Rigour as divinely revealed Truths The Anti-trinitarian System is not at all suited to my Genius Yet I would not stretch our Trinitarian Doctrine so far as to set it at a distance from Scripture as well as from Reason Secret things belong unto the Lord but those things that are Revealed belong to us and our Children Deut. 29. 29. And the Angels it may be think us as foolish and ridiculous for pursuing these Notions as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits I am Sir with all Sincerity Your most humble Servant W. I. To this Letter I reply as followeth To the Reverend W. J. SIR I Am obliged to you for the Kind and Respectful Character which you are pleased to afford me in Both your Letters I am not at all displeased but thank you for it with a like Moderation in Yours to what you commend in my Letters as to the Mysterious Truths concerning the Sacred Trinity And do fully close with what you say in the Conclusion That the Angels may think us as Foolish and Ridiculous for pursuing these Notions further than they are Revealed as we think our selves Wise and Learned in such pursuits Like as You or I should Laugh at a Blind man who had never seen that should undertake to Conceive in his Mind and Express to us in word a Distinct and Perfect Notion or Idea of Sight Light and Colours He may Hear the Noise or Sound of those three Words supposing him though Blind not to be Deaf also and may Believe that they signifie Somewhat But what that Somewhat is he cannot Tell having never had an Idea thereof in his Mind nor a Perception thereof by his Senses And if You or I from that Notion which our selves have of it would Explain it to him We could do it no otherwise than by the Use of such Words in a sense Analogical as do properly belong to somewhat of which he hath from Experience some Idea Sight we might say is a certain kind of Sense or Feeling in our Eyes which we have not in our Hand Feet or other parts of our Body whereby we can as it were Feel with our Eyes the Shape Figure Bigness and Proportion of a Body at a Distance as we might with our Hands if within our Reach Whereby he might Apprehend that there is some kind of Resemblance between Seeing and Feeling but what indeed it is to See he cannot comprehend Light we might tell him is a Necessary Requisite to such a Feeling with our Eyes as that for want of it which Want we call Darkness we can no more so Feel or Discover by our Eyes such Shape Figure or Bigness than we could with our Hands that suppose of a Piece of Money locked up in a Box which we could not open but by the Admission of such Requisite we are inabled so to Feel it with our Eyes as we might with our Hands if the Box were opened whereby we might come to Handle it Colour we might tell him is somewhat of such a Nature as that on a Plain Board or the like on which by our Hand we can Feel nothing but Smooth and Uniform by it may be Represented to be so Felt with our Eyes as great variety of Shapes and Figures suppose of a Horse a Bird a Ship a House or any Shape whatever as by our Hand we might if we had such Shapes formed in Wood or Stone and the different Motions of such But after all this it is not possible for this Blind man to have that Idea or Notion in his Fancy of Sight Light and Colour which we have who See And it is much more Impossible for Us who have no Notions in our Mind other than what we derive Mediately or Immediately from Sensible Impressions of Finite Corporeal Beings to have a Clear and Perfect Notion of the Nature Unity Distinctions or Attributes of an Infinite Spiritual Being or otherwise to express them than by some Imperfect Analogies or Resemblances with things we are conversant with and by words in a borrowed sense from such I do therefore fully agree with you in your Two Conclusions namely That it is Safe and Prudent to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines since we know nothing of them otherwise than as there Revealed And not to impose Consequences of Humane Deduction with the like Rigour as Divinely-revealed Truths For even in common affairs when things are represented onely by the Analogy or Resemblance which they bear to some other things it is seldom that the Similitude is so Absolute between them but that there is some Dissimilitude likewise Much more when the Distance is so great as between Finite Corporeal Beings and what is Infinite and Incorporeal So that we cannot always argue cogently from one to the other And therefore the words Nature Essence Vnity Distinction Father Son Person Beget Proceed and the like when applied to God in a borrowed sense from what they properly signifie as applied to Creatures must not be supposed to signifie just the same but somewhat Analogous to that of their Primary signification nor Consequences thence to be deduced with the same Rigour It would be mere Cavilling for any to argue that Because Knowledge and Strength are separable in Man Therefore what in God we call by those names are so in God and that consequently it may be Possible for the All-wise God not to be Almighty or the Almighty God not to be All-wise So if we should argue from the manner of our Locality or Duration to God's Vbiquity without Extension and his Eternity without Succession the Inferences must needs be Lame and Inconsequent With other Inferences of like nature And even without proceeding to Infinites if we suppose a Spirit or the Soul of Man to be void of Parts and Local Extension and therefore as the Phrase is tota in toto tota in qualibet parte of that Space or Matter to which it is compresent And should yet argue as you do in a like case If one single Spirit be compresent with three or more really-distinct Parts of Space or Matter we must Divide or Multiply it Either each of these extensive Parts must have a Piece of that Spirit and then you Divide it Or each must have the Whole and there being but one Whole you cannot give it to each without Multiplying it Such Inference upon such a Supposition which Supposition I am loth to think Impossible must needs be Lame Yet such are commonly the Cavils of those who study to pick Quarrels with the Doctrine of the Trinity as delivered in Scripture And in particular though amongst Men Three Persons are sometimes not always so used as to import three Men we may not thence conclude that the three Divine Persons must needs imply three Gods Or if the word Persons do not please though I think it a fit word in the case we can spare the word without prejudice to the Cause for 't is the Notion
A Seventh LETTER Concerning the Sacred Trinity Occasioned by a Second Letter From W. I. By IOHN WALLIS D. D. Professor of Geometry in Oxford LONDON Printed for Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside 1691. A Seventh LETTER Concerning the Sacred Trinity IN a Postscript to my Sixth Letter which should have been Printed with it but came it seems too late after all the Sheets were Printed off I gave notice That I had received from London the Night before March 27. another Letter from W. I. of a like import with his former but somewhat fuller That what in it did directly concern me was but Expressions of Thanks Respect and Approbation For which I knew not how otherwise than by such a way to return him my acknowledgment Because he did neither signifie who he is that writes nor do I know any in London to who 's Name the Letters W. I. do belong That there were Reflections in it on some Expressions of a Learned Author which Expressions I do not see that I am at all engaged to defend And did therefore wave them That to say The three Divine Persons are Three Intelligent Beings three substantial Beings three Spirits Really Distinct though mutually conscious is more he thinks than that Learned Author needed to have said And I think so too And that it is more Safe to be less Positive and Particular as to what the Scripture leaves in the dark And his Answer I think would not have been less valid against those he undertakes to answer though such Expressions were omitted That I did forbear to publish that Letter without his Order because I was loth to engage the Learned Writer thereof in a Publick Dispute against that Learned Author unless he please Since which time considering that the Postscript came too late to be Printed with that Letter of mine and that the Letter of this Reverend Divine for such I take him to be by the contents of it seems to be penned with that care and caution as if he were willing to have it publick and without any intimation of Dislike for my having published his former Letter in like Circumstances I have thought not amiss nor unagreeable to his mind to publish this also Which is as followeth supplying the Date from the Post-mark at London denoting what day it was given-in to the Post-Office there For the Reverend Dr. Wallis Professor of Geometry at Oxford London March 24. 1690-91 SIR YOur Repeated Letters give me a just occasion of Repeating my hearty Thanks to you And I hope you will give me leave to join both my good Wishes and Endeavours to promote that Moderation which you seem to Aim at in stating the Mysterious Truths concerning the Trinity Methinks we might be easily perswaded to this by the Difficulties which all men find in conceiving those Mysteries Especially the Consequences which some make from them and impose upon us as Certain and Sacred Truths Sir Because I would have you lose as little of your Time as may be in reading my Letters I will enter immediately upon the Subject proposed and consider not some lesser Niceties but the Two Main Points in the Doctrine of the Trinity and the Difficulties which our Vnderstandings represent to us in the Conception of them The Two Main Points are these The Unity of the Godhead notwithstanding the Distinction of Three Persons And the Equality of those Three Persons notwithstanding their Derivation one from another Concerning the Divine Persons The Hypothesis which we referred to formerly and shall still follow asserts these Three Things First That they are Three Beings or Three Intelligent Beings Really Distinct. Secondly That they are Three Substantial Beings Really Distinct. Thirdly That they are Three Infinite Minds or Three Holy Spirits Really Distinct. And to these I think we may of course add a Fourth Character That they are Three Compleat Beings really Distinct. They are not Inadequate or Partial Beings For a Spirit infinite in Perfection as each of these is represented can want nothing to compleat its Being or Perfection Let us now if you please run over these Characters and observe the most obvious Difficulties that occurr to our Minds in the Conception of them For the first Three Beings really distinct According to the plain Tract of humane Reason Every real Being hath its Essence that is the Basis it stands upon as distinguished from Non-Entity or a Fictitious Being And every Distinct Being hath its Distinct Essence I mean Numerically distinct And therefore according to this Principle there ought to be Three distinct Essences in the Godhead seeing there are Three Beings there really distinct Furthermore If you give one single Essence to Three Beings really distinct you must either Divide it or Multiply it Either each of these Beings must have a Piece of this Essence and then you Divide it or each must have the Whole and then being but one Whole you cannot give it to Three without Multiplying of it This is still made more difficult to conceive when the Author allows these Three to be as Distinct as Peter James and John For if they be as Distinct as Peter James and John they are One but as Peter James and John For every degree of Distinction takes away a degree of Vnity As every degree of Heat takes away a degree of Cold. We proceed to the second Character The Three Divine Persons are Three Substantial Beings Really distinct That is in plain English are Three Substances Really distinct As a Spiritual Being is a Spirit a Corporeal Being a Body so a Substantial Being is a Substance putting onely Two Words for One. And the Author must understand it so because he makes them Three Spirits afterwards and therefore they must be Three Substances Besides what are they 'pray if not Substances they cannot be Modes or bare Relations I know some Platonists call them Super-Substances Or if you will think them lower and call them Semi-Substances as some Philosophers do their Substantial Forms All this is but playing with Words For there is nothing represented to our Faculties but as Substances Modes or Relations excepting what is meerly Notional And the Learned Author must not debar us the use of the Word Substance under pretence that it sounds Corporeally For two Creeds make use of it and the Scripture it self upon a fair interpretation Heb. 1. 3. To proceed therefore Here are Three Substances Really Distinct whereof each is a God pag. 47. l. 13. p. 98. l. 23. and yet there is but One God This is very hard to conceive as contrary to all our Idea's of Number and Numeration 'T is true we may conceive these Three Substances in strict Vnion one with another notwithstanding their real Distinction But Union is one thing and Unity is another For Vnity excludes all Plurality and Multiplicity which Vnion doth not but rather supposes it Vnity also in simple Natures excludes all Compositions which Vnion on the contrary always Implies
time in telling you what the Author means by mutual Consciousness nor how he applies it to the present case You know them both sufficiently But methinks this Vnitive Principle is defectively expressed by the word Consciousness For bare Consciousness without Consent is no more than bare Omnisciency As God is Conscious of all our Thoughts good or bad and of all the Devils thoughts without Vnion as without Consent If a good and bad Angel were made mutually Conscious of one anothers mind they would not thereupon become One being still of different Wills and Inclinations It may be the Author will say Consciousness involves Consent as he says Knowledge involves Power or is the same with it But besides that I cannot well reconcile the Author to himself in this point See P. 9. l. 3 4. compared with p. 72. I have given you Instances in a former Letter to the contrary To which you may add if you please this further consideration If Knowledge be the same thing with Power then actual Conception is the same thing with actual Execution And if so then You and I may sit quietly in our studies and with our Thought and Pen build Palaces and take Towns and Cities For we know the Methods of both and can distinctly conceive them and delineate them And as these are not the same thing in us so neither can we conceive them in all respects the same in God For from all Eternity God had a clear Idea of the frame of the World and of the manner of producing it therefore if Gods Conception or Knowledge had been the same with his Power the World had been produced from Eternity But to proceed Let us give this Principle its full strength Consciousness and Consent they would not together make a perfect Vnity of Operations in the Deity much less of Substance We noted before that Vnity and Vnion are different things And this is more apparent now when Three Spirits are to be united into One. For how that can be done without some sort of Composition is an unconceivable Mystery You may indeed conceive these Three Spirits singly and separately as simple Beings But if you conceive these three simple Beings united into One without Annihilation of any one that One must be a Compound Being according to our Conceptions Then as to Vnity of Operations Besides the Energies peculiar to the Father and the Son this Author allows p. 67. that every one of these three Minds notwithstanding their Vnion hath some Distinct Consciousness not common to the other Two therefore the Godhead which consists of these Three Minds cannot be One as a single Mind is One where there is an intire Community and Sameness of Consciousness in all Operations In my opinion if this Hypothesis were prest to speak out the plain language of it would be this There are Three Divine Substances three Holy Spirits infinitely Perfect and in truth and reality three Gods But for some Reasons not fit to be called so These three Beings by Similitude of Nature mutual Consciousness Consent Cooperation are under the greatest Vnion possible and in that state of Vnion do constitute the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Intire All comprehensive Godhead This I confess books something like a conceivable thing But the Christian Trinity does not use to be represented thus For this amounts to no more than a kind of Hypostatical Vnion of Three Divine Spirits Sir I will trouble you no further upon the first general Head The Distinction of the Persons I proceed now to consider the Equality of the Persons Which I will dispatch in a few Words The first Argument against their Equality may be this pag. 99. l. 29. c. The Father is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-existen◠self-originated whereas the other Two are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 existent and originated from another Now this cannot but make according to our Faculties not only some Difference but also some Inequality For 't is a fundamental Perfection to be self-originated and what is not so is not Equal to that which is so You will say possibly Though the Son and Holy-Ghost are produced of the Father yet 't is not in such a way as Creatures are produced That is by a voluntary External Act but This by an Internal Necessary and Emanative Act. We will allow your Distinction and admit that the Son and Holy-Ghost have a different Origin from that of common Creatures But this does not remove the Difficulty It shews indeed a great Difference and Inequality betwixt any of the Divine Persons and bare Creatures But it does not shew any Equality amongst the Divine Persons themselves 'T is true the Dependance which a Creature hath upon the Creator for its Being is of another kind and degree from that of the Son or Holy-Ghost But however they are Derivative Beings in some way or other and dependent upon the Father And we cannot but conceive some Inequality betwixt an Original and a Derivative a Dependent and Independent Being Secondly That Act whereby the Son is Generated by the Father is some Energy and Perfection Nay 't is an Energy of the Highest Perfection Because the Result of it is the most Perfect Being that can any way be produced or the Noblest and Greatest Product in Things Creation or that Energy that produceth a Creature hath not a Term or Effect so Noble or so Great as that Energy whereby the Son is generated And consequently it is not so great a Perfection to Create a World as to Generate the Divine Logos This being so there is you see not only Self-Origination in the Father which is not in the Son but also an Active Perfection of the highest Degree possible in the One which is not in the other And therefore we cannot in either respect conceive these two Beings equal Besides if you make them all three Equal and all Infinite they will be Co-ordinate I mean internally as to perfection of Nature For External Subordination as to Oeconomy signifies nothing in this case And are no more One than three Individuals of the same Species are One that is than Peter James and John are or may be One. And this I think was the Doctrine of the Tritheites or very near it Lastly You may please to reflect upon the various Sentiments and Expressions of the Ancients concerning the Dignity and Preheminence of the Fathers which you know are noted by Petavius de Trin. lib. 2. c. 2. l. 8. c. 9. § 15. and consider their Consistency or Inconsistency with perfect Equality Sir As I do not write this with any Disrespect to that Treatise which contains many Excellent things so neither to represent absolute Truth or Vntruth But the Difficulty of our conceiving things of an Infinite Nature From which Consideration I would willingly infer Two Conclusions First That we ought to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines Secondly That we should not impose Consequences humanely made with the same
rather than the Name that we contend for and content our selves to say They be three Somewhats which are but One God Or we may so explain our selves That by three Persons we mean three such Somewhats as are not inconsistent with being One God And hitherto I suppose that You and I do well enough agree Now as to what you observe concerning the Learned Author Dr. Sherlock I shall begin where you end And agree with you that the Treatise to which you refer contains many Excellent things The Strength and Weight of his Arguments as to those to whom he undertakes Answer doth not depend upon those Expressions against which you object But his Arguments against those are of equal Force though these Expressions were spared As to those Expressions of his by you noted That the three Divine Persons are Three Beings three Intelligent Beings three Substantial Beings three Holy Spirits Really Distinct even as distinct as Peter Iames and Iohn and One God onely as they are mutually Conscious I was I confess Unsatisfied therein as You are from the first Looking upon them as Expressions too Hardy for one to venture upon and so I find are most others with whom I have discoursed about them and wish he had declined them Yet I did not think it necessary for me to write against them though I did not like them but chose rather to wave them and express my self otherwise For it would be Endless if I should make it my business to write Books against every one who hath some Expressions which I cannot approve amongst many others wherein I think he doth well Nor shall I Aggravate the Objections which you have Urged against them But leave them as they are I might perhaps mollifie some of his Expressions by putting a softer sense upon them than at first view they seem to bear for I find some Men in such matters do use words at a very different rate from what others do But I have not where now I am the Book at hand and have read it but once a good while since when it first came out and therefore am not willing to say much without Book least I should miss his sense or not perform it to his mind That learned Author may if he think fit so Vindicate or Explain those Expressions as he shall judge convenient Or he may which I had rather he should Decline them without prejudice to his main Cause which in my opinion he may as well defend without them and thereby less expose himself to the Cavils of the Anti-trinitarians who are catching at every colourable pretence of Objecting though not against the main Cause concerning the Trinity if but against some Expressions of those who maintain it Thus far I think He and both of Us do agree namely That there is a Distinction between the Three more than meerly Notional and even more than that between what we commonly call the Divine Attributes yet not so as to be Three Gods or more Gods than One which is as much as we need maintain against the Anti-Trinitarians And that the word Person is no unfit Name to denote that Distinction And thus far we may close with him notwithstanding some other Inconvenient Expressions And if it be agreed that these Three thus distinguished are but One God each Communicating in one and the same Numerical Essence then they are all Equal as to that common Internal Essence and the common Attributes thereof and then an External Subordination as to Oeconomy you grant signifies nothing in this case Now Sir if you look back upon your own Discourse You will find that the whole Edge of your Arguments is directed against those Expressions Three Beings Three Substances Three Spirits and I do acknowledge that as to these the Arguments seem to me sharp enough and to do their work But if instead of these he say as I think he should that The Three Persons are One Being One Substance One Spirit like as he says they are One God that Edge will be taken off That I conceive which did impose upon him in this Point is the forced sense which in our Language we sometimes put upon the word Person for want of another English Word answering to Homo which might indifferently respect Man Woman and Child and a like forced sense put by the School-men upon the word Persona for want of a Latin word which might equally relate to Men and Angels as signifying an Intelligent Being Whence he was induced to think that Three Persons must needs be Three Intelligent Beings Whereas Persona in its true and ancient sense before the School-men put this forced sense upon it did not signify a Man simply but one under such and such and such Circumstances or Qualifications So that the same Man if capable of being qualified thus and thus and thus might sustain three Persons and these three Persons be the same Man Now if as he says of himself elsewhere in a like case he have not been taken to be a Fool Yet a wise Man may sometimes upon second thoughts see Reason to change his Opinion as in that case he did or rectify his Expressions And if then he consider how much easier it will be and less obnoxious to Exceptions to maintain his Hypothesis thus Rectified He may think I have done him no ill Offices thus to suggest Having thus given you my thoughts of this Hypothesis If you press me further as between our selves to tell you What Degree of Distinction as in our Metaphysicks they are wont to be Reckoned up I take this to be between the Three Divine Persons I think we need not much trouble our selves with such niceties And if I do tell you it is only ex abundanti as what doth not much concern the main question in hand which is safe enough without it Nor that I so prescribe therein as to require others to express their Sentiments just as I do The Degrees of Distinction commonly mentioned in our Metaphysicks are such as these Distinctio rationis ratiocinantis which is purely Notional and depends meerly on our Imagination Destinatio rationis ratiocinatae which is otherwise said to be secundum inadaequatos conceptus ejusdem rei Distinctio Modalis either ut res modus or ut modus modus which is otherwise said to be ex parte rei sed non ut res res And Distinctio realis or ut res res Though in the Names of these several Degrees all Writers do not always speak alike One perhaps by a distinction ex parte rei may mean the same which another means by Distinctio Realis And so of the rest And these thus marshalled are but a contrivance of our own They might for ought I know have been made more or fewer if the Contriver had so thought fit But these Degrees of Distinction I take to be primarily fitted to our Notions of Created Beings And are not intended as applicable to God otherwise than by Analogy as other Words properly fitted to created Beings are wont to be so applied And therefore I should choose to say that in strictness of speech our Metaphysicks have not yet given a Name to these Distinctions Nor do I know any need of it The Divine Attributes we use to say are distinguished ratione ratiocinata or as inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei And it is well enough so to say to those that have not a mind to be captious but are willing to understand Figurative Words in a Figurative sense But to those that have a mind to Cavil I would speak more cautiously and say It is in God somewhat Analogous to what we so call in Created Beings And That of the Divine Persons somewhat Analogous in the Deity to what in Created Beings is called Distinctio Modalis or Distinctio à parte rei sed non ut res res If it be asked What that Distinction is which is thus Analogous I say that I cannot tell You must first tell me and enable me to comprehend what is the full and adaequate import of the words Father Son Beget Proceed c. when applied to God in a sense Analogous to what they signify as to Created Beings If you cannot tell me precisely what they are How should I tell you How they Differ But what need we trouble our selves with these Niceties or Names of these Degrees of Distinction Which when we have all done will by divers Men be diversly expressed I think it is enough to say The Distinction is Greater than that of what we call the Divine Attributes but not so as to make them Three Gods Or That they be so Three as yet to be but One God And I am content to rest there I am Sir Yours to serve you I. Wallis Apr. 11. 1691. * Augustin Epist. 174. Spiritus est Deus Pater Spiritus est Filius ipse Spiritus Sanctus nec tamen Tres Spiritus sed Vnus Spiritus sicut non Tres Dii sed Vnus Deus