross and an Advowson appendant Cur. When a man shews a precedent Right and then alledges a Presentation in pursuance of that Right as in this case the Plaintiff does in Sir George Horner there it needs not be alledged to have been tempore pacis but where no Title is alledged so that the Presentation only makes the Title there it must be pleaded tempore pacis Davies Cutt. DAvies as Administrator to Eliz. B. a feme Covert brings an Action of Debt upon a Bond against Cutt. The Defendant pleads That Administration of the Wives goods ought de jure to be committed to the Husband who was then alive upon this there was a Demurrer and it was resolved for the Plaintiff for he is rightful Administrator till his Letters of Administration are repealed James Johnson TRespass For taking and driving away some Beasts of the Plaintiff the Defendant justifies for that he and all they whose Estate he has in such a Mannor the Mannor of Blythe have had a Toll for all Beasts driven over the said Mannor viz. ½ d. a Beast if under twenty and if above then 4 d. a score Issue being joyned upon this justification a special Verdict was found viz. That the Mannor aforesaid was parcel of the Possessions of the Priory of Blythe that the Prior had by Prescription such a Toll as appurtenant to the said Mannor that by the dissolution it came to the Crown and so to Sir Gervase Clifton and at last to one Bingley in whose Right as Servant to him the Defendant justifies but then they conclude that if the Defendant may entitle himself to it by a que estate they find for the Defendant if not then for the Plaintiff Serjeant Baldw. For the Plaintiff it does not appear whether the Toll which the Defendant claims be a Toll-thorough or a Toll-traverse or what sort of Toll it is A Toll-thorough is against common Right because it is to be taken in the Kings High-way And no Prescription can be for it unless he that claims it shew that the Subject has some advantage by it And when a man claims a Toll-traverse he must lay it to be for a way over his own Freehold Keil 148. Statham Toll 2. Pl. 236. Moor 574. Cr. Eliz. 710. Keil 152. A Toll supposeth a Grant from the Crown and therefore when the Mannor of Blythe came to the Crown the Toll was disjoyned from the Mannor and became in gross Nor can a Toll be appendant to a Mannor nor claimed by a que estate Serjeant Maynard The Iury have found exactly whatever the Defendant has disclosed in his Plea and have made a special conclusion upon a Point of pleading Toll may be appurtenant to a Mannor as well as any other profit a prendre Nor does it become in gross by the Mannor coming to the Crown The difference is as to that betwixt things that had a being in the Crown before they were granted out to Subjects and things which had not 9. Rep. The Case of the Abbot of Strata Marcella There is no such legal difference between a Toll-thorough and a Toll-traverse as has been offered the words are used promiscuously in our Books A Toll-thorough may be by Prescription without any reasonable cause alledged of its commencement for having been paid time out of mind the true cause of its beginning in the intendment of the Law cannot be known And for the que estate indeed a thing that lies in grant cannot be claimed by a que estate directly by it self but it may be claimed as appurtenant to a Mannor by a que estate in the Mannor c. Cur. accord and gave Iudgment for the Defendant Atkyns When Toll is claimed generally it shall be intended Toll-thorough and so is the case in Cr. Eliz. 710. Smith Shepheard Lord Townsend versus Hughes AN Action upon the Stat. de Scandalis Magnatum for these words viz. My Lord Townsend is an unworthy Person and does things against Law and Reason Vpon issue Not Guilty there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and four thousand pounds damages given The Defendant moved for a new Trial because of the excessiveness of the damages and a President was cited a of new Trial granted upon that ground and no other And Atkins was for granting a new Trial. North
feigned names The first cause thereof was the ignorance of Sheriffs who being to make a return looked into some Book of Presidents for a form and finding the names of John Doo and Rich. Roo put down for examples made their return accordingly and took no care for true Sumners and true Manucaptors For Non-appearance at the return of the great Distress in a plea of Quare Impedit final Iudgment is to be given and our right bound for ever which ought not to be suffered unless after Process legally served according to the intention of the Statute In a case Mich. 23. of the present King Iudgment was entred in this Court in a plea of Quare impedit upon non-appearance to the great Distress but there the party was summoned and true Summoners returned upon non-appearance an Attachment issued and real Sumners return'd upon that but upon the Distress it was return'd that the Defendants districti fuerunt per bona catalla manucapti per Joh. Doo Rich. Roo and for that cause the Iudgment was vacated Cur ' The design of the Statute of Marlebridge was to have Process duly executed which if it were executed as the Law requires the Tenant could not possibly but have notice of it For if he do not appear upon the Summons an Attachment goes out that is a command to the Sheriff to seize his body and make him give Sureties for his appearance if yet he will not appear then the great distress is awarded that is the Sheriff is commanded to seize the thing in question if he come not in for all this then Iudgment final is to be given Now the issue of this Process being so fatal that the right of the party is concluded by it we ought not to suffer this Process to be changed into a thing of course It is true the Defendant here had notice of the Suit but he had not such notice as the Law does allow him And for his fourching in essoyn the Law allows it him Accordingly the Iudgment was set aside Anonymus FAlse Judgment out of a County Court the Record was vitious throughout and the Iudgment reversed and ordered that the Suitors should be amerced a Mark but the Record was so imperfectly drawn up that it did not appear before whom the Court was held and the County Clark was fined Five pounds for it Cessavit per biennium the Defendant pleads Non-tenure He commenceth his plea quod petenti reddere non debet but concludes in abatement Serjeant Barrell He cannot plead this plea for he has imparled Cur̄ Non-tenure is a plea in bar the conclusion indeed is not good but he shall amend it Barrell Non-tenure is a plea in abatement The difference is betwixt Non-tenure that goes to the tenure as when the Tenant denies that he holds of the demandant but says that he holds of some other person which is a plea in bar and Non-tenure that goes to the Tenancy of the Land as here he pleads that he is not Tenant of the Land and that goes in abatement only The Defendant was ordered to amend his plea. Addison versus Sir John Otway TEnant in tail of Lands in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marleston in the Towns of A. B. C. Tenant in Tail makes a Deed of bargain and sale to J. S. to the intent to make J. S. Tenant to the Praecipe in order to the suffering of a common Recovery of so many Acres in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone Now in those Parishes there are two Towns called Rippon Kirby-Marlestone and the Recovery is suffered of Lands in Rippon Kirby-Marlestone generally all this was found by special Verdict and further that the intention of the parties was that the Lands in question should pass by the said recovery and that the Lands in question are in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone but not within the Townships and that the bargainor had no Lands at all within the said Townships The question was whether the Lands in question should pass by this Recovery or not Shaftoe They will pass The Law makes many strained constructions to support common Recoveries and abates of the exactness that is required in adversary Suits 2 Rolls 67. 5 Rep. Dormer's case Eare Snow Plo. Com. Sir Moyle Finche's case 6 Rep. Cr. Jac. 643. Ferrers Curson In Stork Foxe's case Cr. Jac. 120 121. where two Villes Walton Street were in the Parish of Street and a man having Lands in both levied a Fine of his Lands in Street his Lands in Walton would not pass but there the Conusor had Lands in the Town of Street to satisfie the grant but in our case it is otherwise He cited also Rolls Abridgm Grants 54. Hutton 105. Baker Johnson The Deed of bargain and sale and the Recovery make up in our case but one assurance and construction is to be made of both together as in Cromwells case 2 Report The intention of the parties Rules Fines and Recoveries and the intention of the parties in our case appears in the Deed and is found by the Verdict Rolls Abridgm 19. 2 part Winch. 122. per Hob. Cr. Car. 308. Sir George Symond's case betwixt which last case and ours all the diffreence is that that case is of a Fine and ours of a Common Recovery betwixt which Conveyances as to our purpose there is no difference at all He cited Jones Wait's case Trin 27 Car. 2. in this Court and a case 16 Reg. nunc in B. R. when Hide was Chief Iustice betwixt Thynne Thynne North. The Law has always stuck at new niceties that have been started in cases of Fines and Common Recoveries and has gotten over almost all of them I have not yet seen a case that warrants the case at Bar in all points Nor do I remember an Authority expresly against it and it seems to be within the reason of many former resolutions But we must be cautious how we make a further step Wyndham I think the Lands in question will pass well enough and that the Deed of bargain and sale which leads the uses of the Recovery does sufficiently explain the meaning of the words Rippon Kirby Marlestone in the recovery I do not so much regard the Iuries having found what the parties intention was as I do the Deéd it self in which he expresses his own intention himself and upon that I ground my Opinion Atkyns agreed with Wyndham Indeed when a place is named in legal proceedings we do prima facie intend it of a Ville if nothing appears to the contrary stabitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium In this case the Evidence of the thing it self is to the contrary The reason why prima facie we intend it of a Ville is because as to civil purposes the Kingdom is divided into Villes He do not intend it of a Parish because the division of the Kingdom into Parishes is an Ecclesiastical distribution to Spiritual purposes
Penel post mortem praed J. W. licet sepius requisit̄ c. Conventionem suam praed Warrant̄ praed non tenuit sed infregit sed J. H. eidem J. W. tenere omnino recusavit adhuc recusat ad dam̄ c. 600 l. The Defendant pleads Representando quod eadem Penelope conventionem suam Warrant̄ praed a tempore levationis finis praed ex parte sua custodiend hucusque bene fideliter custodivit representandoque quod praed Hugo Stowell praed tempore intrationis ipsius Hugonis in tenementa praed non habuit aliquod Legale Jus aut titulum ad eadem tenementa c. pro placito eadem Penel dicit quod praed H. Stow. ipsum Johannem a possessione occupatiane tenementor non ejecit expulit amovit prout praed Johannes superius versus eam narravit hoc parat̄ est verificare Vpon this issue was taken and a Verdict for the Plaintiff was found and 300 l. damages And upon a motion in arrest of Iudgment the Cause was spoken to three or four times Jones pro Defendent̄ 1. It is considerable whether an Action will lie against a Feme upon a Covenant in a Fine levied by her when Covert-Baron It would be inconvenient that Land should be unalienable and therefore the Law enables a Feme Covert to levy a Fine Which Fine shall work by Estoppel and pass against her a good Interest But to make her liable to a personal Action thereupon to answer damages c. it were hard and it is Casus primae impressionis For the Plaintiff it was said there is little question but an Action of Covenant will well lie upon this warranty The Law enables a Feme Covert to corroborate the Estate she passes and to do all things incident If she levy a Fine of her Inheritance she may be vouched or a Warrantia Chartae c. thereupon be had against her and so is Roll versus Osborn Hob. 20. and if she can thus bind her Land a fortiori she may subject her self to a Covenant as in the Case at the Bar. If a Husband and Wife make a Lease for years and she accept the rent after his death she shall be liable to a Covenant This Point was agreed by the Council on both sides that a Covenant in this Case would lie against her and so this Court agreéd Twisd added That there was no question but a Covenant would lie upon a Fine For saith he sealing is not always necessary to found an Action of Covenant Thus Covenant lies against the Kings Lesseé by Patent upon his Covenant in the Patent though we know there is no sealing by the said Lessée Secondly It was urged on the Defendants behalf That the breach of Covenant is not well assigned for it is not shewed what Title Stowell had It is not only participially expressed Habens Legale c. but what is said is altogether general and uncertain Jus Legalem titulum ad tenementa praed ' so that the breach assigned is in effect no more but that Stowell entred and so the Covenant was broken If a man plead Indemn Conservat̄ he must shew how Gyll versus Gloss Yelverton 227. 8. 2 Cr. 312. Debt for Rent on a parol-Lease the Defendant pleads That the Plaintiff nil habuit in tenementis praedictis unde dimissionem praedictam facere potuit The Defendant replies Quod habuit c. in general without shewing in special what Estate he had that so it might appear to the Court that he had sufficient in the Lands whereout to make the Lease and therefore the Replication was adjudged naught It is true it was adjudged That after the Verdict it was helped by the Stat. of Jeoffails But that I conceive was because the issue though not very formal yet was upon the main point viz. Whether the Lessor had an Estate in the Tenements or no. For the true reason why a Verdict doth help in such a Case is because it is supposed that the matter left out was given in Evidence and that the Iudges did direct accordingly or else the Verdict could not have been found So in our Case If the issue had béen Whether Stowell had Right c. it might have been supposed and intended by his special Title and Estate made out and proved by trial But here the issue going off on a Collateral point it cannot be intended that any such matter was given in Evidence Jones and Pollexfen for the Plaintiff This Objection is against all the Precedents by which it appears that alledging generally as we do habens Legale Jus Titulum is good It is sufficient for a man to alledge that the Covenantor had no power to demise or was not seized c. without shewing any cause why or that any other person was seized c. 9 Co. 61. 2 Cr. 304. 369. 70. Co. Ent. 177. a. It it to be inquired upon Evidence Whether the party had a good Title or no and so the Court agreéd Thirdly Saunders for the Defendant said Though the Plaintiff was very wary bringing in the Right of Stowell with a Participle only so that we could not take issue upon it we could only protest yet I agreed that having taken issue upon one Point we must admit and do admit the rest of the matter in the Declaration But that is only as it is alledged Now here therefore we must admit that Stowell had Right and Title c. But we do not admit that he had a Title precedent to this Fine or had right otherwise than from and under the Plaintiff himself for that is not alledged And it shall never be intended no not after Verdict that Stowell had good and Eigne Right and Title before the Lease granted by the Fine but the contrary shall be intended And for that I rely upon Kirby versus Hansaker 2 Cr. 315. By all Iudges of C. B. and Scacc̄ in Cam. Scacc̄ in Point Nay that is a stronger Case than ours is For there the issue which was found for the Plaintiff was that the Recovery by Essex who answers to Stowell in our Case was not by Covin but by lawful Title And yet because it was not alledged that he had a good and Eigne Title it was held to be ill and not helped and the Iudgment was reversed The saying that Stowell ejected him c. Contra formam effectum Finis Warrant̄ praed ' or if it had been Contra formam effectum Conventionis praed ' is absurd and helps nothing For Stowell could not do so because he is not party to the Fine Jones for the Plaintiff It can never be intended that Stowell entred c. by a Title under us because it is alledg'd to be Contra formam effectum Finis Warrant ' praed ' Contra voluntatem ipsius J. W. eum a possessione sua Custodivit c. had it been by Lease under us the Defendant should have pleaded it