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A41769 The true idea of Jansenisme both historick and dogmatick. By T. G. Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.; Owen, John, 1616-1683. 1669 (1669) Wing G152; ESTC R218792 68,669 204

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Nature to which he replies 1. That God is to be loved by his creature in every state 2. That this love although it be consentaneous to human nature yet it is the effect of supernatural Grace 3. Hence saies he it is most safe to affirme that a rational creature considered without any fore-going sin cannot be created without love to God at least without a sufficient facultie by which he may be inabled to cleave unto God as his Creator for otherwise the will should be void of ●s natural rectitude and so sinful c. Which to impute to God is a note of blasphemie whereby he is made the Author of sin How of Grace Thence Jansenius proceeds cap. 20. fol. 320. to shew how this love to God though a debt due to human Nature proceeds notwithstanding from Grace 1. There are saies he certain debts or decent connaturalities congruencies and equities which spring not from the right of the creature but from the Grace of God For God is oft said to be a debtor to himself his own attributes not only to his Justice but also to his Wisdom and Goodnesse c. 2. Again the very nature of a Rational creature is the gratuitous and free gift of God so in like manner the rectitude of the same nature which though inseparable yet it ariseth not from any merit of the creature but from such arguments or reasons as concerne the attributes of God his Wisdom and Goodnes From the foresaid hypothesis §. 12. There is no natural virtue or happines but what is supernatural that there is no such thing as a state of pure Nature Jansenius rationally concludes against and rejects that usual distinction amongst the Scholemen of virtue and beatitude into natural and supernatural c. So Tom. 2. de Nat. Pura lib. 2. cap. 2. fol. 326. Where he tells us That he has oft wondred how it came to pass that the ancient Philosophers Socrates Plato c. discoursed more accurately and truly of the lapsed state of man than the late Scholemen Neither addes he can I find any other reason hereof than this that the late Scholemen have all followed the pur-blind reasonings of Aristotle who being ignorant of his own imbecillitie and not sensible of any supernatural adjutorie taught men to expect all good from their own virtue c. Hence the Pelagians sucked all their poison which the Scholemen endeavoring to moderate and allay have framed two men in one a Philosopher and a Christian Whence what ever they find in the Philosopher touching free will or natural virtue they apply to their Philosopher and whatever they find in Scripture touching Grace they refer to their Christian. Thus they frame a double virtue and happinesse one natural another supernatural So again Jansen Tom. 2. lib. 4. de Grat. Christi cap. 16. fol. 255. The Scholemen saies he finding the Pelagian Infusions touching seeds of virtue repugnant to the Catholick Doctrine they frame a double man in a single and so double charitie double virtues double works the one natural the other supernatural whereof there is not the least foot-steps in Austin who termes the Philosophers and Scholemens natural virtues but splendid sins So Tom. 2. de pur Nat. lib. 2. c. 5. fol. 332. The Scholemen saies Jansenius confes that man cannot be in a connatural mode created but for some last end hence they are forced to coin a twofold beatitude one natural t'other supernatural c. Then he concludes cap. 8. That as this state of pure Nature derived its original from the error of Gentile Philosophie so likewise this imagination of natural happines c. In brief he demonstrates clearly that these common notions so frequent in the Scholes touching natural and moral virtues and happines as distinct from spiritual or supernatural are but a meer chimera or figment hatcht first in the Gentile Scholes and thence derived by the Pelagians and Scholemen into the Christian Scholes with no small prejudice to the Christian Faith That there cannot indeed be any action or work naturally or morally good but what is such supernaturally and spiritually is very evident because the rule of all good whether natural moral or spiritual is one and the same namely the Will of God revealed in the Moral Law which gives the esse morale the moral Being moralitie or formal constitution to all moral good or virtue whether natural or supernatural Besides all good that is truly such requires an integritie or fulnes of causes a good principle and end as well as matter or duty according to that Theologick M●xime Good consists of all its causes but evil of any defect Hence Jansenius proceeds to prove §. 13. That God cannot but punish sin that there is a kind of necessitie on God for the punishing of sin So Tom. 2. de Pura Nat. lib. 3. cap. 2. That God saies he can permit sin whereby his order is disturbed to go unpunished Austin every where rejects as a Paradoxe irreconcileable with Divine Justice And this necessitie of punishing sin results not hence that God has thus by his peculiar will constituted but from the very sanction of the Eternal Law against which God cannot act any more than against himself seeing it is nothing else but Gods eternal Reason and Will The punishment of sin is sin Then he proceeds cap. 3 4. to shew what those punishments are which are so inseparably and indispensably fastened to sin 1. Horror of Conscience viz. 1. Horror of Conscience which is oft more intolerable than death it self And if there be at any time securitie on sinners yet this ariseth not from any health of conscience but from its s●upor Now by how much the more stupid conscience is by so much the more uncurable 't is as in the bodie so in conscience stupidnes is a disease worse than the most torturing dolors or pains 2. Inquietude 2. Another inseparable punishment of sin is a perpetual inquietude 3. Losse of God 3. But another more weightie and intimate punishment of sin is the losse of the chiefest good For although no one sins but with his will yet no one parts with his chiefest good but against his will 4. Adherence to the creature 4. This is followed with another punishment which is adherence to the creature and by how much the more pleasingly and securely the sinner enjoyes the creature by so much the more 't is fastned to it and therefore by so much the more miserable 5. Sin is the worst punishment of it self 5. Sin is an unseparable punishment of it self For though sin precisely as voluntarie is not a punishment but offence yet as it is the offence of a rational creature so it is an evil which none would voluntarily partake of For none chooseth pure sin The greatest punishment of sin saies Seneca is in it self it is no sooner committed but punished by its very act Whence Jansenius cap. 11 c. fol.