of Wills did not Originally belong to the Spiritual Courts de jure they had that Authority per consensum Regis Magnatum And as those Courts had not original Iurisdiction in such Cases so they had no power to grant Administration 'till enabled by the Statute of Edw. 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. 3. For before that time the Kings of England by their proper Officers solebant capere bona intestatorum in manus suas 'T is plain that the Ordinary had no power by the Common Law over an Intestate's Estate for he could not maintain an Action to recover any part of it now if the Law had given him a power over the Goods it would likewise have given him an Authority or Remedy to recover them An Action would have lain against him at the Common Law 13 E. 1. cap. 19. and by the Statute of Edw. 1. which was made in affirmance thereof if he had possessed himself of such Goods and refused to pay the Debts Then since he hath no original Power in this Case and this being a special kind of Administration when he hath once executed that power he shall not repeal it and the Court enclined to that Opinion vid. 9 Rep. Henslow's Case DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683. Roe versus Sir Thomas Clargis IN a Writ of Error Papist is actionable Raymond 482. upon a Iudgment in the Common-Pleas in an Action upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declar'd That the King had made him one of his Privy Council in Ireland and that he was a Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Middlesex and had serv'd in several Parliaments for the Burrough of Christ-Church in Hampshire and that the King having summon'd a Parliament to meet at Westminster he did stand to be a Member of that Burrough and that the Defendant Roe did then speak these words of him Viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is a Papist Vpon a Tryal there was a Verdict and a Iudgment for the Plaintiff This Case was argued by Sir Francis Winnington for the Plaintiff in the Errors and by Mr. Roger North for the Defendant The Questions were these 1. Whether the words abstracted from the Offices set forth in this Declaration were actionable or not 2. Whether they are actionable as joined to those Capacities The Councel for the Plaintiff in the Errors held the Negative in both Points 1. The word Papist is not defin'd either by the Common Law or the Statutes of this Realm for from the first of the Queen to the 25 Car. 2. it is not to be found what a Papist is There are several Statutes between those times which provide against the Iurisdiction of the Pope and which inflict particular Punishments upon committing Offences therein prohibited but none of those Laws give any definition of a Papist If by a Papist is meant him who embraces the Doctrine of the Pope it was punishable before the Reformation to be of a contrary Opinion Now in the vulgar acceptation of the word a man may hold the same Opinion with the Church of Rome and yet not profess the Popish Religion so as to bring himself in danger of any of the Penalties in these Laws There was never yet an Indictment against a person for being a Papist but many have been indicted upon the breach of those Laws made against Recusants by which they incurred the Penalties thereby appointed In Michaelmas 27 H. 8. 27 H. 8. 14. B. an Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas for calling of the Plaintiff Heretick and Willoughby the King's Serjeant argued That the Action would not lye because the word did import a Spiritual Matter of which the Temporal Courts had no knowledge and of that Opinion were the Chief Justice Fitzherbert and Justice Shelley The same may be said in this Case that the word Papist relates to something which is Spiritual of which this Court hath no cognizance Words which are actionable must immediately injure the person of whom they are spoken either in his Profession or bring him in danger of some Punishment Hob. 8. as to call an Attorney Bribing Knave which are adjectively spoken yet 't is an Injury done to him in his Profession It was said at the Trial in the Common-Pleas That 't is actionable to call a Man Papist at this time though it might not be so at another time This seems to be a very vain assertion for though the Times may alter the Law is still the same It would be a very great inconvenience if Men should be deterr'd by Actions to call another Man a Papist for this would be an encouragement to Popery and a check upon the Protestant Religion to punish the Professors thereof for saying a Man is a Papist who is really so both in his Iudgment and Profession But admitting the word to be actionable Not actionable to call a man Papist Cro. Eliz. 191. 't is not so before Conviction for 't is very improperly used and of no signification or discredit before that time 2. These words are not actionable as coupled with his Offices because he hath alledged no particular damage or Loss and his Offices are only Honorary and of no Profit and therefore he could receive no Damage by speaking these words if true when they in no sort relate to his Offices and are too remote to be applied to them 1. E contra The words are actionable in themselves for they scandalize the Plaintiff in his Reputation and may be a means to bring him to corporal Punishment for by several Acts of Parliament many Punishments are inflicted upon Popish Recusants which is the same thing with a Papist they are disabled from holding any Office or Imployment in the Kingdom they are not to come into the Kings presence or within five Miles of the City of London and the calling of him Papist subjects him to the danger of being Indicted for a Traytor for the words are Synonimous When H. 8. took upon him the Supremacy which the Pope had unlawfully Vsurped there were certain Papists in those days who called themselves Roman Catholicks that they might be distinguished from those who bore Allegiance to their lawful King which general appellation was afterwards changed into the word Papist so that both signifie the same thing The Objection that tho Times change the Law is still the same may receive this Answer That when the force of words is changed with the Times those words shall be actionable now which were not so at another time As for Example the proper and genuine signification of the word Knave is a Servant but now the Times have altered the sense of that word and made it to be a term of Reproach so that 't is actionable to call an Attorny Knave who is but a Servant to his Client 1. Then as to the Objection that the word Papist is not defin'd in our Law There is a Statute which disables a
upon the Estate which Affidavit was produced in Court but not suffered to be read but as a Note or Letter unless the Plaintiff would produce a Witness to swear that he was present when the Oath was taken before the Master And an Objection was made to the Settlement it self which recited That whereas a Marriage was intended to be had between the said Edmund Goodier and Elizabeth Mees now in consideration thereof and of a Portion he conveyed the said Mannor to the Feoffees to the use of himself for life and after his decease to the use of the said Elizabeth for life but doth not say from and after the Solemnization of the said Marriage so that if she had not married Mr. Goodier yet after his decease she would have enjoyed the Estate for life Vpon the whole matter the Iury found for the Defendant Dominus Rex versus Coney and Obrian THE Defendants were convicted for the Murder of Mr. Murder was pardoned by the name Felonica interfectio and held good 10 E. 3. c. 3. 13 R. 2. c. 1. Tyrrwhite and Mr. Forster in a Duel and now pleaded their Pardon in which there was a Clause Non obstante the Statute of Ed. 3. which appoints him that hath a Pardon of Felony to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour before it shall be allowed and another Non obstante to the Statute of R. 2. which enacts that if the Offence be not specified in the Pardon it shall not be allowed Now the Word Murdrum was not in this Pardon the Offence was expressed by these general Words Felonica interfectione and whether it did extend to pardon Murder was the Question Mr. Astry the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that one Alexander Montgomery of Eglington pleaded the like Pardon for Murder but it was held insufficient and the Court gave him time to get his Pardon amended which was done likewise in this Case The Defendants came again on another day and Councel being allowed to plead for them insisted that the Pardon was good and that the Murder was sufficiently pardoned by these Words that it is in the power of the King to pardon by general Words and his intent did plainly appear to pardon the Defendants That the murther of a person is rightly expressed by felonious killing though not so properly as by the word Murdrum it self the omission of which word will not make the Pardon void And to prove this he cited the Sheriff of Norfolk's Case 2 R. 3. 7. a. who was indebted to the King during the time he was Sheriff and was pardoned by the Name of J. W. Esquire who was the same person de omnibus debitis computis c. Afterwards he was charged in the Exchequer for 100 l. where he pleaded this Pardon and it was held good though he was not named Sheriff and so not pardoned by the name of his Office yet the Kings intention appearing in his Charter and having pardoned him by his right Name that was sufficient and in that Case the King himself was concerned in point of interest The Books all agree More 752. Lucas's Case 8 Co. 18. 3 Inst 234. that before the Statute of R. 2. the King might pardon Murder by the word Felony now this Prerogative being incident to the Crown and inseparable from the person of the King was not designed to be wholly restrained by that Act for the Parliament only intended that by specifying the Offence in the Pardon the King should be rightly informed of the nature of it and when he understands it to be Murder he would not grant a Pardon But admitting his power to be restrained by that Statute Stamf. 101. yet a Non obstante is a dispensation of it and therefore this Pardon ought to be allowed The Pardon was held good by the whole Court And Jefferies the Chief Justice said that he had proposed this Case to all the Judges of England Sid. 366. and they were all of the same Opinion and that he remembred Dudley's Case where a Pardon in general words was allowed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683 4. Brason versus Dean A Covenant upon a Charter Party for the Freight of a Ship A thing lawful to be done when the party did covenant to do it and afterwards prohibited the Covenant is binding The Defendant pleaded that the Ship was loaded with French Goods prohibited by Law to be imported and upon Demurrer Judgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Court were all of Opinion That if the thing to be done was lawful at the time when the Defendant did enter into the Covenant though it was afterwards prohibited by Act of Parliament yet the Covenant is binding Barnes versus Edgard TRespass for breaking his Close and impounding of his Cattle Where Damages are under 40 s. the Plaintiff must have ordinary Costs Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict but Damages under 40 s. Whereupon Mr. Livesay the Secondary refused to tar full Costs alledging it to be within the Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. by which 't is Enacted 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 9. That in all Actions of Trespass Assault and Battery and other personal Actions wherein the Judge shall not certifie upon the back of the Record that a Battery was proved or the Freehold or Title of the Land chiefly in question if the Jury find the Damages under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall recover no more Costs than Damages Mr. Pollexfen moved for Costs alledging that this Act doth not extend to all trespasses but only to such where the Freehold of the Land is in question If the Action had been for a Trespass in breaking his Close and Damages given under 40 s. there might not have been full Costs but here is another Count for impounding the Cattle of which the Defendant is found guilty and therefore must have his Costs The like Case was adjudged in this Court in Hillary Term last Smith versus Batterton Raym. 487. Jones 232. which was Trespass for breaking and flinging down Stalls in the Market place The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 2 d. damages and upon a debate whether he should have full Costs the Court were of Opinion that it was not within that Statute because the Title could not come in question upon the destruction of a Chattle In the principal Case the Plaintiff had ordinary Costs DE Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Marsh versus Cutler THE Plaintiff obtained a Iudgment in an Hundred Court for 58 s. and 4 d. If Debt be brought upon a Specialty for part of the Sum the Plaintiff must shew how the other is discharged 2 Cro. 498 499 529 530. and brought an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment in this Court for 58 s. only and did not shew that the 4 d. was discharged and upon Nultiel Record pleaded and a Demurrer to that Plea the
quam ad illud facere debet solet And it was the Opinion of a * Justice Doderidge in Surry and Piggots Case Pop. 171.27 Assise placito 8. Br. Prescription 49. Rast Entr. 441 Tit. Nusance learned Iudge that the words currere consuevit solebat did supply a Prescription or Custom Thus it was in an Assise of Nusance wherein the Plaintiff set forth that he had a Fountain of Water currentem usque ad rotam molendini c. and that the Defendant divertit cursum aquae and this was held good The Cases of stopping up of Lights and diverting of Water-courses are not parallel the Prescription to Lights must be ratione loci and therefore if a Man will erect a new House and a Stranger will stop the Lights 't is an injury done and the Action may be maintained upon the Possession Lutterel 's Case was grounded upon the Possession for upon the Plaintiff Cottell 's own shewing the Prescription was gone because he set forth that he had pulled down the old Mills and that the Defendant Lutterel diverted the Water from running to those Mills which the Plaintiff newly built All which prove that a Prescription goes to the Right but a possession is sufficient to support an Action against a Tort-fesor Lastly Slackman vers West Palmer 387. 2 Cro. 673. in the Case of a Common or a Rent which cannot pass without Deed if the Plaintiff shews a Que Estate he must produce the Deed by which it was granted but where he prescribes for a Way he may set forth his Estate without shewing how he came by it because 't is but a Conveyance to the Action which is grounded upon the disturbance done to the Possession Cur. The word solet implies Antiquity and will amount to a Prescription and solitus cursus aquae running to a Mill makes the Mill to be antient for if it be newly erected there cannot be solitus cursus aquae towards that Mill For which Reasons the Iudgment in the Original Action was affirmed in Hillary Term Primo Willielmi But the Chief Iustice was of Opinion that if the Cause had been tried upon such a Oeclaration that the Plaintiff ought to prove his Prescription or else he must be Nonsuit Anonymus ONE was Indicted for drinking of an Health to the Pious Memory of Stephen Colledge who was Executed at Oxford for High Treason He was Fined 1000 l. and had Sentence to stand in the Pillory and was ordered to find Sureties for his good Behaviour Rex versus Rosewel THE Defendant was a Non-conformist Minister and Indicted for High-Treason in Preaching of these words viz. Why do the People innuendo the People of England make a flocking to the King innuendo Carolum Secundum under pretence of curing the Kings Evil which the King cannot do but we are the Priests and Prophets to whom they ought to flock who by our Prayers can heal them We have had two Wicked Kings now together innuendo Carolum Primum Carolum Secundum who have suffered Popery to be introduced under their Noses whom I can liken to none but wicked Jeroboam and if they innuendo the People c. would stand to their Principles I make no doubt but to COnquer our Enemies innuendo the King and all his Loyal Subjects with Rams Horns broken Pitchers and a Stone in a Sling as in the time of old Vpon this Indictment he was arraigned and pleaded Not Guilty and was Tried at Bar and found Guilty of High Treason upon the Evidence of two Women And the Court having assigned Mr. Wallop Mr. Pollexfen and Mr. Bampfield to be his Council they moved in Arrest of Iudgment First That the Words discharged of the Innuendo's if taken seperate or altogether have no tendency to Treason The first Paragraph doth not import any Crime and to say that we have had two wicked Kings may be a Misdemeanor but 't is not Treason either by intendment of the Death of the King or by levying War against him The Crime seems to consist in the next Words which are if they would stand to their Principles c. This seems to stir up the People to Rebellion but as they are placed in the Indictment they will not admit of such a Construction neither as they have reference to the words precedent or as they stand by themselves The words which go before are viz. We have had two wicked Kings together 'T is not expressed what Kings or when they Reigned which is very uncertain Et si ipsi ad fundamentalia sua starent which word ipsi is relative and must refer ad proximum antecedens and then it must be ipsi Reges which is the proper and natural sense of the words But now if the Innuendo's must be incerted 4 Co. 17. it must be under some Authority of Law either to design the person or the thing which was not certain before that the intention of the Party speaking may be more easily collected and this is the most proper Office of an Innuendo It will not change the meaning of the words Hob. 45. 2 Cro. 126. for that is to make them still more incertain Now most of the Innuendo's in this Indictment are naught because they do not ascertain the subject matter First by the word People innuendo the People of England may be as well intended any other People because there was no previous Discourse of the People of England Then follow these words We have had two wicked Kings now together innuendo King Charles the First and Second which may be as well intended of King Ethelred and Alfred because the words denote a time past and therefore cannot possibly intend the King of whom there was no precedent Discourse And the Rule is De dubiis generalibus benignior Sententia recipienda est Besides those words are insensible and indeed impossible for we cannot have two wicked Kings together it ought to be successively Then to say we shall Conquer our Enemies cannot be intended the Enemies of the King because the word Enemies is of a large sense for Man by reason of his Sins and Infirmities hath many Enemies and possibly such might be intended If therefore it be doubtful what Enemies were meant if it shall not be in the power of a Clerk by an innuendo to make Words of another sense than what they will naturally bear nor to help where they are insensible as in this Case If there was no precedent Discourse either of Kings People or Enemies which must be proved by the Evidence then is this Indictment naught and therefore Iudgment ought to be arrested Mr. Attorney and Solliciter contra 'T is laid in this Indictment that the words were spoken to stir up Rebellion and to depose the King and 't is so found by the Verdict of twelve Men. That which aggravates the offence is That it was spoken in a publick Assembly to the People which must be intended the People of England
general as this Case There are many instances where Breaches have been generally assigned and held ill that in Croke is so but the later Opinions are otherwise Affirmetur Judicium Pye versus Brereton A Lease was made of Tythes for three years rendring Rent at Michaelmas and Lady-day and an Action of Debt was brought for Rent arrear for two years Vpon Nil debet pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was too general for the Rent being reserved at two Feasts 2 Cro. 668. the Plaintiff ought to have shewed at which of those Feasts it was due But the Council for the Plaintiff said That it appears by the Declaration that two years of the three were expired so there is but one to come which makes it certain enough Curia This is helped by the Verdict but it had not been good upon a Demurrer DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. MEmorandum That in Trinity-Vacation last died Sir Francis North Baron of Guilford and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England at his House in Oxfordshire being a Man of great Learning and Temperance And Sir George Jefferies Baron of Wem and Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench had the Seal delivered to him at Windsor and was thereupon made Lord High Chancellor of England And Sir Edward Herbert one of the Kings Council succeeded him in the Place of Chief Justice There died also this Vacation Sir Thomas Walcott one of the Justices of the Kings-Bench and he was succeeded by Sir Robert Wright one of the Barons of the Exchequer Sir John Newton al' versus Stubbs IN an Action on the Case for Words Words laid to be spoke ad tenorem effectmu sequen ' not good The Plaintiffs declared that they were Iustices of the Peace for the County of Gloucester c. and that the Defendant spake these scandalous Words of them Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie Men out of their Estates postea eodem die c. they spoke these words Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie me and Mr. Creswick out of our Estates And afterwards these words were laid in Latin without an Anglice ad tenorem effectum sequen ' c. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiffs and entire damages and now Mr. Trindar moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the words in the Declaration are laid in Latin Roll. Abr. 74. pl. 2. without an Anglice and without an Averment that the hearers did understand Latin 2. 'T is not expressly alledged that the Defendant spoke those very words for being laid ad tenorem effectum sequen ' something may be omitted which may alter the sense and meaning of them Cro. Eliz. 857. and for this very reason Iudgment was staied though the Court held the words to be actionable Rex versus Ayloff al' THey were Outlawed for High-Treason Treason and on Tuesday the 27th day of October they were brought to the Bar and a Rule of Court was made for their Execution on Fryday following The Chief Iustice said that there was no hardship in this proceeding to a Sentence upon an Outlawry because those Malefactors who wilfully flie from Iustice and a new Crime to their former Offence and therefore ought to have no benefit of the Law for tho' a Man is Guilty yet if he put himself upon his Tryal he may by his submissive Behaviour and shew of Repentance incline the King to mercy In Felonies which are of a lower nature than the Crimes for which these persons are attainted flight even for an Hour is a forfeiture of the Goods of the Criminal so likewise a Challenge to three Iuries is a defiance to Iustice and if that be so then certainly flying from it is both despising the mercy of the King and contemning the Iustice of the Nation They were both Executed on Frday the 30th of October following Dominus Rex versus Colson al' AN Information was exhibited against the Defendants Information for a Riot not good setting forth that they with others did riotously assemble themselves together to divert a Watercourse and that they set up a Bank in a certain place by which the Water was hindred from running to an antient Mill in so plentifull a manner as formerly c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded it came to a Tryal and the Iury found that Quoad factionem Ripae the Defendants were Guilty and quoad Riotum not Guilty And now Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment because that by this Verdict the Defendants were acquitted of the charge in the Information which was the Riot and as for the erecting of the Bank an Action on the Case would lie and the Iudgment was accordingly arrested Mason versus Beldham Trin. 1 Jac. Rot. 408. THE Plaintiff brings his Action against the Defendant Quantum meruit will lie for Rent and sets forth That in consideration that he would suffer the Defendant to enjoy a House and three Water-Mills c. he promised to pay so much yearly as they were reasonably worth and avers that they were worth so much And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether this Action would lie for Rent It was argued for the Defendant that it would not lie Cro. Eliz. 242. 786 859. 2 Cro. 668. because it was a real Contract 'T is true there is a Case which seems to be otherwise 't is between Acton and Symonds Cro. Car. 414. which was in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to the Defendant certain Lands for three years at the Rent of 25 l. by the year he promised to pay it this was held to be a personal Promise grounded upon a real Contract and by the Opinion of three Iudges the Action did lie because there was an express promise alledged which must also be proved But Iustice Croke was of a contrary Opinion Mr. Pollexfen contra If a Lease be made for years reserving a Sum in gross for Rent and which is made certain by the Lease in such case an Action of Debt will lie for the Rent in arrear But if where no Sum certain is reserved as in this Case a Quantum meruit will lie and no reason can be given why a Man may not have such an Action for the Rent of his Land as well as for his Horse or Chamber And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus THere was a Libel in the Spiritual Court for scandalous Words Prohibition for words where some are actionable and others not Viz. She is Bitch a Whore an old Bawd And a Prohibition was now prayed by Mr. Pollexfen because some of the words were actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court and therefore prayed that it might go Quoad those words which were actionable at Law The Chief Iustice granted
the one took 70 l. and the other 30 l. damages shall be assessed severally It was admitted that regularly the damages ought to be entire especially where the Action is joint but where the Facts are several damages may likewise be so assessed but in this Case the Iury hath done what the Court would do had it béen in a Criminal Cause Curia This is all but one Fact which the Iury is to try 'T is true when several Persons are found Guilty criminally then the damages may be severed in proportion to their Guilt but here all are equally guilty of the same offence and it seems to be a contradiction to say that the Plaintiff is injured by one to the value of 50 l. and by the other to the value of 1000 l. when both are equally Guilty Every Defendant ought to answer full as much as the Plaintiff is damnified now how is it possible he should be damnified so much by one and so little by the other But notwithstanding this Opinion Iudgment was afterwards given for the Plaintiff Peak versus Meker IN an Action on the Case for Words the Plaintiff declared that he was a Merchant and bred up in the Church of England and that when the present King came to the Crown the said Plaintiff made a Bonfire at his Door in the City of London and that the Defendant then spoke of him these words for which he now brought this Action viz. He innuendo the Plaintiff is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his Door but he The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 500 l. Damages were given A Writ of Error was brought but it was adjudged without argument that the words were actionable Joyner versus Pritchard AN Action was brought upon the Statute of R. II. Admiralty for prosecuting of a Cause in the Admiralty Court which did arise upon the Land it was tried before the Chief Iustice in London and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Mr. Thompson moved in Arrest of Iudgment for that the Action was brought by Original in which it was set forth that the Defendant prosecut fuit adhuc prosequitur c. in Curia Admiralitat now the prosequitur is subsequent to the Original and so they have recovered Damages for that which was done after the Action brought Curia These words adhuc prosequitur must refer to the time of suing forth this Original like the Case of a Covenant for quiet Enjoyment and a breach assigned that the Defendant built a Shed whereby he hindred the Plaintiff that he could not enjoy it hucnsque which word must refer to the time of the Action brought and not afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dominus Rex versus ........ AN Information was brought against the Defendant for Forgery Forgery setting forth that the Defendant being a man of ill fame c. and contriving to cheat one A. did forge quoddam scriptum dated the 16th day of October in the year 1681. continens in se scriptum obligatorium per quod quidem scriptum obligatorium praed A. obligatus fuit praed Defend in quadraginta libris c. He was found Guilty and afterwards this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Viz. That the Fact alledged in the Information was a contradiction of it self for how could A. be bound when the Bond was forged 2. It is not set forth what that scriptum obligatorium was whether it was scriptum sigillatum or not Curia The Defendant is found Guilty of the forging of a Writing in which was contained quoddam scriptum obligatorium and that may be a true Bond. Iudgment was arrested MEMORANDUM On Tuesday April the 27th Sir Thomas Powes of Lincolns-Inn was made Sollicitor General in the Place of Mr. Finch and was called within the Bar. Hanchet versus Thelwal IN Ejectment a special Verdict was found Devise What words in a Will make an Estate for Life and what in Tail in which the Case did arise upon the construction of the words in a Will Viz. The Testator being seised in Fee had Issue Two Sons and Four Daughters He made his Will and devised his Estate being in Houses by these words Viz. Irem I give and bequeath to my Son Nicholas Price my Houses in Westminster and if itplease God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters naming them share and share alike and if it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give my said Houses to my Sister Anne Warner and her Heirs Nicholas Price entred and died without Issue then the four Sisters entred and Margaret the eldest married Thellwel and died leaving Issue a Son who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff who insisted upon his Title to a fourth part of the Houses The Question was what Estate the Daughters took by this Will whether joint Estates for Life or several Remainders in Tail If only joint Estates for Life then the Plaintiff as Heir to his Mother will not be entituled to a fourth part if several Remainders in Tail then the Father will have it during his Life as Tenant by the Curtesie This Case was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff And in Hillary Term following by Councel for the Defendant The Plaintiffs Council insisted that they took joint Estates for Life and this seemed to be the intent of the Testator by the words in his Will the first Clause whereof was Viz. I give and bequeath my Houses in W. to Nicholas Price Now by these words an Estate for Life only passed to him and not an Inheritance for there was nothing to be done or any thing to be paid out of it 2. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters share and share alike Now these words cannot give the Daughters a Fee-simple by any intendment whatsoever but if any word in this Clause seems to admit of such a Construction it must be the word Estate which sometimes signifies the Land it self and sometimes the Estate in the Land But here the word Estate cannot create a Fee-simple because the Testator gave his Daughters that Estate which he had given to his Son before and that was only for Lise Then follow the words share and share alike and that only makes them Tenants in Common 3. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving These words as they are penned can have no influence upon the Case 4. Then followeth the last Clause Viz. And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give c. These words create no Estate tail in the
Daughters for the Testator having two Sons and four Daughters it cannot be collected by these words how they shall take and by consequence it cannot be an Estate Tail by implication Now suppose one of the Daughters should dye without Issue 't is uncertain who shall have her part and therefore there being no appointment in what order this Estate shall go it cannot be an Estate Tail and to maintain this Opinion this Case was cited One Collier was seised in Fee of three Houses 2 Cro. 655. Gilbert versus Witty and had Issue three Sons John Robert and Richard he devised to each of them a House in Fee Proviso if all my Children dye without Issue of their Bodies then the Houses to be to his Wife The two eldest Sons died without Issue the younger had Issue a Daughter who married the Lessor of the Plaintiff The Question was Whether by the death of the eldest Son without Issue there was a cross Remainder to Richard and the Heirs of his Body or whether the Wife shall take immediately or expect till after the Death of all the Sons without Issue And it was adjudged that the Wife shall take immediately and that there were no cross Remainders nor any Estate by implication because it was a devise to them severally by express limitation So that if no Estate tail ariseth to the Daughters in this Case by implication Cro. Eliz. Taylor versus Sawyer then 't is no more than a devise to his Issue which extends to them all and gives only an Estate for Life For the Defendant it was argued Ex parte Def. that the Sons and Daughters have no Estate Tail by implication It was agreed that Nicholas had only an Estate for Life and that the word Estate in this case means the Houses and not the Interest in them 'T is true there is no express Limitation of any Estate to them but there is an express determination of it Now if this be not an Estate Tail by implication then the words dying without Issue are void A devise to his Son More 127. and if he dye not having a Son then 't is devised over This is an Estate tail in Remainder It cannot be a doubt who shall take first for the Daughters shall take it Dyer 333. and after them as 't is most natural the eldest Son for where there is the same proximity of Blood the Estate shall go to the eldest As for instance Hob. 33. one Chapman being seised in Fee of two Houses and having three Brothers devised the House which A. dwelt in to his said three Brothers and the House in which his Brother Thomas Chapman did dwell he devised to the said Thomas paying so much c. or else to remain to the Family of the Testator provided that the Houses be not sold but go to the next of the Males and the blood of the Males Thomas died without Issue the eldest of the two surviving Brothers had Issue a Daughter and died the Question was whether that Daughter or the youngest Brother of the Testator should have the House It was adjudged that the Daughter should have it in tail For the Proviso that the Houses be not sold c. made it a tail and the words viz. to remain to the Family must be intended to the eldest If this be not an Estate tail then the Devise over to Anne Warner is void As to the Case of Gilbert and Witty that moves upon another reason for there every one took by a distinct and separate Limitation Curia In that Case all the Estate was limited distinctly to the three Sons but in this 't is otherwise for the Testator had two Sons and no Estate was limited to one of them before then he saith If all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then c. And thus the Cases differ which creates the difficulty But no reason can be given why this Court should not construe Wills according to the Rules of Common Law where an Estate by implication is so incertain for when Men are sick and yet have a disposing power left they usually write Nonsense and the Iudges must rack their Brains to find out what is intended This cannot be an Estate tail in the Daughters and therefore the Heir must come in for his fourth part Iudgment for the Plaintiff Dixon versus Robinson THIS was a special Issue directed out of Chancery Wayhil Fair. and tried this day at the Bar by a Middlesex Iury. The Question was Whether Ballivus probi homines Burgenses Burgi de Andover in Hampshire had power to keep a Fair at Wayehil in any one place where they please the Bill being Exhibited to confine the Fair to a particular place which Fair was granted to them by Charter from Queen Elizabeth They who would have it confin'd to a certain place gave in Evidence that the Hospitaller of Ewelme in Oxfordshire was seised in Fee of the Manor of Rambridge within which Manor the place was where the Fair was always kept and that the Parson of Andover had Glebe there That this place was called Wayehil and that the profits did arise by Piccage and Stallage to the yearly value of 200 l. That it was an ancient Fair held there by Prescription before the Town of Andover had a Charter That upon the late Surrender of Charters the Town of Andover did likewise surrender and took a new Charter in which liberty was given to them to keep this Fair in what place they would That both the Hospitaller and Parson petitioned the King in Council and obtained an Order to Try where the Fair ought to be kept which was tried accordingly at the Exchequer Bar and a Verdict for the Parson Chief Justice If the Fair belongs to Andover they may chuse whether they will keep it at any place and that may create another Question Whether they may not forfeit this Franchise by disuser But certainly if the place be not limited by the King's Grant they may keep it where they please or rather where they can most conveniently and if it be so limited they may keep it in what part of such place they will Dawling versus Venman AN Action on the Case was brought against the Defendant Action for a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery for making a Scandalous Affidavit in Chancery in which were these words Viz. Mr. Dawling is a Rogue and a Knave and I will make it out before my Lord Chancellor and I will have him in the Pillory Vpon not Guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and damages entire It was moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the truth of on Oath shall not be liable to a Trial in an Action on the Case for the Law intendeth every Oath to be true Before the Statute of 3 11 H. Cro. Eliz. 521 2 Cro. 607. Sid. 50. Hutt 11. 7. which gives power to examine Perjury there was not any Punishment at
the Common Law for a false Oath made by any Witness and therefore an Action will not lye for a scandalous Affidavit Adjornatur Anonymus NOta An Action of Assault and Battery Release of one Def. shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing and false imprisonment was brought against four Defendants the Plaintiff had Iudgment and they brought a Writ of Error The Plaintiff in the Action pleaded the Release of one of them and to this Plea all four jointly demur The Opinion of the Court was that Iudgment might be given severally for they being compelled by Law to join in a Writ of Error the release of one shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing But where divers are to recover in the personalty 6 Co. Ruddock's Case the Release of one is a Bar to all but it is not so in point of discharge If two Coparceners make a Lease of a House and the Rent is in arrear and one of them brings the Action and recovers the Iudgment shall be arrested because one alone hath recovered in Debt for a moiety when both ought to join But it is agreed that if one Tenant in Common make a Lease rendring Rent which afterwards is in arrear Litt. Sect. 316. they must join in an Action of Debt because it savours of the Personalty But 't is otherwise in case of the Realty DE Term. Sanct. Trin. Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Wright Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General Aldridge versus Duke ASsault Trespass continued many years and the Statute of Limitations pleaded the Jury gives Damages only for the last six years Battery Wounding and Imprisoning of him from the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. usque exhibitionem Billae The Defendant pleaded not Guilty infra sex infra Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Writ was sued out 2 Octobris 1 Jacobi 2. And that the Defendant was Guilty within six years next before the Writ brought Vpon this Issue was joyned and a Verdict was given for the Plaintiff and entire damages given Mr. Pollexfen moved two Exceptions in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That a Verdict cannot help what appears to be otherwise upon the face of the Record Now here the Plaintiff declared that he was imprisoned the 10th of August 24 Car. 2. which is 13 years since and being one entire Trespass the Issue is found as laid in the Declaration which cannot be for so many years between the cause of Action and bringing of the Writ for if a Trespass be continued several years the Plaintiff must sue only for the last six years for which he hath a compleat cause of Action but when those are expired he is barred by the Statute When the Plaintiff hath any cause of Action Sid. 25. then the Statute of Limitations begins as in an Action on the Case for words if they are actionable in themselves without alledging special damages the Plaintiff will recover Damages from the time of the speaking and not according to what loss may follow So in Trover and Conversion when there is a cause of Action vested and the Goods continue in the same possession for seven years afterwards in such case 't is the first conversion which entitles the Plaintiff to an Action So in the Case at Bar tho' this be a continued imprisonment yet so much as was before the Writ brought is barred by the Statute Thompson contra The Verdict is good for the Iury reject the beginning of the trespass and give Damages only for that which falls within the six years and this may be done because 't is laid usque exhibitionem Billae If the Defendant had pleaded not Guilty generally Cro. Car. 160 381 404. then Damages must be for the 13 years though the Plaintiff of his own shewing had brought his Action for a thing done beyond the time limited by the Statute but having pleaded not Guilty at any time within six years if the Verdict find him guilty within that time 't is against him As to the Objection that the Cause of Action ariseth beyond six years tho' it doth appear so in the Declaration yet that doth not exclude the Plaintiff for there might have been Process out before or he might be disabled by an Outlawry which may be now reversed or he might be in Prison and newly discharged from which time he hath six years to begin his Action for being under either of these circumstances the Statute doth not hurt him Curia If an Action of false Imprisonment be brought for seven years and the Jury find the Defendant guilty but for two days 't is a Trespass within the Declaration This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Act for after six years it will be difficult to prove a Trespass many accidents may happen within that time as the death or removal of Witnesses c. Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dobson versus Thornistone THE Plaintiff was a Husbandman Words spoken of a Farmer actionable who brought an Action against the Defendant for these words He owes more mony than he is worth he is run away and is broke He had a Verdict and it was moved now in Arrest of Iudgment that the Words being spoken of a Farmer are not actionable To say that a Gentleman is a Cozener Hill 28 Eliz. B.R. Godb. 40. a Bankrupt and hath got an Occupation to deceive Men though he used to Buy and Sell yet being no Merchant 't was the better Opinion of the Court that the Words were not actionable So to say of a Farmer Stiles 420. that he is a Whoreson Bankrupt Rogue and it not appearing that he got his living by Buying and Selling or that the Words were spoken of him relating to his Occupation 't is not actionable For it must not only appear that the Plaintiff hath a Trade Sid. 299. Hutt 50. but that he gets his Living by it otherwise the Words spoken of him will not bear an Action But the Court held the Words to be actionable the like Iudgment was given in the Case of a Carpenter Mich. 3 Jac. for Words Viz. He is broke and run away Anonymus NOta Misentry of a Writ of Enquiry amendable without paying Costs Iudgment was given upon a Demurrer and a Writ of Enquiry was awarded and in the Entry thereof upon the Roll the Words per Sacramenum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out and now the Question was Whether it shall be amended It was said that a Capiatur for a Misericordia shall be amended upon the new Statute of Jeofails after a Verdict but whether upon a Demurrer it was doubted In a Quo Warranto Iudgment was entred by disclaimer Cro. Car. 184. by the consent of all Parties and the Words virtute praetextu literarum patentium geren dat 17 Jacobi were wrote in the Margin of the
the person who made Oath before them The Commissioners sign the Depositions and they ought to produce them so signed to the Court and prove it for Depositions are often suppressed by Order of the Court. If a true Copy of an Affidavit made before the Chief Iustice of this Court be produced at a Trial 't is not sufficient to convict a Man of Perjury This is not like the Case of Perjury assigned in an Answer in Chancery taken in the Country for that is under the Parties Hand but here is nothing under the Defendant's Hand and therefore the Commissioners ought to be in the Court to prove him to be the Man The Court were equally divided The Chief Iustice and Wythens Iustice were of Opinion that it was not Evidence to convict the Defendant of Perjury it might have been otherwise upon the Return of a Master of Chancery for he is upon his Oath and is therefore presumed to make a good Return but Commissioners are not upon Oath they pen the Depositions according to the best of their skill and a man may call himself by another name before them without any offence The Commissioners cannot be mistaken in the Oath tho' they may not know the person for this Court may be so mistaken in those who make Affidavits here but not in the Oath if the Commissioners or the Clerk to the Commission had been here they would have been good Evidence If an Affidavit be made before a Iustice of the Peace of a Robbery as enjoyned by the Statute if you will convict the person of Perjury you must prove the swearing of the Affidavit The Attorney General perceiving the Opinion of the Court rather than the Plaintiff should be nonsuit because no Evidence could be given offered to enter a Nolle prosequi which the Court said could not be done because the Iury were sworn but he insisted upon it and said he would cause it to be entred Sir John Knight's Case AN Information was exhibited against him by the Attorney General upon the Statute of 2 E. 3. Information upon the Statute for going armed 2 E. 3. c. 3. Which prohibits all persons from coming with Force and Arms before the King's Justices c. and from going or riding armed in affray of Peace on pain to forfeit his Armour and suffer Imprisonment at the King's Pleasure This Statute is confirmed by that of R. 2. 20 R. 2.1 with an Addition of a farther punishment which is to make a Fine to the King The Information sets forth that the Defendant did walk about the Streets armed with Guns and that he went into the Church of St. Michael in Bristol in the time of Divine Service with a Gun to terrifie the King's Subjects contra formam Statuti This Case was tryed at the Bar and the Defendant was acquitted The Chief Iustice said that the meaning of the Statute of Ed. 3. was to punish People who go armed to terrifie the Kings Subjects 'T is likewise a great Offence at the Common Law as if the King was not able or willing to protect his Subjects and therefore this Act is but an affirmance of that Law and it having appointed a Penalty this Court can inflict no other Punishment than what is therein directed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 2 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686 7. Kingston versus Herbert A Common Recovery was suffered Anno 22 Jacobi primi Where a Scire Facias must go to the Tertenants before Judgment be reversed and a Writ of Error was brought about five years since to reverse it and Iudgment was given for the Reversal and it was now moved to set aside that Reversal because there was no Scire Facias against the Tertenants Mr. Williams who argued for the Reversal said that the want of a Scire Facias must be either in Law or in Fact it cannot be Error in Law for that must appear upon the Record it self which it doth not here It cannot be Error in Fact because there is no necessity of such a Writ 't is only discretionary in the Court and not ex necessitate juris But on the other side it was insisted that the Court cannot proceed to examine Errors before a Scire Facias is awarded to the Tertenants Dyer 320 331. for they may have a Matter to plead in Barr to the Writ as a Release c. and the Party cannot be restored to all which he hath lost by the suffering of the Recovery unless the Defendant be brought in upon the Scire Facias Curia The only Question is whether this Iudgment be well given without a Scire Facias The Secondary hath reported that the Practice is so Then as to the Ojection that such a Scire Facias is not ex necessitate juris but only discretionary 't is quite otherwise for 't is not only a cautionary Writ as all other Scire Facias but 't is a legal caution which in a manner makes it necessary 'T is true if there had been a Iudgment corruptly obtained this Court might have set it aside but if Erronice 't is a doubt whether it may be vacated but according to the Forms and Methods of Law Adjornatur Baldwin versus Flower BAron and Feme brought an Action on the Case for Words spoken of the Wife Words where actionable without special damage The Declaration was that the Defendant having some discourse with another person called the Wife Whore and that she was his Whore and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum c. The Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in arrest of Iudgment for that the Words were not actionable without alledging special damage But it was answered Rol. Abr. 35. placit 7. that the Action was well brought To say A Man is rotted with the Pox is actionable without alledging special damage because the person by such means will lose the Communication and Society of his Neighbours As to the Conclusion ad dampnum ipsorum 't is good for if she survive the Husband the Damages will go to her and so are all the Presidents Curia The Words are actionable And three Iustices were of Opinion that the Conclusion of the Declaration was as it ought to be which Iustice Wythens denied for if an Innkeepers Wife be called a Cheat and the House loses the Trade the Husband hath an injury by the Words spoken of his Wife but the Declaration must not conclude ad dampnum ipsorum Sir Thomas Grantham's Case HE bought a Monster in the Indies which was a Man of that Country who had the perfect Shape of a Child growing out of his Breast as an Excrescency all but the Head This Man he brought hither and exposed to the sight of the People for Profit The Indian turns Christian and was baptized and was detained from his Master who brought a Homine Repleg ' the Sheriff returned that he had replevied the Body but doth not say the Body in which
to Sir Edward Biggs against the Countess as Administratrix of the Earl of Plymouth wherein the Plaintiff sets forth a Writing by which the Earl had given power to Sir Edward to be the Collector and Receiver of his Mony and Rents and that he promised to allow him 100 l. per Annum for his pains and in default of payment thereof that Sir Edward should detein the same which Writing was in these Words following viz. I do direct and appoint Sir Edward Biggs to take and receive to his own use 100 l. of lawful Mony of England out of the first Mony which he shall receive of mine The Action was brought for 75 l. being his Salary for three quarters of a year and Iudgment by Nil dicit It was argued this Term and in Easter Term by Councel on both sides It was agreed on all sides that the Earl left sufficient Assets to satisfie all his Bond Creditors but not enough to pay Debts upon simple Contract First it was said for the Plaintiff in the Errors that no Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 11 Co. Godfreys Case because the Testator might have waged his Law but this was not much insisted on 2. That admitting an Action would lye yet this is an erronious Iudgment because the Suit was for 75 l. for three quarters Salary when by the Writing Sir Edward was to serve the Earl a whole year and this being an entire Contract shall not be seperated Therefore he cannot be well entituled to the Actionn unless his Testator had served a year and he had averred it so in his Declaration As where a Covenant was to pay 2 s. Yelv. 133. 7 Co. 10. Allen 9. for copying every Quire of Paper and the Breach assigned that he copyed 4 Quire and 3 sheets for which 8 s. and 3 d. was due to the Plaintiff 't is true he had Iudgment but it was reversed because it was an entire Covenant of which no apportionment could be made pro rata 3. That which was chiefly insisted on was to make these words amount to an Obligation that so it might be satisfied amongst the Bond Creditors But those who argued for the Plaintiff in the Errors said that it cannot be an Obligation for it was only a bare Letter of Attorney and an Authority and no more for there were no words to oblige the Earl or which can make a Warranty and therefore if the Mony was not received the Party to whom the Note was given could not resort back to him who made it had they been both living neither shall the Plaintiff now to his Administratrix Like the common Cases of the assigning of Iudgment if the Assignee doth not receive the Mony he cannot have an Action against the Assignor who only directs and appoints him so to do But on the other side Ex parte Def. the second Objection was thus answered viz. That this being only an Executory thing the Plaintiff may now bring an Action for so long time as his Testator served and this may be apportioned secundum ratam if the Law should be otherwise the Case of all Servants would be bad for they are generally hired for a year and not usually serve so long In an Assumpsit to pay for a years board Sid. 225. and the Plaintiff had declared only for three quarters of a year but yet had Iudgment because as the Book saith if there be any variance in the Agreement 't is for the advantage of the Defendant The 3d. Vaughan 92 93. Pl. Com. 182. Dyer 21. Objection answered viz. When a Man is indebted to another by simple Contract which is aknowledged by Deed an Action of Debt will lie against his Executor for any thing which is under Hand and Seal will amount to an Obligation especially where the Debt is confessed Now there are words in this Deed to shew that Mony was due and that makes it a Bond. But the Court was of Opinion that this was an entire Agreement and therefore the Action not well brought for three quarters Salary and for this reason the Iudgment was reversed Nisi c. Chapman versus Lamphire AN Action on the Case was brought for scandalous words spoken of the Plaintiff Words spoken of a Carpenter where actionable who declared that he was a Carpenter and a Freeman of the City of London and that he got great Sums of Mony by buying of Timber and Materials and by building of Houses and that the Defendant having discourse of him and of his Trade spoke these words viz. He is broken and run away and will never return again There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and a Motion was now made in arrest of Iudgment for that a Carpenter was not a Trade within the Statute of Bankrupts and a day being given to speak to it again Mr. Pollexfen argued that before the Statutes made against Bankrupts words spoken reflecting upon a man in his Trade were actionable even at the Common Law because it might be the occasion of the loss of his Livelyhood 1 Rol. Abr. 59. pl. 6. Hutton 60. and therefore it was actionable to say of a Scrivener that he is broken and run away and dares not shew his Face and yet a Scrivener was not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy before the Act of 21 Jac. therefore the Action must lie at the Common Law because words disparage him in his Trade But the Councel for the Defendant said that these words were not actionable for they do not tend to his disparagement he may be broke and yet as good a Carpenter as before The Case of one Hill in 2 Car. Latch 114. in this Court was much stronger than this the words spoken of him were viz. Hill is a base broken Rascal and hath broken twice already and I will make him break the third time the Plaintiff had Iudgment but it was arrested A Carpenter builds upon the Credit of other men and so long as the words do not touch him in the skill and knowledge of his Profession they cannot injure him Chief Iustice The Credit which the Defendant hath in the World may be a means to support his skill for he may not have an opportunity to shew his Workmanship without those Materials for which he is entrusted The Iudges were divided in Opinion two against two and so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment there being no Rule made to stay it so that he had his Iudgment upon his general Rule for Iudgment but if it had been upon a Demurrer or Special Verdict then it would have been adjourned to the Exchequer Chamber Goring versus Deering IN an Appeal for the Murder of Henry Goring Esq Auterfoits convict of Manslaughter no good Plea in an Appeal for Murder brought by his Widow The Defendant pleaded that he was indicted for the said Murder at the Sessions-house in the Old Bayly in Middlesex that he was found guilty of Manslaughter
being no where alledged that the Goods were weighed elsewhere or that they were such which are usually sold by Weight then there is no need of bringing of them to the Beam If one prescribes to a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant the Prescription is not good This being the consideration of the Duty it ought to be precisely alledged as in an Assumpsit where the Plaintiff declared that in consideration that the Defendant owed him 40 l. he promised to pay it ante inceptionem proximi itineris to London Yelv. 175. 2 Cro. 245. and alledged that such a day incepit iter suum ad London ' but for omitting the Word proxime Iudgment was arrested after Verdict because the Duty did arise upon the commencement of his next Iourney The true reason why any thing is helped by Verdict is for that the thing shall be presumed to be given in Evidence at the Trial. Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra Here is enough set forth in the Plea to shew that the Goods were not weighed and it must be given in Evidence at the Trial that they were sold contrary to the Custom which is the only Offence to be proved The want of Averment that the Goods sold by the Defendant were not weighed shall not vitiate this Declaration after a Verdict To prove this some Authorities were cited Cro. Eliz. 458. 2 Cro. 44. Siderfin 218. Palmer 360. Cro. Car. 497. as where in Trespass the Defendant justified for Common by Prescription for Beasts Levant and Couchant and that he put in his Beasts utendo Communia Issue was taken upon the Prescription and found for the Defendant now though he did not averr that the Cattle were Levant and Couchant yet it was held that it was cured by a Verdict And of this Opinion were three Iudges now but Iustice Allybon differed for says he if this Declaration should be good after a Verdict then a Verdict will cure any fault in Pleading Iudgment for the Plaintiff Prowse versus Wilcox AN Action on the Case for scandalous Words Words spoken of a Justice of the Peace where actionable The Plaintiff declared that he was a Justice of the Peace for the County of Somerset that there was a Rebellion in the West by the Duke of Monmouth and others that search was made for the Defendant being suspected to be concerned in that Rebellion and that the Defendant thereupon spoke these words of the Plaintiff viz. John Prowse is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest Men of my sort and I will make him give me satisfaction for plundering me There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and the Iudgment being stayed till the Return of the Postea Mr. Pollexfen moved that the Plaintiff might have his Iudgment because the Words are actionable 1 Roll. Abr. 59. pl. 3. for they touched him in his Office of a Iustice of a Peace It was objected to stay the Iudgment that the Words were improper and therefore could not be actionable But admitting them so to be yet if they in any wise reflect upon a Man in a publick Office they will bear an Action Shore contra The Plaintiff doth not lay any Colloquium of him as a Justice of the Peace or that the words were spoken of him relating to his Office or the Execution thereof and therefore an Action will not lie though an * Vid. antea Rex versus Darby 2 Cro. 315. Information might have been proper against him If a Man should call another Lewd Fellow and that he set upon him in the High-way and took his Purse from him an Action will not lie because he doth not directly charge him with Felony or Robbery The Court were divided in Opinion two against two so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Boyle versus Boyle A Libel was in the Spiritual Court against a Woman causa jactitationis Maritagii Prohibition granted The Woman suggests that this person was indicted at the Sessions in the Old-Bayly for marrying of her he then having a Wife living contra formam Statuti Godb. Rep. Can. 507. Hales 121. 1 Jac. cap. 11. Sid. 171. that he was thereupon convicted and had Iudgment to be burned in the Hand so that being tried by a Iury and a Court which had a Iurisdiction of the cause and the Marriage found a Prohibition was prayed Serjeant Levinz moved for a Consultation because no Court but the Ecclesiastical Court can examine a Marriage for in the Dower Writ is always directed to the Bishop to certifie the lawfulness of the Marriage and if this Woman should bury this Husband and bring a Writ of Dower and the Heir plead Ne unques accouple c. this Verdict and Conviction shall not be given in Evidence to prove the illegality of the Marriage but the Writ must go to the Bishop This is proved by the Case of Emerton and Hide in this Court The Man was married in fact and his Wife being detained from him she being in the Custody of Sir Robert Viner brought an Habeas Corpus she came into the Court but my Lord Hales would not deliver the Body but directed an Ejectment upon the Demise of John Emerton and Bridget his Wife that the Marriage might come in question It was found a Marriage and afterwards at an Hearing before the Delegates this Verdict was not allowed to be given in Evidence because in this Court one Iury may find a Marriage and another otherwise so that it cannot be tried whether they are legally married by a Temporal Court 'T is true this Court may controle the Ecclesiastical Courts but it must be eodem genere E contra E contra It was said that if a Prohibition should not go then the Authority of those two Courts would interfere which might be a thing of ill consequence If the lawfulness of this Marriage had been first tried in the Court Christian the other Court at the Old-Bayly would have given Credit to their Sentence But that Court hath been prohibited in a Case of the like nature 2 Cro. 535. for a Suit was there commenced for saying That he had a Bastard The Defendant alledged that the Plaintiff was adjudged the reputed Father of a Bastard by two Iustices of the Peace according to the Statute and so justified the speaking of the words and this being refused there a Prohibition was granted and so it was in this Case by the Opinion of three Iudges Dr. Hedges a Civilian being present in the Court said that Marriage or no Marriage never came in question in their Court upon a Libel for Jactitation unless the Party replies a lawful Marriage and that the Spiritual Court ought not to be silenced by a Proof of a Marriage de facto in a Temporal Court for all Marriages ought to be de jure of which their Courts had the proper Iurisdiction Sir John Newton versus Francis Creswick IN an Action on the
Where an Averment may be made of another person so as it consists with the Condition of a Bond. in which Bond the said A. B. the elder and A. B. the younger were joyntly and severally bound in the penal Sum of 1000 l. conditioned that if the above bounden A. B. omitting the word younger do and shall forbear knowingly and wittingly to come to or write Letters unto C. the Wife of D. that then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleaded that he did not come to or write Letters to the said C. knowingly c. The Plaintiff replied that he exhibited an Information against A. B. the younger shewing in what Term and that it was agreed between them that in consideration that he would forbear to prosecute the same the said A. B. the elder together with A. B. the younger should become bound to the Plaintiff in 1000 l. that the said A. B. the younger should not knowingly or wittingly come into the Company c. then sets forth the Bond and the Condition thereof at large and avers that A. B. in the Condition mentioned is A. B. the younger and farther that the said A. B. the younger did afterwards knowingly come into the Company c. The Defendant re-joyned and said that the Plaintiff ought not to averr that the aforesaid A. B. the younger is the person in the Condition of the said Bond c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Plaintiff was estopped by the words in the Condition to make such an Averment It was argued for the Plaintiff that he might make such an Averment which is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was very incertain before if it be not repugnant in it self nay sometimes an Averment doth reduce contradictory things to a certainty 'T is plain that A. B. the younger is bound in this Bond the Objection is that A. B. the elder being of the Name and being likewise bound that the Condition might referr to either 'T is agreed there are many Cases where a Man shall be estopped to averr against a Record but this Averment is not contradictory to any thing in the Record for it appears by the Pleadings that the Information was prosecuted against A. B. the younger and therefore he must be intended to be bound not to come to the said C. knowingly c. If an Estate should be devised to A. and the Name of the Testator omitted in the Will 2 Leon. 35. yet the Devise is good by averring of the Name and by proof that it was his intention to give it him by his Will So if the Plaintiff should claim a Title under the Grant of such a person Knight and the Iury find he was an Esquire Lit. Rep. 181 223. but that the Knight and the Esquire are both the same person this is a good Declaration 'T is usual to make an Allegation even against the express words of a Condition to shew the truth of an Agreement Cro. Car. 501. as if Debt be brought upon a Bond of 100 l. conditioned to pay 50 l. within six Months the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Vsury the Plaintiff replied that he lent the Mony for a year and alledged that by the mistake of the Scrivener the Bond was made paiable in six Months The Defendant rejoyned that it was lent for six Months only And upon a Demurrer this was adjudged to be a good Allegation though it was against the very words of the Condition which is a stronger Case than this at the Barr because the Averment consists with the Condition of the Bond. If a Man should levy a Fine and declare the Vses thereof to his Son William and he hath two Sons of that Name 4 Co. 71. 8 Co. 155. a. Dyer 146. then an Averment is made that he intended to declare the Vses to his youngest Son of that Name this Averment out of the Fine hath been adjudged good for the same reason given already which is because it standeth with the words thereof and 't is a good Issue to be tried It cannot be objected that the Bond is illegal being entred into for the not prosecuting of an Information because a Nolle prosequi was entred as to that Matter so 't is the Act of the Court. Lastly It was said that every Estoppel must be certain to every intent which cannot be in this Case for by the words of this Condition 't is incertain which of the Obligors shall be intended E contra It was argued that an Estoppel is as well intended by Law as expressed by Words that if an Averment can be taken yet this is not well because the Plaintiff hath absolutely averred that A. B. in the Condition is A. B. the younger he should have said that A. B. in the Condition is intended A. B. the younger which might have been traversed and Issue taken thereon No Iudgment was given for this Case was ended by Compromise Hoil versus Clerk In the Common-Pleas THIS was a special Verdict in Ejectment for Lands in Wetherfield A subsequent Will though not made pursuant to the Statute is a Revocation of a former in the County of Essex upon the demise of Abigail Pheasant The Iury find that one John Clark was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will in writing bearing date the 14th day of September in the year 1666. devised the same to Benjamin Clark for Life so to his first and second Sons c. in Tayl Male and for default of such Issue then to his two Sisters for Life Remainder over c. This Will was attested by one Witness only They find that the said John Clark made another dated the sixth day of February 1672. which was 13 years after the making of his first Will and that by this last Will he revoked all former Wills and Testaments by him made They find an Endorsement on this Will written by the Testator himself in these words Viz. My Will and Testament dated the 6th of February 1679. and then published by me in the presence of three Witnesses They find that this last Will was so published and attested by three Witnesses in his presence but that it was not signed by the Testator in their presence They find that Benjamin Clark entred and devised the Lands to Mary Micklethwaite who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff for three years upon whom the Defendant entred This Case was argued at the Bar and in this Term at the Bench Seriatim The single Question was 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. whether this last Will not being duly executed according to the Statute is a Revocation of the first Will or not It was admitted by all that it was a good Will to pass the personal Estate but as to the point of Revocation the Court was divided Iustice Lutwitch argued that it was not a Revocation He agreed that if the last Will hath any respect to the first it must be as a
on the 29th day of April seize the Goods of the said Toplady that after the seizure and before any Venditioni exponas viz. 4 Maij an Extent which is a Prerogative Writ issued out of the Exchequer against two persons who were indebted to the King and by inquisition this Toplady was found to be indebted to them whereupon parcel of the Goods in the Declaration was seized by the Sheriffs upon the said Extent and sold and the Mony paid to the Creditors but before the said Sale or any execution of the Exchequer Process a Commission of Bankrupcy was had against Toplady and that the Commissioners on the second of June assigned the Goods to the Plaintiff The Question was whether this Extent did not come too late And it was held it did or whether the Fi. Fa. was well executed so that the Assignees of the Bankrupts Estate could not have a Title to those Goods which were taken before in Execution and so in Custodia Legis And it was held that they had no Title Fitzgerald versus Villiers WRIE of Error upon a Iudgment in Dower Infant must appear by Guardian and the Error assigned was that the Tenant in Dower was an Infant and no Warrant was alledged of the admission of any Guardian 29 Assise pl. 67. Bridg. 74. Lib. Entr. 45. Hut 92. 4 Co. 53. Lit. 92. Hetl. 52. 3 Cro. 158. Moor 434. Hob. 5. that it might appear to be the act of the Court 't is true an Infant may sue by Prochein Amy but shall not appear by Attorny but by Guardian because 't is intended by Law that he hath not sufficient discretion to chuse an Attorny therefore 't is provided that he appear per Guardianum which is done by the Court who are always careful of Infancy and a special Entry is made upon the Roll. Viz. Per Guardianum ad hoc per Curiam admissum c. 2. The Appearance is by the Guardian in his own Name Viz. Et praedicta Katherina Fitzgerald per Richardum Power Guardianum suum venit dicit quod ipse c. it should have been in the name of the Party quod ipsa c. Adjurnatur Harrison versus Austin A Settlement was made as followeth Viz. What words amount to a Covenant to stand seised That if I have no Issue and in case I dye without Issue of my Body lawfully begotten then I give grant and confirm my Land c. to my Kinswoman Sarah Stokes to have and to hold the same to the use of my self for Life and after my decease to the use of the said Sarah and the Heirs of her Body to be begotten with Remainders over c. The Question was whether this did amount to a Covenant to stand seised so as to raise an use to Sarah without transmutation of the possession The Objection against it was Sid. 26. Moor 687. Dyer 96. 2 Roll. Abr. 786. Winch 59. Plowd 300. that Vses are created chiefly by the intention of the Parties and that by these words grant and confirm the Feoffor did intend the Land should pass at Common Law so it could not be a Covenant to stand seised 't is like the Case where a Letter of Attorny is in the Deed or a Covenant to make Livery there nothing shall pass by way of use but the possession according to the course of the Common Law and therefore there being neither Livery and Seisin or Attornment no use will pass to Sarah It cannot be a Bargain and Sale for that is only where a Recompence is on each side to make the Contract good besides 2 Inst 672. the Deed is not inrolled To this it was answered 1 Vent 137. that it shall be construed to be a Covenant to stand seised though the formal words are wanting to make it so and for that purpose it was compared to Fox 's Case 8 Co. 93. who being seised in Fee devised his Land to C. for Life remainder over for Life reserving a Rent and afterwards by Indenture in consideration of Mony did demise grant and set the same Lands to D. for 99 years reserving a Rent the Lessee for Life did not attorn in which Case there was not one word of any use or any attornment to make it pass by Grant and the Question was whether this Lease for years shall amount to a Bargain and Sale so that the Reversion together with the Rent shall pass to the Lessee without Attornment Hob. 277. and it was held that by construction of Law it did amount to a Bargain and Sale for the words import as much And in this Case it was adjudged that it was a Covenant to stand seised Hexham versus Coniers IN Ejectment the Plaintiff declared de uno Messuagio sive Tenemento An Ejectment will lye for a Tenement and had a Verdict but Iudgment was arrested because an Ejectment will not lye of a Tenement for 't is a word of an uncertain signification it may be an Advowson House or Land but it is good in Dower so is Messuagium sive Tenementum vocat ' the Black Swan for this addition makes it certain that the Tenement intended is a House Rex versus Bunny A Motion was made for a Melius inquirendum to be directed to a Coroner who had returned his Inquisition upon the death of Bunny that he was not compos mentis when in truth he was Felo de se But it was opposed by Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Law gives great credit to the Inquest of a Coroner and that a Melius inquirendum is seldom or never granted tho' it appear to the Court upon Affidavits that the Party had his Senses Mod. Rep. 82. It hath been granted where any fault is in the Coroner or any incertainty in the Inquisition returned That there is such a Writ it cannot be denied Cro. Eliz. 371. but 't is generally granted upon Offices or Tenures and directed to the Sheriff 3 Keb. 800. but never to a Coroner in the case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum Corporis DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. In Trinity-Vacation last Mr. Justice Holloway and Mr. Justice Thomas Powell had their Quietus and Mr. Serjeant Baldock and Mr. Serjeant Stringer were made Justices of this Court And Mr. Justice Allibon who was a Roman Catholick died in the same Vacation and Sir John Powell one of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of this Court Sir Thomas Jennor another of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of the Common-Pleas and Mr. Serjeant Rotheram and Mr. Serjeant Ingoldby were made Barons of the Exchequer Wright Chief Justice Powel Justices Baldock Justices Stringer Justices Shuttleworth versus Garnet Intratur Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 965. THE Defendant was Tenant of Customary Lands held of the Manor of A. of which Manor B. was Lord
the first words the Legacy is released then the subsequent words viz. all Actions Suits and demands whatsoever which he had against the Defendant as Executor of Lawford must mean something 'T is true where general words are at the beginning of a Release and particular words follow if the general words agree with those which are particular the Deed shall be construed according to the special words But where there are such words at first and the conclusion is with general words as 't is in this Case both shall stand for the Rule is Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae antea specialiter sunt comprehensa 8 Co. 154. b. These words do also Release not only such Actions which he had in his own Right but also as Executor to Mr. Lawford If a Man hath a Lease in right of his Wife as Executrix to her former Husband and he grants all his Right and Title therein by this Grant the Right which he had by his Wife doth pass for the word His doth imply a propriety in possession But per totam Curiam Curia Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff If an Executor hath Goods of the Testators and also other Goods in his own Right and then grants omnia bona sua in strictness the Goods which he hath as Executor do not pass because they are not bona sua but so called because of the Possession which he hath and therefore it must be a great strein to make general words which are properly applicable to things which a Man hath in his own Right to extend to things which he hath as Executor It was never the intent of the Party to release more than what he had in his own Right and that appears by the Recital of the Legacy of 5 l. and therefore the words which follow must have a construction according to the intent of Donning at the time of the making the Release and shall be tied up to the foregoing words and then nothing will be discharged but the Legacy As if a Lease for years be made Dyer 255. and the Lessor enters into a Bond that he will suffer the Lessee quietly to enjoy during the Term without trouble of the Lessor or any other person if an Entry should be made upon the Lessee without the procurement or knowledge of the Lessor the Condition is not broken for the last words are tied up to the word suffer If the Legacy had not been released by particular words it would not have been discharged by a Release of all Actions and Demands whatsoever and therefore there would be a great inconvenience if these general words should be construed to Release any thing besides this Legacy for suppose there are two Executors and one refuseth to Administer but meeting with a Debtor of the Testator gives him a Release of all Actions will this amount to an acceptance of the Administration Certainly it will not The words in this Case are not of that extent as to Release Actions as an Execuror for 't is a Release which goeth to the right 'T is like the Case where one of the Avowants released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattel 1 Roll. Rep. 246. which was adjudged void upon a Demurrer because he had not then any Suit or Demand against the Plaintiff but had distreined the Beasts as Bayliff and in right of another Iustice Dolben cited a Case adjudged in B. R. in the year 1669. it was between Stokes and Stokes The Plaintiff released all which he had in his own Right there was a Bond in which his Name was used in Trust for another and afterwards he brought an Action of Debt upon that Bond to which the Release was pleaded The Plaintiff replied that the Release was only of all such Actions which he had in his own right and not such which he had in the right of another upon this they were at Issue and the Plaintiff had a Verdict and Mr. Sympson moved in Arrest of Iudgment that this Bond must be in his own Right But the Court affirmed the Iudgment Anonymus AN Action on the Case was brought for these words Words where actionable without a Colloquium viz. He stole the Colonel's Cupboard-Cloth It was made a Question whether these words were actionable there being no precedent discourse laid in the Declaration either of the Colonel or his Cupboard-Cloath But the Court held the words actionable for 't is a charge of Felony and if such words as now laid in this Declaration are not actionable any person may be scandalized for 't is and must be actionable to say of a Man that he stole my Lord's Horses or the Parson's Sheep tho' it doth not appear to what Lord or Parson they did belong Rex versus Silcot THE Defendant was convicted before a Iustice of the Peace Conviction for keeping a Gun not having a 100 l. per Annum and doth not say when 33 H. 8. c. 6. upon the Statute of H. 8. for keeping of a Gun and upon proof it did appear that he had not 100 l. per Annum The Record of the Conviction was removed into B. R. and this Exception was taken to it viz. non habuisset 100 l. per Annum but doth not say when for it may be that he had one hundred pound per Annum at the time when he kept a Gun but not when he was Convicted It was answered that the words non habuisset shall relate to all times past and is as much as to say nunquam habuit and the conclusion being contra formam Statuti must explain such words which seem to be doubtful This was compared to the Case where Debt was brought upon the Statute of R. 1 R. 3. c. 3. 3. for taking away of Goods before the Plaintiff was convicted of the Felony laid to his charge contra formam Statuti he being only committed upon suspicion now though he did not alledge that the Goods were taken Cro. Eliz. 749. for this cause it shall be intended they were so taken when no other cause is shewed Curia This is a conviction before a Iustice of the Peace and therefore the time when the Offence was committed should be certainly alledged viz. that the Defendant praedict Anno die had not 100 l. per Annum for which reason it was quashed Bisse versus Harcourt Hill 1 Gulielmi Rot. 217. THE Plaintiff brought an Action for 400l Replication not well concluded for so much Mony had and received of him by the Defendant The Defendant pleaded an Attainder of High Treason in Abatement and therefore ought not to answer the Declaration The Plaintiff replied that after he was Attainted and before this Action brought he was pardoned and concludes thus Unde petit Judicium dampna sua The Defendant demurs and for cause shewed Rast Ent. 663. b. 681. Co. Ent. 160. that the Replication is not well concluded for dampna sua
before a Coroner the person having drowned himself it was suffocat ' emergit fuit if it had stood singly upon the word emergit it had been insensible but the word suffocat ' expressing the sense it was held good 100 4. Where nothing is vested in the King before Office found ibid. 5. It must always be found that there is an Estate in the person offending and a cause of Forfeiture of that Estate to vest it in the King 336 Interest in a thing See Pardon 4. Where a Man may have an interest in a Chattel without a Property 61 2. Devise to a Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an interest vests in the Devisees but 't is otherwise in case of Administration for there no Interest vests till actual distribution 65 3. A Man may have a Property tho' not in himself as in the Case of Joyntenancy 97 Intestate See Administration Innuendo The proper office of it is to make the subject matter certain 53 2. It will not help insensible words 54 Joyntenancy and Tenancy in Common See Abatement 3. Baron and Feme 12. Interest 3. If one Joyntenant bring an Action against the other unless he pleads the Jointenancy in abatement the Plaintiff will recover 97 2. If two Coparceners lease a House and the Rent is arrear and one brings an Action and recovers Judgment shall be arrested because both ought to joyn 109 3. Tenants in Common must join in the personalty but 't is otherwise in real Actions for though their Estates are several yet the Damages to be recovered survive to all 109 251 4. Where one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow 251 Joint Action See Action for a wrong 6. Ioyntenancy 2 3. Where an Action may be joint or several at the Election of the Plaintiff 86 2. Where 't is brought against three Defendants who plead jointly the Jury may sever the Damages and the Plaintiff may take Execution de melioribus damnis as well as where their Pleas are several and Tryals at several times 101 102 3. Judgment against two and one brought a Writ of Error and assigned the Infancy of the other for Error the Writ was abated because both did not joyn 134 4. The Defendants in the original Action must joyn in a Writ of Error but it seems otherwise where the Plaintiffs bring Error 135 5. Two covenant to sell Lands and the Purchasor agreed to pay the Mony to one of them he alone ought to bring the Action 263 6 Where there are several Proprietors of a Vessel for carriage of Goods which are damaged by carrying the Action must be brought against all or against the Master alone 321 322 7 Where two Tenants in Common were sued for not setting out of Tythes the Action ought to be brought not against him who set them out but against the other who carried them away 322 8. Two are bound joyntly one is sued he may plead in Abatement that he was bound with another but cannot plead Non est factum 323 9 In all Cases which are grounded upon Contracts the Parties who are Privies must be joyned in the Action ibid. 10 Action must be brought against all where a promise is created by Law 324 Issue Must be joyned upon an affirmative and a negative by concluding to the Country 80 Iudges The making altering and displacing of several Judges Serjeants at Law and King's Council 71 99 100 104 125 143 191 239 Iustices of Peace Offences against the Statute of 23 Eliz c. 1. for not coming to Church may be enquired of by them in their Sessions 79 2. Where a Statute appoints a thing finally to be done by them yet the Court of King's Bench may take Cognizance of it 95 3. Conviction for keeping of a Gun before a Justice of Peace the time when he had not 100 l. per Annum must be precisely alledged 280 Iustification See Pleading 4 5. Where 't is pleaded by way of Excuse to an Action of Trespass for the taking of any thing the Defendant must averr the Fact to be done and set forth the Warrant to him directed and the taking virtute Warranti and not generally that he took it by a Mandate c. 138 2. In Replevin where the Defendant made Conusance in right of the Lord he may Justifie the taking generally ibid. Iudgment 1. At the Common Law no Execution could be of a Judgment after a year and a day but the remedy was to bring an Action of Debt upon Judgment 187 189 2. Now a Scire Fac. is given upon a Judgment after the year by the Statue of W. 2. 189 3. When a Judgment is once execucuted the Goods are in custodia legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or by the Commissioners of Bankrupts 236 L. Lapse See Notice Lease A Covenant in a Lease for years that the Lessee should pay the Rent without obliging his Executors or Administrators 't is determined by his Death 231 2. For 99 yeas if three persons or any of them so long live reserving a Rent and an Herriot upon the death of either the Beast of the Assignee shall not be taken for a Herriot for the Lessee is to pay his best Beast and that shall not be carried further than to the person named 231 Libel Where a Fine and Corporal punishment was imposed upon the Offender after Conviction 68 Limitation An Estate was setled upon Trustees to the use of A. and her Heirs provided she marry with the consent of Trustees remainder over to B. This is a Limitation and not a Condition 32 Limitation of Action See 21 Jac. 16. Where a Trespass is laid with a continuando for more than six years and the Statute pleaded and entire Damages it must be intended only for that which falls within the six years and that the Jury rejected the beginning of the Trespass 111 2. This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Account 112 3. It provides a Remedy when the Plaintiff is beyond Sea at the time when his Right accrews and saves it till he returns whether it may be extended in a Case where the Defendant is beyond Sea longer than six years from the time the Plaintiff was entituled to the Action 311 312 Local Actions Whether Covenant will lie by an Assignee of a Reversion against an Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land lieth 337 2. Debitum contractus sunt nullius loci ibid. 3. Debt for Rent upon a Lease for years brought upon the Contract and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory ibid. 4. If Privity of Contract is gone by making an Assignment and only a privity in Law remains the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth ibid. M. Mayor See Corporation Marriage See Condition 3. Evidence 7. Limitation Notice A Maid above 12 and under 16 taken from Parents or Guardian and Married forfeits her Estate to the next in
Man from having any Office whatsoever who shall affirm the King to be a Papist 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. that is a person who endeavours to introduce Popery 2. But if the word Papist is not actionable of it self yet as coupled with his Offices 't is otherwise and the Plaintiff may well maintain this Action And of that Opinion was all the Court So the Iudgment was affirmed Malloon versus Fitzgerald ERror of a Iudgment in Ireland Where an Estate Tail shall not be determined for want of notice of a Proviso to determine it for Lands in the County of Waterford the Case upon the special Verdict was this John Fitzgerald was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue Katherine his only Daughter He by Lease and Release made a Settlement of those Lands upon the Earl of Ossory and other Trustees therein named and their Heirs to the use of himself for Life and after his Decease to the use of his Daughter Katherine in Tail Provided that she Married with the consent of the said Earl and the Trustees or the major part of them or their Heirs some worthy person of the Family and Name of Fitzgerald or who should take upon him that Name immediately after the Marriage but if not then the said Earl should appoint and raise a Portion out of the said Lands for the Maintenance of the said Katherine with a Remainder to Laetitia in Tail John Fitzgerald died his Daughter being then but two years old She afterwards at the Age of fourteen had Notice of this Settlement but not by the Direction of the Trustees That on the 20th of March in the 16th year of her Age she Married with the Plaintiff Edward Villiers Esq without the consent of the Trustees or the major part of them and that her Husband Mr. Villiers did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald after the said Marriage That Laetitia the Aunt was married to Franklyn who likewise did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald 1. The Questions were Whether the Estate limited to Katherine be forfeited without Notice given to her of the Settlement by the Trustees themselves 2. Whether her Estate be not determined by her marrying Mr. Villiers without their consent And it was argued That the Estate Tail was determined And first as to the point of Notice 't is not necessary to be given to the Daughter because the Father had not made it in the Settlement He might dispose of his Estate at his pleasure and having made particular Limitations of it there is no room now for the Law to interpose to supply the defect of Notice in the Deed. And to this purpose the Mayor of London 's Case was cited which was That George Monox Devised certain Houses to his Executors in Trust and their Heirs Cro Car. 576. Idem Jones 452. upon condition to pay mony to several Charitable uses which if not performed then he devised them over to his Heir in Tail upon the same Conditions and if not performed by him then to the * The Devise to him was void because it was a possibility upon a possibility Mayor and Commonalty of London The Trusts were not performed by the first Devisees A Stranger entered and levied a Fine with Proclamations and five Years passed Then the Mayor of London brought his Action supposing he had a right of Entry for the non performance of the Trusts but was barred by the Fine although it was argued for him that he had not notice of the Devise or breach of the Trust till after the Fine levied which shews that Notice was not necessary for if it had been so when his Title accrewed he could not have been barred by the Fine As Katherine the Daughter takes notice what Estate she hath in the Land so as to pursue a proper Remedy to recover it so she ought to take notice of the Limitations in the Settlement and hath the same means to acquaint her self with the one as with the other and the same likewise as her Aunt had to know the Remainder Suppose a Promise is made to indempnifie another from all Bonds which he should enter into for a third person 2 Cro. 432. Hob. 51. Jones 207. Pop. 164. and then an Action is brought against him wherein the Plaintiff declared that he was bound accordingly and not saved harmless but doth not shew that he gave notice of his being bound yet the Plaintiff shall recover As to the Case of a Copyholder having three Sons who surrendred to the use of his Will 2 Cro. 56. and then devised to his middle Son in Fée upon condition to pay Legacies to his Sisters at full age which were not paid Now tho' it was adjudged that his Estate was not determined upon the non-performance of this Condition without an actual demand and denial and that he was not bound to take notice of the full age of his Sisters yet this is not an Authority which can any wise prevail in this Case because 't is a * If the Devise had been to the eldest Son then it had been a Limitation annexed to his Estate and not a Condition because if it had been a Condition it would have descended upon the Heir who could not be sued for the breach 1 Ventr 199. Rep. Canc. 140. Sid. Poph. 104. Condition to pay Legacies which is a thing in its nature not to be paid without a demand which implies notice In all Cases where Conditions are annexed to Estates to pay Mony there notice is necessary but where Estates are limited upon the performance of collateral acts 't is not necessary And this has been held the constant difference So is Fry and Porter 's Case which was this The Earl of Newport had two Daughters and he devised Newport House to the Daughter of his eldest Daughter in Tail which she had by the Earl of Banbury Provided and upon condition that she marry with the consent of her Mother and two other Trustees or the major part of them if not or if she should dye without Issue then he devised the said House to George Porter in Fee who was the Son of his youngest Daughter and who had married one Thomas Porter without her Fathers consent The Lady Ann Knowles the first Devisee married Fry without the consent of her Grandmother or Trustees and it was adjudg'd against her upon point of Notice that it was not necessary because her Grandfather had not appointed any person to give notice he might have imposed any Terms or Conditions upon his own Estate and all Parties concerned had the same means to inform themselves of such Conditions The third Resolution in Frances Case 8 Co. comes nearest to this now in question it was in Replevin the Defendant avowed the taking Damage Fesant The Plaintiff pleaded in Barr to the Avowry that R. Frances was seized in Fee of the place where c. and devised it to John who was his
Declaration was held to be naught for that very reason for if a Debt upon a Specialty be demanded the Declaration must be for the whole Sum if for less you must shew how the other was satisfied The Earl of Macklefield's Case THE Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Statute de Scandalis Magnatum against Sir Thomas Grosvenor Special Bail denied in a Scandalum Magnatum for that he being Foreman of the Grand Iury in Cheshire spoke these Words of the Plaintiff viz. That he was a tedious Man and a Promoter of Sedition and tedious Addresses The Plaintiff desired that the Defendant might put in Special Bail but the Court would not grant it and said it was a discretionary thing and not to be demanded of right It was denied to the Duke of Norfolk unless Oath made of the words spoken and therefore the Court ordered Common Bail to be filed Holloway's Case HE was taken at Nevis in the West-Indies and brought over hither and now appeared in Custody at the Barr being outlawed for High-Treason in the late Conspiracy Sir Samuel Astry Clerk of the Crown read the Indictment upon which he was outlawed and the King by his Attorney General consented that the Outlawry should be reversed which could not have been done without such consent and that he might come to his Trial but he having nothing to alledge in his defence other than that he had made an ingenuous Confession to the King and hoped that he might deserve Mercy the Court made a Rule for his Execution to be on Wednesday following and did not pronounce any Sentence against him and he was executed accordingly Dominus Rex versus Barnes al' THE Defendant Barnes and others were excommunicated for not coming to their Parish Churches who pleaded the Statute of 5 Eliz. 5 Eliz. c. 23. which inflicts pecuniary Penalties for not appearing upon the Capias but enacts That if the excommunicate person have not a sufficient addition according to the Statute of 1 H. 1 H. 5. c. 5. 5. or if in the Significavit it be not contained that the Excommunication proceeds upon several causes in that Statute mentioned and amongst the rest for refusing to come to Divine Service he shall not incurr the Penalties Now Mr. Pollexfen made these Objections 1. The Defendant was excommunicated for not coming to his Parish Church which is not required by this Statute for if he doth not tefuse to hear Divine Service in any Church the Penalties are saved 2. The Statute of Additions requires that the Condition and Dwelling place of the Defendant shall be inserted which was not done in this Case for they are excommunicated by the Names of A. B. Mercator B. C. Scissor ' E. F. de Parochia c. which last Addition of the Parish shall referr to him only last mentioned and not to all the rest and so it was always ruled in Indictments Attorney General contra The Statute of 5 Eliz. is grounded upon that of 1 of the Queen which enjoins every person to resort to his Parish Church or upon lett thereof to some other or to forfeit 12 d. every Sunday and Holy day to be levied by the Churchwardens there for the use of the Poor Now though the Parish is not named in this Act yet the Law must be interpreted as it was then 2. The word Parish goes to all so 't is in Informations for Riots And by Astry Clerk of the Crown t is always so in Significavits Tamen quaere Curia If the Defendant had pleaded below or here that he had heard Divine Service in any other Church though not in his own Parish the Penalties should not have went out but being now incurred there is no remedy and the word Parish goes to all preceding Prodgers versus Frazier IN Trespass The Defendant pleaded The Grant of the Custody of an Ideot passeth an Interest to the Executor of the Grantee that before the time of the Trespass supposed to be committed Bridget Dennis was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who by a Writ de Indeota inquirendo was found to be an Ideot not having any lucid intervals per spacium octo annorum c. by virtue whereof the King was entituled who granted the Custody to Sir Alexander Frazier who died and that the Defendant Mary Frazier was his Executrix The Plaintiff replyed and confessed the Ideocy but that the King granted the Custody of the Ideot to the Plaintiff And upon this Replication the Defendant demurred In this Case it was agreed by the Council on both sides that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole interest in him of granting the Estate of an Ideot to whom he pleaseth without any account but 't is otherwise in case of a Lunatique for there the Grantee shall have nothing to his own use but must put in Security to account to the Lunatick if ever he comes to be capable or else to his Executors or Administrators Vide Frances's Case in Moor fol. 4. But the Questions that did arise in this Case were 1. That there was not sufficient Title found for the King for by the Inquisition the Ideot was found to be so per spatium octo annorum c. which is incertain because before that time she might have lucida intervalla and then she cannot be an Ideot without being naturally so therefore the Iury ought to have found her an Ideot a nativitate for that is the only matter which vests an interest in the King But it was answered and agreed by the Court that the finding her to be an Ideot was sufficient without the addition of any other words and therefore per spacium octo annorum shall be surplusage for in this Case Words are not so much to be regarded as the reason of the Law which doth not allow of Ideocy otherwise than a nativitate But supposing a seeming incertainty in this Office found yet it being said generally that she was an Ideot the subsequent words shall not hurt because the general finding shall be taken in that sense which is most for the advantage of the King As for Example Dyer 155. b. 161. b. 306. b. It was found by Office that a person died seised of two Mannors and that he held one of the Queen by Knights Service generally and the other of a Mesne Lord in Chivalry which is the same Tenure now it was held that the first general finding shall be intended Knights Service in Capite because it was most for the King's benefit that he might thereby be entituled to the Wardship of the Heir who was found to be under Age. 2. Whether the Grant of the Custody of an Ideot will pass any Interest to the Executor of the Grantee because such a Grant carries a Trust with it and the King may have some knowledge and consideration of the Grantee but not of his Executor To which it was answered that here was an interest coupled with a
hath been the constant course for many years in such Actions to set forth the Antiquity of the thing either in express terms or in words which amount to it In 8 Eliz. such an Action was brought Dyer 248. B. Quod defendens divertit multum aquae cursum per levationem constructionem Waerae c. per quod multum aquae quae ad molendinum of the Plaintiff currere consuevit e contra recurrit Which word consuevit doth imply that it was an ancient Mill for otherwise the Water could not be accustomed to run to it Anno 25 Eliz. the like Action was brought 1 Leon. 273. Russel versus Handford wherein the Plaintiff declared Quod cum molendinum quoddam ab antiquo fuit erectum whereof he was seized and the Defendant erected a new Mill per quod cursus aquae pred coarctatus fuit And eighteen years afterwards was Lutterell 's Case in this Court 4 Co. 86. wherein the Plaintiff shewed that he was seized of two old and ruinous Fulling Mills and that time out of Mind magna pars aquae cujusdam rivoli did run from a certain place to the said Mills and that during all that time there had been a certain Bank to keep the current of the said Water within its bounds c. That the Plaintiff did pull down those old Mills and erected two new Mills and the Defendant digged down the Bank c. The like Action happened 14 Car. I. Cro. Car. 499. Palm 290. it was for diverting an ancient Watercourse Qui currere consuevisset debuisset to the Plaintiffs Mill. In all which Cases 1 Roll. Abr. 107. tho' there are various ways of declaring yet they all shew that the constant course was to alledge that the Mills were ancient for 't is that which intitles the Party to his Action 'T is for this reason also that if two Men have contiguous Houses and one stops the other's Lights if they are not ancient an Action will not lye for stopping of them up There may be some seeming difference between a Right to a Watercourse and to Lights in a Window for no Man can prescribe to Light Quatenus such because 't is of common Right to all Men and cannot be claimed but as affixed to a particular thing or purpose A Watercourse may be claimed to several purposes but Water is of as universal use and benefit to Mankind as Light and therefore no particular Man hath a Right to either but as belonging to an antient House or ruunning to an ancient Mill or for some other antient Vse Anno 15 Car. Cro. Car. 575. Sands versus Trefusis I. The Plaintiff Sands declared that he was seised in Fee of a Mill and had a Watercourse running thro' the Defendants Lands to the said Mill and that he stopped it up There was a Demurrer to this Declaration and the same Objection as now was then taken to it viz. that he had not shewed that it was an ancient Mill. And though the Court seemed to over-rule that Objection yet no Iudgment was given The Case of Sly and Mordant was there cited which is Reported by Mr. 1 Leon. 247. id 1 Rol. Abr. 104. Leonard and is this viz. That the Plaintiff was seised in Fee of certain Lands c. and the Defendant had stopped a Watercourse by which his Land was drowned it was adjudged that the Action would lie for this Injury but that is no Authority to support this Declaration 2. The Plaintiff hath not entituled himself to this Water-course either by Prescription or that the Water debuit vel consuevit currere to his Mill for so is the Pleading in Lutterell 's Case and in all the other Cases before cited 3. Therefore the Plea in Bar is good the Defendant having sufficiently justified his Right and the Plaintiff having not Prescribed to it here can be no Trespass done and so concluded that Iudgment ought to be reversed This Case depends upon the Declaration Ex parte Quer. for the Plea in Bar is only argumentative 't is no direct answer to it and the Replication and Rejoynder are not material The Plaintiff hath a good cause of Action for it cannot be denied but where an injury is done to another and Damages ensue 't is sufficient to maintain an Action of Trespass or upon the Case 'T is plain that an Injury was done to the Plaintiff and the Damage is as manifest by diverting of the Watercourse and the loss of his Mill and the Fact is laid to be injuste malitiose The Defendant gives no reason why he injured him but only that he had no use of the Water because his Mill was burnt This is an Action brought by the Plaintiff upon his Possession against a wrong doer Roll. 339 394. Palm 290. in which it is not necessary to be so particular as where one prescribes for a Right A Man may have a Watercourse * Bracton lib. 4. cap. 32. by Grant as well as by Prescription and in such case be need not set forth any particular use of the Water as that it ought to run to his Mill neither is it absolutely necessary to mention the Mill for that is only to inform the Court of the Damages In the Printed Entries there are many Forms of Declarations without any Prescription Rast Ent. 9. B. or setting forth that the Mill was antient as where an Action was brought against the Defendant De placito quare vi armis stagnum molendini ipsius the Plaintiff fregit and this was only upon the Possession Antea The Case in Dyer is a good Authority to support this Action for 't is as general as this viz. for diverting a Watercourse per Constructionem Waerae and doth not shew where it was erected or what Title he had to it So where the Action was for disturbing the Plaintiff 2 Cro. 43. Dent vers Oliver Nota This was after Verdict in collecting of Toll and doth not shew what Title he had to it either by Prescription or Grant but declared only that he was seised in Fee of a Manor and Fair and held good And it was the Opinion of my Lord Hobert That a Declaration for breaking down of a Bank generally includentem aquam Hob. 193. Biccot versus Ward running to the Plaintiffs Mill was good The Authorities cited on the other side do rather maintain this way of Pleading than the contrary for those Cases are wherein the Plaintiff declared that the Water currere consuevit debuisset to the Plaintiffs Mill time out of mind Cro. Car. 499. which words are of the same signification as if he had shewed it to be an antient Mill and that agrees in substance with this Case for the Water cannot be diverted ab antiquo solito cursu if the Mill was not ancient The word solet implies Antiquity Reg. 153. The Writ De secta admolendinum is
for to such the Defendant Preached and to them he declared the power given unto him by God to heal them by Prayer Then he tells them that their King is wicked and having insinuated this Doctrine into their Minds he then bids them stand to their Principles in opposing and subduing wicked Kings 'T is objected that there ought to have been a precedent Discourse of the King but the Presidents are otherwise In 33 H. 8. Rot. 17. There was an Indictment against the Lord Grey for words spoken against the King without setting forth any precedent Discourse of him So was my Lord Cobham 's Case in 12 Jac. for that he proditorie dixit pro palavit haec verba viz. It will never be well for England until the King and his Cubbs are killed without an Avernient that the words were spoken de Rege And in William 's Case 2 Roll Rep. 88. Reported by my Lord Rolls who was Indicted for High Treason for writing two Books in which were many Traiterous Assertions but no Averment of any previous Discourse concerning the King all these Indictments were thus viz. Dixit such words de Domino Rege Therefore the Indictment is good in form if the words therein contained amount to Treason now they do import Treason or not if they do import it then 't is unnecessary to aver that they were spoken de Rege because it cannot be intended to be Treason against any other King If a Man should say that he would go to Whitehal and kill the King 't is not necessary to averr any precedent Discourse de Rege In Actions on the Case for Words there must be an Averment of the person because many men are of the same Name but in Indictments the form will govern the Case Several Traitors have suffered Death in such Cases as this at Bar and many learned Men in all Ages have attended this Court and this Objection was never made till now and therefore the Presidents being without this Averment de Rege where the overt Act is by words Iudgment was prayed against the Prisoner Curia Words may be an overt Act but then they must be so certain and positive as plainly to denote the intention of the speaker If a Man should tell another that he would drive the King out of England there needs no averment that such words were spoken de Rege because they tend immediately to depose the King but if he had said that he would go to Whitehal and destroy his Enemies that is not Treason without an Averment c. Iudgment was arrested DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Pool versus Trumbal THE Defendant was sued in the Spiritual Court for Dilapidations 25 Car. 2. cap. 5. and pleaded the general Pardon by which all Offences Contempts Penalties c. were pardoned and for this reason he prayed a Prohibition but it was denied because the Statute never intended to pardon any satisfaction for Damages but only to take away Temporal Punishments Dorrington versus Edwin Mich. 36 Car. II. Rot. 277. SCire Facias against Pledges in a Replevin brought by Pleint Sci. Fac. will lye against pledges in Replevin by pleint setting forth that John Temple did levy a Pleint in the Sheriffs Court of London for the taking of three Baggs of Mony in which Suit he found Pledges de prosequendo de retorno habendo if it should be awarded That this Pleint was transmitted out of that Court into the Hustings and by * If it had not been a Court of Record it might have been remov'd by Re falo Dalt 425. 9 Hob. 6.58 13 Ed. 1. cap. 2. F. N. B. 74. F. Dalt 273. Certiorari removed into the Kings-Bench where the Plaintiff declared as aforesaid c. Dorrington avowed the taking c. and Temple was Non-suited and thereupon a Retorn ' Habend ' was awarded to the Sheriff who returned elongat ' c. Then a Sci. Fa. was brought against the Pledges upon the Statute of Westm 2. which provides that where Lords upon Replevins cannot obtain Justice in Inferiour Courts against their Tenants when such Lords are attached at their Tenants Suits they may have a Recordari to remove the Plea before the Justices c. and the Sheriff shall not only take Pledges of the Plaintiff to prosecute his Suit but also to return the Cattle if a Return be awarded c. The Defendants appeared and prayed Oyer of the Certiorari which was returned by the Mayor and Sheriffs only without the Aldermen And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether a Scire Facias will lie against them by virtue of this Statute they being only Pledges in Replevin brought by Pleint without Writ This Case was argued by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendants And for the Defendants it was said that they could not be charged by this Scire Facias because the Pleint was removed by Certiorari and thereby the Plaintiff Dorrington had lost the benefit he had against the Pledges in the Sheriffs Court This Case was compared to other Actions in inferior Courts which if removed by Habeas Corpus the Bail below are discharged of course By the Common Law there were no Pledges of Retorn ' habend Dyer 246. for before this Statute the Sheriff could not make a Replevin without the King 's Writ Now he hath power to take Pledges but if he will make deliverance of the Goods ad querelam alicujus sine brevi the fault is still in him for he may * Dalt 434. compel the Party to bring a Writ and then the Pledges will be liable because it will appear who they are And therefore it hath been adjudged Cro. Car. 446. that where a Replevin is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without taking Pledges because if the Plaintiff should recover he hath a remedy against them by Scire Facias but if he recover upon a Replevin brought by Pleint Cro. Car. 594. the Iudgment shall not be avoided by assigning the want of Pledges for Error because in such Case the Sheriff is not by Law obliged to take Pledges 2. This Scire Facias is brought too soon for there ought to go an Alias Pluries Retorn ' habend before the Return of Elongata and then and not before the Scire Facias is properly brought The Pledges are answerable E contra and the Scire Facias is well brought and this grounded upon the Statute of W. 2. which directs Pledges to be taken before the delivery of the Goods It takes notice that Replevins were sued in inferior Courts by the Tenants against their Lords who had distrained for Rents due for Services or Customs and that such Lords could not have Iustice done in those Courts and therefore to remedy this mischief the Statute gives the Writ Recordare c. to remove the Pleint before the Iustices and because such Tenants after they had replevied their Cattle did usually
Dorothy Margery survived and is since dead The Question was whether upon this Reservation the Beast of any person being upon the Land may be distreined for an Heriot Mr. Pollexfen argued that it could not because the words in the Reservation ought to be taken very strictly and not to be carryed farther than the plain expression Where words are doubtful they have been always expounded against the Lessor Cro. Eliz. 217. 2 Roll. Abr. 448. Latch 99. as if a Lease be made for years reserving a Rent durante termino to the Lessor his Executors or Assigns the Lessor dies his Heir shall not have the Rent because 't is reserved to the Executors But here is no room for any doubt upon these words for if a Lease for years be made in which there is a Covenant that the Lessee shall pay the Rent without any other words this determines upon the death of the Lessee So where a Lease was made for 99 years if A. B. C. 2 Rol. Abr. 451. Hetley 58. Cro. Car. 314. or any of them should so long live reserving Rent to him and his Executors and also at or upon the death of either his or their best Beast in the name of an Heriot provided that if B. or C. die living A. no Heriot shall be paid after their deaths A. assigns his Term and the Beast of the Assignee was taken for an Heriot but adjudged that it could not for the words his or their shall not be carried farther than to the persons named in the Limitation The Books that affirm that a Man may seize for an Heriot Service cannot be brought as Authorities in this Case because they are all upon Tenures between Lord and Tenant and not upon particular Reservations as this is The old Books say that if a Tenant by Fealty and Heriot-Service Broke tit Heriot 2. made his Executor and died that the Lord might seize the best Beast of his Tenant in the Hands of the Executor and if he could not find any Beast then he might distrain the Executor Plo. Com. 95. and the reason of this seizure was because immediately upon the death of the Tenant a Property was vested in the Lord but it was held always unreasonable to put him to distrain when he might seise And it is now held that for Heriot-Service the Lord may either distrain or seise but then if he makes a seisure Cro. Car. 260. Jones 300. it must be the very Beast of the Tenant but if he distrain he may take any persons Cattle upon the Land So that admitting this to be Law yet it proves nothing to this matter because such Services being by Tenure shall not be extended to those which are created within time of memory upon particular reservations for by those ancient Tenures the Lords had many Priviledges which cannot be upon Reservations Besides the seisures in those Cases were by the Lords who continued so to be at the very time of the seisure but in our Case the Lease is determined by the death of the last Life so the Priviledge is lost and then it must stand upon the particular words in the Deed. Sed adjornatur into the Exchequer Chamber the Iudges being divided in Opinion Vid. 2 Sand. 165. Shipley versus Chappel Pasch 3 Jac. Rot. 404. THE Plaintiff Shipley as Administrator of Hannah his Wife Condition of two parts in the disjunctive and one part becomes impossible to be done yet the other must be performed according to the subsequent matter brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond against Chappel an Attorny for 140 l. The Defendant craved Dyer of the Condition which was Viz. Whereas Hannah Goddard who was Wife to the Plaintiff and Thomas Chappel of Greys-Inn in the County of Middlesex are Coparceners according to the Common-Law of one House with the Appurtenances in Sheffeild in the possession of William White and whereas the said Hannah Goddard hath paid unto Thomas Chappel the Father for the use of his Son the Sum of 72 l. in consideration that the said Thomas Chappel the Son when he attains the Age of 21 years which will be about Midsomer next do by good Conveyance in the Law at the costs and charges of the said Hannah Goddard convey his said moiety of the said House with the Appurtenances unto her and her Heirs Now the Condition of this Obligation is such That if the said Thomas Chappel the Son shall at the Age of 21 years convey his said moiety of the said House or otherwise if the said Thomas Chappel the Father his Heirs Executors or Administrators shall pay or cause to be paid the sum of 72 l. with lawful Interest for the same unto the said Hannah Goddard her Executors Administrators or Assigns that then this Obligation to be void Then he pleaded that his Son Thomas Chappel was Coparcener with Hannah Goddard as Co-heires of Elizabeth Goddard that Thomas came of Age and that before that time Hannah died without Issue The Plaintiff replied that true it is that before Thomas Chappel the Son came of Age the said Hannah died without Issue of her Body that Elizabeth Goddard before the making of the said Bond died seised in Fee of the said Messuage but that she first married with one Malm Stacy by whom she had Issue Lydia that Malm her Husband died and Elizabeth married John Goddard by whom he had Issue Hannah their only Daughter and Heir that John Goddard died and that Lydia Stacy married the Defendant Thomas Chappel by whom he had Issue Thomas Chappel his Son that Lydia died in the life-time of Elizabeth that Thomas Chappel hath not paid the 72 l. to Hannah in her life time or to John Shipley after her death The Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joyned in Demurrer The Question was since the word Heirs in the Condition being a word of Limitation and not of any designation of the person whether the death of Hannah Goddard before Chappel the Son came of Age and who was to make the Conveyance shall excuse the Defendant from the payment of the Mony Those who argued for the Defendant 5 Co. 21. b. chiefly relied upon Laughter's Case which was viz. Laughter and Rainsford were bound that if R. after marriage with G. together with the said G. shall sell a Messuage c. if then R. do or shall in his life-time purchase for the said G. and her Heirs and Assigns Lands of as good value as the Mony by him received by the said Sale or leave her as much Mony at his decease then c. G. died R. did not purchase Lands of an equal value with that he sold and upon Demurrer it was held that where a Condition consisteth of two parts in the disjunctive and both possible at the time of the Bond made and afterwards one is become impossible by the act of God there the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part because the Condition is made for
c. yet one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow besides in this Case they are not Tenants in Common for every Man is seized severally of his Freehold Adjornatur Ayres versus Huntington AScire Facias was brought upon a Recognizance of 1000 l. Amendment of the word Recuperatio for Recognitio after a Demurrer to shew cause quare the Plaintiff should not have Execution de praedictis mille libris recognitis juxta formam Recuperationis where it should have been Recognitionis praed And upon a Demurrer it was held that the words juxta formam Recuperationis were Surplusage The Record was amended and a Rule that the Defendant should plead over Mather and others versus Mills THE Defendant entred into a Bond to acquir Non damnificatus generally where 't is a good Plea discharge and save harmless a Parish from a Bastard Child Debt was brought upon this Bond and upon Non damnificatus generally pleaded the Plaintiff demurred and Tremain held the Demurrer to be good for if the Condition had been only to save harmless c. then the Plea had been good but 't is likewise to acquit and discharge c. and in such Case Non damnificatus generally is no good Plea 1 Leon. 71. because he should have shewed how he did acquit and discharge the Parish and not answer the Damnification only E contra E contra 2 Co. 3. 2 Cro. 363 364 2 Sand. 83 84. It was argued that if the Defendnat had pleaded that he kept harmless and discharged the Parish such Plea had not been good unless he had shewed how c. because 't is in the affirmative but here 't is in the negative viz. that the Parish was not dampnified and they should have shewed a Breach for though in strictness this Plea doth not answer the Condition of the Bond yet it doth not appear upon the whole Record that the Plaintiff was dampnified and if so then he hath no cause of Action Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Memorandum That on the 4th day of November last past the Prince of Orange landed here with an Army and by reason of the Abdication of the Government by King James and the Posture of Affairs there was no Hillary-Term kept Coram Johanne Holt Mil ' Capital ' Justic Gulielmo Dolben Mil ' Justiciar Gulielmo Gregory Mil ' Justiciar Egidio Eyre Mil ' Justiciar Kellow versus Rowden Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 796. IN Debt by Walter Kellow Where the Reversion in Fee is expectant upon an Estate Tail and that being spent it descends upon a collateral Heir he must be sued as Heir to him who was last actually seized of the Fee without naming the intermediate Remainders Executor of Edward Kellow against Richard Rowden The Case was this viz. John Rowden had Issue two Sons John and Richard John the Father being seized in Fee of Lands c. made a Settlement to the use of himself for Life the Remainder to John his eldest Son in Tail Male the Remainder to his own right Heirs The Father died the Reversion descended to John the Son who also died leaving Issue John his Son who died without Issue so that the Estate Tail was spent Richard the second Son of John the elder entred and an Action of Debt was brought against him as Son and Heir of John the Father upon a Bond of 120 l. entred into by his Father and this Action was brought against him without naming the intermediate Heirs viz. his Brother and Nephew The Defendant pleaded Quod ipse de debito praed ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden Patris sui virtute scripti obligatorii praed onerari non debet quia protestando quod scriptum obligatorium praed non est factum praed Johannis Rowden pro placito idem Richardus dicit quod ipse non habet aliquas terras seu tenementa per discensum haereditarium de praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici nec habuit die exhibitionis billae praed Walteri praed nec unquam postea hoc parat est ' verificare unde pet judicium si ipse ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden patris sui virtute scripti praed onerari debeat c. The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant die Exhibitionis billae praed habuit diversas terras tenementa per discensum haereditarium a praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici c. Vpon this pleading they were at Issue at the Assises in Wiltshire and the Iury found a special Verdict viz. that John Rowden the Father of Richard now the Defendant was seized in Fee of a Messuage and 20 Acres of Land in Bramshaw in the said County and being so seised had Issue John Rowden his eldest Son and the Defendant Richard that on the 22th of Januarii 18 Car. I. John the elder did settle the Premisses upon himself for Life Remainder ut supra c. That after the death of the Father John his eldest Son entred and was possessed in Fee-Tail and was likewise entituled to the Reversion in Fee and died in the 14th year of King Charles the II. that the Lands did descend to another John his only Son who died 35th Car. II. without Issue whereupon the Lands descended to the Defendant as Heir of the last mentionted John who entred before this Action brought and was seised in Fee c. But whether upon the whole matter the Defendant hath any Lands by by descent from John Rowden in Fee-simple the Iury do not know c. The Council on both sides did agree that this Land was chargable with the Debt but the Question was whether the Issue was found for the Defendant in regard the Plaintiff did not name the intermediate Heirs It was argued that the Defendant ought to be sued as immediate Heir to his Father and not to his Nephew for whoever claims by descent must claim from him who was last actually seised of the Freehold and Inheritance this is the express Doctrine of my Lord Coke in his first Institutes and if so Co. Lit. 11. the Defendant must be charged as he claims Seisin is a material thing in our Law for if I am to make a Title in a real Action I must lay an actual seisin in every Man 8 E. 3.13 Bro. Assise 6. F.N. B. 212. F. 't is so in Formedons in Descender and Remainder in both which you are to run through the whole Pedegree But none can be Filius Haeres but to him who was last actually seised of the Fee-simple and therefore the Brother being Tenant in Tail and his Son the Issue in Tail in this Case they were never seised of the Fee 1 Inst 14. b. for that was expectant upon the Estate Tail which being spent then John the Father was last seised thereof and
certain or 't is not good 134 4. Must be taken strictly when it goes to the destruction of an Estate 224 5. A Custom that every Copyholder who leases his Land shall forfeit it doth not bind an Infant 229 6. Amongst Merchants where it must be particularly set forth 226 7. It must be certain and therefore where it was laid for an Infant to sell his Land when he can measure an Ell of Cloth 't is void for the incertainty 290 8. To have solam separalem pasturam hath been held good 291 9. Prescription must have a lawful commencement but 't is sufficient for a Custom to be certain and reasonable 292 10. Whether a Custom likewise ought to have a lawful commencement 293 D. Damages See Ejectment 3. Ioint Action 2. Trespass 2. Baron and Feme brought an Action for words spoken of the Wife and concluded ad damnum ipsorum 't is good for if she survive the Damages will go to her 120 Det See Admittance 5. Assignment 1. Iudgment 1. Quantum meruit Where 't is brought upon a Specialty for less than the whole Sum it must be shewed how the other was discharged 41 2. Whether it lies for a Fine upon an admission to a Copyhold Estate for it doth not arise upon any Contract 240 3. There must be a personal Contract or a Contract implyed by Law to maintain an Action of Debt ibid. Deceit See Action on the Case Deputy See Office 6 7 9. Devise See Tail Where it shall not be extended by implication 82 2. Where the word Estate passeth a Fee where not 45 105. 3. I give All to my Mother passeth only an Estate for Life for the Particle All is a Relative without a Substantive 32 4. To A. and the Testator's Name is omitted in the Will yet 't is good by averring his Name and proving his Intention to devise it 217 5. The Testator after several Specifick Legacies and Devises of Lands gave all the rest and remaining part of his Estate c. by those Words the Reversion in Fee passed 228 6. By the Devise of an Hereditament the Reversion in Fee passeth 229 Disseisin See Election 1. Interest 2. The Son Purchased in Fee and was disseised by his Father who made a Feoffment with Warranty the Son is bound for ever 91 2. Lessor made a Lease for Life and died his Son suffered a Common Recovery this is a Disseisin ibid. 3. Where an Estate for Life or years cannot be gained by a Disseisin ibid. 4. A wrongful Entry is never satisfied with any particular Estate nor can gain any thing but a Fee-simple 92 Distribution Before the Statute if there was but one Child he had a right of Administration but it was only personal so that if he died before Administration his Executor could not have it 62 E. Ejectment THE Demise was laid to be the 12th of Junii habendum a praed duodecimo die Junii which must be the 13th day by vertue whereof he entred and that the Defendant Postea eod 12 die Junii did Eject him which must be before the Plaintiff had any Title for his Lease commenced on the 13th day not good 199 2. De uno Messuagio sive Tenemento not good because the word Tenementum is of an incertain signification but with this addition vocat ' the Black Swan 't is good 238 3. If the Term should expire pending the Suit the Plaintiff may proceed for his Damages for though the Action is expired quoad the possession yet it continues for the Damages 249 Election Where the Cause of Action ariseth in two places the Plaintiff may choose to try it where he pleases 165 2. Tenant at Will made a Lease for years the Lessee entreth this is no disseisin but at the Election of him who had the Interest in it 197 Entry In Feoffments Partitions and Exchanges which are Conveyances at the Common Law no Estate is changed until actual Entry 297 2. Lease for years not good without Entry 297 3. Tenant for Life Remainder in Tail Male levied a Fine and made a Feoffment having but one Son then born and afterwards had another Son the eldest died without Issue the Contingent Remainder to the second was not destroy'd by this Feoffment for it was preserved by the right of Entry which his elder Brother had at the time of the Feoffment made 305 Escape Debt upon an Escape would not lie at the Common Law against the Goaler it was given by the Statute of W. 2. 145 2. The superior Officer is liable to the voluntary Escapes suffered by his Deputy unless the Deputation is for life 146 3. If an Escape is by negligence it must be particularly found 151 4. A person was in Execution upon an erroneous Judgment and escaped and Judgment and Execution was had against the Gaoler and then the first Judgment was reversed yet that against the Gaoler shall stand 325 Evidence See Witness An Affidavit made in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence but only as a Letter unless Oath is made by a Witness that he was present when it was taken before the Master 36 2. What shall be Evidence of a fraudulent Settlement ibid. 3. An Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence to conclude an Infant 259 4. Whether the return of the Commissioners in a Chancery Cause that the person made Oath before them is sufficient Evidence to convict of Perjury 116 5. Whether a true Copy of an Affidavit made before the Chief Justice is sufficient to convict the person for the like Offence 117 6. A Verdict may be given in Evidence between the same Parties but not where there are different persons unless they are all united in the same interest 142 7. Conviction for having two Wives shall not be given in Evidence to prove the unlawfulness of a Marriage but the Writ must go to the Bishop because at Law one Jury may find it no Marriage and another otherwise 164 Exchange Ought to be executed by each Party in their Life time otherwise 't is void 135 Excommunication Stat. 5 Eliz. For not coming to the Parish Church the Penalties shall not incurr if the person hears Divine Service in any other Church 42 2. The Causes are enumerated in the Statute which must be contained in the Significavit otherwise the Penalties are not to incurr 89 Executor See Grants Notice 5. Whether an Executor de son tort can have any interest in a Term for years 91 93 2. An Executor may sell the Goods before Probate 92 3. May pay Debt upon a simple Contract before a Bond of which he had no notice 115 4. Whether an Action of Debt will lie against an Executor upon a Mutuatus 5. By what words he hath an Authority only without an Interest in the thing devised 209 210 6. He had both Goods of his Testator and of his own and granted omnia bona sua that which he hath as Executor will not pass for
grounded upon these Letters Patents I shall apply my self to speak to it for our Crime is in the undue electing of an Alderman namely not being summoned together for that purpose by the Mayor and doing it in his absence I must desire the Court to observe in what manner the mention of these Letters Patents is introduced The Matter and Question before us is concerning the Election of an Alderman for the City of Bristol which concerns the very being and succession and continuance of the Corporation Nothing can more nearly concern it The defects I observe in the frame of this Indictment are these 1. It does not so much as say or alledge that Bristol is antiqua Villa or antiqua Civitas or that there was or yet is any Corporation at all there nor what it does consist of if there be any nor by what name they are called whether there ought to be a Mayor or not whether their Corporation be by Charter or Prescription And this Court cannot judicially take notice that there is any Corporation there or what it is unless it had been shewn Now if there be no Corporation and no Mayor of right then our meeting to choose an Alderman without his Summons and in his absence is no undue nor irregular Proceeding It cannot appear to the Court whether the Mayors Summons and presence at the Election be necessary or not Now in all legal Proceedings that any way concern a Corporation it is constantly averr'd and alledged that there is a Corporation and what it is and how erected and the least that can be in any Case is to say that it is antiqua Villa or antiqua Civitas where the Corporation extends to a Town or City which make any Prescription or set forth any Custom Thus we find it in the Case of the City of York Dyer 279. plac ' 10. in the Case of a Custom of Foreign bought and Foreign sold They Prescribe in being a Corporation So in Latches Rep. 229. Harris's Case In James Bagg's Case 11 Co. f. 94. A Case of a Writ of Restitution to Restore a Capital Burgess to his Place and Office of a Capital Burgess in Plimouth the Writ was directed to the Mayor and Commonalty of Plimouth the very Words of the Writ suppose a Corporation and shew what their Name is The Return thereupon by the Mayor and Commonalty is That Queen Elizabeth granted to the Mayor and Commonalty that the Mayor and Recorder should be Iustices of the Peace and that James Baggs was a Capital Burgess and did misdemean himself towards the Mayor and thereupon he was disfranchised In the printed Margent of that Case which I suppose is my Lord Cokes own Opinion it is said That in their Return they first ought to prescribe That there hath been a Corporation of a Mayor and Commonalty time out of the Memory of Man and not to begin with the mention of a Grant made to a Coporation as the Indictment does in our Case and not shew the Original and Erection of it either by Prescription or Charter And Mr. Trotman a Learned Man in his abridging of James Bagg's Case bids his Reader observe this Marginal Note Yet in that Case the Return was but in answer to the Writ of Restitution which Writ it self admitted there was a Corporation and directs the Writ to them by Name yet by the Opinion there it was a defect in the Return not to shew that they were by Prescription And if it be necessary upon a Return of a Writ of Restitution to set forth how they came to be incorporated to which Return there can be no Traverse taken nor no pleading to it as has been held by some how much more in such a Case as ours of an Indictment which must be traversed and pleaded to and therefore ought to be more exact That was in a Case of removing of a chief Member a Capital Burgess of a Corporation ours is in a Case of the choosing in of a chief Member an Alderman into a Corporation so that ours is much resembling that Case in that respect 2. Another thing wherein the Indictment is faulty is this viz. In the manner of introducing the mention of these Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth upon which the Indictment is grounded and upon the Construction of which the Case depends The Indictment does not say positively and directly that Queen Elizabeth made or granted any Letters Patents to the Mayor and Commonalty of Bristol That there should be twelve Aldermen and for the appointing how they should be chosen upon which our Case arises nor does it so much as say continetur which would not have been enough neither but it introduces the mention of those Letters Patents no otherwise than by these Words viz. Secundum Privilegia concessa per Literas Patentes c. There were or ought to be twelve Aldermen Et secundum eadem Privilegia sic ut praefertur concessa per totum tempus praedictum after the death of an Alderman the Mayor and the surviving Aldermen eorum major pars ad summonitionem ejusdem Majoris convocati eligerunt eligere consueverunt c. Now this is no positive and direct shewing that there ought to be any Aldermen nor how they should be chosen but it is no more than the Opinion and Conceit of the Iury that found the Indictment upon their perusal of the Letters Patents which were produced in Evidence to them the Iury take it by way of Collection out of a Record of which they are no proper Iudges And this being in an Indictment which is the Kings Declaration and ought to be very exact and certain and which is in a criminal proceeding to which the Parties must plead and if convict are liable to Fine and Imprisonment the Law is more curious in this than where Parties do agree civiliter That all Criminal Proceedings must be very exact and certain is proved by this viz. None of the Statutes of Jeofails would ever help them but by express Words except and exclude them from the benefit of them It is said in Long 's Case 5 Co. 120 121. That If in Declarations between Party and Party for Lands or Goods there must be great certainty expres'd a fortiore says that Case must it be so in Indictments which are the Kings Counts or Declarations to which the Party shall answer they ought to be full and not taken by Intendment or to be by way of Argument so it is held in Leeches Case Cro. Jac. 167. and in Sir William Fitz-Williams's Case Cro. Jac. 19 20. Object If it be objected That the Indictment is but the finding of a Iury who are the Lay-gentz as we call them and they know not the forms of Law Answ The Fact indeed is found by the Iury but the constant course is to have the Iury consent to mend the Form and the Kings Council are addised-with in the drawing of it and after 't is found and sometimes the Iudges
of the Clauses yet he is repeated over again when they come to make him of the Quorum This shews the naming him before by his Office did not do it if it did the naming of him again in the Quorum will be a Tautology and a vain Repetition But perhaps it will be said It belongs to the Office of a Mayor at the Common Law to summon the Corporation and amongst the rest the Aldermen when he sees there is occasion and he must as Mayor be present among them or nothing can be done Let us examine the truth of this Those that advis'd the Indictment were not of this Opinion and I heard it was said at the Tryal that it was drawn with good advice for the Indictment it self challenges this Right to the Mayor upon another ground It would intimate as if the Words of the Charter gave it him as I have already observ'd which says that secundum privilegia concessa est therefore they thought it was not his due at the Common Law 1. For his Name of Mayor that imports no such thing He is Major that is the Greater the more Eminent this notes his pre-eminence in Respect and Reverence but gives him little more of power than what the rest of the Aldermen have The like Office among the old Romans was the Praetor which as Minsheu says comes from prae-itor a prae-eundo he does praeire or praecedere or praesidere He goes first and sits uppermost but it gives him no more power But the Mayor in our Case would neither lead nor drive But if there can be no Election of an Alderman without his Summons and Presence and if he be wilful as the Mayor in our Case was he is not only Major Maximus but Dominus fac totum as the vulgar Saying is or Dominus faciens totum The twelve Aldermen without him will be but so many Cyphers the Mayor will be the Great Figure and the Aldermen will signifie only in conjunction with him We may then say of every Alderman as the one Grecian Captain said of the other of Ulysses Nihil est Diomede remoto Mr. Mayor will be that which the Logicians call Causa sine qua non quae per se nihil facit sed tantum esse aliquid sine qua Reliquae causae non faciunt So much for his Name and Title Then for the Office it self That does not require his Summons nor Presence in all the meetings of the Aldermen for the Business of the Corporation it is not incident nor essential to his Office of Mayor by the Common Law The Common Law looks upon him as the Head or Chief of a Corporation but he is no Officer of the Common Law to whom the Common-Law limits or prescribes any Duty as it does to a Iudge a Sheriff a Conservator of the Peace a Coroner or a Constable These are all Officers at the Common Law and the Common-Law instructs them in their Power and Duty But the Mayor being the Head of a Corporation and a Corporation having its essence by Charter or Prescription which presupposes a Charter he has no power but what the Charter expresly gives him The Common Law takes no farther notice of him Let us examine the Ground and Nature of a Corporation and there we shall find the true Nature and Office of a Mayor or any other Head for 't is all one The true Ground and Original of Corporations in Cities and great Towns is this Those are generally the Staples of Trade and Merchandize and Trade as is said in the Case of the City of London 8 Co. 125. a. cannot be maintain'd without Order and Government And therefore the King for the Publick Good may exect Gildam Mercatoriam a Fraternity or Society or Incorporation of Merchants to the end that good Order and Rule shall be by them observ'd for the Encrease and Advancement of Trade and Merchandizing Suppose the King should by his Charter Encorporate a Town by the Name of Mayor and twelve Aldermen and should not set out their Duty and Office What power would the Law give them in that Case They would have no power as Conservators of the Peace or as Iustices of the Peace They could neither Fine or Imprison If they should take upon them to meddle in these matters without express power given them by the words of the Charter It would be Sutor ultra Crepidam Therefore Charters usually add these Powers by express Clauses to those purposes and make the Mayor a Iustice of Peace or a Iudge of Goal-Delivery but then he acts in those Powers not Quatenus Major nor eo nomine but because of the express power given him as it might have done to any other Man The uniting the Powers in one person does not confound the several and different Capacities of that person That the Charter gives the only Rule in these Cases and that a Corporation is a meer Creature of the Charters that does constitute it and gives it it's Being and therefore the Bounds and Limits of it's working appears by this Suppose that neither this nor any other Charter had given to this Corporation of Bristol any power to choose a new Mayor or new Aldermen upon the Death of the old they could then have made no new Election but when the Mayor and Aldermen had died the Corporation had been dissolv'd The Charter that gives them their Being must provide for their Continuance and Succession Thus it is held in the Case of the Corporation of Dungannon in Ireland in those Reports that go by the Name of the Lord Coke 's 12 Rep. 120 121. So that the Charter must provide for an Election in order to a Succession or otherwise the Law will not help them And though the Mayor is the more Eminent and Excellent and ought to have greater respect and reverence yet the subject matter that we are upon is to be consider'd in the nature of it viz. The Election of an Alderman It is not a matter of Interest or of Privilege or of Power for then the Mayor ought to be preferr'd in it But it is matter of Duty and Labour and Trust and Trouble It is Officium not Dominium to choose an Alderman It is rather a Burthen than a Power or Authority as is said in the Mayor of Oxford 's Case in Latches Rep. 231. But then it will be ask't that if it depend upon the Charter and not upon the Common Law Who shall appoint the time of Election if the Charter be silent in it as here it seems to be This will be a great defect and so there will be no meeting nor no Election and so the Corporation will expire To this I Answer That the Charter does provide for it for those whose Duty it is to make an Election it is their Duty to agree to meet for that purpose and to appoint the time or else they do not discharge their Duty They break their Oath and are punishable for their Omission and
may forfeit their Charter by it Now I do not deny but it is the Duty of the Mayor and it is the equal Duty of the Aldermen to see a time be appointed for an Election And as the Mayor is the Chief in pre-eminence so it aggravates his neglect if he refuses it But his neglect of his Duty will not excuse the rest of the Electors for the not doing of their Duty and the performing of their Qaths If it be said What if they do not agree upon the time but are divided I Answer Whoever can carry an Election when they are met and chuse shall also govern in the time of meeting if there be any difference about it and that is not the Mayor but the Major pars eorum c. Now this agrees with the Rule of the Law in the like Cases In a Commission of the Peace to try Felonies c. And to hold a Court of Quarter-Sessions Who shall issue out the Summons and appoint the Time Answ Those that constitute the Court and are to Exercise the Power must issue out the Summons If twenty Iustices of the Peace not having one of the Quorum amongst them should issue out a Summons for a General Quarter-Sessions it would be void for twenty Iustices of the Peace cannot hold such a Sessions if there be not one of the Quorum among them Nor can the Custos Rotulorum alone do it though he is commonly most Eminent Thus is it in the Commission of Gaol-Delivery and of Dyer and Terminer We may see the Forms of them in Crompt Jurisd of Courts f. 121 125. The express words of their Commission for appointing time and place Ad certum diem quem vos tres vel duo vestrum Quorum vos A. B. C. D. unum esse volumus ad hoc provederitis And therefore there was no need of any more express Provision in the Charter for a Summons for an Election of an Alderman or the appointing of a time In the next place for the necessity of the Mayor's being present as well as their meeting by his Summons I see no reason for it It is true there is a Case in Print that seems to make for it tho' I never yet heard it so much as mention'd either at the Trial for I was not there or throughout the whole Case yet it is fit for me to take notice of it for I make no doubt but before we have done we shall hear of it It is in Serjeant Rolls's Abridgment Part I. Tit. Corporation f. 513 514. Case 5 6 7. Between Hicks and the Borough of Launceston in Cornwal Resolved per Curiam which were only two Iudges viz. the Chief Iustice Richardson and Iustice Croke no other of the Iudges being there That if a Corporation consists of a Mayor and eight Aldermen with a Clause in the Patent That if any of the Aldermen dye that then the Mayor and the rest of the Aldermen within eight days after shall Elect another though it be not limited that they or the greater number of them may elect yet the greater number of them may elect And if the Mayor at the time of the death of an Alderman be absent at London till after the eight days and the rest of the Aldermen within eight days come to the Deputy Mayor and require him to make an Assembly of them to elect another within the eight days and he refuse and upon that the greater number of the Aldermen meet without the Mayor or his Deputy and Elect an Alderman that it is a void Election for the Mayor ought to be present at it by the Words of the Grant This seems to be a stronger Case than ours for there is a certain time limited by which they must make their Election viz. eight days I first Observe That this Case as far as I can find was not a Case depending by any Suit or Action for in that Case it is said That a Writ was granted to make a new Election of an Alderman So that I suppose it was upon a Motion only I have a Copy of the Rules which shews it to be so as I take it Then it does not appear to be upon an Argument for had it beén so two Iudges I presume would not have determin'd it but have put it off till the Court had been full as usually they do therefore it was not so solemn nor has not so great Authority But take it as it is The time of eight days being limited by which the Election was to be made makes the Case never a whit the stronger for there the Iudges declare that there may be an Election after the eight days and the limiting that time was to quicken them Then observe the ground those two Iudges went upon they do not say it ought to be so at the Common Law as doubtless they would had they thought that the Common Law would have ruled it for if the Common Law serves for it it was idle to resort to any other ground But the Iudges in the Case of Launceston say that the Mayor must be present at the Election by the Words of the Grant So that they went by that Rule which I have urged which is the words of the Grant 't is the Charter only must give the Rule as I have Argued all this while Now what the words of the Charter were in the Case of Launceston does not appear in the Report of that Case Perhaps there was an express Provision in the Charter requiring the meeting of the Aldermen by the Summons of the Mayor and in his presence which if so then there is no disputing against it And the drawer of the Indictment against us has so drawn it as if the Charter in our Case did so require it too But there is nothing to that purpose nay as I have observ'd there are concomitant Clauses that give another construction and argue to the contrary Therefore the Case of Launceston differs from ours But there is another thing wherein the Case of Launceston and ours differs I am no Enemy to the Government I Live under if any man think otherwise of me I care not because I cannot govern another Man's Thoughts I do agree that this Sovereign Court of the King's Bench as is resolv'd in James Bagg 's Case hath a super-intendency and a special Authority in Cases of this nature which more concern matter of Government and the publick Peace and Order than any Man 's private Right or Property And in such Cases this Court governs it self much by the Circumstances of the Case Now let us mind the Circumstances of the Case Reported by Serjeant Rolls and of our Case and let them be compar'd and there will be a very wide difference between them And therein I dare appeal to any rational unbiass'd Man in the World for the Innocency of our proceedings in the whole matter The Mayor in the Case of Launceston happen'd to be in London at the death
of the Alderman to supply whose place there needed the Election He was not in the Town that was to chuse whereof he was Mayor when the Election was made The Aldermen were under an apprehension that they should be guilty of a great omission and neglect of their Duty and perhaps had some thought of their being under an Oath too and that they might be liable to punishment if they did not chuse within the eight days prescrib'd by their Charter nay 't is likely they thought they could make no choice at all if they did it not within the eight days Tho' all this was but their mistake of the Law yet it was very pardonable in them The Iudges in their Resolution upon that Case rectifie that Mistake and a new Election is thereupon order'd by this Court The Mayor there was not wilfully absent for he was at London when the Alderman died he was at a very great distance from his Town too viz. Launceston about 200 miles as I take it so that he could hardly hear of the death of the Alderman in the eight days time and go down thither before the end of the eight days there was no great necessity of an Election so soon And the Aldermen had done what they did out of a zeal for the Publick though it were a zeal without knowledge But I do not find that the void Election and the Aldermens meeting about it was held a Ryot or an unlawful Assembly No they were not so much as blam'd for what they did nay sure they were rather to be commended for their just intentions But our Case was quite another thing And all our Circumstances and the very plain words of our Charter that appoints the manner of our Election we had to our great charge and upon good advice drawn up in a special Plea for the Question truly arises upon the words of the Charter and the construction of them How it happen'd I cannot tell but a Iudge ruled us to plead not Guilty our chargeable special Plea came in a little too late It was a matter of Record and of Law and fitter to be determin'd by the Iudges than by a Iury. But these in truth were our Circumstances as I shall briefly relate them and I am ready to make out the truth of them An Alderman of Bristol tho' chosen yet cannot officiate till he be sworn he cannot be sworn by the express words of the Charter but before the Mayor and Recorder both I being the Recorder of Bristol happenn'd to be there some time before the day of chusing Members to the Oxford Parliament not long after Sir John Lloid's death I was indeed invited thither Sir Richard Hart the then Mayor and all of us I think not one Alderman absent were then met in the Council Chamber the usual place for that purpose we had nothing else to do It was mov'd that we might then make choice of a new Alderman while not only Mr. Mayor was present but while the Recorder was there too So that the Party chosen might instantly have been sworn and enter'd upon his charge for they have their distinct Wards And the Recorder many times comes not thither in a year or two for I live forty Miles from them and I seldom tarry above two nights at a Gaol-Delivery but then as it fell out I was there upon another occasion None oppos'd it but Mr. Mayor and he did it upon a Ceremony and Complement as he pretended because Sir John Lloid as he said was not yet buried Out of respect to Mr. Mayor we did forbear Some good time after and after Sir John Lloid had been buried I happen'd unexpectedly to be there again and Mr. Mayor was earnestly press'd again then to go to an Election upon the former reason that the new Alderman might presently be sworn Mr. Mayor still refus'd I do not remember but all the rest were very willing to have gone to an Election We did the second time forbear tho' I think we were all there I am sure a great number I tarried then four or five days it was at the Election to Parliament the Poll lasted six days but I left them at the Poll I was not fond of being chosen The Evening as I take it before I went away we were again upon the place and the Mayor with us and he was again press'd to it but wilfully went away and we still forbore But that night some of us sign'd a Writing desiring Mr. Mayor to joyn with us and we declar'd in it if he did not joyn we would proceed without him being the major pars This shews we had no design to chuse in his absence nay it plainly appear'd that the design was on the Mayor's part for he knew I could not stay and he was desirous to chuse in the absence of some of us that he might carry the Election against the person next in course to be chosen and every way qualified viz. Alderman Day I consulted the Charter and found it as I have now observ'd upon it and was clearly of Opinion for the Reasons I have offer'd that in such Circumstances the major part might chuse We gave notice to the Mayor and all the Aldermen then in Town and tho' the Government is most miserably divided yet in this Business there was nothing of Faction and the different Parties were not engag'd only the Mayor had his Design For we were six Aldermen at the Choice Sir Robert Cann an intimate Friend of the Mayor's being lame of the Gout sent us an Excuse but would approve of our Choice Another of our number one of our six is a zealous Man of Mr. Mayor's way yet not taking that to be now concern'd joyned with us and voted the same way We were six and this appears by the Indictment and we were unanimous in the person we chose No other person was so much as nam'd nor I believe thought on by any Body unless by Mr. Mayor there were but four Aldermen more in being for Mr. Mayor was none And the person chosen was not only next in course but every way qualifi'd has a great Estate worth three or four of some of the Aldermen no Tang of a Fanatick a constant Churchman he had but one great Fault he gave his Vote at the Election to Parliament for my self and Sir John Knight against Mr. Mayor and Sir Tho. Earl The person is not sworn to this day nor does desire the Office but rather declines it being fit for it He should have been Mayor this Year in course but is put by it and he is contented There has been another since chosen in his place by the Votes of five only Sir Richard Hart the Mayor being one I am sure they are not major pars And for this choice by six who are Iustices of the Peace as well as Mr. Mayor and the other four we who are four of six are all Indicted for a Ryot upon the account of this
Election And this Indictment is found before Mr. Mayor our Fellow Iustice and four more at the most so that five who are the lesser number exercise their Authority over those that were six in number when they acted which fix were as much Iustices of the Peace as they five It is observable that tho' we were six of us and all unanimous in our Election yet they have politickly Indicted but four of us and left two out because it would have been too gross and palpable if six Iustices of Peace should have been indicted before a lesser number of their Brother Iustices But had they Indicted all six it would then plainly have appear'd too that the choice had been made by the greater part which they wisely thought to conceal but yet it does appear in their very Indictment though darkly couch'd in it for it says that we four being Recorder and Aldermen Cum aliis Aldermannis did chuse the Alderman that word Aldermannis being in the Plural Number must be two more at least If it shall be adjudg'd that we cannot chuse an Alderman but by the Mayor's Summons and in his presence these Mischiefs will follow That he will wholly govern and dispose of Elections at his single will and pleasure for he that can order the time as he pleases and forbear to summon the Electors till he sees his own opportunity and advantage tho' often desired to go on upon it and refuses to do it time after time till such as will not comply with him be out of the way as the Recorder is very seldom there and tarries but a night or two and then is in a hurry of Business and most of the Aldermen are often at their Country Houses the Mayor will cast the choice upon whom he thinks fit as in this case he has done This Mayor and four Aldermen have rejected the choice made by six and of the person that was next in course and every way qualified And yet the Charter thought not fit to trust any fewer than the Mayor and the whole Bench of Aldermen in a matter of this importance to the City If it be said That in case the Mayor unreasonably defer it we may complain to this Court viz. the King's-Bench and have a Mandamus or apply our selves to the King and Councel to compel him to proceed to an Election Who will be at so great a charge and trouble And that course is not so speedy it may chance to be in a Vacation but let it be as speedy as can be the Mayor in the mean time has obtain'd his Ends and gain'd his Opportunity and done his Work as the Mayor in our Case did where the Mayor and four more but five in all being minor pars have controll'd the choice made by the major pars If it shall be said That if the major pars be present and join in Voting to an Election tho' they divide in the person yet the major pars so met shall make a good Election and in Law it shall be the choice of all present That I must deny for the words of the Charter are That the major pars superviventium shall make the choice that is as I understand it agree in their Votes or Voices in the Party chosen and so it was in the choice that we six made This agrees with the Rules of the Common Law in Elections and Leases to be made by Corporations Dyer 247. plac 74. and Sir John Davies Rep. 47. And this agrees with the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 27. But if this should not be Law as I take it is yet the subsequent Election of an Alderman made by the Mayor and four Aldermen more cannot be good for though the Mayor and seven Aldermen were present at it yet three of them did not join in going then to an Election for they had join'd with us before in our choice and therefore oppos'd any after Election to be made But they have gotten a conceit among them at Bristol that what is done in a Man's presence where his presence is requir'd by their Charter tho he dissent and oppose what is done is yet legally done As in the Case of the Swearing of an Alderman by the express words of the Charter it cannot be done but before the Mayor and Recorder both This Sir Richard Hart was duly chosen an Alderman long ago but not sworn until the last Gaol-Delivery when we were going to Try the Felons I being present they thought that sufficient to satisfie the Charter and in a Tumultuous manner with an hideous noise they cryed out to swear him and this was not the usual place neither for it I oppos'd the Swearing of him and I will justifie it that he was utterly unfit to be Sworn by something that happenn'd since his being Elected an Alderman they would not hear me but resolv'd to proceed to swear him because I was present with the Mayor Thereupon I withdrew and in my absence they went on to swear him and he now acts as an Alderman and as a Iustice of Peace under this colour If no Election of an Alderman can be made but in the Mayor's presence it will be in the power of one single person if he be obstinate and wilful to forfeit the Charter For if he find the Aldermen like to chuse contrary to his mind he need but with draw and all the rest are insignificant persons and so there shall be no Election in any reasonable time and thereby the Liberties forfeited If this absolute power allow'd to Mayors may serve a politick Turn for once it may do as much Mischief another time for he may be of a contrary and cross humour to what may be desir'd And he is not a person nominated by any superiour power to that place or impos'd upon the Corporation but chosen from amongst themselves and chosen by themselves But tho' they chuse him yet it is not safe to trust all the Liberties of the City in the Breast of one Man for one man may easily change and be wrought upon where many cannot It is better to trust twelve than one The Right of Election is a very tender thing and it is a Maxim at the Common Law and strengthned by several Acts of Parliament That Elections should be free By the Stat. of Westm the 1st in the time of that Wise and Excellent King Edward the I. It is Enacted That Elections be free And it forbids under a grievous Penalty those are the words that nul haut home no great Man such as every Mayor is in his sphere shall disturb to make free Election Sir Edward Coke in his 2 Inst f. 169. in his Exposition of that Statute says it extends to all sorts of Elections and agreés with the Maxim of the Common Law Now if the Mayor shall at three several times refuse the advice and desire of the Aldermen and knowing that they can make no choice without him refuse to join with them till he
sees his own time and advantage he will have his own choice do what they can for before they can complain of him which is a work of time and charge and trouble he will have done his work and so prevent them And then where is the freedom of Election This could never appear more plainly than in this Case of ours where the Election by the majority is set aside and the choice made by a lesser number and in effect by Mr. Mayor only is that which carries it It plainly appears that we had no sinister design to do any thing without the Mayor for we did all we could to get him to join with us and he thrice denied us but it as plainly appears that the Mayor had a design in refusing to do it till some of us must be gone and then to steal an Election behind our backs by a lesser number when he had the advantage After all that I have said I do agree that had eleven Aldermen of us gone about an Election without so much as desiring the Mayor to join with us or it may be upon once or twice being refused or when the Mayor had been occasionally absent or had it any way appeared that we meant a surprise in it or had we made a Choice subject to the least Exception and had he not obstinately gone away from us being in person upon the place without so much as giving us the least reason for his refusal I should have held my tongue and not have concern'd my self any farther in it I hope it sufficiently appears that I have been no Enemy to Government and Order But to choose an Alderman was our Duty and we were under an Oath to do our Duty and we did but discharge our Trust I may I think save my self the labour of arguing that however if we were mistaken in the Construction of the Charter and in the point of Law in the making of our Election yet here is no Riot in the Case for we are indicted for a Riot for a Riot is the doing of an unlawful act with force and violence neither are we an unlawful Assembly for that is where there is an intent to do an unlawful Act but still with force and violence but they go away without doing it as appears by Poulton de Pace Reg. Regin fol. 25. And in case the Election we made be adjudged duly made then the pretence of a Riot vanishes of it self as is held in Eden's Case Cro. Eliz. 697. If the Indictment be void for the principal matter which in the Case there was an unlawful Entry against the Statute of 8 H. 6. where that Statute was mis-recited they were not allowed in that case to stand upon the Riot I have but a short word more I have been the Recorder of Bristol these one and twenty years longer I think than any Man can be remembred I have sworn all the Aldermen that are now upon the Bench in my time and many more who are now dead I can say it without vanity till the time of this unhappy Election of Members to the Oxford Parliament which I sought not I had the good Will of all sides even of this Mr. Mayor who was Sir Richard Hart for I never would join with any Party but did all I could when I came amongst them to join them together and unite them For ever since they grew rich and full of Trade and Knighthood too much Sail and too little Ballast they have been miserably divided And unless this Court to whom I think it properly belongs upon complaint in such Cases will examine their Dis-orders and command Peace and Order to be observed in our Proceedings I cannot safely attend there any more nor hold any Gaol Delivery I submit what I have said to the Court. Whereupon the Court arrested the Iudgment Lord Grandison versus Countess of Dover IN a Prohibition the Case was Where an Administration once granted ought not to be repealed Charles Heveningham died Intestate leaving an only Sister Abigail then an Infant The Countess of Dover who was her Great Grandmother came into the Prerogative Court and prayed to be assigned her Guardian Ex officio which was granted and thereupon she obtained Administration durante minore aetate Afterwards my Lord Grandison brought a Prohibition suggesting that the Court had granted Administration upon a surprise and being Grandfather to the Children and so nearer of kinred prayed that Administration might be committed to him The Lady replyed that it was obtained after great deliberation and without any surprize and upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether this Administration was well granted to the Lady It was argued now by Dr. Master for the Plaintiff and afterwards by a Common Lawyer on the same side in Hillary Term following And by Dr. Reines and Sir William Williams for the Defendant The Civilian argued That the Father of both the Children died intestate and that their Mother administred and afterwards made a Will of which she appointed my Lord to be Executor and thereby committed the Infant to his Custody which being in Fact true the Curatorship of the Living Child by the Civil Law draws to it the Administration of the Estate of the dead Child There is a Statute Law which empowers the Father by Deed or Will to dispose the custody of his Child under Age 12 Car. 2. cap. 24. to any in Possession or Remainder who may take the Profits of his Lands and possess himself of the said Infant 's personal Estate and bring Actions in relation thereunto as a Guardian in Socage might have done And wherever a Father or †Quare of the Mother Mother has made such a disposition a Iudge cannot assign a Guardian The Spiritual Courts have power to repeal this Administration granted to my Lady Dover the Right is not in question for whoever has it reaps no advantage because 't is for the benefit of the Infant the contest is who ought to be admitted by the Spiritual Court to Administer It cannot be denied but that the Great Grandmother is a degree more remote than the Grandfather If therefore that Court hath entrusted one who ought not to have Administration they have an undoubted power in such case to make an Alteration If my Lord had been Administrator it had been agreeable to the Common-Law for he is Guardian in Socage durante minore aetate E contra E contra It was said That my Lord was really indebted to the Estate of the Infant intestate and therefore as this Case is the Spiritual Court ought not to repeal the Administration once granted for 't is for the benefit of the Infant 'T is not material who shall be Administrator for he who is so durante minore aetate hath no power over the Estate he is only a Curator in the Civil Law which is in the nature of a Bayliff in our Law who hath only power to sell bona peritura Probate
eldest Son for sixty years if he so long lived Remainder to Thomas for Life and that John made a Lease to the Plaintiff for a year The Defendant replied that after the Devise R. Frances made a Feoffment in Fee of the same Lands amongst others to the use of himself for Life Then as to the other Lands to divers Vses contained in the Deed but as to those Lands in which the Distress was taken to the same Vses as in the Will in which Conveyance there was this Priviso That if John should disturb his Executors in the quiet Enjoyment c. or if he shall not suffer them to carry away the Goods in his House then the Uses limited to him should be void He did hinder the Executors to carry away the Goods yet it was adjudged that he should keep his Estate because being a Stranger to the Feoffment he shall not lose it without notice of the Proviso But in answer to that Case notice was not the principal matter of that Iudgment it turned upon a point in Pleading for the Avowant had not shewed any special act of disturbance and a bare denial without doing any more was held to be no breach of the Condition Some other Authorities may be cited to prove notice necessary Green's Case 6 Co. 24. as where Tenant for Life of a Mannor to which an Advowson was appendant did in the year 1594. present Durston who neglecting to read the Articles was deprived nine years afterwards by the Ordinary at the Suit of the Patron who presented him who also dyed two years after the Deprivation then the Queen presented by Lapse whose Presentee was inducted and six years afterwards Durston dyed after whose death he in Remainder presented Green now though the Patron was a Party to the Suit of Deprivation and thereby had sufficient notice that the Church was vacant yet it was adjudged that a Lapse should not incurr but only after notice given by the Ordinary himself and not by any other person whatsoever But this Case may receive this Answer viz. That notice had not been necessary at Law but it was provided by a particular Act of Parliament 13 Eliz. ca. 12. that no Title by Lapse shall accrue upon any deprivation but after six months notice thereof given by the Ordinary himself to the Patron 'T is true the Law is very tender in divesting the Rights of the Subject but where an Estate is created by the Act of the Party and restrained by particular limitations without any appointment of notice there the Law will not add notice and make it necessary because the person who made such a disposition of his Estate might have given it upon what conditions he pleased Therefore it may seem hard that this Estate should be determined by the neglect or omission of the Trustees to give notice of this Proviso but 't is apparent that it was the intent of the Father it should be so for by this Limitation the Estate is bound in the Hands of an Infant the reason is because there is a Privity between an Heir and an Ancestor and therefore the Heir is bound to take notice of such Conditions which his Ancestor hath imposed on the Estate 2. This Estate is determined by the Marriage of the Daughter with Mr. Villiers because there is an express Limitation in the Deed for that very purpose she is enjoyned to marry a Fitzgerald or one who should take upon him that name which is still more extensive and she having neglected to do the one and her Husband having refused to do the other the Aunt in Remainder shall take advantage of this Non-performance And 't is this Remainder over which makes it a Limitation 1 Ventr 202. Owen 112. Goldsb 152. Lit. Sect. 723. for if it had been a Condition then the intent of the Father had been utterly defeated for none but the Heir at Law can enter for the breach of a Condition and such was Katharine in this Case The Proviso in this Deed depends upon another Sentence immediately going before 2 Co. 70. to which it hath reference and then by the express resolution in Cromwel's Case 't is a Limitation or Qualification of the Estate and not a Condition which Estate is now determined without Entry or Claim It was argued that in this Case three things are to be considered E contra 1. The Nature of the Proviso 2. That Notice is absolutely necessary 3. That the Notice given was not sufficient being not such as is required by Law As to the 1st The very nature of this Proviso is condemned by the Civil Law and because it works the destruction of Estates it hath never been favoured at the Common Law All Conditions to restrain Marriage generally are held void by both Laws so likewise are such which restrain people from marrying without the consent of particular persons because they may impose such hard terms before they give their consent that may hinder the Marriage it self and therefore a bare request of such without their subsequent assent has been always allowed to preserve the Estate 2. And which was the principal Point Notice in this Case is absolutely necessary both by the intent of the Father and by the construction of the Law There are three things of which the Law makes an equal Interpretation viz. Uses Wills and Acts of Parliament in which if the intention of the Parties and of the Law makers can be discerned the Cases which severally fall under the direction of either shall be governed by the intention without respect to the disagreeing words nay sometimes the Law will supply the defect of words themselves The Books are full of Authorites where Constructions have been made of Acts of Parliament according to the intent of the Makers and not according to the Letter of the Law As in Eyston and Stud's Case in the Commentaries Plowd Com. 2 pt 463. where the Husband and Wife levyed a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and declared the Vses to their Heirs in Tail the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife they had Issue and the Husband died the Widow married a second Husband and he and his Wife join in a second Fine and declared the Vses thereof to themselves for Life the Remainder to the Husband and his Heirs for sixty years the Remainder in Tail to their Issue the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife the Issue of the first Husband entred supposing the Estate had been forfeited by the Statute of H. 7. 11 H. 7. c. 20. which Enacts That if a Woman hath an Estate in Dower or in Tail jointly with her Husband or to her self of the Inheritance or Purchase of him and she doth either sole or with another Husband discontinue it shall be void and he in the Remainder may enter Now this Case was directly within the words of the Statute for the Woman had an Estate Tail in possession jointly with her first Husband
Trust as in the Case of Wardship formerly which always went to the Executor of the Grantee and which was of greater consideration in the Law than the feeding or clothing of an Ideot and of that Opinion was the Court that the King had a good Title to dispose of both the Ward and the Ideot one till he was of Age and the other during his Ideocy Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Reeves versus Winnington THE Testator was a Citizen and a Freeman of London A Devise of all his Estate passed a Fee and being seised in Fee of a Mesuage c. and likewise possessed of a considerable personal Estate made his Will in which there was this Clause viz. I hear that John Reeves is enquiring after my Death but I am resolved to give him nothing but what his Father hath given him by Will I give all my Estate to my Wife c. The Question was Whether by these words the Devisee had an Estate for Life or in Fee in the Mesuage It was argued that she had only an Estate for life because the Words All my Estate cannot be construed to pass a Fee for it doth not appear what Estate was intended and Words in a Will which go to disinherit an Heir must be plain and apparent A Devise was in these Words viz. Sid. 191. Bowman versus Milbank I give all to my Mother all to my Mother and it was adjudged that a Fee did not pass which is as strong a Case as this for by the word All it must be intended All that was in his power to give which is as comprehensive as if he had said All my Estate 'T is true Kerman and Johnson Stiles 281. 1 Rol. Abr. 834. Cro. Car. 447. it hath been adjudged that where a Man devised his whole Estate to his Wife paying his Debts and Legacies that the word Estate there passed a Fee because it was for the benefit of the Creditors there being not personal Assets sufficient to pay all the Debts But that is not found in this Case therefore the Word Estate being doubtful and which will admit of a double construction shall not be intended to pass a Fee Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra The first part of this Sentence consists in negative words and those which are subsequent explain the intention of the Testator viz. That John Reeves should take nothing by the Will The Word Estate doth comprehend the whole in which the Owner hath either an Interest or Property like a Release of all Actions which is a good discharge as well of real as personal Actions In common understanding it carries an interest in the Land and then 't is the same as if he had devised all his Fee-simple Estate In the Case of Bowman and Milbank it was adjudged that a Fee-simple did not pass by the Particle All because it was a Relative Word and had no Substantive joined with it and therefore it might have been intended All his Cattle All his Goods or All his personal Estate for which incertainty it was held void yet Iustice Twisden in that Case said that it was adjudged that if a Man promise to give half his Estate to his Daughter in Marriage that the Lands as well as the Goods are included The Testator devised all his Tenant-right Estate held of such a Manor 3 Keb. 245. Mod. Rep. 100. and this being found specially the Question was Whether any more passed than an Estate for Life because he did not mention what Estate he intended but it was held that the Devisee had a Fee-simple because the Words were as comprehensive as if he had devised all his Inheritance and by these Words a Fee-simple would pass Curia It plainly appears that the Testator intended nothing for John Reeves therefore he can take nothing by this Will and that the Devisee hath an Estate in Fee-simple for the Words All my Estate are sufficient to pass the same Rex versus Sir Thomas Armstrong Saturday June 14th THE Defendant was outlawed for High-Treason and being taken at Leyden in Holland was brought into England and being now at the Bar he desired that he might have leave of the Court to reverse the Outlawry and he tried by virtue of the Stature of Ed. 6. which Enacts 5 6 E. 6. cap. 11. That if the Party within one year after the Outlawry or Judgment thereupon shall yield himself to the Chief Justice of England and offer to traverse the Indictment upon which he was outlawed he shall be admitted to such Traverse and being acquitted shall be discharged of the Outlawry He alledged that it was not a year since he was outlawed and therefore desired the benefit of this Law But it was denied because he had not rendered himself according to the Statute but was apprehended and brought before the Chief Iustice Whereupon a Rule was made for his Execution at Tyburn which was done accordingly DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Hebblethwaite versus Palmes Mich. 36 Car. II. in B. R. Rot. 448. AN Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas Possession is a sufficient cause to maintain an Action against a wrong doer for diverting of a Watercourse The Declaration was That the Defendant Primo Augusti c. injuste malitiose did break down an ancient Damm upon the River Darwent by which he did divert magnam partem aquae ab antiquo solitu cursu erga molendinum ipsius quer c. ad dampnum c. The Defendant pleaded that before the said Breach made he was seised in Fee of an ancient Mill and of six Acres of Land adjoyning upon which the said Damm was erected time out of mind to turn the Water to his said Mill which Damm was always repaired and maintained by the Defendant and the Tenants of the said Land that his Mill was casually burnt and he not intending to Re-build it suffered the Damm to be broken down and converted the Timber to his own use being upon his own Soil prout ei bene licuit c. The Plaintiff replied that by the breaking of the Damm the Water was diverted from his Mill c. The Defendant rejoyned and justified his Plea and Traversed that the Mill of the Plaintiff was an ancient Mill. And upon a Demurrer to this Rejoynder Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error now brought to reverse that Iudgment and for the Defendant in the Action it was argued 1. That the Declaration is not good because the Plaintiff had not set forth that his Mill was an ancient Mill. 2. Because he had not entituled himself to the Watercourse 3. That the Plea was good in Bar to this Action because the Defendant had sufficiently justified having a Right to the Land upon which the Damm was erected and always repaired it As to the first Point it
of a person dying intestate and tells what share his Relations shall have and 't is probable that the Custom of London might guide the Parliament in the making of this Law which Custom distributes the Estate of a Freeman amongst his Wife and Children This shews that an Interest is vested in them which goes to the Administrator the consequence whereof is very considerable for if such Children should marry they have a Security by this Act that a Portion shall be paid and if the Wife should take another Husband he will be entituled to her share and this may be a means of giving credit in the World when the certainty of their Portions are so well known and secured 'T is such an Interest which is known in the Law and may be compared to that in Sir Thomas Palmer's Case 5 Co. 24. who sold 1600 Cord of Wood to a Man who assigned it to another and afterwards the Vendor sold 2000 Cord to one Maynard to be taken at his Election the Assignee of the first person cutt 600 Cord and Maynard carried it away thereupon an Action was brought and the Plaintiff had Iudgment because the first Vendee had an Interest vested in him which he might well assign This Case is a plain proof that a Man may have an Interest in a Chattle without a Property and such an Interest which gives the person a remedy to recover and where there is a remedy there must be a Right for they are convertibles 'T is not a new thing in the Law that a contingent Interest in the Ancestor shall survive to the Heir Wood's Case cited in Shelleys Case 1 Co. 99. as if a Man be seized of the Mannor of S. and covenants that when B. shall make a Feoffment to him of the Mannor of D. then he will stand seized of the said Mannor of S. to the use of the Covenantee and his Heirs who dyed leaving Issue an Heir who was then an Infant B. made a Feoffment to the Covenantor accordingly it was held that no Right descended to the Heir of the Covenantee but only a possibility of an Vse which might have vested in the Ancestor and therefore the Heir shall claim it by descent 'T is like a Debt to be paid at a day to come Lit. Sect. 512. which is debitum in praesenti though solvendum in futuro and though the Obligee cannot have an Action before the day is come yet such an Interest is vested in him that he may release it before that day and so bar himself for ever Now if this Act makes a Will it ought to be construed as such and it cannot be denied that if this Case had happened upon a Will the Executor of the Son would have a very good Title 'T is a weak Objection to affirm that this Law was made to establish the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts and that 't is only explanatory of the Statutes of Ed. 3. and H. 8. because 't is plainly introductory of a new Law for Distribution is now made otherwise than it was before 2. An Interest is vested where there is but one Child For the better understanding of this Point the Clause in the Act ought to be considered which is viz. If there be no Wife then to be distributed amongst the Children if no Child then to the next of Kin of the Intestate upon which Clause these Objections have been made Object 1. That 't is insignificant because the Statute of H. 8. gives the right of Administration to the Child 2. That Distribution cannot be made where there is but one 3. That this Clause ought to be construed according to the Law in the Spiritual Courts Answ Now as to the first Objection 't is true that before this Act the Child had a Right of Administration but that Right was only personal so that if he had died before he had administred his Executor or Administrator could not have it Besides many inconveniences did attend this personal Right of Administration which are now prevented by the vesting of an Interest For when the Right was personal and the Administrator gave Bond with Sureties to administer truly and the Ordinary had appointed Distribution to be made the Administrator was bound to perform it though not in equal degree and if he died before the Estate was got in it was lost for ever But now by this Clause Distribution must be made equally viz. one third part of the Surplus to the Wife the rest by equal portions to the Children so that what was very incertain before and almost at the Will of the Ordinary is now reduced to a certainty and therefore an Interest must vest in such persons to whom such equal Distributions of filial Portions are given 2. Object That Distribution cannot be made where there is but one Child Answ This also is true in propriety of Speech and taking the Word distribute in the strict sense But this was never intended by the Statute as may plainly appear upon the construction of the whole for the Word Children doth comprehend a Child and more and the form of the Bond directed by this Statute is that the Administrator shall deliver the Goods to such person and persons c. which shews that one is comprehended and therefore Distribuere in this Case is no more than Tribuere and must be so taken The Parliament never intended that Distribution should not be made where there is but one Child as may be easily collected from the reason of the thing and the inconveniences which would ensue 1st If a Man should die leaving a Wife and one Child the Wife would be entituled to one third and the Child to the other two thirds of the personal Estate now if the Child shall have two thirds being comprehended under the Word Children what reason can be given why he should not have the whole where there is no Wife which he could not have if the Word Children did not comprehend Child in this Case 2dly If a Man hath a personal Estate to the value of 2000 l. and dieth leaving Issue three Sons but hath in his life time made provision for the second Son to the value of 1000 l. the eldest Son dies intestate shall the youngest be totally excluded from the remaining 1000 l. because there is none left to have distribution his second Brother being preferred in the life time of his Father by an equal portion with what remains 3dly If the Father hath a Son married and two Brothers and dies intestate now if his Estate should not be vested in the Son then if he should also die intestate his Wife could have nothing but it would go to the Vncles and this would be a very hard construction of this Law to carry the Estate to the Vncles and their Executors from the Son and his Administrator But there is a Case which proves that a Child is intended by the Word Children 8 Co 96. 't is between Amner
it because the words were an entire Sentence and spoken altogether at the same time and therefore if a Prohibition should not go it would be a double vexation DE Termino Paschae Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Earl of Yarmouth versus Darrel THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case Grant of the King of sole Printing not good setting forth Letters Patents of King Charles the II. by which the Sole Printing of Blank Writs Bonds and Indentures were granted to him excepting such Forms which belonged to the Custom-House and which were formerly granted to Sir Roger L'Estrange that this Grant was to continue for the space of 30 Years and that the Defendant had notice thereof and had printed 500 Blank Bonds which he laid to his damage of the sum of 40 l. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was that the Defendant was a Stationer and that the Company of Stationers for the space of 40 years last past before the granting of these Letters Patents had constantly printed Blank Bonds and so made a general conclusion Mr. Trindar argued for the Plaintiff and the only Question was Whether this Patent did vest a sole Interest in the Plaintiff exclusive to all others In his Argument he insisted on these Points 1. That the King hath a Prerogative in Printing and may grant it Exclusive to others 2. That this Prerogative extends to the Case at the Bar. That he hath such a Prerogative 't is confirm'd by constant Vsage for such Grants have been made by the Kings of England ever since Printing was invented But to instance in a few Viz. The Patent for Printing of Law-Books was granted to one More on the 19th day of January in the 15th year of King James the I. And when that Patent was expired another was granted to Atkyns and others on the 15th day of November in the 12th year of King Charles the II. In 23. Eliz. a Patent was granted to the Company of Stationers for the sole Printing of Psalm-Books and Psalters for the space of 30 years And on the 8th of August 31 Eliz. the like Patent was granted to Christopher Barker for Life Another Patent to the Company of Stationers for printing of Corderius c. These and many more of the like nature shew what the constant usage hath been Now the Statute of Monopolies doth not reach to this Case because of the Proviso therein to exempt all such Grants of sole Printing and by the Statute of King Charles the II. for regulating of the Press 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. 't is Enacted That no person shall Print any Copy which any other hath or shall be granted to him by Letters Patents and whereof he hath the sole Right and Priviledge to Print And upon the breaches of these Statutes several Iudgments have been given Between Streater and Roper in this Court Mich. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 237. 't is true the Iudgment was against the Plaintiff but upon a Writ of Error brought in Parliament that Iudgment was reversed The same Term there was a Iudgment given upon a special Verdict in the Common-Pleas for the Plaintiffs Hill 35 Car. 2. B. R. Rot. 99. who were the Company of Stationers against Seymour for Printing of Almanacks And they obtained the like Iudgment against Wright for Printing of Psalters and Psalm-Books Now to apply this to the principal Case 't is to be considered that these Books for which the sole Printing was so claimed were of a publick nature and importance relating to the good and benefit of the Subjects and so likewise are Blank Bonds for there may be false and vitious Impressions to the ruin and destruction of many innocent people And as a farther Argument that the King hath this Prerogative 't is likewise to be considered that where no individual person can claim a Property in a thing there the King hath a Right vested in him by Law and it cannot be pretended that any particular person hath a Right to Print those Bonds therefore the finding that such were printed by the Company for above 40 years is immaterial because there being an inherent Prerogative in the King whenever he exerts it all other persons are bound up who were at liberty before To prove which the Iudgment in the Case of the East-India Company is express in point for before that Patent the subject had liberty to Trade to those places prohibited by that Grant but afterwards they were restrained by that Grant Neither is this in the nature of a Monopoly 11 Co. 84. 't is not like that of the sole Grant of making Cards which hath been adjudged void and with great reason because that Grant reached to prohibit a whole Trade and therefore differs from this Case for the Defendant may print other Instruments or Books and exercise his Trade in some other lawful and profitable Commodities and so might the Merchants in the Case of the East-India Company for they were restrained by the Patent as to particular places but might Trade to any other part of the World Neither will the Subjects in general receive any prejudice by this or such like Grants for if the Patentees make ill use of their Priviledges tho' it cannot be properly called an Office yet 't is a Trust and a Scire Facias will lie to repeal their Grants It was argued by the Councel for the Defendant E contra That the Verdict having found that the Company of Stationers had used to print those Bonds for above 40 years before the making of this Grant the Question will be Whether they are now divested of a Right so long enjoyed And as to that 't is not a new thing to object That notwithstanding such Grants yet other persons have insisted on a Right to Print and have printed accordingly Thus the sole Printing of Law-Books was granted to one Atkyns yet the Reports of Iustice Jones and my Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan were printed without the direction of the Patentees Printing as 't is a manual Occupation makes no alteration in this Case for the King hath as great a Prerogative in Writing any thing that is of a publick Nature as he hath in Printing of it Now considering Printing as an Art exclusive from the thing printed this Patent is not good For if a Man invent a new Art and another should learn it before the Inventor can obtain a Patent if afterwards granted 't is void Then consider it in relation to the thing printed 1 Roll. 4. 11 Co. 53. id which in this Case are Blank-Bonds 't is not a new Invention because the Company of Stationers have printed such above 40 years and for that reason this Patent is void for where the Invention is not New there Trade shall not be restrained No Man can receive any prejudice by the printing of such Bonds for they are of no Vse till filled up 't is only a bare Manufacture
shall not alien or sell the Lands given to her from the Heirs Male of her Body lawfully to be begotten but to remain upon default of such Issue to W. and the Heirs Males of his Body to be begotten according to the true intent and meaning of this my Will Dorothy Hopkins had Issue Richard who had Issue Henry who had Issue a Daughter now the Defendant The Question was Whether the Son of Dorothy did take an Estate Tail by this Will to him and to the Heirs of his Body in general or an Estate in Tail Male This Case was argued in Michaelmas Term 36 Car. II. And in the same Term a year afterwards by Council on both sides Those who argued for the Plaintiff held that the Son had an Estate in Tail Male and this seems plain by the intention of the Testator that if Dorothy had Issue Daughters they should have no benefit for no provision is made for any such by the Will and therefore the Daughter of her Son can have no Estate who is more remote to the Testator This is like the Case of Conveyances Turnam vers Cooper 2 Cro. 476. Poph. 138. id 25 Ass pl. 14. wherein the Habendum explains the generality of the precedent words as if Lands be given to Husband and Wife and to their Heirs habendum to them and the Heirs of their Bodies Remainder to them and the Survivor to hold of the chief Lord with Waranty to them and their Heirs this is an Estate Tail with a Feé expectant So it is here tho' the first words in the Will extend to Heirs which is general yet in the Memorandum 't is particular to Heirs Males and the words Heirs and Issues are of the same signification in a Will The Memorandum is a confirmation of the Will Ex parte Def. and the construction which hath been made of it is not only inconsistent with the Rules of Law but contrary to the intent of the Testator and against the express words of his Will Cases upon Wills are different from those which arise upon Deeds because in Conveyances subsequent words may be explanatory of the former but in Wills the first words of the Testator do usually guide those which follow As if Land be devised for Life Dyer 171 a. 1 And. 8. id Golds 16. Moor 593. Remainder to F. and the Heirs Males of his Body and if it happen that he dye without Heirs not saying Males the Remainder over in Tail this was held not to be a general Tail but an Estate in Tail Male therefore the Daughter of F. could not inherit Now to construe this to be an Estate Tail Male doth not only alter the Estate of the Sons of Dorothy but of the Issue of W. and nothing is mentioned in this Memorandum of the Limitation over to Jones so that the whole Will is altered by it But this Memorandum cannot enlarge the Estate of Dorothy because 't is inconsistent with the intention of the Testator who gave her only an Estate for Life by the Will but if she should have an Estate Tail she might by Fine and Recovery bar it and so alien it contrary to his express words Besides there is no Estate limited to Dorothy by this Memorandum and she having an express Estate for Life devised to her by the Will it shall never be enlarged by such doubtful words which follow As where a Man had 100 Acres of Land 2 Leon. 226. Moor 593. called by a particular Name and usually occupied with a House which House he lett to S. with 40 Acres parcel of that Land and then devised the House and all the Lands called by that particular Name c. to his Wife Adjudged she should only have the House and the 40 Acres and that the Devise shall not be extended by implication to the other sixty Acres So that to make the design of this Will and Memorandum to be consistent the latter words must be construed only to illustrate the meaning of the Testator in the former Paragraph of the Will and must be taken as a farther declaration of his intention Viz. that the Heirs Males mentioned in the Memorandum is only a description of the Persons named in the Will The Law doth usually regard the intention of the Testator and will not imply any contradictions in his Bequests The Court was of Opinion that it was a plain Case Judicium for in the Limitation 't is clear that 't is a general Tail and it doth not follow that the Testator did not design any thing for his Grandaughters because no provision was made for Daughters For where an Estate is entailed upon the Heirs of a Man's Body if he hath a Son and a Daughter and the Son hath Issue a Daughter the Estate will go to her and not to the Aunt Now this Memorandum doth not come to make any alteration in the Limitation because it directs that the Estate shall go according to the true intent and meaning of the Will and is rather like a Proviso than an Habendum in a Deed. And therefore Iudgment was given accordingly for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Hicks versus Gore ON Tuesday the 17th day of November there was a Trial at the Barr by a Somerset-Shire Iury in Ejectment The Case was thus The Plaintiff claimed the Lands by virtue of the Statute of 4 5 Ph. Mar. cap. 8. by which 't is enacted That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away any Maid or Woman Child unmarried and within the Age of sixteen years from the Parents or Guardian in Soccage and that if any Woman Child or Maiden being above the Age of twelve years and under the Age of sixteen do at any time assent or agree to such person that shall make any Contract of Matrimony contrary to the Form of the Act that then the next of Kin of such Woman Child or Maid to whom the Inheritance should descend return or come after the decease of the same Woman Child or Maid shall from the time of such Assent and Agreement have hold and enjoy all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments as the said Woman Child or Maid had in Possession Reversion or Remainder at the time of such Assent and Agreement during the Life of such person that shall so contract Matrimony and after the decease of such person so contracting Matrimony that then the said Land c. shall descend revert remain and come to such person or persons as they should have done in case this Act had never been made other than him only that so shall contract Matrimony Benjamin Tibboth being seised in Fee of the Lands in question to the value of 700 l. per annum had Issue a Son and four Daughters the Son had Issue Ruth his only Daughter who was married to the Defendant Gore her Father died in the time of her Grandfather and her Mother
Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
Case Plea where it amounts to the general Issue wherein the Plaintiff declared that the Defendant exhibited a Peittion against him and Sir R. H. before the King in Council by reason whereof he was compelled to appear at his great Expence and that he was afterwards discharged of the matter alledged against him which was the erecting of Cottages in Kingswood Chase in the County of Gloucester This Action was first laid in Gloucestershire and the Defendant moved that it might be laid in Middlesex where the Petition was exhibited But it was insisted for the Plaintiff that where a cause of Action ariseth in two places he hath his Election to lay it in either The Court held that the exhibiting of the Petition was the ground of the Action and though it conteined matter done in another place yet it shall be tried in the County where the Petition was delivered for suppose the Petition had contained Matter done beyond Sea c. Now in this Case the Action being brought in Middlesex the Defendant pleaded that the Chase was injured by the erecting the said Cottages by the digging of Pits and by the making of a Warren by Sir John Newton and that the other person Sir R. H. being then a Iustice of the Peace for the County of Gloucester upon Complaint to him made did not impose Penalties upon the Offenders but did abet the said Plaintiff by reason whereof the Deer were decreased from 1000 head to 400. To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred Mr. Pollexfen argued against the Plea first that it charged Sir R. H. with no particular Crime but enlargeth the Matter upon the Plaintiff and amounts to no more than the general Issue for the Question is whether the Defendant hath fasly prosecuted the Plaintiff before the King in Council which is only matter of fact and which is charged upon the Defendant and therefore he ought to have pleaded Not-Guilty 'T is true where the Defence consists in matters of Law there the Defendant may plead specially but where 't is purely fact the general Issue must be pleaded E contra E contra It was insisted upon that what is alledged in this Plea might be given in Evidence upon the general Issue but the Defendant may likewise plead it specially and not trust the Matter to the Lay-gents As in Conspiracy for procuring of the Plaintiff to be falsly and maliciously indicted of a Robbery Cro. Eliz. 871 900. 21 E. 3.17 27 Ass 12. Kelway 81. Moor 600. Rast Ent. 123. Sed nota This Defence was matter of Law the Defendants plead that they were robbed and suspecting the Plaintiff to be guilty procured a Warrant in order to have the Plaintiff examined before a Iustice of the Peace of which he had notice and absented himself but was afterwards committed to the Gaol by a Iudge of this Court who advised them to preferr a Bill of Indictment c. quae est eadem conspiratio this was adjudged a good Plea though it amounted to no more than the general Issue and all this matter might have been given in Evidence at the Trial. The Court except Iustice Allybon advised the Plaintiff to waive his Demurrer and the Defendant to plead the general Issue But Iustice Allybon took an Exception to the Declaration for that the Plaintiff had not alledged any damnification but only that he was compelled to appear and doth not shew how either by the Petition of the Defendant or by Summons c. He ought to set forth that he was summoned to appear before the King in Order to his discharge but to say coactus fuit comparere is incertain for that might be in the vindication of his Honour or Reputation He complains of a Petition exhibited against him which the Defendant hath answered by shewing to the Court sufficient matter which might reasonably induce him so to to and for that reason he held the Plea to be good Sed adjornatur Rex versus Hockenhul AN Information was exhibited against him for a Riot Misprision of a Clerk amended of which he was found guilty and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Memorandum quod ad general ' quarterial ' Session ' Pacis tent ' c. die Sabbati prox ' post quindenam Sancti Martini praesentat ' existit quod the Defendant 27 die Januarii in such a year vi armis c. So the Fact is laid after the Indictment which was exhibited against the Defendant at the Michaelmas Sessions and the Fact is laid to be in January following in the same year But the Attorny General said this was only a Misprision of the Clerk in titling the Record viz. in the Memorandum 8 Co. 156. 4 H. 6.16 10 Ass 26. Cro. Car. 144. and there was no fault in the Body of the Information and that it was amendable at the Common Law He cited some Cases to prove where amendments have been in the Cases of Subjects of greater Mistakes than here a fortiori it ought to be amended in the King's Case 'T is not only amendable at the Common Law 4 H. 6. c. 3. 8 H. 6. c. 12. Jones 421. but by several Statutes which extend to all Misprisions of Clerks except Treason Felony and Outlawry wherefore this mistake of Quinden ' Martini was amended and made Quinden ' Hillarii Rex versus Sellars THE Defendant was indicted at the Sessions in London for not attending at the Wardmote Inquest being chosen of the Iury for such a year Indictment quashed To this Indictment he pleaded the King's Grant to the Company of Cooks of which he was a Member by which Grant that Company is exempted from being put or summoned upon a Iury or Inquest before the Mayor or Sheriffs or Coroner of London c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Cooks are discharged by this Grant from their Attendance at the said Wardmote Inquest And for the King it was argued that they are not discharged Before the Iudgment upon the Quo Warranto brought against the City of London these Courts there were like the Hundred Courts in the County for as these were derived out of the County 4 Inst 249. so those were derived from the Lord Mayor's Court which is a Court of Record and erected for the better Government of the City and the Aldermen of every Ward had right to hold Leets there 1. But now the words of this Grant do not extend to this Case for the Cooks are thereby discharged only from being of a Iury before the Mayor Sheriffs or Coroner c. but the Court of Wardmote is held before neither for 't is held before the Alderman of the Ward 2. Dyer 269. The words in this Grant ought to be taken strictly viz. that Cooks shall be exempted if there be other sufficient Men in the Ward to serve besides and if this doth not appear the Grant is void but this is not alledged E contra E
Release or Confirmation and then his Council should advise what sort of Conveyance is proper But here it is to make an Assignment and such as the Parties had agreed on If a Man should be bound to give another such a Release as the Iudge of the Prerogative Court shall think fit 5 Co. 23. Lambs Case 1 Rol. Abr. 424. pl. 8. the person who is so bound must procure the Iudge to direct what Release shall be given because the Condition is for his benefit and he hath taken upon him to perform it at his Peril 'T is usual for Men to have Council on both sides to put their Agreements into method but in this Case it being left generally as Council shall direct what reason can be given why the Defendants Council shall not be intended especially when it seems by the penning of the Covenant he shall For an Assignment is to be made as Council shall direct and here being a Verdict for the Plaintiff it must now be presumed that the Defendants Council was first to give the advice and then he was to make the Assignment E contra E contra It was argued that first as to the Verdict 't is not materially objected in this Case because the Plea is non est factum so that nothing of the special matter could come in Evidence Now admitting this Covenant to be general yet one of the Parties must make his choice of Council before he can entitle himself to an Action All Deeds are taken according to the general intendment and therefore by this Covenant his Council is to advise to whom the Assignment is to be made 3 Bulstr 168. for if the Council of the Defendant should advise an insufficient Deed that would not have saved his Covenant Befides the Plaintiff hath not averred that Council did not advise and therefore the Defendant could not plead any thing but non est factum Adjornatur Anonymus A Pleint was removed out of the Lord Mayors Court by Habeas Corpus the Return whereof was Exceptions to a By-Law that the City of London was an ancient City Incorporate and that time out of mind there was a Custom that the Portage and unlading of all Coals and Grain coming thither should belong to the Mayor and Aldermen c. That there was a Custom for them to regulate any Custom within the City c. Then they set forth an Act of Common-Council by which the Porters of Billingsgate were made a Fellowship and that the Meeters of Corn should from time to time give notice to the Porters to unlade such Corn as should arrive there and that no Bargeman not being Free of the said Fellowship shall unlade any Corn upon the Forfeiture of 20 s. to be recovered in an Action brought in the Name of the Chamberlain and that the Party offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law Then they set forth the Iudgment in the Quo Warranto and the re-grant and that the Defendant not being of the said Fellowship did unlade one hundred Quarters of Malt c. Serjeant Thompson took many Exceptions to this By Law but the most material were 1. It appears upon the Return that the City of London hath assumed an Authority to create a Fellowship by Act of Common Council which they cannot for 't is a Prerogative of the Crown so to do and they have not averred or shewed any special Custom to warrant such an Authority 2. They have made this By-Law too general for if a Man should carry and unlade his own Goods there he is lyable to the Forfeiture in which Case he ought to be excepted 3. This Act of Common Council prohibits Bargemen not being Free of the Fellowship of Porters to unlade any Coals or Grain arriving there and they have not averred that the Malt unladed did arrive c. so they have not pursued the words of the By-Law 4. They say in this Law Godb. 107. that the person offending shall have no Essoign or Wager of Law which is a Parliamentary Power and such as an inferiour Iurisdiction ought not to assume Adjornatur Beak versus Thyrwhit THere was a Sentence in the Court of Admiralty Whether Trover will lie for a Ship after Sentence in Admiralty for the same Ship concerning the Taking of a Ship and afterwards an Executrix brought an Action of Trover and Conversion for the same The Defendant after an Imparlance pleads that at the time of the Conversion he was a Servant to King Charles the Second and a Captain of a Man of War called the Phoenix and that he did seize the said Ship for the Governour of the East-India Company she going in a trading Voiage to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition c. And upon a Demurrer these Exceptions were taken to this Plea 1. The Defendant sets forth that he was a Servant to the King but hath not shewed his Commission to be a Captain of a Man of War 2. That he seized the Ship going to the Indies contrary to the King's Prohibition and hath not set forth the Prohibition it self It was Argued by the Council contra That it may be a Question whether this was the Conversion for which this Action is brought for it was upon the Sea and the Defendant might plead to the Iuisdiction of this Court the Matter being then under the Cognizance of the Admiralty But as to the Substance of this Plea 't is not material for the Defendant either to set forth his Commission or the King's Prohibition he hath shewed enough to entitle the Court of Admiralty to a Iurisdiction of this Cause and therefore this Court cannot meddle with it for he expresly affirmeth that he was a Captain of a Man of War and did seize this Ship c. which must be intended upon the Sea so that the Conversion might afterwards be upon the Land Cro. Eliz. 685. yet the original cause arising upon the Sea shall and must be tried in the Admiralty and it having already received a determination there shall not again be controverted in an Action of Trover The Case of Mr. 3 Keb. 785. Hutchinson was cited to this purpose who killed Mr. Colson in Portugal and was acquitted there of the Murder the Exemplification of which Acquittal he woduced under the great Seal of that Kingdom being brought from Newgate by an Habeas Corpus to this Court notwithstanding the King was very willing to have him tried here for that Fact the consideration whereof he referred to the Iudges who all agreed that he being already acquitted by their Law could not be tryed again here Adjornatur Smith versus Pierce A Special Verdict was found in Ejectment A Term for years was devised for payment of Debts the Remainder over in Tail he in Remainder enters and levies a Fine and settles the Land upon his Wife for life and dies the Wife surviving and the Debts not paid whether this Term is barred by
the Wife they both had their existence at one and the same time and it appear'd they were made to distinct purposes but here no body can tell what was designed or intended by the Testator in this subsequent Will And therefore it hath been held Cro. Car. 51. Eyres Case Godolph 443. Perkins 92. b. that where a Man devised Legacies to his two Brothers and afterwards in his sickness was asked to leave Legacies to his said Brothers he replied he would leave them nothing but devised a small Legacy to his Godson and died This Discourse was set down in a Cocidil which together with the Will was proved in common form This Codicil was not a revocation of the Legacies given to the Brothers because the Testator took no notice of the Will which he had made in the time of his Health and non constat what he intended by these words which were set down in the Codicil If therefore doubtful words shall not make a revocation of a former Will a fortiori a subsequent Will especially when the contents of such Will doe not appear shall not revoke a former It was argued for the Defendant E contra And The only Objection is That a latter Will being made and it not appearing to the Iury what was contained in that Will it can be no revocation because no express words of revocation can be found or any thing which is contradictory to the first Will and without the one or the other a former Will cannot be revoked But this is contrary to all the Authorities in the Books Linwood 175. Swinb 7 part Sect. 14. 2 H. 5.8 pl. 3. Offiice of Ex. 443. which shew that a Testament which is good in the beginning may become void by making of a subsequent Will by words of revocation or by words contradicting each other for in such cases 't is not doubted but the first Will is revoked But the meaning must be that by the very making of a latter Will the first is become void This may be collected from the nature of a Will which a Man hath power to alter in part or in all at any time during his Life but when he makes a new Will it must be presumed that he declared his whole mind in it for if his Intentions are to alter any part the Law hath appointed a proper Instrument for that purpose which is a Codicil but when he maketh aliud Testamentutum 't is a sign that he intended nothing of his former Will should take any effect when he had so easie a method to alter it in part Every subsequent act of the Testator shews that he intends a revocation either by word or deed and there is great reason why it should be so because every revocation of a Will is in the nature of restitution to the Heir It cannot be denied but that a Will may be revoked by words without writing before the making of the Statute against Frauds 1 Rol. Abr. 614. Dyer 310. b. c. As if a Man should say that he would alter his Will when he came to such a place and he should dye before he came thither this is a revocation But it never was yet controverted but a revocation may be by Deed as if a Man devise Lands to another 1 Rol. Abr. 614. and afterwards makes a Feoffment to the use of his Will this was always held a revocation So it is if Lands which are well given by a Will are afterwards by another Will devised to the Poor of the Parish 1 Rol. Abr. 614. pl. 4. tho' this last Will is void because the Devisees have not a capacity to take yet 't is a revocation of the first Will and shall a Will which is lost be of less authority than such which is void 'T is not denied but that there may be a subsequent Will which may not contradict the first so is Coward 's Case where both Wills did appear to be consistent but that is not parallel with this because the Iury hath found that the Testator made aliud Testamentum which word aliud imports a distinct Will from the former 'T is agreed also that a Man may make many Wills and that they may stand together and it must also be agreed that such are but partial Wills because they are but pieces of the whole tho' written in several papers but when 't is found in general that aliud Testamentum was made it must naturally be intended of his whole Estate The Case in the Year Book of Richard III. is an Authority in point where in Trespass the Defendant justified the taking of the Goods by vertue of a Will by which they were devised to him and of which Will he was made Executor The Plaintiff replied that the Testator made another Will and thereby did constitute him Executor and this was held a good Replication without a Traverse that the Defendant was Executor because by the making of the second Will the other was void in Law and therefore the shewing that he was Executor was not to avoid the first Will which the Law doth adjudge to be of no force but to make to himself a Title to the Goods taken out of his possession If a Man should make twenty Codicils without dates they may all stand together but if he make two Wills without dates they are both void the reason is because by the making of the later Will the first is destroyed and it being incertain which is the last rather than the Rules of Revocation should be broken they adjudge both to be void It cannot be reasonably objected that this later Will may devise the same Lands to the same person for why should a Man be thought so vain Besides if it was so the Plaintiff should have claimed under that Will But this cannot be the same Will because 't is contrary to the Verdict which hath not found it to be idem but aliud Testamentum besides 't is in the Case of an Heir who shall not be disinherited by an intendment that the later Will is the same with the first Neither can the Statute of Wills have any influence upon this Matter 32 H. 8. c. 1. 34 H. 8. c. 5. 'T is true at the Common Law no Land could be devised by a Will but now by the Statutes of H. 8. Lands c. in Socage may be devised by Will and if held in Knights Service then only two parts in three Godolph 299. but it must be by the last Will. Now how can any Man say that this shall be a Devise of the Lands by the last Will of the Testator when the Iury find he made aliud Testamentum the Contents whereof are not necessary to be shewed because the Defendant claims as Heir and not as Executor It must not be intended that this Will shall confirm or stand with the other because the Law is otherwise and therefore if the Plaintiff would have supported his Will by
question as forfeited to the Lady who entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-entred The single Question upon this special Verdict was whether this was a Forfeiture and so a good seisure to bind the right of an Infant It was argued for the Plaintiff in the Action that it was a good Seisure and a Forfeiture till the Infant should come of Age for as a Copyhold is established by Custom so likewise 't is Custom which obligeth the Infant to the Conditions thereof and therefore where one under Age hath an Estate upon a Condition to be performed by him 8 Co. 44. b. Whittingham 's Case Latch 199. Jones 157. and that Condition is broken during his Minority the Estate is lost for ever In this Case the Custom obligeth the Heir to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine which if he should lose because his Tenant is an Infant then that priviledge of Infancy works a wrong which the Law will not permit 'T is true an Infant shall not be prejudiced by the Laches of another but shall be answerable for himself and therefore if he is Tenant of Lands and the Rent should be unpaid for two years and no Distress can be found a Cessavit lies against him and the Lord shall recover the Land because of the Non-performance which arises by his own default So if one under Age be a Keeper of a Gaol and suffer a Prisoner to escape out of Execution 2 Inst 382. an Action of Debt will lie against him upon the Statute of W. 2. It was agreed that such a Custom and Non-claim will not foreclose an Heir 8 Co. 100. Sir Rich. Letchford 's Case who is an Infant and beyond Sea at the time of his Ancestors Death though he is bound by the Custom to claim it at the next Court but that if he will come over and tender himself though after a Seisure he shall be admitted and so shall the person in this Case if after his Minority he offer himself to be admitted But it cannot be denied 2 Cro. 226. but that the Lord may seize when the Heir is beyond Sea till he return and tender himself to be admitted and by the same reason he may also seize in this case during the Minority A Temporary Forfeiture is no new thing in the Law Cro. Car. 7. for if a Feme Covert be a Copyholder and marrieth and her Husband makes a Lease for years without License of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture and shall bind her during the Coverture So the Law is Cro. El. 351. that the Lord may seize the Land till a Fine is paid for 't is a reasonable Custom so to do It hath been a good Custom for the Lord to assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate descended to the Infant during his Minority without rendring an Accompt when he came of Age. 1 Leon. 266. 2 Leon. 239. So that all taht is to be done in this Case is to enforce the Infant to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine The Inheritance is not bound but the Land is only seized quousque E contra It was argued that here is a general Seizure E contra which cannot extend to an Infant for he is not bound in a Writ of Right much less in an inferior Court after three Proclamations but if this had been a Temporary Seisure the Iury ought to have found it so which is not done There are many Authorities in the Books which affirm that an Infant is not obliged to be admitted during his Non-age 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. or to tender the Fine in order to an Admittance that the Law was settled in this Point and therefore without any further Argument he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Afterwards in Hillary-Term 1 Willielmi Mariae this Case was argued seriatim at the Bench three Iudges being of a contrary Opinion to the Chief Iustice for the affirming of the Iudgment Iustice Eyre premised two things 1. That he could not intend but that this Verdict had found an absolute Forfeiture the Iury having no way qualified it as to a certain time and therefore he would give a Iudgment upon the whole Record 2. He agreed that a Feoffment of an Infant was no Forfeiture at the Common Law and that as a particular Custom may bind an Infant for a time so it may barr him for ever but whether this Custom as 't is found in general words shall bind an Infant after three Proclamations is now the Question he not coming then to be admitted And he held that it shall not and that for these reasons 1. The Right of Infants is much favoured in the Law and their Laches shall not be prejudicial to them as to Entry or Claim upon a Presumption that they understand not their Right 1 Inst 380. 2 Inst 401. and therefore in a Cessavit per biennium which is a remedy given by the Statute of W. 2. and which extends to Infants Westm 2. c. 31. who have not the Land by descent for if a Cesser be in that Case the Infant shall have his Age because the Law intends that he doth not know what Arrerages to tender 'T is admitted that if an Infant doth not present to a Church within six Months or doth not appear within a year that his Right is bound but this is because the Law is more tender of the Church and the life of a Man than of the Priviledges of Infancy So if an Office of Parkship be given or descends to an Infant if the Condition in Law annexed to such an Office which is skill be not observed the Office is forfeited But that a Proclamation in a base Court should bind an Infant when he is not within the reason of the Custom is not agreeable either to Law or Reason 2. Cro. Jac. 80. Cro. El. 879. Noy 42. 1 Rol. Abr. 568. All Customs are to be taken strictly when they go to the destruction of an Estate and therefore a Custom was that if a Copyholder in Fee surrender out of Court and the Surrendree doth not come in after three Proclamations the Lord shall seize it A Copyholder in Fee surrendred to another for Life the Remainder over in Fee if the Tenant for Life will not come in he in the Remainder shall not be barred for the Custom shall be intended to extend only to those in possession But the Infant in this Case is not within the Letter of the Custom for 't is found that the Surrender was made to one Freeman who died before the next Court-day and that John Freeman the Infant was his Son and Heir so they have found a Title in him for the word Heir is not here a word of Purchase but of Limitation 3. Jones 157. Noy 92. Infants are not bound by other Customs like this as a Custom that every Copyholder
an Inn-keeper or common Carrier 't is usual to declare secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae for 't is not a Custom confined to a particular place but 't is such which is extensive to all the King's People The word Consuetudo might have been added 1 Inst 182. but it imports no more than Lex for Custom it self is Law If the Custom of Merchants had been left out the Defendant had then pursued his Covenant for if a Man agrees to pay Mony to such a person or his Assigns and he appoints the payment to another a tender to that person is a good performance of the Covenant But the Court were of Opinion that this was not a good Plea Panton versus the Earl of Bath A Scire Facias to have Execution of a Iudgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging Where the Pleading is good in substance tho' there is a small variation it will not hurt and in reciting the Iudgment 't is said that it was obtained before Oliver Protector of England and the Dominions thereunto belonging leaving out the word Territories And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen held this to be a variance Yelv. 212. Orde versus Moreton and like the Case where a Writ of Error was brought to remove a Record in Ejectment directed to the Bishop of Durham setting forth that the Action was between such Parties and brought before the said Bishop and seven other persons naming them and the Record removed was an Ejectment before the Bishop and eight others so that it could not be the same Record which was intended to be removed by the Writ E contra E contra It was said suppose the word Scotland should be left out of the King's Title would that be a variance The Iudicature in this Case is still the same and the Pleading is good in Substance and of that Opinion was the whole Court Hyley versus Hyley HYley had Issue W. Where the Reversion in Fee shall pass in a Will by the words viz. Remaining part of my Estate his eldest Son who had Issue Peter Charles John He by Will devised 1000 l. to his eldest Son and several parcels of Land to other Legatees Then he gave to Peter Lands in Tail Male To John a Mansion House now in question in Tail Male He devised another House to his Grandson Charles in like manner And all the rest and remaining part of his Estate he devised to his three Grandsons equally to be divided amongst them that only excepted which he had given to Peter Charles and John and to the Heirs of their Bodies whom he made Executors Then by another Clause he devised viz. That if either of his Executors die without Issue then the part or parts of him so dying shall go to the Survivor or Survivors equally to be divided John the youngest Grandson dyed without Issue and the question was whether the Reversion of his House shall be divided between his surviving Brothers or descend to his Heir And it was adjudged that the Exception in the Will did comprehend the Reversion in Fee and that it did not pass but without such an Exception it had passed * Allen 28. as where a Man devised his Mannor to another for years and part of other Lands to B. and his Heirs and all the rest of his Lands to his Brother in Tail it was held that by these words the Reversion of the Mannor did pass Anonymus NOTA. An Infant having entred into a Statute brought an Audita Querela to avoid it he was brought into the Court and two Witnesses were sworn to prove his Age and then his Appearance and Inspection were recorded he was bound in this Case with two other persons for 1600 l. and had no more than 200 l. for his share Lydcott versus Willows IN Ejectment A special Verdict was found viz. Devise of an Hereditament carries the Reversion in Fee that the Testator being seized in Fee of certain Houses in Bedfor-Bury and in Parker's Lane did by Will devise his Houses in Parker's Lane to charitable Vses then he gave several specifick Legacies to several persons named in the said Will and then he devised his Houses in Bedford-Bury to Edward Harris and Mary his Wife for their Lives then follow these words viz. The better to enable my Wife to pay my Legacies I give and bequeath to her and her Heirs all my Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Kingdom of England not before disposed of c. The Question was whether this Devise would carry the Reversion of the Houses in Bedford-Bury to his Wife Adjudged that it did not but that it ought to go to the Heir of the Testator who was Plaintiff in this Case It being found that Harris and his Wife were dead and that the Wife who was Executrix had sufficient Assets to pay the Legacies without the Reversion But Iustice Powel was of another Opinion for that the word Hereditament imports an Inheritance and if it had devised thus viz. the Inheritance not before disposed of the Reversion had passed Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer-Chamber upon this Iudgment 2 Vent 285. and according to the Opinion of Iustice Powel the Iudgment was reversed Nota. A Rule of Court was made that no Certiorari should go to the Sessions of Ely without Motion in Court or signing of it by a Iudge in his Chamber But Mr. Pollexfen insisted that the Sessions there did not differ from other Courts and Franchises for the inferior Courts in London are of as large a Iurisdiction as any and yet a Certiorari goes to them and so it ought to go to Ely for 't is the Right of the Subject to remove his Cause hither Their course in the Royal Franchise of Ely is to hold the Sessions there twice a year viz. in March and September in which two Months the Iudges are seldom in Town and if this Court should deny a Certiorari the Court of Common Pleas would grant it Attorney General contra This Franchise of Ely is of greater Priviledge and Authority than any inferior Court for it hath many Regalia though 't is not a County Palatine A Certiorari will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes 't is true it lyeth to remove Indictments for Riots and this Franchise being truly called Royal hath equal priviledge with a County Palatine and therefore a Certiorari will not lie But no Rule was made Osborn versus Steward TRespass Distress for an Heriot where it may be taken The Case upon the Pleadings was this viz. A Lease was made of Land for 99 years if Margery and Dorothy Upton should so long live reserving a yearly Rent and an Heriot or 40 s. in lieu thereof after the death of either of them Provided that no Heriot shall be paid after the death of Margery living
the benefit of the Obligor and shall be taken most beneficially for him who had election either to perform the one or the other to save the penalty of the Bond. But the Council for the Plaintiff said that the whole intent of the Condition in that Case was to provide a Security for G. who died before her Husband so that no body could be hurt for the non-performance of that Condition there being no manner of necessity that any thing should be done in order to it after her decease 'T is quite otherwise in the Case at Bar for Hannah Goddard paid Mony for the House and certainly it was never intended that Chappel the Father to whom the Mony was paid should have both House and Mony If she had lived the House ought to have been conveyed to her now she is dead the Mony ought to be paid for 't is not lost by her death In Laughter's Case the person who was to do the thing was the Obligor himself but here the Father undertakes for his Son that he should convey when he came of Age or to repay the Mony so that 't is not properly a Condition in the disjunctive for 't is no more than if it had been penn'd after this manner Viz. The Father undertakes for his Son that he shall convey at the Age of 21 years if he refuse then the Father is to repay what mony he received Besides Cro. Eliz. 399. Laughter's Case is Reported by Iustice Croke and therein he cites two other Cases of Chew and Baker That of Chew was viz. A. promised B. that if C. did not appear at Westminster such a day he would pay him 20 l. The Defendant pleaded that C. died before the day and ruled to be no Plea for he ought to pay the Mony which Case is parallel to this for 't is the same in Reason and Sense That of Baker was viz. A Man was bound that A. should appear the first day in the next Term at the Star-Chamber or he would pay 20 l. A. died before the day so as by the act of God he could not appear yet it was adjudged that the Mony must be paid The like Case was adjudged between Huntley and Allen in the Common-Pleas in my Lord Hale 's time 't is entred Pasch 1658. Rot. 1277. The Rule in Laughter's Case cannot be denied viz. where the Condition is in the disjunctive consisting of two parts and one becomes impossible by the act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other but then it must be governed by the subsequent matter As in Greningham's Case Cro. Eliz. 396. Moor 395. viz. Debt upon Bond conditioned that if the Defendant delivered three Bonds to the Plaintiff wherein he was bound to the Defendant or a Release of them as should be advised by the Plaintiff's Council before such a day then c. The Defendant pleaded that neither the Plaintiff or his Council did advise a Release before the day c. and upon Demurrer it was adjudged that the Plea was good for the Defendant had an election to deliver or release as the Plaintiff should devise which if he will not do the Defendant is discharged by the neglect of the Plaintiff for the Defendant being at his choice to perform the one thing or the other 't is not reason that the Plaintiff should compel him to perform one thing only It was argued on the other side E contra that this is a disjunctive condition and not only an undertaking of the Father for the Son Where a Condition is to perform two things and if either be done no Action will lye such Condition is in the disjunctive as in this Case if the Son had conveyed or the Father repaid the Mony By the Condition of this Bond the Father did as much undertake for his Son as Laughter did for Rainsford viz. to convey the House or pay the Mony to Hannah Goddard now the last part of the Condition being discharged by the Act of God he is acquitted of the other Suppose the Condition had been single to convey to Hannah Goddard if she die the Bond is void There is an Authority to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 380. Reported by Iustice Croke which was an Action of Debt was brought by the Plaintiff as Executor c. The Condition of the Bond was for the yearly payment of a Sum of Mony twice in a year viz. at Michaelmas and Lady day during the Life of a Lady or within 30 days after either of the said Feasts the Lady died after one of the Feasts but within the 30 days it was adjudged that by her death that payment which was due at the Feast preceding was discharged In the Case at Bar the Condition is that if the Son should not convey when of Age or otherwise if the Defendant re-pay c. Now certainly these words or otherwise make the Condition disjunctive 'T is like the common Case of Bail entred into in this Court whereby the Parties undertake that the Defendant shall render himself to Prison if condemned in the Action or they shall pay the condemnation mony this is a disjunctive condition and if the Defendant dye before the return of the second Sci. Fa. the Bail are discharged Iustice Allibon said Roll. Abr. tit condition 450. pl. 4. that if a condition be to make an Assurance of Land to the Obligee and his Heirs and the Obligee dies before the Assurance made yet it shall be made to the Heir for this copulative is a disjunctive Sed Adjornatur Franshaw versus Bradshaw Mich. 1 Jac. Rot. 45. DEbt upon a Iudgment obtained in this Court 34 Car. 2. Matter of Form not amendable upon Demurrer setting forth the said Iudgment c. Sicut per Recordum processum inde remanen ' in eadem Curia nuper Domini Regis coram ipso Rege apud Westmonast plenius liquet apparet And upon a Demurrer to the Declaration this Objection was made viz. It doth not appear that the Iudgment was in force or where the Reeord was at the time of this Action brought he should have declared Coram ipso nuper Rege apud Westm sed jam coram Domino Rege nunc residen ' c. plenius liquet c. The Court held it was but matter of form but being upon a Demurrer it was not amendable Letchmere versus Thorowgood al' Vic. London TRespass by the Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy for taking of their Goods When a Judgment is once executed the Goods are in Custodia Legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or Assignment of Commissioners of Bankrupts upon not Guilty pleaded the Iury find a special Verdict the substance of which was viz. one Toplady a Vintner on the 28th of April became a Bankrupt against whom a Iudgment was formerly obtained the Iudgment Creditor sued out a Fi. Fa. and the Sheriffs of London by virtue thereof did
and that before the Pardon for these Reasons it cannot be revested in the party Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. E contra Finch contra The Question is what Interest the King hath by this Verdict for as to the Offence it self 't is within the Body of the Pardon for all Misdemeanours and Offences are pardoned and the Exception doth not reach this Case for that excepts Misdemeanours in answering of the Revenues Now that which arises by a Forfeiture can never be taken to be part of the King's Revenue because the Revenue is properly a stated Duty originally setled on the King and the Penalty to be inflicted for this Misdemeanour cannot be a Revenue because the Court have not yet given Iudgment so that 't is incertain what Fine they will set and this appears more plain because the King may assign his Revenue but cannot grant over a Penalty The Information is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament which establishes the Revenue but for concealing of a thing forfeited to prevent the Seisure thereof which indeed may be a casual Revenue as all Fines are so that if this should be taken as an Offence committed against the King in deceiving him of this Revenue then the first part of the Pardon dischargeth all such Offences and the Exception pardons none 'T is for these Reasons that the Case cannot fall under any of the words in the Exception no not under these Words viz. Mony due or to be due to the King because no Mony is yet due to him 'T is true the Iury have found it a Misdemeanour which is finable but until the Fine is set no Mony is due because the Court may set a greater or less Fine as they shall see cause And if any other Construction should be made of this Exception then every thing for which a Fine may be set is excepted and this will be to make the Pardon signifie nothing for what is meant by Offences and Misdemeanours if they should be pardoned and yet the Fine arising thereon should not But admitting that all Offences relating to the Concealment of collecting of the Revenue are excepted then this Revenue must be either antecedent or it must arise by the Fine 'T is no antecedent Revenue this appears by the Book of Rates wherein the King 's stated Revenue is set down and no mention of this so that the Revenue to which this relates must arise upon the Offence and what an absurd thing is it to say that all Offences are pardoned by one part of this general Pardon and by the Exception none are pardoned Besides the Information is not grounded upon that part of the Statute which inflicts a Penalty upon the person who exposeth prohibited Goods to Sale for then they would sue for the 50 l. therefore it must be upon the Forfeiture which is expresly pardoned and though there is a Conviction yet nothing is vested in the King before Iudgment because it may be arrested and therefore Tooms's Case is in no wise applicable to this for the Debt which was due to him was actually vested in the King by the Inquisition returned here which found him to be Felo de se Adjornatur Anonymus A Libel in the Admiralty against a Ship called the Sussex Ketch A Ship was pawned for necessaries and a Libel was exhibited in the Admiralty though the pawning was at the Land setting forth that the said Ship wanted Necessaries super altum Mare and that the Master took up several Sums of the Plaintiff at Roterdam for which he did hypothecate the said Ship and upon a Suggestion that this Contract was made at St. Katherines infra Corpus Comitatus Council moved for a Prohibition upon which a Question did arise whether a Master of a Vessel can pawn it on the Coast for Necessaries and the person to whom 't is pawned shall sue for the Mony in the Admiralty here By the Common Law a Master of a Ship had neither a general or special property in it Sid. 453. and therefore could not pawn it but by the Civil Law in cases of necessity he may rather than the Voyage should be lost and if any such cause appear 't is within the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty but then the pawning must be super altum Mare Now the Statute of 28 H. Cap. 15. H. 8. which abridgeth the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty in Trials of Pyrates and which appointeth Offences committed on the Sea to be tried by a Commission under the great Seal directed to the Admiral and others according to the course of the Common Law and not according to the Civil Law gives a remedy in this very Case Molloy de Jure maritimo 62. for it provides that it shall not be prejudicial to any person for taking of Victuals Gables Rapes c. in cases of necessity upon the Sea paying for the same So that this is an excepted Case because of the Necessity and 't is like the Cases of suing for Mariners Wages in this Court The Service was at Sea so that the Admiralty hath no proper Iurisdiction over this Matter 'T is true Prohibitions have been denied for Mariners Wages the first is reported by Iustice Winch Winch. f. 8. but the reason seems to be because they proceed in the Admiralty not upon any Contract at Land but upon the Merits of the Service at Sea and allow or deduct the Wages according to the good or bad performance of the Services in the Voyage Besides there is an Act of Parliament which warrants she Proceedings in the Court of Admiralty for Mariners Wages Cotton Abr. f. 340. nu 37. For in a Parliament held in the 14th year of Richard II. the Commons petititioned for remedy against great Wages taken by Masters of Ships and Mariners to which the King answered that the Admiral shall appoint them to take reasonable Wages or shall punish them Now the reason of the Civil Law which allows the pawning of a Ship for necessaries upon the high Sea seems to be plain because there may be an extraordinary and invincible necessity at Sea but not at Land So that this being a Contract beyond Sea and at Land the Court of Admiralty cannot have any Iurisdiction over it 4 Inst 134. Cro. Car. 603. Latch 11. 2 Brownl 37. for where the Common Law cannot relieve in such Cases the Admiralty shall not because they are limited to Acts done upon the Sea and in cases of necessity for if the Law should be otherwise the Master may take up as much Mony as he will Mr. Pollexfen contra 1 Rolls 530. That things arising upon Land may be sued for in the Admiralty is no new thing for so it is in all Cases of Stipulation Mariners Wages are also recoverable in that Court not by vertue of any Act of Parliament Exton Mant. Diraeologiae f. 192. but because it grows due for Services done at Sea which is properly a Maritime Cause though the
Intratur Trin. 1 W. M. Rot. 249. THis was a Trial at the Bar A Will shall not be revoked by a subsequent Writing unless that be also a good Will by a Wiltshire Iury in an Ejectment brought by the Plaintiffs as Heirs at Law to Ann Speke who died seized in Fee of the Lands in Question Vpon not Guilty pleaded this Question did arise at the Trial Whether the Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall be read as Evidence in this Court to conclude the Infant There being some Opinions that it ought to be read and the Defendants Council insisting on the contrary Mr Iustice Eyres being the Puisne Iustice was sent to the Court of Common-Pleas then sitting to know their Opinions who returning made this Report That the Judges of that Court were all of Opinion that such Answer ought not to be read as Evidence for it was only to bring the Infant into Court and to make him a Party Then the Plaintiffs proceeded to prove their Title as Heirs at Law viz. by several Inquisitions which were brought into Court and by the Heralds Office The Defendants Title likewise was thus proved viz. That the Lady Speke being seised in Fee c. did by Will dated in March 1682. devise the Lands to John Petit for Life Remainder to the Defendant and his Heirs for ever That the Lady Speke died so seised that John Speke the Tenant for Life and Father to the Defendant was also dead c. This Will was proved by several Witnesses one of which likewise deposed that my Lady Speke made two other Wills subsequent to this now produced and a Minister prov'd that she burnt a Will in the Month of December which was in the year 1685. Then the Plaintiffs produced another Will made by her at Christmas 1685. attested by three Witnesses but not in the presence of my Lady so that though it might not be a good Will to dispose the Estate yet the Council insisted that it was a good Revocation of the other for 't is a Writing sufficient for that purpose within the sixth Paragraph of the Statute of Frauds The Case of Sir George Sheers was now mentioned whose Will was carried out of the Chamber where he then was into a Lobby and signed there by the Witnesses but one of them swore that there was a Window out of that Room to his Chamber through which the Testator might see the Witnesses as he lay in his Bed Vpon which Evidence the Iury found this special Verdict viz. That Ann Speke being seised in Fee c. did on the 12th day of March 1682. make her Will and devised the Lands to John Pettit for Life and afterwards to George his Son and to his Heirs for ever upon condition that he take upon him the Name of Speke That the 25th of December 1685. she caused another Writing to be made purporting her Will which was signed sealed and published by her in the presence of three Witnesses in the Chamber where she then was and where she continued whilst the Witnesses subscribed their Names in the Hall but that she could not see them so subscribing They find that the Lessors of the Plaintiff are Heirs at Law and that they did enter c. This matter was argued in Easter Term following and the Question was whether this Writing purporting a Will was a Revocation of the former or not and that depended upon the Construction of the sixth Paragraph in the Act of Frauds viz. All Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the party or some other in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested by three or four Witnesses c. and that such devise shall not be revocable but by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing c. declaring the same Now the want of Witnesses doth not make the last Will void in it self but only quoad the Lands therein devised it hath its operation as to all other purposes It must therefore be a Revocation of the former and this is agreeable to the Resolution of the Iudges in former times for there being nothing in the Statute of Wills which directs what shall be a Revocation 32 H. 8. cap. 1. Dyer 143. the Iudges in Trevilian's Case did declare that it might be by word of mouth or by the very intention of the Testator to alter any thing in the Will for before the late Statute very few words did amount to a Revocation Moor 429. 1 Roll. Abr. 614 615 616. If Lands are devised and afterwards a feoffment is made of the same but for want of Livery and Seisin 't is defective yet this is a Revocation of the Will though the Feoffment is void The Council on the other side argued that this Will was not void by any Clause in the Statute of Frauds E contra for if this is a Revocation within that Statute then this second Writing purporting a Will must be a good Will for if 't is not a good Will then 't is not a good Revocation within that Law No Man will affirm that the latter Writing is a good Will therefore the first being a Devise of Land cannot be revoked but by a Will of Land which the second is not This Statute was intended to remedy the mischief of parol Revocations and therefore made such a solemnity requisite to a Revocation It cannot be denied but that this latter Writing was intended to be made a Will but it wanting that perfection which is required by Law it shall not now be intended a Writing distinct from a Will so as to make a Revocation within the meaning of that Act. If a Man hath a power of Revocation either by Will or Deed and he makes his Will in order to Revoke a former this is a Writing presently but 't is not a Revocation as long as the person is living Therefore a Revocation must not only be by a Writing but it must be such a Writing which declares the intention of a Man that it should be so which is not done by this Writing Vpon the first Argument Iudgment was given for the Defendant that the second Will must be a good Will in all Circumstances to Revoke a former Will Cross versus Garnet THE Plaintiff declared that on such a day and year there was a discourse between him and the Defendant concerning the Sale of two Oxen then in the possession of the Defendant and that they came to an agreement for the same that the Defendant did then sell the said Oxen to the Plaintiff and did falsly affirm them to be his own ubi revera they were the Oxen of another Man The Plaintiff had a Verdict Cro. Eliz. 44. 1 Rol. Rep. 275. 2 Cro. 474 1 Roll. Abr. 91. More 126. Yel 20. Sid. 146. and Serjeant Thompson moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good because the Plaintiff hath not alledged that the Defendant did affirm the
quarter for by such means Diseases may be brought into a Family and a Man hath no security either for his Goods or Mony This was the Opinion of Iustice Twisden in Coutrell's Case Sid. 29. and it seems to be very natural and therefore the chief reason why power was given by the Statute to the Overseers to raise mony was that they might place poor Children to such who were willing to take them for Mony for otherwise they might compel a Man to receive his Enemy into his Service He relied on the Case of the King and Price Hillary 29 and 30th of Car. II. which was an Order of the like nature moved to be quashed And Iustice Twisden said in that Case that all the Iudges of England were of Opinion that the Iustices had not such a Power and therefore that Order was quashed 'T is plain that by the Statute of the 43 Eliz. E contra the Iustices may place out poor Children where they see it convenient and so the constant practice hath been so is the Resolution of the Iudges in Dalton which was brought in by the Lord Chief Iustice Hyde but denied so to be by Iustice Twisden for no other reason but because Iustice Jones did not concur with them In Price 's Case this matter was stirred again but there hath been nothing done pursuant to that Opinion Since then the Iustices have a power to place out poor Children 'T is no Objection to say that there may be an inconvenience in the exercise of that power by placing out Children to improper persons for if such things are done the Party hath a proper remedy by way of Appeal to the Sessions Three Iustices were of Opinion that the Iustices of Peace had such a Power and therefore they were for confirming the Order and Iustice Dolbin said it was so resolved in the Case of the King and Gilliflower in the Reign of King James the first Foster being then Chief Iustice tho' the Iudges in Price 's Case were of another Opinion The Chief Iustice was now likewise of a different Opinion for the Statute means something when it says that a Stock shall be raised by the Taxation of every Inhabitant c. for putting out of Children Apprentice There are no compulsory words in the Statute for that purpose nor any which oblige a Master to take an Apprentice and if not the Iustices have not power to compel a Man to take a poor Boy for possibly such may be a Thief or Spy in the Family But this Order was quashed for an apparent fault which was that the Statute has entrusted the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor by and with the Approbation of two Iustices to bind Apprentices c. And the Churchwardens are not mentioned in this Order DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Thirsby versus Helbot DEBT upon a Bond for performance of an Award Award void where a person who is a Stranger to the Submission is ordered to be a Surety Vpon Nullum Arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replyed and shewed an Award made which amongst other things was that the Defendant should be bound with Sureties such as the Plaintiff should approve in the Sum of 150 l. to be paid to him at such a time and that they should seal mutual Releases and assigned a Breach in not giving of this Bond. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and now Serjeant Pemberton moved in arrest of Iudgment that this was a void Award because 't is that the Defendant shall be bound with Sureties c. and then Releases to be given now the Sureties are Strangers to the Submission and therefore the Defendant is not bound to procure them He relied upon the Case of Barns and Fairchild 1 Roll. Abr. 259. which was an Award that all Controversies c. should cease and that one of the Parties should pay to the other 8 l. and that thereupon he should procure his Wife and Son to make such an Assurance c. this was held to be void because it was to bind such persons who were not Parties to the Submission Tremain Serjeant contra E contra That Cause doth not come up to this at the Barr because by this Award the Party was to sign a general Release whether the Defendant paid the Mony or not But the Court was of Opinion that the Award was void because it appointed the Party to enter into a Bond with such Sureties as the Plaintiff shall like and Releases then to be mutually given Now if the Plaintiff doth not like the Security given then he is not to seal a Release and so 't is but an Award of one side Savier versus Lenthal ASsisa ven ' recogn ' si Willielmus Lenthal Armiger Henricus Glover Armiger Johannes Philpot Generosus Thomas Cook Generosus Samuel Ellis Generosus injuste c. Assize disseisiverunt Thomam Savier de libero tenemento suo in Westm infra triginta annos c. Et unde idem Thomas Savier per Jacobum Holton Attornatum suum queritur quod disseisiverunt eum de officio Marr ' Maresc ' Domini Regis Dominae Reginae coram ipso Rege Regina cum pertin ' c. The Cryer made Proclamation and then called the Recognitors between Thomas Savier Demandant and William Lenthal Tenant who were all at the Bar and severally answered as they were called Then Mr. Goodwin of Greys-Inn arraigned the Assize in French but the Count being not in Parchment upon Record the Recognitors were for this time discharged and ordered to appear again the next day But the Council for the Tenant relied on the authority in Calvert's Case that the Title ought to be set forth in the Count Plo. Com. 403. 4 E. 4.6 which was not done now and therefore the Demandant ought to be nonsuited But the Writ being returnable that day was ex gratia Curiae adjourned to the Morrow afterward and if the Demandant did not then make a Title he must be nonsuited The next day the Iury appeared Then the Cryer called Thomas Savier the Demandant and then the Tenants and afterwards the Recognitors and the Assize being arraigned again the Demandant set forth his Title Then Sir Francis Winnington of Council for Mr. Lenthal one of the Tenants appeared after this manner Vouz avez icy le dit Williem Lenthal jeo prye oyer del Brief del Count. Then the other Tenants were called again three times and they not appearing Process was prayed against them Doe versus Dawson BAil was put in to an Action brought by the Plaintiff Bail liable if the Principal had two Terms after an Injunction dissolved and before he declared the Defendant obtained an Injunction to stay Proceedings at Law which was not dissolved for several Terms afterwards Then the Injunction was dissolved and the Plaintiff delivered his Declaration and had Iudgment by default
the six Months by this means the Conusee of the Statute is defeated for after the inrollment the Land passeth ab initio and the Bargainee in Iudgment of Law was seised thereof from the delivery of the Deed but not by way of Relation but by immediate Conveyance of the Estate by vertue of the Statute of Vses But the Law will not suffer contingent Remainders to waver about and to be so incertain that no Man knows where to find them which they must be if this Doctrine of Relation should prevail Now suppose the Surrendree had made a Grant of his Estate to another person before he had accepted of the Surrender and the Grantee had entred would this subsequent assent have divested this Estate and made the Grant of no effect if it would then here is a plain way found out for any Man to avoid his own acts and to defeat Purchasors Therefore 't is with great reason that the Law provides that no person shall take a Surrender but he who hath the immediate Reversion and that the Estate shall still remain in the Surrenderor until all acts are done which are to compleat the Conveyance Those who argued against the Iudgment E contra held that the Estate passed immediately without the assent of the Surrenderor and that even in Conveyances at the Common-Law 't is divested out of the person and put in him to whom such Conveyance is made without his actual assent 'T is true in Exchanges the Freehold doth not pass without Entry nor a Grant of a Reversion without an Attornment but that stands upon different Reasons from this Case at the Bar for in Exchanges the Law requires the mutual acts of the Parties exchanging and in the other there must be the consent of a third person But in Surrenders the assent of the Surrendree is not required for the Estate must be in him immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some dissent to it If a Man should plead a Release without saying ad quam quidem relaxationem the Defendant agreavit yet this Plea is good because the Estate passeth to him upon the execution of the Deed. It may be a Question whether the actual assent must be at the very time that the Surrender was made for if it should be afterwards t is well enough and the Estate remaineth in the Surrendree till dis-agreement Presumption stands on this side for it shall never be intended that he did not give his Assent but on the contrary because t is for his benefit not to refuse an Estate Therefore where a Feme Sole had a Lease and married Hob. 203. the Husband and Wife surrendred it to another in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and her Sons c. this Estate vests immediately in her tho' a Feme Covert and that without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it to be her Estate till he dissent 't is true in that Case his assent was held necessary because the first Lease could not be divested out of him without his own consent So a Feoffment to three 2 Leon. 224. and Livery made to one the Freehold is in all 'till disagreement So if a Bond be given to a Stranger for my use and I should die before I had agreed to it my Executors are entituled to an Action of Debt and will recover A Feme Covert and another were Ioint-tenants for Life 1 Rol. Rep. 401 441. she and her Husband made a Lease for years of her moiety reserving a Rent during her Life and the Life of her partner then the Wife died this was held to be a good Lease against the surviving Ioint-tenant till disagreement which shews that the agreement of the Parties is not so much requisite to perfect a Conveyance of this nature as a disagreement is to make it void And this may serve as an answer to the second point which was not much insisted on that Mens Titles would be incertain and precarious if after the assent of the Surrendree the Estate should pass by Relation at the very time that the Deed was executed and that it was not known where the Free-hold was in the mean time for if he had agreed to it immediately it had been altogether as private Then as to the Pleadings 't is true that generally when a Surrender is pleaded 't is said ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Party adtunc ibidem agreavit which implies that the Surrendree was then present and in such Case he ought to agree or refuse Besides those Actions to which an Agreement is thus pleaded were generally brought in disaffirmance of Surrenders and to support the Leases upon which the Plaintiffs declared and then the proper and most effectual Bar was to shew a Surrender and express Agreement before the Action brought It might have been insufficient pleading not to shew an Acceptance of the Surrendree but 't is not substance for if Issue should be taken whether a Surrender or not Cro. Eliz. 249. and a Verdict for the Plaintiff that defect of setting forth an Acceptance is aided by the Statute of Ieofails In this Case there is not only the Word Surrender but * Grant and Release which may be pleaded without any consent to it and a Grant by operation of Law turns to a Surrender because a Man cannot have two Estates of equal dignity in the Law at the same time Neither can it be said that there remained any Estate in Simon Leach after this Surrender executed for 't is an absurd thing to imagine that when he had done what was in his power to compleat a Conveyance and to divest himself of an Estate yet it should continue in him Therefore the Remainder in Contingency to the Lessor of the Plaintiff was destroyed by this Surrender of the Estate to him in reversion for by that means when it did afterwards happen there was no particular Estate to support it But notwithstanding the Iudgment was affirmed and afterwards Anno quarto Gulielmi Mariae upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords it was reversed Idem versus Eundem THIS Point having received a legal determination the same Plaintiff brought another Action of Trespass and Ejectment against the same Defendant Surrender by a person Non compos is void and at a Trial at the Barr in Easter Term nono Gulielmi Regis another special Verdict was found upon which the Case more at large was viz. That Nicholas Leach being seised in Fee of the Lands in question made his Will in these Words viz. In the Name of God Amen c. I devise my Mannors of Bulkworth Whitebear and Vadacot in Devonshire and Cresby Goat and Cresby Grange in Northallerton in Yorkshire unto the Heirs Males of my Body begotten and for want of such Issue Male I devise the same unto my Brother Simon Leach for Life and after his decease to the
said Feoffees made a Feoffment of the Land in Fee without any consideration afterwards Christopher had Issue two Sons Now the Vses limited by the Feoffment of Sir R. C. being only contingent to the Sons of Christopher and they not being born when the second Feoffment was made to their Father the Question now was whether they shall be destroied by that Feoffment before the Sons had a Being in Nature or whether they shall arise out of the Estate of the Feoffees after their Births And it was adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber that the last Feoffment had divested all the precedent Estates and likewise the Vses whilst they were contingent and before they had an existence and that if the Estate for Life which Christopher had in those Lands had been determined by his death before the birth of any Son the future Remainder had been void because it did not vest whilst the particular Estate had a being or eo instanti that it determined So in this Case Mr. Leach cannot have any future Right of Entry for he was not born when the Surrender was made so that the contingency is for ever gone Suppose a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and his Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor The Husband afterwards makes another Feoffment of the same Lands Cro. Car. 102. and dies and the Wife enters the Fee shall not vest in her by this Entry for she had no right the Husband has destroyed the contingent use by the last Feoffment so that it could not accrew to her at the time of his death Nay tho' the particular Estate in some Cases may revive yet if the contingency be once destroyed it shall never arise again As where the Testator being seized in Fee of Houses 2 Sand. 380. devised the inheritance thereof to such Son his Wife should have after her Life if she baptized him by his Christian and Sir-Name and if such Son dye before he attain the Age of 21 years then to the right Heirs of the Devisor He died without Issue the Widow married again then the Brother and Heir of the Testator before the birth of any Son conveyed the Houses thus Viz. To the Husband and Wife and to their Heirs and levied a Fine to those uses Afterwards she had a Son baptised by the Testator's Christian and Sir-Name Then the Husband and Wife sold the Houses to one Weston and his Heirs and levied a Fine to those Vses It was adjudged that by the Conveyance of the Reversion by the Brother and Heir of the Testator to the Baron and Feme before the Birth of the Son her Estate for Life was merged and tho' by reason of her Coverture she might waive the Joint-tenancy 2 Roll. Abr. 796. Wigg versus Villiers and reassume the Estate for Life yet that being once merged the contingent Remainders are all destroied Curia Cro. Car. 502. The Grants of Infants and of persons non compos are parallel both in Law and Reason and there are express Authorities that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore this Surrender by a person non compos is likewise void If an Infant grants a Rent-charge out of his Estate 't is not voidable but ipso facto void for if the Grantee should distrain for the Rent the Infant may have an Action of Trespass against him In all these Cases which have been cited where 't is held that the Deeds of Infants are not void but voidable the meaning is that non est factum cannot be pleaded because they have the form though not the Operations of Deeds and therefore are not void upon that account without shewing some special matter to make them of no efficacy Therefore if an Infant maketh a Letter of Attorny though 't is void in it self yet it shall not be avoided by pleading non est factum but by shewing his Infancy Some have endeavoured to distinguish between a Deed which giveth only authority to do a thing and such which conveys an interest by the delivery of the Deed it self that the first is void and the other voidable But the reason is the same to make them both void only where a Feoffment is made by an Infant 't is voidable because of the solemnity of the Conveyance Now if Simon Leach had made a Feoffment in Fee there had still remained in him such a Right which would have supported this Remainder in Contingency This Surrender is therefore void and all persons may take advantage of it Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought to reverse this Iudgment in the House of Lords but it was affirmed Cases Adj. 150. Hall versus Wybank THE Statute of Limitations is Statute of Limitations whether it extendeth to the Defendant being beyond Sea six years 21 Jac. cap. 16. that if any person be entituled to an Action and shall be an Infant Feme Covert Imprisoned or beyond Sea that then he shall bring the Action at full Age Discovert of saue Memory at large and returned from beyond Sea The Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit to which the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant was all that time beyond Sea so that he could not prosecute any Writ against him c. And upon a Demurrer Serjeant Tremaine argued that the Plaintiff was not barred by the Statute which was made to prevent Suits by limiting personal Actions to be brought within a certain time and it cannot be extended in favour of the Defendant who was a Debtor and beyond Sea because 't is incertain whether he will return or not and therefore there is no occasion to begin a Suit till his return 'T is true the Plaintiff may file an Original and Outlaw the Defendant and so seise his Estate but no Man is compelled by Law to do an act which is fruitless when 't is done and such this would be for if the Plaintiff should file an Original 't is probable the Defendant may never return and then if the Debt was 1000 l. or upwards he would be at a great Expence to no purpose or if the Party should return he may reverse it by Error 'T is a new way invented for the payment of Debts for if the Debtors go beyond Sea and stay there six years their Debts would by this means be all paid The words of the Statute do not extend to this Case for the Proviso is That if the Plaintiff be beyond Sea when the cause of Action doth accrew Cro. Car. 246. 333. that then he have shall liberty to continue it at his return yet 't is within the equity of Law for him to bring his Action when the Defendant returns who cannot be sued 'till then That Statutes have been expounded according to Equity is not now a new Position 2 Roll. Rep. 318. for Constructions have been made according to the sense and meaning and not according to the Letter of many Statutes
Latch 262. is said not to be adjudged for the Court was divided in Opinion The Case of Marwood and Turpin is the same Moor 600. Cro. Eliz. 715. but there the Defendant pleaded the acceptance of the Rent after the assignment which was not done here Now if both those Cases should be admitted to be Law Sid. 240 266. Allen 34 42. Palm 118. Latch 260. Noy 97. 2 Cro. 334. Mooo 392. and parallel with this yet the later Resolutions have been quite contrary for 't is now held and with great reason that the privity of Contract of the Testator is not determined by his death but that his Executor shall be charged with all his Contracts so long as he hath Assets and therefore such Executor shall not discharge himself by making of an Assignment but shall still be liable for what Rent shall incur after he hath assigned his Interest nay if the Testator himself had assigned the term in his life-time yet his Executor shall be charged in the Detinet so long as he hath Assets Newton versus Trigg Mich. 1. Jac. Rot. 226. TRespass for breaking and entring of his Close Statute of Bankrupts do not extend to an Inn-kepeer treading down of his Grass c. and taking away of his Goods Vpon not Guilty pleaded a special Verdict was found That the Plaintiff was an Inn-Keeper and a Freeman of the City of London that he bought Oates Hay c. which he sold in his Inu by which he got his Living that he with others built a Ship and he had a Share therein and a Stock of 50 l. to Trade withal that he was indebted to several persons and departed from his House and absconded from his Creditors that thereupon a Commission of Bankrupcy was taken out against him at the Petition of the Creditors that the Plaintiff was indebted to Trigg and that the Commissioners found him to be a Bankrupt and by Indenture bearing date the 25th day of June made a Bargain and Sale of the Goods of Trigg who did take and carry them away c. The Question was whether upon the whole matter the Plaintiff was a Bankrupt or not Serjeant Thomson argued that he was not within any of the Statutes of Bankrupcy for an Inn-Keeper is under many obligations and circumstances different from all other Trades-men for he is to take care of the Goods of Travellers and if he set any unreasonable Price upon his Goods 't is an Offence which the Iustices of Peace and Stewards in their Leets have power to hear and determine 2. He doth not buy and sell by way of Contract for most of his Gains arise by the entertaining and lodging of his Guests by the attendance of his Servants and by the Furniture of his Rooms and by uttering of Commodities as in other Trades Cro. Car. 548. And therefore by the Opinion of three Iudges in the Case of Crisp and Prat it was held that an Inn-holder doth not get his Living by Buying and Selling for though he buyeth Provision he doth not sell it by way of Contract but utters it at what gain he thinks reasonable which his Guests may refuse to give Iustice Berkley in the arguing of that Case agreed that he who getteth his Living by Buying and Selling and not by both is not within the Statutes but the Iury having found that he got a livelyhood by both and using the Trade of an Inholder therefore he was a Bankrupt But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion because an Inn-Keeper cannot properly be said to sell his Goods As to his having a Share in a Ship 't is no more than a Stock to Trade which may go to an Infant or to an Executor after his decease and if either of these persons should Trade with it they cannot be made Bankrupts because 't is in auter droit E Contra. E contra It was argued that he who keepeth an Inn is a Trades-man and may be properly said to get his Living by Buying and Selling. The Goods of a Traveller are not distrainable for the Rent of an Inn-Keeper the reason is because he is more immediately concern'd as a Trades-man for the benefit of Comerce It was the Opinion of my Lord Rolls 2 Roll. Abr. 84. that an Inn-Keeper was a Trades-man therefore any Man might build a New Inn for it was no Franchise but a particular Trade to keep an Inn. And as a Trades-man he selleth his Goods to his Guests by way of Contract 39 H. 6.18 19. for he is not bound to provide Hay and Dates for the Horses of his Guests without being paid in hand as soon as the Horses come into the Stable for the Law doth not oblige him to trust for the payment The Case of Crisp and Prat as Reported by Iustice Croke seems to be against this Opinion Jones 437. March 34. but 't is mis-reported for Jones who mentions the same Case says that it being found that the Inn-Keeper got his Living by Buying and Selling it was the Opinion of two Iudges that he was within the Statute but the other two Iudges as to this Point were of a contrary Opinion for they held that an Inn-Keeper could be no more a Bankrupt than a Farmer who often Buys and Sells Cattel and other Goods Tho' a Man is of a particular Trade yet if it doth not appear that he got his Livelyhood by Buying and Selling 't is not actionable to call such a person Bankrupt Now certainly if the Plaintiff had declared that he was an Inn-Keeper Stiles 420. Sid. 299. and got his living after that manner and that the Defendant to scandalize him said He was a Bankrupt the Action would lie as well as for a Dyer Farmer Carpenter or such like Trades of manual Occupation Most of the Inn-Keepers are Farmers and if it had been so found in this Case it would not have been denied but that he had been within the Statute of Bankrupts Afterwards in Trinity Term 3 Willielmi Judgment Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for taking the whole matter as found by this Verdict 't is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt 1. That he had a Ship which he let to Freight this was not much insisted on at the Bar to make him a Bankrupt for 't is no more than for a Man to have a Share in a Barge Hackney-Coach or Wagon all which are let for Hire Besides in this Case 't is found that the Plaintiff was but a Partner with another And as to the 50 l. which he had in this Trade that is not sufficient to make him a Bankrupt Cro. Car. 282. Sid. 411. for he must be actually a Trader at the time that the Debt was contracted which is not found so it must be to make the word Bankrupt actionable for it must be found that he was a Trader at the time of the words spoken All the Question of difficulty is that the Plaintiff was
Demise and the Word Assignes is in the Deed yet they are not bound if they have no Estate so that 't is not the naming of them but by reason of the Estate in the Land they are made chargeable No Iudgment is entred upon the Roll. FINIS ERRATA FOlio 88. Line 13. for Defendant read Plaintiff f. 106. l. 26. for no r. an f. 119. l. 7. after must be r. Error f. 147. l. 13 18 38. for coram r. quorum f. 189. l. 23. for reasonable r. unreasonable f. 196. l. 28. for devises r. demises f. 199. l. 1. for 23. r. 13. f. 201. l. 14. before merged r. not f. 218. l. 17. for 1672. r. 1679. f. 203. l. 31. after Berkley r. and Mr. Killigrew f. 222. l. 31. leave out and marrieth f. 226. l. 21. leave out she marrieth f. 237. l. 29. for devise r. demise f. 255. l. 31. for Father r. Nephew f. 256. l. 12. for joyned r. tryed f. 287. l. 6. after delivered r. tied f. 303. l. 16. for Grantee r. Guarantee f. 307. l. 36. for voidable r. void A TABLE to the Third Part of Modern Reports A. Abatement See Ioint Action 8. 1. DEBT was brought by four Plaintiffs one of them died before Judgment the Action is abated as to the rest 249 2. Waste is brought against Tenant pur auter vie and pending the Writ Cestui que vie dieth the Writ shall not abate because no other person can be sued for the Damages ibid. 3. Two Jointenants are Defendants the death of one shall not abate the Writ for the Action is joint and several ibid. 4. Where two or more are to recover in a personal thing the death of one shall abate the Action as to the rest ibid. 5. But in Audita Querela the death of one shall not abate the Writ because it is in discharge ibid. Abeiance See Acceptance 1. Resignation of a Benefice passes nothing to the Ordinary but putteth the Freehold in Abeiance till his acceptance 297 See Acceptance Resignation Surrender Acts of Parliament See Iustice of Peace 2 Pardon 2 Ought to be construed according to the intention of the Law-makers and ought to be expounded according to the Rules of the Common Law 63 2. Where a particular punishment is directed by a Statute Law it must be pursued and no other can be inflicted upon the Offender 78 118 3. When an Act is penal it ought to be construed according to Equity 90 157 312 4. Preamble is the best Expositor of the Law 129 169 Action upon the Ease Assumpsit A Feoffment was made upon Trust that the Feoffee should convey the Estate to another the Cestuy que Trust may have an Action if the Feoffee refuseth to convey 149 2. In consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink c. he promised to pay as much as it was reasonably worth the word valerent was in the Declaration it should have been quantum valebant at the time of the Promise but held good after Verdict 190 3. Where a personal promise is grounded upon a real Contract the Action will lie 73 4. It will not lie for Rent reserved upon a Demise but where a Promise is made to pay Rent in consideration of occupying a House it will lie 240 Action on the Case See Bankrupts 2 Indictment 2 Slander where it lieth 1. He is a Papist spoken of a Deputy Lieutenant 26 2. Where the words injure a person in his Profession or bring him in danger of punishment 27 3. He stole the Colonel's Cupboard Cloth there being no precedent Discourse either of the Colonel or his Cloth 280 4. He is broken and run away and never will return again spoken of a Carpenter 155 5. He is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his door but he spoken of a Merchant who made a Bonefire at the Coronation of King James 103 6. He owes more Mony than he is worth he is run away and is broak spoken of an Husbandman 112 7. The Wife was called Whore and that she was the Defendant's Whore the Husband and she brought the Action and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum it lies without allegding special Damages 120 8. Sir J. K. is a buffle headed Fellow and doth not understand Law he is not fit to talk Law with me I have baffled him and he hath not done my Client Justice spoken of a Justice of Peace 139 9. J. P. is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest men of my sort and I will make him give satisfaction for plundering me spoken of a Justice of Peace no Colloquium was laid the Court was divided 163 Where it doth not lie Words were laid to be spoken ad tenorem effectum sequen ' which is not an express allegation that they were spoken 71 72 Action on the Case against a Common Carrier Where it was brought against him upon an Assumpsit in Law and likewise upon a Tort the Declaration is not good 322 Action on the Case for a wrong See Pleading For diverting of a Water-course the Antiquity of the Mill must be set forth 49 2. It lies against a wrong doer upon the bare possession only and the Plaintiff need not set forth whether he hath a Title by Grant or Prescription for that goes to the right 51 52 132 3. If the Declaratien is for the diverting of the Water ab antiquo solito cursu this amounts to a Prescription which must be proved at the Trial or the Plaintiff will be non-suited 52 4. Whether it lieth for the making of a scandalous Affidavit in Chancery 108 5. For selling of Oxen affirming them to be his own ubi revera they were not but doth not say sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them fraudulenter or deceptive 't is naught upon a Demurrer but good after Verdict 261 6. Where several are guilty of a wrong the Action may be brought against either 321 7. Debt upon the Statute of Ed. 6. for not setting out Tithes brought against two Tenants in Common one of them did set out the Tithes and the other carried them away it ought to be brought only against the wrong doer 322 8. For disturbing of a Man in a Common Passage or Common High-way no Action on the Case lieth without a particular damage done to himself for the proper remedy is a Presentment in the Leet 294 Administrator Vide Infant 18 Ordinary Interest 2 Pleading 2 Administrator durante minore aetate hath no power over the Estate 24 2. Administration could not be granted by the Spiritual Court before the Statute of Ed. 3. 24 3. Where 't is once granted whether it ought to be repealed 25 4. Administrator had the whole Estate in him before the Statute of Distributions 60 5. He then gave Bond to distribute as the Ordinary should direct ibid. 6. The Father died
IT lies to remove Causes and Orders from an inferior Jurisdiction where 't is not prohibited in express words by any Statute 95 2. Will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes quaere whether it lies to the Royal Franchise of Ely 230 Charter Usage shall expound ancient Charters 9 2 The Common Law doth operate with it ibid. 3. One Clause of a Charter may expound another 10 4. A Charter which establishes a Corporation must provide for a new Election in order to a Succession otherwise the Common Law will not help 13 Church See Prohibition Commitment By the Lord Chancellor and several others Dominos Concilii for a Misdemeanour whether it should not be Dominos in Concilio 213 2. Of a Peer for a Misdemeanour which amounts to a Breach of the Peace for which Sureties are to be given 214 3. When a person is brought in by a Capias for any offence he ought to plead instanter 215 Common and Commoner See Ioytenancy 4 Ioynt Action 7 Prescription 7 A Common cannot pass without Deed and if the Plaintiff sheweth a Que Estate he must produce the Deed 52 2. If a Prescription is made for a Common and doth not say for Cattle Levant and Couchant 't is not good 162 246 3. But this fault is cured by a Verdict 162 Confederacy See Indictment Condition See Infant 2. Notice 2 4. A bare denial without doing any more is no Breach of the Condition 31 2. How it differs from a Limitation 32 3. To restrain Marriage to the consent of particular persons is void ibid. 4. Where 't is of two parts in the disjunctive and both possible at the time of the Bond given and one becomes impossible afterwards by the Act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part for the Condition being made for his benefit shall be taken very beneficially for him who had election to perform either part 233 5. When the Condition is but of one part 't is otherwise as if A. promise B. that if C. do not appear such a day at Westminster he will pay 20 s. C. died before the day the Mony must be paid 234 6. Condition was to pay Rent at Michaelmas or Lady-day during the Life of a Woman or within thirty days after she died after the Feast but within the thirty days the payment which was due at the Feast was discharged thereby ibid. 7. To save harmless Non damnificatus generally is a good Plea but if it be to save harmless acquit and discharge then 't is not good without shewing how acquitted and discharged 252 Confederacy See Agreement Consideration See Action on the Case Construction Where it shall be made of an Act of Parliament according to the intent of the Law-makers 33 2. Where it shall be made of an entire Sentence so as the intent of the Law may appear 220 3. Where particular words are in the first part of a Sentence and general words follow both shall stand 278 279 Contract Where an Agreement is entire to do or perform a thing for a certain Sum it shall not be apportioned pro rata for the performance of part 153 2. There must be a recompence of each side to make the Contract good 237 Copyhold and Copyholders See Baron and Feme 8 9. Lord may seize the Land of a Copyholder till a Fine is paid 222 2. A Man by Custom may assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate during the Minority of an Infant without rendring an accompt when he comes of Age ibid. Corporation See Charter 4. In all proceedings which concern a Corporation it must be alledged that there is one and how erected whether by Grant or Prescription 6 2. Mayor hath no more Power than an Alderman in the Coporation where he is Mayor 9 3. Is not of the Quorum for electing of an Alderman 10 4. The Mayor is named in the Grant as part of the Name of the Corporation and is not of the Quorum without naming him to be so 9 10 5. He is a Mayor in respect of Reverence but not of Power 11 6. At the Common Law neither his Name or Office require his presence at the choosing of an Alderman 11 14 7. He cannot act eo nomine but by the express Power given in the Charter 12 8. Elections of Officers of a Corporation must be free 21 9. Mayor of a Corporation is no Officer at the Common Law 12 10. Original of Corporation was preservation of Trade ibid. 11. Corporation by Charter without setting forth their Duty or Office hath no Power ibid. 12. A Company in London made a By-Law that none of them should buy such a Commodity within 24 Miles of London but two Men 't is too large to bind at such a distance out of their Jurisdiction 159 Costs See Amendment 3. Trespass for breaking of a Close and impounding of Cattel and Damages given under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall have his Costs 39 2. Amendment after a Writ of Error brought Costs must be paid 113 Covenant See Local Action Where a thing is lawful at the time of the Covenant made and afterterwards prohibited by Law yet the Covenant is binding 39 2. To find Meat Drink and other Necessaries the Breach was assigned in not finding Meat Drink alia necessaria and entire Damages though this Breach was too general yet 't is good for it may be as general as the Covenant 69 3. There must be such certainty in it that if the Defendant should be sued again he may plead the former Recovery in Bar ibid. 4. Need not so much certainty in assigning a Breach upon a Covenant as upon a Bond for performance of Covenants ibid. 5. For quiet enjoyment the Breach was that a Stranger habens jus titulum and doth not say what Title for it may be under the Plaintiff himself therefore not well assigned 135 6. To make an Assignment according to an Agreement between the Partis as Council should direct whether the Council of the Plaintiff or Defendant should advise 192 7. Give grant and confirm are words at the Common Law where they shall be taken to amount to a Covenant to stand seized 237 Court Cause not to be removed out of an inferiour Court unless the Habeas Corpus is delivered to the Steward before Issue or Demurrer joyned so as 't is joyned within six Weeks after Arrest or Appearance 85 2. If the Cause is tried in an inferior Court the Steward not being an Utter Barister an Attachment shall go ibid. 3. Amerciament in a Court Leet is a Duty vested in the Lord for which he may distrain 138 4. Presentment in a Court Leet is the proper remedy when a Man is disturbed in a common Passage or Way 294 Custom See Admittance Infant 10. Prescription 8. Pleading 12. Must have nothing to support it but Usuage 133 2. 'T is made of repeated Acts ibid. 3. Must be very
they are not properly sua 278 Exposition of Words and Sentences See Number Subsequent words may explain a former Sentence in a Deed but in Wills the first words guide all which follow 82 2. Action was brought by Original for that the Defendant prosecut ' fuit adhuc prosequitur in the Admiralty those words adhuc prosequitur shall not be construed to make it subsequent to the Original but must refer to the time of suing it forth 103 157 3. Doubtful Words must be Expounded always against the Lessor 230 4. To make an Assurance to the Obligee and his Heirs the Conjuction and shall be taken in the disjunctive 235 F. Fair See Trade IF the place where it should be kept is not limited by the Grant it may be kept where the Grantee will 108 False Imprisonment It will not lye against a Sheriff for taking the Body by vertue of a Casa upon an Erronious Judgment for the Execution is good till avoided by Writ of Error 325 Fees Of the Clerks of the Crown-Office the Court will not regulate upon a Motion but if oppressive they must be indicted for Extortion 297 Fines levied See Tenant at Will 6. One of the Cognisors died before the return of the Writ of Covenant 't is Error but not in the case of a Purchaser for a valuable consideratino for the Court will interpose 99 2. If the Cognisor doth dye after the Entry of the Kings-Silver the Fine is good 140 3. Writ of Covenant Teste 15th of January returnable in Crastino Purificationis taken by Dedimus 18th of Januarii The Cognizor died in Easter-Week following but four days before her Death the Kings-Silver was entred as of Hillary-Term precedent this was held a good Fine 141 4. Where a person is in possession by vertue of a particular Estate for Life and accepteth a greater Estate it shall not divest the Estate of those in Remainder for Life so as the same may be barred by Fine and Non-claim 195 5. Lease for one hundred years in Trust to attend the Inheritance cestuy que Trust being in possession Demises to another for fifty years and levied a Fine and the five years passed the Term for a hundred years is divested by this Fine and turned to a right and so barred 196 6. In what Cases a Fine is a Bar and what not 198 Fines upon Admittance See Admittance Copihold Debt 2. Infant 9. The Judges are to determine whether it be reasonable or not 134 2. Lord cannot enter for non-payment of an unreasonable Fine 134 Forfeiture If Tenant for years make a Feoffment 't is a Forfeiture but if he make a Lease and Release ' tho 't is of the same Operation yet 't is no forfeiture 151 Fraud See Evidence G. Grants Grantor and Grantee WHere an Interest is coupled with a Trust in a Grant it shall go to the Executor of the Grantee 43 2. Grants must be certain otherwise they are void 134 Grants of the King Not good for the sole Printing of Blank Bonds exclusive of all other Printers 75 2. A Grant to restrain trading to particular places is good 77 3. But of sole making Cards not good because it restrains a whole Trade ibid. 4. A Grant cannot divest the Subject of a Right enjoyed long before it was made ibid. 5. Cannot discharge a person of a Duty to which he is made lyable by a subsequent Act of Parliament 96 6. Difference between his Grants and Prohibitions 7. Where his Grants ought to be taken very strictly 168 8. In a Quo Warranto the Defendant pleaded that the King was seised in Fee of a Franchise who granted it to another Habendum the Hundred whether good or not 199 Gun See Iustice of Peace 3. Conviction before a Justice of Peace upon the Statute of H. 8. for keeping a Gun not having 100 l. per Annum quashed because it was said non habuisset instead of nunquam Habuit 100 l. per Annum 280 H. Habendum WHere it shall be said to explain the general Words preceding 81 2. Nothing passes in the Habendum but what was mentioned in the Premisses 199 Heir Error by the Plaintiff ut Consanguineus Haeres viz. Filius c. 't is sufficient without shewing the descent from more Ancestors 152 2. Where he shall take by Descent and where by Purchase 205 3. In a Bond where the word Heir is a word of Limitation and not a designation of the person 233 4. Reversion in Fee descended to an Heir after the Estate Tail spent and an Action was brought against him upon a Bond of his Ancestor 't is not necessary that the Plaintiff name all the intermediate Remainders but him who was last actually seized of the Fee 255 Heriot Lease for 99 years if A. B. C. so long live paying an Heriot upon the death of either A. assigns the term no Heriot shall be taken of the Assignee 231 2 May seize or distrain for Heriot Service if distrain it may be the Beast of any man upon the Land but if he seise it must be the very Beast of the Tenant ibid. 3. Where an Heriot is reserved upon a Demise it differs from those which are due by Tenure 231 4. Lease for 99 years if M. and D. so long live reserving an Heriot after death of either provided if D. survive no Heriot to be paid but M. survived the Court was divided whether a Heriot should be paid 230 Highways A Man cannot be exempted from repairing by the Grant of the King if made before the Statute of Ph. Mar. which charges him to repair 96 Homine Replegiando Brought for a Monster and upon the Return of the Sheriff that he had replevyed the Body he was bailed 121 2. Brought for a young Woman taken out of her Parents Custody and married against her Consent 169 Hue and Cry See Robbery Hundred Court This Court was first derived from the County Court 200 2 Hundreds were usually granted to Abbots and their Possessions coming to the Crown by dissolution of their Abbies are merged and cannot be regranted 200 I. Ideot HOW it differs from a Lunatick 43 2. The King hath power to grant his Estate to any person without Accompt to be given ibid. 3. Grant of an Ideot by the King the Grantee dieth his Executor hath an Interest in him ibid. Ieoffails See Indictment 8. Travers 4. Variance 2. None of the Statutes help an insufficient Indictment 79 2. Variance between original and declaration not aided by the Statute of Ieofails 136 3. Want of concluding without a Travers is but matter of form and aided 319 Indictment For using of Alias Preces than enjoined by the Book of Common Prayer it may be upon an extraordinary occasion and so no Offence 79 2. For scandalous words whether it lieth as it doth for Libels the one being a private the other a publick Offence 139 3. For Baretry in soliciting of a Suit against another who was not indebted to the person 97
the Land 211 5. Not granted for Mariners Wages 244 6. Libel for a Tax upon the Parishioners for not repairing of their Church who suggest that they had a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish the Prohibition was denied for of common right they ought to repair the Mother Church 264 7. Proof of Matter of Fact by one Witness denied to be allowed in the Spiritual Court is a good cause for a Prohibition 284 8. Where the Release of a Legacy offered to be proved by one Witness was denied in the Spiritual Court ibid. 9. Proof of Payment or Subtraction of Tythes denied and a Prohibition granted ibid. 10. Whether a Prohibition ought to be allowed after Sentence an Appeal being then the more proper remedy 284 Property See Interest Q. Quorum MUst be one Justice of the Peace of the Quorum otherwise cannot be a Sessions 14 152 Quantum meruit Will lie for Rent reserved upon a real Contract where the Sum is not certain but if a Sum in gross is reserved then Debt must be brought 73 R. Record ERror shall not be assigned against the Essence of a Record 141 Recovery Common Reversed without a Scire Facias to the Tertenants but it seems not to be good 119 2. For there must be a Scire Facias against the Heir and Tertenants when a Writ of Error is brought to reverse it 274 Relation Where an Estate shall pass by Relation where not 299 300 Release Of a Legacy by one Executor and also of all Actions Suits and Demands whatsoever those general words which follow are tied up to the Legacy and release nothing else 277 2. Of a Demand will not discharge a growing Rent 278 3. A Receipt was given for 10 l. in which there was a Release of all Actions Debts Duties and Demands nothing is released but the 10 l. 277 4. Judgment against four Defendants who all joyned in a Writ of Error and the Plaintiff pleaded a Release of Errors by one it shall not discharge the rest of a personal thing but if there had been four Plaintiffs to recover the Release or death of one is a Barr to all 109 135 249 5. A Release of all Actions will discharge an Award of Execution upon a Scieri Facias 185 187 6. Of all Actions and Demands doth not discharge a Legacy it must be by particular words 279 7. One of the Defendants who made Conusance released the Plaintiff after the taking of the Cattle this was held void upon a Demurrer for he had no Demand or Suit against the Plaintiff having distrained in the right of another ibid. Remainder See Entry 3. Fines levied 4. Must take place eo instanti the particular Estate is determined or else it can never arise 309 2. By the Conveyance of the Reversion in Fee to him who had the Estate for Life before the Birth of a Son the particular Estate is merged and all contingent Remainders are thereby destroyed 311 Replevin Where 't is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without the taking of Pledges de prosequendo retorn ' Habend ' 35 Replication Where the Plaintiff confesseth and avoideth he ought not to traverse for that would make his Replication double 318 Request When a thing is to be done upon Request the time when the person requires it to be done is the time of the performance 295 Reservation Of a Rent upon a Lease for three years payable at Michaelmas and Lady-Day Debt was brought for 2 years without shewing at which of the Feasts it was due 't is good after Verdict but ill upon a Demurrer 70 Resignation See Abeiance To the Ordinary and Patron presented 'ts void if the Ordinary did not accept the Resignation 297 Reversion See Bargain and Sale Surrender 2. Tenant in Tail who had likewise the Reversion in Fee if he acknowledge a Judgment the Reversion may be extended 256 2. But a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets until it comes into possession 257 3. By what words a Reversion in Fee passeth in a Will 228 Revocation A Will shall not be revoked by doubtful words 206 2. It might be revoked by Word without Writing before the Statute of Frauds 207 3. Before that Statute a Will might be revoked by a subsequent Will which was void in it self yet good to revoke the former 207 218 4. A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be any Revocation of a written Will which doth appear 204 205 206 5. Whether a subsequent Will which is void in it self may revoke another since the Statute of Frauds 218 6. Such a Will must be good in all circumstances to revoke a former 260 261 Riot See Information Robbery The Hundred was sued and it did not appear that the Parish where the Fact was laid to be done was in the Hundred or that it was done upon the High way or in the day time this was helped after Verdict 258 2. A Servant delivered Mony to a Quaker to carry home for his Master they were both robbed viz. the Servant of 26 s. and the Quaker of 106 l. the Servant made Oath of the Robbery and the Quaker refused the Master brought the Action it doth not lie for him 287 288 S. Scire Facias See Bail 3 4. Baron and Feme 1 4 5. Iudgment 2. Pledges 1. Recovery MUst be to the Tertenants before the Common Recovery shall be reversed by Writ of Error 119 2. Scieri Facias quare Executionem non habet recites the first Judgment but prays no new thing only to have Execution upon that Judgment 187 3. 'T is not an original but a judicial Writ and depends upon the first Judgment 187 4. 'T is suspended by Writ of Error and if the original Judgment is reversed that is so also ibid. 5. Debt will lie upon a Judgment had on a Scire Facias 188 189 6. A Judgment upon a Scire Facias is a distinct Action from the original cause 189 7. Judgment in Dower and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages the Woman marries and dies before the Writ of Enquiry executed the Husband administred and brought a Scire Facias upon the Judgment whether it lieth or not 281 Serjeants at Law See Iudges Surplusage See Inquisition Steward See Court Supersedeas See Parliament Surrender See Assent 1 2. Where it may be pleaded without an acceptance 297 2. No man can take it but he who hath the immediate Reversion 299 3. If pleaded without an Acceptance 't is aided after Verdict which shews 'tis no Substance 301 4. By one Non compos mentis 't is void ab initio 303 T. Tail DEvise to D. for Life the Remainder to her first Son and the Heirs of the Body of such first Son endorsed thus viz. Memorandum that D. shall not alien from the Heirs Males of her Body she had a Son who had Issue a Daughter 't is not an Estate Tail Male for the Memorandum shall not alter the Limitation in the Will