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Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
word_n	nature_n	person_n	unity_n	2,746	5	9.5752	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A67408	A seventh letter, concerning the sacred Trinity occasioned by a second letter from W.J. / by John Wallis ...	Wallis, John, 1616-1703.	1691 (1691)	Wing W604; ESTC R18000	12,865	24

Rigour as divinely revealed Truths The Anti-trinitarian System is not at all suited to my Genius Yet I would not stretch our Trinitarian Doctrine so far as to set it at a distance from Scripture as well as from Reason Secret things belong unto the Lord but those things that are Revealed belong to us and our Children Deut. 29. 29. And the Angels it may be think us as foolish and ridiculous for pursuing these Notions as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits I am Sir with all Sincerity Your most humble Servant W. I. To this Letter I reply as followeth To the Reverend W. J. SIR I Am obliged to you for the Kind and Respectful Character which you are pleased to afford me in Both your Letters I am not at all displeased but thank you for it with a like Moderation in Yours to what you commend in my Letters as to the Mysterious Truths concerning the Sacred Trinity And do fully close with what you say in the Conclusion That the Angels may think us as Foolish and Ridiculous for pursuing these Notions further than they are Revealed as we think our selves Wise and Learned in such pursuits Like as You or I should Laugh at a Blind man who had never seen that should undertake to Conceive in his Mind and Express to us in word a Distinct and Perfect Notion or Idea of Sight Light and Colours He may Hear the Noise or Sound of those three Words supposing him though Blind not to be Deaf also and may Believe that they signifie Somewhat But what that Somewhat is he cannot Tell having never had an Idea thereof in his Mind nor a Perception thereof by his Senses And if You or I from that Notion which our selves have of it would Explain it to him We could do it no otherwise than by the Use of such Words in a sense Analogical as do properly belong to somewhat of which he hath from Experience some Idea Sight we might say is a certain kind of Sense or Feeling in our Eyes which we have not in our Hand Feet or other parts of our Body whereby we can as it were Feel with our Eyes the Shape Figure Bigness and Proportion of a Body at a Distance as we might with our Hands if within our Reach Whereby he might Apprehend that there is some kind of Resemblance between Seeing and Feeling but what indeed it is to See he cannot comprehend Light we might tell him is a Necessary Requisite to such a Feeling with our Eyes as that for want of it which Want we call Darkness we can no more so Feel or Discover by our Eyes such Shape Figure or Bigness than we could with our Hands that suppose of a Piece of Money locked up in a Box which we could not open but by the Admission of such Requisite we are inabled so to Feel it with our Eyes as we might with our Hands if the Box were opened whereby we might come to Handle it Colour we might tell him is somewhat of such a Nature as that on a Plain Board or the like on which by our Hand we can Feel nothing but Smooth and Uniform by it may be Represented to be so Felt with our Eyes as great variety of Shapes and Figures suppose of a Horse a Bird a Ship a House or any Shape whatever as by our Hand we might if we had such Shapes formed in Wood or Stone and the different Motions of such But after all this it is not possible for this Blind man to have that Idea or Notion in his Fancy of Sight Light and Colour which we have who See And it is much more Impossible for Us who have no Notions in our Mind other than what we derive Mediately or Immediately from Sensible Impressions of Finite Corporeal Beings to have a Clear and Perfect Notion of the Nature Unity Distinctions or Attributes of an Infinite Spiritual Being or otherwise to express them than by some Imperfect Analogies or Resemblances with things we are conversant with and by words in a borrowed sense from such I do therefore fully agree with you in your Two Conclusions namely That it is Safe and Prudent to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines since we know nothing of them otherwise than as there Revealed And not to impose Consequences of Humane Deduction with the like Rigour as Divinely-revealed Truths For even in common affairs when things are represented onely by the Analogy or Resemblance which they bear to some other things it is seldom that the Similitude is so Absolute between them but that there is some Dissimilitude likewise Much more when the Distance is so great as between Finite Corporeal Beings and what is Infinite and Incorporeal So that we cannot always argue cogently from one to the other And therefore the words Nature Essence Vnity Distinction Father Son Person Beget Proceed and the like when applied to God in a borrowed sense from what they properly signifie as applied to Creatures must not be supposed to signifie just the same but somewhat Analogous to that of their Primary signification nor Consequences thence to be deduced with the same Rigour It would be mere Cavilling for any to argue that Because Knowledge and Strength are separable in Man Therefore what in God we call by those names are so in God and that consequently it may be Possible for the All-wise God not to be Almighty or the Almighty God not to be All-wise So if we should argue from the manner of our Locality or Duration to God's Vbiquity without Extension and his Eternity without Succession the Inferences must needs be Lame and Inconsequent With other Inferences of like nature And even without proceeding to Infinites if we suppose a Spirit or the Soul of Man to be void of Parts and Local Extension and therefore as the Phrase is tota in toto tota in qualibet parte of that Space or Matter to which it is compresent And should yet argue as you do in a like case If one single Spirit be compresent with three or more really-distinct Parts of Space or Matter we must Divide or Multiply it Either each of these extensive Parts must have a Piece of that Spirit and then you Divide it Or each must have the Whole and there being but one Whole you cannot give it to each without Multiplying it Such Inference upon such a Supposition which Supposition I am loth to think Impossible must needs be Lame Yet such are commonly the Cavils of those who study to pick Quarrels with the Doctrine of the Trinity as delivered in Scripture And in particular though amongst Men Three Persons are sometimes not always so used as to import three Men we may not thence conclude that the three Divine Persons must needs imply three Gods Or if the word Persons do not please though I think it a fit word in the case we can spare the word without prejudice to the Cause for 't is the Notion

in one kind or other Accordingly Substances upon Vnion are not Confounded or Identified or brought to Vnity of Substance But continuing numerically distinct Substances acquire some Community or Communication of Operations namely of such Actions and Passions as they are respectively capable of Let us consider Instances of these things in the chief unions that are known to us Our Soul and Body are two Substances really distinct and in close Vnion with one another But notwithstanding this they continue distinct Substances under that Vnion In like manner the Humane Soul of Christ is in Vnion with the Logos or second Person of the Trinity which we call an Hypostatical Union But neither doth this Vnion make any Vnity of Substance for the two substances of the Divine and Humane Natures continue Distinct under that Vnion Which must not be allowed in the Vnity of the Godhead where there can be no Plurality or Multiplicity of Substances The Learned Author does acknowledge p. 87 97. that these three Substances if they were separate would be three Gods but being Inseparate and Inseparable they make but One. This is again uneasy to conceive that Substances Really Distinct should not be separable For the notion of a Substance is of that which may subsist by it self And what mark have we of separability but Real Distinction Things that are only Modally or Notionally distinct we allow cannot subsist separate But if they be Really distinct as Substances why may they not be separated Really When we have proved the Real Distinction of the Soul and the Body as two Substances we think we have sufficient ground to assert the Separability of the Soul from the Body And from the same Reason we assert the Parts of Matter to be Separable as being Really distinct Substances let their Vnion be otherwise what it will For if our Faculties be true what things we clearly conceive Really distinct ut res res may possibly be separated Clear and Distinct Conception being to us the rule of Partibility But however Suppose if you please this Vnion Indissoluble this does not change it into Vnity If the Soul of Man was made to be in Perpetual Conjunction with Matter as some Platonists affirm that doth not make Matter and the Soul One and the same substance nor Matter cease to be Matter or the Soul a Spirit So if you suppose these three Divine Substances to be under an Indissoluble Vnion that doth not make them cease to be three Substances but it makes them Three Substances in an Indissoluble Vnion What the learned Authour says concerning Matter and Extension may be returned upon him in reference to the Godhead p. 80. l. 9 10. He supposes Extension to consist of Parts if they be only Assignable parts whether they can be divided or not so say we according to this opinion The Godhead may consist of several Substances if they be only Assignable Substances whether they can be Divided or not And you may as Distinctly Assign by your Vnderstanding Three Substances in the Godhead that of the Father that of the Son and that of the Holy Ghost as you may Assign Three Parts in a Physical Atome by A. B. C. Lastly There is no Substance lost or destroyed in this or any other Vnion Dissoluble or Indissoluble Therefore as to Substances they are the same whether in Conjunction or Separation We come unto the Third Character pag. 50. 166. 258. see also p. 93. The Three Divine Persons are Three Infinite Minds or Three Holy Spirits And yet but One God This rises still higher than the former as to its Vnconceivableness It seems to say and unsay the same thing with the same breath An Infinite Spirit is compleatly a God as to Essence and Attributes Therefore three such are three Gods Omnis mens infinitè perfecta est Deus Tres sunt mentes infinitè perfectae Ergo Tres sunt Dii Where is the fourth of this Syllogism This Character seems to assert Three Infinites Whereas the Athanasian Creed which stands at the highest pitch of any is yet very tender and cautious in giving the number Three to any thing but the Persons It will not allow three Eternals nor three Incomprehensibles nor three Almighties But three Infinites include all these An Infinite Spirit as I said before is a God I mean Infinite in Perfection as our Authour doth And three Spirits whereof each is Infinite in Perfection are Three Gods As three Creatures whereof each is a Rational Animal are three Men. Both these Propositions go upon the same ground namely That the Definition and the thing Defined are reciprocal and of the same extent Now as we have no better Definition of a Man than that he is a Rational Animal so neither have we a better Definition of a God than that he is a Spirit infinitely Perfect And as so many Animals Rational so many Men so likewise so many Spirits infinitely perfect so many Gods I speak this according to the use of our Faculties For what the true and precise state of things is in themselves when the question is concerning Infinite Natures I do not presume to determine But thus much I think we may safely determine That in such cases where our Faculties are at a loss the safest way is to keep close to Revelation and the words of Scripture And that 's the Conclusion I drive at Lastly To put a plain question which will come into every one's mind Here are Three Spirits infinitely Perfect either they are Gods or they are Creatures They must be one of the Two When we speak of a Spirit infinitely perfect we describe an absolute compleat entire Being Which must be of some Denomination either a God or a Creature for we know nothing of a middle nature betwixt these Possibly they will Answer this by a Distinction namely that they are three Gods considered Separately but considered collectively and in Vnion they are but One God And seeing they cannot be really separate it would be improper to call them Three Gods But pray Why not as properly three Gods as three Infinite Spirits seeing these terms A Spirit infinitely perfect and A God are terms equivalent or identical What partiality is it then to allow the one and not the other And if these Infinite Spirits be Inseparable why do you grant the number Three to that name and not to the name of Gods seeing they are both the same Thing and equally Inseparable We observed before that this Learned Authour is liberal in his Threes three Intelligent Beings three Infinite Minds three Holy Spirits three Divine Glories three Majesties but not three Kings 'T is the Name it seems is scrupled rather than the Thing Sir I will add no more upon these Heads But will consider now the grand Principle which is designed to take off all these Difficulties And that is mutual Consciousness whereby all these Threes are made One and reduced to a perfect Numerical Unity I need not spend