true or probable but is indeed deceitful And the Antients did call those Sophisters which endeavoured to obtain Glory by disputation and that by five waies or means especially by forcing the respondent 1. To Redargution which is the denial of something that was before granted or the concession of something that was before denied When the respondent is forced to contradict himself 2. To something that is false as when he admits of something that is apparently known to be so 3. To something contrary to common sense as when he admits of some proposition that is contrary to the common received opinion 4. To some Soloecisme as when he admits of some thing contrary to the rules of Grammar or 5. And lastly to some trivial and vain thing as when there is a vain and useless repetition of the same thing These fallacious waies of arguing Aristotle hath well referred to these two heads to Fallacies in words or in things Of Fallacies in words he reckons five Ambiguity Amphibolie Composition Division and Figure of a word Of Fallacies in things he names seven Accident Of a thing spoken after a sort to a thing spoken simply Ignorance of the argument A false or wrong Cause Consequent Begging of the question and An asking of many questions CHAP. XX. Of Fallacies in Words ALL Fallacies in words arise from some Multiplicity that is in them and the multiplicity that is in words is either Actual Potential or Phantastick 1. Actual when a word without variation hath many meanings as in Aequivocation and Amphibolie 2. Potential when a word being altered in the pronunciation hath many meanings as in Composition Division and Accent 3. Phantastick when a word doth really and indeed signifie but one and yet doth seem to signifie many things as in the figure of a word A Fallacy of Aequivocation or Homonymie is when some simple word is diversly taken in the several propositions of the same Syllogism and this may be three waies 1. When one word is applied to several things for example Every Dog doth bark The Dog star is a Dog Therefore the Dog star doth bark 2. When a word properly signifying but one thing is by Analogy or Metaphor applied to another as if one would prove that water hath feet because it runs or the meadow a mouth because it smiles 3. When there is some ambiguity in respect of the accidents of the parts of speech according to Grammar as if one would prove that he which is sitting doth stand because he did rise In these Fallacies there are four terms and may be resolved by shewing the several significations of the ambiguous word A Fallacy of Amphibolie is when some sentence is doubtful by reason of the construction and this may be three waies 1. The construction of the words being the same but under a diverse habitude as if one would prove this to be Aristotle's book because he made it 2. By changing the order of the construction as thus That which one doth see is true But you saw Thomas drunk Therefore it is true that Thomas was drunk 3. When a sentence hath both a proper and a Metaphorical sense as thus They which laugh have mouths The Meadows do laugh Therefore the Meadows have mouths And to this belong all proverbial speeches and may be resolved by shewing the ambiguity of the sentence A Fallacy of composition is when such words are joined together which should be disjoined and the contrary unto this is a Fallacy of division when such words are severed which ought to be joined together both of these may happen four waies 1. When the dictum in a modal proposition may be put for its whole self or for a part of its self as for example It is possible for him that is sitting to run the which proposition is false if taken together for while he doth sit he cannot actually run but being disjoined it is true for he that doth now sit at another time may run 2. In Hypothetical propositions whose parts are joined by some conjunction copulative or disjunctive as two and three are even and odd but five are two and three therefore five are even and odd 3. When some word in a sentence may be joined to diverse things as for example He that may now be truly said to be born is born in this hour But a man that is threescore years old may now be truly said to be born Therefore a man that is threescore years old is born in this hour 4. When two things are taken severally in the premisses and conjunctly in the conclusion and the contrary as thus This dog is a father And this dog is yours Therefore this dog is your Father In these there are four terms and are resolved by separating the divided sense from that which is compounded and shewing which of them is true and genuine and which not A Fallacy in Accent is when one and the same word or sentence doth signifie diverse things by reason of the different accent or manner of pronunciation and this may be four waies 1. By making a wrong pronunciation a long syllable for a short or the contrary 2. By the diverse writing without a diphthong or aspiration as thus They that could pronounce Shibboleth were safe from the Gileadites but the Ephramites could pronounce Shibboleth therefore they were safe 3. When one word is made of two or two of one 4. By changing the manner of the pronunciation as thus He that saith well done doth acknowledge the action to be good But he that derides another doth say well done Therefore he that derides another doth acknowlede the action to be good In these also there are four terms and they are solved by shewing the reason of the diverse accent or writing A Fallacy of the figure of a word is when for some similitude and likeness of words that doth seem to agree to one thing which is proper to another But these Fallacies have the least shew of probability and therefore are but rarely used and are many of them solved by saying that the words are indeed like by reason of some accidents as sound or termination but not in substance sense or signification CHAP. XXI Of Fallacies 〈◊〉 Things FAllacies in things are seven 1. A Fallacy of accident when that which agreeth to one of the terms in a Syllogism only by accident is attributed unto another as if it were essential This happeneth 1. When we argue from the accident to the subject and the contrary for example That which causeth drunkenness is to be removed But wine is the cause of drunkenness Therefore wine must be taken away 2. When the Genus of the supposition is changed the material into the formal the simple into personal and the contray as thus An animal is a Genus a man is an animal therefore a man is a Genus 3. When we argue from the Superiour to the Inferiour and the contrary as if we would prove that rationality is
Dog for another reason viz. the Anology that it hath to a Dog So a living man and a painted man agree in the common name of men but the reasons for which they are so called are diverse The common names which for diverse reasons are given to the several things signified by them are called Aequivocating Aequivocals and the things expressed by those names are called Aequivocated Aequivocals thus a man is an Aequivocating Aequivocal a living man and a painted man are Aequivocated Aequivocals Aequivocals are either such as are 1. By chance of which no reason can be given for their being called by that common name or 2. By counsel of which some reason of dependency or similitude may be given for their being called by that common name as a living man and a painted man and those are Synechdochically called Aequivocals by Analogy Of both which these Canons are to be observed 1. Aequivocal words if they be not distinguished and taken in one sense are of no use in any science Every Ens or Entity in respect of the ten Predicaments is a common Analogous thing 3. Every Analogous thing put by it self is to be taken in the most common signification Vnivocals are such things as have a common name and the reason for which it is applied to many is one and the same in them all thus the name of a living creature is common both to man and beast The common names which are for the same reason attributed unto many are called Vnivocating Vnivocals And the things expressed by these names are called Vnivocated Vnivocals thus a living creature is an univocating Vnivocal and a man a Bull a Lyon are univocated Vnivocals Denominatives are such words as being of near affinity in sound and signification dâ— differ in termination as Justice and Just In every Denomination there are three things 1. The Form denominating and that is some Accident in the Abstract which is inherent in the subject as Justice 2. The Subject Denominated and that is a substance in which the form is inherent as Socrates 3. The Denominative and that is some Accident in the Concrete which is predicated of the subject and riseth from the form as Just The Form Denominating and the Denominative as Justice and Just in reference to The Word Agree in the beginning Differ in the end The signification Agree in the thing Differ in the manner The use of these Definitions is that the form of predication Aequivocally Vnivocally and Denominatively may be the better known 1. Aequivocal predication is in reference to the name but not in reference to the defini-nition and thus every ens or entity is predicated of in the ten predicaments 2. Vnivocal predication is in reference to the name and definition both thus superiours are predicated of the inferiours of the same â—â—edicament 3. Denominative predication is to be predicated in the Concrete as an Accident is predicated of its subject thus the Accidents in â—he nine last predicaments are predicated of the â—ubstances in the first The Divisions belonging to the Antepredicaments are two one is of words and the other of things A Word is either Simple or Compound A Simple Voice or Word is threefold 1. In respect of the sound only when one word doth signifie many things as a Dog and every aequivocating aequivocal 2. In substance and signification when more words than one are used to express one thing as a living creature for an Animal 3. In sound and substance both when one word doth express one only thing as a man an Animal A compounded voice or word is also threefold 1. In respect of the sound only as when more words than one are used to express one only thing as a living body for an Animal 2. In substance and signification when one word expresseth diverse things as a Dog is one word but hath diverse significations as every aequivocating aequivocal hath 3. In sound and substance both as when they are diverse words and these diverse words do signifie more things as these words a learned man do signifie the substance and the quality Things are either Vniversal or Particular and both of them are either substances or accidents 1. Vniversal substances are spoken of the subject but are not in it as a man is predicated of Socrates and Plato but inhereth not in any subject 2. Particular substances are neither predicated of the subject nor inherent in it because they are individual substances as Socrates 3. Vniversal accidents are both predicated of and inherent in their subjects as Whiteness is spoken of this or that Whiteness and may be inherent in a man or a wall or a ship 4. Particular accidents are not predicated of any subject but are inherent in some as this whiteness is in Socrates A Subject is either of inhesion or predicatiâ—n A Subject of inhesion is that in which some accident doth inhere thus a wall in respect of whiteness is a subject of inhesion and accidents only are capable of such a subject A subject of predication is that of which any thing is predicated essentially and so every inferiour thing is the subject of his superiour every universal substance as well as every universal accident is capable of such a subject A thing may be said to be inherent in a subject eight several ways 1. Perfectively as a part is in the whole and thus a hand may be said to be in a man 2. Comprehensively as the whole is in its parts and thus a man may be said to be in all his members 3. Potestatively as a Species in its Genus thus man may be said to be in an Animal 4. Actually as a Genus in its Species thus an Animal may be said to be in a man 5. Authoritatively as a King in his Kingdome 6. Eminently as a thing in the end thereof and thus vertue may be said to be in happiness 7. Circumscriptively as a thing in its place thus Socrates may be said to be in a house 8. Inherently as an Accident in its Subject and thus heat may be said to be in fire Of these several ways we are here to understand the last only to wit of Inhesion as heat is in fire or as an accident in its subject The first Antepredicamental rule is this Whatever may be spoken of the predicate may be spoken of the subject of that predicate also as whatsoever may be spoken of an Animal may be spoken of every sort of Animals as of men beasts and such like The limitations of this rule are many but the most considerable are these three 1. That you proceed not from words tâ— things that is from words of the first to words of the second intention whence it follows not Animal is a Genus A man is an Animal therefore man is a Genus 2. That you pass not from one side of the predicamental order to the othr and hence it doth not follow Man is an Animal an Animal is rational or
more immediate â—â—use doth intervene between the predicate â—nd the subject as that which is rational is â—â—sible a man is rational 12. In a most perfect demonstration where â—â—e middle term is the material or formal inâ—rnal cause of the subject and efficient of the â—â—fect by emanation the major proposition 〈◊〉 immediate in respect of the cause but not â—f the subject as that which is rational is â—sible The conclusion is immediate in respect 〈◊〉 the subject but not of the cause as a â—an is risible The minor is immediate in reâ—â—ect of the cause and the subject both as a â—an is risible 13. In a most perfect demonstration wherâ— the middle term is not the internal cause of thâ— subject though both the major and conclusioâ— be immediate yet the minor is not immediate in respect of the cause This happen in every chief demonstration from the external cause as also where we proceed from one affection predemonstrated to the demonstration of another such as are all mathematical demonstrations for the most part aâ— Zab. de medio demonst c. 7. 14. The relative conditions to be observed in reference to the conclusion are three first that the premisses be the cause of the conclusion secondly that they be before thirdly that they be more known than the conclusion 15. The premisses may be said to be thâ— cause of the conclusion as the medium is thâ— cause why an affection is not only the cauâ—â— why the conclusion is known but the cauâ—â— why it is true and as the medium is before aâ— affection not in time but nature so the truâ—â— of the premisses is first in nature before thâ— truth of the conclusion Lastly as the medium is more known than an affection not bâ— a confused knowledge and in respect of us but by a distinct knowledge and accordinâ— to nature so are the premisses more knowâ— than the conclusion because we by reason 〈◊〉 the premisses receive the conclusion with full assent of mind we must needs assent to that more than to the premisses for according to Aristotle That for which another is such as it is must needs it self be more such Lib. 1. post cap. 2. 16. Premissâ—s are of two sorts Axiomes and Theses 17. An Axiome is a proposition of whose â—ruth no body can be ignorant the signification of the words being known 18. A Thesis is a proposition whose truth doth not sufficiently appear by knowing only the signification of the words but by the judgment of the senses or any other declaration and it â—s either a Definition or an Hypothesis 1. A Definition is that by which we shew what a thing is An Hypothesis is that by which we shew whether the thing be or not 20. The medium of a demonstration ought to be the next cause of the predicate and that either efficient or final and the efficient either internal or external 21. A cause may be said to be the next either absolutely or in his own kind here it is understood to be the next absolutely that it is such a cause as doth produce the effect and without which that effect cannot be For as much as there are four kinds of causes and in every kind some one the next of the four next causes there is but one that is the next absolutely 22. Moreover it is required that this next cause should be the cause of the predicate but it is necessary that it should be the cause of the subject also for the question is not whether there be a subject for this is supposed but whether there be a predicate or whether it be inherent in the subject 23. This next cause must be either the efficient or the final for when the predicate is an accident it hath neither matter not form properly so called The final cause is used in those things which are made for other such as are mediums and natural instruments actions also and habits if any such can be demonstrated The efficient cause is used in all the rest Sometimes it falls out that the next efficient cause is also the form oâ— matter of the subject and these kind of demonstrations are indeed the most excellent but do not make a different species of themselves but these things will be more clearly understood by the examples following 1. Every rational creature is capable 〈◊〉 knowledge Every man is a rational creature Therefore every man is capable of knowledge In this demonstration the medium rational is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and form of the subject 2. Every terrestial thing doth sink in water Ebene is terrestial Therefore Ebene doth sink in water Here the medium is the internal efficient cause and matter of the subject 3. Whatsoever doth consist of matter and form hath three dimensions Every body doth consist of matter and form Therefore every body hath three dimensions Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and both the form and matter of the subject 4. That which hath three dimensions will not admit of another body in the same place with it self But every body hath three dimensions Therefore c. Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and propriety of the subject 5. That which by the interposition of the earth cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams doth suffer an Eclipse of the Sun-light But the Moon the earth being interposed cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams Therefore the Moon c. Here the medium is the external efficient cause of the predicate 6. Whoso is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things ought to have his countenance lift up Man is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things Therefore c. Here the medium is the final cause of the predicate 24. Sometimes it so comes tO pass that one and the same question may be demonstrated both by the efficient and final cause so you may demonstrate that a living creature doth sleep either because the common â—ense is overcome by vapours and that the â—assage of the external senses are obstructâ—d and this is a demonstration from the â—ficient cause or that the animal spirits may be â—efreshed and strengthened and this is a demonstration from the final cause CHAP. VIII Of an Imperfect Demonstration or the Demonstration What. HAving hitherto spoken of the principal Demonstration or the Demonstration â—hy the next is the less principal or the â—emonstration What and which leaveth an â—mperfect knowledge and is twofold the â—ne is from the effect the other from a remote â—ause The first of these collecteth the cause from â—ome sensible effect for example Every thing that is risible is rational Every man is risible Therefore every man is rational Here the medium is the next effect and the predicate is the cause of the conclusion 2. The second of these demonstrations collecteth the effect from some remote cause for example That which hath not a sensitive soul doth not breath A Plant hath not a sensitive
the first of these Logick hath its name from this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth speech and according to Aristotle speech is twofold internal and external Internal speech he calleth that which is conceived in the mind And that he calleth external which is expressed by words now Logick hath its name from both these kinds of speech but chiefly from the internal which is the reason or ratiocination of the mind whereas the external speech is but the interpreter of the internal This word Logick may be taken two waies 1. For the Habit which is gotten by precept and practice 2. For the Systeme of Logical precepts by which that habit may be more easily acquired And this definition of Logick doth bessute with it in the first acceptation though I shall here speak of it in the second namely as it is taken for the Systeme of Logical precepts The parts of this definition are two the Genus and the differentia the Genus or general name here given to Logick is Art not a manual art or handy-craft trade but an internal and mental art for the mind hath its artificial workings as well as the body as is manifest even in Poetry The difference or particular name by which it is distinguished from other arts will be best conceived by considering three things the End the Offices and the Object thereof The last and principal end of Logick is the knowledge of things and its chief Offices by which this End may be attained are these three 1. To define things that are obscure 2. To divide things that are general and universal 3. To reason concerning things dubious And the matter or Object about which it â—reateth is all that we can possibly either conceive in our minds or utter with words but the manner how this matter is to be considered is not as things are in their own nature but â—s the Instruments of Logick may be applied unto them The parts of Logick therefore are these two Thematical and Organical The Thematical part is that which treateth of Theams with their various affections and second notions as of the matter of which Logical Instruments are composed The Organical part is that which treateth of those Instruments and their composition CHAP. II. Of Simple and Compounded Theams A Theam is any thing propounded to the understanding that it may be known 1. To know is to form a conception or notion of the thing proposed And a Notion is the representation of a thing in the understanding 2. Notions are of two sorts Primary or Secundary 3. A Primary Notion is that which represents the thing as it is in it self 4. A Secundary Notion is that which together with the first Notions represents the manner how the mind doth either understand a thing or explain its own understanding unto others 5. Theams are either Simple or Compound 6. Simple Theams are such Theams as are apprehended without any composition of Notions as a man a house 7. Compounded Theams are such as are understood by two or more Notions being joined together in the affirmation or in the negation of a thing as a man doth run 8. A Simple Theam is either universal or particular 9. An universal Simple Theam is that which in its own nature may be spoken of many in one and the same respect and that univocally and without any ambiguity as a man a horse a plant 10. A Particular or Singular Theam is that which in its own nature can be spoken of no more than one as Socrates Plato for though the names of Socrates and Plato may be given to many yet that is by way of imposition not of their own nature names as names are naturally spoken of no more than one 11. Singular Theams are call'd individuals because they cannot be divided into any more of the same name and nature 12. And Individuals are of two sorts 1. Such as are certain and determinate the which may be expressed three waies 1. By a proper name as Alexander Paul which signifies some certain and determinate particular 2. By a Pronoun Demonstrative as this man 3. By Circumlocution or Paraphrase as the Apostle of the Gentiles that is Paul 2. Such as are uncertain and indeterminate which doth indeed express a particular thing but this or that indefinitely as some man 3. An Vniversal simple Theam otherwise called a Predicable may be spoken of two ways 1. By declaring what a thing is and then it is spoken of such things as do differ either 1. In Species and is called Genus as a living creature colour or 2. In number only and is called Species as a man 2. By declaring what kind of thing it is of which it is spoken and that either Essentially and is called Difference or Accidentally and that either Of necessity and then it is called a proper Accident as the Risible faculty in man or Not of necesity and then it is called a common or simple Accident as white CHAP. III. Of Genus and Species A Genus or General may be taken two ways 1. Civilly and then amongst Grammarians it noteth the distinction of Sex but amongst Orators it is taken for a Multitude which had their beginning from some one thus the Romans are said to be the Genus or race of Romulus or else it is taken for that one from whence that multitude had it's beginning thus Romulus is the Genus or person from whence the Romans had their rise 2. Logically and then it is Vniversal which is spoken of many that do differ in the Species by declaring what a thing is and thus taken it is either Supream and so a Genus as that it cannot be a Species and of this sort there are ten Generals or Predicaments or Subaltern and so a Genus in respect of those things which are contained under it and a Species in regard of that under which it is it self contained as a living creature 2. A Species also may be taken two ways 1. Civilly as it is used amongst Orators and so it is taken for the external form and beauty of the body 2. Logically and so it is an Vniversal which may be spoken of many that differ in number only by declaring what a thing is The Genus in this definition is this word Vniversall the rest of the definition is put for the difference in which by these words spoken of many by declaring what a thing is Difference and Accident whether proper or common are both excluded and by these words differing in number only Genus is excluded also 3 A Species is either Subaltern that is species of one and Genus of another or Most Special that is so a Species as that it cannot be a Genus as a Horse a man 4. The Canons or Rules of Genus and Species are these following 1. Every Genus must have two or more Species 2. Nothing can be said of the Genus which may not be also said of every Species and the Species is
irrational therefore man is rational or irrational 3. That you proceed not from the concreet to the abstract and hence this doth not follow A man is just Justice is a quality therefore a man is a quality The second Antepredicamental rule hath two parts The first is this subaltern Generalls have the same Species and differences as a body and an Animal have the same diffeâ—ences The second part is this Generals not Subaltern have not the same Species and differences as substance and qualitie They are said to be subaltern Generals whereof one is essentially contained by the other as an Animal and a Body And they are said not to be Subaltern Generals where the one is not essentially contained of the other as an Animal and a science The chief use of this Rule is to prevent the confounding of the Predicaments and to distinguish things between themselves that do belong to diverse predicaments CHAP. VII Of the Predicaments in General THe particular orders or predicaments to which all simple Theams may be reduced are ten of which some are more principal some less 2. The more principal predicaments are the first six and these are of two sorts one of substance and the other of accidents 3. Predicamental ranks or Orders of Accidents are of two sorts 1. Absolute as the predicaments of Quantity Quality Action anâ— Passion 2. Relative as the Predicament of Relation 4. The less principle predicamental ranks oâ— orders are these four When where situation and Habit. And in these ten predicament are all to be ranked which can be predicated or spoken of any thing Directly Collaterally or by Reduction First then Directly and primarily ever supream Genus or every thing of which thâ— supream Genus may be predicated essentially may be placed in the predicamental scale and thus all Generals Specials and Individual are placed in them Secondly Collaterally or sideways and so some things are placed in the predicamentaâ— order which are not spoken or predicated oâ— the supream Genus but yet do divide the Generals and constitute the specials and thus essential differences only are there placed Thirdly indirectly or by Reduction thuâ— Matter and form are in the predicament oâ— Substance a point and unitie in quantity and a proper accident is in the same predicament with its Species The Canons or Rules are four 1. All words of Ambiguity or doubt at least before they be distinguished and limited with all feigned and impossible things are excluded the predicamental order 2. Every real finite simple and Vnivocal thing is in some predicament directly collaterally or by Reduction 3. Individuals are in some predicament not for themselves but by reason of their Species 4. No one and the same numerical thing can be in diverse predicaments either in one respect or in diverse CHAP. VIII Of Substance A Substance is a thing subsisting of itself and it is either first or second 2. The first substance is a singular substance or a substance that cannot be predicated of its subject as Alexander Bucephalus 3. The second substance is an universal substance or a substance which may be predicated of its subject as a man a horse 4. The first substance is chiefly and properly a substance and among the second substances every one is by so much more a substance by how much it is nearer to the first The Rules or Properties are six 1. A Substance is not in its subject This agreeth to every substance and to every substance only but not only to those which are compleatly so but to the differences and parts of substances also 2. A Substance is univocally predicated of those things of which it is predicated This agreeth to all second substances and their differences and no other for the first substances are not predicated of any subject 3. Every first substance doth signifie some particular thing 4. A substance as it is a substance is not contrary to another but as it hath accidents or qualities thus fire and water are contrary not as they are substances but in reference to their qualities of heat and cold c. 5. A Substance as it is a substance is not varied by degrees or receiveth not more and less but the variance or comparison is in respect of accidents as a wise man and a fool an old man and a child one water hotter than another these differ in qualities not in substance 6. One and the same numerical substance is capable of contrary Accidents As water may be now seething hot and anon as cold as Ice CHAP. IX Of Quantity HItherto we have spoken of the predicament of Substance those of Accidents now follow and first those that are absolutely so as Quantity Quality Action and passion 2. Quantity is an absolute Accident by which a thing is said to be great in bulk or number 3. And hence quantity may be said to be twofold continued or dissevered 4. Continued Quantity is that whose parts are joyned together by a common terme 5. Dissevered Quantity is that whose parts are not joyned together by a common term and this is nothing else but number 6. Continued Quantity is either successive whose parts consist in succession and then it is time or permanent as magnitude and place 7. Every Magnitude is either a line a superficies or a body 8. A line is a Magnitude which can be divided but one way the limit whereof is a point for every line is made continued and bounded with a point 9. A Superficies is a Magnitude which may be divided two ways the term or limit thereof is a line 10. A solid or body is that which may be divided three ways namely by length breadth and thickness whose term or limit is a superficies 11. Place is that which measureth something beside the subject in which it is namely the thing which is placed this seems to be refer'd to a superficies for Place according to Aristotle lib. 4 phys cap. 14 is the superficies next to the body that is conteined in it The Canons or Rules are three 1. Nothing is contrary unto Quantity in it self but in reference to its Qualities only thus winter is contrary unto summer in respect of heat and cold 2. Quantity cannot receive more or less As one house is not more or less a house than another though one be a greater house than another 3. Things may be said to be equal or unequal in respect of Magnitude or greatness CHAP. X. Of Quality QUality is an absolute accident by which it is simply and determinately declared whâ—â— kind of thing that subject is of which it is the quality 2. Quality is the most copious of all the predicaments and it is of two sorts Patible or Impatible 3. An impatible quality is such a quality as doth not cause any passions in the senses or any way affect them and this is either innate or acquired 4. An acquired quality is such a quality as is begotten by labour and this Aristotle maketh the first
it by some other Synonymous word more generally known 5. A real Definition is that which sheweth what the thing is and this is twofold perfect imperfect 6. A real a perfect Definition is that which doth explain the thing by essential attributes whether they be such as constitute the thing and then it is a Definition of the substantial form which doth most exactly explain the nature of its species as a man is a rational living creature Or such as do partly constitute the thing and partly produce the same necessarily and then it is a Definition of the accidents and this is threefold 1. Formal which consists of the Genus and the subject of the accident for the subject of the accident is as it were the form as Thunder is a noise in the clouds 2. Causal which doth demonstrate the nature of the thing defined and it is the next cause of the accident either efficient or final 3. Both formal and causal which sheweth the Genus subject and cause of the thing defined as if an Eclipse of the Moon be thus defined it is a privation of light in the Moon by the interposition of the earth The Genus is privation the difference or form is the subject viz. the Moon and the efficient cause is the interposition of the earth 7. A real but imperfect definition otherwise called a description is that which explains the nature of the thing by certain accidental attributes it doth consist of a Genus or something which doth supply the place of a Genus and of proper and common accidents which supply the place of the difference as a man is a living creature that is risible hath two feet And because our knowledge begins from the accidents therefore this kind of description is most in use with all The Canons or Rules are 1. In every science you are to begin with the definition of the name thereof 2. A description may be sutable as well to the substantial as the accidental part of any thing 3. A Species only is defined by a formal definition 4. An accident only is defined by a causal definition or by a formal and a causal both 5. A definition consisting of the form and cause both doth differ from a Demonstration in the disposition of the terms only 6. Every descriptive definition whether formal or formal and causal both is an oration CHAP. II. Of Division DIvision is the resolving of the whole into parts And this is either of some ambiguous word into its several significations or of the whole into its parts 2. Now the whole is either simple or aggregate 3. Division of the whole simply and properly so called is threefold 1. Vniversal into its subjective parts or of the General into the specials as to divide animal into man and beast 2. Essential which resolves the whole into essential parts and this is either of a species into its Genus and difference or of some spefical nature into its matter and form as a â—an into soul and body 3. Integral which resolveth the whole inâ—o integral parts and this is the division of some individual either into its sensible or material parts 4. Division of the aggregated whole into â—s parts and by accident is four fold 1. When the subject may be divided by its accidents as men are learned or unlearned 2. When an accident may be divided by â—ts subjects as Feavers are in the spirits or in the humours or in the solid parts 3. When an accident may be divided by â—ccidents as good is either profitable honest â—r pleasant 5. When things may be divided by their â—bjects as sight by colours hearing by â—ound 6. When causes may be divided by their â—ffects and the contrary as Heavenly heat â—s from the Sun and Elementary from fire The Canons or Rules are these 1. An ambiguous word must be explained before it can define any thing 2. Vnless the ambiguity be explained in the beginning the errour will be afterward the greater 3. In the simple dividing of the whole tâ—â— members dividing should be equal to and agreâ— with the whole 4. The members dividing should be disjoineâ— from one another 5. Division doth consist of as few members or parts as the nature of the whole will bear 6. In any Division the whole must be of a larger extent than any one of the parts CHAP. III. Of a Syllogism A Syllogism is an oration in which some things being taken for granted something else not granted before is proved or inferred from them and this is twofold perfect or imperfect 2. A perfect Syllogism is an argumentation in which from two premises disposed rightly and according to rule some conclusion doth necessarily follow as every man is an animal every thing that hath reason is a man therefore every rational thing is an animal 3. A perfect Syllogism is twofold Categoriâ—l and Hypothetical 4. A Categorical Syllogism is that in â—ich all the propositions are categorical and â—â—is is also twofold Common and Expositoâ— 5. A common categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a common name 〈◊〉 every sound may be heard every voice is a found therefore every voice may be heard 6. An Expository Categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a singular â—â—me as Sorates is learned Socrates is an Athenian therefore some Athenian is learnâ—â— 7. An Hypothetical Syllogism is that in â—hich one or more of the propositions are Hypoâ—â—etical as if Socrates be a man he is an aâ—imal but Socrates is a man therefore he 〈◊〉 an animal 8. To make a common Categorical Sylloâ—sm two things are required matter and â—rm 9. The matter of a Syllogism is either remote or next 10. The remote matter of a Syllogism is â—hat matter of which it is remotely made â—s the three terms in every proposition callâ—d the major extreme the minor extreme and the middle term or argument 11. The major extreme is that which is in the major proposition and in the conclusion but never in the minor 12. The minor extreme is that which is in the minor proposition and in the conclusion but never in the major 13. The middle term or argument is that which is in the major and minor propositions but never in the conclusion 14. The next or immediate matter of a Syllogism is that of which the Syllogism is immediately made as the three propositions of which the first is called the major the second the minor and the third the conclusion 15. The form of a Syllogism is the right disposing of the matter both next and remote and this comprehendeth two things figure and mode 16. A figure is that which shews how the middle term may be fitly placed which may be done three waies or by three figures 17. The first figure maketh that which is the subject in the major proposition to be the predicate in the minor 18. The Second figure maketh that which is the predicate in the major proposition to