23. 3 E. 3. 330 305. Besides the party is not bound to tarry till the Bailiffs come in and beat him 2 H. 4. 8. 19 H. 6. 31. 34 H. 6. 16. 43 Ass. pl 31. 3. This Authority which is given to the Kings Officer is given by the Law and if he execute it according to the Law the Law will protect him but if he exceed the priviledge given him by the Law then all he doth is illegal and he loseth its protection And he resembled it to the 6 Carpenters case C. 6. part Farther one may pretend he hath such a warrant when he hath it not of purpose to rob or do some other mischief And it was agreed by all the Justices nullo contradicente that it was not Murder but that it was Manslaughter for this reason especially because the Officer was doing an unlawful act not warranted by Law and therefore it was at his peril if he were killed And farther upon this difference there ought to be malice in fact or in Law to make Murder but in this Case there is none of them for it is apparent that there was no malice in fact and there is no malice implied for then it ought to be where a man kills another without any provocation or the Minister of Justice in the due and lawful execution of his Office which is not our Case for here he did an unlawful act at the time he was killed and therefore it was not Murder but Manslaughter There was a Case tried at the Sessions in the Old-Baily which was thus One Lovell had two Maid-servants and one of them without his knowledge had received into the house a Chare-woman who all being in their beds by her negligence let a Thief into the house and afterwards called out Thieves Thieves and afterwards Lovell came out of his Bed with a Sword in his hand and the Chare-woman calling to mind that she was there without his privity or his wifes hid her self behind the Dresser and Lovell's wife espying her there cried out Thieves Thieves for which Lovell came and ran her into the brest with his Sword And the Opinion of the Justices at the Old-Baily and also of all the Justices of the Kings Bench was That it was neither Murder nor Manslaughter Not Murder because there was no forethought malice not Manslaughter because he supposed her to be a Thief and if she had been a Thief then it was clear that it was not Manslaughter 8. It was resolved in the Chancery as the Judges of the Kings Bench said That where the Son is of full age and is ravished that the Father shall not recover Damages because the Son being of full age might marry himself without the consent of the Father and that was the reason given as I conceive and the Case was said to be Sir Francis Lees Case 9. The Book of Canons is that the Parson may Elect one Church-warden and the Parishioners another 10. There can be no Surrender without the Consent of the Reversioner 11. It was Libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for these words Thou art a Drunkard or usest to be drunk thrice a week And thereupon Prohibition was Prayed and Granted and it was said and agreed That so it was adjudged betwixt Vinior and Vinior in this Court The Case in Dyer 254. b. where the Presentee was refused because he was a common haunter of Taverns c. was by Justice Barckley denied to be Law and so agreed by Justice Iones the Lord Chief Justice and Justice Crooke being absent But Justice Barckley was utterly against the Prohibition 1. Because the Action in the Ecclesiastical Court is only pro salute animae And 2. Because that Drunkenness is in their Articles and Presentable But Justice Iones granted a Prohibition and said that Linwood said well That if all things which are against the Law of God or words to that effect should be tried in the Ecclesiastical Court the Jurisdiction of the Temporal Court should utterly be destroyed 12. If there be an Indictment of Forcible Entry if it appear that the Plaintiff had seisin at the time of the Writ brought there can be no Writ of Restitution for the Statute â—aith If he Enter with Force or keep him out with Force but yet in that case the King shall have his Fine And there was an Indictment which was a principal Case at Bar which was That the Defendant adtunc adhuc doth keep the possession forcibly whereas the Plaintiff was in possession And thereupon a Writ of Restitution was awarded by reason of the word adhuc 3 E. 4. 19. it was adjudged That where there is Forcible Entry and Reteiner with Force that both are punishable although the Statute of 8 H. 6. 9. be in the disjunctive 13. Descent of a Copy-hold shall not take away Entry There ought to be a custome to enable the Lord of a Mannor to grant a Copy-hold in Reversion 14. In the Council of Marches of Wales they proceed according to Directions and they cannot exceed them and they 〈…〉 with Freehold for it is not within their 〈…〉 And they cannot hold Plea of Debt above fifty poundâ— 15. An Assignment of Rent to a Woman out of Land of which she is Dowable by Word is good but if she be not Dowable of the Land then the Assignment by Word is not good and void because that in the first Case it is according to common Right but in the last not 33 H. 6. 16. In a Writ of Error to Reverse a Judgment in an Action of Debt upon an Arbitrament the Error assigned was this That two did refer themselves to Arbitrament of their two several Arbitrators and there is no word of Submission that the same is Error and there was Error in the Entry of the Judgment the entry of which was in this manner Consideratum est and per Curiam is omitted and left out And for these Errors the Judgment was Reversed Smith's Case 17. ONe said of him Thou art forsworn and hast taken a false Oath at Hereford Assises against such a one naming the party And the Opinion of the Court the Chief Justice and Justice Crooke being absent was against the Action But they conceived that the Action would have lied if the Defendant had said Thou art forsworn and hast taken a false Oath at the Assises against such an one with Averment that he was sworn in the Cause 18. It was said at the Bar That it was adjudged in this Court in Appletons Case That where a man said unto another by way of Interrogatory Where is my Piece thou stolest from me that it was actionable Justice Iones remembred this case where one said J. S. told me that J. N. stole a Horse but I do not believe him This with Averment that I. S. did not say any such thing would bear an Action Justice Barkley said That an Action was brought upon these words You are no Thief and that these words with Averment which
erect his Tavern For it is a disorderly Profession and not fit for every place And it was adjudged in this Court That a Brewhouse ought not to be erected in Fleet-street because it is in the heart of the City and would be annoyance to it And if one would set up a Butchers shop or a Tallow-Chandlers shop in Cheap-side it ought not to be for the great annoyance that would ensue And therefore the Mayor and Communalty may redress it And therefore the party was remanded and was advised by the Court to submit to the Government of the City Note the Recorder certified the Custom That the Mayor might appoint a place 35. Upon a Recovery in a Court-Baron against one he offered here to wage his Law And Justice Barckley doubted whether wager of Law would lie in such Case To which Justice Iones said Yes and Barckly agreed hereunto because the Recovery was in a base Court and not in a Court of Record Vide 2 E. 4. 36. No antient Mill is Tithable but Mills newly erected shall pay Tithes by the Statute of 9 E. 2. 5. Meade against Axe in a Writ of Error to reverse a Iudgment 37. THe Case was Axe brought an Action against Meade for these words spoken of the Plaintiff a Dyer by the Dâ—fendant Thou art not worth a Groat And the Plaintiff added that these words amongst Citizens of such place where they were spoken have the common acceptation and doth tant amount as the calling of him Bankrupt The Errors which were assigned by Meade Plaintiff in the Writ of Error were 1. Because it is added that the words were spoken inter diversos ligeos and doth not say Citizens of the place where they have such acceptation 2. Because that the Judgment is Consideratum est and the words per Curiam left out And the Court was clear that for these two Errors the Judgment should be reversed But the Court was clear of Opinion That the words of themselves are not actionable and that the averment in this Case was idle and to no purpose because the words of themselves imply a plain and intelligent sense and meaning to every man And it was compared to the Cases Where there is no Latine for words there where words of no signification are put to express them there they ought to be explained by an Anglicè but where the words are significant there needs not any Anglicè Now if you will explain significant words under an Anglicè contrary to the meaning and true intendment of the word it self the Anglicè is void So in our Case of Averment The reason which was conceived wherefore the words of themselves are not Actionable Because that many men in their beginnings are not worth a Groat and yet their credit is good with the world But if he had laid specially That he was damnified and haâ— lost his Credit and that none would trust him upon this special matter the words would be Actionable Bonds Case 38. IN Trespass the Plaintiff declared That the Defendant entred in his Land and did cut down and carry away two Loads of Grass in the Plaintiffs Soil in a certain piece of Ground in which the Trespass was supposed to be done to strow the floor of the Church and that he cut two Loadâ— there to estrew the floor of the Church and did not say that it is the same Trespass c. And it was adjudged Error But the Court was clear that the Prescription for cutting of grass to estrew the Church was good because it was but in the nature of an Easement And so to have a washing-place in the land of another and so the custom here in London to shoot in the land of another and so for the Inhabitants of a town to have a way over the land of another to their Church But Mr. Rolls who moved the Case at the Bar said That it was adjudged that Inhabitants of a town by custom should have an Easement over the Freehold or in the Freehold of a Stranger but not profit Apprender But as I remember the Plaintiffs Freehold lay near the Church and for that reason the Court might conceive the same to be but an Easement Vide 2 H. 3. cited by Justice Iones Vid. Gatewoods Case 6 Rep. 60. b. Conysbies Case 39. UPon the Lease of an House the Lessee Covenanted that he would Repair the House with convenient necessary and tenantable Reparations The Lessor brought Covenant and alleaged a breach of the Covenants in not repairing for want of Tiles and dawbing with Morter and did not shew that it was not Tenantable And the Opinion of the Court was that he ought to have shewed it for the house may want small Reparations as a Tile or two and a little Morter and yet have convenient necessary and tenantable Reparations 40. A Writ of Error was brought and the Error assigned was want of Pledges And the Judgment was reversed although it was after Verdict And so was it adjudged in Dr. Hussies case and Young and Youngs case in this Court and the Reason was given because that otherwise the King should lose his Amercement 41. Fish in the River are not Titheable if not by Custome 42. Two referred themselves to Arbitrement and the Arbitrators arbitrate that one of them should pay a certain sum to the other and the other in consideration thereof should acquit him of a Bond wherein they both were bounden to a third person in a 100 lib. eo circiter and it was objected That the Arbitrators had arbitrated a thing incertain by reason of these words eo circiter But the Opinion of the Court was That there was sufficient certainty because that in this Case it doth not lie in their power to know the direct sum and because a small variation is not material but if they as in Salmons case 5 Rep. will arbitrate that one shall be bound in a Bond to another and not express in what sum the same is utterly void for the incertainty Difference was taken where the Arbitrators arbitrate one party to do a thing which lieth in his power and where not without the help of a third person there the Arbitrament is void and in the principal Case the difference was taken by the Court where the Bond is forfeit and the penalty is incurred and where not or the day of payment is not incurred there payment at the day is a good discharge and acquittance but where it is incurred it is not But Justice Iones said That he might compel the Obligee upon payment although the Bond was forfeit to deliver the Bond by Subpoena in Chancery or that he suffer an Action to be brought against him and then to discharge it and pay it Goodman against VVest Debt upon the Statute of 5 Eliz. Cap. 9. 43. THere was an action brought against the Plaintiff in the Common Pleas who procured Process to issue against the Defendant for his Testimony in his Cause and a Note of
the Actions brought by the other Creditors But Justice Bramston contrà That the damages were well assessed because that the Actions brought by the Creditors were added for aggravation only and the cause of the Action was the Arrest and Imprisonment like the case where a man speaks words which are in part actionable and others only put in for aggravation and damages is assessed for the whole it is good There was a third Error assigned That the Venire facias was de Warda omnium Sanctorum de Bristow without shewing in what Parish Childe against Greenhil 77. CHilde brought Trespass against Greenhill for Fishing in seperali piscaria of the Plaintiff and declared that the Defendant pisces ipsius cepit c. And Verdict found for the Plaintiff And it was moved by Saint-Iohn in Arrest of Judgement because the Plaintiff declared of taking of pisces suos whereas the Plaintiff they being ferae naturae hath not property in them Register 94 95. and F. N. B. and Book Entries 666. No count that the Defendant cepit pisces ipsiuâ— but ad valentiam c. without ipsius So Fines Case in Dyer 7 H. 6. 36. 10 H. 7. 6. 12 H. 8. 10. by Brudnell 13 E. 4. 24. 7 Rep. case of Swannes And the Book of 22 H. 6. 59. is over-ruled by the case of Swannes 34 H. 6. 24. And the same is matter of substance and therefore not helped after Verdict An Action of Trover and Conversion against husband and wife quia converterunt is not good and it is not helped after Verdict because it is matter of substance Rolls for the Defendant I agree that lepores suos or pisces suos without any more is not good But where he brings an Action of Trespass for taking them in his Soil there it is good because it is within his Soil So in our case for taking pisces suos in his several Piscary and with this difference agree 22 H. 6. 59. 43 E. 3. 24. so Regist. 93 102. 23 H. 6. tit Tresp 59. 14 H. 8. 1. and the Book of 43 E. 3. saith That in Trespass the Writ shall not say Damam suam if he do not say that it was taken in his Park or Warren or saith damam domitam or as the Book is in 22 H. 6. in my Soil or Land and by Newton he shall say there damas suis. And admit that it was not good yet I hold that it is helped after Verdict because it is not matter of Substance for whether they be pisces suos or not the Plaintiff shall recover damages Justice Barckly It is true that in a general sense they cannot be said pisces ipsius but in a particular sense they may and a man may have a special or qualified property in things which are ferae naturae three ways ratione infirmitatis ratione loci ratione privilegii and in our case the Plaintiff â—ath them by reason of Priviledge And it was agreed by the whole Court That Judgment should be affirmed upon the very difference taken by Rolls that where a man brings Trespass for taking pisces suos or lepores suos c. and the like that the Action will not lie But if he bring Trespass for fishing in his several Piscary as in our Case or for breaking of his Close and taking lepores suos c. there it will lie Pitfield against Pearce 78. IN an Ejectione firme the Case was thus Thomas Pearce the Father was seised of Lands in Fee and by Deed in consideration of Marriage did give and grant this Land to Iohn Pearce the now Defendant his second Son and to his Heirs after his death and no Livery was made Thomas Pearce died the Eldest Son entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff who entred and upon Ejectment by the Defendant brought an Ejectione firme Twisden The only question is whether any estate passeth to the Son by the Deed and it was said there did and that by way of Covenant And it was agreed That in this Case if Livery had been made it had been void because that a Freehold cannot begin at a day to come But I may Covenant to stand seised to the use of my Son after my death So a man may surrender a Copyhold to take effect after a day to come Com. 301. So a man may bargain and sell at a day to come 1 Mar. Dyer 96. Chudleighs Case 129. 20 H. 6. 10. A use is but a trust betwixt the parties and 7 Rep. 400. There need not express words of Covenant to stand seised to an use 25 Eliz. Blithman and Blithmans case 8 Rep. 94. Besides these words dedi concessi are general words and therefore may comprehend Covenant and words shall be construed that the Deed may stand if it may be 8 Ass. 34. 7 E. 3. 9. But I agree that if the intent appeareth that it shall pass by transmutation of possession that there it shall be so taken but here his intent doth not appear to be so for if there should be Livery then the son should take nothing for the reason before given which is against his meaning Mich. 21 Iac. Rot. 2220. Buckler and Simons Case Dyer 202. Vinions case The cases cited before are in the future tense but the words are here I give c. 36 Eliz. Callard and Callards Case Stand forth Eustace reserving an estate to my self and my wife I do give thee my Land and the better Opinion was That in that case it did amount to a Livery being upon the Land for his intent is apparent Mich. 41 42 Eliz. Trelfe and Popwells Case adjudged in such case That an use shall be raised For which it was concluded that in this case there is a good estate raised to Iohn Pearce by way of Covenant Rolls I conceive that not estate is raised to Iohn Pearce by this conveyance It was objected That it shall inure by way of Covenant to raise an use I agree that if the meaning of the party may appear that he intended to pass his estate by way of raising of an use otherwise not And here is no such appearance Foxes Case in 8 Rep. is a stronger case and here it doth not appear that he meant to pass it by way of use But by the word give he intended transmutation of possession 8 Rep. Bedells case Mich. 18. Car. Rot. 2220. in the Common Pleas it was adjudged That a gift of a Remainder after the death of the grantor was void wherefore he concluded for the Plaintiff and so Judgment was given by the whole Court And Justice Iones said When a man makes a doubtful Conveyance it shall be intended a Conveyance at the Common Law And it shall not be intended that the Father would make him Tenant for life only punishable of wast Mich. 15º Car ' in the Kings Bench. 79. IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Counsel of the Marches and the Case was such A man seised of Lands in Fee
age should be which should be a great mischief And where it is objected it may be for his benefit To that he answered that the Law will not leave that to him to judge what shall be for his benefit what not and to this purpose amongst other he cited it to be adjudged That where an Infant took a shop for his trading rendring renâ— and in debt brought for the rent the Infant pleaded his Infancie the other replied that it was for his benefit and livâ—lihood and yet it was adjudged for the Infant vid. 13 H. 4. 12. 10 H. 6. 14. Books in the point and therefore he prayed that Judgment might be stayed Bramston Heath and Mallet Justices Barckley being then impeached for High Treason by the Parliament were clear of Opinion That the submission by an Infant was void and they all agreed That if the Infant was not bound that the man of full age should not be bound so that it should be either totally good or totally void But Ward who was of Counsel with the Plaintiff said that the case was not that the infant submitted himself to the award but that a man of full age bound himself that the Infant should perform the Award which was said by the Court quite to alter the Case To that Trevor said that the case is all one for there cannot be an Award if there be not first submission and then the submission being void the Award will be void and so by consequence the Bond and to prove it he cited 10 Rep. 171. b. where it was adjudged that the non-performance of a void Award did not forfeit the Bonâ— and many other Cases to that purpose And the Court agreed That if the Condition of a Bond recite that where an Infaâ—â— hath submitted himself to an Award that the Defendant doth bind himself that the Infant shall perform it that the samâ— makes the Bond void because the submission being void allâ— void and therefore day was given to view the Record 190. A. and B. are indicted for murder B. flies and A. brings a Certiorare to remove the Indictment into the Kingâ— Bench Whether the whole Record be removed or but partâ— Keeling the younger said that all is removed and that theâ— cannot be a Transcript in this Case because he said the Writ saith Recordum processus cum omnibus ea tangentibus but the Chief Justice doubted of it and he said that the Opinion of Markham in one of our Books is against it and he said it should be a mischievous case if it should be so for so the other might be attainted here by Outlawry who knew not of it and note that Bramston Chief Justice said That the Clerk of the Assises might bring in the Indictment propriis manibus if he would without a Certiorare 190. A man was outlawed for Murder and died his Administrator brought a Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry and it was prayed that he might appear by Atturney and by Bramston Chief Justice and Justice Mallet none other being then in Court it was granted that he might for they said that the reason wherefore the party himself was bound to appear in proper person is that he may stand rectus in Curia and that he may answer to the matter in fact which reason fails in this case and therefore the Administrator may Appear by Attorney 191. One said of Mr. Hawes these words viz. My Cozen Hawes hath spoken against the Book of Common Prayer and said it is not fit to be read in the Church upon which Hawes brought an Action upon the case and shewed how that he was cited into the Ecclesiastical Court by the Defendant and had paid several sums c. The Defendant denied the speaking of these words upon which they were at issue and it was found for the Plaintiff and now it was moved by Keeling for stay of Judgment That the words are not Actionable as to say A man hath spoken against a penal Law which doth not inflict punishment of life and member will not bear Action and the punishment which is inflicted by the Statute of 1 Eliz. cap. 2. is pecuniary only and not corporal but in default of payment of the sum that he shall be imprisoned for such a time which meerly depends upon the non-payment and is incertain And by the same reason he said to say of a man that he hath not Bowe and Arrows in his house or not a Gun or to say of a man That he hath spoken against any penal Law whatsoever would bear Action which should be unreasonable wherefore he prayed that Judgment might be stayed Brown contrary the words are actionable because that if it was true that he spoke them he subjected himself to imprisonment by the Statute of 1 Eliz. although not directly yet in default of payment so as there might be corporal damage and to prove it he cited Anne Davies Case 4 Rep. 17. a. where it is said that to say that a woman hath a Bastard will bear Action because that if it were true she was punishable by the Statute of 18 Eliz. Further he said that if the words are not Actionable yet the Action will lie for the special damage which the Plaintiff hath suffered in the Ecclesiastical Court Justice Mallet the words of themselves are not Actionable because that the corporal punishment given by the Statute doth depend upon the non-payment and is not absolute of it self but the Action will lie for the temporal damage and therefore he conceived that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Justice Heath that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment for the pecuniary Mulct is a good cause of Action there being in default of payment a corporal punishment given But here is not only injuria but damnum also which are the foundations of the Action upon the Case and if the words of themselves be not Actionable yet the Action will lie for the damage that the Plaintiff here suffered by the citation in the spiritual Court Bramston Chief Justice doubted it and he conceived it hard that the words should bear Action because as he said the corporal punishment doth meerly depend upon the not payment and upon the same reason words upon every penal Law should bear Action and therefore this being a leading Case he took time to consider of it It was said To say of a man that he had received a Romish Priest was adjudged Actionable and that was agreed because it is Felony At another day the Case was moved again and Justice Mallet was of the same Opinion as before viz. That the words themselves were not actionable but for the special damage that the Action would lie and he said that one said of another That he was a Recusant for which an Action was brought in the Common Pleas and he conceived the Action would not lie Justice Heath was of the same Opinion as before that the words oâ— themselves would bear Actioâ— and
â—e conceived That if a man speak such words of another that if they were true would make him liable to a pecuniary or corporal punishment that they would bear an Action and here the Plaintiff was endamaged and therefore without question they will bear an Action Bramston Chief Justice as before also That the words are not Actionable neither of themselves nor for the damage not of themselves for no words which subject a man to a pecuniary Mulct if they were true either at the Common Law or by the Statute will bear an Action For by the same reason to say that a man hath erected a Cottage or to say that a man hath committed a Riot would bear Action 37 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. One said of another That he did assault me and took away my Purse from me and upon Not Guilty pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and Judgment was stayed because he might take his purse from him and yet be but a Trespasser So as it appeareth that words ought to have a favourable construction to avoid multiplicity of Suits and if these words would bear an Action by the same reason words spoken against every penal Law should bear Action which against the reason given before should be a means to increase Suits And he took it for a rule If the words import scandal of themselves by which damage may accrue then the words will bear action without damage otherwise not and therefore the damage here shall not make the words Actionable which of themselves are not actionable as I conceive they are not Besides by this means the Act of a third person should prejudice me which is against reason as here the Act of the Ordinary by the Citation and damage thereupon accrued which perhaps might be ex officio only for which cause he conceived that Judgment should be stayed but because there were two Judges against one Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Mich. 17º of the King in the Common Pleas. 192. BAine brought an Action upon the Case against for these words viz. That he kept a false Bushel by which he did cheat and cosen the poor he said in his Declaration That he was a Farmor of certain lands and used to sow those lands and to sell the Corn growing on them and thereby per majorem partem used to maintain himself and his family and that those words were spoken to certain persons who used to buy of him and that by reason of those words that he had lost their custom the parties were at issue upon the words and found for the Plaintiff and it was moved by Serjeant Gotbold in arrest of Judgment that the words were not actionable because that the Plaintiff doth not alledge that he kept the false Bushel knowing the same to be a false Bushel for if he did not know it to be a false Bushel he was not punishable and by consequence no Action will lie and compared it to the case Where a man keeps a Dog that useth to worry sheep but he doth not know of it no Action lieth against him for it but yet notwithstanding Bankes chief Justice and Crawley were of Opinion that the words were Actionable for of necessity it ought to be taken that he kept the Bushel knowingly for otherwise it is no cousenage and here being special damage alledged which was the loss of his custom as he had pleaded it the maintenance of his livelihood they hold the words clearly actionable gave Judgment accordingly Note the other Judges were in Parliament 193. Doctor Brownlow brought an Action upon the case for words against 〈◊〉 spoken of him as a Physitian which words were agreed to be Actionable but yet Serjeant Gotbold conceived that although that the words were actionable that the Plaintiff had not well intitled himself to his Action because although that he said that he is in Medicinis Doctor yet because he doth not shew that he was licensâ—d by the Colledge of Physitians in London or that he was a Grâ—dâ—ate of the Universities according to the Statute of 14. H. 8. cap. 5. that therefore the action will not lie see Doctor Bâ—unchams case 8 Rep. 113. â— where he shewed the Statute aâ—orâ—said and pleaded it accordingly that he was a Graduate of the University of Cambridge wherefore he prayed that Judgment might be stayed Bankes Chief Justice and Crawley doubted whether the Act were a general Act or not for if it were a particular Act he ought to have pleaded it otherwise that they could not take notice of it but upon reading of the Statute in Court they agreed that it was a general Act wherefore they gave day to the party to maintain his Plea 194. By Bankes Chief Justice upon an Elegit there needs no Liberate otherwise upon a Statute and note the Elegit doth except Averia Corucae Dye and Olives Case 195. IN an Action of false Imprisonment the Defendant shewed that London hath a Court of Record by prescription and that the same was confirmed by Act of Parliament and that he was one of the Serjeants of the Mace of that Court and that he had a Warrant directed unto him out of that Court to arrest the Plaintiff pro quodam contemptu committed to the Court for not paying twenty shillings to K. B. and that in pursuance of the command of the Court he accordingly did arrest the Plaintiff Maynard that the justification was not good because the Defendant doth not shew what the contempt was nor in what Action so as it might appear to the Court whether they had Jurisdiction or not And if such general Plea should be tolerated every Court would usurp Jurisdiction and every Officer would justifie where the proceeding is Câ—ram non Iudice and void and thereby the Oâ—â—icer liable to false Imprisonment according to the case of the Marshalâ—ee in the 10 Rep. And here the pleading is incertain that the Jury cannot try it and he put the case of the Mayoâ— of Plymouth The Mayor hath Jurisâ—iction in Dâ—bt and Trespass is brought there which is Coram non Iudice But in this Action the parâ—y is imprisoned pro quodam contemptu shall this be a good Justification in a false imprisonment brought against the Officer certainly no. Serjeant Rolls contrary that the Plea was good because that the Defendant hath shewed that the Court was holden secundum consuetudinem and therefore it shall be intended that the contemptâ— was committed in a Case within their Jurisdiction and therefore he cited the 8 Rep. Turners Case to which Maynard replied that that doth not make it good because that issue cannot be taken upon it At another day the Judges gave their Opinions Justice Mallet That the Plea is not good because that it is too general and non constat whether within their Jurisdiction or not and where it was objected that he is a Minister of the Court and ought to obey their commands and therefore it should go hard that he
should be punished for it he conceived that there is a difference betwixt an Officer of an inferiour Court which ousts the Common Law of Jurisdiction and one of the four Courts at Westminster for where an Officer justifies an Act done by the command of an Inferiour Court he ought to shew precisely that it was in a Case within their Jurisdiction and he cited 20 H. 7. the Abbot of St. Albâ—rs case Justice Heath contrary the party is servant to the Court and if he have done his duty it should be hard that he should be punished for it and he agreed that there is a difference betwixt the Act of a Constable and a Justice of Peace and the Act of a Servant of a Court for the Servant ought to obey his Master and although it be an inferiour Court yet it is a Court of Record and confirmed by Act of Parliament and all that is confessed by the Demurrer Bramston Chief Justice that the Plea is naught because that it is too general and incertain true it is that it is hard that the Officer should be punished in this case for his obedience to which he is bound and it is as true that the Officer for doing of an act by the command of the Court whether it be just or unjust is excused if it appear that the Court hath Jurisdiction but here it doth not appear that the Court hath Jurisdiction and if the Court had not Jurisdiction then it is clear that the Officer by obeying the Court when they have not Jurisdiction doth subject himself to an Action of false imprisonment as it is in the Case of the Marshalsy in the 10 Rep. but it was adjorned c. The Bishop of Hereford and Okeleys Case 196. THe Bishop of Hereford brought a Writ of Error against Okeley to reverse a Judgment given in the Common Pleas the point was briefly this One under the age of twenty three years is presented to a Benefice Whether the Patron in this case shall have notice or that lapse otherwise shall not incur to the Bishop which is grounded upon the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 12. And upon debate by the Counsel of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that which was said being upon the general Law of notice nothing moved the Court against the Judgment given in the Common Pleas upon solemn debate as it was said and therefore they gave day to shew better matter or else that Judgment should be affirmed The Reasons of the Judgment in the Common Pleas were two First upon the Proviso of the Statute which says That no Lapse shall incur upon any deprivation ipsâ— facto without notice Second reason was upon the body of the Act which is That admission institution and induction shall be void but speaks nothing of presentation so as the presentation remaining in force the Patron ought to have notice and that was said was the principal reason upon which the Judgment was given and upon the same reasons the Court here viz. Mallet Heath and Bramston Justices held clearly that the notice ought to be given or otherwise that Lapse shall not incur but they agreed that if the Act had avoided the presentation also that in such case the Patron ought to have taken notice at his peril being an avoydance by Statute if the Proviso help it not Mich. 17º of the King in the Common Pleas. 197. A. Said of B. that he kept false weights for which words B. brought an Action upon the case shewed how that he got his living by buying and selling but did not shew of what profession he was and by all the Court viz. Foster Reeve Crawley and Bankes in the Common Pleas the Action will not lie First because he doth not shew of what Trade or profession he was and it is too general to say that he got his living by buying and selling Secondly because although that he had shewed of what Trade he was as that he was a Mercer as in truth he was that yet the words are not actionable because there is nothing shewed to be done with them or that he used them and it can be no scandal if the words do not import an act done by the false weights for he may keep them and yet not use them and he may keep them that another do not use them and the keeping of false weights is presentable in Leet if the party use them otherwise not And where one said of another That he kept a false Bushel by which he did cheat and cousen the poor the same was adjudged actionable that is True and differs from this case for there he said he not only kept them but used them and cheated with them but it is otherwise in our case and this case was compared to Hobarts Reports where one said of another That he kept men which did rob upon the High-way and adjudged that the words were not actionable for he might keep them and not know of it Bankes the action upon the case for words is to recover damages and here it can be no damage First because he doth not shew of what profession he was and Secondly because although he had shewed it yet the words will not bear Action and Judgment was given against the Plaintiff 198. It was moved by Serjeant Wild That depositions taken in the Ecclesiastical Court might be given in evidence in a Trial in this Court and the Court was against it because they were not taken in a Court of Record and they said although the parties were dead yet they ought not to be allowed and by Bankes Chief Justice no depositions ought to be allowed which are not taken in a Court of Record and Foster and Reeve were of Opinion that although the parties would assent to it yet they ought not to be given in evidence against the constant rule in such case Crawley contrary for he said that a writing which by the Law is not Evidence might be admitted as Evidence by the consent of the parties 200. A man was bound to keep a Parish harmless from a Bastard-child and for not performance thereof the Obligee brought Debt upon the Bond the Defendant pleaded that he had saved the Parish harmless and did not shew how the Plaintiff replied and shewed how that the Parish was warned before the Justices of Peace at the Sessions of Peace and was there ordered by Record to pay so much for the keeping of the childe and because the Defendant had not saved him harmless c. The Defendant pleaded Nul tiel Record upon which the Plaintiff did demur And here two things were resolved First that the Plea Nul tiel Record upon an Order at Sessions of Peace is a good Plea because that an Order at the Sessions of Peace is a Record Secondly that notwithstanding Judgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff because the Dâ—fendants bar was not good in that he hath pleaded in the affirmative that he hath saved the Parish
the Corporation spake these words of the Plaintiff to his Brethren of the Corporation He praedict the Plaintiff innuendo is an ignorant man and not fit for the place and he said that by reason of speaking of these words that they refused to elect him Steward and whether these words were actionable or no was the Question This case was argued twice in Trinity-Term by Callis and Gotbold Serjeants and the Judges seemed to incline to opinion That the words were Actionable but yet no judgment is given Selden against King in Common Pleas Trin. 17 Car. Regis 218. IN a Replevin the Case was thus A man granted a rent out of certain Lands and limited the same to be paid at a house which was another place off the Land and in the grant was this clause that if the rent were behind and lawfully demanded at the house that then it should be lawful for the grantee to distrein the Rent was afterward behind and the grantee distreined and upon traverse taken upon the demand whether this distress upon the Land which had been good in Law if there had not been a special limitation of demand at a place off the Land be a good demand as this Case is was the point Mallet Serjeant the distress is a demand in it self and there needs not any other demand although the rent be to be paid off the Land as here And it was adjudged in this Court about 3 years past that the distress was a sufficient demand but I confess that a Writ of Error is brought in the Kings Bench and they incline there to reverse it and there is no difference where the rent is payable upon the Land where not and so it was adjudged Trin. 3 Car. Rot. 1865 or 2865. betwixt Berriman and Bowden in this Court and he cited also Fox and Vaughans Case Pasch. 4 Car. in this Court and Sir Iohn Lambes case Trin. 18 Car. Rot. 333. in this Court both adjudged in the point and he cited many other Judgments Iermyn Serjeant contrary that the distress is no sufficient demand as this Case is he ought to demand it at the place appointed by the grant for it is part of the grant and the words of the grant ought to be observed 28 H. 8. Dyer 15. and in the Comment 25. a. it is said that Modus legem dat donationi and therefore by the same reason that the grantor may appoint the time and place of payment as here he hath done by the same reason he may appoint a place for the demand and that he shall make that demand before he distrein for the same is neither repugnant nor impossible nor against the Law and therefore good and by consequence ought to be observed and then he answered the Cases which were cited to be adjudged against him In Symmons Case in the Kings Bench there it was resolved that a distress was a demand in Law and a demand in Law is as strong as a demand in fact as it was said by Justice Barckley in debate of that Case But note that in that Case there was no time in certain limited and further in that Case the Rent was payable upon the land and therefore in that Case I agree that a distress will be a good demand because that the demand is to be made upon the land but it is not so in our Case In Sands and Lees case Trin. 20 Iac. in this Court there also the rent was payable upon the land Berriman and Bowdens Case Trin. 3 Car. cited before I agree was our very Case in point but there Judgment was given upon Confession and therefore doth not rule our Case and in Sir Iohn Lambes Case there was no Judgment given and therefore that doth not rule our Case but Melsam and Darbies case M. 6 Car. Rot. 389. in the Kings Bench a Case in the point where Judgment was reversed upon a Writ of Error there brought for want of demand and Selden and Sherleys case in that Court a Case also in the point was reversed Mich. 16 Car. in the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error brought for want of demand wherefore I conclude that there ought to have been an actual demand at the house according to the grant in our Case and therefore the Traverse in this Case taken by the grantor is well taken Note that Justice Crawley said that Lambes Case was adjudged that there needed no demand and he said that there were three Judgments accordingly in this Court but Rolls Serjeant said that Darbies Case was reversed in the Kings Bench for want of a demand But note that Foster and Reeve Justices did incline that there should be a demand and so Bankes Chief Justice for he said that it is part of the contract and like a condition precedent for as in a condition precedent a man ought to perform the condition before he can take any thing by the grant so in this Case the grantee ought to make a demand to enable him to distrein for before the demand he is not by the manner of the grant which ought to be observed entitled to a distress wherefore he give direction to the Counsel that they would view the Records and shew them to the Court and further he said to them that where it appeareth that the Rent was demandable upon the land that those cases were not to the purpose and therefore wished that they would not trouble the Court with them Levet and Sir Simon Fanshawes Case in Common Pleas Trin. 17. Car. Regis 249. LEvett brought debt against Sir Simon Fanshawe and his Wife as Executrix of another and sued them to the Exigent and at the return of the Exigent the Defendant Sir Simon Fanshawe came in voluntarily in Court and prayed his Priviledge because he was an Officer of the Exchequer and whether he should have his priviledge in that case or not was the question and that rests upon two things First because he is sued as this case is meerly for conformity and necessity-sake and in the right of another viz. in the right of his wife as Executrix And secondly because he demands his priviledge at the Exigent Whitfield Serjeant that he ought to have his priviledge and he cited Presidents as he said in the point as Pasch. 44 Eliz. in the Exchequer Iames Ashtons case sâ—rvant to the Treasurer and Pasch. 23. Iac. Rot. 131. Stantons case also in the Exchequer in both which cases he said husband and wife were sued in the right of the wife and the husband had his priviledge But he cited a Case which was nearer our Case and that was Hill 8. Iac. in the Exchequer Wats and Glovers case where husband and wife were sued in the right of the wife as Executrix and he said that it was over-ruled that the husband should have his priviledge 22 H. 6. 38. and 27 H. 8. 20. in those Cases the husband and wife were sued in the right of the wife and yet the husband
REPORTS OR NEW CASES WITH Divers Resolutions and Judgements given upon solemn Arguments and with great deliberation AND The Reasons and Causes of the said Resolutions and Judgements COLLECTED By JOHN MARCH of Grayes Inne BARRESTER LONDON Printed by M. F. for W. Lee M. Walbanke D. Pakeman and G. Beadel M.DC.XLVIII REPORTS Easter-Term 15º CAROLI In the Kings Bench. IT was agreed by Justice Iones and Justice Barckley the Lord Chief Justice and Justice Crook being absent That if the Sheriff do arrest a man upon mesne processe and return a Cepi corpus and that the Defendant was rescued that no Action lieth against the Sheriff But if the party be taken upon an Execution an Action upon the Case lieth against him and so is the express Book of 16 E. 4. 2 3. Br. Escape 37. upon which Book Justice Iones said That it was adjudged in this Court as above is said 2. It was agreed by the Court That if a man in pleading derive an Estate from another man and doth not shew what Estate he had from whom he deriveth his Estate that is a good cause of Demurrer And Justice Iones said That if a man claim a Rent by Grant out of the Land of any other man it is not sufficient for him to say That such an one was seised and concessit but he ought to express of what Estate he was seised So is Dyer But in this Case it was agreed That the shewing of what Estate c. ought to be material to the maintenance and support of the Estate which he claimeth otherwise it is not necessary 3. An Action upon the Case for words was brought by one who was Journey-man and â—ore-man of a Shoomakers-shop which was his living and livelihood for these words viz. It is no matter who hath him for he will Cut him out of doors And farther the Plaintiff did aver that the common acceptance of these words amongst Shoomakers is That he will begger his Master and make him run away and shewed that he was particularly endamnified by speaking of those words And the Court was clear of Opinion that the Action would lie And these Rules were taken and agreed For some words an Action will lie without particular averment of any damage as to call a man Thief Traytor or the like these are malum in se And some words will not bear Action without particular averment of some damage as to say Such a one kept his wife basely and starved her these words of themselves will bear no Action but if the party of whom the words were spoken were in election to be married to any other and by speaking of these words is hindred there with such Averment they will bear an Action It was farther agreed That the words ought to be spoken to one that knows the meaning of them otherwise they are not actionable as in the principal Case they were spoken to a Shoomaker but if they had been spoken to any other who knew the meaning of them it had been all one And therefore scandalous words which are spoken to one in Welsh or any other Language which the party to whom they are spoken doth not understand are not actionable And it was agreed That some words which are spoken although of themselves they are not actionable yet being equivalent with words which are actionable they will bear an Action And therefore it was said by Justice Iones That in York-shire as I remember Straining of a Mare is as much as Buggering and because these do amount to as much with averment they will bear Action And all words which touch a man in his livelihood and profession will bear Action And the Opinion of the Court also was that the Averment ought to be That in this and shew it specially the Plaintiff was damnified and so it was agreed upon these Reasons that the Action did lie 4. The Opinion of the Court was upon a Judgment given there there ought to be two Scire facias one against the Principal the other against the Bail but one only is sufficient in the Common Pleas and that two Nichils returned do amount to Scire feci 5. There was a Contract made at Newcastle that a ship should sail from Yarmouth to Amsterdam and there was an Action of Debt brought upon the Contract at Newcastle and it was adjudged that the Action would not lie and the difference was taken betwixt a particular and limited Jurisdiction as in this case Newcastle is and a general Jurisdiction as one of the Courts at Westminster hath for in the first Case no particular Jurisdiction shall hold plea of a thing which is done in partibus transmarinis although the Original as the Contract in the principal Case be made in England but contrary in case of general Jurisdiction as any the Courts at Westminister have 6. The Custome of London is that any man in London may pass over or put over his Apprentices to any other man within the City King and Cokes Case 7. WIlliam Marshal and other Bailiffs had an Execution viz. a Capias ad satisfaciend ' against Coke and others which Bailiffs came to Coke's house and lay one night in his out-houses privily and the next morning they came to his dwelling-house and gave him notice of the Execution but Coke shut the doors of his house close so as the Bailiffs could not enter whereupon they brake the Glass-windows and the Hinge of the door endeavouring to enter whereupon Coke commanded them to be gone or he would shoot them notwithstanding which they did continue their ill-doing whereupon Coke shot Marshal one of the Bailiffs and whether this was Manslaughter or Murder was the Question And Rolls argued that it was not Murder for these causes 1. Because the act of the Bailiffs in breaking of the Glass and the Hinge of the door was an unlawful act and was at their pâ—ril Where the Kings Officer may break the house to serve any mean Process or Execution the differences are such as are in Semaynes Case C. 5. part 91 92. 1. betwixt Real and Personal Actions In Real Actions they may break the house to deliver seisin to him who recovereth contrary in Personal Actions 2. There is a difference in the case of the King and of a common person where the King is party in some cases his Officers may justifie the breaking of a house but not in the case of a common person 13 E. 4. 9. 18 E. 4. 4. 4 Rep. 4 9 Rep. 69. And therefore if they could not justifie the breaking of the house at the suit of a common person then in the principal Case they did a thing which was not warranted by Law and therefore the killing of one of them was not Murder But clearly if the Bailiffs had lawfully executed their Office then it had been Murder 2. It was not Murder because the person was in his House which is his Castle and defence which is a place priviledged by the Law 26. Ass.
be at one time customary and go according to the custom and at another guildable And the whole Court Crooke only being absent were against him that the custom was good Hicks against Webbe 83. IN Trespass for a way the Defendant did justifie and said that he had a way not only ire equitare averia sua fugare but also carrucis carreragiis carriare The Plaintiff traversed it absque hoc that he had a way not only ire equitare c. in the words aforesaid and thereupon they were at issue and found for the Plaintiff Glynn moved in arrest of Judgment that the Issue was ill joyned because it was not a direct affirmative but by inducement only And the whole Court was against him And Justice Iones said That if I say that not only Mr. Glynn hath been at such a place but also Mr. Iones without doubt it is a good affirmative that both have been there But they all agreed that the pleading was more elegant than formal 84. In the Case betwixt Brooke and Boothe Justice Barckley said that it is a Rule That if there be two things alledged and one of necessity ought to be alledged and he relies on-only upon the other it is no double Plea As if a man plead a Feoffment with Warranty and relieth upon the Warranty it is not double 85. Justice Barckley said That the Court of the Exchequer they may make a Lease for three Lives by the Exchequer-Seal Clarke against Spurden 86. IN a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas the case was shortly thus A. wife of I.S. intestate promiseth to B. to whom Adnistration was committed that if he shall relinquish the Administration at the request of C. and suffer A. to Administer that A. will discharge B. of two Bonds In Assumpsit brought by B. in the common Pleas he alledged that he did renounce Administration and suffered A. to Administer and that A. had not discharged him of the two Bonds And it was found for the Plaintiff And thereupon Error was brought because B. doth not shew that he did renounce the Administration at the request of C. And Rolls for the Plaintiff in the writ of Error did assign the same for Error Justice Barckley all the other Justices being absent held that it was Error for consideration is a thing meritorious and all ought to be performed as well the request on the part of C. as the permission of the part of B. which ought to be shewed For perhaps B. was compelled to relinquish it in the Ecclesiastical Court as it might be for of right the wife ought to Administer And therefore it ought to have been averred that it was at the request of C. And therefore if it had been that he should renounce at the charge of C. it ought to be averred that it was at the charge of C. And it was adjourned 87. A man Libelled in the Spiritual Court for Tithes for barren cattle and it was moved for a Prohibition upon this suggestion viz. That he had not other cattle than those which he bred for the Plough and Pale and thereupon Barckley being alone there granted a Prohibition And the same Parson also Libelled for Tithes of Conies and for that also he granted a Prohibition for they are not Titheable if not by custome And here Barckley said That if Land be Titheable and the Tenant doth not plough it and manure it yet the Parson may sue for Tithes in the Ecclesiastical Court North against Musgrave 88. IN Debt upon the Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. c. 12. the words of which Statute are That no man shall take for keeping in pound impounding or poundage of any manner of distress above the sum of four pence upon pain of forfeiture of five pounds to be paid to the party grieved And the Plaintiff shewed that his Cattle were distreyned and impounded and that the Defendant took of him ten pence for the poundage And thereupon the Plaintiff brought an Action for the penalty of five pounds and found for the Plaintiff And the Judgment was That he should recover the five pounds and damages ultra praeter the mony taken for the poundage And thereupon a Writ of Error was brought and three things assigned for Error First because the Action was brought for the penalty of five pounds only and not for the six pence which was taken above the allowance of the Statute which ought not to be divided Which was answered by Justice Barckley all the other Justices being absent That notwithstanding it is good for true it is that he cannot bring his Action for fifty shillings part of the penalty because it is entire but here are two several penalties and he may divide and disjoyn them if he will or he may wave the six pence For quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto The second was That he doth not demand that which is ultra praeter the four pence given by the Statute and yet the Judgment is given for that which is not good To which Justice Barckley said That the Judgment was good For no judgment is given for that which is ultra praeter the four pence but only for the four pounds because he doth not demand it And we cannot judge the Judgment to be erroneous by Implication The third Objection was That Costs and Damages are given which ought not to be upon a penal Law For he ought not to have more than the Statute giveth and therefore upon the Statute of Perjury no Costs are given so upon the Statute of Gloucester of Wast the Plaintiff shall recover no more than the treble value But Rolls who was on the contrary said That there are many presidents in the common Pleas that Damages have been given upon this Statute But Barckley and Iones who afterwards came and seemed to agree with Justice Barckley in the whole was against it That no Damages ought to be given and desired that the Presidents might be viewed But here Rolls offered this difference Where the penalty given by the Statute is certain as here upon which he may bring Debt there he shall recover Damages but where the penalty is uncertain as upon the Statute of Gloucester for treble damages the Statute which giveth the treble value and the like there because it is incertain he shall have no more Barckley asked Mr. Hoddesdon If the Informer should recover Damages And he and Keeling Clerk of the Crown answered No but said Damages should be given against him and it was adjourned 89. Skinner Libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for thâ— Tithes of Roots of a Coppice rooted up And Porter prayed Prohibition And it was said by Iones and Barckley Justiceâ—â— no other Justice being present That if cause were not shewed before such a day that a Prohibition should be awarded because it is ad exheredationem and utter destruction of 〈◊〉 And the Opinion was that the
Branches should be priviledged And a man shall not pay Tithes of Quarries of Stonâ— And Barckley said It had been adjudged That a man shalâ— not pay Tithes for Brick and Clay 90 A. said to B. Hast thou been at London to change 〈◊〉 Mony thou stolest from me And it was Objected That thesâ— words are not actionable because they are an Interrogatorâ— only and no direct affirmativâ— But by Barckley and Ioneâ— the other Justices being absent the words are actionablâ— For the first words Hast thou been at London are the wordâ— of Interrogation and the subsequent words viz. The 〈◊〉 thou stolest from me is a positive affirmation And Barckley said That it had been oftentimes adjudged That words 〈◊〉 Interrogation should be be taken for direct affirmation Ioneâ— also agreed to it and he said that this Case had been adjudged That where a man said to I. S. I dreamed this night that you stole an Horse That the words are actionable And if these and the like words should not be actionable a man might be abusive and by such subtile words always avoid an Action 91. A. said of B. that he took away money from him with a strong hand and alledged that he spoke those words of him innuendo feloâ—icè and for them the Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case And by Barckley and Iones none other being present the Action doth not lie â—or he may take money from him manu forti and yet be but a Trespasser and therefore the Innuendo is void for that will not make the words actionable which are not actionable of themselves 92 Justice Iones said that it was a question Whether a Bar in one Ejectione firme were a Bar in another And Justice Barckley said that it is adjudged upon this difference That a Bar in one Ejectione firme is a Bar in another for the same Ejectment but not for another and new Ejectment to which Iones agreed Dickes against Fenne 93. IN an Action upon the Case for words the words were these the Defendant having communication with some of the Customers of the Plaintiff who was a Brewer said That he would give a peck of Malt to his Mare and she should piss as good Beer as Dickes doth Brew And that he laid ad grave damnum c. Porter for the Defendant that the words are not actionable oâ— themselves and because the Plaintiff hath alledged no special Damage as loss of his Custome c. the Action will not 〈◊〉 Rolls that the words are actionable and he said that it had been adjudged here That iâ—â—ne say of a Brewer That he brews naughty Beer wiâ—hout more saying these words are actionable without any special damage alledged But the whole Court was against him Crooke only absent That the words of themselves were not actionable without alledging special damage as the loss of his Custome c. which is not here And therefore not actionable And Barckley said That the words are only comparative and altogether impossible also And he said that it had been adjudged that where one says of a Lawyer That he had as much Law as a Monkey that the words were not actionable because he hath as much Law and more also But if he had said That he hath no more Law than a Monkey those words were actionable And it was adjorned Hodges and Simpsons Case 94. A Man brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against husband and wife of two Garbes Anglicè Sheaves of Corn and said that they did convert those sheaves ad usum ipsorum viz. of the Husband and Wife And here were two things moved by Hyde First that he shewed the Conversion to be of two Garbes Anglicè Sheaves of Corn which plea is naught and incertain And Courts ought to have certainty but here it is not shewed what Corn it was And the Anglicè is void and therefore no more than Trover and Conversion of so many Sheaves which is altogether incertain and therefore not good The other thing is That the Plaintiff sayth that the conversion was ad usum ipsorum which cannot be for the wife hath no property during the life of the husband and therefore cannot be ad usum ipsorum And he cited two Judgments in the point where it was adjudged accordingly And Justice Barckley said that it had been many times so adjudged But Justice Iones said that there may be a Conversion by the wife to her use as in this case to bake the Barley into bread and to eat it her self And Bramston Chief Justice said that a wife hath a capacity to take to her own use for there ought of necessity to be property in the wife before the husband can have by gift in Law and they desired to see Presidents And therefore it was adjourned as to this point But by the whole Court the other was not good More of the Case of North and Musgrave 95. MAynard for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That the Judgment was erroneous First because the damages and costs were given where none ought to be given being a penal Law and therefore no more than the penalty shall be recovered And he remembred the rule taken in Pilfords case 10 Rep. 116. a. and he cited divers Presidents also for it Cokes Book of Entries 31 41. And Presidents upon the Statute of Perjury 38 39. Secondly because he divided the Penalty given by the Statute which ought not to be for by such means the offender should be doubly vext for he might sue him after for the six pence praeter ultra that which was taken for the distress And he said it is like to the case of an Annuity which is entire and cannot be divided Thirdly he said That the Judgment it self was erroneous because that Judgment is given for more than he demands For the Judgment is quod recuperet 5. li. ultra praeter that which is above the 4 d. given by the Statute Rolls contrary that the Damages and Costs are well given and the same is out of the rule of Pilfords case because that the Action is no new action but the thing is a new thing for which the old Action is given And the Damages and Costs are here given for the Suit and Delay and not for the Offence And he cited also Presidents for him viz. The new Book of Entries 163 164. For the second point he said That they are several penalties which are given and therefore he might bring his Action severally for them if he would As to the third point That Judgment is given for more than the party declares it is not so for then the Judgment shall be made vitious by Implication which ought not to be And as to dividing of the penalty and Judgment the same was good by the whole Court for the reasons before given As to the giving of Costs Iones and Bramston Chief Justice conceived that they were well assessed upon the presidents before cited But Barckley
doubted thereof and did conceive that no costs should be given in this case and that upon Pilfords case 10 Rep. As to the Presidents he said that they did not bind him for perhaps they passed sub silentio And afterwards it was adjorned Johnson against Dyer 96. IN an Action upon the Case for words the Defendant having speech with the Father of the Plaintiff said to him I will take my Oath that your Son stole my Hens For which words the Plaintiff brought the Action But did not aver that he was his Son or that he had but one Son And it was holden by the whole Court Crooke being absent that the plea was not good Leake and Dawes Case 97. LEake brought a Scire facias in the Chancery against Dawes to avoid a Statute and the Case as it was moved by Serjeant Wilde was such Hopton acknowledged a Statute to Dawes and afterwards conveyed part of the Land liable to the Statute to I. S. who conveyed the same to Leake the plaintiff and afterwards the Conusor conveyed other part of the Land to Dawes the Defendant who was the Conusee by bargain and sale the Conusee extended the Lands of Leake the Purchaser who thereupon brought this Scire facias to avoid the Statute because that the Conusee had purchased parcel of the Land liable to the Statute and so exâ—inguished his Statute And this case came by Mittimus into the Kings Bench. And here it was moved by Serjeant Wilde for Dawes the Defendant in arrest of Judgment And taken by him for Exceâ—â—ion That the bargain and sale is alledged to be made to Dawes but it is not shewed that it was by Deed inrolled but yet it is pleaded That Virtute cujus viz. of Bargain and Sale the Conusee was seised and doth not shew that he entred And here it was said by the Court There are two points First Whether an Inrolment shall be intended without pleading of it Secondly Admitting not what Estate the Bargaineâ— hath as this Case is As to the first Justice Iones took this difference Where a man pleads a bargain and sale to a stranger and where to himself In the first case he need not plead an Inrolment but contrary in 〈…〉 Barckley agreed it and took another difference betwixt a Plea in Bar and a Count In a Count if a man pâ—â—ad a grant of a Reversion without attorâ—ment it is good contrary in Bar so in this Case The second question is admitting that the Deed shall be intended not to be inrolled without pleading What estate Dawes the Conusee hath before Entry the Deed not being inrolled For it was agreed by the whole Court That if he be a disseior or if he hath but an estate at will that the Statute is suspended And first whether he hath an estate at will at the common Law or not without Entry Barckley that he had But Iones and Bramston contrary and it seemed that he had an estate at will by the Statute And put the case of feoffment in Bucklers case 3. Rep. Where the Feoffee entreth before Livery that he hath an estate at will and Barckley agreed therein with him for the possibility of inrolment But Iones conceived that an estate at will could not be executed by the Statute And it was adjorned Curtisse against Aleway 98. THe Case was thus A woman was dowable of certain Land within the Jurisdiction of the Council of the Marches of which I. S. died seised She accepted a Rent by parol of the Heir out of the same Land in satisfaction of her Dower And afterwards there was a Composition betwixt them for defalcation of that Rent Afterwards there was an Action brought before the Council of the Marches for the Arrerages of the Rent where the question was Whether the Rent were in satisfaction of her Doweâ— or not and it was moved by Moreton for a Prohibition And it was granted by the Court because the same did concern Freehold of which they have not Jurisdiction for by the express Proviso of the Statute of 34 H. 8. of holding of plea of Lands Tenements Hereditaments or Rents But because that it appeared by the Bill that the woman was dead so as the realty was turned into the personalty viz. into Debt And therefore it was conceived by Evers Attorney of the Marches That although it was not within the Jurisdiction before yet being now turned into a personal Action that they have Jurisdiction But Iones and Barckley Justices were of a contrary Opinion and Iones said That an Action of Debt for Arrerages would not lie before them because it touched the realty which was denied by none but Evers Attorny Edwards against Omellhallum 99. IN a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment given in Ireland in an Ejectione firme the Case was this as it was found by special verdict A Mortgager made a Lease for years by Deed indented and afterwards performed the Condition and made a Feoffment in Fee the Lessee entred upon the Feoffee who re-entred and the Lessee brought an Ejectione firme And the only question as it was moved by Glynn was Whether this Lease which did inure by way of Estople should binde the Feoffee or no and by him it did and Rawlyns case in the 4 Rep. 53. expresly and 1 2 Phil. Mar. Dyer agreeth And the whole Court Crooke only absent without any argument were clear That it should binde the Feoffee for all who claim under the Estople shall be bound thereby vid. Edriches case 13 H. 7. 100 Serjeant Iermayn came into the Court and shewed cause why a Prohibition should not be granted in the case of Skinner before who Libelled for Tythes of Coppice rooted up He agreed that for timber-trees above the growth of twenty no Tithes should be paid and so he said was the common Law before the Statute of 45 E. 3. which was but a confirmation of the Common Law And he said That as the body of the tree is priviledged so are the branches and root also which is a proof that where the body is not priviledged there neither shall be the root â—or branches And in our Case he Libels for roots of underwoods and the underwood it self being titheable therefore the roots shall be also tithable And he said that the 〈…〉 are not parcel of the Land But Justice Barckley was against it for they are not crescentia nor renovantia as Tithes ought to be and therefore no Tithes ought to be paid for them and he said that a Prohibition hath many times been granted in the like cases But Dr. Skinner did alledge a custome for the payment of Tithes of them And upon that they were to go to trial And here it was said that Dr. Skinner had used to have some special particular benefit of the Parishioners in lieu of Tithe of Roots And thereupon Barckley said That it is a Rule where the Parishioner doth any thing which he is not compellable by the Law to do
the matter and the form but he objected that where it is said that he did drive quoddam gestatorium that gestatorium is a word incertain and that therefore the Information should be insufficient but he agreed that notwithstanding that that it was good by reason of the Auglicè for that reduceth it to certainty and he cited the Case betwixt Sprigge and Rawlinson Pâ—seh 15 Car. in this Court where the Case was that a man brought an Ejectione firme de uno repositorio which word was put for a Warehouse and resolved that it was naught for the incertainty but the Chief Justice here said that it had been good if it had been explained by an Anglicè and so he said it was resolved in that Case and therefore he agreed that the Information here was good notwithstanding that exception by reason of the Anglicè this offence is an offence against the Commonwealth and such an offence for which a man may be indicted for it is â—aid in the Information to be ad nocumentum Ligeorum Domini Regis wherefore he agreed that the Judgment should be a fine with Capiatur and he said that it cannot be part of the Judgment in this Case that the Defendant should repair it because it is said in the Information expresly thaâ— the Parishioners ought to repair it and the Chief Justice said and so Justice Heath which I before omitted that the Township cannot have their Actions for so there should be multiplicity of Actions which the Law will not suffer but he conceived that if any man had a special and peculiar damage then he might have his Action otherwise not as if a man were bound by prescription or tenure to repair that place called Lobbe-Lane or any part of it then he might have his action upon the Case against the defendant otherwise not he agreed that the fine should be secundum quantitatem delicti but yet not too high because the other Parishes may have their Information in like manner against the Defendant but he agreed to adjorn the setting of the fine Southward against Millard 209. IN an Ejectione firme the Defendant pleaded Not Guilty Upon which a special Verdict was found Nicholls possessed of a Term for 1000 years devised the same to E. his daughter for life the remainder to Iohn Holloway and made Lowe the Husband of the Daughter his Executor and died Iohn Holloway devised his interest to Henry and George Holloway and made Oliver and others his Executors and died afterwards Lowe spake these words If E. my wife were dead my estate in the premisses were ended and then it remains to the Holloways E. died the Executors of Iohn Holloway made the Lease to the Plaintiff and Lowe made the Lease to the Defendant who entred upon the Plaintiff who brought Ejectione firme and whether upon the whole matter the Defendant were guilty or not of the trespass and ejectment supposed the Jury referred to the Court and the points upon the Case are two First whether the words spoken by Loâ—e the Executor be a sufficient assent to the devise or not admitting that it is then the Second Point is Whether thâ— assenâ— came in due time or not as to the interest of Iohn Holloway in the remainder because he died before the words spoken which should make the assent and as to that the pâ—int is no other but that the Legatee dieth before assent to the Legacie whether assent afterwards came too late or that the Legacie shall be thereby lost or not that is the Question and by Justice Mallet it is a good assent and that in due time And here some things ought to be cleared in the Case First that the devise to Iohn Holloway in the Remainder is good by way of executory devise Secondly that the devise by Iohn Holloway to Henry and George is a void devise because but a possibility Thirdly that the assent to the first devise is an assent also to him in the remainder And lastly that if an Executor enter generally he is in as Executor and not as devisee all which are resolved in Lampetts and in Matthew Mannings Case Now these Cases being admitted the Question is Whether that Lowe the Executor here hath made a sufficient Declaration to take the Term as Devisee in the right of his wife or not for he hath his Election to take it as executor or in the right of his wife and as I conceive he hath made a good Election to have it as Legatee in the right of his wife The last words viz. That then it remains to the Holloways which is impossible by Law to be because that the devise to them was void he did not waigh because but additional and the first words of themselves are sufficient to make an assent it is not a transferring of an Interest but an assent only to it which was given by the first Testator and after assent the devisee is in by the first Testator and that being but a perfecting Act like an Attornment and admittance of a copy-holder the Law always favours it for the Law delights in perfection and therefore an assent by one Executor shall binde all so an assent by one Infant-Executor above 14 years shall binde the other so an assent to the particular Tenant is good to him in the Remainder Admittance of a Copyholder for life is admittance of him in the remainder which Cases shew that an assent being but a perfecting act the Law shall always make a large construction of it and he said that Mannings case in the 8 Rep. is the very Case with our Case as it appeareth in the pleading of it in the new Book of Entries 149. b. and also in Mannings Case aforesaid but that Case was not resolved upon that point for the devise there was paying so much and the devisee being also executor payed the money and therefore it was ruled to be a sufficient assent to the Legacie and therefore our case may be doubted notwithstanding that case and for my part I conceive it a good assent to the Legacie in our Case And for the second point I hold that the assent comes in due time to settle the Remainder although that Iohn Holloway were dead before for otherwise by this common casualty of death which may happen so suddenly that an assent cannot be had before or by the wilful obstinacie of the Executor that he will not assent Legatees should be defeated of their Legacies which would be a great inconvenience Besides I hold that the devise by Iohn Holloway was void he having but a possibility at the time of the devise and therefore that it remain to his Executors and by consequence that the Ejectione firme brought by their Lessee will lie Justice Heath acc for the Plaintiff Three things are here considerable First whether there need any assent at all of the Executor to a Legacie Secondly whether here be an assent or not Thirdly whether this assent come in due
case that an Infant should have power to submit himself to that which should be final against him and no remedy for consensus tollit errorem wherefore he conceived that the submission was void and if that which is the ground faâ—ls all fails An Infant may take any thing for that is for is advantage and cannot prejudice him and the Church lâ—ke an Infant is in perpetual Infancie and conditionem meliorem facere potest but deteriorem nequaquam And where it was objected in this Case that this submission might be for the avail of the Infant and therefore should be good he answered and took this for a rule that an Infant shall never submit himself to any thing under a pretence of benefit which by possibility may prejudice him and with that agreeth the better Opinion of 10 H. 6. 14. that it shall not bind him because it may be to his prejudice for they may give greater damages than peradventure the Law would give in any Action brought against an Infant But 14 H. 4. is not any Authority Where it was objected that it shall be voidable at the election of the Infant To that he answered that it is absolutely void and therefore there cannot be any Election and it should be hard that the man of full age should be bound and the Infant not an Infant shall not be an accomptant because that Auditors cannot be assigned to him and he conceived that an Infant cannot bind himself an Apprentice but it is usual in such cases for some friend to be bound for him and as this Case is it appeareth by the Award that it might be for the prejudice of the Infant For the Arbitrators award that the Infant shall pay five pound for quit-Rents and other small things now what these small things were Non constat and they might be such things for which by the Law the Infant was not chargeable and by the same reason that they may assess five pound they might have set twenty pound and more and it should be inconvenient that an Infant should have such a power to submit himself to the Judgment of any which might charge him in such manner Besides part of the Award is void for the incertainty for it is said small things and it doth not appear what in certain and void in part void in all and for these reasons he gave Judgment against the Plaintiff Bramston Chief Justice agreed that the submission is void and not voidable only as it was objected for then it should be tale arbitrium until reversal of it 10 H. 6. and 14 H. 4. are no Authorities or if they be the best Opinion is for the Infant as it hath been observed and Knight and Stones Case cited before is no authority for no Judgment was given in the Case But all in that case agreed that the award was void because it was awarded that the Infant upon the payment of an hundred pounds should make a release which proves that the submission was also void because that if it should be good by the same reason the release Where it was objected that it shall be voidable at the Election of the Infant To that he answered that the submission ought to be either absolutely good or absolutely void for the end of an Arbitrament is to conclude and compose controversies and the Arbitrators are Judges to determine them which should never be done if it should lie in the power of the Infant to make good or frustrate the Arbitrament at his Election for which cause to say that it shall be conditional is against the nature of an Arbitrament and to say that it shall bind the Infant absolutely cannot be and to say that it shall bind the one and not the other is unequal Besides there can be no election in this case for if he were within age nothing binds him if at full age he ought to perform it Besides the Arbitrament it self as this Case is and as it was before observed by Heath is void for the award was That the Infant should pay five l. for quit-Rents and other small things and it doth not appear what those small things were so that for any thing that appeareth it might be for such things for which the Infant by the Law was not chargeable and therefore is void for the incertainty and void in part void in all and by the same reason as the Arbitrators might award five pound they might award twenty pound or more But he conceived that if it had appeared in certain that the things had been such for which the Infant is by the Law chargeable perhaps it had been good but here it doth not appear what the things were and therefore it was not good Trinit 4 Car. Pickering and Iacobs case it was resolved that a Bond taken for necessaries of an Infant was good 8 E. 4. Arbitrators Award more than the debt is the same is naught so here for any thing that appeareth to the contrary the Award was to pay such things as the Infant was not liable to pay and therefore void But note Reader I conceive that an Infant cannot submit himself to an Arbitrament for things for which by the Law he is chargeable for the reason given before because the Arbitrators may charge him farther than by the Law he is liable which should be to his prejudice and he hath not any remedy for it Judgment was given against the Plaintiff Quod nihil capiat per Billam The Case was entred Hill 15 Car. Rot. 313. The Serjeants Case Trin. 17 o Car. in the Common Pleas. 216. THe Serjeants Case was this A. seised of Land in see B. his Brother levied a Fine come ceo to C. B. had issue D. and died A. died without issue C. entred D. entred and gave it to C. and R. his wife and to the heirs of their two bodies C. levied a Fine come ceo with proclamations to D. C. and R. have issue L. C. dieth D. confirmeth to R. his estate to have to her and the heirs of her body by C. begotten R. dies D. enters L. oustes him D. brings entre in the Quibus In this Case there are two points First Whether the Fine levied by B. shall bar his Issue as this Case is or not and that is the very point of Edwards and Rogers Case Pasch. 15 Car. in the Kings Bench and admitting it shall not bar D. then the second point is what is wrought by the confirmation if by that the Issue in Tail shall inherit or not and that is the very point in the 9 Rep. Beaumonts Case Saunderson and Ruddes Case in Common Pleas Trin. 17 Car. 217. SAunderson brought an Action upon the Case for words against Rudde the Case was this The Plaintiff being a Lawyer was in competition for a Stewardship of a Corporation and the Corporation being met together for Election of a Steward the Plaintiff was propounded to be Steward and then the Defendant being one of
was allowed his priviledge But see Reader 34 H. 6. 29. 35 H. 6. 3. against it And note that many of these cases come to the second point whether he may demand his priviledge at the Exigent or not but for that see 9 E. 4. 35. Br. Priviledge 22. 10 E. 4. 4. Br. Priviledge 40. Rolls Serjeant contrary that the Defendant ought not to have his Priviledge and he said that use practise and reason is against it and he took these differences First where the Defendants are coming to make their appearance and are arrested as in 22. H. 6. 20. and where they are sued in one Court and the husband demands his priviledge because he is an Officer in another Court as in our Case Secondly where he is Defendant and where he is Plaintiff And lastly where he is sued in his own right and where in the right of another as in our Case For in the first of these differences he shall have his priviledge in the latter not and it is to ouste this Court of Jurisdiction and therefore shall be taken strictly Besides if in this Case the Defendant should have his priviledge we should be without remedy for we cannot have a Bill against the wife and we have no remedy to make the wife to appear and therefore it should be a great prejudice to us if he should have his priviledge Wherefore he prayed that the Defendant might not have his priviledge Note that Bankes Chief Justice seemed to agree the differences put by Rolls and also he conceived that point considerable whether the Defendant had not surceased his time in this Case because he demands his priviledge at the Exigent and not before And note the whole Court viz. Foller Reeve Crawley and Bankes Chief Justice seemed to incline that the Defendant should not have his priviledge because that the Action was brought against him and his wife in auter droit viz. in the right of the wife as Executrix but no Judgment was then given Hillary 17º Car ' in the Common Pleas. Moss and Brownes Case 220. MOsse exhibited a Bill in the Court of Requests against Brown and in his Bill set forth that the Defendant was indebted unto him in the sum of 400 pounds for wares delivered to him and further he shewed how that the Defendant was decayed in his estate and was not able to pay him and therefore he was content to accept of an hundred pound for the whole and that the Defendant at the payment of the said hundred pound required the Plaintiff to give him a general release and then promised him in consideration that he would make him a general release that he would pay to him the residue of his debt whensoever God should please to make him able and the defendant divers times afterwards did renew his promise with the Plaintiff Further he shewed that now a great estate to such a value is fallen to the Defendant and that now he is able to pay him and notwithstanding refuseth so to do which is the effect of the Plaintiffs Bill To that the Defendant answered and pleaded the Statute of Limitations of Actions and the Court of Requests would not admit this Plea But note the Defendant pleaded first the general issue that he made no such promise upon which they were at issue and found against him and afterwards he pleaded the Statute of Limitation and upon the whole matter Serjeant Clarke moved for a Prohibition First because the Bill is in the nature of an Action upon the Case at the Common Law and whether he promised or not promised is triable at Law Secondly because the Court refused the â—â—ea of the Statute of Limitations which they â—â—ght not to do because there is no remedy in Equity against a Statute Serjeant Whitfield contrary that no Prohibition ought to be granted First because the Plaintiff hath no other remedy but in Equity because that the Assumpsit made before the release is discharged by the release and the Assumpsit which was after is void because there is no consideration the debt being released before Secondly our case is not within the Statute of Limitations for it is but a trust reposed in the Defendant that he would pay the residue when God should make him able and being a bare trust is not taken away by the Statute of Limitations But he agreed for any Action which is within the Statute and is superannuated that there is no remedy in Equity But in answer to that it was said by Clarke that there is no trust expressed in the Bill But notwithstanding that it was resolved by the whole Court viz. Foster Reeve Crawley Justices and Bankes Chief Justice that no Prohibition ought to be granted for the reasons given before by Whitfield and they said that although no trust be expressed yet if it appeareth upon the whole Bill that there is a trust it is enough and he needs not to express it And note there was an order of the Court of Requests produced by Clarke by which it was ordered That the parties should take issue only upon the subsequent promise and should not meddle with the first which as the Court conceived made the Case a little worse notwithstanding the Court would not award a Prohibition for they said so long as they order nothing against the Law it is good and they ought to be Expositors of their own Orders therefore if it appeareth upon the merits of the Cause and the body of the Bill that they have Jurisdiction of the Cause and proceed as they ought be their Orders what they will it is not material and therefore it was resolved by the whole Court that no Prohibition should be granted in this Case Hill 17º Car. in the Common Pleas. 221. DVdley who was a Parson did libel in the Arches against Crompton for scandalous and defamatory words which words were these Thou meaning the Plaintiff lyest thâ—u art a fool and putting his hand behind him bid him kiss there and further said to him Thou hast spent so much a year in drunkenness and Sentence was given for the Plaintiff and now four years after Sentence the Defendant prayed a Prohibition and the Court viz. Foster Reeve Crawley Justices and Bankes Chief Justice were against the Prohibition because the Defendant came too late but if he had come in due time the three Justices did incline that a Prohibition would have lien because that the words are words only of passion and anger and God forbid that all words spoken only in wrangling and anger should bear Action But the Chief Justice inclined that the Defendant was punishable in the Ecclesiastical Court for those words for he said that the suit there is pro salute animae reformatione morum and it was fit that his manners should be reformed who spake such words of a man in Orders and a reverend Minister And he said that although that he held not that where there is no remedy at Law
that there they might sue in the Ecclesiastical Court yet he said that in many cases where there is no remedy at Law yet there is remedy in the Ecclesiastical Court and so he conceived in this Case But that which made Justice Reeve to doubt whether a Prohibition should issue as this Case was or not was for the incertainty of their Sentence which was for speaking of these words contained in the Articles aut eorum aliqua which he said is therefore not good for he said that Judgments or Sentences ought to have these two things Veriâ—y and Certainty and if there want any of these two it is not good and if it should be suffered it were a mischievous case for by this â—ick they might hold Plea of words not within their Jurisdiction and we should not have power to prevent it for if some of the words should be actionable some not they might by this way hold Plea as well of words which were not actionable or punishable by them as of those which were To which Foster agreed but Justice Crawley and the Chief Justice conceived that no Prohibition would lie notwithstanding that for that might be the course amongst them and although it be incertain yet it may be allowed by them for Law and Reeve was of opinion that a man might be indicted at the Assises before the Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer for speaking of such defamatory words and that he grounded upon the Commission of Oyer and Terminer which giveth them power to hold Plea de prolationibus verborum and he conceived that a man might be fined for them But the Chief Justice contrary for the Commission giveth them power to hold Plea secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae Now if the speaking of such words be not punishable by the Law and Custome of England then we cannot hold Plea of them by way of indictment or otherwise at the Assises for them 222. It was said by the whole Court that a bare Information at the Bar is not sufficient to cause the Court to examine any man upon Interrogatories wherefore they ruled that the party should make an Affidavit 223. Judgment was given against the principal and after a Scire facias was brought against the Bail who appeared and pleaded Nul tiel Record of the Judgment given against the principal upon which day was given to bring in the Record in Court at which day the principal tendred his body in discharge of the Bail and now it was prayed by Pheasant Serjeant that it might be admitted but Reeve Foster and Bankes Chief Justice inclined against it True it is that the condition of the Bail is that they render his body indefinitely withoue limiting any time in certain when they shall do it or pay the condemnation but yet they conceived that if they appear and plead such a dilatory Plea as this is that thereby they have waived the benefit of bringing in his body and Justice Foster said that the same being general and uncertain the Law ought to determine a time certain when it shall be done for otherwise by the same reason that they may do it now they may do it twenty years after which should be inconvenient and against the meaning of the condition And Reeve said that if this trick should be suffered that the Bail might plead such a dilatory Plea and afterwards bring in the body of the Principal the Plaintiff should lose all his costs of suit which he had expended in the suit against the Bail which would be mischievous But Justice Crawley that the usage hath always been that the Bail might bring in the body of the Principal at any time before judgment given against them upon the Scire facias and there are many presidents in this Court to that purpose To that the Court seemed to agree if they plead not such a dilatory Plea as in this case Therefore the Court awarded that the Pronotharies should consider of it and should certifie the Court what the use hath been in such case 224. Serjeant Pheasant came to the Bar and said to the Court that antiently as appeareth by our old Books the usage was that the Serjeants in any difficult point of pleading did demand of the Court their advise concerning it â—nd accordingly were used to be directed by the Court wherefore he humbly prayed of the Court to be resolved of this doubt A man was imprisoned for not submitting to Patentees of a Monopoly after seven or eight years past and then he brought an Action of false Imprisonment and that is grounded upon the Statute of Monopolies 21 Iac. c. 3. whether in this case the Defendant might plead the Statute of 21 Iac. c. 16. of Limitations of Actions or not was the Question But the whole Court was against him that they cannot be Judges and Counsellors and that they ought not to advise any man for by that means they should prevent their Judgment and they confessed that that was the use when the Serjeants used to count at the Bar as appeareth in our Books But they said you shall never find the same to be used since they counted and declared before they came to the Bar and these Counts and Declarations are upon Record wherefore the Court upon these considerations would not advise him Dewel and Masons Case 225. THis Case of Dewel and Mason which see before pl. 184. came now again in debate and it was adjudged by the whole Court viz. Foster Reeve Crawley Justices and Bankes Chief Justice nullo contradicente that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment and that upon these differences First where the Defendant is to do a single Act only and where he hath election of two things to do Secondly the second difference stood upon this that no notice is to be given or tender made of a thing which lieth not in the power or proper conusance of the Plaintiff so as the difference stands where it is a thing which lies in the conusance of the Plaintiff and where not and therefore where the award was that the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff eight pound or three pound and costs of suit as should appear by a note under the Attorneys hand of the Plaintiff it was resolved in that Case that although the Attorney be in some respect as a servant to his Master yet to this purpose he is a meer stranger and therefore the Plaintiff was not bound to make any tender of that note but the Defendant ought to have gone to the Plaintiffs Attorney and required a note of him of the costs of suit so as he might have made his Election But they all agreed that where it is a thing which lieth in the knowledge of the Plaintiff that there he ought to have made a tender or given notice but in this Case it lieth not in the knowledge of the Plaintiff and he cannot compel the Attorney to make it wherefore it was resolved that the Plaintiff should have
the Statute to prove that the Plaintiff cannot plead this plea the words of which are That the Plaintiffs shall have such Pleas and Aid-prayers as at the Common Law and if the Plaintiff could have pleaded this Plea by the Statute the Statute would not have enacted that there should be the like Aid-prayers as at the Common Law for if the Plaintiff might plead this plea then there need not any Aid-prayer and as at the Common Law no Aid-prayer was grantable of a stranger to the avowry so neither is it so now and to prove that he cited 27 H. 8. 4. 19 Eliz. New Entries 598. 26 H. 8. 5. against the Institutes 312. a. Besides the Statute gives the like pleas as at the Common Law and therefore no new pleas and that caused me to give those reasons before at the Common Law and if this should be suffered every wrangler by putting in of his cattle should put the Lord to shew his title which would be a great prejudice to him The Statute of 25 E. 3. c. 7. enables the possessor to plead to the title of the Patronage and that it is not till induction if it be against a Common person which he ought to shew otherwise he is not inabled to plead to the title as it is in the 7 Rep. 26. a Dyer fol. 1. b. But note there the Statute enables him to plead to the title which is not so in our Case the general words of the Statute of West 2. have always received construction at the Common Law as appeareth by 18 E. 3. 3. 10. 22 E. 3. 2. 9 Rep. Bucknells case and 11 Rep. 62 63. there you may see many Cases cited which have the like words of reference to the Common Law as the Statute in that Case and there always they have received construction by the common Law the Authorities cited before against me are not against me for they say that the Plaintiff after this Statute may have any answer which is sufficient so clearly by these authorities the answer ought to be sufficient and that is the question in our Case Whether the answer be sufficient or no which as I have argued it is not because the Plaintiff is not enabled to take this traverse by the Common Law and the Statute doth not give any other Plea than at the Common Law 26 H. 8. 6. is express in the point That the Plaintiff being a stranger is not enabled by this Statute to meddle with the tenure wherefore I conceive that the Plaintiff is not a person sufficient within the Statute to take this traverse without taking some estate upon him as in see for life or years c. But for the latter point admitting that the Plaintiff were enabled by the Statute to take this traverse yet I hold clearly that as this case is he hath not pursued the form of the common Law in the taking of it and I agree the rule that the Plantiff cannot traverse the seism without admitting of a tenure and therefore the traverse here is not good because he takes all the tenure by protestation Besides I agree that traverse of seism generally is not good 9 Rep. Bucknells case and I agree that traverse of seism per manus is not good without confessing the tenure for part and here he takes all the tenure by protestation and therefore not good 18 E. 2. Fitz. Avowry 217. is express in the point that the traverse is not good Wherefore I conclude that Judgment ought to be given for the avowant Justice Crawley that Judgment ought to be given for the avowant he held clearly that the avowry is within the Statute and that being within the Statute the Plaintiff is enabled to take this traverse and that he grounded upon the Books of 34. H. 8. Br. Avowry 113. 24. H. 4. 20. 9 Rep. 36. and Hobarts Rep. 129. Brown and Goldsmiths Case Then he being inabled by this Statute to take this plea as a very tenant the Question is Whether the Traverse here per manus be good or not and he held not but he ought to have traversed the tenure as this Case is that the traverse of the seism per manus generally is not good I ground me upon the 9 Rep. Bucknells Case 35. a. and I agree the third rule there put that Ne unque seisie per manus is a good plea but that must be intended where the Plaintiff confesseth part of the tenure which he hath not done in this Case as it appeareth by the fourth rule there taken which is an exception out of the precedent rule upon which I ground my opinion and therefore the traverse here is not good Besides Homage and Fealty are not within the Statute of Limitations and therefore not traversable and if it should be permitted the rule in Bevills Case 4. Rep. 11 12. and Com. 93. Woodlands Case which resolve that they are not traversable should be by this means quite defeated Further in this Case the fealty only is in demand and the Plaintiff hath traversed the seism of the rent as well as of the fealty which is not good I agree the Book in the 9 Rep. Bucknells Case fol. 35. that seism is not traversable but only for that for which the avowry is made if not that seism be alledged of a superior service for which the avowry is not which by the Law is seism of the Inferiour service with which agrees 26 H. 8. 1. 21 E. 4. 64. But in our Case seism is not alledged of a superiour service for which the avowry is not made but of an inferiour viz. of a rent which is inferiour to fealty as the Books are of 21 E. 3. 52. Avowry 115. and 19 E. 4. 224. and which of right ought to be so unless a man esteem and value his money above his conscience and therefore the traverse of the rent which is inferior service and not in demand is not good Besides you cannot traverse the seism of the fealty without the traverse of the seism of the rent because the seism of rent is the seism of fealty and the rent is not here in demand and therefore not traversable and therefore you ought to have traversed the tenure for although it be said that rent which is annual is inferiour to all other services 4 Rep. 9. a. yet it is resolved that the seism of rent is seism of all other services further I conceive that if you avow for one thing you need not to alledge seism of other services 24 E. 3. 17. 50. seemeth to cross the other authorities before cited but I believe the latter authorities Wherefore I conclude that Judgment ought to be given for the avowant Bankes Chief Justice I conceive that it is a plain avowry upon the Statute and therefore I need not to argue it here are two Questions only The first Whether this Plaintiff who is a stranger be enabled by the Statute of 21 H. 8. to plead
well lie Bramston Chief Justice for the Avowant that 〈◊〉 may well distrâ—in and cannot have a Scire facias but if he may have a Scire facias yet he may distrein without it There is no authority in the Law directly in the point in this Case I agree that if there be any prejudice to the conusee there it is reason to have a Scirâ— facias It was objected that it is a constant course to have a Scire facias in this Case But I believe you will never find a Scire facias brought by the Grantee of a rent or other profit apprender Besides the best way to judge this Case is to examine what the Scire facias is which ought to be brought and what the Judgment is which is given upon it whether he may recover the thing in demand or not vid. 32 E. 3. Fitz. Scire facias 101. 47 E. 3. 11. which are brought to have account and to shew cause wherefore he should not have the land see Fitz. Scire facias 43. v. The old Entries the Judgment which is given thereupon and the demand there is quod tenement praed redeliberatur and may the grantee in this Case have the land and thing in demand certainly not and that gives sufficient answer to the Cases objected by my Brother Heath where the second conusee shall have a Scire facias against the first Besides you shall never find in all our Books that a man shall have an attaint or a writ of error but he who may be restored to the thing lost by the judgment or verdict 2 R. 3. 21 Dyer 89. 9 Rep. the Lord Sanchars Case so in debt and erroneous Judgment upon it wherewith agreeth Doctor Druries Case 8 Rep. 12. 18 E. 3. 24. the feoffee shall have a Writ of Error because he shall have the land and see 32 E. 3. Scire facias 101. And the grantee shall not have a Writ of Error in this Case upon erroneous Judgment and for the same reason he shall not have a Scire facias and the grantee cannot have a Scire facias for want of privity and therefore I conclude that he cannot have a Scire facias for if he might certainly it would have been brought before this time either for this cause or for some other profit apprender It was objected that he shall not be in better condition than the conusor that is regularly true as to the right but he may have another remedy It was objected that the reason why that a Statute without a Scire fatias shall not be defeated is because he is in by Record and therefore shall not be defeated without Record but that is not the true reason but the reason is because the conusee ought to have costs and damages besides his debt as is Fullwoods Case 4 Rep and 15 H. 7. 16. is that the Chancellor shall judge of the costs and damages But 47 E. 3. 10. 46 E 3. Scire facias 132. by all the Judges that they lie in averment But here an inconvenience was objected that great arrerages should be put upon the conusee for a little mistaking to that he said that of a small mistake the Court shall judge and it shall not hurt him but if he hold over being doubly satisfied it is reason that he pay the arâ—erages and he put this Case A man acknowledgeth a Statute and afterwards makes a lease to begin at a day to come the lâ—ssee shall have a Scire facias for where remedy doth fail the Law will help him for which cause he concluded and gave Judgment for the avowant Trin. 18 Car ' in the Kings Bench. Paulin against Forde 248. AN Action upon the Case brought for words the words were these Thou art a thievish Rogue and hast stolen my wood innuendo lignum c. Gardiner the words are not actionable because it shall be intended wood standing or growing and not wood cut down and so he said it had been adjudged so if a man says of another that he hath stollen his Corn or Apples the words are not actionable because they shall be intended growing Bramston Chief Justice that the words are actionable because that wood cannot otherwise be meant but of wood cut down because it is Arbor dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit for which cause he conceived that the words were actionable and it was adjorned Chambers and his wife against Ryley 249. ACtion upon the Case for words the words were these Chambers his wife is a Bawd and keeps a Bawdy-house for which words the Action was brought and the conclusion of the Plea is ad damnum ipsorum Wright the words are not actionable because it is not the wife that keeps the house but the husband and therefore the speaking the words of the wife cannot be any damage to him but admit the words were actionable the husband only ought to bring the Action because the speaking of the words is only to his damage Bramston Chief Justice the wife only is to be indicted for the keeping of a Bawdy-house and therefore she only is damnified by the words and the husband ought to joyn in the Action but that is only for conformity and the conclusion of the Plea is good for the damage of the wife is the damage of the husband and therefore ad damnum ipsorum good And here it was agreed that to say that a woman is a Bawd will not bear an Action but to say she keeps a Bawdy-house will Porter who was for the Action cited a Case which was thus One said of the wife of another that she had bewitched all his beasts and she and her husband joyned in an Action and upon debate it was adjudged good and there the conclusion also of the plea was ad damnum ipsorum Rickebies Case 250. RIckebie was indicted in Durham for Murder and afterwards the Indictment was removed into the Kings Bench where he pleaded his Pardon which Pardon had these words in it viz Homicidium feloniam felonicam interfectionem necem c. seu quocunque alio modo ad mortem devenerit And note there was a Non obstante in the Pardon of any Statute made to the contrary and whether these words in the Pardon were sufficient to pardon Murder or not was the Question Hales for the Prisoner said that the Pardon was sufficient to pardon Murder and in his argument first he considered whether Murder were pardonable by the King at the Common Law or not and he argued that it was the King is interessed in the suit and by the same reason he may pardon it It is true that it is Malum in se and therefore will not admit of dispensation nor can an appeal of Murder which is the suit of the Subject be discharged by the King but the King may pardon Murder although he cannot dispense with it see Bracton lib. 3. cap. 14. And the Law of the Jâ—ws differs from our Law
paid may inforce a Distribution or not quaere 65. pl. 102. 93. pl. 158. Double Plea Where two things are alleadged and the one of necessity onely or by way of inducement and the party relies onely upon the other that is no double Plea 55. pl. 84. 74. pl. 113. Ejectione Firme Ejectone Firme de uno repositorio nought for the incertainty 96 pl. 166. Ejectione Firme de tanto unius messuagii c. qâ—aâ—tum â—â—at super ripam is nought for the incertainty and so where the Tâ—over of the Jury is such it is nought 97. pl 168. Elegiâ— Upon an Elgit there needs no Liberate otherwise upon a Statute Note the Elegit excepts averia Caruâ—â— 117. pl. 194. Equity Certain special Cases where there shall be remedy in Eqâ—ity where not pa 83. pl. 1â—8 88. pl. 141 90. pl. 145. 93. pl. 159. 99. pl 1â—1 102 pl. 175. 105. pl. 182. 106. pl. 183. 129. pl. 207. Errors In Error to reverse a Judgement in Debt upon an Arbitrament Judgement was reversed first because that in the reference to the Arbitrament there was no word of the submission Secondly because that the entry of the Judgement was considâ—ratum est and per Curiam omitted 7. pl. 16. In an Actâ—on for words Judgement was reversed because that it was averred that the words were spoken inter diversos ligeos and doth not say Cives of the place where they have such an acceptation as also for that the Judgement was Consideratum est and per Curiam Omitted 15 pl 37. In Trespass the Defendant justifies by a special Custom by Vertue of which he did it and doth not say quae est eadem transgressio for which Judgment was reversed 16. pl. 38. Judgment was reversed for want of Pledges 17 pl. 40. Outlawry was reversed because it did not appear where the party outlawed was inhabitant as also for that it did not appear that Proclamations were made at the Parish-church where c. 20. pl. 46. Judgement reversed for the appearance of an Infant by Attorney 24. pl. 53. Oâ—tlawry reversed because the Exigent was Secund. exact ' ad Com' Meum â—bm ' c. 25. pl. 58. A. Wife of I. S. intestate promises to B. to whom Administration was committed that if he would relinquish Administration at the request of C. and permit A. to Administer that A. would c. in Assumpsit by B. he shewed that he renounced Administration and permitted A. to Administer but doth not shew that it was at the request of C. by Barkley Just. it is Error 55. pl. 86. Judgement ought not to be judged erroneous by implication 56. pl. 88. 61. pl. 95. A Writ of Error upon Dower well lies before the Retorn of the Writ of Enquiry of damages but whether a Writ of Error lies in an Ejectione firme before Judgment given upon the Writ of Enquiry quaere 88. pl. 142. Want of Warrant of Attorney for the Plaintiff after Judgment upon nihil dicit is Error and not amendable 121. pl. 201. 129. pl. 209. Writ of Error bearing Teste before the Plaint entered is nought otherwise where is bears Teste before Judgment 140. pl. 112. In an Ejectione firme the Writ was 〈◊〉 armis but it wanted in the Count and whether this is error or amendable or not quaere 140. pl. 213. Escape Upon mean Process if the Sheriff retorn a Cessi and Rescous no Action lies against him for the escape otherwise in case of Execution 1. pl. 1. Estoppel Morgager makes a Lease for years by Deed indented after performs the condition and makes a Feoffment in â—ee the Feoffee claiming undeâ— the Estoppel shall be bound by the Lease 64. pl. 99. If a man bind himself to deliver any thing he is estopped to say that he hath it not 74. pl. 113. Estoppel binds only parties 105. pl. 180. Evidence to an Inquest upon Issues joyned Depositions taken in the Ecclesiastical Court cannot be given in evidence at Law though the parties were dead 120. pl. 198. Executions prayer in execution A second Execution cannot be granted before the retorn of the former 47. pl. 73. Where a man is imprisoned for the Kings Fine and upon a Habeas coâ—pus it is retorned that he is in Execution also for the Damages of the party it ought to be intended at the prayer of the party 5a pl. 80. Executor Administrator An Executor or an Administrator may maintain an Action for any Coâ—tâ—â—ct made to the Testator or Inâ—estate or for any thing which riseth ex contractu 9. pl. 23. Administrator of an Executor shall not sue a Scire Faâ— ' upon a Judgement given for the Testator 9. pl. 24. A Sheriff levies moneys upon a Fâ—â—ri Fas ' and dies Debt will lie against his Executors 13. pl 33. Whether the Executor of a Phâ—llizer shall have the profits of the Writs which are to â—e subscribed with his name or his Successor quaere 90. pl. 147. Expositors of Statutes The Judges are the sole Expositors of Acts of Parliament though they concâ—rn Spiritual matters 90 pl. 148. Extinguishment and Suspension Three covenant joyntly with two severally after one of the covenantors marries one of the covenantâ—es whether the covenant be good or not 103. pl. 176. Fine to the King IF a Carrier spoil the High-ways by drawing a greater weight than is warrantable by the Custom of the Realm he is â—inable to the King 145. pl. 210. Fines of Lands Disseisee levies a Fine to a stranger this doth not give the right to the Disseisor 105 pl. 180. Tenant for life the Reversion to an Ideot an Uâ—cle Heir apparant to the Ideâ—â— levies a Fine and dies Tenant for life dâ—eth the Ideâ—t dies whether the Issue of Uncle who levied the Fire â—â—albe barred by this or not quaere 4. pl. 164. 146. pl. 216. Forcible Entry Restitution cannot be awarded to the Plaintiff if it doth appear that he hath seisin yet the King shall have his Fine and if the Indictment be adtunc adhuc the Defendant keeps the possession forcibly where the Plaintiff was in possession Re-restitution shall be awarded 6. pl. 12. Forgery To forge a Will in writing though without a Seal is forgery within the Statute of 5 Q. ca. 14. Freehold What shall be said a grant of a Freehold to commence at a day to come what not 31. pl. 66. Gardeins of a Church WHere the Custom is for the Parishoners to chuse the Churchwardens the Person by colour of the Cannon cannot chuse one and if the Minister of the Bishop refuse to swear one of them chosen by the Parish a Mandat lies to inforce him to it and if the Parson thereupon doth Libel in the Ecclesiastical Court a Prohibition lies 22. pl. 50. 67. pl. 104. The Gardeins of a Church in London are a Corporation and may purchase Lands to the use of the Church and in the Country they are a Corporation capable to purchase Goods to the
imply an affirmative will bear an Action 19. It was said to a Merchant That he was a cousening Knave And the Opinion of the Court was the chief Justice and Justice Crooke being absent that the words were not actionable because he doth not touch him in his Profession for the words are too general But it was said That to call him Bankrupt was actionable And mall Cases where a man is touched in his Profession the words are actionable But to call a Lawyer a Bankrupt is not actionable Justice Iones said that Serjeant Heath brought an Action for these words One said of him That he had Vndone many and it was adjudged actionable because he touched him in his Profession 20. Kingston upon Hull is a Particular and Limited Jurisdiction and they held Plea of a Bond which was made out of their Jurisdiction and thereupon a Capias was awarded against the Obligor who was arrested upon it and suffered by the Sheriff to escape And the Opinion of the Court was clear That no escape would lie against the Sheriff upon the difference in the case of the Marshalsea That if the Court hold Plea of a thing within their Jurisdiction but proceed erroneously that it is avoidable by Error but if they have not Jurisdiction of the cause all is void and coram non Iudice 11 H. 4. and 19 E. 4. Acc. So in the principal Case for they held Plea of a thing which was out of their Jurisdiction and therefore the whole proceeding being void no Action can lie against the Sheriff for there was no Escape 21. Where a man is Outlawed and the Outlawry reversed notwithstanding the Original doth remain and the cause that the Original was determined was the Outlawry and now Cessante causa cessat effectus 22. A man made a Lease for years with exception of divers things and that the Lessee shall have conveniens lignum non sâ—â—ccidendo c. vendendo arbores c. Now the Lessee cut down Trees and the Lessor brought an Action of Covenant and the Opinion of the Court was That the Action would lie and that it is as a Covenant on the part of the Lessee because the Law gives him reasonable Estovers and by this Covenant he abridgeth his Priviledge 23. Justice Iones said and so it was agreed by the Court In what case soever there is a Contract made to the Testator or the Intestate or any thing which ariseth by Contract there an Action will lie for the Executor or Administrator but Personal Actions die with the Testator or Intestate 24. The Administrators of an Executor shall not sue a Scire facias upon a Judgment given for the Testator because the Testator now died Intestate because there is no privity And so it hath been many times adjudged 1 Rep. 96. a. 5 Rep. 9. b. The Earl of Oxford and Waterhouse Case in a Writ of Error to reverse a Fine 25. WAterhouse levied a Fine the Earl of Oxford pleaded that he was beyond Sea at the time of the Fine levied Waterhouse replied That he came here into England in August within the five years and upon that they were at issue The Jury found that he came over in Iuly And notwithstanding the Opinion of the Court was clear That the Writ of Error did not lie For although the Jury have found that he came over in Iuly yet the substance of the matter is that he was in England so as he might have made his Claim and therefore the Fine should bar him And Justice Barckley compared it to the Case of 10 Eliz. Dyer 271. b. which Case is a Quaere in Dyer but Resolved in the 6 Rep. 47. a. A man brought Debt against an Heir who pleaded that he had nothing by Descent The Plaintiff pleaded that he had Assets in London and the Jury found Assets in Cornwal and good for the substance is whether he had Assets or not 26. If a Nobleman who is not a Baron or Earl of this Realm in an Action brought against him or by him be named Knight and Earl of such a place it is good because that although he cannot be sued or sue another by the name of Earl Baron c. yet by the name of Knight he may and that is sufficient 27. Writ of Error was brought here to reverse a Judgment given in Ireland it is a Supersedeas to the Execution for although the Record it self is not sent over for fear of losing the same in the water or otherwise yet a transcript is made thereof which is all one And Justice Barckley compared it to the Case where a Writ of Error is brought in this Court to reverse a Fine in the Common Pleas there the Record it self is not sent but a Transcript thereof because we have not a Cirographer to receive it but the Transcript is all one Sir John Compton's Case upon the Statute of Winchester 13 Ed. 1. and 27 Eliz. of Robberies 28. SIr Iohn Compton Knight brought an Action against the Hundred of Olison or the like name for a Robbery done upon Red-hill in the County of Surry within the aforesaid Hundred and the Robbery was done upon his man and five hundred and ten pounds was taken from him And in this Case it was agreed by the Justices That although there be a remisness or negligence in the party who was robbed to pursue the Robbers or that he did refuse to lend his Horse to make Hue and Cry yet this doth not take away his Action nor excuse the Hundred if notice be given with as much convenient speed as may be as the Statute of 27 Eliz. speaks for them to make Hue and Cry And although the Party who was robbed doth not know the Robbers at the present time and thereof takes his Oath before a Justice of Peace as the Statute of 27 Eliz. hath provided and afterwards comes to know them and so he affirm yet this doth not take away his Action And it was resolved also that notice given in one Hundred five miles from the place where he was robbed is sufficient and the reason is because that the party who is a stranger to the Country cannot have conusance of the nearest place or Town Chief Justice That notice given at one Town and Hue and Cry levied at another is good And the Jury found for the Plaintiff And thereupon a Quaere was made by one who was of Counsel with the Hundred Whether such persons who become Inhabitants after the Robbery and before the Iudgment whether they should contribute And Justice Barckly said That all who are Inhabitants at the time of the Execution should pay it 29. A Vicar cannot have Tithes but by Gift Composition or Prescription For all Tithes de jure do appertain to the Parson 30. A man was bound to the Good Behaviour for Suborning of Witnesses Plowden against Plowden 31. PLowden the Son brought Trespass against Plowden the Father for taking the Plaintiffs Wife cum bonis viri And
the Process was lest at the Defendants house being sixty miles from London and twelve pence to bear his charges which the party did accept And the party who served the Process promised the Defendant sufficient costs And here Mr. Iones who was of Counsel with the Defendant took three Exceptions 1. Because the Process was not served upon the Defendant as the Statute requires but a Note only thereof and it being a Penal Statute ought to be taken strictly 2. There was but 12 d. delivered to the Defendant at the time of the serving of the Process which is no reasonable sum for costs and charges according to the distance of place as the Statute speaks and therefore the promise that he would give him sufficient for his costs afterwards is not good 3. The party who recovers by force of this Statute ought to be a party grieved and damnified as the Statute speaks by the not appearance of the Witness and because the Plaintiff hath not averred that he had loss thereby by his not appearance therefore he conceived the Action not maintenable For the first the Court was clearly against him because it is the common course to put divers in one Process and to serve Tickets or to give notice to the first persons who are summoned and to leave the Process it self with the last only and that is the usual course in Chancery to put many in one Subpoena and to leave a Ticket with one and the Label with another and the Writ with the third and that is the common practice and so the Statute ought to be expounded But if there be one only in the Process there the Process it self ought to be left with the party For the second the Court did conceive That the acceptance should bind the Defendant but if he had refused it there he had not incurred the penalty of the Statute For he ought to have tendred sufficient costs according to the distance of the place which 12 d. was not it being 60 miles distant But for the third and last Exception the Court was clear of Opinion That the Action would not lie for want of Averment that the Plaintiff was damnified for the not appearance of the Defendant And so it was adjudged that the Plaintiff Nihil capiat per Billam 44. The Opinion of the Court was That whereas one said of another That he will prove that he hath stollen his Books that the words are actionable for they imply an affirmative and are as much as if he had said That he hath stollen my Books And so if I say of another That I will bring him before a Iustice of Peace for I will prove that he hath stollen c. although the first words are not actionable yet the last are Molton against Clapham 45. THe Defendant upon reading Affidavits in Court openly in the presence and hearing of the Justices and Lawyers said There is not a word true in the Affidavits which I will prove by forty Witnesses and these words were alledged to be spoken maliciously And yet the Court was clear of Opinion that they will not bear Action And the reason was because they are common words here and usual where an Action is depending betwixt two for one to say That the Affidavit made by the other is not true because it is in defence of his cause And so it was here The Defendant spake the words upon the reading of the Affidavits in a cause depending betwixt the Plaintiff and the Defendant And therefore if I say That J. S. hath no Title to the Land if I Claim or make Title to the Land Or if I say That J. S. is a Bastard and entitle my self to be right Heir the words are not actionable because that I pretending Title do it in defence thereof And Justice Barckley said That there are two main things in Actions for words the words themselves and causa dicendi and therefore sometimes although that the words themselves will bear Action yet they being considered causa dicendi sometimes they will not bear Action Now in our Case causa dicendi was in his own defence or his Title and therefore they will not bear Action 46. Outlawry was reversed for these two Errors 1. Because it was not shewed where the party Outlawed was inhabitant 2. Because it was shewed that Proclamations were made but not that Proclamation was made at the Parish-Church where c. Buckley against Skinner 47. THere was Exception taken because that the Defendant pleaded and justified the Trespass cum equis and said nothing to the Trespass done porcis bidentibus And the Opinion of the Court was That the Plea was insufficient for the whole And Justice Iones said That if several Trespasses are done to me and I bring Trespass and the Defendant justifie for one or two and sayeth nothing to the other that the whole Plea is naught because the Plea is intire as to the Plaintiff and the demurrer is intire also But Justice Barckley was of Opinion that the Plea was naught quoad c. only and that Judgment should be given for the other Vide 11. Rep. 6. b. Gomersall and Gomersalls Case 48. A man pleaded a descent of a Copy-hold in Fee The Defendant to take away the descent pleaded That the Ancestor did surrender to the use of another absque hoc that the Copy-holder died seised And the Opinion of the Court was That it was no good traverse because he traversed that which needed not to be traversed for being Copy-hold and having pleaded a surrender of it the party cannot have it again if not by surrender Like the Case of a Lease for years Helliers Case 6 Rep. 25. b. For as none can have a Lease for years but by lawful conveyance so none can have a Copy-hold Estate if not by surrender But if a man plead a descent of inheritance at the Common Law there the defendant may plead a feoffment made by the Ancestor absque hoc that he died seised because he may have an estate by disseism after the feofment Traverse of the descent and not of the dying seised is not good so was it adjudged in this Court Vide 24 H. 8. Dyer 49. It was moved in Arrest of Judgment upon an Action of Trespass upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 13. because that the Plaintiff said that the Defendant was Occupier only and did not shâ—w how he occupied or what interest he had And the 〈◊〉 â—pinion of the Court was that he need not because here he makes no Title and whosoever it be that taketh the Tithe is a Trespasser And therefore Justice Iones said That it was adjudged in this Court that an Action lieth against the disseisor for the Tithes so against a servant and so if one cut them and another carry them away an Action lieth against any of them 50. The Parish of Ethelburrow in London alledged a custome that the greater part of the Parishioners have used to
Common Law there notwithstanding he shall recover costs also So in our Case these being Acts of Creation which give remedy where there was no remedy before shall be taken strictly according to the Letter and shall not extend to such penalties as in our case And upon this difference he cited the Cases in Pilfords case and especially the Case upon the Statute of 5 E. 6. of Ingrossers the Plaintiff shall not recover costs but only the penalty given by the Statute grounded upon 37 H. 6. 10. I agree That there be many Presidents in the Common 〈◊〉 That damages have been allowed in our very Case but that is the use of the Clerks and passed sub silentio without any solemn debate or controversie Vide Greislies case and the first Case of the Book of Entries Presidents and Judgments in this Court Pasch. 33 Eliz. Rot. 292. Halesworth against Chaffely A Judgment of the Common Pleas was reversed for this very point M. 36 Eliz. Ruddal and Wilds Case M. 44 45 Eliz. Rot. 22. Shepwiths Case Avowry for relief a stronger case Judgment was reversed because damages was assessed Hill 14 Iac. Rot. 471. Leader against Standwell in a Replevin Avowry was made for an Amercement in a Leet and found â—or the Dâ—fendant and damages assessed But the Entry upon the Record was thus Super quo nullo habito respectu c. The Plaintiff was discharged of the damages because nulla damna debent esse adjudicanda per Legem terrae but he shall have his costs But it was objected by Justice Crook That by the Statute of 4 Iac. c. 3. which giveth costs and damages to the Defendant in certain Actions there specified where the Plaintiff shall recover damages and that where the Plaintiff is Non-suit or verdict pass against him That Demurrer hath been construed to be within that Statute Notwithstanding that it is an Act of Creation I agree that and answer that Demurrer is within that Statute and the mischief of it but it is not so in our Case for in our Case there is no such mischief For there is no colour to extend it beyond the words of the Statute For which cause I conclude that the Judgment in this case ought to be reversed 65. A Clerk of the Court dwelling in London was chosen Churchwarden and prayed a Writ of Priviledge which was granted And it was agreed by the whole Court That for all Offices which require his personal and continual attendance as Churchwarden Constable and the like he may have his Priviledge but for Offices which may be executed by Deputy and do not require attendance as Recorder and the like from which the Justices themselves shall not be exempt for them he shall not have his Priviledge And where he hath his Priviledge for the not obeying thereof an Attachment lieth Swift against Heirs in Debt upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. for setting out of Tythes 66. THe doubt in this Case did arise upon two several Indentures found by special verdict which were made by the Vicar and Subchauntors Corrols of Lichfield one 2 E. 6. the other 2 3 Phil. Mar. The Question upon the Indenture of 2 E. 6. was Whether the Grant upon the Habendum be a grant of a Freehold to begin at a day to come or not The chief Justice Justice Crooke and Justice Barckley were clear of Opinion That it was a grant of a Freehold to begin at a day to come And for that the Case is thus In the Indenture of 2 E. 6. there is a recital of a former Lease for years And by this Indenture in 2 E. 6. another Lease was to begin after the first Lease determined the remainder in Fee to another And upon that the three Justices before were clear in their Judgments That it was a Grant of Freehold to begin at a day to come which without doubt is void 8 H. 7. 39 H. 6. and Bucklers case 3 Rep. And in 8 H. 7. the difference is taken betwixt the grant of a Rent in esse and Rent de novo A Rent de novo may be granted in futuro but not a Rent which is in being But Justice Iones in this Case was of Opinion That here is not any grant of a Freehold to begin at a day to come because in this case the Lease doth begin presently because the Lease recited is not found by the Jury and therefore now it is all one as if there had been no Lease at all contrary in the case of the King because it passeth a good estate of Inheritance to the Grantee And therefore if I make a Lease for years unto a man after the expiration of such a Lease where in truth there is no such Lease in being the Lease shall begin presently The Question upon the Indenture of 2 3 P. Mar. was no more but this The Vicar and Subchauntors of Lichfield made a Grant of all their Tithes in Chesterton and name them in certain and in specie as Tithe-wool Tithe Geese Pigs Swans and the like and that in a distinct clause with especial Exception of four certain things After which came this clause All which were in the Tenure of Margaret Pâ—toe And the Jury sound that none of these Tithes were in hâ—r Tenure And whether that Grant were void or not was the Question And resolved by the whole Court nullo contradicente That the Grant notwithstanding this fallâ— reciâ—al was good For these reasons But first it was resolved That where they grant all their Tithes in Chesterton that it is a good grant and hath sufficient and convenient certainty 13 E. 4. and â—â—â—lands Case There are two Generalities 1. Absolute 2. Genâ—â—al in particular â—o here And in our Case it is as câ—râ—ain that demand in an Action may be for them by the name of all their Tithes in Chesterton So in the like manner an Action of Ejectione firme will lie For an Ejectione firme will 〈◊〉 for Tithes as it hath been adjudged here If the King grant all his Lands it is altogether incertain and void but if the King grant all his Lands in Dale or which came to him by the dissolution of such an Abby it is good because it is a generalâ—y in particular And it was agreed that convenient certainty is sufficient And therefore it was said by Justice Iones That if I grant all my Rents in Dale which I have of the part of my Mother that he conceives the same to be good The first reason wherefore this grant shall be good notwithstanding the false recital was this because the words here All which c. are not words of denotation or restriction but of suggestion or affirmation and therefore shall not make void the Grant And here the difference was taken between the Case of a common person and of the King Suggestion which is false in the Case of the King makes the Patent void but contrary in the case of a common person And
therefore iâ— the King be deceived either in point of profit or in point of Title his Grant is void 9 H. 6. Where he is not deceived in point of profit he shall not avoid the Grant 26 H. 8. The second reason That a Deed ought to be construed Vt res magis valeat quam pereat 34 H. 6. A man having a Reversion deviseth his land in Manibus thereby the Reversion passeth 9 E 4. 42. Release of all Actions against Prior and Covent shall be construed and intended all Actions against the Prior only for an Action cannot be brought against the Covent Farther by this construction you would avoid this deed and by the Rule of Law the deed and words of every man shall be taken very strong against himself ut res magis valeat as is said before And it is against reason to conceive that it was the meaning of the parties that nothing should pass A third reason was because the grant was a distinct clause of it self And the words which were objected at the Bar to be restrictive were in another distinct clause and therefore shall not restrain that which was before for words restrictive ought to be continued in one and the same sentence Wherefore they having granted all their Tithes in Chesterton by one clause the false recital afterwards in another clause shall not make the grant void See 3 4 Eliz. Dyer in Wast 31 Eliz. the Lord Wenworths Case in the Exchequer upon this Rule of distinct clauses And Atkins and Longs case in the Common Pleas upon which cases Justice Iones did rely The fourth reason was That construction ought to be made upon the whole Deed And it appeareth by the context of the Deed That it was the meaning of the parties to grant the Tithes by the Deed. Further the Exception of the four things sheweth That it was the meaning of the parties to grant all things not excepted as the Tithes in this Case For exceptio firmat Regulam And to what purpose should the Exception be if they did not intend to pass all other things not excepted See 4 Car. Hâ—skins and Trâ—ncars Case Sir Robert Napwiths Case 21 Iac. cited by the chief Jâ—â—tice to that purpose Wherefore it was agreed by the whole Court that Judgment should be given for the Defendant And the Opinion of the Court was clear also That although some of the Tithes had been in the Tenure of Margaret Petâ—e that yet the grant was good And that was after Argument upon the Demurrer to avoid all scruples to be after made by Counsel because it was conceived That some of the Tithes were in her Tenure Crisp against Prat in Ejectione firme 67. THe Case upon the four Statutes of Bankrupts viz. 34 H. 8. 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. and 21 Iac. was thus Ralph Brisco 9 Iac. purchased Copyhold to him and his Son for their lives the Remainder to the Wife in Fee 11 Iac. he became an Inholder and about twelve years after a Commission of Bankrupt is obtained against him And thereupon the Copyhold-land is sold by the Commissioners to the Defendant Ralph Brisco dieth and his Son Iohn Brisco entred and made the Lease to the Plaintiff The Defendant entred upon him and he brought an Ejectione firme And Judgment was given upon solemn argument by the Justices for the Plaintiff The first point was Whether an Inholder be a Bankrupt within these Statutes And it was resolved by all the Justices viz. Iones Crook Barckley and Bramstone chief Justice that an Inholder quatenus an Inholder is not within these Statutes Justice Barckley and Justice Iones one grounded upon the special Verdict the other upon the Statutes did conceive That an Inholder in some cases might be within these Statutes Justice Barckley did conceive upon this special Verdict that this Inholder was within them because it is â—ound That he got his living by buying and selling and using the Trade of an Inholder And he conceived upon these words Buying and selling in the verdict and getting his living thereby although that the Jury have also found him an Inholder that the same is within the Law And he agreed That he who liveth by buying or selling and not by both is not within the Law but in our case the Jury have found both And it hath been adjudged That he who buys and sells cattle and stocks his ground with them that he may be a Bankrupt within those Statutes I agree that a Scrivener was not within 13 Eliz. for he doth not live by buying and selling but by making use of the monies of other men but now he is within 21 Iac. But in our case the Inholder buys his grass hay and grains and provision also for his Guests and by selling of them he lives But he agreed That if the Jury had found that he was an Inholder only and not that he did get his living by buying and selling that in that case he was out of the Law And for these reasons he did conceive That this Inholder as by the special Verdict is found was within the Statutes of 13 Eliz. and 21 Iacobi Justice Iones An Inholder may be or not be within these Laws upon this difference That Inholder who gets his living meerly by buying and selling as many of the Inholders here in London do they are within these Statutes But those who have Lands of their own and have hay and grain and all their provisions of their own as many have in the Country those are not within the Statutes Farther he said That buying and selling doth not make men within these Statutes for then all men should be within the Statutes but they ought to be meant of them who gain the greatest part of their living thereby and live chiefly or absolutely thereby But Bramston chief Justice and Justice Crook were clear of Opinion that an Inholder could not be a Bankrupt neither by the Statutes nor according as it is found by the special Verdict And their reason was because that an Inholder doth not live by buying and selling for he doth not sell any thing but utter it He which sells any thing doth it by way of contract but an Inholder doth not contract with his Guests but provides for them and cannot take unreasonable rates as he who sells may and if he doth he may be Indicted of Extortion which the seller cannot Wherefore they concluded that an Inholder is not within the Statute of 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. Justice Crook remembred these Cases Webb an Inholder of Vxbridge brewed in his house and sold his Beer to his Guests And it was adjudged in the Exchequer that it was not within the Statute of Brewers And Bedells Case who being a Farmer bought and sold cattle and adjudged that he was not a Bankrupt within these Statutes And he put thâ—se cases upon this reason That where the Statutes said Get their living by buying and selling that it ought to bâ—â—or the greater part that they gain
the greater part of their living thereby And he said that if a Gentleman buy and sell Land he is not within the Statutes for it ought to be taken those who buy and sell personal things The second point It was agreed by all that Copyhold is within the Statute of 13 Eliz. 1 Iac. First because it is no prejudice to the Lord because there ought to be composition with the Lord and the Vendee And although the sale ought to be by Indenture yet the Vendee ought to be admitted by the Lord. And the difference in Heydons case in 3 Rep. was agreed Secondly It is expresly within 13 Eliz. and therefore within 1 Iac. also by way of recital although the Statute of 1 Iac. hath new provisions And by the Statute of 21 Iac. it was said That these Statutes shall be construed most beneficial for the Creditors because their ground is suum cuique tribuere 5 Eliz. Dyer Vmpton and Hides Case The Acts of Explanation shall be taken most beneficial and liberally And the Statute of 13 Eliz. says expresly That the Commissioners shall dispose of Lands as well Copy as Free But although a Copyhold be not within the later part of 13 Eliz. expresly yet by connexion it is And the Statute of 13 Eliz. guides the Statutes 1 21 Iacobi Justice Iones did agree That the Copyhold is within 13 Eliz. but not the person of the Copyholder although the person be within 1 Iac. And the chief Justice said That his Opinion was that upon the Statute of 21 Iac. which is That these Statutes shall he taken liberally that Copyholds although they had not been named had been within these Statutes It was said by Justice Barckley who argued for the Defendant That the verdict hath not found within 13 Eliz. because the verdict hath not found fraud expresly but badges only thereof See Meriel Littletons Case in the Chancellor of Oxfords Case That the Fraud ought to be expresly found but so it is not here for here it is found that the Son was an Infant at the time of the purchase and also that the purchase was with the mony oâ— the Father which are only inducements of Fraud But he argued it was within 1 Iac. because the Father hath caused oâ— procured this conveyance to his child as the Statute speaks And here is Fraud apparent Et quod constat clarè non debâ—verificari And therefore if a man enfeoff his Son it is Fraâ—â— apparent ought not to be found particularly But it was resolved by all the other Justices That here was not fraud apparent and therefore it ought to be found by the Jury The third and chief point in this Case was He being no Inholder at the time of the purchase and afterwards becoming an Inholder whether he were within the Statute of 13 Eliz. And it was resolved he was not But here Justice Barckley who argued for the Defendant was against it And he argued that if a man purchase and sell and afterwards become a Tradesman and Bankrupt that that was not within the Statute but if he keepeth the Land in his hands there he conceived him within the Statute as it was in this case And he was against the Book of the Chancellor of Oxfords Case of relation to devest the Advowson and he said It is not like to the Case in 6 7 Eliz. there cited Iâ— Eriches Case in the 5 Rep. there is a Rule taken that A verbis legis non est recedendum and in our Case it is within the express words of the Statute which are That if any person which hereafter shall become a Bankrupt c. And here he after became a Bankrupt But it was resolved by the others with whom Justice Barckley did concur after that it was not within the Statute Justice Crook argued That it is not within the words of the Statute which are If the offender purchase and that the sale shall be good against the offender and here he was not offender at the time of the purchase and using no Trade shall he be punished for that after Besides here the soâ— should be punished for the offence of the Father which the Law of God will not suffer Smith and Cullamers Case 2 Rep. he ought to be endebted at the time otherwise he is no offender And he might give away his goods before he was in Debt And the mischief here will be That Lands purchased 40 years before should thereby be defeated And I hold that it a man ba a Tradesman and afterwards leaves his Trade and thâ—n purchaseth and afterwards becomes a Tradesman again and a Bankrupt that he is not within the Statute But Justice Iones was of opinion that iâ— he be a Tradesman at the time although not an offender yet he is within the Statute But the chief Justice did argue that he ought to be an offender and the thing which makes him to be an offender is his intent to defraud his creditors Iones It shall be hard in this Case to cause the estate to be reached by this Statute for perhaps it was for the marriage of the son and perhaps the son might sell it and after the father become Bankrupt it would be hard to void the sale The Chancellor of Oxfords case was a stronger case for there the party was Indicted And if a man be Accomptant to the King and afterwards sell yet the sale shall be avoided by the King But if he be not accomptant and â—ellâ—th and afterwards becomes Accomptant the sale shall not be defeated And here he became Inholder after the purchase and being a clear man at the time of the purchase he shall not now be within the Statute Chief Justice If that should be permitted all things which the party did should be defeated and therefore he agreed That although he be a Tradesman yet if he be not in debt if he purchase for another or give unto another if no fraud be found it is not within the Statutes And Judgment accordingly was given for the Plaintiff Young against Fowler 68. YOung brought an Action upon the Case against Fowler for disturbing of him to execute the Office of Register to the Bishop of Rochester and upon Not guilty pleaded the Jury gave a special verdict They found that the Office was granted by one Bishop to one for life which was confirmed by the Dean Chapter which Bishop died and afterwards Iohn Young was created Bishop And then they found that the Office was grantable in Reversion time out of mind c. And that Iohn Young Bishop did grant the said Office of Register to Iohn Young his son now Plaintiff in Reversion And that the Office was to be executed by the said Iohn Young or his Deputy which Iohn Young the son was but of the age of 11 years at the time of the Grant but they found that he was of full age before the Tenant for life died And then they found that Iohn Young
which agrees 11 Rep. Auditor Curles Case The 5 Question Whether it be within the Statute of 1 Eliz. And I hold it is not because that must take effect from the time of the granting of it as the Statute speaks 6. I conceive it is not a necessary Grant because it is not within the exception of the Statute Et exceptio firmat Regulam It was objected That Usage makes these Grants good I conceive the contrary That Usage is not a Rule to measure a thing whether it be convenient or not And a grant may be good which is not used And the Courts of Justice ought to judge what is convenient or necessary and what not So in Litt. and the Commentaries Say and Smiths case Besides it is not Necessary for he stands but for a Cypher and doth nothing and therefore not Necessary Besides it is inconvenient and takes from the Successor honorem munificentiae for by the same reason that he may grant one he may grant all the Offices in Reversion so as his Successors shall not have one to grant and by this means shall take away a flower of the Bishoprick 10. Rep. 61. a. The Opinion of Popham Chief Justice An Office is not Grantable in Reversion by the Bishop But the Court was clear of Opinion without Argument for the Plaintiff That the Grant is good Crooke he denied that such an Office is not grantable in Fee and instanced in the Ushers Office and Chamberlains of the Exchequer which are Judicial Offices and yet granted in Fee And it was denied that this is an Office of Judicature but Ministerial only To that which was objected That the Action doth not lie against an Infant It was answered That an Action upon the case doth lie against an Infant Executor an Action upon the Case will lie against an Infant for a Nusance or for words by the common Law And in our Case he shall forfeit his Office Anâ— Infant may be Executor in which greater confidence and trust is reposed and in our Case the Grant to an Infant is not void ab initio but voidable only upon contingent And 〈◊〉 conceive that if the usage will warrant it That he may grant all the Offices in Reversion and upon that difference depends the Opinion of Popham in the 10. Rep. for there it doth not appear that the Custom was to grant in Reversion And therefore it was not good Barckley The King may grant iâ— Reversion without any Custom 9 Eliz. Savages Case And there is no question but that Custom may make an Office grantable in Reversion in the case of a common person 1 H. 7. Crofts case Also the case of the Usher of the Exchequer granted in Fee And there is no question but a Judicial Office may be granted to one and his Heirs And the Office of Warden of the Fleet which is an Office of great trust is granted in Fee And as such Offices may descend to an Infant so a Feme covert may have such an Office for she may have a husband who may execute it and so an Infant may have a deputy 7 H. 6. There is a difference amongst Infants an Infant before the Statute of 10 Eliz. might have been Presented to a Benefice and he was Parson de facto So a meer Lay man but the same ought to be understood of an Infant who was of age of discretion A Prebâ—ndary was granted to Prideaux at the age of 3 years and was adjudged void because he was not of age of discretion but if he had been it had been good And I conceive that it is necessary and convenient that it should be granted in Reversion for by that means the Office would never be vacant and should be always provided of those who were sufficient to execute it So in our Case the Infant may be instructâ—d before he come of full age And farther as an Infant when he is Presented is to be allowed or disallowed by the Ordinary so the Deputy is by the Court The Statute of 1 El. makes against you for although it be not within it yet it may be good at the common Law like the concurrent Lease which is good at the common Law and not within the Statute of 1 Eliz. The rest of the Justices did all agree with Barckley And Justice Iones said that Scamblers Case cited by my Lord Coke in Institutes 3. b. was adjudged contrary That an Infant was capable of a Stewardship in Reversion and he said that it was adjudged in the Exchequer that an Ignorant man was capable of an Office in Reversion which doth not differ from our Case Sir John Saint-Johns Case 69. THe Lady Cromwell was possessed of divers Leases and conveyed them in trust and afterwards married with the said Sir Iohn Saint-Iohn and afterwards she received the mony which came of the trust and with part of it she bought Jewels and part she left in Mony and died And Sir Iohn Saint-Iohn took Letters of Administration of the goods of the Wife And the Ecclesiastical Court would make him accomptable for the Jewels and for the Mony and to put them into an Inventory And the Opinion of the Court was That he should not put them into the Inventory because the property is absolutely in the husband he hath them not as Administrator but things in action he shall have as Administrator and shall be accomptable for them and in that case a Prohibition was granted as to the Mony It was moved again this Term That the Lady Saint-Iohn did receive part of the Mony put it out and took Bonds for it in the names of others to her use and the Spiritual Court would have him accompt for that and thereupon a Prohibition was prayed but the Court would not grant it And there Barckley differed in Opinion and so did the Court some being for it and some against it The reason given wherefore the Prohibition should not be granted was because the Mony received upon the trust is in Law the Monies of the Trustees and the wife hath no remedy for it but in Court of Equity and therefore that the husband should have it as Administrator The reason urged wherefore the Prohibition should be granted was because here the trust was executed when the wife had received the Mony and by the Receipt the husband had gained property therein as husband and therefore should not be accomptable for it Farther here the Ecclesiastical Court should determine the trust of which they have no Jurisdiction for they have not a Court of Equity And the Court ruled That the Counsel should move in Chancery for a Prohibition for in Equity the mony did belong to the wife And here it was agreed That if the Trustees consent that the wife shall receive the mony as in our Case the contrary doth not appear that there the husband might gain a property as husband but because the Court conceived that the Ecclesiastical Court had not Jurisdiction a Prohibition was
granted And here it was agreed That if a woman do convey a Lease in trust for her use and afterwards marrieth that in such case it lies not in the power of the husband to dispose of it and if the wife die the husband shall not have it but the Executor of the wife and so it was said it was resolved in Chancery 70. Barckley and Crooke there being no other Justice at that time in Court said That upon a Petition to the Archbishop or any other Ecclesiastical Court no Prohibition lieth But there ought to be a Suit in the Ecclesiastical court And by them a Libel may be in the Ecclesiastical court for not repairing a way that leadeth to Church but not for repairing of a high-way and upon suggestion that the Libel was for repairing a high-way a Prohibition was granted 71. Many Indictments were exhibited severally against several men because each by himself suffered his door to be unrepaired and it was shewed in the Indictments that every one of them ought to repair And thereupon it was moved that they might be quashed but the Court would not quash them without certificate that the parties had repaired their doors but it was granted that Process should be stayed upon motion of Counsel that reparation should be immediately done But at the same time many Indictments for not repairing of the high-way which the Parishioners ought to have repaired according as it was found by Verdict the same Term were quashed for the same defect But in truth there was another fault in the Indictment for that it was joynt one only whereas there ought to have been several Indictments but they were quashed for the first defect 72. A Replevin was brought in an Inferiour Court and no Pledges de retorno habendo were taken by the Sheriff according to the Statute of West 2. c. 2. After the Plaint was removed into this Court by a Recordari and after Verdict given it was moved in arrest of Judgment want of Pledges for thâ—se reasons because the Pledges de retorno habendo are given by that Statute as 2 H. 6. 15. and 9. H. 6. 42. b. And that Statute saith That Pledges shall be taken by the Sheriff and therefore no other can take them notwithstanding that Pledges might be found here in Court And 3 H. 6. 3. and F. N. B. 72. a. say That where Pledges are found that they shall remain notwithstanding the removal of the Plaint by Recordari and the reason is because the Sheriff is a special Officer chosen to that purpose by the Statute and therefore no other can take them Besides there would be a failer of Justice if the Court should put in Pledges for then there might be no remedy against the Sheriff for that he found no Pledges and no remedy against the Pledges because they are not found according to the Statute and so a failer of Justice and by that means the Sheriff should frustrate and avoid the Statute for no Pledges should ever be found and so he should take advantage of his own laches and wrong Farther it was objected that these proceedings are the judicial act of the Court and therefore the Court will not alter or diminish them L. Entries 1. and 3 H. 6. And farther it was said That the cases of Young and Young and Dr. Hussies case adjudged in this Court That Pledges may be found at any time before Judgment were in Action upon the Case and not in Replevine as our case is for which there is special Provision made by the Statute But it was answered and agreed by the whole Court that Pledges may be found by this Court for the Pledges given by the Statute of West 2. are only to give remedy against the Sheriff and if the Sheriff do not his duty but surceaseth we may as at the Common Law put in Pledges and yet notwithstanding remedy may be against the Sheriff upon the Statute for his neglect And farther it was agreed That Pledges may be found at any time before Judgment as in Young and Youngs Case and Dr. Hussies Case it was adjudged And Judgment was affirmed 73. There can be no second Execution granted out before that the first be returned 74. Two Joyntenants of a Rectory agree with some of their Parishioners that they shall pay so much for Tithes and notwithstanding one of thâ—m sueth for Tithes in the Ecclesiastical court and a Prohibiâ—ion was prayed because that one of them cannot sue without the other and the Court would not grant it and their reason was because although that one of them cannot sue without the other by our Law yet perhaps the spiritual Court will permit it 75. Husband and Wife brought a Writ of conspiracie and it was adjudged that it would not lie And Iones cited this case That Husband and Wife brought an Action upon the Case against another for words viz. That the Husband and Wife had bewitched another and it was not good because that the wife cannot joyn for Conspiracie made against the husband nor for trespass of Battery as the Book is 9 E. 4. But Justice Crook was of Opinion That the Conspiracie would well lie because that the Indictment was matter of Record and therefore not meerly Personal but the whole Court was against him and Justice Barckley took the difference where they sue for Perâ—onal wrong done to thâ—m there they shall not joyn but wherâ— they have a joynâ— Interest as in case of a Quare impedit there they shall joyn Thurston against Ummons in Error to Reverse a Iudgment in Bristow 76. THurston brought an Action upon the Case against Vmmons declared That the Defendant brought an Action against him at the Suit of Hull without his privity And thereupon did arrest and imprison the Plaintiff by reason whereof all his Creditors came upon him and thereby that he had lost his Credit c. And a Verdict was found for the Plaintiff and thereupon Error brought and two Errors were alledged 1. That the Action will not lie because in truth there was a just Debt due to Hull in whose name he sued 2. Because it is not shewed that the causes of Actions which the other Creditors had against him did arise within the Jurisdiction of the Court of Bristow And notwithstanding the first Error alledged Judgment was affirmed by the whole Court upon this difference where Hull himself sueth or commenceth Suit against the Plaintiff there although by that Suit he draw all the Creditors upon the back of him and so perhaps undo him yet because it was a lawful act no Action upon the Case lieth against him But where one commenceth Suit against another in the name of another and without his privity that is Maintenance which is a tortious Act and therefore an Action will lie so in the principal case As to the second Error alledged the Court differed in Opinion Barkley That the damages were ill assessed because they were given aswel for
killed B. inter horam decimam undecimam was adjudged to be naught And he took many exceptions all which were disallowed by the Court. For which cause Sir Matthew prayed his Clergy and had it Pasch. 17º Car. in the Common Pleas. Weeden against Harden 128. CUstome to pay Tithes in kinde for Sheep if they continue in the Parish all the year but if they be sold before shearing-time but an half-penny for every one so sold. And custome in the same Parish also to pay no Tithes of Loppings or Wood for fire or Hedges c. The first is an unreasonable custom for by such means the Parson shall be defeated of his Tithes But the last custom is good by the whole Court Sir Edward Powells Case 119. THe Lady Powell sued Sir Edward Powell her husband in the High Commission Court for Alimony Whereupon a Prohibition was prayed in this Court and granted Serjeant Clark who argued for the Prohibition The Spiritual Court cannot meddle with any thing which is not redressable by them they may compel a man tractare uxoreâ— or Divorce them but not grant Alimony which doth appertain to the Judges of the Common Law 7 8 H. 3. there is a Writ directed to the Sheriff to set out reasonable Estoverâ— for the Alimony of the wife President since the Statute of 1 Eliz. where Prohibitions have been granted in this Case viz. Sir William Chenyes Case Mich ' 8 Iac. in Comm ' Banâ—â— who committed Adultery and was separated and the wiâ—e sued for Alimony and a Prohibition granted P. 8 Iac. A Prohibition granted And by the Statute of 1 Eliz. they have not power to hold Plea of Alimony The words of the Statute are Reform Redress c. And it is not apt to say that Alimony shall be Reformed or Redressed And besides Alimony is a Temporal thing and chargeth a mans Inheritance and therefore they shall not intermeddle with it Serjeant Rolls contrary She may sue for Alimony in the Ecclesiastical Court but if they proceed to Fine or Imprisonment then a Prohibition lieth They have power of Separation which is the principal and therefore of Alimony which is Incident And the High Commission have the same power given to them by the Statute of 1 Eliz. as the Spiritual Court hath and therefore they may meddle with Alimony And where it was before objected The great inconvenience to the party by the citing him out of his Diocess for by that he should lose the advantage of his Appeal Rolls said It was good for any within the Province and that is the Court of the Province Banks Chief Justice Although that there be Presidents that the High Commission have hoâ—den Plea of Alimony and granted the same yet it was not Law And although though that Alimony be expressed in their Commission that doth not make it Law if it be not within the Statute As to the citing out of the Diocess he conceived the Commission should be useless if they might not do it and therefore he granted a Prohibition Crawly Reeve and Foster Justices agreed But they doubted whether the citing out of the Diocess were good or not for the great prejudice which might ensue to the party in losing his Appeal And in answer to the Objection of Rolls the Chief Justice said That the Ecclesiastical Court had not Jurisdiction of Alimony but if they had yet all the Jurisdiction of the Spiritual Court is not given to the High Commission by the Statute of 1 Eliz. And they all agreed That they might as well charge my Land with a Rent-charge as grant Alimony out of it and a Prohibition was granted 130. No Sequestration can be granted by a Court of Equity until the Proces of contempt are run out And by Reeve and Foster Justices The granting of Sequestration of things â—â—llateral as of other Lands or Goods is utterly illegal 131. Whereas upon Suggestion of a Modus decimandi a Prohibition was granted now a Consultation was prayed as to Offerings and granted because the Modus c. doth not go to the personalty 132. Upon a Jury retorned a stranger who was not one of the Jury caused himself to be sworn in the name of one who was of the Jury And he against whom the Verdict passed moved the Court for a new Trial upon that matter But the Court would not give way to it because it appeareth to them that he is sworn upon Record But all the Court agreed that he might be Indicted for that Misdemeanour and by Reeve and Foster Justices the parties may have an Action upon the Case against him 133. It was taken for a Rule by the Court That no Amendment should be after a Verdict without a consent 134. Trover and Conversion against husband and wife and declared that they did convert ad usum corum The Jury found the wise not guilty And by the Court this naughty Plea is made good by the Verdict Sir Richard Greenfields Case in the Kings Bench. 135. THou innuendo Captain Greenfield hast received mony of the King to buy new Saddles and hast coâ—sened the King and bought old Saddles for the Troopers Tâ—ver It is not actionable 8 Car. The Mayor of Tivertoâ— case One said of him That the Mayer had cousened all hâ—â— Brethren c. not actionable 9 Iac. in the Kings Bench Thaâ— the Overseers of the Poor had cousened the poor of their Bread not actionable 26 Eliz. in the Kings Bench Kerby and Wallers case Thou art a false Knave and hast cousened my twâ— Kinsmen not actionable K. is a cousening Knave not actionable 18 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. Serjeant Fenner hath cousened me and all my Kindred is not actionable Words are actionable either in respect of themselves or in relation to the person of whom they are spoken where Liberty is infringed the Estate impaired or Credit defamed there they aâ— actionable Mich. 29 H. 8. Rot. 11. Villain is not actionable Morgan and Philips case That he is a Scot actionable because he is an Alien born Hill 1. Car. in Com. Ban. Siâ— Miles Fleetwoods case Mr. Receiver hath cousened the King actionable in respect of his Office of Receivership And seâ— it was afterwards adjudged upon Error brought in the Kings Bench. If these words had been spoken of the Kings Saddler they had been actionable for thereby he might lose his Office but there is no such prejudice in our case and he is of another Imployment and is but for a time only But by Heath Justice and Bramston Chief Justice the words are actionable for it is not material what imployment he hath under the King if he may lose his imployment or trust thereby And it is not material whether the imployment be for life or years c. 136. A Lawyer who was of Counsel may be examined upon Oath as a Witness to the matter of Agreement not to the validity of an assurance or to matter of Counsel And in examining of a Witness Counsel
cannot question the whole life of the Witness as that he is a Whoremaster c. But if he hath done such a notorious fact which is a just exception against him then they may except against him That was Onbies case of Grays-Inn and by all the Judges it was agreed as before And by Reeve Justice If a Counsellor say to his Client that such a Contract is Simony and he saith he will make it Simony or not Simony And thereupon the Counsellor that a Simoniacal Contract it is no offence in the Counsellor Pasch. 17º Car. in the Kings Bench. 137. PRescription to have Common for all his cattle Commonable is not good for thereby he may put in as many beasts as he will But a Prescription to have Common for his cattle commonable levant and couchant is a good Prescription And it was said that that was Sayes case of the County of Lincoln adjudged in this Court 138. In Tompson and Hollingsworths case it was agreed That a Court of Equity cannot meddle with a cause after it hath received a lawful Trial and Judgment at the Common Law although that the Judgment be surreptitious 139. The Statute of 31 Eliz. enacts That if a man be presented admitted instituted and inducted upon a Simoniacal contract that they shall be utterly void c. Whether the Church shall be void without deprivation or sentence declaratory in the Spiritual Court or not was the Question in a Quare impedit brought by Sir Iohn Rowse against Ezechiel Wright Rolls and Bacon Serjeants That it is absolutely void without sentence declaratory c. Where the Statute makes a thing void it shall be void according to the words of the Statute unless there shall be inconvenience or prejudice to him for whom the Statute was made The Statute of 8 H. 6. cap. 10. That an utlagary shall be void if process do not issue to the place where the party is dwelling yet it is not void before Errour brought The Statutes of 1 Eliz. 31 Eliz. That all Leases by a Bishop not warranted c. shall be void They are not void but voidable only which agreeth with the reason of the Rule given before The Statute of 18 H. 6. 6. That if the King grant Lands by Patent not found in the Office that the Patent shall be void it is void presently M. 30 H 6. Grants 92. and Stamford 61. although they be matter of Record The Statute of 31 Eliz. is expresly that it shall be void frustrate and of none effect therefore by the Rule before given it shall be absolutely void M. 10 Iac. Stamford and Dr. Hutchinsons case Resolved that an Incumbent presented by Simony cannot sue for Tythes against his Parishioners a villain purchaseth an Advowson the Church becomes void the Lord presents by Simony and the Clark is admitted Institute and Inducted yet it is void and doth not gain the Advowson to the Lord. Institut 120 a. If an Incumbent take a second Benefice the first is meerly void 4 Rep. Hollands Case The difference is where it is of the value of 8 l. where not And there is difference betwixt avoidance by Statute and avoidance by the Ecclesiastical Law Avoydance is a thing of which the Common Law takes notice and shall be tried by Jury if it be avoydance in fact if an avoydance in Law by the Judges If a Parson doth not read the Articles according to the Statute of 13 Eliz. it is ipso facto void without sentence 6 Rep. 29. Greens case 30 Eliz. Eatons case Instit. 120. a. express in the point And the difference is that before the Statute of 31 Eliz. it was only voidable by deprivation but now by the Statute it is absolutely void Mich. 9 Iac. Cobbert and Hitchins case Mich. 42 Eliz. Baker and Rogers case 2 Iac. Goodwins case in Com' Banc. in all which cases it was not resolved but passed tacitely and without denial That a Presentation by Simony was void without declaratory Sentence It was objected that it is clear by the Ecclesiastical Law it is not void without a Sentence declaratory It is answered Of things of which our Law and the Ecclesiastical Law take conusance we are only to relie upon our Law and not upon the Ecclesiastical Law especially when the Ecclesiastical is repugnant or contrary to our Law as in this Case it is The Judges of the Common Law shall judge the Church void or not void Fitz. Annuity 45. 12 13 Iac. in the Kings Bench Hitchin and Glovers case in an Ejectione firme In this case it was resolved That if I. S. marry two wives the Judges of the Common Law may take conusance of it yet marriage is meerly an Ecclesiastical thing It was objected That the first branch of the Statute of 31 Eliz. that it shall be void c. Secondly that it shall be void as if he were naturally dead c. So that the adding of these words as if he were naturally dead in the later clause prove that it was the meaning of this Statute that it should not be void in the first case without Sentence declaratory It is answered There is a difference in words not in substance or the intent qui haeret in litera c. Iermin and Taylor Serjeants That it is not void before Sentence c. First Admission Institution and Induction are Judicial acts and done by the Bishop and therefore shall not be void before an act done to make them void which is Sentence declaratory or deprivation Secondly the Statute of 31 Eliz. saith it shall be void not that it is c. Thirdly the Ecclesiastical Lâ—w is That no Presentation c. shall be void before Sentence c. Fourthly the Ecclesiastical Law is Judge of it c. Plenarty shall be tried by the Bishop not by Jury 6 Rep. 49. a. Refusal shall not be tried by Jury but Death shall 5 Rep. 57. 9 H. 7. Profession shall be tried by the Spiritual Court 4 Rep. 71. b 4. vid. 4. Rep. 29. a. the credit which our Law gives to the Ecclesiastical Law It is there put That one was divorced without his knowledge which was said to be a strange case Fifthly the Presentee by Simony doth remain Incumbent de facto although not de jure and that by the words of the Statute which makes the Church void as to the King only not as to the Incumbent without declaratory Sentence and the Church is no more capable to have two Incumbents than a woman to have two husbands There is a difference where the Incumbent presented by Simony is alive the same is not void in facto without sentence declaratory but if he be dead there itis And this difference stands upon the two clauses in the Statute of 31 Eliz. And the Statute of 17 Car. of Election of Burgesses taken notice of Avoidance de facto de jure Trinit 16 Car. in Com. Banc. Ogelbics case One was Presented within the age oâ— twenty
the Kings Bench an Ejectione firme was brought for the Gate-house of Westminster and the Jury found the Defendant guilty for so much as is between such a room and such a room and adjudged good and here it is as uncertain as in our case Mich. 19 Iacobi Smalls case in Hobarts Rep. The Jury in an Ejectione firme found the Defendant guilty of a third part and good Mallet Serjeant that the Verdict is uncertain and therefore not good And it is not sufficient that the certainty appear to the Jury for it behooveth that certa res deducatur in judicium Institut 227. a. 3. E. 3. 23. b. 18 E. 3. 49. 40 E. 3. 5 Rep. Playtors case Secondly here is no certainty for the Sheriff to give execution for so much in length or in breadth that is quod stat super ripam doth not appear And thirdly thereupon great inconvenience will arise that no attaint will lie upon such uncertain Verdict so as the defendant shall be without remedy and the whole Court except Justice Crawley Banks Reeve and Foster did resolve that the Verdict was insufficient for the incertainty and all agreed That there is great difference betwixt Trespass and Ejectione firme for such Verdict in Trespass may be good for there damages are only to be recovered but in an Ejectione firme the thing it self And their reason in this Case was That although the certainty may appear to the Jury yet that is not enough for they ought to give judgment oportet quod certa res deducatur in judicium And they agreed that if they had found him guilty of a Room it had been good and so the Cases on the Acre of Land and of the third part of a Mannor is good for those are sufficiently certain for of them the Law takes notice The Opinion of Crawley wherefore the verdict should be good was because the demand here was certain although the Jury found it in tanto c. And where there may be certain description for the Jury it is good enough and the rather because the Verdict is the finding of lay gents and he compared it to the case of the Gate-house aforesaid but he agreed that if the Writ of Ejectione firme had been brought de tanto unius messuagii c. quod stat super ripam that it would not have been good but the Verdict is good for the reason aforesaid But Justice Reeve said that that which is naught in the demand is naught in the Verdict and therefore naught in the judgment and therefore the Court would not give judgment and therefore a Venire facias de novo was prayed and granted by the Court. 169. Couch libelled against Toll ex officio in the Ecclesiastical Court for Incontinencie without a Citation or presentment and for that the Defendant was excommunicated and Gotbold prayed a Prohibition which was denied by Crawley and Reeve Justices the others being absent and it was said by Reeve That where they proceed ox officio a Citation is not needful but put case it were yet they said that no Prohibition is to be granted as this case is because that where the Ecclesiastical Court hath Jurisdiction although they proceed erroneously yet no Prohibition lieth but the remedy is by way of Appeal and there he shall recover good costs and it was said by Crawley That if the party be retorned cited and he is not cited That an Action upon the case lieth 170. A woman libelled in the Arches against another for calling of her Iade and a Prohibition was prayed and granted because the words were not defamatory and do not appertain unto them And Reeve said that for Whore or Bawd no Prohibition would lie but they doubted of Quean 171. Bacon Serjeant prayed a Prohibition to the Court of Requests upon this suggestion That one Executor sued another to accompt there and an Executor at the Common Law before the Statute of West 2. cap. 11. could not have an accompt for cause of privity and now by that Statute they may have an accompt but the same ought to be by Writ and therefore no accompt lieth in the Court of Requests Secondly they have given damages where no damages ought to be given in an Accompt And lastly they have sequestred other Lands which is against the Law and for these reasons he prayed a Prohibition Whitfield Serjeant contrary 1. It is clear that an accompt by Bill lieth for an Attorney in this Court and so in the Kings Bench and Exchequer and as to damages it is clear that in an accompt a man shall recovâ—â— damages upon the second judgment but as to the sequestâ—â—ion he could not say any thing but further he said That it was not an accompt but only a Bill of discovery against Trustees who went about to defeat an Infant and upon the reading of the Bill in Court it appeared that the suit was meerly for the breach of a trust and for a confederacie and combination which is meerly equitable Wherefore a Prohibition was denied because it was no accompt but as to the Decree for sequestring other Lands the Prohibition was granted Trin. 17º Car ' in the Kings Bench. 172. EAste brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against Farmer because that where the Plaintiff had sold to the Defendant so much wood the Defendant in consideration thereof did assume and promise to pay so much money to the Plaintiff and to carâ—â— away the wood before such a day the Defendant pleaded thâ— he paid the money at the day aforesaid but as to the carrying of it away before the day he pleaded non assumpsit and the Jury found that he did not pay the money at the day but as to the other they found that he did assume and promise as aforesaid and it was moved in Arrest of judgment that the finding of the Jury was naught for being but one Assumpsit and the same being an intire thing it could not be apportioned and therefore they ought to find the intire Assumpsit for the Plaintiff or all against him And the Court agreed all that and awarded that there should be a Repleader and the Chief Justice Bramston said That for the reason given before the Defendants plea was not good and therefore the Plaintiff might have demurred upon it which he hath not done and therefore they agreed that the Verdict was naught for the reason aforesaid 173. Williams was indicted at Bristow upon the Statute of 1 Iac. cap. 11. for having two wives and upon not Guilty pleaded the Jury found a special Verdict which was thus That the said Williamt married one wiâ—e and was afterwards divorced from her causa adulterii and afterwards married the other and if that were within the Proviso of that Statute which provides for those who are divorced was the Question And it was resolved without argument by Bramston Chief Justice and Heath Justice the other being absent That it is within the Proviso for the
pay to the Plaintiff such costs as shall be delivered by note of the Attorneys hand and it was here adjudged that there needs no averment because it was to be done by a stranger but otherwise it had been if it had been to be done by the Plaintiff himself and by the Justices the only question here is Whether the Attorney shall be taken for a stranger or not Justice Foster that the Defendant ought first to make his election which is to pay either the eight pound which is certain or the costs which shall be delivered by a note of the Attorney Besides here the Attorney is a stranger because the suit is ended and to the Defendant he is totally a stranger and therefore he ought to seek him to have the note delivered to him But notwithstanding he did conceive that as this Case is Judgment ought to be stayed because the Plaintiff hath not well entitled himself to the Action because he hath not averred that there were costs expended in such a suit and in the Case ciâ—ed by Rolls the Plaintiff did aver the costs incertain Justice Crawley it is without question the Defendant hath Election in this case but as this Case is he ought to have notice and if the Case had been such that the Plaintiff himself had been to have delivered the note then without question there ought to be notice and here the Attorney is no stranger but is a servant to the Plaintiff as every Attorney is And I conceive that if the Case had been that the Plaintiffs servant had been to deliver such a note that there notice ought to be given And for want thereof in this Case I conceive that the Judgment ought to be stayed Bankes Chief Justice I doubt upon the different Opinions of my Brethren whether Judgment ought to be stayed or not I agree that the Defendant hath Election in this Case and further I agree that where a thing is to be done by the Plaintiff or Dâ—fendant himself there notice ought to be given but otherwise in Case of a stranger and upon this difference stands our Books as 10 H. 7. and all our Books but the Question here is Whether the Attorney be a stranger or not and I conceive that it is not in the power of the Plaintiff to compel him to bring the note and is all one as a stranger and therefore the Defendant ought to seek the Attorney to deliver this unto him but the Case was adjourned because Justice Reeve was not present in Court 187. A. said to B. Thou hast killed my Brother for which B. ought an Action upon the Case and by Serjeant Whitfield it will not lie because it is not averred that the Brother of the Defendant was dead at the time and if he were not dead then it is no slander because the Plaintiff is not in danger for it 4 Rep. 16. a. Snaggs Case Aâ—â— Serjeant Evers contrary because the words imply that he is dead and besides in the Innuendo it is also shewed that he was â—ead for that is the innuendo C. c. fratrem nuper mortuum But by the whole Court the words are not actionable without averment that he was dead and the Innuendo doth not help it Hobarts Rep. p. 8. Miles and Iacobs Case acc 188. A Frenchman had his Ship taken by a Dunkirk upon the Sea and before that it was brought infra praesidia of the King of Spain it was driven by a contrary wind to Waymouth and there the Dunkirk sold the Ship and Goods to a Lord in Waymouth whereupon the Frenchman having notice of his ship and goods to be there libelled in the Admiralty pro interesse suo against the Lord the Vendee of the Ship shewing that it was taken by Piracie and not by Letters of Mart as was pretended and thereupon a Prohibition was prayed and by Foster a Prohibition ought to be granted for whether the Dunkirk took it by Letters of Mart or as a Pirate it is not material the sale being upon the Land and infra corpus comitatus and so he said it was adjudged in such a case for whether the sale were good or not Non constat Justice Crawley conceived it should be hard that the sale being void if it were taken as a Pirate or by Letters of Mart not being brought infra prâ—sidia of the King of Spain that by this means you should take away the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty but he said he did conceive it more fit for the Frenchman to have brought a Replevin which he said lieth of a Ship or Trover and Conversion and so have had the matter found specially Bankes Chief Justice conceived that there should be a Prohibition otherwise upon such pretence that it was not lawful prize and by consequence the sale void you would utterly take away the Jurisdiction of the Common Law But because there was some misdemeanor in the Vendee the Court would not award a Prohibition but awarded that the buyer should have convenient time given him by the Court of Admiralty to find out the seller to maintain his Title and in the mean time that he give good caution in the Admiralty that if it be found against him that then he restore the ship with damages But note the Court did agree Justice Reeve only absent that if a ship be taken by Piracie or if by Letters of Mart and be not brought infra praesidia of that King by whose subject it was taken that it is no lawful prize and the property not altered and therefore the sale void and that was said by the Prâ—ctoâ— of the Frenchman to be the Law of the Admiralty Rudston and Yates Case 189. RVdston brought an Action of debt upon an Obligation against Yates for not performance of an Award according to the Condition of the Bond the Defendant pleaded that the Arbitrators Non fecerunt arbitrium upon which they were at issue and found for the Plaintiff and it was now moved in arrest of Judgment by Trevor that the Defendant was an Infant and therefore that the submission was void and by consequence the Bond which did depend upon it and he conceived the submission void First because it is a Contract and an Infant cannot contract and he took a difference betwixt acts done which are ex provisione legis and acts done ex provisione of the Infant an Infant may bind himself for his diet schooling and necessary apparel for that is the provision of the Law for his maintenance but a Bond for other matters or Contracts of other nature which are of his own provision those he cannot do Secondly an Arbitrator is a Judge and if an Infant should be permitted to make an Arbitrator he should make a Judge who by the Law is not permitted to make an Attorny which were against reason Thirdly it is against the nature of a Contract which must be reciprocally binding here the Infant should not be bound and the man of full
time or not The first hath been granted that there ought to be assent for the great inconvenience which might happen to Executors if Legatees might be their own carvers and so are all our Books except 2 H. 6. 16. and 27 H. 6 7. which seem to take a difference where the Legacie is given in certain and in specie there it may be taken without assent but where it is not given in certain there it cannot but he held clearly the Law to be otherwise that although it be given in certain yet the Legatee cannot take it without assent of the Executor for so the Executor should be subject to a Devastavit without any fault in him or any means to help himself which should be very inconvenient Then the second thing here to be considered is Whether there be an assent or not It is clear that if an Executor enter generally he shall be in as Executor and not as Legatee for that is best for him to prevent a Devastaviâ— and it is as clear that if he declare his intention to be in as Legatee that then he shall be so then the Question here is Whether the words in our Case be a sufficient declaration of the mind of the Executor to take the same as Legatee in the right of his wife or not and I hold that it is He agrees that the second words are not so weighty as the first but he held the first words are sufficient of themselves to make an assent and when he saith that then it remains to the Holloways that proves that he took notice thereof as a Legacie and that he would have it in that right although in truth the devise by Iohn Holloway was void so as it could not remain to them For the third he held that the assent came in due time otherwise it might be very prejudicial to Legatees for else by that means they may be many times defeated of their Legacies for put Case that an Executor will not assent and the Legatee dieth before he can compel him to assent or that the Legatee dieth in an instant after the devisor in the 5 Rep. Princes Case it is resolved that an Infant under 17 may not assent to a Legacie nor the administrator Durante minori aetate then put case that the Legatees die during the administration durante minori aetate in whose time there cannot be an assent It would be a vâ—ry great mischief if that in any of these Cases the Legatees should be defeated of their Legacies when by possibility they could not use any means to get them wherefore he held clearly that the assent of the Executor after the death of the Legatee came in good time and therefore he concluded for the Plaintiff Bramston Chief Justice also for the Plaintiff For the first point he held that there is a good assent and he said that Mannings Case hath the very words which our Case hath but my Lord Cooke did not speak of these words in the Report of the Case because he conceived that the payment of the money was a sufficient assent to the Legacie but further I conceive that it differs fully from Mannings Case for there it is found expresly that the Executor had not Assets and therefore it should be hard to make him assent by implication thereby to subject himself to a Devastavit for as I conceive an Executor shall never be made to assent by implication where it is found that he hath not Assets but there ought to be an express assent by reason of the great prejudice which might come unto him but in our Case it is not found that Lowe had not Assets an Infant cannot assent without Assets but if there be then it shall bind him and perhaps that was the reason that my Lord Coke did not report any thing of these words whether they were an assent or not and his passing over them without saying any thing of them seems partly to grant and agree that they did not amount to an assent A man deviseth unto his Executor paying so much and he payeth it it is a good assent to the Legacie so is Matthew Mannings case 8 Rep. and Plowden Comment Welâ—den and Elkingtons case and he said that an assent is a perfecting act which the Law favours and therefore he said that it was adjudged that where an Executor did contract with the devisee for an assignment of the Term to him devised that it was a good assent to the Legacie For the second point also he held clearly that the assent came in due time for otherwise it should be a great inconvenience for by that means it should be destructive to all Legacies for of necessity there ought to be an assent of the Executor and if he will not assent and the Legatee dieth before he can compel him to assent or if the Legatee dieth immediately after the Devisor before any assent to the Legacie in the first Case it should be in the power of the Executor who is a stranger to prejudice me and in the latter Case the Act of God should prejudice me which is against two Rules of Law that the Act of a stranger or the act of God shall not prejudice me wherefore without question the assent comes in due time Besides If a Legatee dieth before assent to a Legacie the same shall be assets in the hands of his Executors and the Legatee before assent hath an interest demandable in the Spiritual Court An Executor before probate shall not have an Action but he may release an Action because that the right of the Action is in him so in this Case although that the Legatee before assent hath not an interest grantable yet he hath an Interest releasable A man surrenders Copyhold-Land to the use of another and the surrenderee dieth before admittance yet his heir may be admitted and this Case is not like those Cases put at the Bar where there is but a meer possibility and not the least Interest as where the grantee of a reversion dieth before Attornment or the devisee before the devisor in those Cases the parties have but a meer possibility and therefore countermandable by death but it is otherwise in our Case as I have shewed before and therefore I conclude that here is a good assent and that in due time and therefore that the Ejectione firme brought by the Plaintiff well lieth Dale and Worthyes Case 212. DAle brought a Writ of Error against Worthy to reverse a Judgment given in the County-Palatine of Chester and the Writ of Error bore Teste before the Plaint there entred and whether the Record were removed by it or not was the Question and the Court viz. Mallet Heath and Bramston were clear of opinion without any solemn debate that the Record was not removed by that Writ of Error because that if there be not any plaint entred at the Teste of the Writ how can the Processus according to the Writ be removed
in Bar of this conusance or not Secondly admitting that he be inabled by the Statute to plead this plea whether the traverse be here welâ— taken or not To the first I hold that he is inabled by the Statute to take this traverse but for the second I hold clearly that the traverse is not well taken here the Plaintiff and Defendant are both strangers so as here is neither the very Lord nor the very Tenant And now I will consider what the Common Law was before the Statute it is clear that by the Common Law a stranger might plead nothing in discharge of the Tenancie nor could plead a release as the Books are 34 E. 3. Avowry 257. and 38 E. 3. Avowry 61. he could not plead rien arrere or levied by distress he could plead no Plea but hors de son fee or a Plea which did amount to so much I confess that the Book of 5 E. 4. 2. b. is that the Tenant in a Replevin could not plead hors de son fee but the Book of 28 H 6. 12. is against it True it is that in some special Case as where there is Covin or Collusion in the avowant there the Tenant shall set forth the special matter as it is in 9 Rep. 20. b. Now there are two Reasons given in our Books wherefore the Plaintiff in a Replevin being a stranger could not plead in Bar of the Avowry The first is that the Seignory being in question it is matter of privity betwixt the Lord and the Tenant The second that the Law doth allow unto every man his proper plea which is proper to his Case and that he ought to plead and no other as appeareth by the Books 12 Ass. p. 2. 13 H. 8. 14. 2. H. 7. 14. 13 H. 7. 18. Lit. 116. 35 H. 6. 13. 45 E. 3. 24. Now seeing that the Plaintiff being a stranger could not plead this Plea at the Common Law the Question now is Whether he be inabled by the Statute to take this Plea or not the words of the Statute are That the Plaintiff and Defendant shall have the like Pleas and Aid-prayer as at the Common Law and therefore it was objected that it doth not give any new Plea true it is that by the express words thereof that it gives not any new Plea but yet I conceive that any stranger is enabled to plead any plea in discharge of the Conusance by the equity of this Statute at the Common Law avowry was to be made upon the person and therefore there was no reason that the Plaintiff being a stranger should plead any thing in Bar of the Avowry of Conusance but now the Statute enables the Lord to avow upon the Land not naming any person certain it is but justice and equity that the Plaintiff should be inabled to plead any thing in discharge of it I compare this Case to the Case in the 3 Rep. fol. 14. Harberts Case where it is resolved that sâ—ossce of a Conusor of a Statute being only charged may draw the other in to be equally charged and if execution be sued against him only that he may discharge himself by Audita querela for so much 8 E. 4. 23. a. there the Defendant avowed for a rent-charge the Plaintiff shewed how that one E. leased the Land to him and prayed in aid of him and resolved that he should not have aid because the avowry is for Rent-charge so as thâ— Plaintiff might plead any plea that he would in dischâ—â—ge of the land now by the same reason where the lands of the Plaintiff were charged with a rent-charge he might at the common Law have pleaded any thing in discharge of his land by the same reason where there is an avowry upon the Land according to the Statute the land being charged the Plaintiff may plead any thing in discharge thereof and this is my first reason My second reason is that this Law hath been construed be equity for the benefit of the Lord and therefore it shall be construed by equity for the benefit of the Tenant also Instit. 286. b. My third reason is Although the Plaintiff be a stranger and claimeth no interest in the Land yet for the saving of his goods he may justifie this plea I may plead an assault upon another who endeavoreth to take away my goods and I may justifie maintenance where it is in defence of my interest as it appeareth in 15 H. 7. 2. and 34 H. 6. 30. Fourthly and lastly upon the authorities in Law after the making of this Statute I conceive that the Plaintiff may well take the Plea 27 H. 8. 4. The plaintiff prayed in aid of a stranger and had it which could not be â—t the Common Law as appeareth by 3 H. 54. and 34 H. 6. 46. and many other Books and for Books in the point 34 H. 8. Petty Brooke 235. Institutes 268. 9 Rep. 36. Hobarts rep 150 151. Brown and Goldsmiths Case wherefore I hold that the Plaintiff may by the equity of the Statute plead this plea. But it was objected by my brother Reeve that by the Statute of 25 E 3. c. 7. It is enacted that the possessor shall plead in Bar and therefore the incumbent before induction cannot plead in Bar as it is resolved in 4 H. Dyer 8. 1. and 31 E. 3. Incumbt 6. and upon the same reason he conceived it should be hard in our Case that the Plaintiff who is but a stranger not taking upon him any estate should be admitted to plead this plea especially the Statute in this Case saying that the Plaintiff shall have the like pleas as at the Common Law To that I answer that by the Statute of 25 E. 3. it is enacted that the possessor shall plead in Bar and therefore clearly there he ought to shew that he is possessor otherwise he cannot plead in Bar and therefore not like to our Case and the Novel Entries 598 599. doth not make against it for there it was not upon the Statute and 26 H. 8. 6. is express that the Plaintiff being a stranger is enabled by the Statute of 21 H. 8. to take this plea Wherefore I conclude this point that the Plaintiff is inabled by the Statute to plead any thing in Bar of the avowry But for the second point I hold clearly that the traverse as it is here taken is not well taken it is only an equitable construction that the Plaintiff shall plead this plea as I have argued before and therefore he ought to pursue the form of the Common Law in the form of his traverse which he hath not here done and therefore the traverse is not good and where the seism is not material there it is not traversable and in this Case the seisim of the fealty is not material for it is out of the Statute of Limitations and therefore not traversable and so is it in the Case of a gift in tail and grant of a Rent-charge it is
therefore I did not stick upon the Certiorare because what was done was by consent consensus tollit errorem if any be Now for the points as they arise upon the proceedings of the Commissioners and for the first I hold that the covenant doth well extend to this new wall and the making of it in the form of a horshooe is not material so as it be adjoyning to the land as it here was for that may be ordered according to their discretions it is a rule in Law that the covenant of every man ought to be construed very strong against himself and although that in this Case the new wall be not parcel of the premisses as it was at the time of the covenant because that the wall then in esse and to which the covenant did extend was a straight wall yet according to the words of the covenant this tax is towards the reparation of the premisses and if it should not extend to this new wall the covenant should be idle and vain and clearly the meaning of the parties was that it should extend to all new walls For the second point I hold the covenant although it be a collateral thing within their Jurisdiction true it is as it is said in 28 H. 8. that contracts are as private Laws betwixt party and party but you ought to know that their Commission gives them power to charge every man according to his tenure portion and profit and he who is bound by custom or prescription to repair such walls is not within the words of their Commission yet it is resolved in the 10 Rep. 139 140. in Kighleys case that the Commissioners may take notice of it and charge him only for the reparations where there is default in him and the danger not inevitable and by the same reason you may exclude this covenant to be out of their Jurisdiction you may exclude prescription also I agree that where the covenant is meerly collateral as if a man who is a stranger covenants to pay charges for repairing of such a wall that that is not within their Jurisdiction because he is a meer stranger and cannot be within their Commission but in our Case it is otherwise for the covenantor is occupier of the land and it hath been adjudged that if lands or chattels are given for the reparation of a Sea-wall that it is within their Jurisdiction and they may meddle with it that is as collateral as the covenant in question wherefore I hold that the covenant is within their Jurisdiction For the third point I hold that they may well charge the executor for the executor here hath the lease as executor but it was objected That the term is now determined and peradventure the executor hath not assets To that I answer that it is admitted that he hath assets for the Commissioners cannot know whether he hath assets or not and therefore he ought to have alledged the same before the Commissioners and because he hath not done it he hath lost that advantage and it shall be intended that he hath assets by not gain-saying of it Fourthly for the damages I first chiefly doubted of that but now I hold that it is within their Jurisdiction Put case that one in extreme necessity as in this Case disburse all the money for the reparations or the wall or Sea-bank if the Case had gone no further clearly he shall be repaid by the tax and levy after and I conceive by the same reason they have power to allow him damages and use for his mony for if it should not be so it would be very inconvenient for who would after disburse all the money to help that imminent danger and necessity if he should not be allowed use for his money and the Lessee here is only charged with the damages for the money collected which he had in his hands and converted to his own use and therefore it is reasonable that he should be charged with all the damages Besides they having conusans of the principal have conusans of the accessory as in this Case of the damages and he urged Fitz. 113. a. to prove that before the Statute of 23 H. 8. they had a Court and were called Justices but he held as it was agreed before That no Writ of Error lieth after this Statute but yet he said that the party grieved should be at no loss thereby for he said that where the party cannot have a Writ of Error nor Audita querela there he shall be admitted to plead as in 11 H. 7. 10. a. Where a Recognisance of debt passed for the King upon issue tried and afterwards the King pardons it the party after Judgment may plead it because Audita querela doth not lie against the King and where a man is not party to a Judgment there he cannot have a Writ of Error but there he may falsifie so I conceive that he may in this Case because he cannot have a Writ of Error and I conceive as it hath been said before that after the Statute of 23 H. 8. the Commissioners of Sewers have a mixt Jurisdiction of Law and equity For the Certiorare I will advise hereafter how I grant it although I conceive as I have said before that a Certiorare lies after the Statute and is not taken away by the Statute and I conceive in some clearness that it may be granted where any fine is imposed upon any man by Commissioner which they have authority to do by their Commission as appeareth by the Statute to moderate it in Case that it be excessive But as I have said before because that the parties by agreement voluntarily bound themselves by Recognisance to stand to the judgment of this Court upon the proceedings as they are certified that made me at this time not to stand upon the Certiorare wherefore I do confirm the decree 242. Rolls moved this Case A. did suffer B. to leave a trunk in his house Whether B. might take it away without the special leave of A. was the Question Justice Mallet leave is intended but Rolls conceived that he could not take it without leave Hammon against Roll Pasch. 18. Car. in the Common Pleas. 243. IN an Action upon the Case upon Assumpsit the Case upon special verdict was this A. and B. were bound joyntly and severally in a Bond to C. who released to A. afterwards there being a communication betwixt B. and C. concerning the said debt B. in consideration that C. would forbear him the payment of the said mony due and payable upon the said Bond till such a day promised to pay it c. C. for default of payment at the said day brought this Action upon the Case B. pleaded the general issue and thereupon the whole matter before was found by the Jury Serjeant Clarke here is not any good consideration whereupon to ground an Assumpsit because by the release to one obligor the other is discharged and then there being no
so the constitution of other Realms then the question is Whether this Prerogative of the King to pardon murder be taken away by any Statute or not and first for the Statute of 2 E. 3 cap. 2. upon which all the other Statutes depend that Statute made was only to prevent the frequencie of Pardons but not totally to take away the Kings Prerogative for the words of the Statute are That offenders were incouraged because that Charters of Pardon were so easily granted in times past c. And the Statute of 13 R. 2. cap. 2. admits the Power and Prerogative of the King of pardoning Murder notwithstanding the former Statute for that Statute prescribes the form only and 13 R. 2. in the Parliament-Roll Number 36. the King saith Saving his Prerogative The next thing considerable here is admitting Murder pardonable by the King Whether in this Pardon there be sufficient words to pardon murder or not and he argued that there was and first for the word felony and he said that by the Common Law pardon of felony is pardon of murder the Statute of 18 E. 3. cap. 2. inables Justices of Peace to hear and determine felonies and in 5 E. 6. Dyer 69. a. it is holden clearly that the Justices of Peace by virtue of that act have authority to inquire of murder because it is felony and in Instit. 391. a. By the Law at this day under the word felony in Commissions c. is included Petit Treason Murder c. Wherefore murder being felony the pardon of felony is the pardon of murder Further he said that the pardon of manslaughter is a good pardon of murder for he said that murder and manslaughter are all one in substance and differ only in circumstance as the Book in Plowd Comment fol. 101. is and if they were divers offences then the Jury could not find a man indicted of murder guilty of manslaughter as it was in the Case before cited The last words are quocunque alio modo ad mortem devenerit which extends to all deaths whatsoever and if it should not be so the Statute of 13 R. 2. should be in vain I agree the Books of 1 E. 3. 14 22 Ass. 49. 21 E. 3. 24. objected on the other side that the pardon of felony doth not extend to treason with which the Institutes 391 agrees they make not against me see the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 2. and the Books of 9 E. 4. 26. by Billin 8 H. 6. 20. by Strange they are but bare opinions It was objected that an Indictment at the Common Law shall not extend to murder unless the word Murdravit be in the Indictment I answer that a pardon of felony may pardon robbery and yet here ought to be also Robberia in the Indictment A pardon need not nor can follow the form of Indictments the offence apparent it sufficeth Further he argued that the King might dispense with the Statute of 2 E. 3. 13 R. 2. by a Non obstante It was objected that the Kings grant with a Non obstante the Statute of 13 R. 2. cap. 5. of the Admiralty is not good and that so of a pardon oâ— murder with a Non obstante to that he answered and took this difference Where the subject hath an immediate interest in an Act of Parliament there the King cannot dispense with it and such is the case of the Admiralty but where the King is intrusted with the managing of it and the subject only by way of consequence there he may see 2 R. 3. 12. 2 H 7. 6. It was objected that the King cannot dispense with the inquiry of the Court upon the Statute of 13 R. 2. cap. 1. To that he answered that the inquiry is the Kings suit and therefore he may dispense with it See 5 E. 3. 29. It was objected further that the Pardon saith Vnde indictatus est To that he answered That if it be left out it is good without it for the same is only for information See 36 H. 6. 25. And the words of pardon are usual to say Vnde indictatus vel non indictatus utlegat ' vel non utlegat ' and that would avoid all Pardon 's before if it should be suffered and for these causes he concluded and prayed that the Pardon might be allowed Shaftoe of Grays-Inn at another day argued for the King that the pardon was insufficient and first he said That the words of the pardon were not sufficient to pardon murder For the words Homicidium and Feloniâ—am interfectionem are indifferent words and therefore shall not be taken in a strict and strained sense It is true that killing is the Genus but there are several Species of it and several offences Now for the word Felony I conceive that the pardon of Felony will not pardon murder vide 33 H. 8. 50. fol. 4. Dyer But yet I conceive that felony in the general sense will extend to murder but not in a Pardon for there ought to be precise and express words and so are the Books of 8 H. 6. 20. by Strange and 22 H. 7. Keilway 31 b. express in the point Hill 2. Iac. Institut 391. a. and Stamford Pleas of the Crown 114. a. If a man be indicted for an offence done upon the Sea it is not sufficient for the Indictment to say Felonicè but it ought also to say Pyraticè And pardon of all felonies is not a Pardon of all Pyracie by the same reason here pardon of Felony is no pardon of Murder For the â—ast words Quocunque alto modo ad mortem pervenerit these words do not pardon Murder because they are too general vide 8 H. 4. 2. 29 Ass. Pl. 24. And clearly if there were but these general words they would not pardon Murder I was objected that these words are as much as if murder had been expressed in the pardon To that he answered that the Statute of 13 R. 2. cap. 1. saith that the offence it self ought to be expressed and doth not say by words equipollent and the Title of the Statute is that the offence committed ought to be specified In all Pardon 's the King ought to be truly informed of the form as also of the Indictment and proceeding upon it See 6 Rep. fol. 13. and here is no recital in the Pardon 9 E. 4. 28. 8 H. 4. 2. Pardon of Attainder doth not pardon the felony and pardon of the felony doth not pardon the Attainder I agree that the King may pardon his suit but the same ought to be by apt words The words of Licet indictatus or non indictatus will not help it it goeth to the proceedings only and not to the matter Besides the Law presumes that the Patent or Pardon is at the suggestion of the party and therefore if the King be not rightly informed of his Grant he is deceived and the Grant void and perhaps if the King had been informed that the fact
done was murder he would not have pardoned it and the words Ex certa scientia shall not make the Grant good where the King is deceived by false suggession of the party See Altonwoods Case 1 Rep. 46. a. 52. b. 9. E. 4. 26. b. is an authority in the point by Billing Charter of Pardon ought to make express mention of murder or otherwise it will not pardon it and 22 H. 7. 91. b. Keilway Pardon of all felonies will not pardon murder Br. Charter de pardon 10. there ought to be express words of murder in the pardon See the Old Entries 455. 2 H. 7. 6. by Ratcliffe objected that the King may pardon murder with a Non obstante that I agree but if ought to be by express words See Stamford Pleas of the Crown fol. 103 104. and 19. a. Where it is said that a pardon of all felonies doth not extend to murder Besides I conceive that a Non obstante cannot dispense with the Statute of 13 R. 2. I agree that where there is a penalty only given by the Statute there the King may dispence with it I agree the Book of 2 H. 7. 6. there it was a penalty only I agree also that the King may dispense with the Statute of Quia emptores â—errarum as the Book is N. B. 3. 211. f. But when a Statute is absolute and not Sub modo there he cannot dispense with it See 18 Eliz. Dyer 352. and 8 Rep. 29. Princes Case Institut 120 a. and Hobarts Rep. 103. The King with a Non obstante cannot dispense with the Statute of Simony because it is a positive Law and not Sub modo and this Statute of 13 R. 2. is for the common good It was objected that the King may pardon murder by the Common Law and that the Statute of 13 R. 2. takes away the inquiry only further it was objected that the Statute of 2 E. 3. did allow that the King might pardon murder but not so easily and the Statute of 13 R. 2. is saâ—â—ng our Regality by which was concluded that his Prerogative is saved Bracton fol. 133. a. saith that the Kings pardoning of murder was contra justitiam and Register fol. 309. Se defendendo and per infortunium only are pardonable and that well expounds the Statute of 2 E. 3. cap. 2. which enacts that Charters of Pardon shall be only granted where the King may do it by his Oath that is to say where a man kills another Se defendendo or per infortunium And for the saving of the Regality which is in the Statute of 13 R. 2. to that I say that the Judges ought to judge according to the body of the Act and that is express that the King cannot pardon murder 5 E. 3. 29. and Kelway 134. there it is disputed but yet it came not to our Case for that is only of a pardon of the Kings suit and for these reasons he prayed that the pardon might not be allowed Keeling for the King that the pardon is not sufficient to pardon murder The Kings pardons ought to be taken strictly and so is the 5 Rep. The Question here is not whether the general words shall extend to murder but whether it ought to be precisely expressed in the Pardon or not and he held that it ought and hâ— held that the King cannot dispense with the Statute of 13 R. 2. by a Non obstante the Books of 2 R. 3. 2 H. 7. 6. 11. Rep. 88. That the King may dispense with a Penal Law he agreed but he said that this Act of 13 R. 2. binds the King in point of Justice and therefore the King cannot dispense with it and Institutes 234 the King by a Non obstante cannot dispense with the buying and selling of Offices contrary to the Statute because it toucheth and concerneth Justice Wherefore he prayed that the Pardon might not be allowed FINIS THere is lately Reprinted Mr. March's Actions for Slanders and Arbitrementâ—â— Sold by Mris Walbanck at Grays Inn-Gate in Grays-Inn-Lane An Exact TABLE to these REPORTS Alphabetically composed by the Author Abatement of Writ See Title Writ Acceptance WHere a Witness hath not a reasonable sum delivered to him for Costs and Charges according to the distance of place as the Stat. of 5 Q 9. saith yet if he accept it it shall binde him See Tit. Witnesses 1. Accompt For what things a Husband who is administrator to his Wife shall be accomptable in the Ecclesiastical Court for what noâ— pa. 44. pl. 69 Where an accompt by Bill lies for an Attorney of the Common Bench Kings Bench or Exchequer and where iâ— an accompt a man shall recover Damâ—mages upon the second Judgement 99 100 pl. 171. In Debt upon an accompt it sufficeth to say that the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff upon an accompt pro diversis mercimoniis without reciting the particulars 102. pl. 175. Action upon the Case Where if a man sue another in the name of a third person without his privity an Action upon the Case will lye against him where not 47 pl. 76. Where oâ—e who is not of the Jury cauâ—seth himself to be sworn in the name of one returned of the Jury and gives his Verdict either party may have an Action upon the Case against him 81. pl. 132. A man retorned cited in the Ecclesiastical Court where he was not cited shall have an action upon the case 99. pl. 169. Action upon the Case for words What words shall be actionable and what not pa 1. pl. 3. pa. 7. pl. 17 18 19. pa. 15. pl. 37. 19. pl. 44. 20. pl. 45. 58. pl 90. 59. pl. 91 93. 76. pl. 119. 82. pl. 135. 107. pl. 184. 109. pl. 187. 113. pl. 191. 115. pl. 192. 116. pl. 193. 119. pl. 197 146. pl. 217. 62. pl. 96. 211. pl. 248. 212. 149. Actio personalis moritur cum persona What shall be said to be an Action personal and to dye with the person what not 9. 13 14. Alimony Where a man puts his Wife from him he is compellable by the Ecclesiastical Court to allow her Alimony 11. pl. 31. The High Commission Court had not power to allow Alimony 80. pl. 129. Amendment Where amendment may be in the inferiour Court after Errour brought where not 72 pl. 109. No amendments allowed in Courts below 78. pl. 124. No amendment after a Verdict without 〈◊〉 82. pl 133. A Declaâ—ation cannot be amended in substance wiâ—hout a new Original otherwise o◠〈◊〉 93. pl. 161. A Warrant of Attorney may be amended after Errour brought 121. pl. 201. 129. pl. 209. In an Ejectione firme vi arms was in the Writ but wanted in the Count whether it be amendable or not quaere pa. 140. pl. 113. Appendant Leet may be appendant to a Hundred 75. pl. 115. Apportionment Where a Debt or other duty may be apportioned and several Actions brought where not 57. 61. Assumpsit being an entire
say per scriptum obligatorium and to conclude that it was secundum formam statuti will not help it but in a Verdict it was agreed to be good 76. pl 117. Apothecary brought an action upon the case upon a promise for divers wares medicines of such a value the Desendant pleads in bar that he payed to the Plaintiff tot tantas denariorum summas as the medicines were worth and shews no sum in certain and therefore naught 77. pl. 120. A. and B. were bound to stand to and observe such order and decree as the Kings Counsel of the Court of Requests should make A. brought an action against B. and pleaded that the Counsel of the King of the said Court made such order and decree and that the Defendant did not observe it the Defendant pleaded that the King and his Counsel did not make the decree which is naught 78. pl. 126. Where a bad plea shall be made good by Verdict See Title Verdict 2. If a man plead an affirmative plea as that he hath saved the Plaintiff harmless and doth not shew how it is naught otherwise of a negative plea as non damniâ—icatus c. 121. pl. 200. What shall be said to be an argumentative plea what not 207. pl. 247. Pleas of the Crown Bayliffs endeavour to break open a house to serve an Execution upon the owner who not desisting upon his threats he shot and killed one of them it is not murder but man-slaughter 3 pl. 7. Many notable resolutions upon the Statutes of Winchester and 27 Q. of Robberies 10 pl. 28. Pledges Judgement reversed for want of Pledges 17. pl. 40. In a Replevin brought in an inferior Court and no Pledges de retorno habendo taken by the Sheriff according to the Statute of W. 2. ca. 2. upon the plaint removed into the Kings Bench that Court may find Pledges and that any time before Judgement 46. pl. 72. Presentments in Courts Presentments taken in an Hundred Court were quashed because that it is not the Kings Court and therefore coram â—on judice 75. pl. 115. Priviledge If the Clerk of a Court be elected into any office which requâ—res his personal constant attendance as Churchwarden or the like he shall have his priviledge otherwise not as for watching and warding and the like 30. pl. 65. Ordered by the upper House of Parliament 16 Caroli that onely menial servants or such as tend upon the person of a Knight or Burgess should be priviledged from arrest 92. pl. 157. Debt against a husband and his wife as executrix who are sued to the Exigent and at the retorn of it the husband being an officer in the Exchequer came into Court and demanded his priviledge and whether as this case is he shall have it or not quâ—ere 149. pl. 219. Prohibition A man libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court against one for these words Thou art a drankard and usest to be drunk thrice a week upon which a Prohâ—bition was prayed and granted 6. pl. 11. 66. pl. 103. If the Ecclesiastical Court proceed upon a Canon which is contrary to the Common Law Statute Law or Custom a Prohibition lies 22. pl. 50. 67. pl. 74. Two joynt Tenants of Tythes the one sues in the Ecclesiastical Court without the other or a Feme Covert solely for deâ—amation this is no cause of Prohibition 25. pl. 26. pa. 47. pl. 112. See pa. 93. pl. 112. Upon a Petition to any Ecclesiastical Judge without suit there no Prohibition lies 45. pl. 70. A man is compellable in the Ecclesiastical Court to repair a way which leads to the Church but upon a Libel there to repair a highway a Prohibition lies 45. 70. Tenant in Taâ—l levyed a Fine to the use of himself for life the Remainder in see to I. S. and died the Counsel of the Marches wou'd settle the possession upon the Heir of the Tenant in Taâ—l against the purchasor upon which a Prohibition was granted 51. pl. 79. Libel for Tythes for barren Cattle upon a suggestion that the party had no cattle but for plough and pale Prohibition was granted the same Parson libelled for Tyth of Coneys upon which a Prohibition was also granted 58. pl. 87. No Prohibition after sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court 73. pl. 111 92. pl. 156. Many men recover Costs in the Spiritual Court one of them releases the others sue there for their costs this is no came of Prohibition Baron and Feâ—â—e recover costs there for defaming the wife the Baron releases this will not baâ— the wife 73 pl. 112. See pa 25. pl. â—6 pa. 4â— pl. 〈◊〉 Contract betwixt the Vicar and a 〈◊〉 shiâ—ner to pay so much for 〈…〉 Tythes the Vicar dies his 〈…〉 in the Ecclesiastical Court for them 〈◊〉 on which a Prohibition was granted by reason of the real contract which is a temporal thing 8â— l. 1â—0 Libel in the Ecclesiastical Court for these words 〈…〉 upon which a Prohibition was granted 89. pl. 144. Where the Ecclesiastical Court hath conâ—sance of the cause though they proceed erroneously a Prohibition will not lie 92. pl. 152. See pa. 98. pl. 169. 〈◊〉 The Ecclesiastical Courts may hold plea of an excuse for not going to Church and no Prohibition lies 93. pl. 162. Where there are several Moâ—â—ses there several Prohibitions shall be granted where one Moaâ—s onely though divers parties all shall have but one Prohibition 94. pl. 163. If the Ecclesiastical Court proceed against a man without Citation where they have Jurisdiction no Prohibition lies the remedy is by way of Appeal 98. pl. 169. See pa. 92. pl. 152. 〈◊〉 Legatee may sue an executor in the Spâ—ritual Court for to assent to a Legacy Assets or not Assets may be tried by them and no Prohibition lies 96. pl. 167 A woman Libelled against another for calling of her lade upon which a Prohibition was granted but for Whore or Eawd no Prohibition lies quaere whether or not for Quan 99. pl. 1â—0 If a man be sued in the Court of Requests to account there a Prohibition lies See Title Sâ—â—â—â—stratica 1. 2. A man exhibited a 〈◊〉 in the Court of Requests for moneys due upon an account upon which a Prohibition was granted for that it is no 〈◊〉 than Debt upon an account further they referred the 〈…〉 the 〈◊〉 to â—â—â—ers which 〈…〉 of Prohibition 102. pl. â— 5 〈…〉 If a Ship â—e taken at Sea whether b Letters of Mart or by â—itacy if it be sold infra coâ—pus conitatus and the party Libels against the vendee in the Admiralâ—y a Prohibition lies 110. pl. 188. Upon deciding of Actions in an inferiour Court a Prohibition lies 141. pl. 214. Property In Trover and Conversion for a Hawk if he doth not say that it was reclaimed the Action will not lie for that it doth not appear he had a property in it and to say that he was possessed of it ut de bonis suis propriis will not