sown in Corruption and Weakness and Dishonour Either therefore he must speak of the same Body or his meaning cannot be comprehended For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption and is to be restored with more noble Qualities For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption and this Mortal must put on Immortality I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body with that after the Resurrection and that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith this is an Article of it and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body The Dispute is not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a Renovation i. e. it may be a New Life but not a raising the Body from the Dead 2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with are no less than those of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Saviour The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature the latter is said Art 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person which you have endeavour'd with all your Art to perplex and confound and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment Of which afterwards The Original Question was whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas and my business was to prove that we could not because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways These are your own Words And then I undertook to shew that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties or for that Substance wherein that Property lies whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas you could come to no Certainty about them And as to Person I shew'd that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses but upon a different manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another And as to this I said that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception but whether that make a Person or not must be understood some other way for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures but there must be two Persons Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it As to Nature you say That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea which when they are found united in any Individual existing though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man or the Nature of a Man to be in him forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him which answer the â—omplex abstract Idea to which the specifick Name is given by any one which abstract specifick Idea he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals And as to Person in the way of Ideas you say that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing and so no Idea belonging to it nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person and so of Nature Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstracted and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more To this you answer in your second Letter That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition But the Question is whether these be meer Words and Names or not Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person Of which I gave this evident Proof that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals every Individual must make a different Kind And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason Nothing particular that I can find But in the general you say that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing And is this all indeed Did not I tell you in these Words which I am forced to repeat on this occasion although I am very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions The Question now between us comes to this whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea or a general Name and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted The Question is not whether in forming
the Notion of common Nature the Mind doth not abstract from the Circumstances of particular Beings but it is whether there be not an Antecedent Foundation in the Nature of things upon which we form this abstract Idea For if there be then it cannot be called an Universal Name only or a meer sign of an Idea which we have formed from putting many simple Ideas together which Name belongs to all of such a sort as have those simple Ideas united together In these Words which you cannot deny to be in the place mention'd I thought I had stated the Case fairly between us And why do you not return an Answer to them But instead of that you only mention another Passage more liable to cavilling where I say That upon your Notions of Nature and Person I do not see how it is possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the sign of two Ideas then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind as all abstract and complex Ideas are and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more Upon this you charge me with affirming that of you which you never said viz. that these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas but your Words are Taking therefore Nature and Person for the sign of two Ideas they are put to stand for and by enumerating all the simple Ideas that are contained in the complex Idea that each of them is made to stand for we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them These are your own Words Now from thence it appears that Nature and Person are Terms which are the signs of two Ideas by your own Confession but you never made these or any other Terms to be Ideas and you should be ashamed of such Iargon But have not you said in your Essay that it is a very common Practice for Names to be made use of instead of the Ideas themselves especially if the Ideas be very complex Nature and Person you grant to be complex Ideas and these Terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas Therefore here is an Ambiguity in the Use of these Words for they are complex Ideas themselves and they are made the signs of them and so the Words of the Sentence are capable of both those Senses For it is true according to you that these Terms Nature and Person really signifie nothing in themselves but are only complex and abstract Ideas and those Terms are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas So that Nature and Person are both Ideas themselves and those Terms are the Signs of two Ideas and the Sense had not been liable to Exception if And had been inserted For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves but are only abstract and complex Ideas And which the common Use had appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas c. But whether this be properly expressed or not according to your Sense of Ideas the Weight of the Controversie depends not at all upon it but whether Nature and Person can be any other but abstract Ideas according to your own plain Expressions and if they are so they are no more than Notions of the Mind and then the Consequence must hold that One Nature and three Persons can be no more Upon which I said I did not see how it was possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity and I now add of the Incarnation which was the thing I undertook to make out But you very freely say whether I rightly deduce from it this Consequence viz. And so one Nature and three Persons can be no more is what you neither know not are concerned to examin Which I think is an Expression could hardly drop from a Person who did know how to declare his Belief of three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature But you pretend these are none of your Notions of Nature and Person nor indeed any thing you can understand But it is plain that this Consequence follows from your own Notions of Nature and Person as they are set down expresly by your self in the former Letter You tell me I made this Inference a little in haste Whether a Man write in haste or not the World will judge by what appears and not by what he or any other saith And I think it will appear that I did not make this Inference in haste but from a deliberate Consideration of your Notion of the Ideas of Nature and Person But by those Terms signifying nothing in themselves you say that you meant that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another nor in themselves signifie any thing at all but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition And was this truly all that you meant by it And do you think that Peter and Iames and Iohn signifie any thing by Nature Are not all Words made significative by Imposition But is there no difference in the signification of Words as they stand for signs of Things If they be Words for particular Substances then you grant that there is something really existing which is meant by those Words but if they relate only to the Conceptions of the Mind then they signifie them and no more And the Question is which of these two you meant by those Words Nature and Person And you plainly affirm both of them to be complex Ideas which are made only by an Act of the Mind and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood You presume that upon more leisurely thoughts both my self and the rest of Mankind will concur with you I never affected Singularity and am ready to comply with the rest of Mankind in any reasonable thing But you say that this Notion of Nature and Person That they are two Words that signifie only by Imposition is what will hold in the common Sense of Mankind No doubt of it But I must again and again tell you that is not the Point in Question but whether they are only abstract and complex Ideas which have no other Being but in the Mind And to this you answer not a Word I do not in the least think as you suggest that it is necessary to the Defense of the Trinity that these two Articulate sounds should have Natural significations and that unless they are used in those significations it were impossible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity But I do affirm that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas can neither defend nor reasonably believe it And this is making no extraordinary Supposition necessary to the Belief or Defence of it but only that which in the common Sense of Mankind is necessary to it For if you have expressed your
Comfort left that you are not the first Person who hath run himself into insuperable Difficulties as to Matters of Faith by this way of Ideas For Des Cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner He was a Person of a great Reach and Capacity and spent many Thoughts in laying the Foundations of Certainty from Ideas both as to Incorporeal and Corporeal Substances and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them His Demonstrations from his Ideas in his Metaphysical Meditations did not meet with the Entertainment he promised himself from the Inquisitive part of Mankind for his Objective Reality from his Idea gave no Satisfaction and his other Argument was thought to have no Force unless it were taken off from the Idea and placed upon the Necessity of Existence in the Nature of the Thing As to Corporeal Substances his fundamental mistake was in a wrong Idea of Matter which he made to be the same with Extension and upon this he built his Systeme of Nature But against this first false step many things were objected by his Adversaries as may be seen by the late Disputes in France about his Principles they objected that his Notion or Idea of Matter made it necessary and impossible for God to Annihilate it and his Defenders are driven to such shifts as to God's Will and Power that an indifferent Person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with Ideas as to the Ground of Certainty although neither himself nor his Followers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct Ideas But when they came to reconcile their Ideas with Matters of Faith they were so plunged that they could see no way to get through their Difficulties For as Monsieur Huet observes Although Des Cartes professes great submission to Divine Revelation yet when it came to the Trial he judged his Opinions could not be repugnant to it because he was certain of the Truth of them which shews that he judged of Revelation by his Rules of Certainty and whatever he pretended he did not take his Measures of Truth from Revelation A late Defender of Des Cartes in answer to this produces the Words used by him in his Principles wherein he owns That in case of Divine Revelation if God declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our Capacity as the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation he would not refuse to believe them although he could not clearly understand them This Monsieur Huet denies not viz. That he made such a general Profession of Submission to Revelation and owning the Mysteries of Faith but saith he when it comes to particular Points then Ideas are to be the Standard by which we are to judge of Revelation Monsieur Regis in his Reply saith That Matters of Faith and Philosophical Truths are of different kinds and that there can be no Contrariety but between things of the same kind Which makes him run into that great Absurdity that although in a Philosophical Sense God cannot do things repugnant to Reason yet in the Way of Faith he may and all this to preserve the Certainty by Ideas when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of Certainty than such a Supposition But another great Admirer of Des Cartes thinks this way unreasonable But Des Cartes he saith hath shewn the right Method of Certainty by clear and distinct Ideas and therefore he calls it no less than a Divine Certainty and he adds that Truth cannot be contrary to it self and he laughs at the Distinction of Philosophical and Theological Truths or the two ways of Certainty by Knowledge and Faith For Truth is always one and the same and changes not its Countenance and if Truth be an Agreement of Words with Things how can the same Words agree in one Book and differ in another for the same God is the Author of Truth where-ever it is and therefore he calls it A most absurd Opinion of those who say that God who is immutable should teach that as Truth in Philosophy which is false in Divinity But I return to you You seem to be not a little concerned that I say That as you have stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I had endeavoured to defend Such an Accusation you say brought into any Court in England would be thought to shew a great Inclination to have the Accused be suspected rather than any Evidence of being guilty of any thing and so would immediately be dismissed without hearing any Plea to it But you must give me leave to say that you have quite mistaken my Design which was not to accuse you but to shew my own Dissatisfaction as to the Way you had taken to clear your self I hoped you would have said so much for your own Vindication as would have satisfied the World that your Notion of Ideas was far from any Tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your Expressions But instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning And that made me to say That as you had stated it it may be of dangerous Consequence It may be say you this is no Evidence but only an Inclination to accuse you So far from it that it shewed an Inclination to favour you when I only said it may be for now you see that I think it is of such dangerous Consequence and I must think so till you have cleared it better But the Notion of Ideas as you have stated it relates to your whole Book Why should you carry it farther than I intended it The stating of it I mentioned was in your first Letter where you told us what you meant by Nature and Person But you have found out two Particulars wherein it may be of dangerous Consequence first in making so much use of the word Ideas and your placing Certainty in Ideas As to the Term of Ideas I have no Objection to the use of the word it self provided it be used in a common Sense and no Weight be laid upon it more than it can bear for I am for no new affected Terms which are apt to carry Mens Minds out of the way they are like Ignes fatui which seem to give Light but lead those that follow them into Bogs Like Fontanges which seem to set Peoples Heads that wear them higher but their Understandings are just what they were before I always dislik'd the Stoical Improvements by New Words or giving New Senses to Old ones But I told you I should never have mention'd this Way of Ideas but for the ill use I found made of them and you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction you had in them long enough unless I had found them imploy'd in doing Mischief Which as you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more that I fear
For the Nature of Man as in Peter is distinct from that same Nature as it is in Iames and Iohn otherwise they would be but One Person as well as One Nature And what Reply is made to this You cannot understand what this is a Proof of It is plain that I meant it of a Particular Subsistence and if you cannot for your Life understand such easie things how can I for my Life help it Read the Words over again which are before them and join them together And this is the Common Nature with a Particular Subsistence proper to each of them for the Nature of Man as in Peter is distinct from that same Nature as it is in Iames and Iohn But I am really ashamed to be put to explain such things I hope Ideas do not give another Turn to Common Sense But you say That otherwise they could not be three Persons is to prove it by a Proposition unintelligible to you because you do not yet apprehend what a Person is Of that in its proper place These Words of mine follow And this Distinction of Persons in them is discerned both by our Senses as to their different Accidents and by our Reason because they have a separate Existence not coming into it at once and in the same manner And is this unintelligible too You say It will hold as well for three Physical Atoms which are three distinct Individuals and have three distinct Natures in them as certainly as three distinct Men. But are three Atoms as much three Persons as three Men But you cannot discern the distinction by our Senses as to their Accidents nor by your Reason as to separate Existence because God might create them at once Therefore we cannot distinguish three Humane Persons that way In this Reasoning in the Way of Ideas Or in any Way Suppose we put the Common Nature of an Animal for the Common Nature of Man What follows Therefore three Animals are three distinct Persons as well as three Men I thought there was some cause for your Disliking the Common Principles and Methods of Reasoning I am forced to give but short touches at such things which I cannot answer more largely without being thought to make Marks of Distinction Come we now therefore to the Second Sense of Nature as it is taken abstractly without Respect to Individual Persons and then I said it makes an entire Notion of it self For however the same Nature may be in different Individuals yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same which appears from this evident Reason that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind Is this to be understood any better No. An entire Notion of it self is an Expression never met with before An entire Idea of it self had been very plain and easie but this is not to talk with Men in their own Dialect But if we put it so the Difficulty remains What Difficulty It then makes no more an entire Notion than the Nature of Peter Is it not the same Nature considered as common to all Individuals distinct from that Nature as in Peter I wish among all the Ways of inlarging Knowledge you could think of some new Way of conveying Notions into Mens Minds for I find your Way of Ideas will never do it For you cannot be brought one step beyond the first Cast of Ideas And you will not allow that which I give for an Evident Reason to prove any thing towards clear Apprehensions of one Common Nature But if Nature be one and the same in different Individuals then there must be one Common Nature which makes an entire Notion of it self If it be not one and the same then every Individual must make a Distinct Kind Can any thing be more evident But you give one common Answer I understand not any thing that is meant in this whole Paragraph as to the right Apprehension of one Common Nature And so I am very well content to leave it to the Reader 's Understanding And now I come at last to the Idea of a Person And here I am glad to find something you do understand Which is great News This say you I understand very well that supposing Peter James and John to be all three Men and Man being a Name for one Kind of Animals they are all of the same Kind Do you mean that they have the same common Essence or have only the same common Name If you mean the former there must be a common Nature if only the latter that cannot make them of the same Kind For Kind signifies nothing but a meer Name without it If it be asked you whether Men and Drills be of the same Kind or not Could you give no other Answer but that the Specifick Name Man stands for one sort and the Specifick Name Drill for the other and therefore they are not of the same Kind Are those Names arbitrary or are they founded on real and distinct Properties If they be arbitrary they have no other Difference but what a Dictionary gives them If they are founded on real and distinct Properties then there must be a real Difference of Kinds founded in Nature which is as much as I desire But to go on You understand too very well that Peter is not James and James is not John but that there is a Difference in these Individuals You understand also that they may be distinguished from each other by our Senses as to different Features and Distance of Place c. But what follows you say You do not understand viz. that supposing there were no such external Difference yet there is a Difference between them as Individuals of the same Nature For all that this comes to as far as you can understand is that the Ground of the Distinction between several Individuals in the same common Nature is that they are several Individuals in the same common Nature You understand it seems that they are several Individuals that Peter is not James and James is not John and the Question is what this Distinction is founded upon Whether upon our observing the Difference of Features Distance of Place c. or on some antecedent Ground I affirm that there is a Ground of the Distinction of Individuals antecedent to such accidental Differences as are liable to our Observation by our Senses And the Ground I go upon is this that the true Reason of Identity in Man is the vital Union of Soul and Body And since every Man hath a different Soul united to different Particles of Matter there must be a real Distinction between them without any respect to what is accidental to them For if Peter have a Soul and Body different from Iames and Iames from Iohn they must have different Principles of Individuation without any respect to Features or Place c. You say You cannot suppose a Contradiction viz. that there is no difference of Place between them But that is
not the Point whether when we consider them with respect to Place there can be such a thing as Identity of Place to two different Bodies But whether we cannot consider two several Individuals of Mankind without particular Regard to Place Which I say we may and for this Reason because Relation to Place is an external Difference but the real Distinction of Individuals doth not relate to any Accident of the Body because the Individual consists of the Union of Soul and Body and you cannot judge of the Existence of the Soul by the Place of the Body You say that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of Time we are sure be it what it will that it is that very thing and not another which at that Time exists in another Place how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other Respects And in this consists Identity But I think the Identity of Man depends neither upon the Notion of Place for his Body nor upon the Soul consider'd by it self but upon both these as actually united and making one Person Which to me seems so clear and intelligible that I can imagine no Objection against it I am certain you produce none My next Words are And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that Manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another In your Answer to this I pass over the trifling Exceptions about the Dissyllable Person and the true Idea and Signification of the articulate Sound and about here and herein c. being resolved to keep to what appears material And the only thing of that kind is that according to my Sense of Person it will as well agree to Bucephalus as to Alexander and the Difference will be as great between Bucephalus and Podargus as between Alexander and Hector all being several Individuals in the same common Nature but for your Part you cannot understand that Bucephalus and Podargus are Persons in the true signification of the Word Person in the English Tongue And whoever desired you should For I expresly say that a Person is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar Manner of Subsistence And again For a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature So that it is impossible to apply my Notion of Person to any irrational Creatures although they be Bucephalus and Podargus And I think a Man must strain hard to make such Objections so directly against that Idea of a Person which I set down And it is very easie to understand the Difference between a Distinction of Individuals as such and of intelligent Individuals and that Manner of Subsistence in them which makes them distinct Persons But you say that I affirm that an individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it and yet afterwards I make it to be the Definition of a Person that it is a compleat intelligent Substance To this I answer That in the former Place I give an Account of the Reason of Personality which I say lies in the Manner of Subsistence and not in the intelligent individual Substance which is rather supposed to the making of a Person For that which critically distinguishes the Person is the Reason of Personality but when we come to give a common Definition of it there is no such Necessity of insisting upon the Reason of the Difference but upon the common Acception of it Person And upon that Account I call it a complete intelligent Substance because although the Soul be so in it self yet we take Person with Relation to Soul and Body united together And so the Identity of Person must take in both not only here but at the Resurrection And thus I have gone through all that I could find that seem'd material in the Dialogue between you and your Friends as to this Subject and I assure you I have omitted nothing which I apprehended had any Appearance of Difficulty in it And I find not the least Reason to be unsatisfied in the Account I had given of the Difference of Nature and Person but I still think that it doth tend very much to the right Apprehension of the Doctrine of the Trinity as I hope doth farther appear by the foregoing Discourse And now to come to a Conclusion of this whole Debate For I intend not to draw this Saw any longer having done as much as I think sitting for my self to do I saw no Necessity of writing again for my own Vindication as to your first Charge which I was contended to leave to the Reader 's Judgment But in the Conclusion of my former Answer I had said That as you had stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I endeavour'd to defend This you call a new Charge against your Book and you complain that I do not specifie the Particulars wherein I apprehend it may be of such dangerous Consequence and you blame me for this saying without shewing that it is so and that all the Reason I give is that it is made use of by ill Men to do mischief that when I say it may be it shews only an Inclination to accuse and proves nothing that Danger may be apprehended where no Danger is that if any thing must be laid aside because it may be ill used you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept and lastly that the Imputation of a Tendency to Scepticism and to the overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith are no small Charge and that you cannot see any Argument I have brought that your Notion of Ideas tends to Scepticism These things laid together made me think it necessary to do that which I was unwilling 〈◊〉 do till you had driven me to it which was to shew the Reasons I had why I look'd on your Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them as inconsistent with it self and with some important Articles of the Christian Faith What I have now done I thought it my Duty to do not with respect to my self but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith which I do not charge you with opposing but with laying such Foundations as do tend to the Overthrow of them of which we have had too much Experience already and may have more if your Way of Certainty by Ideas should obtain Which I cannot think it will among such as are capable and willing to judge impartially I have now done with this Matter And as some may think it the first Part of Wisdom not to begin in such Disputes and I am of their Mind if they did not touch the Christian Faith so they cannot but judge it the next as I do to know when to make an End I am Sir Your
own Mind in your former Letter that must guide us in your Notion of Nature and Person where you undertook to explain them For if Nature and Person be abstract and complex Ideas as you say and such are only Acts of the Mind I do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation I do not go about to accuse you of denying these Doctrines I hope you do not But I impute all this Hesitancy and doubting only to your Notions of Ideas which you had been so long forming in your Mind that as it often happens in such Cases one darling favourite Notion proves too hard for some Points of far greater Consequence when they are found inconsistent with it And because you had first fixed your Notion of Ideas and taken much Pains about them you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them But you could not but find that the Articles of three Persons and one Nature and two Natures and one Person were not reconcileable with your Ideas of Nature and Person which is that they are complex Ideas which depend upon the Act of the Mind for this were to make the two Natures in Christ to be only two complex Ideas For if Nature as you say be a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex abstract Idea then two Natures can be nothing else but two such Collections or two abstracted and complex Ideas It may be said that when you make Nature an abstracted and complex Idea you speak of a specifick Idea but the Humane Nature in Christ was a particular Substance and this you assert to be a real thing and not to depend on the Act of the Mind But this doth not clear the Matter For in your former Letter you said that all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas which in Corporeal Substances are sensible Qualities in Incorporeal are Operations of the Mind The utmost then which the Idea of Humane Nature in Christ comes to is that there were in him the sensible Qualities and Intellectual Operations of a Man with an unknown Substance to support them which belongs not to the simple Ideas but is supposed by them This is all I can make of your way of Ideas and so the Incarnation of Christ is the assuming the sensible Qualities and intellectual Operations of a Man to which a Substratum doth belong but is no Part of the simple Ideas So that we can have no Idea at all of the Humane Nature of Christ but only an Inference that since those are but Accidents there must be a Substratum to support them and consequently there was a particular Substance in him made up of Mind and Body But if this had come in the Way of Ideas yet it cannot make out the Humane Nature of Christ. For if it were in him no otherwise than in other Men then the Mystery of the Incarnation is quite gone and Christ is to be consider'd but like other Men which doth not answer to what the Scripture saith of the Word 's being made Flesh and that God was manifest in the Flesh. There must be therefore something beyond the meer Humane Nature in him and either it must be only some Divine Operation upon and with it and that is no Substance or if it be a Substance it must either cohabit with it or else be united to it If it only co-habits then there are two Persons dwelling together in one Body and the Actions of one cannot be attributed to the other If there be a real Union between them so as the Acts belong to one Person then there must be such a Manner of Existence in the Humane Nature of Christ which is different from it in other Persons For in all others the Acts belong to the Humane Person but if it were so in Christ then the Divine Acts of Christ must flow from the Humane Nature as the Principle of them which is to confound the Divine and Humane Nature and Operations together If they come from the Divine Person then the Humane Nature must have another kind of Subsistence than it hath in others or else there must be two Persons and Person being as you say a Forensick Term there must be two different Capacities of Rewards and Punishments which is so absurd an Opinion as I think no one will assert If there be then but one Person and two Natures how can you possibly reconcile this to your Way of Ideas Person say you in it self signifies nothing but as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea then that is the true Idea of a Person i. e. Men may call a Person what they please for there is nothing but common use required to it They may call a Horse or a Tree or a Stone a Person if they think fit but since the common use of Language hath appropriated it to an Intelligent Being that is a Person And so you tell us That Person stands for a Thinking Intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection and can consider it self as it self the same thinking Being in different times and place How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else From whence comes Self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this Idea of a Person Whether it be true or false I am not now to enquire but how it comes into this Idea of a Person Hath the common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense If not this seems to be a meer Arbitrary Idea and may as well be denied as affirmed And what a fine pass are we come to in the Way of Ideas if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty But of that afterwards We now proceed in the Way of Ideas as you give it us But if this be the true Idea of a Person then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person For if an Intelligent Conscious Being be the Idea of a Person and the Divine and Human Nature be Intelligent Conscious Beings then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk for here must be two Persons in this Way of Ideas Again if this be the Idea of a Person then where there are three Persons there must be three distinct Intelligent Beings and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gone if this Way of Ideas hold So great a difference there is between forming Ideas first and then judging of Revelation by them and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds and interpreting the Sense of it by the due Measures of Reason You may pretend what you please that you hold the Assurance of Faith and the Certainty by
meant by these Archetypes in the Mind which cannot deceive us I confess here are such things said in order to Certainty which are above my Understanding if taken with respect to Things as how we cannot but be infallibly certain that all the Knowledge we attain concerning these Ideas is real and reaches things themselves and yet they are Archetypes of the Mind 's own making not intended to be the Copies of any thing nor referr'd to the Existence of any thing How can the Certainty by these Ideas reach the things themselves if they are Archetypes of the Mind not referr'd to the Existence of any thing But I suppose all this is meant of Mathematical Truths and so reaches not the Case which is concerning the Certainty of our Knowledge of things that really exist 3. You say there is another sort of complex Ideas which being referr'd to Archetypes without us may differ from them and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real Now these were the things we desired to be made certain in and to find out such Rules as would make our Knowledge real But for all that I can see the hopes of any Criterion is quite lost as to the Point in Question How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas know that they agree with the things themselves For upon these Grounds we can have no Certainty as to simple Ideas but only as to the Power of making Impressions on our Senses but as to complex Ideas as of Substances our Knowledge about them may come short of being real i. e. we cannot arrive to Certainty about them in the way of Ideas because they may differ from the Archetypes without us And you confess that our Ideas are not very exact Copies and yet are the Subjects of real as far as we have any Knowledge of them which will not be found to reach very far But to make it real concerning Substances the Ideas must be taken from the real Existence of things And if our complex Ideas may deceive us as to the things from whence they are supposed to be taken what an Account of Certainty in the way of Ideas is here And yet you conclude this Chapter in that Triumphant manner I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty real Certainty consists which whatever it was to others was to me heretofore one of those Desiderata's which I found great want of And for all that I can see may do so still For here is nothing said to distinguish the strong Impressions of Fancy from the Appearances of things from that Certainty of Knowledge which comes from the things themselves For a confident Opiniator will talk with greater Assurance of the Agreement and Disagreement of things with his Ideas than a Man of far greater Judgment and more Modesty And you have given us no Rules to make a difference between Opinion and rational Certainty especially when the Ideas of Fancy are found to agree with one another But I shall go a step farther to shew that the Agreement of Ideas is no Ground of Certainty and that from a Supposition relating to the present Case We have seen how possible it is for an ingenious Person skilled in the Phaenomena of Nature to contrive such an Hypothesis that one Part may agree with another so as that no discernible Inconsistency may be found in it and yet all this may be built on such a Foundation as cannot be consistent with your Certainty by Ideas nay such as you are certain cannot be true The Hypothesis I mean is that of Des Cartes for allowing him his Laws of Motion and his three Elements the Phaenomena of Nature or the Ideas of it agree with one another and yet all this is built upon Space being the same with Body and consequently that there can be no Vacuum upon which his Laws of Motion and his Solution of the Phaenomena is all built And therefore when a learned Man of our own objected that to him and thought it of no great Consequence to his Philosophy he replied with some smartness that he was mistaken for he took it for one of the most certain Principles of his Philosophy What Certainty then can there be in Ideas when so absurd a Principle as that shall be look'd on by so great a Man as so certain a thing in the Way of Ideas as to build his whole System of Natural Philosophy upon it And his followers to this day stifly defend it who are otherwise ingenious Men. Nothing now remains to be answer'd in your second Letter but what relates to the Defence of what I had said in my Book concerning Nature and Person For I cannot but observe that instead of clearing some pressing Difficulties in my Answer to your former Letter you run back to my Book and begin a new Critique upon that Part of it and take in the help of some ingenious Persons of your Acquaintance to whom I must shew so much Civility as to take notice of their Objections Which I shall the rather do because the Doctrine of the Trinity is expressed in the first Article of our Religion by one Nature and three Persons and so it hath been understood by the Christian Church long before And it is the Sense of the Christian Church which I am bound to defend and no particular Opinions of my own You tell me that there hath not been one of your Acquaintance who owned that he understood my Meaning but confessed that the farther he look'd into what I had said the more he was at a loss about Nature and Person But I hope I am not to answer for other Men's want of Understanding in these Matters which requires greater Application of Mind than most Men are willing to allow themselves about them But I am to judge no otherwise of their Sense and Capacity than as you have represented them One said I began with giving two significations of the word Nature One of them as it stood for Properties and this he understood but the other wherein Nature was taken for the thing it self wherein those Properties were he said he did not understand But he said he was not very well acquainted with Greek and Aristotle was brought to explain and settle the Sense of Nature But why did not this Gentleman in the first Place consider what it was I undertook to shew which was that we had an Idea of Nature which came not in by our Senses and in the very next words I said That Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent and so that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties is the Nature whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual Substances And although by Sensation and Reflection we know the Powers and Properties of things yet it is by Reason we are satisfied there must be such a Nature or Substance because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves Methinks if the
Gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him you should have helped him out by your relative Ideas For hard things go down much better with some Men's minds in the Way of Ideas which is a sort of gilding the Pills and I doubt not but you could have satisfied him that the Understanding may by virtue of a relative Idea be very well satisfied of the Being of Nature as well as Substance when I declared that I took them to be of equal Extent as they were the Subject of Powers and Properties But he saith that this he understood not because Nature extended to things that were not Substances Did I not say that Nature was sometimes taken only for Properties but that there must be another Sense proved because there must be a Subject wherein these Properties are and in that respect I said that Nature and Substance were of equal Extent But he doth not understand the Deduction Aristotle takes Nature for a corporeal Substance therefore Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent What a hard Fate doth that Man lie under that falls into the hands of a severe Critick He must have a care of his But and For and Them and It For the least Ambiguity in any of these will fill up Pages in an Answer and make a Book look considerable for the Bulk of it And what must a Man do who is to answer to all such Objections about the Use of Particles But let any indifferent Reader judge how I am used in this Place My words are Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance which had the Principles of Motion in it self but Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent Doth not any Man of Common Sense see that I oppose this to Aristotle's Sense of Nature for a Corporeal Substance He confines it to that only I say That it is of equal Extent with Substance whether Bodily or Spiritual and those very words follow after If you had really such a Conversation with a Gentleman I am sorry for him and I think you did not deal so like a Gentleman by him to expose him thus to the World But I perceive he is a Philosopher too for he proves That Aristotle 's Notion of Nature for a Corporeal Substance will not hold Did I ever say that it would I am far enough from thinking that a Corporeal Substance hath a Principle of Motion from it self but might not I mention Aristotle's taking Nature for a Substance although I presently add his Sense was too short and narrow because Nature and Substance were of equal extent But did not his Notion of Nature imply that it was a Principle of Motion in it self Whatever Aristotle thought the Notion of Nature doth not depend upon a Principle of Motion from it self but it was considered not as in it self as the Cause but in it self as the Subject And that Philosophical Gentleman might be pleased to consider that Aristotle did not make Motion to arise from Matter but asserted it to come from a first Mover and said That those Philosophers talked like Men not well in their Wits who attributed Motion to Matter of it self as I could easily prove if it were needful And methinks you should not have been such a Stranger to Aristotle to let your Acquaintance run into such Blunders and then to print them for them But the Gentleman is farther plunged and knows not how to get out He cannot for his Life understand Nature to be Substance and Substance to be Nature Where lies the Difficulty Is the Repugnancy in the Words or in the Sense Not in the Words or Sense either in Greek or Latin For the Greek if I may have leave to mention that Language in this Case those who have been very well acquainted with the force of Words therein have made Nature of the same importance with Substance So Hesychius renders it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Substance but I shall not bring the Testimony of Criticks but of Philosophers And Aristotle may be allowed to understand his own Language he saith positively 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Substance is called Nature and the Reason he gives for it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because Nature is a Substance It may be said That Aristotle said this because he took Nature for such a Substance as had the Power of Motion in it self I do not deny but he look'd on that as the proper Acception of Nature but from hence it follows that whatever Substance had such a Principle of Motion in it self was truly and properly Nature not as exclusive of a Superiour Principle of Motion but as having an internal self-moving Principle And herein Aristotle differed from some modern Philosophers who make all Motion to come from the Impulse of another Body and to be a meer Mode of Matter continued from one Body to another I confess Aristotle was of another Opinion from those Gentlemen and look'd on Motion as an Effect of an inward Principle and not meerly of an External Impulse but whether Aristotle were mistaken herein is not the Question and it is possible he was not however it plainly appears that Substance with a Power of Motion in it self and Nature had the same Sense and none of those who have been the most severe Criticks upon Aristotle have disputed that I remember against this Sense of Nature in him One of them finds this fault that it was but a Repetition of what he had said in his Physicks where he doth likewise treat of the Sense of Nature And there he takes it for such a Substance which hath the Principle of Motion and Rest within it self and by it self which he opposes to artificial things as a Bed or a Garment And as much as this Definition hath been run down by some Men if we set aside some affected Obscurity in his Philosophical Writings there is no such Absurdity in it when he explains himself not to understand it of meer Local Motion or change of Place but of all Alterations incident to Bodies So that Nature in his Sense was a Substance endued with a Principle of Life and Action And all those things which did partake of Nature in this Sense he said were Substances 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For Nature is always a Subject and in a Subject i. e. the Substance it self is Nature and that which is in it is according to Nature And this Sense of Aristotle Plutarch relies upon as the true Notion of Nature which he saith is the Principle of Motion and Rest because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it But Plutarch by no means approves of those Mens Opinion who made Nature to be an Original Self-moving Principle For saith he Matter of it self cannot move without an Efficient Cause no more than any Metal can frame it self into a particular Form without an Artificer
From whence we see that Aristotle's Notion of Nature was very consistent with an Efficient Cause of Nature But your Gentleman saith That to those who admit not Matter and Motion to be Eternal no Nature in that Sense will be left since Nature is said to be a Corporeal Substance which hath the Principles of Motion in it self and such a sort of Corporeal Substance those Men have no Notion of at all and consequently none of Nature which is such a Corporeal Substance But if Aristotle did not suppose Matter to move it self without an Efficient Cause as certainly he did not then all this falls to the Ground and his Notion of Nature for a Substantial Principle of Life and Action may remain good But it may be said That this was one of his singular Notions and that no other Philosophers took it so Which is so far from being true that a great Enemy of Aristotle's confesses That the Name of Nature among the Writers before him extended to all kinds of Beings and not only to Individual but to Specifick Natures Aristotle's fault lay in applying Nature only to Corporeal Substances and whatever was above them he look'd on as above Nature but the Pythagoreans and Platonists took Nature to extend to Spiritual as well as Bodily Substances Which appears by Timaeus Locrus his Book of Nature in the beginning whereof he divides Things into two kinds Intellectual and Corporeal and the former whose Nature was more excellent he derives immediately from the best Principle viz. God himself But to make this plainer we are to consider that there were four Opinions among the Old Philosophers about Nature Some held Nature to be the same with Matter and attributed the Beginning of all things to that alone such were the followers of Anaximander and Democritus Others rejected this Doctrine as absurd and impious and held a Divine Being above Matter which gave the beginning to Motion and framed the World and they asserted Spiritual as well as Corporeal Natures and these were the followers of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras Others asserted the Beginning of Motion and of the World from a first Cause but confined the Sense of Nature to the Course of things established in this Visible World by an Universal Providence at first And this was the Notion of Aristotle and his followers to the time of Strato who attributed all to meer Nature Lastly there were some who made Nature to be the first Principle which formed all things which sometimes they called God and sometimes Nature as is obvious in all the Writings of the Stoicks Vis illum Naturam vocare non peccabis saith Seneca and in another place Quid aliud est Natura quam Deus divina Ratio and again Nec Deus sine Naturâ est nec Natura sine Deo sed idem est utrumque which he elsewhere calls Incorporalis Ratio ingentium operum Artifex With which Balbus in Cicero agrees when he defines Nature from Zeno to be an Intelligent Fire that produces all things For what he calls Ignem artificiosum ad gignendum c. Laertius calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and it is called in Cicero Natura Artifex Consultrix Provida c. which can agree to nothing but a Spiritual Substance and when he explains what Nature is he saith That Epicurus called all by the Name of Nature and divided it into Matter and Vacuity and the Accidents of both but we saith he of the Stoicks by Nature understand no Inanimate Things which have no Principle within to unite them as Earth and Stones but a living Substance as an Animal in which is no Chance but Order and Contrivance And so Plato said That Nature ordered all things with Reason and Vnderstanding By which he understood the Divide Being If we come lower down among the Philosophers we shall find Nature taken for a Principle of Life So Sextus Empiricus distinguishes the Union of Matter in Stones and Wood from that which is in Plants and this he calls Nature which is the lowest degree of it for afterwards he speaks of Rational and Intellectual Natures and places God in the head of them Antoninus distinguishes Nature in Plants from a heap of the Particles of Matter in Wood and Stone But in another place he distinguishes that which is meer Nature in Man viz. what he hath in common with Plants from the Nature of an Animal in him and that again from the Nature of a Rational Creature in him Here indeed he speaks of the Properties of those Natures but he still supposes that where they are separate they are founded in distinct Substances So that I hope if the Philosophers of old of all kinds did understand the Sense of Nature and Substance the Gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory Humour of saying That for his Life he cannot understand Nature to be Substance nor Substance to be Nature For they all agreed in this however they differed in their Opinions of Nature But I have something farther to add concerning the Sense of the Christian Church in this Matter which I think is by no means to be despised It is observed by Damascen that some of the Philosophers made this difference between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the former was taken for simple Essence but the latter for Essence with a Specifical Difference but that the Christian Writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one as an Angel a Man a Horse c. So St. Chrysostom calls Angels 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Theodoret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 St. Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but they all agree that Incorporeal and Invisible Substances are real Natures And the Reason Damascen gives is That they have both the same Original and you know that it is a good way to find out the true Idea for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both which are the same So that if Real Existence belong to Substance and Nature hath its Name from thence too then Substance and Nature must be of the same Importance And this Notion of Nature they do not take up meerly from the Etymology of the Word but from the Sense of it in Scripture as when St. Paul saith They worshipped those which by Nature are no Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Alexandrian Copy hath it more clearly i. e. which are not really and substantially Gods They had the Names of Gods and the Divine Properties were attributed to them but because they had not the Divine Essence they are said not to be Gods by Nature And what Sense would this Gentleman make of the Apostle's words who cannot for his Life understand that Nature is the same
with Substance He must understand this only of the Properties which belong to God But these Properties must be somewhere and so a Substance must be supposed as the Subject of them and what Reason can there be to exclude that which is the Subject of those Properties For there must be a Divine Being as well as Properties and that Being must have Essential Properties belonging to it and what imaginable Reason can there be why that should not be called the Divine Nature And if it be then Substance and Nature are the same I might easily pursue this farther but I design to bring things into as little a compass as I can But it may be there is something in our own Language which hinders Nature from being taken for a Substance and for this I appeal to a late Ingenious and Honourable Person and Philosopher of our own I mean Mr. Boyle who hath written a Philosophical Enquiry into the Notion of Nature and he tells us of the various Acceptations of it 1. For the Author of Nature 2. For the Essence of a Thing 3. For what comes to Men by Birth as a Man is Noble by Nature 4. For an Internal Principle of Motion as that a Stone is carried downwards by Nature 5. For the established course of things as that Nature makes the Night to succeed the Day 6. For an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Living Body as that Nature is strong or weak 7. For the System of the Universe as when we say of a Chimaera there is no such thing in Nature 8. For a Semi-Deity which is the Notion he opposes But we may observe that he allows God and all the real Beings of the Vniverse to have Nature belonging to them and he saith The Word Essence is of great Affinity to it if not of an adequate Import But the Real Essence of a thing is a Substance and therefore Nature and Substance are of the like Importance The next thing fit to be considered is How far your Certainty by Ideas and the Certainty by Reason differ from each other The occasion of this Debate stands thus I had said in my Book That I granted that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas In answer to this you said That you can find no Opposition between Ideas and Reason but Ideas are the Objects of the Vnderstanding and Vnderstanding is one of the Faculties imployed about them To which I replied No doubt of it But you might easily see that by Reason I understood Principles of Reason allow'd by Mankind which I think are very different from Ideas But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of or one as obscure as that of Substance If there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the Manner of Expression I do not go about to defend it but the worst of it is That your Idea of Reason is as obscure as that of Substance And whether there were not a just Occasion for it the Reader must judge when the Faculty was put for the Principles of Reason Could any Man judge otherwise but that you had a very obscure Idea of Reason who could mistake the Vnderstanding for it But Reason you say taken for the Faculty is as different from Ideas in your Apprehension But what is that to the Point in Dispute whether the Notion of Nature be to be taken from Ideas or from Reason You say the Vnderstanding is imploy'd about them And what then I shewed that the Nature of things belongs to Reason and not to bare Ideas because Ideas come in by Sensation and Reflection by which we come to know the Powers and Properties of things but we cannot come to know the Notion of Nature as the Subject of them but by this Reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves And is this no more than to say the Vnderstanding is imployed about Ideas But now you answer farther That if Reason be taken for the Faculty or the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind Reason and Ideas may consist together This leads me to the Examination of that which may be of some use viz. To shew the Difference of your Method of Certainty by Ideas and the Method of Certainty by Reason And the Way of Certainty by Reason lies in two things 1. The Certainty of Principles 2. The Certainty of Deductions As to the former the Gentleman your Defender in your Book saith That in your Essay in more places than one you have spoken and that pretty largely of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims so that if I have ever read them I cannot doubt but you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason What Ideas you have of them must appear from your Book And I do there find a Chapter of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims which I cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it which is thus summed up in the Conclusion viz. That it was to shew That these Maxims as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are not clear and distinct And is not this a fair way to convince me that your Way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason when the Way of Reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon General Principles and you assert them to be Vseless and Dangerous Your first Design you say is to prove that the Consideration of these General Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge which overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonstration and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason To make this plain I shall put a Case grounded upon your Words which are that you have discoursed with very rational Men who have actually denied that they are Men. These Words I. S. understands as spoken of themselves and charges them with very ill Consequences but I think they are capable of another meaning However let us put the Case that Men did in earnest question whether they were Men or not and then I do not see if you set aside general Maxims how you can convince them that they are Men. For the way I look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason As in the first place that Nothing can have no Properties which I take to be the Fundamental Principle of Certainty as to real Beings For all our inward Perceptions are only of some Acts or Properties as of Thinking Doubting Reasoning c. and if a Man
appear from your self which will farther discover the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas And the Reasons I go upon are these 1. That you confess that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident 2. That there may be contradictory Opinions about some Ideas which you account most clear and distinct 3. That granting the Ideas to be true there is no Self-evidence of the Connexion of them which is necessary to make a Demonstration 1. That some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident by your own Confession Among these you cannot deny those of Matter and Motion of Time and Duration and of Light to be very considerable But I shall prove from your self that we can have no Intuition of these things which are so obvious to us and consequently can have no Self-evident Ideas of them As to the Idea of Matter That you tell us consists in a solid Substance every where the same and a Body is a solid extended figured Substance Now there are two things concerning Matter which I would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of And those are 1. The Manner of Cohesion of the Parts of Matter concerning which you have these Words For since no Body is no farther nor otherwise extended than by the Vnion and Cohesion of its solid Parts we shall very ill comprehend the Extension of Body without understanding wherein consists the Vnion and Cohesion of its Parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the Manner of Thinking and how it is performed I would have any one intelligibly explain to me how the Parts of Gold or Brass that but now in fusion were as loose from one another as the Particles of Water or the Sands of an Hour-glass come in a few Moments to be so united and adhere so strongly one to another that the utmost force of Men's Arms cannot separate them A considering Man will I suppose be here at a loss to satisfie his own or another Man's Vnderstanding And can you then imagine that we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter Or that it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it by the help of any intervening Idea The Idea of Solidity or firm Cohesion of Parts cannot be said to come from the Idea of Matter it self for then there could be no such thing as fluid Matter Whence then comes the distinction between these Ideas of solid and fluid Matter That there is such a Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter is evident now what other Ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident how this Solidity and Matter came to have this Agreement with each other Is it by the Density or Compactedness of the Matter in a little Compass But that is as hard to give an account of viz. how some Parts of Matter come to take up so much less Room and to stick closer than others Is it by bare Rest of the Parts But how comes the Resistance of solid Bodies to come only from Rest Is it from the Pressure of the Ambient Air No you say that in Truth the Pressure of an ambient Fluid how great soever can be no intelligible Cause of the Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter So that we are not to look for any thing like a Demonstration of the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter 2. And as little are we to expect it as to the Divisibility of it which was the other thing I hoped to find demonstrated in the Way of Ideas For you tell us that the Notion of Body is cumbred with some Difficulties which are very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us And among these you particularly instance in the Divisibility of Matter which you say whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum it involves us in Consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent Consequences that carry greater Difficulty and more apparent Absurdity than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance So that I think it is vain to expect a Demonstration in the Way of Ideas as to this Matter The next is that of Motion Concerning which you tell us that the Definition of the Schools is exquisite Iargon That of the Atomists is but putting one Synonymous Word for another viz. that Motion is a Passage from one Place to another for Passage may as well be defined a Motion from one Place to another And the Cartesian Definition that it is the successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another will not prove a much better Definition of Motion when well examin'd And what is there so evident as Motion So that if our Ideas fail us in so plain a Case what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our Senses As to Time and Duration you say that the Answer of a great Man to one who asked what Time was Si non rogas intelligo which amounts to this the more I set my self to consider it the less I understand it might perhaps perswade one that Time which reveals all other things is it self not to be discover'd This shews that there is no Self-evident Idea of Time But here you offer to furnish us with as clear and distinct Ideas as of many other which are thought much less obscure However then it is plain that we have not the Knowledge by Intuition but by rational Deduction For you proceed from the Idea of Succession to that of Duration by observing a Distance in the Parts of Succession and then from observing Periodical Motions we get Ideas of the Measures of Duration as Minutes Hours Days Years c. From hence we proceed to imagine Duration not yet come and such to which we can always add from which comes the Idea of Eternity and by considering any Part of Duration with Periodical Measures we come to the Idea of what we call Time in general So that the Idea of Time in general is so far from being known by Intuition that many Steps are to be taken in order to it and some such as one would hardly have thought of As how the Idea of Succession should arise from a Train of Ideas in our Minds You say it is because we have no Perception of Duration but by considering the Train of Ideas that take their Turns in our Vnderstandings What think you of those People that fail'd not in reckoning the Succession of Time right for many Years together by Knots and Notches on Sticks and Figures without ever so much as thinking of Ideas or any thing like them But besides such Arbitrary Measures of Time what need any Recourse to Ideas when the Returns of Days and Months and Years by the Planetary Motions are so easie and so universal If a Man hath no Perception of Duration when he sleeps yet the Time runs on and Nights
them have a particular Turn of their understandings about these Matters For I cannot but think that those who were not very rational Men might understand the Difference between Men and Horses without being told that although Horses might be called by their Names yet that these were real Men and their Constitution and Nature was conformable to that Idea which the general Name Man stands for But this is no more than to say that he that has the Nature of a Man is a Man or what has the Nature of a Drill is a Drill and what has the Nature of a Horse is a Horse whether it be called Peter or not called Peter If this were really the Discourse of your Friends in private Conversation you have been very obliging to them to publish it to the World For Mankind are not so stupid as not to know a Man from a Horse or a Drill but only by the Specifick Name of Man You may have a Horse called Peter if you please and another Iames and a third Iohn but for all that there is no one that hath the Understanding of a Man but will be able without your Specifick Names to tell the Difference of your Horse Peter from your Man Peter and call them by what Names you please the Difference will not depend upon them but upon the Essential Properties which belong to them and so it will be owned by all that have not this New turn of their Vnderstandings But I plainly see that a new Notion when it hath got deep into a Man's Head doth give a strange Turn to his Understanding so that he cannot see that which every one else can that hath not the same Tincture upon his Mind And I remember an Observation of yours How dangerous it is to a Man's Reason to fix his Fancy long upon one sort of Thoughts These Ideas are a very odd sort of Spectacles to our Understandings if they make them see and understand less than People of very ordinary Capacities do For even the Man who had the Horse with the Name Peter and might have others by the Names of James and John would not a little wonder at a grave Philosopher that should seriously say to him You see Friend that your Horses have the Names of Men how do you know but that they are Men Know saith the Country-man I hope you are wiser than to ask me such a Question Or what do you take me for if I cannot tell the Difference of Men from Horses whatever Names they have Do not tell me of your Specifick Names and Conformity to your Ideas I know well enough the Difference between my Horse Peter and my Man Peter without such Gibberish My Man Peter and I can sit and chop Logick together about our Country Affairs and he can Write and Read and he is a very sharp Fellow at a Bargain but my Horse Peter can do none of these things and I never could find any thing like Reason in him and do you think I do not know the Difference between a Man and a Beast I pursue this no farther lest the Country-man should be too rude to the Gentlemen with whom you had this Learned Conversation about the Difference of Men and Horses and Drills But you or your Friend or both are very hard set again about a Common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each Person For such is your Misfortune you say that for your Life you cannot find it out This is a hard Case before for your Life you could not understand Nature and Substance to be the same and now again for your Life you cannot find out this Where lies the monstrous Difficulty of it You say You repeated and this twenty times to your self and your weak Vnderstanding always Rejolts At what My Words are Nature may be considered as it is in distinct Individuals as the Nature of Man is equally in Peter Iames and Iohn And this is the common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them You say That the Nature of Man in Peter is the Nature of a Man if Peter be supposed to be a Man but if it be the Name of a Horse your Knowledge vanishes Cannot you for your Life know the Difference between a Man and a Horse by their Essential Properties whatever their Names be If so there is a greater turn of Mens Vnderstandings than I imagined But again say you Let it be impossible to give that Name to a Horse who ever said or thought so yet you cannot understand these Words the common Nature of a Man is in Peter for whatsoever is in Peter exists in Peter and whatever exists in Peter is particular but the common Nature of Man is the general Nature of Man or else you understand not what is meant by Common Nature and it confounds your Vnderstanding to make a General a Particular To this I answer That the Common Nature of Man may be taken two ways In the way of Ideas and in the way of Reason In your way of Ideas it is not at all to be wondered at that you cannot understand such a Common Nature as I spake of which subsists in several Persons because you say You can have no Ideas of Real Substances but such as are Particular all others are only Abstract Ideas and made only by the Act of the Mind But I say That in the Way of Reason you may come to a better understanding of this Matter Which is by considering the Nature of Beings and the Causes of the Differences amongst the several kinds of them I had told you before in my Answer to your first Letter that we are to consider Beings as God hath ordered them in their several Sorts and Ranks and that he hath distinguished them by Essential Properties from each other as appears by Mankind and Brutes and Plants And that although the Individuals of the several kinds agree in Essential Properties yet there is a real Difference between them in several Accidents that belong to them as to Time Place Qualities Relations c. Now that wherein they agree is the Common Nature and that wherein they differ is the Particular Subsistence And if this be so hard to be understood why was it not answered here in the proper place for it is not that a Real Nature that is the Subject of Real Properties Is not that Nature really in all those who have the same Essential Properties And therefore the Common Nature of Man must exist in Peter because he is a Man and so in Iames and Iohn and yet every one of these is so distinguished from the other that we may justly say he hath a Particular Subsistence with that Common Nature And this is no making a General a Particular but distinguishing one from the other which is a Distinction so easie and necessary that I cannot but wonder at those who say that for their Lives they cannot find it out I had said