any other thing which lies in Grant and the Deed is lost or cancelled the Office or the thing granted falls to the ground for the Deed is the foundation and a Case was cited in the Lord Dyer If there be two Iointenants and one cancels the Deed it hath destroyed the Right of the other Quaere of these things But it was agreed that if two Men who have one Office for their Lives and the survivor of them if one surrenders to the other and then a new Grant is made to this other and a Stranger he hath debarred himself of the Survivorship and he and the Stranger are jointly seised Crossman versus Sir John Churchil IN a Quare Impedit the Plaintiffs Title was set forth in his Declaration which was also found in a Special Verdict Where an Agreement for a Presentation by turns is good that Sir George Rodney was seised of the Advowson in Fée and died seised leaving two Sisters who were his Coheirs that Sir John Rodney being also one of the same Family and pretending a Right to the Estate for preventing Suits that might happen they all enter into an Agréement by Indentures mutually executed by which it was agreed that Sir John Rodney shall hold some Lands in severalty and the Co-heirs shall hold other Lands in the like manner and as for this Advowson a temporary provision was made thereof that each of them should Present by turns and this was to continue till partition could be made then comes an Act of Parliament and confirms the Indenture and Enacts That every Agreement therein contained shall stand and that all the rest of the Lands not particularly named and otherwise disposed by the said Indenture should be held by these three in common one of the three who by Agréement was next to Present grants the next Avoidance the Church being then full to the Plaintiff and the Question was whether these threé persons were not Tenants in Common of the Advowson and if so then the Grant of the next Avoidance cannot be good by one alone because he hath not the whole Advowson but only a Right to the third part It was said that if Tenants in Common had made such an Agreément it would not have beén any division of their interest for there must be a partition to sever the Inheritance The Court were all of Opinion Curia that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff for there was an Agréement that there shall be a Presentation by turns and therefore for one turn each hath a Right to the whole Advowson by reason of the Act of Parliament by which that Agreement is confirmed and thereby an Interest is setled in each of them till Partition made but this Agreement would have vested no Interest in either of them without an Act of Parliament to corroborate it therefore there had been no remedy upon it but by an Action of Covenant This Case was argued four times and not one Authority cited The Earl of Shaftsbury versus Lord Digby In Banco Regis For Words upon the Statute of 2 R. 2. c. 5. Jones 49. SCandalum Magnatum The Plaintiff declares upon the Statute of 2 R. 2. cap. 5. for these Words viz. You are not for the King but for Sedition and for a Common-wealth and by God we will have your Head the next Sessions of Parliament After Verdict for the Plaintiff and 1000 l. damages given it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment and several Exceptions taken 1. As to the Recital of the Statute the Words of which are That no Man shall devise any Lies c. and the Plaintiff for the Word devise had used the Latin Word contrafacio in his Declaration which was very improper that being to counterfeit and not to devise for it should have béen machino or fingo those are more expressive Words of Devise 2. 'T is alledged that the Defendant dixit mendacia of the Plaintiff viz. haec Anglicana verba sequen̄ and doth not alledge that he spoke the Words 3. The most material Objection was a mistake in the Recital of the Statute the Words of which are That none shall speak any scandalous Words of any Dukes Earls c. the Justices of either Bench nor of any other great Officer of the Kingdom but the Plaintiff in his Declaration recites it thus viz. None shall speak any scandalous Words of any Dukes Earls c. Justices of either Bench great Officers of the Kingdom and leaves out the Words neque al so that it must be construed thus None to speak of any Dukes Earls c. being great Officers of the Kingdom and then 't is not enough that the Plaintiff is Comes but he also ought to be a great Officer of the Kingdom which is not set out in this Case But upon great Debate and Deliberation these Exceptions were overruled and the whole Court gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff As to the first Exception they said contrafacio is a legal Word and apt enough in this sense and so are all the Presidents and thus it was pleaded in the Lord Cromwel's Case As to the second Exception it was said the Mendacia which were told were the English Words which were spoken and the viz. haec Anglicana verba sequen̄ being in the Accusative Case are governed by the same Verb which governs the Words precedent viz. horribilia mendacia Besides for the supporting of an Action the viz. may be transposed and then it will be well enough viz. the Defendant spoke haec Anglicana verba viz. Lies of the Plaintiff As to the third Exception it was answered that the Plaintiff neéd not recite the Statute it being a * Sid. 348. general Law and admitting there was no necessity yet if he will undertake to recite it and mistake in a material Point 't is incurable but if he recites so much as will serve to maintain his own Action truly and mistakes the rest this will not vitiate his Declaration and so he hath done here by reciting so much of the Statute which Enacts That no Man shall speak any scandalous Words of an Earl which is enough he being an Earl to entitle him to an Action and he concludes prout per eundem Actum plenius liquet and the Court grounded themselves principally upon a Iudgment given in this Court which was thus viz. There was a Robbery committed and the Party brought an Action upon the Statute of Huy and Cry in which he recited incendia domorum 13 E. 1. cap. 1. the said Statute beginning Forasmuch as from day to day Robberies Murders burning of Houses c. and the Presidents are all so But the Parliament Roll is Incendia generally without domorum and it was strongly urged that it was a misrecital which was fatal But the Court were all of Opinion that the Plaintiffs Case being only concerning a Robbery for which the Statute was well recited and not about burning which was mistaken it was for that reason good
versus Lascomb 267 Duck versus Vincent 33 E. EDwards versus Roberts 24 Edwards versus Weeks 259 Ellis versus Yarborough 177 Escourt versus Cole 58 Evered versus Hone 293 F. FOrrest qui tam c. versus Wire 246 Frosdick versus Sterling 269 G. GIlmore versus the Executor of Shooter 310 Godfrey versus Godfrey 303 Goffe versus Elkin 239 Goodwin qui tam c. versus Butcher 67 H. HAll versus Carter 304 Hambleton vers Scrogs Mil ' 296 Hammond versus Howel 218 Harding versus Ferne 177 Harman's Case 176 Harris's Case 101 Harwood and Binks versus Hillyard 268 Hayes versus Bickerstaffe 34 Hickman Mil ' versus Thorn and others 104 Hill versus Thorn 309 Higginson versus Martin 195 Hill versus Pheasant 54 Hocket Vxor versus Stiddolp Vxer 66 Hollis Mil ' versus Carre 86 Howard Mil ' versus the Queens Trustees 173 I. JAmes versus Johnson 143 James versus Trollup 320 Ingram versus Tothil 93 Jones's Case 198 Ipsley versus Turk 193 Ironmongers Company versus Naylor 185 K. KEndrick versus Bartland 253 The King versus the Bishop of Rochester 1 The King versus Tourvil 52 The King versus Moor 128 Keen versus Kirby 32 L. LAne versus Robinson 102 Lee versus Brown 69 Lever versus Hosier 47 Loyd versus Langford 174 Long 's Case 181 M. MARY Magdalen Bermonsey Church 222 Major versus Grigg 213 Mayor and Comminalty of London versus Gatford 39 Mason versus Stratton 36 Mason versus Caesar 65 Mendyke versus Stint 271 Milward versus Ingram 43 Mires versus Solebay 242 Moor versus Pitt 287 Morris versus Philpot 108 N. NAyler versus Sharpless 23 Nichols versus Ramsel 280 Norris versus Palmer 51 Norris versus Trist 78 Northumberland's Countess of Case 182 Nurse versus Yearworth 8 O. OSbaston versus Stanhop 50 Osborn versus Wright 296 Otway Mil ' versus Holdips 266 P. PAge versus Tulse al' 83 Paget versus Vossius 223 Parrington versus Lee 311 Peck versus Hill 136 Penrice and Wyn's Case 306 Piggot versus the Earl of Salisbury 109 Plummer versus Whitchot Mil ' 119 Prince versus Rawson 51 Put versus Roster 318 Q. QUadring versus Downes al 176 R. RAnds Mil ' versus Trip 199 Randals Case 308 Read versus Dawson 139 Reder versus Bradley 101 Reed versus Hatton 25 Richards versus Sely 79 Rose versus Standen 294 Rozal versus Lampen 42 S. SAms versus Dangerfield 31 Samways versus Eldslly 73 Scoble versus Skelton 318 Searl versus Long 264 Searl versus Bunion 70 Sambrook versus Fettiplace 283 Sharp versus Hubbard 58 Shaw Mil ' versus a Burgess of Colchester 228 Shaxton versus Shaxton 305 Shaftsbury Earl of versus Lord Digby 98 Sherrard versus Smith 103 Simpson versus Ellis 36 Singleton versus Bawtry 168 Smallwood versus Brickhouse 315 Smith versus Tracy 204 Smith versus Shelberry 33 Smith versus Hall 31 Smith versus Feverel 6 Snow al' versus Wiseman 60 Southcot versus Stowel 207 Spring versus Eve 240 Squib versus Hole 29 Strangford versus Green 227 Staples versus Alden 309 Steed versus Berryer 313 Stephens versus Austin 185 Styleman versus Patrick 141 Steward versus Allen 264 Stoutfield 's Case 77 Strangford versus Green 227 Stroud versus Bishop of Bath and Wells 183 Stubbins versus Bird al' 63 Suffeild versus Baskervil 36 T. TAyler versus Biddal 289 Taylor versus Baker 214 Thorp versus Fowle 58 Threadneedle versus Lynam 57 Tissard versus Warcup 279 Townsend Lord versus Hughs 150 Trevil versus Ingram 281 Trotter versus Blake 229 Turner Sir William 's Case 144 V. VAughan versus Wood 56 W. WAkeman versus Blackwel 70 Walwyn versus Awberry 254 Warden of the Fleet 's Case 221 Waterfield versus the Bishop of Chichester 118 Week's Case 278 Wells versus Wright 285 Whitrong versus Blaney 10 Wilcox versus the Servants of Sir Fuller Skipwith 4 Wilkinson versus Loyd Mil ' 82 Williamson versus Hancock 14 Wilson versus Drake 20 Wilson versus Ducket 61 Windam Lady 's Case 294 Wine versus Rider al' 67 Woodward versus Aston 95 Wright versus Bull 304 ERRATA PAge 6. Line 31. for Defendant read Plaintiff p. 58. l. 15. after out r. of p. 79. l. 19. after according read to p. 143. l. 17. for and r. one p. 145. l. 25. for by r. in p. 180. l. 40. for Plaintiff r. Sheriff p. 200. l. 22. for Defendant r. the Plaintiff and for the word Replication r. Plea DE Termino Sancti Hill Annis 26 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Coram Francisco North Milite Capital Justic ' Hugone Wyndham Milite Justic ' Roberto Atkins Milite Justic ' Willielmo Ellis Milite Justic ' The King versus the Bishop of Rochester and Sir Francis Clark IN a Quare Impedit a special Verdict was found Quare Impedit Mod. Rep. 195. Grant of the King where the first Clause is certain and a mistake in another yet the Grant is good wherein the Case was thus The Mannor of Laburn to which the Advowson of the Church of Laburn was appendant did by the dissolution of Monasteries Anno * 31 H. 8. c. 13. 31 H. 8. come to the King who granted the said Mannor to the Archbishop of Canterbury excepting the Advowson and afterwards the said Archbishop regrants the same to King H. 8. and the Advowson of the Church of Laburn aforesaid and then King H. 8. grants the said Mannor of Laburn Advocation̄ Ecclesiae de Laburn dicto Archiepiscopo having named him before dudum spectan̄ and which was regranted to the said King by the said Archbishop and lately belonging to the Abbot of G. c. adeo plene as the said Archbishop or Abbot had it or as it was in our hands by any ways or means howsoever And whether the Advowson passed by this last Grant was the Question Three Iustices absente North gave Iudgment for the Defendant that the Advowson did pass by this Grant Iustice Ellis in his Argument said That it was plain that when the Mannor came to H. 8. the Advowson was appendant but when it was granted to the Archbishop and the Advowson excepted it then became in gross and therefore could never afterward be appendant James and Johnson 's Case Postea As an Aere once disunited from the Mannor can never after be part of that Mannor Liford's Case 7 Co. And 't is as plain that before the Statute de Praerogativa Regis cap. 15. That in the ease of the King by the Grant of a Mannor the Advowson though not named passed much more if it be named in any part of the Deéd as if it be in the Habendum though not in the Premisses but that must be intended of an Advowson appendant 10 Co. 63. And though Advowsons are excepted by that Statute yet in case of Restitution an Advowson will pass by the Words Adeo plene integre though not named In this
Case there are general Words and the same as in * 10 Co. 63. Postea Atturney General against Turner Whistler's Case yet this differs from that for here 't is granted adeo plene as the Abbot had it by those Words it doth not pass for then it was appendant but now it is in gross and if the King intended to pass an Advowson as appendant when 't is in gross the Grant is void Hob. 303. In Whistler's Case there are the Words Adeo plene as in this and the Advowson was appendant still but yet there are general Words here that will pass it Adeo plene as the Archbishop had it will not serve because he never had it neither will Adeo plene as the Abbot had it pass this Advowson because he had it in gross but Adeo plene as the King had it by any ways or means whatsoever those general Words are sufficient to pass it The King grants the Mannor and the Advowson of the Church of Laburn which is certain and by particular Name part of what follows as spectan ' to the Archbishop is false for it never belonged to him because it was excepted in the Grant of the Mannor to him but the first discription being full and certain the falsity of the other shall not avoid the Grant especially when the King is not deceived in his Title nor in the Value and when there is a certainty of the thing granted Some false suggestions may make his Grant void as if he grant the Mannor of D. reciting that it came to him by Attainder when it came by Purchase Hob. 229. Lane 11. But if the mis-recital concerns not the Kings Title or Profit it doth not vitiate the Grant 10 H. 2. 4. Sir John Lestrange's Case where the King by Office found had the Wardship of a Mannor and makes a Grant thereof reciting Quod quidem Manerium in manus nostras seisit̄ c. which was not true yet the Grant was held good because it was only to make that certain which was certain enough before by a particular description So in Legat's Case 10 Co. 113. wherein is cited the Case of the Earl of Rutland and Markham to whom the Queén had granted the Office of Parkership c. quod quidem Officium the late Earl of Rutland habuit when in truth the Earl never had it before yet the Grant was held good So also if he grants for and in consideration of Service done or Mony paid if false it avoids not the Grant because such Considerations when past are not material whether they are true or false Cro. Jac. 34. If the King let the Mannor of D. of the value of 4 l. per annum if it be more it is ill but if he let it by a particular Name and then adds Quod quidem Manerium is of such a value 't is good because the * 2 Cro. 34. Quod quidem is but the addition of another certainty so here the Advowson is granted by special and express Name but the Clause that follows Dudum spectan̄ to the Archbishop implies a mistake and had there beén no more in the Case this falsity would never have avoided the Grant But when the King had enumerated several ways by which he thought he might be intitled at last as a proof that he was resolved to pass it he adds these Words viz. as it is in our hands by any way or means whatsoever Atkins Iustice of the same Opinion Where the thing is not granted by an express Name there if a falsity is in the description of that thing the Grant is void even in the case of a common person as if he grant Lands lately let to D. in such a Parish and the Lands were not let to D. were also in another Parish the Grant is void because the Lands are not particularly named Anders 148. Heywood's Case A fortiori in the Case of the King as if he grant omnia illa tenementa situata in Wells when in truth the Lands did not lie there for this reason the Grant was void because it was general and yet restrained to a particular Town and the Pronoun illa goes through the whole sentence But if a thing is granted by an express Name though there is a Falsity in the description yet in the Case of a common person 't is good As when the Subchantor and Vicars Choral of Lichfield made a Grant to Humfrey Peto of 78 Acres of Glebe and of their Tythes Predial and Personal and also of the Tythe of the Glebe All which late were in the occupation of Margaret Peto which was not true yet the Grant was adjudged good for the Words All which are not Words of restriction unless when the Clause is general and the Sentence entire but not when it is distinct Cro. Car. 548. But in the Case of the King if there is a falsity by which the King hath a prejudice and a Falsity upon the suggestion of the Party it will make the Grant void but every Falsity will not avoid his Grant if it be not to his prejudice But let the Falsity in this Case be what it will the Adeo plene as it is in our hands helps it and though it hath been objected that these Words will not help the Grant because nothing new is granted that being done before 't is true there is nothing new granted but that which was before was not well granted till this Clause came which supplies and amends the Falsity for now 't is apparent that the King intended to pass the Advowson as well as the Mannor and therefore at last grants it be his Title what it will In all Cases where the Kings Grant is void because of any mistake in his Title 't is to be intended the King would not make the Grant unless the Title were so as 't is recited but here 't is apparent the King resolved to grant it Judgment Wyndham Iustice agreéd and Iudgment was given accordingly Wilcox versus the Servant of Sir Fuller Skipwith Replevin Justification for an Herriot IN Replevin the Defendant justifies the taking of the Cattle for a Herriot which he alledges to be due upon every Alienation without notice The Plaintiff denies the Herriot to be due upon Alienation And thereupon Issue is joyned The Special Verdict finds the Tenure to be by Fealty and the Rent of 3 s. 1 d. though the Defendant in his Avowry had alledged the Rent to be 12 s. 4 d. and the Plaintiff in his Barr to the Avowry had confessed it to be so Suit of Court and an Herriot which was payable upon every Alienation with or without notice And whether upon this Special Verdict Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff or the Avowant was the doubt Ex parte Def. Vpon the point of Pleading Serjeant Jones for the Defendant said it had béen objected that the Avowry was ill for ut Ballivus c. bene cogn̄ captionem in
Heir enters and claims generally it shall be intended as Heir and the words that he shall not molest by Suit or otherwise are to be intended occasione praemissorum 3dly There is no néed of Entry to avoid an Estate in case of a Limitation because thereby the Estate is determined without Entry or Claim and the Law casts it upon the Party to whom it is limited and in whom it vests till he disagrées to it A. devises Land to B. and his Heirs and dies 't is in the Devisee immediately but indeed till Entry he cannot bring a possessory Action as Trespass c. Pl. Com. 412 413. 10 Co. 40. b. where a Possession vests without Entry a Reversion will vest without Claim Nota. Curtis versus Davenant Prohibition A Bishop cannot appoint Commissioners to tax the Parish for building or repairing a Church IN a Prohibition the Question was whether if a Church be out of repair or being so much out of order that it must be re-edified whether the Bishop of the Diocess may direct a Commission to impower Commissioners to tax and rate every Parishioner for the re-edifying thereof The Court did unanimously agree such Commissions were against Law and therefore granted a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court to stop a Suit there commenced against some of the Parishioners of White-Chappel for not paying the Tax according to their proportions It was agréed that the Spiritual Court hath power to compel the Parish to repair the Church by their Ecclesiastical Censures but they cannot appoint what Sums are to be paid for that purpose because the Churchwardens by the consent of the Parish are to settle that As if a Bridge be out of repair the Iustices of Peace cannot set Rates upon the persons that are to repair it but they must consent to it themselves These Parishioners here who contribute to the charge of repairing the Church may be spared but as for those who are obstinate and refuse to do it the Spiritual Court may proceed to Excommunication against them but there may be a Libel to pay the Rates set by the Church-wardens Nurse versus Yearworth in Cancellaria Bill in Cancellaria for the Assignment of a Term. RIchard Yearworth being seised of Lands in Fee makes a Lease to the Defendant Christopher Yearworth for 99 years to such use as by his last Will he should direct Afterward he makes his Will in writing having then no Issue but his Wife grossement enseint and thereby devises the same Land to the Heirs of his Body on the Body of his Wife begotten and for want of such Issue to the said Christopher the Defendant and his Heirs Richard dies and about a month after a Son is born the Son by vertue of this Devise enjoys the Land but when he attains his full age of one and twenty years he suffers a Common Recovery and afterwards devises the Land to the Complainant Nurse and dies The Complainant exhibits a Bill against the Defendant to have the Lease for 99 years assigned to him and whether he should have it assigned or not was the Question 1. It was pretended that an Estate in Fée being limited by the Will to Christopher who was Lessee for 99 years the Term is thereby drowned 2. It was objected that the Devise by Richard to the Infant in ventre la mere was void and then the Complainant who claimed by a Devise from the Posthumus could have no Title but that the Defendant to whom an Estate was limited by the Will of Richard in Remainder should take presently But notwithstanding what was objected the Lord Keeper Finch decréed that the Lease which was in Trust should be assigned to the Complainant Nurse He said that at the Common Law without all question a Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere of Lands devisable by Custom was good so that the doubt arises upon the Statute of H. 8. Roll. Abr. tit Devise 609. lit H. pl. 2. Godb. 385. 11 H 6. 13. dubitatur which enacts That it shall be lawful for a Man by his Will in writing to devise his Lands to any person or persons for in this Case the Devisée not being in rerum naturâ in strictness of spéech is no person and therefore it hath beén taken that such a Devise is void Moor's Rep. and 't is left as a Quaere in the Lord Dyer 304. But in two Cases in the Common Pleas one in the time when the Lord Chief Iustice Hale was Iudge there the other in the Lord Chief Iustice Bridgman's time it hath been resolved that if there were sufficient and apt words to describe the Infant though in ventre sa mere the Devise might be good But in the King's Bench the Iudges since have been divided upon this Point that as the Law stands now adjudged this Devise in our Case seems not to be good But should the Case come now in question he said he was not sure that the Law would be so adjudged for 't is hard to disinherit an Heir for want of apt Words to describe him and 't is all the reason in the World that a Mans intent lying in extremis when most commonly he is destitute of Council should be favoured Whitrong versus Blaney Process into Wales THIS Term the Court delivered their Opinions in this Case North Chief Iustice who had heard no Arguments herein being absent The Case was this The Plaintiff upon a Iudgment in this Court sues out a Scire facias against the Heir and the Ter-tenants which was directed to a Sheriff of Wales the Defendant is returned Tertenant but he comes in and pleads Non tenure generally and traverses the Return the Plaintiff demurs Two Points were spoke to in the Case 1. Whether the Defendant can traverse the Sheriffs Return And all the three Iustices agreéd that he cannot 2. Whether a Scir̄ Fac̄ Ca. Sa. Fi. Fa. c. would lie into Wales on a Iudgment here at Westminster And they agréed it would well lie An Indictment may be removed 2 Cro. 484. Ellis Iustice agreéd If Iudgment be given in Wales it could not be removed into the Chancery by Certiorari and sent hither by Mittimus and then Execution taken out upon that Iudgment here because such Iudgments are to be executed in their proper Iurisdictions and such was the Resolution of the Iustices and Barons Cro. Car. 34. But on a Iudgment obtained here Execution may go into Wales No Execution can go into the Isle of Man because 't is no part of England but Wales is united to England by the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 26. And therefore in Bedo and Piper's Case 2 Bulstr 156. it was held that such a * Het 20. 2 Cro. 484. The Opinion of Dodderidge Roll. 395. 2 Sand. 194. Twisden denied it Writ of Execution goes legally into Wales He said he had a Report of a Case in 11 Car. 2. where a Motion was made to quash an Elegit into Wales
Termino Paschae Anno 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Naylor versus Sharpless and other Coroners of Lancashire AN Action on the Case was brought for a False Return in which the Plaintiff sets forth Case for a false Return Mod. Rep. 198. that upon a Writ issuing out of this Court to the Chancellor of the Dutchy of Lancaster Process was directed to six Coroners being the Defendants which was delivered to one of them being then in the presence of the Party who was to be arrested but he did not execute it and afterwards at the Return of the Writ they all returned Non est inventus This Action was laid in Middlesex and upon Not-Guilty pleaded the Cause came to Tryal and there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff Baldwyn Serjeant moved in arrest of Iugdment 1. Except That the Action ought not to be laid in Middlesex but in Lancashire where the Tort was committed But as to that it was answered by Serjeant Turner when two Matters both of which are material and are laid in two Counties the Action may be brought in either as if two libel in the Admiralty for a Contract made at Land in Dorsetshire and for which the Plaintiff brings an Action in London against one of them it has been adjudged the Action lies in either County 2. Except The Action will not lie against the six Coroners for the Tort was done by one alone As to that it was said all the Coroners are but one Officer so if one Sheriff suffer an Escape both are liable but in this Case it had been ill to have brought the Action only against one because the ground of it is the false Return which was made by six Coroners And as to the first Exception there could be no doubt now since after Verdict 't is * Stat. 16 17 Car. 2. c. 8. helped though the Trial be in a wrong County But the Court said that Statute helps a Mistrial in the proper County but not where the County is mistaken and inclined likewise that this Action was well brought against the six for this Tort committed by one Coroner but if it had béen for not arresting the Party in such a Case it ought to have been brought against the Coroner who was present with the person to be arrested for that had béen a personal Tort which could not have been charged upon the rest Edwards versus Roberts That he did totally forbear and doth not say hucusque good THE Plaintiff declares that the Defendant promised to pay him so much Mony in consideration that he would forbear to sue him and then he avers that he did extunc totaliter abstinere c. Vpon Non Assumpsit pleaded a Verdict was found for the Plaintiff And it was now moved by Turner Serjeant in Arrest of Iudgment 1. Except The consideration intends a total forbearance and the averment is that from the making of the promise he did totally forbear but doth not say hucusque Sed non allocatur for that shall be intended And it was the Opinion of the whole Court that if the Consideration be as in this Case wholly to forbear the Plaintiff by an Averment that from the making the promise hucusque he did forbear is well entituled to an Action A like Case was this Term where the Consideration was as before and the Averment was that he forbore seven Months and being moved in Arrest of Iudgment by Serjeant Baldwyn because 't is not said hucusque which implies that after the seven Months he did not forbear it was notwithstanding held good it being a reasonable time and the rather because if the Action had been brought within the seven Months and the Plaintiff had averred that hucusque he forbore it had been good enough Quaere Reed versus Hatton IN a special Verdict in Ejectment the Question did arise upon the construction of the Words in a Will Devise paying 5 l. per annum 't is a Fee The Case being this John Thatcher was seised in Feé of the Houses in question and did devise them to his Son Robert in which Will there was this Clause viz. Which Houses I give to my Son Robert upon this Condition that he pay unto his two Sisters five pounds a year the first payment to begin at the first of the four most usual Feasts that shall next happen after the death of the Testator so as the said Feast be a Month after his death with a Clause of Entry for Non-payment The Testator dies the Houses are worth 16 l. per annum and whether Robert the Son shall have an Estate for Life only or in Fee was the Question This was argued by Jones Serjeant for the Plaintiff and by Seys Serjeant for the Defendant And for the Plaintiff it was said Ex parte Quer. that Robert had but an Estate for Life 'T is true in most Cases the Word paying makes a Fee where there is no express Fee limited but the difference is viz. where the Mony to be paid is a Sum in gross let it be equivalent or not to the value of the thing devised the Devisee shall have a Fee though the Estate be not devised to him and his Heirs but if it be an annual payment out of the thing devised as in this Case it will not create a Fee without apt words because the Devisée hath no loss and therefore it hath beén held that if a Devise be made to two Sons to the intent that they shall bear equal share towards the payment of 40 l. to his Wife for Life the Sons had only an Estate for Life because 't is quasi an annuel Rent out of the Profits and no Sum in gross * Jones 211. Cro. Car. 157. Broke Abr. tit Estate 78. And * 6 Co. 16. Colliers Case was much relied on where this very difference was taken and allowed that paying 25 l. in gross makes a Fee but paying 50 s. per annum creates only an Estate for Life All Devises are intended for the benefit of the Deviseé and therefore where a Sum in gross is devised to be paid which is done accordingly in such Case if the Deviseé should die soon after the Mony would be lost if he should have only an Estate for Life but in the Case at Bar the Testator by a nice calculation had appointed when the first payment should be made viz. not until a Month after his decease which hath prevented that damage which otherwise might have happened to the Devisee if no such provision had béen made Vide Hob. 65. Green's Case Ex parte Def. But on the other side it was said that Robert had a Fée for though here is a Sum to be paid annually 't is a Sum in gross and Collier's Case was also relied upon on this side It was agreed where payment is to be made by which the Devisee can sustain no loss the Word Paying there will not make a Fée but if there
Defendant by the Steward of the Burrough of Southwark for that he refused to take the Oath and serve as a Scavenger in the said Burrough though duly Elected according to Custom there and upon nil debt pleaded the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was Viz. They find the Act of 14 Car. 2. cap. 2. And the Proviso therein which governed this Case viz. That all Streets and Lanes in London Westminster and the Liberties thereof shall be Paved as they have alwayes used to be Then follows another Clause by which it is Enacted That Scavengers shall be Chosen in the City of London and the Liberties thereof according to the Ancient Usage and Custom so likewise in the City of Westminster but nothing is therein mentioned of Southwark And in all other places a new form of choosing is prescribed Viz. In the other Parishes the Constables Church-Wardens c. shall meet in the Easter-Week and choose two Scavengers in every respective Parish so that the intent of the Act must be though Southwark is not named that still Scavengers shall be chosen there as formerly because London and the Liberties thereof are to follow their Ancient Custom in the choice of this Officer and Southwark is within the City Liberties But whether the Custom of choosing of him was not taken away by this Statute and so the Fine not well Assessed was the Question Ex partte Quer. Baldwyn for the Plaintiffs argued That admitting in Southwark a Scavenger may be chosen according to the new form prescribed in the Act yet this Statute was only in the * Hob. 173. Dyer 341. b. Affirmative and did not thereby take away the custom of choosing him at the Leet Like the Case in Dyer 50. An Act that the Youngest Son shall have an Appeal of the death of his Father Hob. 17. yet that doth not exclude the Eldest because 't is the Common Law and there are no words to restrain him In the 11 Co. 63. Doctor Foster's Case By the Statute of 35 Eliz. against Recusants which gives the Penalty of 20 l. ê“ Month against the Offender the 12 d. for the neglect of every Sunday given by a former * 1 Eliz. Statute is not taken away But where there is a Negative Clause in an Act of Parliament the Law is otherwise as an Act that the Sessions of the Peace shall be kept at Beaumarris tantum non alibi infra ComÌ„ c. and the Iustices kept it at another place and several were Indicted before them at that time but the Iustices were fined and all their proceedings held Coram non Judice by reason of the Negative Prohibition Dyer 135. 1 Inst Sect. 500. 2 Inst 68. By the Statute of Magna Charta cap. 34. a Woman shall bring no Appeal but for the death of her Husband which she might at Common Law before the making of this Statute if therefore she is Heir to her Father the Appeal which she might have brought for his death by these Negative words is taken away Ex parte Def. Barrell for the Defendant though this Law be in the Affirmative yet since it doth not prejudice any person neither can it be injurious if Scavengers are chosen as directed by the Act it shall be taken as a Negative Clause and for this many Instances may be given as the Statute for devising part of the Testators Land doth not take away the custom to devise the whole for that would be an apparent prejudice to the Parties but not so in this Case where 't is not found that the Lord of the Mannor sustains any loss for he is to have nothing when a Scavenger is chosen in the Leet nor are the Inhabitants prejudiced for by this New choosing their Streets shall be kept as clean as before The Form here established doth not consist with the Custom and so hath the Effect of a Negative Clause Hob. 298. It appears by the Scope of the Act That the intent of the Parliament was to take away those old Customs of choosing because the Customs are expressly saved in London and Westminster but in all other places a new way is appointed The pavement of the Streets in Southwark shall be as before but that Clause goes no farther and therefore concerns not the Case of a Scavenger whose duty is not to pave but cleanse the Streets And the words viz. Liberties of the City of London will not help because Southwark is not comprehended under them in that Clause no more than are the Lands which they have in Yorkshire for the word Liberties * Postea 48. there is taken for Limits and can admit of no other Construction Lastly that the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgment because he hath no alledged the Custom to be That the Steward may Fine in case of the refusal to take the Oath c. and Customs are to be taken stictly The Chief Iustice and Iustice Atkins said That 't is true Scavengers are under the power of the Court Leet by Custom and in case of refusal may be fined as well as an Ale-Taster But this Act of Parliament having taken notice that there were Scavengers before that time and Southwark being therein named as distinct from the Liberties of London for 't is provided That Westminster London and the Liberties thereof and Southwark are to have the Streets paved as before which doth not belong to the Office of a Scavenger and so that Clause in the Act concerns not this Case But where it Enacts That in London and Westminster Scavengers shall be chosen as before but in all other places appoints a new way this is as much as if it had said That Scavengers shall be chosen in every place as by the Act prescribed and no other way except in London and Westminster and so great is the inconsistency between the Custom and the Act that they cannot stand both together therefore though the Act is but temporary the Custom is suspended and though it may be some damage to the Lord to make such Construction yet that will not alter the Case for Law-Makers are presumed to have respect to the publick Good more than to any private Mans profit and the Lord may be said in this case to have dispensed with his Interest being a Party to the Act and consenting thereunto But Wyndham and Ellis Iustices inclined That the Custom did continue because the Act was in the Affirmative and therefore they would not construe it to take away a Mans Right and Interest or a Custom where he hath a benefit as the Lord of the Mannor had in this Case who is prejudiced by the loss of his Fees and the intent of the Statute seemed to them to be That Scavengers should be chosen where none were before but not to take away Customs for chusing of them But another Argument was desired by Serjeant Howel the Recorder of London Rozal versus Lampen Variance in the Actions no
by Serjeant Jones that they should not pass for though Lands would pass so by a Fine because it was the Agreement of the Parties yet in a Recovery 't is otherwise because more certainty is required therein But in Fines no such Certainty is required and therefore a Fine de Tenementis in Golden-Lane hath beén held good though neither Vill Parish or Hamlet is mentioned Cro Eliz. 693. Cro. Jac. 574. Addison and Ottoway Postea But there being a Vill called Walton in the Parish of Street and a Fine being levyed of Land in Street the Lands in Walton did not pass unless Walton had béen an Hamlet of Street and the Fine had beén levied of Lands in the Parish of Street And the reason of this difference is because in Fines there are Covenants which though they are real in respect of the Land yet 't is but a personal Action in which the Land is not demanded ex directo but in a Recovery greater preciseness is required that being a Praecipe quod reddat where the Land it self is demanded and the Defendant must make Answer to it Cro. Jac. 574 5 Co. 40. Dormer's Case The Word * Antea 41. Liberty properly signifies a Right Priviledge or Franchise but improperly the extent of a place Hill 22 23 Car. 2. Rot. 225. B. R. Waldron's Case Hutton 106. Baker and Johnson's Case Liberties in Iudgment of Law are incorporeal and therefore 't is absurd to say that Lands which are corporeal shall be therein contained They are not permanent having their existence by the Kings Letters Patents and may be destroyed by Act of Parliament they may also be extinguish'd abridged or increased and a Vinire fac of a * Rast Ent. 267. Liberty or Franchise is not good 't is an equivocal Word and of no signification that is plain and therefore is not to be used in real Writs Rast Entr. 382. There is no Praecipe in the Register to recover Lands within a Liberty neither is there any authority in all the Law Books for such a Recovery and therefore if such a thing should be allowed many inconveniences would follow for a good Tenant to the Praecipe would be wanting and the intent of the Parties could not supply that But Barton Serjeant said that this Recovery would pass the Lands in Cotton for as to that purpose there was no difference betweén a Fine and a Recovery Postea 2 Roll. Abr. 20 Godb. 440. they are both become Common Assurances and are to be guided by the agreément of the Parties Cro. Car. 270 276. 'T is true a Fine may be good of Lands in an Hamlet Lieu conus or Parish 1 H. 5. 9. Cro. Eliz. 692. Jones 301. Cro. Jac. 574. Monk versus Butler Yet in a * Godb. 440. contra Scire Fac̄ to have Execution of such Fine the Vill must be therein mentioned Bro. Brief 142. The demand must be of Lands in a Vill Hamlet or at farthest in a Parish Cro. Jac. 574. And of that Opinion was the whole Court absente Ellis who was also of the same Opinion at the Argument and accordingly in Michaelmas Term following Iudgment was given that by this Recovery the Lands in Cotton did well pass And North Chief Iustice denied the Case in Hutton 106. Postea to be Law where 't is said A Common Recovery of Lands in a Lieu conus is not good and said that it had béen long disputed whether a Fine of Lands in a Lieu conus was good and in King James his time the Law was settled in that Point that it was good and by the same reason a Recovery shall be good for they are both amicable Suits and Common Assurances and as they grew more in practice the Iudges have extended them farther A Common Recovery is held good of an Advowson and no Reasons are to be drawn from the Visne or the Execution of the Writ of Seisin because 't is not in the Case of adversary Procéedings but by Agréement of the Parties where 't is to be presumed each knows the others meaning Indeed the Cursitors are to blame to make the Writ of Entry thus and ought not to be suffered in such practice Where a Fine is levied to two the Fée is always fixed in the Heirs of one of them but if it be to them and their Heirs yet 't is good though incertain but a Liberty is in the nature of a Lieu conus and may be made certain by Averment The Iury in this Case have found Cotton to be a Vill in the Liberty of Shrewsbury and so 't is not incorporeal Alford versus Tatnel JVdgment against two who are both in Execution Mod. Rep. 170. and the Sheriff suffers one to escape the Plaintiff recovers against the Sheriff and hath satisfaction the other shall be discharged by an Audita Querela Osbaston versus Stanhope General Replication good DEBT upon Bond against an Heir who pleaded that his Ancestor was seised of such Lands in Fee and made a Settlement thereof to Trusteés by which he limited the Vses to himself for Life Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body Remainder in Feé to his own right Heirs with power given to the Trusteés to make Leases for threé Lives or 99 years The Trustées made a Lease of these Lands for 99 years and that he had not Assets praeter the Reversion expectant upon the said Lease The Plaintiff replies protestando that the Settlement is fraudulent pro placito saith that he hath Assets by discent sufficient to pay him and the Defendant demurrs Ex parte Def. Newdigate Serjeant The Barr is good for the Plaintiff should not have replied generally that the Defendant hath Assets by discent but should have replyed to the praeter Hob. 104. Like the Case of Goddard and Thorlton Yelv. 170. where in Trespas the Defendant pleaded that Henry was seised in Fee who made a Lease to Saunders under whom he derived a Title and so justifies The Plaintiff replies and sets forth a long Title in another person and that Henry entred and intruded The Defendant rejoyns that Henry was seised in Fée and made a Lease ut prius absque hoc that intravit se sic intrusit and the Plaintiff having demurred because the Traverse ought to have been direct viz. absque hoc quod intrusit and not absque hoc that Henry intravit c. it was said the Replication was ill for the Defendant having alledged a Seisin in Fée in Henry which the Plaintiff in his Rejoynder had not avoided but only by supposing an intrusion which cannot be of an Estate in Fée but is properly after the death of Tenant for Life for that reason it was held ill Ex parte Quer. But Pemberton Serjeant for the Plaintiff held the Replication to be good The Defendants Plea is no more than Riens per descent for though he pleads a Reversion 't is not chargeable because 't is a Reversion after
of the next Avoidance was not good because it was made by those who were not Head of the Corporation and it must be void immediately or not at all and Iudgment was given accordingly Threadneedle versus Lynam THere being two Mannors usually let for 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. by the year Lease by a Bishop and more than the old Rent reserved good Mod. Rep. 203. a Bishop lets one of them for 21 years reserving the whole Rent and whether this was a good Lease within the Statute of 1 Eliz. cap. 19. was the Question which depended upon the construction of the Words therein viz. All Leases to be void upon which the old accustomed Rent is not reserved and here is more than the old Rent reserved and this being a private Act is to be taken literally North Chief Iustice agreed that private Acts which go to one particular thing are to be interpreted literally but this Statute extends to all Bishops and so may be taken according to Equity and therefore he and Wyndham and Atkins Iustices held the Lease to be good But this Case was argued when Vaughan was Chief Iustice and he and Iustice Ellis were of another Opinion DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Thorp versus Fowle No more Costs than Damages NOTA. In this Case the Court said that since the Statute which gives no more Costs than Damage 't is usual to turn Trespass into Case Cooper versus Hawkeswel Words IN an Action upon the Case for these Words I dealt not so unkindly with you when you stole a Stack of my Corn Per Curiam the Action lies Escourt versus Cole Words IN an Action on the Case for Words laid two ways the last Count was Cumque etiam which is but a recital and dubitatur whether good Sharp versus Hubbard Six Months for proving of a Suggestion THE six Months in which the Suggestion is to be proved must be reckoned according to the Calendar Months and 't is so computed in the Ecclesiastical Court Crowder versus Goodwin Justification by Process out of inferiour Court IN Assault and Battery and false Imprisonment as to the Assault c. the Defendant pleads Not-Guilty and as to the Imprisonment he justifies by a Process out an inferiour Court and upon Demurrer these Exceptions were taken to his Plea 1. The Defendant hath set forth a Precept directed Servienti ad Claven and 't is not said Ministro Curiae 2. 1 Rol. 484. Cro. Car. 254. Dyer 262. b. It was to take the Plaintiff and have him ad proximam Curiam which is not good for it should have beén on a day certain like Adams and Flythe's Case * Cro. Jac. 571. Mod. Rep. 81. where a Writ of Error was brought upon a Iudgment in Debt by Nil dicit in an inferiour Court and the Error assigned was That after Imparlance a day was given to the Parties till the next Court and this was held to be a Discontinuance not being a day certain 3. 'T is not said ad respondend ' alicui 4. Nor that the Action arose infra Burgum 5. The Precept is not alledged to be returned by the Officer To all which it was answered That a Pleint is but a Remembrance and must be short Rast 321. and when 't is entred the Officer is excused for he cannot tell whether 't is infra * Squibb versus Hole antea 29. Jurisdictionem or not And as to the first Exception a Precept may be directed to a private person and therefore Servienti ad Clavem is well enough Then as to the next Exception 't is likewise well set forth to have the Plaintiff ad proximam Curiam for how can it be on a day certain when the Iudge may adjourn the Court de die in diem Then ad respondendum though 't is not said alicui 'tis good though not so formal and 't is no Tort in the Officer but t is to be intended that he is to answer the Plaintiff in the Plaint As to the fourth Exception the Defendant sets forth that he did enter his Plaint secundum consuetudinem Curiae Burgi and when the Plaintiff declared there he shewed that the Cause did arise infra Jurisdictionem And as to the last The Officer is not punishable though he do not return the Writ The end of the Law is that the Defendant should be present at the day and if the Cause should be agreed or the Plaintiff give a Release when the Defendant is in custody no Action lies against the Officer if he be detained afterwards But the Chief Iustice doubted that for the second Exception the Plea was ill for it ought to be on a day certain and likewise it ought to be alledged infra Jurisdictionem But the other threé Iustices held the Plea to be good in omnibus and said that the inferior Court had a Iurisdiction to issue out a Writ and the Officer is excusable though the cause of Action did not arise within the Iurisdiction which ought to be shewn on the other side And so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Snow and others versus Wiseman Traverse necessary where omitted is substance TRespass for taking of his Horse The Defendant pleads that he was seised of such Lands and intitles himself to an Herriot The Plaintiff replies that another person was jointly seised with the Defendant Et hoc paratus est verificare The Defendant demurs generally because the Plaintiff should have traversed the sole Seisin But it was said for him that the sole Seisin néed not be traversed Sid. 300. because the matter alledged by him avoids the Barr without a Traverse In a Suggestion upon a Prohibition for Tythes the Plaintiff entituled himself by Prescription under an Abbot and shews the Vnity of Possession by the Statute of 31 H. 8. by which the Lands were discharged of Tythes Yelv. 231. Pl. Com. 230. 231. The Defendant pleads that the Abbey was founded within time of Memory and confesseth the Vnity afterwards and the Plea was held good for he néed not traverse the Prescription because he had set forth the Foundation of the Abbey to be within time of Memory which was a sufficient avoiding the Plaintiffs Title Yelv. 31. The Plaintiff therefore having said enough in this Case to avoid the Barr if he had traversed it also it would have made his Replication naught Cro. Jac. 221. like the Case of * Bedel and Lull where in an Ejectment upon a Lease made by Elizabeth the Defendant pleads that before Elizabeth had any thing in the Lands James was seised thereof in Fee and that it descended to his Son and so derives a Title under him and that Elizabeth was seised by Abatement The Plaintiff confesses the Seisin of James but that he devised it to Elizabeth in Fee and makes a Title under her absque hoc that she was seised by Abatement and upon a Demurrer the
year before the Sale After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgment by Serjeant Barrell because the Information had set forth the right of these Lands purchased to be in J. S. and that the Son of J. N. had conveyed them by general words 2 Anders 57. as descending from his Father which Title of the Son the Defendant bought whereas if in truth the Title was in J. S. then nothing descended from the Father to the Son and so the Defendant bought nothing Sed non allocatur for if such construction should be allowed there could be no buying of a pretended Title within the Statute unless it was a good Title but when 't is said as here that the Defendant entred and claimed colore of that Grant or Conveyance which was void yet 't is within the Statute so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Wine versus Rider al. TRespass against five Quare clausum fregerunt Traverse immaterial and took Fish out of the Plaintiffs Several and Free-Fishery Four of them pleaded Not Guilty and the fifth justified for that one of the other Defendants is seised in Fee of a Close adjoyning to the Plaintiffs Close and that he and all those c. have had the sole and separate Fishing in the River which runs by the said Closes with liberty to enter into the Plaintiffs Close to beat the Water for the better carrying on of the Fishing and that he as Servant to the other Defendant and by his Command did enter and so justified the taking absque hoc that he is Guilty aliter vel alio modo The Plaintiff replies That he did enter de injuria sua propria absque hoc That the Defendants Master hath the Sole Fishing The Defendant demurs Ex parte Def. and Newdigate Serjeant argued for him That the Iustification is good for when he had made a local justification 2 Cro. 45 372. he must traverse both before and after as he has done in this Case 2. The Plaintiffs Replication is ill for he ought not to have waved the Defendants Traverse and force him to accept of another from him because the first is material to the Plaintiffs Title and he is bound up to it Hob. 104. 3. There was no occasion of a Traverse in the Replication for where a Servant is Defendant de injuria sua propria is good with a Traverse of the Command Ex parte Quer. But on the Plaintiffs side Serjeant Baldwin held the Defendants Traverse to be immaterial for having answered the Declaration fully in alledging a Right to the sole fishing and an Entry into the Plaintiffs Close 2 Cro. 372. 't is insignificant afterwards to traverse that he is guilty aliter vel alio modo Then the matter of the Plea is not good because the Defendant justifies by a Command from one of the other Defendants who have all pleaded Not-guilty and they must be guilty if they did command him for a Command will make a Man a Trespasser Curia The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff For as to the last thing mentioned which was the Matter of the Plea they held it to be well enough for the * Mires and Solebay Post Servant shall not be ousted of the advantage which the Law gives him by pleading his Masters Command Then as to the Replication 't is good and the Plea is naught with the Traverse for where the Iustification goes to a time and place not alledged by the Plaintiff there must be a Traverse of both In this Case the Defendant ought to have traversed the Plaintiffs free fishing as alledged by him in his Declaration which he having omitted the Plea for that reason also is ill and so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Termino Paschae Anno 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Lee versus Brown IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was this Where reputed Lands shall pass under general words viz. There were Lands which re vera were not parcel of a Mannor and yet were reputed as parcel A Grant is made of the Mannor and of all Lands reputed parcel thereof and whether by this Grant and by these general Words those Lands would pass which were not parcel of the Mannor was the Question This Term the Lord Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court That those Lands would pass Postea Cro. Car. 308. and they grounded their Opinions upon two Authorities in Co. Entr. fol. 330 384. The King versus Imber Wilkins If the Iury had found that the Lands in question had beén reputed parcel of the Mannor it would not have passed had they found no more because the Reputation so found might be intended a Reputation for a small time so reputed by a few or by such as were ignorant and unskilful But in this Case 't is found that not only the Lands were reputed parcel but the reason why they were reputed parcel for the Iury have found that they were formerly parcel of the Mannor and after the division they were again united in the possession of him who had the Mannor which being also Copyhold have since béen demised by Copy of Court Roll togethet with the Mannor and these were all great marks of Reputation and therefore Iudgment was given that the Lands did well pass 2 Roll. Abr. 186. Dyer 350. Wakeman versus Blackwel Common Recoveries how to be pleaded QUare Impedit The Case was The Plaintiff entituled himself to an Advowson by a Recovery suffered by Tenant in Tail in pleading of which Recovery he alledges two to be Tenants to the Praecipe but doth not shew how they came to be so or what Conveyance was made to them by which it may appear that they were Tenants to the Praecipe and after search of Presidents as to the form of pleading of Common Recoveries the Court inclined that it was not well pleaded but delivered no Iudgment Searl versus Bunion Justification where good IN Trespass for taking of his Cattel The Defendant pleads that he was possessed of Blackacre pro termino diversorum annorum adtunc adhuc ventur̄ and being so possessed the Plaintiffs Cattle were doing damage and he distrained them Damage fesant ibidem and so justifies the taking c. The Plaintiff demurrs and assigns specially for cause that the Defendant did not set forth particularly the commencement of the Term of years but only that he was possessed of an Acre for a Term of years to come and regularly where a Man makes a Title to a particular Estate in pleading he must shew the particular time of the Commencement of his Title that the Plaintiff may replie to it Curia The Chief Iustice and the whole Court held that the Plea was good upon this difference where the Plaintiff brings an Action for the Land or doing of a Trespass upon the Land he is supposed to be in possession
but if he will justifie by vertue of any particular Estate he must shew the Commencement of that Estate and then such pleading as here will not be good But when the Matter is * Yelv. 75. Cro. Car. 138. collateral to the Title of the Land and for any thing which appears in the Declaration the Title may not come in question such a Iustification as this will be good In this Case no Man can tell what the Plaintiff will reply 't is like the Cases of Inducements to Actions which do not require such certainty as is necessary in other Cases So where an Action is brought for a Nusance and he intitles himself generally by saying he is possessionat ' pro termino annorum 't is well enough and he need not to set forth particularly the Commencement because he doth not make the Title his Case for which reason Iudgment was given for the Defendant Crosier versus Tomlinson Executor IN an Action on the Case Statute of Limitations of personal Actions extends to Indebitatus Assumpsit The Plaintiff declared that the Defendants Testator being in his Life time viz. such a day indebted to the Plaintiff in the Sum of 20 l. for so much Mony before that time to his use had and received did assume and promise to pay the same when he should be thereunto required and that the Testator did not in his Life time nor the Defendant since his death pay the Mony though he was thereunto required The Defendant pleads that the Testator did not at any time within six years make such promise The Plaintiff replies that he was an Infant at the time of the promise made and that he came not to full Age till the year 1672. and that within six years after he attained the Age of one and twenty years he brought this Action and so takes advantage of the promise in the Statute of * 21 Jac. c. 16. Limitations that the Plaintiff shall have six years after the disability by Infancy Coverture c. is removed And the Defendant demurred by Serjeant Rigby Ex parte Def. and the reason of his Demurrer was because in the said Proviso Actions on the Case on Assumpsit are omitted This Act was made for quieting of Estates and avoiding of Suits as appears by the Preamble and therefore shall be taken strictly there is an enumeration of several Actions in the Proviso and this is Casus omissus and so no benefit can be taken of the Proviso In a Writ of Error upon a Iudgment brought 4 Car. 1. in the Court of Windsor the Iudges held that an Action on the Case for * Cro. Car. 163 513 535. Debt upon Escape is out of the Statute 1 Sand 37. But an Action for Escape is not Sid. 305. So is Debt for not setting out of Tithes for these are not grounded upon any Contract Cro. Car. 513. Hut 109. slandering of a Mans Title is out of this Act because such an Action was rare and not brought without special damages But Hide Chief Iustice doubted 1 Cro. 141. The Law-makers could not omit this Case unadvisedly because 't is within those sorts of Actions enumerated by this Act. This Promise was made to the Plaintiff when he was but a day old and it would be very hard now after so many years to charge the Executor Ex parte Quer. But Turner Serjeant argued that though an Indebitat̄ assumpsit is not within the express words of the Proviso yet 't is within the intent and meaning thereof and so the Rule is taken in 10 Co. 101. in Bewfages Case quando verba statuti sunt specialia ratio autem generalis statutum intelligendum est generaliter And this is a Statute which gives a general remedy and the mischief to the Infant is as great in such Actions of Indebitatus assumpsit as other Actions and therefore 't is but reasonable to intend that the Parliament which hath saved their Rights in Debts Trovers c. intended likewise that they should not be barred in an Indebitatus Assumpsit In 2 Anders 55. Smith versus Colshil Debt was brought upon a Bond the Defendant there pleaded the Statute of the 5 E. 6. of selling of Offices the words of which are viz. That every Bond to be given for money or profit for any Office or Deputation of any Office mentioned in the Statute shall be void against the Maker In that case the Bond was given to procure a Grant of the Office and also to exercise the same now though this was not within the express words of the Statute yet the Bond was held void and if it should be otherwise the mischiefs which the Statute intended to remedy would still continue and therefore the intent of the Law-makers in such cases is to be regarded for which reason if Actions of Indebitatus Assumpsit are within the same mischief with other Actions therein mentioned 2 Anders 123 150. Cor. Car. 533. 19 H. 8. 11. such also ought to be construed to be within the same remedy But he took the Case of * Cro Car. 245. Swain versus Stephens to rule this Case at Bar in which Case this very Statute was pleaded to an Action of Trover and the Plaintiff replied that he was beyond Sea and upon a Demurrer to the Replication the Court held Trover to be within the Statute it being named in the Paragraph of Limitation of personal Actions which directs it to be brought within the time therein limited that is to say all Actions on the Case within six years and then enumerates several other Actions amongst which Trover is omitted yet the Court were then of Opinion that Trover is implied in those general words Curia And of that Opinion was the Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Atkyns Iustices That upon the whole frame of the Act it was strong against the Defendant for it would be very strange that the Plaintiff in this Case might bring an Action of Debt and not an Indebitatus Assumpsit When the Scope of an Act appears to be in a general sense the Law looks to the meaning and is to be extended to particular Cases within the same reason and therefore they were of Opinion That Actions of Trespass mentioned in the Statute are comprehensive of this Action because 't is a Trespass upon the Case and the words of the Proviso save the Infants Right in Actions of Trespass And therefore though there are not particular words in the enacting Clause which relate to this Action yet this Proviso restrains the severity of that Clause and restores the Common Law and so is to be taken favourably and this Action being within the same reason with other Actions therein mentioned ought also to be within the same remedy But Iustice Ellis doubted whether Actions of Trespass could comprehend Actions on the Case and that when the Parliament had enumerated Actions of Trespass Trover Case for Words c. If they had intended
Authorities with great exactness and nicety yet this Matter of Livery upon Endorsements of Writing was always favourably expounded of later times unless where it plainly appeared that the Authority was not pursued at all Sid. 428. as if a Letter of Attorney be made to thrée joyntly and severally two cannot execute it because they are not the Parties delegated they do not agreé with the Authority And Iudgment was given accordingly Richards versus Sely. THIS was a Special Verdict in Ejectione firmae for Lands in the County of Cornwal The Case was this viz. Covenant made to enjoy a Copy-hold de anno in annum 't is a Lease and so a Forfeiture Thomas Sely was seised of the Lands in question for life according the Custom of the Mannor of P. and he together with one Peter Sely were bound in a Bond to a third person for the payment of 100 l. being the proper Debt of the said Thomas who gave Peter a Counter-bond to save himself harmless And that Thomas being so seised did execute a Déed to Peter as a Collateral Security to indempnifie him for the payment of this 100 l. by which Deéd after a recital of the Counterbond given to Peter and the Estate which Thomas had in the Lands he did covenant grant and agree for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns with the said Peter that he his Executors and Administrators should hold and enjoy these Lands from the time of the making of the said Déed for seven years and so from the end of seven years to seven years for and during the term of 49 years if Thomas should so long live 2 Cro. 301. In which Déed there was a Covenant that if the said 100 l. should be paid and Peter saved harmless according to the Condition of the said Counterbond then the said Déed to be void The Question was whether this being in the Case of Copyhold Lands will amount to a Lease thereof and so make a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate there being no Custom to warrant it Ex parte Quer. This Case was argued this Term by Serjeant Pemberton for the Plaintiff and in Trinity Term following by Serjeant Maynard on the same side who said that this was not a good Lease to entitle the Lord to a Forfeiture It hath béen a general Rule that the Word Covenant will make a Lease though the Word Grant be omitted nay a Licence to hold Land for a time without either of those Words will amount to a Lease much more when the Words are to * 2 Cro. 92 398. Noy 14. 1 Roll. Abr. 848 849. Cro. Car. 207. have hold and enjoy his Land for a Term certain for those are Words which give an Interest and so it hath béen ruled in Tisdale and Sir William Essex's Case which is reported by several and is in Hob. 35. and 't is now setled that an Action of Debt may be brought upon such a Covenant And all this is regularly true in the Case of a Fréehold But if the construing of it to be a Lease will work a Wrong then 't is only a Covenant or Agreément and no Interest vests and therefore it shall never be intended a Lease in this Case because 't is in the Case of a Copyhold Estate for if it should there would be a Wrong done both to the Lessor and Lessée for it would be a Forfeiture of the Estate of the one and a defeating of the Security of the other It has beén generally used in such Cases to consider what was the intention of the Parties and not to intend it a Lease against their meaning for which there is an express Authority 2 Cro. 172. in the Case of Evans and Thomas Noy 128. in which Howel covenants with Morgan to make a Conveyance to him of Land by Fine provided that if he pay Morgan 100 l. at the end of thirtéen years that then the use of the Fine shall be to the Congnisor and covenants that Morgan shall enjoy the said Lands for thirtéen years and for ever after if the 100 l. be not paid The Assurance was not made and this was adjuged no Lease for thirtéen years because it was the intent of the Parties to make an Assurance only in the nature of a Mortgage which is but a Covenant And this appears likewise to be the intention of the Parties here because in the very Deed 't is recited that the Lands are Copihold It also sounds directly in Covenant for 't is that Peter shall or may enjoy without the lawful let or interruption of the Lessor All Agreements must be construed secundum subjectam materiam if the Matter will bear it and in most Cases are governed by the intention of the Parties and not to work a Wrong and therefore if Tenant in Tail makes a Lease for Life it shall be taken for his own Life and yet if before the Statute of Entails he made such Lease he being then Tenant in Fée-simple it had been an Estate during the Life of the Lessée but when the Statute had made it unlawful for him to bind his Heir then the Law construes it to be for his own Life because otherwise it would work a Wrong Hob. 276. Co. Lit. 42. So in this case it shall not amount to a Lease for the manifest inconveniency which would follow but it shall be construed as a Covenant and then no injury is done On the Defendants part it was argued by Serjeant Newdigate that though this was in the Case of a Copyhold Ex parte Def. that did not make any difference for the plain meaning of the Parties was to make a Lease But where the Words are doubtful and such as may admit of diverse constructions whether they will amount to a Lease or not there they shall be taken as a Covenant to prevent a Forfeiture So also if they are only Instructions as if a Man by Articles sealed and delivered is contented to demise such Lands and a Rent is reserved and Covenants to repair c. Or if one covenants with another to permit and suffer him to have and enjoy such Lands 1 Rol. Abr. 848. these and such like Words will not amount to a Lease because as hath béen said the intention of the Parties is only to make it a Covenant but here the Words are plain and can admit of no doubt But for an Authority in the Point the Lady * 2 Cro. 301. Mountagues Case was cited where it was adjudged that if a Copyholder make a Lease for a year warranted by the Custom sic de anno in annum during ten years 't is a good Lease for ten years and a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate Vide Hill 15 16 Car. 2. Rot. 233. the Case of Holt and Thomas in this Court The Court inclined that it was a good Lease Curia and by consequence a Forfeiture of the Copihold and that a Licence in this
Case could not be supposed to prevent the Forfeiture because if that had been the Iury would have found it the meaning of the Parties must make a Construction here and that seems very strong that 't is a good Lease but they gave no Iudgment Wilkinson versus Sir Richard Lloyd Where the Parties shall join in an Action where not THE Defendant covenanted that he would not agreé for the taking the Farm of the Excise of Beer and Ale for the County of York without the Consent of the Plaintiff and another and the Plaintiff alone brought this Action of Covenant and assigns for breach the Defendants agréeing for the said Excise without his Consent upon which the Plaintiff had a Verdict and 1000 l. damages given And Serjeant Pemberton moved in Arrest of Iudgment for that an Action of Covenant would not lie in this Case by the Plaintiff alone because he ought to have joined with the other both of them having a joint Interest and so is Slingsby's Case 5 Co. If a Bond is made to two joyntly and severally they must both join in an Action of Debt so here 't is a joint contract and both must be Plaintiffs So also if one covenants with two to pay each of them 20 l. they must both join 'T is true in Slingsbies Case 't was held if an Assurance is made to A. of White Acre and to B. of Black Acre and to C. of Green Acre and a Covenant with them and every of them these last Words make the Covenant several But here is nothing of a several interest no more than that one covenants with two that he will not join in a Lease without their Consent so that their Interest not being divided the Covenant shall be entire and taken according to the first Words to be a joint Covenant and the rather because if the Plaintiff may maintain this Action alone the other may bring a second Action and the Defendant will be subject to entire damages which may be given in both Judgment But the Court was of another Opinion that here was no joint Interest but that each of the Covenantees might maintain an Action for his particular damages or otherwise one of them might be remediless for suppose one of them had given his Consent that the Defendant should farm this Excise and had secretly received some satisfaction or recompence for so doing is it reasonable that the other should lose his remedy who never did consent For which reason the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Page versus Tulse Mil ' alios Vic' Midd ' THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case against the Sheriff for a false Return Case lies not against the Sheriff for returning a Cepi Corpus paratum habeo though the Party doth not appear Mod. Rep. 239. Ellis and Yarborough post setting forth that he sued a Capias out of this Court directed to the Sheriff of Middlesex by vertue whereof he arrested the Party and took Bail for his appearance and at the day of the Return of the Writ the Sheriff returned Cepi corpus paratum habeo but he had not the Body there at the Return of the Writ but suffered him to escape The Defendant pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 10. and saith that he took Bail viz. two sufficient Sureties and so let him go at large c. The Plaintiff demurrs and whether this Action lies against the Defendant was the Question who refused to proceed against him by way of Amerciament or to take an Assignment of the Bail-Bond This Case depended in Court several Terms It was argued by Serjeant Pemberton and Serjeant Coniers for the Plaintiff and by Serjeant George Strode for the Defendant and Iudgment was given in Easter Term in the 29th year of this King In the Argument for the Defendant that this Action would not lie it was considered Ex parte Def. 1. What the Common Law was before the making of this Statute 2. What alteration thereof the Statute had made At the Common Law Men were to appear personally to ansswer the Writ the Form of which required it and no Attorney could be made in any Action till Edw. 1. de gratia speciali gave leave to his Subjects to appoint them and commanded his Iudges to admit them 2 Inst 377. After the Arrest the Sheriff mighttie the Party to what Conditions he pleased and he might keep him till he had complied with such Conditions which often ended in taking extravagant Bonds and sometimes in other Oppressions for remedy whereof this Statute was made in which the Clause that concerns this Case is viz. If the Sheriff return upon any person Cepi Corpus or Reddidit se that he shall be chargeable to have the Body at the day of the Return of the Writ in such form as before the making the Act so that as to the Return of the Writ this Statute hath made no alteration the Sheriff being bound to have the Party at a day as before All the alteration made of the Common Law by this Statute is that the Sheriff now is bound to let the Party out of Prison upon reasonable Sureties of sufficient persons which before he was not obliged to do and it would be a Case of great hardship upon all the Sheriffs of England if they being compellable to let out the Party to Bail should also be subject to an Action for so doing because they have him not at the day so that the intent of the Law must be when it charges the Sheriff to have the Body at the Return that he should be liable to a Penalty if the Party did not then appear not to be recovered by Action but by Amerciament Cro. Jac. 286. The Security directed by this Act is to be taken in the Sheriffs own Name 't is properly his business and for his own Indempnity and therefore it is left wholly in his power for which reason no Action will lie against him for taking insufficient Bail that being to his own prejudice in which the Plaintiff is no wise concerned for if that had beén intended by the Act some Provision would have beén made as to his being satisfied in the sufficiency of the Persons When the Security is thus taken if the Defendant doth not appear at the Return of the Writ the Plaintiff by Amerciaments shall compel him to bring in the Body or to assign the Bond either of which is a full satisfaction and as much as is required If the Sheriff refuse to take 2 Sand. 59 154 1 Roll. Abr. 807 808. Cro. Eliz. 460 852. Noy 39. Moor 428. Sid. 23. sufficient Sureties when offered he is liable to an Action on the Case at the Suit of the Defendant for his refusal and it would be very unreasonable to enforce him to have the Party in Court at the Return when he is obliged under a Penalty to let him at large This Action is grounded upon a false Return when in
Trusteés therein named are appointed to sell it for payment of Debts and raising this Portion by which Act all Conveyances made by old Sir Robert Carr since the year 1639. are made void except such as were made upon valuable considerations but all those made by him before the said year with power of revocation if not actually revoked are saved and in the year 1636. he had executed a Conveyance by which he had made a Settlement of his Estate in Tayl with a power of revocation but it did not appear that he did ever revoke the same The greatest part of the Lands appointed by this Act of Parliament to be sold by the Trustees are the Lands comprised in that Settlement and now after the death of Sir Robert Carr the Plaintiff exhibits his Bill against the Son not knowing that such a Settlement was made in the year 1636. till the Defendant had set it forth in his Answer and by this Bill he desires that the Trustees may execute their Trust c. and that he may have relief On the Defendants side it was urged Ex parte Def. that after the Marriage there was a Bond given for an additional Ioynture and it was upon that account that the Defendant was drawn in to execute these Articles And if the very reason and foundation of his entring into them failed then they shall not bind him in Equity and in this Case it did fail because the Plaintiff had disabled himself to make any other Ioynture by a Pre-conveyance made and executed by him of his whole Estate and if this agreement will not bind him then this Court cannot enlarge the Plaintiffs remedy or appoint more than what by the Articles is agreed to be done neither can the Defendants sealing incumber the Estate Tayl in Equity because the Lands were not then in him his Father being Tenant in Tayl and then living and the subsequent descent by which the Lands are cast upon him alters not the Case for the very right which descends is saved by the Act from being charged But on the other side it was argued that though the Marriage did proceed upon the Defendants sealing yet the Assurance which was to be made was a principal Motive thereunto and it being agreed before Marriage though not executed it was very just that he should Seal afterwards and though the additional Ioynture was not made yet there was no colour that the Defendant should break his Articles for that reason because if the Bond be not performed 't is forfeited and may be sued and nothing appeared in the case of any Conveyance made by Sir Francis whereby he had disabled himself to make an additional Ioynture and he hath expresly denied it upon his Oath And though it was was objected that the Money was raised by the old Lady Carr and by the direction of the Trustees lodged in the hands of one Cook who is become insolvent It was answered that there was no proof of the consent of the Trustees and therefore this payment cannot alter the case After the matter thus stated the Lord Chancellor delivered his Opinion That the 6000 l. is doe to the Plaintiff unpaid and unsatisfied for though the Marriage had not taken effect yet the Covenant binds the Defendant because a Deed is good for a Duty without any consideration 2. The Plaintiff has remedy against the person of the Defendant at Law for this 6000 l. 3. He has remedy against such of the Defendants Lands which are not comprised in the Settlement made 1636. for as to them the Trustees may be enjoyned to execute the Trust And he desired the Opinions of the two Iustices if any thing more could be done in this case Iustice Windham was of Opinion that nothing more could be done but to make a Decree to enforce the execution of the Trust And Iustice Wild said that the Plaintiff has his remedy at Law against the Defendant and upon the Act of Parliament against the Trustees but upon these Articles no Decree could be made to bind the Lands for that would be to give a much better security than the Parties had agreed on But if there had been a Covenant in the Articles that a Fine should be levied it might have been otherwise 't is only that a Fine is intended to be levied But as to that the Lord Chancellor was of Opinion that it was a good Covenant to levy a Fine for the words Articles of Agreement c. go quite through and make that Clause a Covenant but because Iustice Wild was of another Opinion he desired the Attorny General to argue these three Points 1. Whether this was a Covenant to levy a Fine or not 2. If it was a Covenant whether this Court can decree him to do it for though the Party has a good remedy at Law yet whether this Court might not give remedy upon the Land 3. If it was a Covenant to levie a Fine and the Court may decree the Defendant to do it yet whether such a Decree can be made upon the prayer of this Bill it not being particularly prayed for the Plaintiff concluded his Bill with praying relief in the execution of the Trust c. In Trinity-Term following these Points were argued by Serjeant Maynard Sir John Churchil and Sir John King for the Plaintiff Mr. Attorny and Mr. Solicitor and Mr. Keck for the Defendant all in one day and in the same order as named The Councel for the Defendant urged Ex parte Def. that this was no Covenant in Law to enforce the Defendant to levy a Fine 'T is agreéd that there is no need of the word Covenant to make a Covenant but any thing under the Hand and Seal of the Parties which imports an Agreement will amount to a Covenant so in 1 Roll. Abr. 518. these words in a Lease for years viz. That the Lessee shall repair make a Covenant so in the Case of Indentures of Apprentiship there are not the formal words of a Covenant but only an Agreement that the Master shall do this and the Apprentice shall do that and these are Covenants but in all these Cases there is something of an undertaking as in 1 Roll 519. Walker versus Walker If a Deed be made to another in these words viz. I have a Writing in my custody in which W. standeth bound to B. in 100 l. and I will be ready to produce it This is a Covenant for there is a present engaging to do it but there are no such words here 't is only a recital That whereas a Fine is intended to be levied to such Uses c. 'T is only Introductive to another Clause without positive or affirmative words and therefore can never be intended to make a Covenant but are recited to another purpose viz. To declare the Use of a Fine in case such should be levied If Articles of Agreement are executed in consideration of an intended Marriage and one side Covenants to do one
thing and the other side another thing was it ever imagined that upon these words Whereas a Marriage is intended c. that an Action of Covenant might be brought to enforce the Marriage And yet there is as much reason for the one as the other therefore since the Parties have neither made nor intended it for a Covenant 't is not necessary that it should be so construed If this is a Covenant the Parties at Common Law could only bring an Action of Covenant and recover damages for not levying of the Fine and that the Plaintiff may do now upon the express Covenant for non-payment of the Money but then the breach must be assigned according to the words viz. That the Defendant did not levy a Fine as intended who may plead that a Fine was never intended to be levied and by what Iury shall this be tryed It may be objected that every Article stands upon its own bottom and the Title of them being Articles of Agreement extends to every Paragraph But as to that each of these Articles is to be considered by it self and every Paragraph begins viz it is Covenanted c. which shews it was never intended to make it a Covenant by the Title of the Articles and the rather because 't is unreasonable to make such a construction for it is not to be supposed that a Man will covenant that a Fine shall be levied as in this Case by A. and B. and himself when 't is not in his power to compel another 2. Admitting it to be a Covenant yet it would be very hard to decree the execution of a Fine in Specie for the Father of the Defendant was alive when he executed the Deed and the Father being Tenant in Tayl who never sealed the Son could have no present Right who did Seal and if matters had stood now as then how could a Court of Equity Decree a Fine by which a Right might be extinguished but could never be transferred and by which no use could be declared For though such a Fine be good by Estoppel before the Tayl descends to the Issue yet no use can be declared thereupon nor upon any Fine by Estoppel and there is no reason why length of time should put the Plaintiff into a better condition than he was when the Articles were executed 3. And lastly since here is a particular relief prayed in no wise concerning the levying of this Fine but only a Relief in the Execution of the Trust this Court cannot Decree the Defendant to levy one it being against the constant course and rules thereof But on the other side it was said by the Plaintiffs Council that the words do declare the intent of the Parties Ex parte Quer. that a Fine shall be levied and 't is the Intent which makes the Agreement and where there is an Agreement an Action of Covenant will lye If a Man Covenant to do such a thing in consideration of a Marriage and then there is this Clause viz. Whereas it is intended that he shall Marry before Michaelmas that then c. certainly upon the whole Deed here is a good Covenant to marry before Michaelmas In this Case 't is Covenanted that 6000 l. shall be paid and that it shall be secured as herein is after mentioned then 't is declared that a Fine is intended to be levied for that purpose this is a good Covenant to make a Security by a Fine But if the particular manner how the the Security was to be made had been omitted yet upon the words Covenant to secure it the Court hath a good ground to make a Decree to levy a Fine that being the only way to secure it 2. As to the Objection that the Defendant had but a possibility of having the Estate when he entred into this Couenant admitting it to be so yet why should that be a reason to hinder him from making good the Security when he hath it if Father and Son Covenant to make an Assurance the Father who had the Estate in possession dies the Decree must then operate upon that Estate in the hands of the Son 3. Here is a general prayer for a proper relief in which the Plaintiffs Case is included and therefore prayed Iudgment for him The Lord Chancellor Curia presently after the Arguments on each side delivered his Opinion That upon the whole frame of the Articles there was a Covenant to levy a Fine for wherever there is an Agreement under Hand and Seal Covenant lies that in this Case there was a plain Covenant if the first Article of giving farther security be coupled to that Paragraph of intending to levy a Fine for that is the farther security intended so that the meaning of the Parties runs thus I do intend to levy a Fine which is for the Securing of 6000 l. and this appears to be their Agreement Now there are many Cases where words will make a Covenant because of the Agreement when the general words of Covenant Grant c. are wanting as * Hays versus Bickerstaff Antea Postea Cook versus Herl Yielding and Paying will make a Covenant for the reasons aforesaid And therefore the Party having provided himself of real as well as personal Security by these Articles he said he would not deprive him of it especially when it might be more trouble to bring an Action of Covenant for the not levying of the Fine for upon that many Questions might arise as who should do the first act c. for which reasons he decreed the execution of the Fine in Specie DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Ingram versus Tothill REplevin The Case was Justification ill 1 Vent 314. Mod. Rep. 216 Postea A Man made a Lease for 99 years if A. B. and C. should so long live rendring an Herriot after the death of each of them successively as they are all three named in the Deed the last named died first and if an Herriot should be paid was the Question Stroud Serjeant urged that it should not because the reservation is the Lessors Creature and therefore to be taken strongly against him As if Rent be reserved to him and his * Per North a Devisee is not Assignee to take Assigns or to him and his Executors the Heir shall not have it So is the Authority in 33 Eliz. Owen 9. Reddend to the Lessor his Executors and Administrators durante termino 21 Annorum c. the Heir shall not have the Rent because 't is not reserved to him 5 Co. 35. Latch 274. In this Case the Herriot is reserved if the three dye successively and the Lessor is contented to trust to that Contingency Reddend ' annuatim duran ' termino praedict ' to the Lessor and his Assigns the Heir shall have it though not named Latch 99. 2 Sand. 367. As to this Point the Court gave no Opinion but Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff
one Prescription is directly contrary to the other and for that reason one must be traversed but here the Defendant hath confessed that the Plaintiff hath a Right of Common but t is not an absolute but a qualified Right against which the Defendant may Enclose and here being two Prescriptions pleaded and one of them not being confessed it must from thence necessarily follow that the other is the Issue to be tryed which in this Case is whether the Defendant can enclose or not The Chief Iustice and the whole Court were of Opinion Curia that where there are several Free-holders who have Right of Common in a Common Field that such a Custom as this of enclosing is good because the remedy is reciprocal for as one may enclose so may another But Iustice Atkyns doubted much of the Case at Bar because the Defendant had pleaded this Custom to Enclose in barr to a Freeholder who had no Land in the Common Field where he claimed Right of Common but prescribed to have such Right there as appendant to two Acres of Land he had alibi for which reason he prayed to amend upon payment of Costs Attorny General versus Sir Edward Turner in Scaccario Exposition of the Kings Grant INformation The Case was Viz. The King by Letters Patents granted several Lands in Lincolnshire by express words and then this Clause is added upon which the Question did arise Nec non totum illud fundum solum terras suas contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses quae sunt aqua cooperta vel quae in posterum de aqua possunt recuperari and afterwards a great quantity of Land was gained from the Sea and whether the King or the Patentee was intituled to those Lands was the Question Devise of a possibility good by a common person 2 Cro. 509. pl. 21. 1 Bulst 194. Sawyer for the King argued that he had a good Title because the Grant was void he having only a bare possibility in the thing granted at the time But Levins on the other side insisted that the Grant of those Lands was good because the King may Grant what he hath not in possession but only a possibility to have it But admitting that he could not make such a Grant yet in this Case there is such a certainty as the thing it self is capable to have and in which the King hath an Interest and it is hard to say that he hath an Interest in a thing and yet cannot by any means dispose of it If it should be objected that nothing is to pass but what is contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses granted and therefore an Inch or some such small matter must pass and no more certainly that was not the intention of the King whose Grants are to be construed favourably and very bountifully for his Honour and not to be taken by Inches Postea Company of Ironmongers and Naylor If there are two Marshes adjoyning which are the Kings and he grants one of them by a particular name and description and then he grants the other contigue adjacen ' ex parte australi certainly the whole Marsh will pass and 't is very usual in pleading to say a Man is seised of a House or Close and of another House c. contigue adjacen ' that is to be intended of the whole House In this Case the King intended to pass something when he granted totum fundum c. but if such construction should be made as insisted on then those words would be of no signification 'T is true the word illud is a Relative and restrains the general words and implies that which may be shewn as it were with a Finger and therefore in Doddington's Case 2 Co. 32. a Grant of omnia illa Mesuagia scituate in Wells and the Houses were not in Wells but elsewhere the Grant in that Case was held void because it was restrained to a certain Village and the Pronoun illa hath reference to the Town but in this Case there could be no such certainty because the Land at the time of the Grant made was under Water But if the Patent is not good by the very words of the Grant the non obstante makes it good which in this Case is so particular that it seems to be designed on purpose to answer those Objections of any mistake or incertainty in the value quantity or quality of the thing granted which also supplies the defects for want of right instruction given the King in all cases where he may lawfully make a Grant at the Common Law 4 Co. 34. Moor pl. 571. Bozuns Case And there is another very general Clause in the Patent viz. Damus praemissa adeo plene as they are or could be in the Kings hands by his Prerogative or otherwise * Ante Adeo plene are operative words Whistlers Case 10 Co. And there is also this Clause omnes terras nostras infra fluxum refluxum maris 'T is true Sid. 149. these words praemissis praed ' spectan ' do follow from whence it may be objected that they neither did or could belong to the Premisses and admitting it to be so yet the Law will reject those words rather than avoid the Grant in that part In the Case of the Abbot of * 9 Co. 27. b. Strata Marcella the King granted a Mannor Et bona catalla felonum dicto Manerio spectan ' now though such things could not be appendant to a Mannor yet it was there adjudged that they did pass Such things as these the King hath by his Prerogative and some things the Subject may have by Custom or Prescription as Wrecks c. and in this very Case 't is said that there is a Custom in Lincolnshire that the Lords of Mannors shall have derelict Lands and 't is a reasonable Custom for if the Sea wash away the Lands of the Subject he can have no recompence unless he should be entituled to what he gains from the Sea and for this there are some Authorities as Sir Henry Constable's Case 2 Roll. 168. 5 Co. Land between High-Water and Low-Water Mark may belong to a Mannor But no Iudgment was given Morris versus Philpot in B. R. Release by an Executor before Probate THE Plaintiff as Executor to T. brings an Action of Debt against the Defendant as Administrator to S. for a Debt due from the said intestate to the Plaintiffs Testator The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff released to him all Brewing Vessels c. and all other the Estate of S. lately deceased this Release was before probate of the Will to which Plea the Plaintiff demurred and whether this Release was a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action was the Question Ex parte Quer. It was said for the Plaintiff that it was not for if a Conusee release to the Cognisor all his right and title to the Lands of the Cognisor and afterwards sues out
pass why did they levy this Fine sur concessit They might have levyed a Fine sur Cognisance de droit come ceo c. and that had beén a Disseisin Besides what need was there for them to mention any Estate which they had in these Houses if they had intended a Disseisin But this being done such a Construction is to be made as may support the intent of the Parties and it would be very unreasonable that what was intended to preserve the Estate should now be adjudged to work a Dissesin so as to forfeit it and such a Disseisin upon which this collateral Warranty shall operate and barr the Estate in Remainder And therefore no more shall pass by this Fine than what lawfully may and rather than it shall be construed to work a Wrong the Estate shall pass by fractions for both the Estates of William Mitton for Life are not so necessarily joyned and united by this Fine that no room can be left for such a Construction 2. Such a Construction will not agreé with the Nature and Words of this Fine 'T is true a Fine as it is of the most solemn and of the greatest Authority so 't is of the greatest force and efficacy to convey an Estate and the most effectual Feoffment of Record where 't is a Feoffment and likewise the most effectual Release where 't is to be a Release But on a bare Agreément made in Actions betwéen the Demandant and Tenant at the Barr and drawn up there the Iudges will alter and amend such Fines if they did not in all things answer the intention of the Parties 24 Ed. 3. 36. Postea 'T is agreed that Fines can work a Disseisin when they can have no other Interpretation as if Tenant pur auter vie levy a Fine to a Stranger for his own Life 't is more than such a Tenant could do because his Estate was during the Life of another and no longer So a Fine sur Cognisance de droit c. implies a Fée which being levyed by any one who has but a particular Estate will make a Disseisin But this Fine sur concessit has beén always taken to be the most harmless of all others and can be compared to nothing else than a Grant of totum statum suum quicquid habet c. by which no more is granted than what the Cognisor had at the time of the Grant and so it hath been always construed Indéed there is a Fine sur concessit which expresses no Estate of the Grantor and this is properly levyed by Tenant in Fée or Tail but when particular Tenants pass over their several Estates they generally grant totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis being very cautious to express what Estate they had therein When this Fine sur concessit was first invented the Iudges in those days looked upon the Words quicquid habent c. to be insignificant and for that reason in Anno 17 E. 3. 66. they were refused The case was Two Husbands and their Wives levied such a Fine to the Cognisee and thereby granted totum quicquid habent c. which Words were rejected and the Iudge would not pass the Fine because if the Party had nothing in the Land then nothing passed and so is 44 Ed. 3. 36. By which it appears that the Iudges in those times thought these Fines did pass no more than what the Cognisor had and for this there are multitude of Authorities in the Year Books Now these Words cannot have a signification to enlarge the Estate granted they serve only to explain what was intended to pass for in the Case at the Barr if the Grant had béen totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis there would have been no question of the Estate granted but the Cognisors having granted tenementa praedicta they seem by these subsequent Words to recollect themselves viz. totum quicquid habent in tenementis praedictis Object But it may be objected that the Limitation of the Estate viz. durante vita eorum alterius eorum diutius viventis works a Disseisin because by those Words two Estates for Life pass entire in possession whereas in truth there was but one Estate for Life of the Husband in possession and therefore this was more than they could grant because the Estate Tayl came between the Estate which the Husband and Wife had for their Lives and for the Survivor of them and the Estate which the Husband had for his own Life And this is farther enforced by that Rule in Law That Estates shall not pass by fractions for otherwise there can be no reason why they should not thus pass Answ But this Rule is very fallible and not so much to be regarded 't is true the Rule is so far admitted to be true where without inconveniency Estates may pass without fraction but where there is an inconveniency it may be dispensed withal it being such an inconveniency as may appear to the Iudges to make the thing granted to go contrary to the intent of the Parties And that such Interpretations have been made agrees with the third Reason proposed in this Case viz. That it hath received countenance by judicial Opinions and determinations in former Iudgments 14 E. 4. 4. 27 H. 8. 13. 1 Co. 67. Bredons Case which was thus Tenant for life remainder in tayl to A. remainder in tayl to B. Tenant for life and he in the first remainder levied a Fine sur cognisance de droit come ceo 't was adjudged that this was no Discontinuance of either of the Remainders 1 Roll. Abr. lit I. pl. 4. 1 Inst 45. a. Cro. Car. 406. because each of them gave what he might lawfully viz. The Tenant for Life granted his Estate and the Remainder-man passed a Fee-simple determinable upon his Estate Tail and yet each of their Estates were still divided On the other side it was said that in all Cases where the person who hath a particular Estate takes upon him either by Feoffment in pais or by Fine which is a Feoffment on Record to grant a greater Estate than he hath as in this Case is done though possibly the Estate of the Grantée may determin before that of the Grantor yet 't is a displacing the Reversion as if a Man has an Estate for ten Lives and makes a Grant for the Life of another here is a possibility that the Estate which he granted may be longer than the Estate he had in the thing granted because one Man may survive the Ten and for that reason 't is a divesting 1. In this Case the Estate which the Husband and Wife had is to be considered 2. What they granted And by comparing of these together it will appear whether they granted more than they had The Husband and Wife had an Estate for the Life of the Wife and after the Estate Tail the Husband had an Estate for his own Life now they grant
an Estate for the Life of the Husband and Wife and the Survivor What is this but one entire Estate in possession No other Interpretation can be agréeable to the sense of the Words for if it had been granted according to the true Estate which each had then it should have been first for the Life of the Wife and after the Tail spent then for the Life of the Husband The next thing to be considered is Whether the Estate shall pass entire or by fractions And as to that I need say no more than only to quote the Authority of that Iudgment given in Garret and Blizard's Case 1 Roll. Abr. 855. which is shortly thus viz. Tenant for Life Remainder for Life Remainder in Tail Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for Life in Remainder this Tenant for Life in Remainder levies a Fine come ceo c. it was adjudged a Forfeiture of his Estate for Life so that the Remainder Man in Tail might enter after the death of the Tenant for Life in possession for it shall not be intended that he passed his Estate by fractions viz. an Estate in Remainder for Life and a Remainder in Feé expectant upon the Estate Tail but one entire Estate in possession and 't is not like the Authority in Bredon's Case for there the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail followed one another Next it is to be considered whether after they granted omnia illa tenementa the subsequent Words totum statum suum c. do not come in by way of Restriction and qualifie what went before But those subsequent Words are placed in this Fine not by way of Restriction but of Accumulation Litt. 345 In Littleton Sect. 613. 't is said that if Tenant in Tail grants all his Estate in the Tenements Habendum all his Estate c. in this Case the Alienee hath but an Estate for the Life of the Tenant in Tail and 't is observable that totum statum in the Case put by Littleton is both in the Premisses and the Habendum But if I will grant tenementa praedicta in the Premisses and then make another Limitation in the Habendum there totum statum quicquid can make no Restriction if it should it will spoil most Conveyances It is agréed that if those Words had béen omitted in this Case then by this Fine the Reversion would be displaced and therefore much weight is laid upon these Words to explain the meaning of the Parties thereby and that when they granted tenementa praedicta they meant totum statum c. But here is no ground for such an Interpretation 't is an entire Grant of the Houses by the Words Tenementa praedicta and the subsequent Words shall never be allowed to make such a Restriction which shall overthrow the frame of the Déed If a Man who has no Estate in the Land passes it by Deéd this shall work against him by way of Estoppel and these Words totum quicquid c. which are usual in all Conveyances shall make no alteration of the Law for if such construction should be made of these Words as hath béen objected then in all Déeds where they are inserted if it happen that the Party hath no Estate or a void Estate nothing passes and then Covenants Estoppels and Warranties would be no Securities in the Law 2. These Words totum quicquid c. come in a distinct Clause of the Grant the precedent Words are Tenementa praedicta totum statum quicquid c. reddiderunt which are two parts a Grant and a Release and have no dependance upon each other being distinct Clauses and therefore these Words shall not be any Restriction of the former but if one Clause be carried on with a connexion so as 't is but an entire sentence in such Case a Man may restrain either general or particular Words Hob. 171. in Stukely and Butler's Case 3. Admitting these Words are a Restriction of the former yet the Estate is so limited that if the first Words were out of the Case this later Clause he said was enough for his purpose for the Grant is not in the usual Words by which Estates pass viz. Estate Right Title Interest but Totum quicquid c. for the Lives of the Grantors and the Survivor which shews that they took upon themselves to grant for a longer time than they had in possession if they had only granted it for both their Lives they might have some colourable pretence 4. 'T is apparent from the Clause of the Warranty that the intent of the Parties was to grant an Estate expresly in possession for the Lives both of the Husband and his Wife for 't is that which the Grantée shall hold c. during their Lives and the longest Liver Object The Case of * 2 Rol. Abr. 36 403. Eustace and Scaven has been objected 'T is reported in 2 Cro. 696. which is Feme Covert and A. are Iointenants for Life the Husband and Wife levy a Fine to A. the other Iointenant and grant the Land and totum quicquid habent c. to him during the Life of the Wife with Warranty the Wife survives A. her Companion Adjudged that these Words Totum quicquid shall not enure by way of Grant and severance of the Iointure of the Moiety for then there would be an Occupancy but they are restrictive only to the Estate of the Wife and shall enure by way of Release to A. so that after his death he in Reversion may enter Answ It would not be a Question in that Case whether these Words were restrictive or not for nothing was granted but what might lawfully pass viz. during the Life of the Wife the other Ioyntenant neither was there any stress laid on those Words for Mr. Iustice Jones who was a Learned Man and reported the same Case fol. 55. hath made no mention thereof but hath wholly omitted those Words which he would not have done if the Case had depended upon them 2. Object Next the Form of this Fine has been objected and a President was cited Rast Entr. 241. where such a Fine was levied and nothing passed but for the Life of the Conusor Answ But no Authority can be produced where a Man that had an Estate for Life in Possession and another in Remainder and granted by the same Words as in this Case but that it was a Forfeiture 3. Object That the Law will not make a Construction to work a Wrong and therefore if Tenant for Life grant generally for Life it shall be interpreted during the Life of the Grantor Answ That Case is without express Words or shewing any time for which the Grantee shall have the thing granted and therefore the Law restrains it to the Life of the Grantor because it will not make Words which are doubtful and of incertain signification to do any Wrong But where there are express Words as in this Case no other
to shew that the Proceedings of that Court did not alter but interpret the Law But admitting the Case of the Duke of Norkfolk to be Law yet it concerns not this because the Sub Marshal there was taken as a Deputy but there is no such Officer as a Sub-Warden for Duckenfield had it for Life And then a Deputy being a person removable at pleasure will not be so considered in Law as one who hath a more fixed Estate for having nothing to lose it cannot be intended that he will be so careful in the execution of his Office as the other and therefore 't is reasonable in such Case that the Superiour should answer But he who hath a Freehold for Life hath an Estate of some value in the Law which he cannot be supposed easily to forfeit and therefore 't is reasonable that he alone should be lyable for his own Miscarriages for if the Defendant should be charged by the same reason the Grantee of the Reversion may be charged who is altogether an innocent person and so may be liable to a vast Sum for the Fault of another for which Reasons he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant The Court delivered no Opinion this Term Judgment but took time to advise and afterwards in Easter Term following Rainsford Chief Iustice delivered the Opinions of Twisden Wild and Jones Iustices who said they were all agreéing in the main Point but thought the Verdict imperfect and not to warrant the Plaintiffs Case for he declared that at the time when the Grant was made to Duckenfield when the Commitment was and when the Escape was suffered and ever since that Duckenfield was insufficient and not able to answer the Plaintiff but the Iury in the Special Verdict do not find the insufficiency at that time when this Action was brought But as to the main Question they were of Opinion that the Defendant was Superior and that he is chargeable for this insufficiency of Duckenfield but if he had béen sufficient when the Plaintiff brought this Action it might have been otherwise but his Inability being fully averred in the Declaration and the Defendant denying it and the Iury having found nothing against it but there being strong Suspicions of the truth of the Fact the Court would not make an intendment to the contrary The Iury have found expresly that Duckenfield was insufficient at the time of the Escape which was within six Weeks of the time when the Action was commenced so that having once found him disabled unless it appear that he was of Ability afterwards the Court will not intend him so but rather that he was insufficient at the time of the Action brought for there being strong surmises of it and there being no ground within the Record to intend him sufficient a Fact may be collected that is not found in the Verdict Fulwoods Case 4 Co. The King versus Moor. Difference between a prohibitory Clause and a Clause which gives a Penalty in a Statute AN Information was brought upon the Statute of the 4th 5th of Philip and Mary cap. 8. which Enacts That if any Person c. above the Age of 14 shall after the first day of April next after the making the Statute unlawfully take a Maid or Woman unmarried being within the Age of 16 years c. the Party shall suffer two years Imprisonment or pay such Fine as shall be assessed in the Star Chamber and that the Defendant existens supra aetatem quatuordecim annorum did take a young Maid away unmarried and kept her three days contra formam Statuti upon which he was found Guilty and now moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. It was said for the Defendant that this Court could not Fine him upon this Statute because when the Informer entitles himself by a Statute he must take the remedy therein prescribed and so 't is not like an Information at the Common Law for in such case this Court might Fine the Plaintiff 2. It is not averred that the party offending was above the age of 14 years at the time of taking but only that he being above the age of 14 such a day did take Where there are not Negative Words the Court of Kings Bench is not restrained Mod. Rep. 34. Sid. 359. Sir William Jones contra If the first Objection hath any weight in it 't is to bring the Party to an Imprisonment for the space of two years which is a punishment directed by that Statute but the Fine is limited to the Star Chamber and those Offences which were punishable there are likewise to be punished here because there are no Negative words in this Statute to abridge the authority of this Court which is never restrained but when the Statute directs before whom the Offence shall be Tried and not elsewhere It was the Opinion of my Lord Chief Iustice Hales That where there is a prohibitory Clause in a Statute and another Clause which gives a Penalty if the Party will go upon the prohibitory Clause Postea he is not confined to the manner expressed in the Statute but if he will go upon the Penalty he must then pursue what the Statute directs The first part of this Statute is but a Declaration of the Common Law the second Clause is introductive of a new Law as to the Court of Star Chamber but is not a restriction as to this Court which might have punished the Defendant if there had been no such Law The first Clause is prohibitory viz. That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away a Maid unmarried and upon this Clause this Information is brought The second Clause is distinct and directs the punishment viz. Upon Conviction to suffer Imprisonment for two years Now by taking away the Court of Star Chamber this prohibitory Clause is not repealed upon which a Man may be Indicted without demanding the Penalty and the Statute having directed that the Offence shall be heard and determined before the Kings Council in the Star Chamber or before the Iudge of Assise and no Negative words to restrain this Court therefore the Chief Iustice who is the Iudge of * Cro. Car. 463. Assise in the County of Middlesex may hear and determine this Offence and by consequence Fine the Party if he be found Guilty As to the second Objection That it is not averred that the Party offending was above the age of 14 years at the time of the taking it had been better if it had been said tunc existen ' supra aetatem quatuordecim annorum but notwithstanding 't is well enough for 't is said that being above the age of 14 years such a day he did take c. so that it cannot be otherwise but that he was of such an age at the time when the Maid was taken and the Iury found him Guilty contra formam Statuti which may likewise be an Answer to the first Objection for he being found Guilty contra formam
Statuti if there be any other Statute which prohibits and punishes a Riot this Information is as well grounded upon such as upon this Statute of Philip and Mary for 't is expresly said that the Defendant and others did unlawfully assemble themselves together and riotose routose made an Assault upon her so that it shall be intended to be grounded upon such a Law as shall be best for punishing the Offence The Court were of Opinion Curia That notwithstanding these Exceptions the Information was good and was not like the Case of an Indictment upon the Statute for a forceable Entry That such a day by force and arms the Defendant did Enter into such a House 2 Cro. 14610 639. existen ' liberum tenementum of J. N. and if he doth not say tunc existen ' the Indictment is naught because the Iury may enquire of a thing before it is done but here the existen being added to the person carries the sense to the time of the Offence committed The Statute of 1 R. 3. saith that all Grants made by Cestui que use being of full Age shall be good against him and his Heirs and 't is adjudged 16 H. 7. that he need not shew when and where but generally existen ' of full Age and upon the Evidence it must be so proved Where a thing relates to the Condition of a Man it shall be tryed in the County where the Action is laid and 't is not necessary to say in what County he is a Knight or an Esquire any Citizen and Freeman may devise his Land in Mortmain by the Custom of London 't is enough to say in Pleading existen ' a Citizen and Freeman without setting forth when and where If a Man be Indicted for not coming to Church 't is enough to say existen ' of the Age of 16 years he did not come to Church This is an Offence punishable at Common Law 't is malum in se But admitting 't was an Offence created by the Statute there being no Negative words to prohibit this Court hath a Iurisdiction to punish this Offence if the Star Chamber had not been taken away for the Party had his election to proceed in this Court upon the prohibitory Clause and the Iustices of Assise must be intended the Iustices of Oyer and Terminer Moor 564. Whereupon the Defendant was Fined 500 l. and bound to his good Behaviour for a Year Brown versus Waite Entailed Lands forfeited for Treason Jones 57. 1 Ventr 299. UPon a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was viz. Sir John Danvers the Father of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was in Anno Domini 1646. Tenant in Tail of the Lands now in Question and was afterwards instrumental in bringing the late King Charles to death and so was guilty of High Treason and dyed Afterwards the Act of Pains and Penalties made 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. Enacts That all the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which Sir John Danvers had the 25th day of March in the year 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King And whether these entailed Lands shall be forfeited to the King by force of this Act was the Question Wallop who argued for the Plaintiff said that the entailed Lands were not forfeited his Reasons were 1. These Lands entailed are not expressly named in that Act. 2. Tenant in Tail hath but an Estate for Life in his Lands and therefore by these words All his Lands those which are entailed cannot be intended for if he grant totum statum suum only an Estate for Life passeth 3. These Lands are not forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. which gives the forfeiture of entailed Lands in case of Treason hecause Sir John Danvers was not convicted of it by Process Presentment Confession Verdict or Outlawry which that Statute doth require for he dyed before any such Conviction Sir Francis Winnington the Kings Solicitor argued contra that entailed Lands are forfeited by the Act of Pains and Penalties and in speaking to this matter he considered 1. The words of that Act. 2. How Estates Tail were created and how forfeitable for Treason 1. This Act recites the Act of general Pardon which did not intend to discharge the Lands of Sir John Danvers and others from a Forfeiture 2. It recites that he was Guilty of High Treason 3. Then comes the enacting Clause Viz. That all the Lands Tenements Rights Interests Offices Annuities and all other Hereditaments Leases Chattels and other things of what nature soever of him the said Sir John Danvers and others which they had on the 25th of March 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King his Heirs and Successors 2. As to the creation of Intails there were no such Estates at the Common Law they were all Fee-simple Conditional and post prolem suscitatam the Condition was performed for three purposes Viz. To Alien Co. Lit. 19. a. 2 Inst 334. To Forfeit Or to charge with a Rent and thus the Law continued till 13 E. 1. and there having been frequent Warrs between King John and the Barons the great Men then obtained the Statute De donis to preserve their Estates lest the like occasion should happen again in which 't is only mentioned that the Tenant in Tail should not have power to alien but it was well known that if he could not alien he could not forfeit for before that Statute as he might alien post prolem suscitatam so the Iudges always construed that he might forfeit 5 Edw. 3.14 for forfeiture and alienation did always go hand in hand 1 Co. 175. Mildmay's Case And from the making of that Statute it always continued a setled and received Opinion That Tenant in Tail could not alien until by the 12th of Ed. 4. a Recovery came in by which the Estate Tail may be docked and which is now become a Common Assurance Then by the Statute of 4 H. 7. cap. 24. Tenant in Tail might bar his Issue by Fine and Proclamation and all this while it was not thought that such Lands could be forfeited for Treason which Opinion continued during all the Reign of H. 7. for though by his Marriage the Houses of York and Lancaster were united yet the Great Men in those days thought there might be some doubt about the Succession after the death of H. 7. if he should dye without Issue and thereby those differences might be again revived and therefore no endeavours were used to make any alteration in the Law till after the death of H. 7. And after his Son H. 8. had Issue those doubts were removed and being never likely to arise again then the Act of 26 H. 8. was made which gives a Forfeiture of entailed Lands in cases of Treason The inference from this will be that all the Cases put before the 26th year of H. 8. and so before entailed Lands were made forfeitable for Treason and where by the general Words
of Lands Tenements and Hereditaments 't was adjudged entailed Lands did not pass do not concern this Case but now since they are made forfeitable by that Statute such general words are sufficient to serve the turn By the Statute of 16 R. 2. cap. 5. entailed Lands are not forfeited in a Praemunire but during the Life of Tenant in Tail because they were not then to be forfeited for Treason 2 Inst 334. 1 Inst 3. Co. Lit. 130. If then it appears that the Crime of which Sir John Danvers was guilty was Treason and if entailed Lands are forfeited for Treason then when the Act saith That he shall forfeit all his Lands by those general Words his entailed Lands shall be forfeited And though by the Common Law there can be no Attainder in this Case the Party being dead yet by Act of Parliament that may be done and the words in this Act amount to an Attainder The intent of it was to forfeit Estates Tail which may be collected from the general Words for if a Fee-simple is forfeited though not named why not an Estate Tail especially since the word Hereditaments is very comprehensive and may take in both those Estates Spelman's Glossary 227. 2 Roll. Rep. 503. In the very Act of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. Estates Tail are not named for the Words are Every Offender convict of Treason c. shall forfeit all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in use possession or by any Right Title or Means c. and yet a Construction hath been made thereupon in favour of the Crown so a Dignity of an Earldom intailed is forfeitable by this Statute by the Word Hereditament 7 Co. 34. Afterwards in Hillary Term Rainsford Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court Judgment That upon Construction of the Act of Pains and Penalties this Estate Tail was forfeited to the King He agreed the Series and progress of Estates Tail to have been as argued by the Solicitor and that the Question now was whether by the Act of Pains c. Estates Tail can be forfeited unless there are express Words to take away the force of the Statute de donis conditionalibus Preface to 3 Co. for by that Statute there was a settled perpetuity Tenant in Tail could neither forfeit or alien his Estate no not in Case of Treason and Forfeiture is a kind of Alienation but afterwards by the Resolution in Ed. 4. an Alienation by a Common Recovery was construed to be out of the said Statute and by the Statute of Fines 4 H. 7. which is expounded by a subsequent Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 36. Tenant in Tail notwithstanding his former restraint had power to alien the Estate Tail and barr his Issue but all this while his Estate was not to be forfeited for Treason till the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. which gives Uses Rights Entries Conditions as well as Possessions Reversions Remainders and all other things of a person attainted of Treason by the Common or Statute Law of the Realm to the King as if such Attainder had been by Act of Parliament Then by the Statute of 5 6 Ed. cap. 11. 't is Enacted That an Offender being guilty of High Treason and lawfully convict shall forfeit to the King all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in his own Right in Use or Possession by which Statutes that de donis conditionalibus was taken off in Cases of Treason as it had been before by the resolution in 12 E. 4. and by the Statute of Fines as to the Alienation of an Estate Tail by Fine and Recovery If therefore this Act of Pains c. will admit of such a construction as to make Estates Tail forfeit here is a Crime great enough to deserve such a great punishment a Crime for which the Parliament hath ordered an Anniversary to be kept for ever with Fasting and Humiliation to implore that the Guilt of that innocent Blood then shed may not be required of our Posterity this they esteemed as another kind of Original Sin which unless thus expiated might extend not only ad Natos sed qui nascantur ab illis And that this Act will admit of such a Construction these Reasons were given 1. From the general comprehensive Words mentioning those things which are to be forfeited viz. Messuages Lands Tenements Reversions and Interests which last Word signifies the Estate in the Land as well as the Land it self or otherwise the Word must be construed to have no effect 2. Estates Tail are not now protected by the Clause in the Statute de donis * Inst 334. Non habet potestatem alienandi but are subject to the forfeiture by the Act of H. 8. which though it extends to Attainders only yet 't is a good Rule for the Iudges to make a Construction of an Act of Parliament by especially in such a Case as this wherein 't is plain that the Law did look upon these Offenders if not attainted yet in pari gradu with such persons and therefore may be a good Warrant to make the like Construction as in Cases of Attainder 3. Because the Offenders are dead for had they béen living there might have been better reason to have construed this Act not to extend to Estates Tail because then something might be forfeited viz. an Estate for Life and therefore the Act would signifie very little if such Construction could not be made of it to reach Estates Tail of such persons who were dead at the time of the making the Law especially since 't is well known that when Men engage in such Crimes they give what Protection they can to their Estates and place them as far as they can out of danger 4. It appears by the Act that the Law-makers did not intend that the Children of such Offenders should have any benefit of their Estates because in the Proviso there is a saving of all Estates of Purchasers for Mony bona fide paid and therein also a particular Exception of the Wife and Children and Heirs of the Offenders and if the Act would not protect the Estate of the Children though they should be Purchasers for a valuable consideration it will never protect their Estate under a voluntary Conveyance made by the Ancestor especially in this Case because the Entail carries a suspicion with it that it was designed with a prospect to commit this Crime for Sir John Danvers was Tenant in Tail before and in the year 1647. levies a Fine to barr that Entail and then limits a new Estate Tail to himself in which there is a Provision to make Leases for any number of years upon what Lives soever in Possession or Reversion with Rent or without it and this was but the year before the Crime committed 5. The Proviso in the Act for saving the Estates of Purchasers doth protect all Conveyances and
Assurances c. of Land not being the Lands of the late King Queen Prince c. and not being Land sold for any pretended Delinquency since the first of June 1641. and all Statutes and Judgments suffered by the Offenders from being impeached from which it appears that the Parliament lookt upon entailed Lands as forfeited for if Estates made to others upon a valuable consideration had need of a Proviso to save them from Forfeiture à fortiori the Estates out of which those are derived have need of such a saving and therefore must be forfeit by the Act for which Reasons these Lands are forfeited As to the great Objection which hath been made and insisted on the other side and which is Trudgeons Case 22 Eliz. 1 Inst 130. Where Tenant in Tail was attainted in a Praemunire and it was adjudged that he should forfeit his Land but during his Life for though the Statue of 16 R. 2. cap. cap. 5. Enacts That in such Case their Lands Tenements Goods and Chattels shall be forfeited to the King yet that must be understood of such an Estate as he may lawfully forfeit and that is during his own life and therefore being general Words they do not take away the force of the Statute de donis so that his Lands in Fee-simple for life c. shall be forfeited but the Land entailed shall not during his life But the Answer is plain For in the Reign of R. 2. when the Statute of Praemunire was made Estates Tail were under a Perpetuity by the said Statute de donis which Statute is now much weakened in the Point of Alienation and the Law is quite altered since that time and 't is apparent by multitude of Presidents that such strict Constructions have not been made since that time to preserve Estates Tail from Forfeitures without special and particular Words 4 Co. 164. and therefore in the Case of Adams and Lambert which is a Case in Point the Iudges there construed Estates Tail to be forfeit for want of special Words in the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. to save it and that was only a Law made for suppressing of superstitious Vses upon a politick consideration but this is a much greater Offence intended to be punished by this Act in which there are demonstrations both from the Words and intent of the Law-makers to make this Estate forfeited to the Crown than in that Case so much relied on And Iudgment was given accordingly Wyld died before Iudgment was given but Iustice Twisden said he was of that Opinion and Jones Iustice concurred Basset versus Salter After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Ca. Sa. or Sci. Fa. against the Sheriff IN an Action for an Escape the Question was whether the Plaintiff may take out a Ca. Sa. or have a Fi. Fa. against the Defendant after the Sheriff or Gaoler voluntarily suffer him to escape but the Court would not suffer it to be argued because it had been lately settled that it was at the Election of the Plaintiff to do either and upon a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber the Iudges there were of the same Opinion But in the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time the Court of Common Pleas were divided but 't is since settled 1 Roll. Abridg. 901 902. If there be an Escape by the Plaintiffs consent though he did not intend it the Law is hard that the Debt should be thereby discharged as where one was in execution in the Kings Bench and some Proposals were made to the Plaintiff in behalf of the Prisoner who seeing there was some likelyhood of an Accomodation consented to a Meeting in London and desired the Prisoner might be there who came accordingly and this was held to be an Escape with the * If it had been by the consent of the Sheriff he could never take him again but the Plaintiff might Sid. 330. consent of the Plaintiff and he could never after be in Execution at his Suit for the same Matter Peck versus Hill In Communi Banco Bond good given in discharge of another Mod. Rep. 221. DEBT upon a Bond brought against the Defendant as Administrator who pleads that he gave another Bond in his own Name in discharge of the first Bond and upon Issue joined it was found for the Defendant and it was moved that Iudgment might not be entred hereupon because it was a bad Plea But North Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices were of Opinion that it was a good Plea because there was other Security given than what the Plaintiff had before for upon the first Bond he was only lyable de bonis Intestatoris but now he might be charged in his own Right Co. Lit. 122. b. which may be well said to be in full satisfaction of the first Obligation for where the Condition is for payment of Mony to the Party himself there if he accept any collateral thing in satisfaction 't is good If a Security be given by a Stranger it may discharge a former Bond and this in effect is given by such And 't is not like the Case in Hobert where a Bond was given by the same Party upon that very day a former Bond was payable and adjudged not a good discharge for the Obligee was in no better condition than he was before Iustice Atkins doubted but inclined that one Bond cannot be discharged by giving another though the Discharge be applied to the Condition of the Bond and for this he cited Cro. Car. 85. Cro. Eliz. 716 727. which was a Case adjudged so in Point and therefore this Plea upon Demurrer should have been over-ruled yet since Issue was taken upon it and a Verdict for the Defendant the Plea is helped by the Statute of Jeofails 32 H. 8. here being a direct Affirmative and Negative But as to that the Chief Iustice and Scroggs Iustice replied that an immaterial Issue no ways arising from the Matter is not helped as an Action of Debt upon a Bond laid to be made in London and the Defendant saith that it was made in Middlesex and this is tried 't is not aided by the Statute but there must be a Repleader But because it was sworn that the Obligor who was the intestate was alive four years after the time that the second Bond was given and for that reason it could not be given upon the accompt of the Defendants being liable as Administrator but must be intended a Bond to secure a Debt of his own therefore a new Trial was granted Cook and others versus Herle Covenant will lie in the personalty tho' the Grant be executed by the Statute of Uses which makes a Distress the proper remedy Mod. Rep. 223. IN Covenant the Case was this Charles Cook made a Iointure to Mary his Wife for life and died without Issue the Land descended to Thomas Cook his Brother and Heir who grants an Annuity or Rent Charge of 200 l. per
annum to the Plaintiffs in Trust for Mary and this was to be in discharge of the said Iointure Habendum to them their Heirs Executors Administrators and Assigns in Trust for the said Mary for Life with a Clause of Distress and a Covenant to pay the 200 l. per annum to the said Trustees for the use of the said Mary the Breach assigned was that the Defendant had not paid the Rent to them for the Use of Mary The Defendant demurred specially for that it appears by the Plaintiffs own shewing that here is a Grant of a Rent-Charge for life which is executed by the Statute of Vses and therefore there ought to have been a Distress for Non-payment which is the proper remedy given by the Statute and this Action will not lie in the personalty 2. 'T is said the Defendant did not pay it to the Plaintiffs for the use of Mary which is a Negative pregnant and implies that it was paid to them 3. 'T is not averred that the Mony was not paid to Mary and if 't is paid to her then the Breach is not well assigned Ex parte Quer. But Serjeant Baldwin for the Plaintiff replyed that it was not a Question in this Case whether this Rent Charge was executed by the Statute or not for quacunque via data an Action of Covenant will lie and that the Breach was assigned according to the Words of the Covenant and so prima facie 't is well enough for if the Defendant did pay the Mony to the Plaintiffs he may plead it and so he may likewise if he paid it to Mary Curia The Court were all of Opinion that this Rent-Charge was executed by the Statute of Vses by the express Words thereof which executes such Rents granted for Life upon Trust as this Case is and transfers all Rights and Remedies incident thereunto together with the possession to Cestuy que use so that though the power of distraining be limited to the Trustées by this Deéd yet by the Statute which transfers that power to Mary she may distrain also but this Covenant being collateral cannot be transferred The Clause of Distress by the express Words of the Act is given to the Cestuy que use but here is a double Remedy by Distress or Action for if the Lessée assign his Interest and the Rent is accepted of the Assignee yet a Covenant lies against the Lessée for Non-payment upon the express Covenant to * Hayes and Bickerstaff Hollis and Carr Antea pay so if a Rent be granted to S. and a Covenant to pay it to N. for his use 't is a good Covenant And it was agreed that the assignment of a Breach according to the Words of the Covenant is good enough and that if any thing be done which amounts to a performance the other side must plead it as in this Case the Defendant might have pleaded that the Mony was paid to Mary which is a performance in substance but it shall not be intended without pleading of it Whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Read versus Dawson DEBT upon Bond against the Defendant as Executor Repleader after an immaterial Issue Issue was joyned whether the Defendant had Assets or not on the thirtieth day of November which was the day on which he had the first notice of the Plaintiffs original Writ and it was found for the Defendant that then he had not Assets It was moved for a Repleader because it was said this was an immaterial Issue for though he had not Assets then yet if he had any afterwards he is liable to the Plaintiffs Action But Barrel Serjeant moved for Iudgment upon this Verdict by reason of the Statute of 32 H. 8. which helps in Cases of Mispleading or insufficient Pleading 'T is true there are many Cases which after Verdict are not aided by this Statute as if there are two Affirmatives which cannot make an Issue or when after a Traverse Issue is joyned with an hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam this is no Issue 2 Anders 6 7. Yelv. 210. Hob. 126. So if there be no Plea at all as if an Action is brought against Baron and Feme and she pleads only 2 Cro. 288. So if the Party puts himself super patriam where it should be tried by Record or if the Plea be nothing to the purpose or lie not in the Mouth of the Parties such immaterial Issues as these cannot be good The difference in Moor 867. is if the Plea on which the Issue is joyned hath no colourable pretence in it to barr the Plaintiff or if it be against an express Rule in the Law there the Issue is immaterial and so as if there was no Issue and therefore 't is not aided by the Statute but if it hath the countenance of a legal Plea though it want necessary matter to make it sufficient there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict Here the Parties only doubt whether there were Assets at the time of the notice and 't is found there were none and so Iudgment was to be given accordingly and of that Opinion was the whole Court But Iustice Atkins was clear of Opinion that if the Parties join in an immaterial Issue there shall be no Repleader because 't is helped after Verdict by these Words in the Statute viz. any Issue 'T is not said an Issue joined upon a material Point and the intent of the Statute was to prevent Repleaders and that if any other Construction should be made of that Act he was of Opinion that the Iudges sate there not to expound but to make a Law for by such an Interpretation much of the benefit intended by the Act to the Party who had a Verdict would be restrained Curia The other Iustices were all of Opinion that since the making of this Statute it had been always allowed and taken as a difference that when the Issue was perfectly material there should be no Repleader but that it was otherwise where the Issue was not material And Iustice Scroggs asked merrily If Debt be brought upon a Bond and the Defendant pleads Robin Hood dwelt in a Wood and the Plaintiff joyns Issue that he did not this is an immaterial Issue and shall there not be a Repleader in such Case after Verdict Ad quod non fuit responsum Beaumont versus ........ Wager of Law THE Plaintiff brings an Action of Debt upon a Iudgment obtained against the Defendant in a Court Baron having declared there in an Action on the Case upon an Assumpsit and recovered The Defendant came to wage his Law and was ready to swear that he owed the Plaintiff nothing Sid. 366. but the Court held that he was not well advised for by the Recovery in the inferior Court it became now a Debt and was owing and being asked whether he had paid the Mony he answered that he owed nothing Whereupon the Court
made so taketh upon him long after the Will to be Executor it shall make him such by relation from the time of the death of the Testator but here is no Executor nor ever was 'T is true that one was named but as soon as he heard of the Will he renounced and therefore there being no Executor in this Case nothing now can hinder the Administration to be granted cum Testamento annexo If the Testator should dye indebted or have Debts owing to him and the Executor refuses Probate and renounces his Executorship Administration must be granted for Lex fingit ubi subsistit Aequitas and the Executor having a possibility to be such and by his refusal becoming no Executor why should the bare naming of him to be an Executor have relation to make such Administration void since 't is not the Name but the doing of the Office which makes him Executor Dyer 372. If all these Executors had dyed after Administration thus committed it cannot be said that they ever were Executors There can be no inconvenience that this Administration should be good for 't is just that Creditors should have their Debts and Purchasors should be secure in the things purchased If the Testator was indebted an Action will lie against an Executor de son tort for such Debt which Executor is altogether as wrongfull as the Administrator to whom Administraton is committed and the Will afterwards proved by the rightful Executor and if such Executor of his own wrong be possessed of a term for years and a Creditor recovers against him that Crecutor shall have the Term in satisfaction of his Debt and by the same reason shall the Administrator here have a good title to this Term which he sold for the payment of a just Debt and there is no authority for making such Administration void unless it be where the Executor proves the Will but never when he renounceth Ex parte Def. But on the other side it was said that an Executor of an Executor hath all the Interest which the first Executor had so that being an Executor the Administration ganted by the Ordinary is void and the renunciation afterwards shall never make it good and this will appear by the different Interests which the Ordinary and the Executor have by Law 1. The Ordinary originally had nothing to do with the Estate of the Intestate for * Godolph 59. bona intestati capi solent in manus Regis Afterwards two Statutes were made which establish his power the first was Westm 1. cap. 19. and the other was 31 E. 3. c. 11. Yet no power was thereby given him to dispose of the Goods to his own use or to the use of any other he had only a property secundum quid and not an absolute and uncontroulable Right in the Estate 2. But the Executor hath a Right and Interest given to him by Law when a Will is made and may * 5 Co. Middleton's Case release before probate if he therefore hath an absolute Right and the Ordinary hath only a qualified property how can he grant the Administration of the Goods which at the same time are lawfully vested in another Suppose the Executor sells such Goods to one Man and the Administrator to another 2 Anders 150. Case 83. the Sale of one of them must be void and for the said Reasons and by the constant course of the Law it must be the latter It hath been objected that here was no Executor at all only one named or if it be admitted that there was an Executor yet his refusal shall relate to the time of the Administration committed and make that good which might not be so before But as to that he said that here was an Executor appointed by the Will who had an Interest and Administration being granted to another 't is void ab initio and what is once void cannot be made good by any subsequent act Mod. Rep. 214. 10 Co. 62. a. Here was a want of power in him who did this Act for the Ordinary could not grant Administration where there is an Executor and therefore no relation shall be to make that good which was once void but if it had béen only voidable it might have been otherwise A Relation may be to inable the Party to recover the Goods of the Intestate and to punish Trespasses as if a Man die possessed of Goods and a Stranger convert them and afterwards Administration is granted to S. this Administration shall * 2 Roll Abr. 399. relate to the time of the death of the Intestate so that he may maintain Trover before the Ordinary had committed it to him but it will never aid the Acts of the Parties to avoid them by Relation as if a Man makes a Feoffment to a Feme Covert and afterwards devises the same Land the Husband disagrées this shall have relation between the Parties so as the Husband shall not be charged in damages but it shall not make the void Devise good 3 Co. 28. b. Butler and Baker's Case So if a Man makes a Release and afterwards get Letters of Administration that shall not relate to make his Release good to barr him neither shall his refusal of the Executorship do it because at the time of the Release or the refusal there was not any right of Action in him for that commences in the one Case after Administration and in the other after the Probate of the Will Notwithstanding such refusal this Executor may afterwards administer at his pleasure Godolph 141. and intermeddle with the Goods of the Testator and if the Administration should be good also then they would have a power over the same Estate by two Titles at the same time which cannot be The greatest Argument which can be brought against this is ab inconvenienti because it cannot be safe to purchase under an Administrator since a Will may be concealed for a time and afterwards the lawful Executor therein appointed may appear but this is more proper for the Wisdom of a Parliament to redress than that the Law should be altered by a judicial determination of the Court and therefore he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant The Court was of Opinion that the Ordinary cannot grant Administration where there is an Executor named in the Will Judgment and therefore gave Iudgment for the Defendant against the Vendée of this Term. The Lord Townsend versus Dr. Hughes In C. B. THE Plaintiff brought an Action of Scandalum Magnatum for these Words spoken of him by the Defendant No new Trial in an Action of Scandalum Magnatum Mod. Rep. 232. viz. He is an unworthy Man and acts against Law and Reason Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Case was tried and the Iury gave the Plaintiff 4000 l. damages The Defendant before the Trial made all possible submission to my Lord he denied the speaking the Words and made Oath that he never spoke the same after the Trial he
likewise addressed to my Lord as before making several Protestations of his Innocency But having once in a Passion said that he scorned to submit My Lord for that Reason would not remit the Damages it was therefore moved for a new Tryal upon these Reasons 1. Because the Witnesses who proved the Words were not Persons of Credit and that at the time when they were alledged to be spoken many Clergy-men were in Company with the Defendant and heard no such Words spoken 2. It was sworn that one of the Iury confessed that they gave such great damages to the Plaintiff not that he was damnified so much but that he might have the greater opportunity to shew himself noble in the remitting of them 3. And which was the principal Reason because the Damages were excessive Curia The Court delivered their Opinions seriatim and first The Chief Iustice North said In Cases of Fines for criminal Matters a Man is to be fined by Magna Charta with a salvo contenemento suo and no Fine is to be imposed greater than he is able to pay but in Civil Actions the Plaintiff is to recover by way of compensation for the damages he hath sustained and the Iury are the proper Iudges thereof This is a Civil Action brought by the Plaintiff for Words spoken of him which if they are in their own nature actionable the Iury ought to consider the damage which the Party may sustain but if a particular Averment of special damages makes them actionable then the Iury are only to consider such damages as are already sustained and not such as may happen in futuro because for such the Plaintiff may have a new Action He said that as a Iudge he could not tell what value to set upon the Honour of the Plaintiff the Iury have given 4000 l. and therefore he could neither lessen the Sum or grant a new Trial especially since by the Law the Iury are Iudges of the damages and it would be very inconvenient to examine upon what account they gave their Verdict they having found the Defendant guilty did believe the Witnesses and he could not now make a doubt of their Credibility Wyndham Iustice accorded in omnibus Atkins Iustice contra That a new Trial should be granted for 't is every days practice and he remembred the Case of Gouldston and Wood in the Kings Bench where the Plaintiff in an Action on the Case for Words for calling of him Bankrupt recovered 1500 l. and that Court granted a new Tryal because the damages were excessive The Iury in this Case ought to have respect only to the damage which the Plaintiff sustained and not to do an unaccountable thing that he might have an opportunity to shew himself generous and as the Court ought with one Eye to look upon the Verdict so with the other they ought to take notice what is contained in the Declaration and then to consider whether the Words and Damages bear any proportion if not then the Court ought to lay their hands upon the Verdict 'T is true they cannot lessen the damages but if they are too great the Court may grant a new Tryal Scroggs Iustice accorded with North and Wyndham that no new Tryal can be granted in this Cause He said that he was of Council with the Plaintiff before he was called to the Bench and might therefore be supposed to give Iudgment in favour of his former Client being prepossess'd in the Cause or else to shew himself more signally just might without considering the matter give Iudgment against him but that now he had forgot all former relation thereunto and therefore delivered his Opinion that if he had been of the Iury he should not have given such a Verdict and if he had been Plaintiff he would not take advantage of it but would overcome with Forgiveness such Follies and Indiscretions of which the Defendant had been guilty but that he did not sit there to give Advice but to do Iustice to the People He did agrèe that where an unequal Tryal was as such must be where there is any Practice with the Iury in such Case 't is good reason to grant a new Tryal but no such thing appearing to him in this Case a new Tryal could not be granted Suppose the Iury had given a scandalous Verdict for the Plaintiff as a Penny Damages he could not have obtained a new Trial in hopes to increase them neither shall the Defendant in hopes to lessen them and therefore by the Opinion of these three Iustices a new Tryal was not granted Afterwards in this Term Serjeant Maynard moved in Arrest of Iudgment and said that this Action was grounded upon the Statute of R. 2. Which consists of a Preamble reciting the Mischief and of the Enacting part in giving of a Remedy and that the Defendants Case was neither within the Mischief or the Remedy This Statute doth not create any Action by way of particular design and if the matter was now Res integra much might be said that an Action for Damages will not lye upon this Statute for the Statute of Westm 2. appoints that the Offender shall suffer imprisonment until he produces the Author of a false Report Ca. 33. and the Statute of 2 R. 2. which recites that of Westm 2. gives the same punishment and the Action is brought qui tam c. and yet the Plaintiff only recovers for himself It was usual to punish Offenders in this kind in the Star Chamber as in the * Earl of Northampton's Case where one Goodrick said of him That he wrote a Book against Garnet and a Letter to Bellarmine 12 Co. 132. intimating that what he wrote in the Book was not his Opinion but only ad captandum populum which was a great disgrace to him in those days being as much as to say he was a Papist Cro. Eliz. But the Serjeant would not insist upon that now since it hath been ruled that where a Statute prohibits the doing of a thing which if done might be prejudicial to another in such case he may have an Action upon that very Statute for his Damages But the ground on which he argued was that these words as spoken are not within the meaning of the Act for they are not actionable 1. Because they are no scandal and words which are actionable must import a great Scandal which no circumstance or occasion of speaking can excuse and if they are scandalous and capable of any mitigation by the precedent discourse the pleading of that matter will make them not actionable and for this the Lord * 4 Co. Cromwel's Case is a plain Authority the Words spoken of him were You like those that maintain Sedition against the King's Person the occasion of speaking of which was to give an account of his favouring the Puritan Preachers which was all that was intended by the former discourse for that Lord had approved a Sermon which was preached by a Parson
against the Common Prayer Book and the Defendant having forbid such Preaching the Lord told him that he did not like him upon which he spoke those Words so that the subject matter explained the sense for which reason it was adjudged that the Action would not lie 2. The scandal for which an Action may be brought within this Statute must be false for that word goes quite through the whole Act viz. false News false Lyes c. and the words here are so general that it cannot appear whether they are true or false for there can be no Iustification here as in case where a Man is charged with a particular Crime my Lord Townsend is not charged with any particular Act of Injustice as a Subject nor with any Misdemeanour as a Peer nor with any Offence in an Office If therefore in all Actions brought upon this Statute the Defendant may justifie and put the matter in Issue to try whether it be true or false and in this Case the Defendant can neither justifie nor traverse for this reason the Action will not lie That the Words are general and of a doubtful signification it cannot be denied for to say He is an unworthy Man imports no particular Crime Unworthy is a term of Relation as he is unworthy of my Friendship Acquaintance or Kindred and so may be applicable to any thing and a Lord may in many things be unworthy of a particular Mans Friendship as if he promises to pay a Sum of Mony at a day certain and faileth in the payment as 't is often seén such is an unworthy Man but that will not bear an Action He is an unworthy Man who invites another to Dinner to affront him but it will not bear an Action to say That a Lord invited me to a Dinner to abuse me neither will it be actionable to say He is an unworthy Man because such instances may be given of his Vnworthiness which will not bear an Action If my Lord had beén compared to any base and unworthy thing these Words might have béen actionable and that was the Case of the Lord Marquess of Dorchester it being said of him That there was no more value in him than in a Dog Then to say A Man acts against Law this is no Scandal because every Man who breaks a Penal Law and suffers the Penalty is not guilty of any Crime The Statute commands the burying in Woollen the Party buries one of his Family in Linnen in this he acts against the Law but if the Penalty is satisfied the Law is so likewise A Man who acts against Law acts against Reason because Lex est summa ratio but no instance is here given wherein he did thus act 'T is not said that he did act against Law wilfully or that he used to do any thing against Law and so cannot be like the Case of the Duke of Buckingham who brought an Action for these Words viz. You are used to do things against Law and put Cattle into a Castle where they cannot be replevied for there was not only an Vsage charged upon him but a particular instance of Oppression This Action lies for Words spoken of a Iudge of either Bench and of a Bishop as well as of a Peer Now if a Man should say A Judge acted against Law will an Action lie Because a Iudge may do a thing against Law and yet very justly and honestly unless all the Iudges were infallible and could not be subject to any mistakes which none will deny So if a Bishop return the Cause of his Refusal to admit a Clerk quia criminosus this is a Return against Law because 't is too general but if J. S. should say A Bishop acted against Law and shew that for Cause an Action would not lye If the the Lord Townsend had commanded his Bayliff to make a Distress without Cause that had been acting against Law and Reason He agreed the Words to be uncivil but not actionable for if such Construction should be made a Man must talk in Print or otherwise not speak any thing of a Peer for fear of an Action There are many Authorities where a Péer shall not have an Action for every trivial and slight Expression spoken of him As to say of a Péer He keeps none but Rogues and Rascals about him like himself by the Opinion of two Iustices Yelverton and Flemming the Action would not lie because they are Words of Scolding and this was the Case of the Earl of Lincoln Cro. Jac. 196. But the Court was divided the Defendant died and so the Writ abated Actions for Words have béen of late too much extended formerly there were not above two or three brought in many years and if this Statute should be much inlarged the Lords themselves will be prejudiced thereby by maintaining Actions one against another Vpon this Statute of 2 R. 2 c. 5 there was no Action brought till 13 H. 7. which was above an hundred years after the making of that Law and the occasion of making the Law was because the Duke of Lancaster who was then the first Prince of the Blood took notice that divers were so hardy as to speak of him several lying Words 1 R. 2. num 56. and therefore this Statute was made to punish those who devised false News and horrible and false Lies of any Peer c. whereby Discords might arise between the Lords and Commons and great Peril and Mischief to the Realm and quick Subversion thereof Now from the natural intent and construction of these Words in the Act can it be supposed that if one should say Such a Peer is an unworthy Man that the Kingdom would be presently in a flame and turned into a state of confusion and Civil War and to say That he acts against Law that the Government would thereby be in danger to be lost and quick Subversion would follow This cannot be the common and ordinary understanding of these Words If therefore the Plaintiff by speaking these Words was in no hazard nor any wise damnified if he was not touched in his Loyalty as a Péer nor in danger of his Life as a Subject if he was not thereby subjected to any Corporal or Pecuniary Punishment nor charged with any Breach of Oath nor with a particular Miscarriage in any Office if the Words are so general that they import no Scandal and are neither capable of any Iustification and lastly if they are not such horrible Lies as are intended to be punished by the Statute for these Reasons he concluded the Action would not lie and therefore prayed that the Iudgment might be arrested Serjeant Baldwin and Serjeant Barrel argued on the same side for the Defendant but nothing was mentioned by them which is not fully insisted on in the Argument of Serjeant Maynard for which Reason I have not reported their Arguments But Pemberton Serjeant who argued for the Plaintiff said Ex parte Quer. that it would conduce much to
the understanding of the Statute of 2 R. 2. cap. 5. upon which this Action of Scandalum Magnatum was grounded to consider the occasion of the making of it In those days the English were quite of another Nature and Genius from what they are at this time the Constitution of this Kingdom was then Martial and given to Arms the very Tenures were Military and so were the Services as Knights Service Castleguard and Escuage There were many Castles of defence in those days in the hands of private Men their Sports and Pastimes were such as Tilts and Turnaments and all their Imployments were tending to bréed them up in Chivalry Those who had any dependency upon Noble Men were enured to Bows and Arrows and to signalize themselves in Valour it was the only way to Riches and Honour Arts and Sciences had not got such ground in the Kingdom as now but the Commons had almost their dependance upon the Lords whose Power then was exceéding great and their Practices were conformable to their Power and this is the true Reason why so few Actions were formerly brought for Scandals because when a Man was injured by Words he carved out his own Remedy by his Sword There are many Statutes made against riding privately armed which Men used in those days to repair themselves of any Injury done unto them for they had immediately recourse to their Arms for that purpose and seldom or never used to bring any Actions for damages This was their Revenge and having thus made themselves Iudges in their own Cases it was reasonable that they should do themselves Iustice with their own Weapons but this Revenge did not usually end in private Quarrels they took Parties ingaged their Friends their Tenants and Servants on their sides and by such means made great Factions in the Commonwealth by reason whereof the whole Kingdom was often in a flame and the Government as often in danger of being subverted so that Laws were then made against wearing Liverys or Badges and against riding armed This was the mischief of those times to prevent which this Statute of R. 2. was made and therefore all provoking and vilifying Words which were used before to exasperate the Peers and to make them betake themselves to Arms by the intent of this Act are clearly forbidden which was made chiefly to prevent such consequences for it was to no purpose to make a Law and thereby to give a Péer an Action for such Words as a common person might have before the making of the Statute and for which the Peer himself had a Remedy also at the Common Law and therefore needed not the help of this Act. If then the design of this Statute was to hinder such practices as aforesaid the next thing to be considered is what was usual in those days to raise the Passions of Peers to that degreé and that will appear to be not only such things as imported a great Scandal in themselves or such for which an Action lay at the Common Law but even such things as savoured of any Contempt of their persons and such as brought them into disgrace with the Commons for hereby they took occasion of Provocation and Revenge 'T is true that very few Actions were brought upon this Statute in some considerable time after it was made for though such practices were thereby prohibited the Lords did not presently apply themselves to the Remedy therein given but continued the Military way of Revenge to which they had béen accustomed As to the first Objection that hath been made he gave no answer to it because it was not much insisted upon on the other side whether an Action would lye upon this Statute for the very words of it are sufficient ground for an Action and 't is very well known that whereever an Act prohibits an evil thing Maxim the person against whom such thing is done may maintain an Action This Statute consists of two parts the first is prohibitory Vide Ante. Viz. That no Man shall do so c. Then comes the additional Clause and saith That if he do he shall incur such Penalty 'T is on the first part that this Action is grounded and so it was in the Earl of Northampton's Case in that Report which goes under the name of the Lord Coke's 12th Report where by the Resolution of all the Iudges in England except Flemming who was absent it was adjudged that it was not necessary that any particular Crime should be fixed on the Plaintiff or any Offence for which he might be indicted So are the Authorities in all the Cases relating to this Action In the Lord * 4 Co. 13. b. 2 Cro. 196. Cromwel's Case for these Words You like those who maintain Sedition In the Lord of Lincoln's Case My Lord is a base Earl and a paultry Lord and keepeth none but Rogues and Rascals like himself In the Duke of Buckingham's Case He has no more Conscience than a Dog In the Lord * Hill 16 Car. 2 Rot. 1269. Affirmed in a Writ of Error in B R. Marquess of Dorchester's Case He is no more to be valued than the Black Dog which lies there All which Words were held actionable and yet they touch not the persons in any thing concerning the Government or charge them with any Crime but in point of Dignity or Honour And they were all villifying Words and might give occasion of Revenge And so are the Words for which this Action is brought they are rude uncivil and ill natured Unworthy is as much as to say base and ignoble a contemptible Person and a Man of neither Honour or Merit And thus to speak of a Nobleman is a Reflection upon the King who is the Fountain of Honour that gives it to such persons who are in his Iudgment deserving by which they are made capable of advising him in Parliament and it would be very dishonourable to call unworthy Men thither 'T is likewise a dishonour to the Nobility to have such a person to fit among them as a Companion and to the Commons to have their proceedings in Parliament transmitted to such Peérs so that it tends to the dishonour of all Dignities both of King Lords and Commons and thereby discords may arise between the two Houses which is the Mischief intended to be remedied by this Act. Then the following Words are as scandalous for to say A Man acts against Law and Reason imports several such acts done a Man is not denominated to be unworthy by doing of one single Act for in these Words more is implied than to say he hath done an unworthy thing for the Words seem to relate to the Office which the Plaintiff had in the Country as Lord Lieutenant which is an Office of great Honour and can any thing tend to cause more discord and disturbance in the Kingdom than to say of a great Officer That he acts according to the dictates of his Will and Pleasure the consequence
of which is that he will be rather scorned than obeyed It hath been objected that the Words are general and charge him not with any act Answ The Scandal is the greater for 't is not so bad to say A Man did such a particular thing against Law and Reason as to say He acts against Law which is as much as to say his constant course and practice is such And to say that the Words might be meant of breaking a Penal Law that is a foreign Construction for the plain sense is he acts against the known Laws of the Kingdom and his practice and designs are so to do for he will be guided neither by Law or Reason Object It has been objected that the Scandal must be false But whether true or not there can be no justification here because they are so general that they cannot be put in Issue Answ He agreed that no Action would lye upon this Statute if the words were true but in some Cases the divulging of a Scandal was an Offence at the Common Law now to argue as on the other side that the Defendant cannot justifie and therefore an Action will not lye is a false Consequence because words may be scandalous and derogatory to the dignity of a Peer and yet the subject matter may not be put in Issue He agreed also that occasional Circumstances may extenuate and excuse the Words though ill in themselves but this cannot be applied to the Case in question because the Words were not mitigated The Defendant pleaded Not Guilty and insisted on his Innocence the Iury have found him Guilty which is an aggravation of his Crime if he would have extenuated them by any occasion upon which they were spoken he should have pleaded it specially or offered it in Evidence neither of which was done This Act is to be taken favourably for him against whom the Words are spoken because 't is to prevent great Mischiefs which may fall out in the Kingdom by rude and uncivil discourses and in such Cases 't is usual for Courts rather to enlarge the remedy than to admit of any extenuation for which reasons he prayed that the Plantiff might have his Iudgment It was argued by Serjeant Calthrop on the same side and to the same effect Afterwards this Term all the Iudges argued this Case Argument at the Bench. seriatim at the Bench. And first Iustice Scroggs said That the greatness of the Damages given should not prevail with him either on the one side or the other at the Common Law no Action would lye for such Words though spoken of a Peer for such Actions were not formerly much countenanced but now since a Remedy is given by the Statute Words should not be construed either in a rigid or mild sense but according to the genuine and natural meaning and agreeable to the common understanding of all Men. At the Barr the strained sense for the Plaintiff is that these Words import He is no Man of Honour and for the Defendant that they import no Scandal and that no more was meant by them but what may be said of every Man 'T is true in respect of God Almighty we are all Vnworthy but the subsequent Clause explains what unworthiness the Defendant intended for he infers him to be Unworthy because he acts against Law and Reason Now whether the Words thus explained fix any Crime on the Plaintiff is next to be considered and he was of Opinion that they did fix a Crime upon him for to say He is an unworthy Man is as much as to say He is a vitious person and is the same as to call him a corrupt Man which in the Case of a Peer is actionable for general words are sufficient to support such an Action though not for a common person To say a Man acts against Law and Reason is no Crime if he do it ignorantly and therefore if he had said My Lord was a weak Man for he acts against Law and Reason such words had not been actionable but these Words as spoken do not relate to his Vnderstanding but to his Morals they relate to him also as a Peer though the contrary has been objected that they relate to him only as a Man which is too nice a distinction for to distinguish between a Man and his Peerage is like the distinction between the person of the King and his Authority which hath been often exploded the words affect him in all qualities and all relations It has been also objected that the Words are too general and like the Case of the Bishops Return that a Man is criminosus which is not good But though they are general in the Case of a Peer they are actionable for to say of a Bishop That he is a wicked Man these are as general words and yet an Action will lye It has been also objected That general Words cannot be justified but he was of another Opinion as if the Plaintiff who was Lord Lieutenant of the County had laid an unequal charge upon a Man who upon complaint made to him ordered such charge to stand and that his will in such case should be a Law If the person should thereupon say That the Lord had done Unworthily and both against Law and Reason those words might have been justified by shewing the special matter either in Pleading or Evidence 'T is too late now to examine whether an Action will lye upon this Statute that must be taken for granted and therefore was not much insisted on by those who argued for the Defendant for the Authorities are very plain that such Actions have been allowed upon this Statute The Words as here laid to be spoken are not so bad as the Defendant might speak but they are so bad that an Action will lye for them and though they are general yet many Cases might be put of general words which import a Crime and were adjudged actionable The Earl of Leicester's Case He is an Oppressor The Lord of Winchester's Case He kept me in Prison 'till I gave him a Release these words were held actionable because the plain inference from them is That they were Oppressors The Lord Abergavenny's Case He sent for me and put me into Little Ease It might be presumed that that Lord was a Iustice of Peace as most Peers are in their Counties and that what he did was by colour of his Authority so are all the Cases cited by those who argued for the Plaintiff in some of which the words were strained to import a Crime and yet adjudged actionable especially in the Case of the Lord Marquess of Dorchester He is to be valued no more than a Dog which are less slanderous Words than those at the Bar because the slander is more direct and positive It appears by all these Cases that the Iudges have always construed in favour of these Actions and this has been done in all probability to prevent those dangers that otherwise might ensue if the Lords
should take revenge themselves for which reasons he held the Action will lye Atkyns Iustice contra This is not a common Action upon the Case but an Action founded upon the Statute of the 2 of R. 2. upon the Construction whereof the Resolution of this Case will depend whether the Action will lie or not And as to that he considered 1. The Occasion 2. The Scope 3. The parts of the Statute 1. The occasion of it is mentioned in Cotton's Abridgment of the Records of the Tower f. 173. nu 9 and 10. At the summoning of this Parliament the Bishop of St. Davids declared the Causes of their meeting and told both the Houses of the Mischiefs that had hapned by divers slanderous Persons and sowers of Discord which he said were Dogs that eat raw Flesh the meaning of which was that they devoured and eat one another to prevent which the Bishop desired a Remedy and his Request seemed to be the Occasion of making this Law for ex malis moribus bonae nascuntur Leges 2. The Scope of the Act was to restrain unruly Tongues from raising false Reports and telling Stories and Lyes of the Peers and Great Officers of the Kingdom so that the design of the Act was to prevent those imminent dangers which might arise and be occasioned by such false Slanders 3. Then the parts of the Act are three viz. reciting the Offence and the Mischief then mentioning the ill Effects and appointing of a Penalty From whence he Observed 1. That here was no new Offence made or declared for nothing was prohibited by this Statute but what was so at the Common Law before The Offences to be punished by this Act are mala in se and those are Offences against the Moral Law they must be such in their nature as bearing of false Witness and these are Offences against a common Person which he admitted to be aggravated by the eminency of the person against whom they were spoke but every uncivil Word or rude Expression spoken even of a Great Man will not bear an Action and therefore an Action will not lie upon this Statute for every false Lye but it must be horrible as well as false and such as were punishable in the High Commission Court which were enormous Crimes 12 Co. 43. By this description of the Offences and the consequences and effects thereof he said he could better judge whether the Words were actionable or not and he was of Opinion that the Statute did not extend to Words of a small and trivial nature nor to all Words which were actionable but only to such which were of a greater magnitude such by which Discord might arise between the Lords and Commons to the great peril of the Realm and such which were great Slanders and horrible Lies which are words purposely put into this Statute for the aggravation and distinction of the Crime and therefore such Words which are actionable at the Common Law may not be so within this Statute because not horrible great Scandals He did not deny but that these were undecent and uncivil words and very ill applied to that honourable person of whom they were spoken but no body could think that they were horrible great slanders or that any debate might arise between the Lords and Commons by reason such words were spoken of this Peer or that it should tend to the great peril of the Kingdom and the quick destruction thereof such as these were not likely to be the effects and consequences of these Words and therefore could not be within the meaning of the Act because they do not agree with the discription given in it 2. Here is no new punishment inflicted on the Offender for at the Common Law any person for such Offences as herein are described might have been Fined and Imprisoned either upon Indictment or Information brought against him and no other punishment is given here but Imprisonment Even at the Common Law scandal of a Peer might be punished by Pillory and loss of Ears 5 Co. 125. De Libellis Famosis 12 Co. 37. 9 Co. 59. Lamb's Case So that it appears this was an Offence at the Common Law but aggravated now because against an Act of Parliament which is a positive Law much like a Proclamation which is set forth to enforce the execution of a Law by which the Offence is afterwards greater He did agree that an Action would lie upon this Statute though there were no express Words to give it to a Peer because where there is a Prohibition and a Wrong and Damage arises to the Party by doing the thing prohibited in such Case the Common Law doth intitle the Party to an Action 10 Co. 75. 12 Co. 100 103. And such was the Resolution in the Earl of Northampton's Case upon construction of the Law as incident to the Statute and as the Offence is greater because of the Act and as the Action will lie upon the Statute so the Party injured may sue in a qui tam which he could not have done before the making this Law 3. But that such words as these were not actionable at the Common Law much less by the Statute for the Defendant spoke only his Iudgment and Opinion and doth not directly charge the Plaintiff with any thing and might well be resembled to such Cases as are in Rolls Abridgm 1 part 57. pl 30. which is a little more solemn because adjudged upon a special Verdict the Words were spoken of a Iustice of Peace Thou art a Blood-Sucker and not fit to live in a Commonwealth These were not held actionable because they neither relate to his Office or fix any Crime upon him Fol. 43. in the same Book Thou deservest to be hanged not actionable because it was only his Opinion So where the Words are general without any particular Circumstances they make no impression and gain no credit and therefore in Cro. Car. 111. 1 Roll. Abridgm 107. pl. 43. You are no true Subject to the King the Action would not lie In this Case 't is said the Plaintiff acts against Law which doth not imply a Habit in him so to do and when Words may as well be taken in a mild as in a severe Sense the Rule is quod in mitiori sensu accipienda sunt Now these Words are capable of such a favourable construction for no more was said of the Plaintiff than what in some sense may be said of every person whatsoever for who can boast of his Innocency who keeps close in all his actions to Law and Reason and to say A Man acts against both may imply that he departed from those Rules in some particular Cases where it was the Error of his Iudgment only In the Duke of Buckingham's Case Sheppard's Abridgment 1 part f. 28. Viz. You are used to do things against Law and mentions a particular fact there indeed because of Usage of the ill practice it was held that an Action lies but if he had been
charged for doing a thing against Law but once an Action would not lie He then observed how the Cases which have been adjudged upon this Statute agree with the Rules he had insisted on in his Argument which Cases have not been many and those too of late times in respect of the Antiquity of the Act which was made almost 300 hundred years since Anno 1379. and for 120 years after no Action was brought the first that is Reported was 13 H. 7. Keilway 26. So that we have no contemporanea expositio of the Statute to guide an Opinion which would be a great help in this Case because they who make an Act best understand the meaning but now the meaning must be collected from the Statute it self which is the best Exposition as the Rule is given in Bonham's Case 8 Co. Vide the Case in 13 H. 7. The next Case in time is the Duke of Buckingham's Case 4 H 8. Cromp Jur. of Courts f. 13. You have no more Conscience than a Dog Lord Abergavenny against Cartwright in the same Book You care not how you come by Goods in both which Cases the Words charge the Plaintiff with particular matter and give a Narrative of something of a false Story and do not barely rest upon an Opinion In the Bishop of Norwich his Case Cro. Eliz. 1. Viz. You have writ to me that which is against the Word of God and to the maintainance of Superstition These were held actionable because they refer to his Function and greatly defame him and yet he had but 500 Marks Damages 29 30 Eliz. 1 Cro. 67. The Lord Mordant against Bridges My Lord Mordant did know that Prude robbed Shotbolt and bid me compound with Shotbolt for the same and said he would see me satisfied for the same though it cost him an hundred pounds which I did for him being my Master otherwise the Evidence I could have given would have hanged Prude These Words were held actionable and 1000 l. Damages given and in all the other Cases which have been mentioned upon this Statute and where Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Words always charge him with some particular Fact and are positive and certain but where they are doubtful and general and signifie only the Opinion of the Defendant they are not actionable The Words in the Case at Bar neither relate to the Plaintiff as a Peer or a Lord Lieutenant and charge him with no particular Crime so that from the authority of all these Cases he grounded his Opinion that the Action would not lie and he said If Laws should be expounded to wrack People for Words instead of remedying one Mischief many would be introduced for in such Case they would be made Snares for Men. The Law doth bear with the Infirmities of Men as Reliligion Honour and Vertue doth in other Cases and amongst all the excellent Qualities which Adorn the Nobility of this Nation none doth so much as forgiving of Injuries Solomon saith That 't is the Honour of a Man to pass by an Infirmity Which if the Plaintiff should refuse yet the Defendant if he thinks the Damages excessive is not without his remedy by Attaint for he said he could shew where an Attaint was brought against a Iury for giving 60 l. Damages He farther said that he could not find that any Iudgment had been either reversed or arrested upon this Statute and therefore it was fit that the Law should be setled by some Rule because 't is a wretched condition for People to live under such Circumstances as not to know how to demean themselves towards a Péer and since no Limits have been hitherto prescribed 't is fit there should be some now and that the Court should go by the same Rules in the Case of a Peer as in that of common person that is not to construe the Words actionable without some particular Crime charged upon the Plaintiff or unless he alledge special damages for which Reasons he held that this Action would not lye Wyndham Iustice accorded with Scroggs and the Chief Iustice North agreed with them in the same Opinion his Argument was viz. First he said that he did not wonder that the Defendant made his Case so solemn being loaded with so great damages but that his Opinion should not be guided with that or with any Rules but those of Law because this did not concern the Plaintiff alone but was the Case of all the Nobility of England but let it be never so general and the Conveniences or Incoveniences never so great he would not upon any such considerations alter the Law He said that no Action would lie upon this Statute which would not lie at the Common Law for where a Statute prohibits a thing generally and no particular Man is concerned an Offence against such a Law is punishable by Indictment but where there is a particular damage to any person by doing the thing prohibited there an Action will lie upon the Statute and so it will at the Common Law The Words therefore which are actionable upon this Statute are so at the Common Law This Statute extends only to Peers or other great Officers now every Peer as such is a great Officer he has an Office of great Dignity he is to support the King by his advice of which he is made capable by the great Eminency of his Reputation and therefore all Words which reflect upon him as he is the Kings Councellor or as he is a Man of Honour and Dignity are actionable at the Common Law In the ordinary Cases of Officers 't is not necessary to say that the Words were spoken relating to his Office as to say of a Lawyer that He is a Sot or an Ignoramus or of a Tradesman He is a Bankrupt the Action lies though the Words were not spoken of either as a Lawyer or Tradesman He did not think that Iudges were to teach Men by what Rules to walk other than what did relate to the particular matter before them all other things are gratis dicta neither would he allow that distinction that an Action would not lie where a Man spoke only his Opinion for if that should be admitted it would be very easie to scandalize any Man as I think such a Judge is corrupt or I am of Opinion that such a Privy Councellor is a Traytor and can any Man doubt whether these or such like Words are actionable or not because spoken only in the sense of the person 'T is true in some Cases where a Man speaks his own particular disesteem an Action will not lie as if I say I care not for such a Lord but that differs much where a Man speaks his Opinion with reference to a Crime for Opinions will be spread and will have an implicit Faith and because one Man believes it another will and 't is upon this ground that all the Cases which have been since the Statute are justified and so was the late
Case of * Sid. 233. the Marquess of Dorchester He is no more to be valued than the Black Dog which lies there which were Words of disesteem and only the Opinion of the Defendant in which Case Iudgment was affirmed in a Writ of Error Object If it be objected to what purpose this Statute was made if no Action lies upon it but what lay at the Common Law Answ The Plaintiff now upon the Statute must prosecute tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso which he could not do at the Common Law And it has beén held in the Starr-Chamber that if a Scandalum Magnatum be brought upon this Statute the Defendant cannot justifie because 't is brought qui tam c. and the King is concerned but the Defendant may explain the Words and tell the occasion of speaking of them if they are true they must not be published because the Statute was to prevent Discords Object These Words carry in them no disesteem Answ According to a Common Vnderstanding they are Words of disrespect and of great disesteem for 't is as much as to say that the Plaintiff is a Man of no Honour he is one who lives after his own Will and so is not fit to be employed under the King if any precedent discourse had qualified the speaking these Words it ought to have been shewn by the Defendant which is not done and therefore he concluded that the Words notwithstanding what was objected were actionable and so by the Opinion of him Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Atkins Iustice of a contrary Opinion Anonymus AN Action of Assault Battery Amendment after a Demurrer joyned and before Judgment given good Wounding and false Imprisonment for an hour was brought against the Defendant who pleads quoad venire vi armis Not-Guilty and as to the Imprisonment he justified as Servant to the Sheriff attending upon him at the time of the Assize from whom he received a Command to bring the Plaintiff being another of the Sheriffs Servants from the Conventicle where finding of him he to wit the Defendant did molliter manus imponere upon the Plaintiff and brought him before his Master quae est eadem transgressio To this the Plaintiff demurred and shewed for Cause 1. That the Substance of the Iustification is not good 2 Cro. 360. because the Servant could not thus justifie though his Master might for the Lord may beat his Villain without a Cause but if he command another to do it an Action of Battery lies against him 2 H. 4. 4. But though this might have been good if well pleaded yet 't is not good as pleaded here for 2. The Defendant saith quoad venire vi armis Not-Guilty Harding and Ferne Postea but saith nothing of the wounding which cannot be justified and therefore this Plea is not good for which reason it was clearly resolved that the Plea was ill but the Court inclined that the Substance of the Plea was well enough The Chief Iustice and Iustice Scroggs were of Opinion that a Man may as well send for his Servant from a Conventicle as from an Alehouse and may keep him from going to either of those places And the Chief Iustice said that he once knew it to be part of a Marriage Agreement that the Wife should have leave to go to a Conventicle But in this Case Leave was given to amend the Plea Sid. 107. and put in quoad vulnerationem Not-Guilty and it was held that though the Parties had joined in Demurrer yet the Defendant might have Liberty to amend before Iudgment given Singleton versus Bawtree Executor Traverse must be where the Charge in the Declaration is not fully answered ASsumpsit against the Defendant as Executor who pleads the Testator made one J. S. Executor who proved the Will and took upon him the Execution thereof and administred the Goods and Chattels of the Testator and so concludes in Abatement Et petit Judicium de Brevi with an Averment that J. S. Superstes in plena vita existit To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred because the Defendant ought to have traversed absque hoc that he was Executor or administred as Executor and so are all the Pleadings 9 H. 6. 7. 4 H. 7. 13. 7 H. 6. 13. But Serjeant Pemberton for the Defendant said that there is a difference when Letters of Administration are granted in case the Party die intestate and when a Man makes a Will and therein appoints an Executor for in that Case the Executor comes in immediately from the death of the Testator but when a Man dies intestate the Ordinary hath an Interest in the Goods and therefore he who takes them is Executor de son tort and may be charged as such but 't is otherwise generally where there is a Will and a rightful Executor who proveth the same for he may bring a Trover against the Party for taking of the Testators Goods though he never had the actual possession of them and therefore the taking in such case will not make a Man Executor de son tort because there is another lawful Executor but 't is true that if there be a special Administration 't is otherwise as if a Stranger doth take upon him to pay Debts or Legacies or to use the Intestates Goods such an express Administration will make him Executor de son tort and liable as in Read's Case 5 Co. So in this Case the Defendant pleads that J. S. was Executor which prima facie discharges him for to make him chargeable the Plaintiff ought in his Replication to set forth the special Administration that though there was an Executor yet before he assumed the Execution or proved the Will the Defendant first took the Goods by which he became Executor of his own Wrong and so to have brought himself within this distinction which was the truth of this Case and that would have put the matter out of dispute which not being done he held the Plea to be good and so prayed Iudgment for the Defendant The Court were of Opinion that prima facie this was a good Plea for where a Man * 2 Sand. 28. confesses and avoids he need not traverse and here the Defendant had avoided his being chargeable as Executor de son tort by saying that there was a rightful Executor who had administred the Testators whole Estate but the Surmise of the Plaintiff and the Plea of the Defendant being both in the * 2 Cro. 579. pl. 9. Sid. 341. 1 Sand. 338. affirmative no Issue can be joined thereon and therefore the Defendant ought to have traversed that he was Executor or ever administred as Executor the rather because his Plea gives no full Answer to the Charge in the Declaration being charged as Executor who pleads that another was Executor and both these matters might be true and yet the Defendant liable as Executor de son tort which
c. The Question was whether the Owner of a new House uninhabited from the time of the building thereof ought to pay this Duty during all that time Mr. Pollexfen and Mr. Sympson argued that they shall not be chargeable with this Duty their general Reason was because no Duty should arise to the King without some benefit to the Subject And as to that it was said that in this Case both the Revenue of the Crown and the Property of the Subject are concerned from which as from a Root all these Impositions arise to sustain the publique Charge And therefore It hath been the way of Iudges in the Interpretations of Statutes not only to consider the benefit of the Crown but to regard what is convenient for the Subject There are two Reasons for Impositions 1. Such as are Customs viz. Tunnage and Poundage and private Tolls which come in lieu of other things and so are quid pro quo 2. Subsidies or Grants from the People which naturally arise in some proportion from a benefit to the Subject And under the last of these Reasons falls the present Duty given by the Act of 14 Car. only to proportion the Revenue to the publique Charge of the Crown and therefore 't is not to be thought that the Parliament ever intended a Duty to the King where the Subject had no benefit for ex nihilo nihil fit and how can it be thought that a Duty should be paid before the Subject hath any Rent which is the Mother of the Duty for if a Man expends 1000 l. in building which is all he is worth and the Houses should happen not to be let how can he then raise such a Sum as must be paid to the King And 't is an Objection of no weight to say if this Duty must not be paid till the Houses are let then the Revenue of the King depends upon a Contingency because all Duties which come to the Crown do depend upon such The next thing to be considered is the Act it self and as to that 1. It must be taken as an Act which gives a new Duty to the Crown and thereupon such Construction ought to be made that the Subjects Estate be not charged further than the Words will bear and for that reason it is to be taken in an ordinary sense and not to be strained though it had been in the Case of an old Duty and for that the * 7 Co. 21. Lord Anderson's Case is a good Authority viz. The Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 30. makes all Mannors which descend to any Heir whose Ancestor was indebted to the King by Judgment Recognisance Obligation or other Specialty chargeable for payment of the Debt Tenant in Tail is bound in a Recognizance to S. who is attainted then Tenant in Tail dies and his Issue aliens bona fide the King cannot extend the Lands so sold because the Act shall not be construed to mean all Recognizances for the Kings Debts though the Words are general enough and though 't is not said which way the Debts shall come to the King either by Forfeiture Attainder c. yet they shall be taken in an ordinary sense viz. such debts as were due to the King originally for which reason it has been always held where an Act gives any thing to the King and lays a Charge upon the Subject in such Case it ought to have a moderate construction And that this Duty is a Gift cannot be denied for 't is called so in the very Act therefore such ought the Construction to be and the rather because it is more for the Kings Honour it should be so and both in this Case as well as in Constructions of his Grants the Law hath more regard for his Honour than for his Profit 2. This being so called a Duty or Tax by the very Words of the Act doth in the natural sense import a proportion out of that in which the Subject hath a benefit and it will be scarce found that there hath been a general Tax given to the King where the Subject has rather received a loss than any profit out of the thing taxed because it would be very hard to pay where a Man cannot receive In the Case of Tunnage and Poundage provision is made that the Party shall have Allowance if the Goods be lost by Pyracy which was mentioned to shew how unlikely it was that the Parliament should intend a Duty where the Subject had a loss Ever since the making the Statute of 43 Eliz. cap. 2. Houses that lay void and untenanted have neither paid to Church or Poor which also shews how the Vsage hath beén in Cases almost of the like nature The next thing considered were the Clauses in this Act of 14 Car. 2. cap. 10. 1. The first Clause gives a Duty viz. That every Chimny and Stove shall pay 2 s. 2. The next Clause is to bring this Duty into a way of Charge viz. That every Owner or Occupier shall give unto the Constable an accompt of the number of Hearths in Writing and the Constables to transmit such Accompts to the Sessions there to be enrolled by the Clerk of the Peace and a Duplicate to be sent into the Exchequer From which it is to be observed that where mention is made of bringing this Duty into a Charge both Owners and Occupiers are named but the Owner is not named in any place where the payment of the Duty is mentioned but the Occupier only so that from the very intent and reason of the Act he cannot be chargeable The Accompt thus transmitted is to charge the Inheritance and therefore it concerns the Owner to look after the Charge but for empty Houses he cannot be charged because the Act takes no notice of them in the Clause of Payment but are purposely omitted that being laid on the Occupier and this appears by the Proviso which is strongly penned for the Subject Viz. Provided that the Payments and Duties hereby charged shall be charged only upon the Occupier for the time being c. and not on the Land-Lord who lett and demised the same so that by the Body of the Act every House is charged which being general might have given some colour to charge the Owner but by the Proviso the Payment is restrained to the Occupier and if there be no such there shall be no Payment It was said that it cannot be insisted upon that an Owner is an Occupier because the legal acceptance of the Word Occupation doth only intend an actual Possession and not a Possession in Law and such is the meaning of the Statute by charging the Occupier for the time being If therefore the Proviso extends to Cases where Tenants run away and pay no Rent as it certainly doth because there is no Occupier then in being what difference can there be between that and this Case where the Land-Lord in both hath no Rent for if he shall not pay where he cannot receive
and so North Chief Iustice said that it had been lately ruled in the Common Pleas. Afterwards the Court of Kings-Bench was moved for a Prohibition in this Case and it was denied so that in this Case there was the Opinion of all the three Courts This matter was so much laboured because twenty four Quakers were reported to be concerned in the Rate and they were unwilling to pay towards the Building of a Church Paget versus Vossius In B. R. A Trial at the Bar in Ejectione Firmae Judgment given upon the Construction of words in a Will Jones 73. 1 Ventris 325. in which the Iury found a special Verdict The Case was Viz. That Dr. Vossius the Defendant being an Alien and a Subject of the States of Holland falling into Disgrace there had his Pension taken from him by Publick Authority Afterwards he came into England and contracted a great Friendship with one Dr. Brown a Prebendary of Windsor Then a War broke out between England and Holland and the King issued forth his Proclamation declaring the said War and the Hollanders to be Alien Enemies Dr. Brown being seised of the Lands now in question being of the value of 200 l. per Ann. and upwards made his Will in these words in Writing Inter alia Viz. Item I give all my Mannour of S. with all my Freehold and Copyhold Lands c. to my dear Friend Dr. Isaac Vossius during his Exile from his own Native Country but if it please God to restore him to his Country or take him out of this Life then I give the same immediately after such restoration or death to Mrs. Abigal Hevenigham for ever A Peace was afterwards concluded between England and Holland whereby all Intercourses of Trade between the two Nations became lawful but Dr. Vossius was not sent for over by the States nor was there any offer of kindness to him but his Pension was disposed of and given to another That the Doctor might return into his own Country when he pleased but that he still continued in England And whether he or the Lessor of the Plaintiff Mrs. Heveningham had the better Title was the question Nota Dr. Vossius was enabled to take by Grant from the King Ex parte Quer. Pemberton Serjeant for the Lessor of the Plaintiff argued that the Estate limited to the Defendant is determined which depended upon the construction of this Devise He did agree that the Will was obscure and the intent of the Devisor must be collected from the circumstances of the Case and it is a Rule That according to the * 2 Cro. 62 371 416. intent of the Parties a Will is to be interpreted 'T is plain then that the Devisor never intended the Defendant an Estate for Life absolutely because it was to depend upon a Limitation and the Words are express to that purpose for he devises to him during his Exile c. Now the Question is not so much what is the genuine and proper sence and signification of those Words as what the Testator intended they should signifie 1. Therefore the most proper signification of the Word Exile is a penal Prohibiting a person from his Native Country and that is sometimes by Iudgment or Edict as in the case of an Act of Parliament and sometimes 't is chosen to escape a greater Punishment as in cases of Abjuration and Transportation c. But he did not think that the Testator took the Word Exile in this restrained sense for Dr. Vossius was never formally or solemnly Banished if that should be the sense of the Word then nothing would pass to the Doctor by this Will because the Limitation would be void and like to the Case of a Devise to a Married Woman durante viduitate and she dies in the life-time of her Husband or to a Woman Sole during her Coverture or of a Devise to A. the Remainder to the right Heis of B. and A. dies living B so that this could not be his meaning 2. The Word Exile in common parlance is taken only for absence from ones Native Country but this is a very improper signification of the Word and nothing but a Catachresis can justifie it and therefore the Testator could not intend it in this sense 't is too loose and inconsiderable an Interpretation of the Word for the Iudgment of the Court to depend on unless there were circumstantial Proofs amounting almost to a Demonstration that it was thus meant But it plainly appears by the following Words this was not the meaning of the Testator for 't is said If it please God to restore him to his Country which shews that there was some Providence or other which obstructed his return thither and so could not barely intend a voluntary absence for if so he might have expressed it viz. during his absence from his Country or till his return thither or whilst he should stay in England and not in such doubtful Words 3. By the Word Exile is meant a persons lying under the displeasure of the Government where he was born or of some great persons who have an Influence upon the Government or have an Authority over him which makes him think convenient considering such circumstances to withdraw himself and retire to some other place and this is a sense of the Word between both the former and even in the Common Law we are not strangers to the acceptation of the Word in that sense There is a Case omni exceptione major in the Writ of Waste which is fecit vastum de domibus venditionem de boscis exilium de hominibus 't is in the Register and in the Writ on the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 24. where by the exilium de hominibus is meant the hard usage of Tenants or the menacing of them whereby they flie from their Habitations 2 H. 6. 11. 'T is found in this Case that the Defendant was under the displeasure of his Governours the War broke out and therefore it might not then be safe for him to return and for that reason he might think it safe for himself to abide here and this Dr. Brown the Testator might know which might also be the reason of making the Will But now all acts of Hostility are past and so the Defendants recess is open and it hath pleased God to restore the Doctor but he is not pleased to restore himself for the Iury find he is not returned now if a Man hath an Estate under such a Limitation to do a thing which may be done when it pleaseth the party in such case if he neglect or refuse to do the thing the Estate is determined 15 H. 7. 1. If I grant a Man an Annuity till he be promoted to a Benefice and I provide a Presentation for him and he will not be Instituted and Inducted the Annuity ceases so shall the Estate in this Case because the Devisor seems to appoint it to the Defendant till he may return
according to the computed or improved value and therefore he inclined that the Action would not lie The Exemplification of the Decree was offered to be read which being opposed Serjeant Maynard informed the Court that nothing was more usual than to read a Sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court or a Decree in Chancery as Evidence of the Fact It being allowed to be read the Council for the Defendant took notice that the Commission was therein mentioned which was returned into Chancery and burned when the Six Clerks Office was on fire in the year 1618. but a Duplicate thereof was produced which the Defendant had from the Heir of the Harveys and so the Survey was praied to be read which was opopsed by Sir William Jones for he said that it was no Duplicate the Commissioners Names being all written with one Hand and no proof being made that it was a true Copy of that which was returned he likewise observed upon the reading of the Decree that it was an Evidence for the Plaintiff because if there had been a setled Rule for payment of the Fines there had been no occasion to seek relief in Equity and that there was no reason that the Defendant should come into a Court of Law to prove such Settlement by a Decree in Chancery for if there be such a Decree his Remedy is proper there besides the Decree it self only mentions the years value which was to be setled by the Commissioners and which he said was never done so that the Decree which appointed the Commission was not compleated and therefore being but executory is of no force even in Equity The Court were doubtful in the matter and Baron Thurland said That no Action of Debt would lie for this Fine because it was neither upon the Contract nor as ex quasi contractu But as to that Serjeant Maynard answered That many Resolutions had been made in his time of Cases wherein the Old Books were silent Vpon the whole the Court thought this to be a proper Case for Equity and so directed a Iurour to be withdrawn which was accordingly done DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 29 Car. II. in Communi Banco Addison versus Sir John Otway IN a special Verdict in Ejectione firmae A Parish and a Vill within the Parish of the same Name a Recovery is suffered of Lands in the Vill and in the Deed to lead the Uses the Parish is named they make but one Conveyance and the Lands in the Parish do pass Mod. Rep. 250. the Case was thus Viz. There was the Vill of Rippon and the Parish of the same Name and likewise the Vill of Kirkby and the Parish of the same Name in the County of York And Thomas Brathwaite being Tenant in Tail of the Lands in question lying in the said Parishes of Rippon and Kirkby did by Bargain and Sale convey the same lying as in truth they did in the Parishes of Rippon and Kirkby to the intent to make a Tenant to the Praecipe in order to suffer a Common Recovery and thereby he did Covenant to suffer the same which Recovery was afterwards suffered of Lands in Rippon and Kirkby but doth not say as he ought in the Parishes of Rippon and Kirkby and the Verdict in effect found That he had no Lands in the Vills but farther that it was the intent of the Parties that the Lands in the Parishes should pass and whether they should or not was the Question It was said for the Defendant That by this Indenture and Common Recovery the Lands which lie in the said Parishes shall pass 1. Supposing this to be in the Case of a Grant there if the Vill is only named yet the Lands in the Parish of the same Name shall pass because the Grant of every Man shall be taken strongest against himself Owen Rep. 61. So where part of the Lands lie in B. and the Grant is of all the Lands in D. all the Lands in the Parish of D. shall pass because in that Case the Parish shall be intended and if the Law be thus in a Grant a fortiori in the Case of a Common Recovery Postea Barker and Keat which is the Common Assurance of the Land 2. The Verdict hath found that the Defendant had no Lands in the Vills of Rippon and Kirkby and the Court will not intend that he had any there if not found so that nothing passes by the Recovery if the Lands in the Parishes do not pass which is contrary to the intention of the Parties and to the Rules of Law in the like Cases for if a Man deviseth all his Lands in Dale and hath both Free-hold and Lease-hold there by this Devise the Freehold only passes but if no Free-hold the Leases shall pass Cro. Car. 293. So adjudged in the Case of Rose and Bartlet for otherwise the Will would be void 3. The Parish and Vill shall be both intended to support a Trial already had as where a Venire facias ought to issue from the Parish of Dale and it was awarded from Dale generally 't is well enough * 1 Roll. Rep. 21 27 293. Hob. 6. 2 Cro. 263. 1 Roll. Rep. 27. A fortiori to support a Common Recovery which has always been favourably interpreted and yet a new Tryal will help in the one case but a Man cannot command a new Recovery when he will and therefore the Iudges usually give Iudgments to support and maintain Common Recoveries that the Inheritances of the Subject might be preserved for if there be Tenant in Tail the Reversion in Fee or if Baron and Feme suffer a Recovery this is a bar of the Reversion and the Dower and yet the intended Recompence could not go to either Pl. Com. 515. 2 Roll. Rep. 67. 5 Co. Dormer's Case Antea 4. The Iury have found that the intention of the Parties was to pass the Lands in the Parishes which Intention shall be equivalent to the Words Omitted And for that there is a notable Case in 2 Roll. Rep. f. 245. where the intent of the Parties saved an Extinguishment of a Rent The Case was A. makes a Lease for years rendring Rent and then grants the Reversion for 40 years to B. and C. which he afterwards conveyed to them and their Heirs by Bargain and Sale and covenanted to levy a Fine accordingly to make them Tenants to the Praecipe to suffer a Common Recovery to another Vse the Bargain Fine and Recovery were all executed and it was adjudged that they made all but one Conveyance and that the Reversion was not destroyed and by consequence the Rent not extinguished for though the Bargainor might intend to destroy the Reversion by making this Grant to them and their Heirs yet the Bargainees could never have such Intention and though they were now seised to another Vse yet by the Statute of Wills their former Right is saved which they had to their proper Vse and their intention being only to make a
upon the Statute and then the Defendant might have pleaded the Act of Indempnity of which he might have the benefit but if not he may be let into the Equity of the Statute of the 33 H. 8. cap. 39. which gives liberty to Purchasers to have contribution and to plead sufficient matter if they have any in discharge of the Debt Ex parte Quer. But on the other side it was said that the Replication was good for if the Sale was after his being Receiver though before he became indebted yet by the Statute of the 13 Eliz. the Lands are subject to a Debt contracted afterwards because it hath a Retrospect to the time he was first Receiver Pl. Com. 321. Dyer 160. By the Common Law both the Body and Lands of the Kings Debtor were lyable from the time he became indebted but because such Debtors oftentimes sold those Lands which they had whilst they were Officers and so the King was defeated therefore was this Statute made to supply that defect of the Common Law by which Statute all the Lands he had at any time during his continuance in the Office were made lyable And though it may be objected That because of this Inquisition the King is limited to a time Viz. that inquiry should be made what Lands Havers had in the 20th year of the King yet it was said the Inquiry may be general The Elegit anciently left out the time because the Law doth determine from what time the party doth become lyable so that the question is about the King's Title which if it appear to precede that of the Ter-tenant then the King's Hands are not to be amoved and thereupon Iudgment was prayed for him Bro. Prerogative 59. Curia adversare vult Barker versus Keat IN a Special Verdict in Ejectione firmae Reservation of a Pepper Corn a good consideration to raise an use to make a Tenant to the Praecipe Mod. Rep. 262 the Iury made a special Conclusion by referring to the Court whether there was a good Tenant to the Praecipe or not which was made by a Bargain and Sale but no Mony paid nor any Rent reserved but that of a Pepper Corn to be paid at the end of six Months upon demand and the Release and Grant of the Reversion thereupon was only for divers good Considerations The Question was if this Lease upon which no Rent was reserved but that of a Pepper Corn be executed by the Statue of Uses or not if it be Cro. Jac. 604. Jones 7. 1 Cro. 110. 5 Rep. 124. b. then there is no need of the Entry of the Lessee for the Statute will put him in actual possession and then the Inheritance by the Release or Grant of the Reversion will pass But if this Lease be not within the Statute because no Vse can be raised for want of a Consideration then it must be a Conveyance at the Common Law Lit. Sect. 465. Co. Lit. 46. b. and so the Lessee ought to make an actual Entry as was always usual before the making of the Statute Serjeant Waller and Maynard argued that here was no Consideration to raise an Vse for the reservation of a Pepper-Corn is no profit to the Lessor 't is not a real and good Rent For so small and trivial a matter is no Consideration for that which must be a good Consideration ought to be Mony or some other valuable thing Then this Conveyance is not executed by the Statute of Vses and if so 't is not good at the Common Law it being only a Lease for years and no Entry without which there can be no possession and if not then there can be no Reversion upon which the Release may operate 't is only an interresse termini and so was the Opinion of my Lord Coke since the Co. Lit. 270. making of this Statute 1 Leon. 194 195. And that no Vse was raised here the Case of my Lord Paget was cited to which this was compared My Lord being seised in Fee Covenanted to stand seised to the Vse of Trentham and others in consideration of payment of his Debts out of the Profits of his own Estate this was adjudged a void Vse because there was no consideration on Trentham's part to raise it the Mony appointed to be paid being to be raised out of the Profits of my Lords Estate The Words of the Lease are Demise Grant c. which are Words at the Common Law Co. Lit. 45. b. and 't is not possible that a future executory Consideration should raise a present Vse for the Pepper Corn is not to be paid till the end of six Months and as this Consideration is executory so it is contingent too for the Lessor might have released before the expiration of the six Months If the Case of * Cro. Jac. 604. pl. 32. Lutwitch and Mitton be objected where it was resolved by the two Chief Iustices and Chief Baron that upon a Deed of Bargain and Sale of Lands where the Bargainee never entred and the Bargainor reciting the Lease did grant the Reversion expectant upon it Cro. Car. 110 400. that this was a good grant of the Reversion from which the Possession was immediately divided and was executed and vested in the Bargainee by virtue of the Statute of Vses This is no Objection to the purpose because in that Case the Bargainor was himself in actual possession So that if there be no good Tenant to the Precipe in this Case though all that joyn in it are Estopped to say so yet the Tenant in Tail who comes in above is not barred 5 H. 5. 9. But on the othe side it was said that the Lessee was in possession by the Statute for the Word Grant being in the Lease and the reservation being a Pepper Corn that will amount to a Bargain and Sale though it hath not those precise words in it 8 Co. 94. Pl. Com. 308. Dyer 146. b. contra But if it should not yet another Vse may be averred than what is in this Lease like Bedel's Case 7 Co. 40. b. Where a Man in consideration of Fatherly Love to his eldest Son did covenant to stand seised to the Vse of him in Tail and afterwards to the use of his second Son there though the consideration respected his eldest Son only in Words yet a consideration which is not repugnant to it may be averred and though an Entry is not found yet it shall not be intended since the Iury have not found the contrary North Chief Iustice At first when this sort of Conveyance was used the Lessee upon the Lease for a year did always make an actual Entry and then came the Release to convey the Reversion but that being found troublesome the constant Practice was to make the Lease for a year by the Deed of Bargain and Sale for the consideration of five shillings or some other small sum and this was held and is so still to be good
reason alone the Plaintiff had no cause of Demurrer for the Defendant may well disclose the matter of Law in Pleading which is a much cheaper way than to have a Special Verdict and that this is on the same reason of giving of colour but if the matter by which the Defendant justifies be all matter of Fact and proper for the Tryal of a Iury then the Dfendant ought to plead the General Issue And as to the Matter of the Plea the Chief Iustice and Wyndham Iustice held it to be good for the Common which was pleaded was a Common by Grant and not argumentatively pleaded for if the Defendant had pleaded an express Grant of Common in those two places and the Plaintiff had demanded Oyer of the Deed it would have appeared that there was no such Deed and this had been a good cause of Demurrer If this Plea should not be good it would be very mischievous to the Defendant for there being a perpetual Vnity as to the Freehold there can be no Prescription to the Common but there being a constant enjoyment thereof by the Tenants and so a perpetual Vsage and a Grant made referring to that Vsage 't is well enough And since whilst the Lands were in possession of the Lord the Commoners could not complain of a Surcharge why should they if he grant the Premisses the Granteé being in loco c. In the Case of the King a Grant of tot talia Libertates Privilegia quot qualia the Abbot lately had 9 Co. 23. Abbot de Strata Marcella was held good by such general Words Here the Lord Paget granted to the Defendant that which the Lessées had before viz. that Common which the Tenants had time out of mind and it cannot be conceived but that the Tenants had a Right for as a Tort cannot be presumed to be from time immemorial so neither shall it be intended that the Lord gave only a Licence and permitted his Tenants to enjoy this Common But Iustice Atkins was of Opinion that the Plea was not good he said he knew not by what Name to call this Common for it was no more than a Permission from the Lord that the Tenants might put their Cattle into his Freehold or a Connivance at them for so doing and if it be taken as a new Grant then nothing can pass but the Surplus for the Lord cannot derogate from his former Grant and the new Grantee shall not put in an equal proportion with him who hath the Prescription for if he may then such Prescription would be quite destroyed by such puisne Grant for as the Lord might grant to one so he might to twenty and then there would not be sufficient Common left for him who prescribes to the Right So that he conceived that the Defendant had no Right of Common or if he had any it would not be till after the Right of the Plaintiff was served and he said that Vsage shall not intend a Right but it may be an Evidence of it upon a Tryal But if there had been an Vsage 't is now lost by the Vnity of the Possession and shall not be revived by the new Grant like the Case of Massam and Hunter Yelv. 189. there was a Copyholder of a Messuage and two Acres in Feé which the Lord afterwards granted and confirmed to him in Fee cum pertinentiis it was adjudged that though the Tenant by Vsage had a Right to have Common in the Lord's Wast yet by this new Grant and Confirmation that Right was gone the Copyhold being thereby extinguished for the Common being by Vsage and now lost these Words cum pertinentiis in the new Grant will not revive it But notwithstanding Iudgment by the Opinion of the other three Iustices was given for the Defendant Week's Case A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court at Bristol the Suggestion was that he was excommunicated for refusing to answer upon Oath to a Matter by which he might accuse himself viz. to be a Witness against another that he himself was present such a day and saw the other at a Conventicle which if he confessed they would have recorded his Confession of being present at a Meeting and so have proceeded against him The Court granted a Prohibition but ordered him to appear in the Ecclesiastical Court to be examined as to the other persons being there Anonymus A Man wins 100 l. of another at play Gaming not within the Statute where the Security is given to a third person the Winner owed Sharp 100 l. who demanded his Debt the Winner brought him to the other of whom he won the Mony at Play who aknowledged the Debt and gave Sharp a Bond for the payment of the 100 l. who not being privy to the Matter or knowing that it was won at Play accepted the said Bond and for default of payment puts it in Suit the Obligor pleads the Statute of Gaming The Plaintiff in his Replication discloseth the Matter aforesaid and saith that he had a just Debt due and owing to him form the Winner and that he was not privy to the Monies being won at Play c. and that he accepted of the said Bond as a Security for his Debt and the Defendant demurred And the Court were all of Opinion Hill and Phesant Antea that this Case was not within the Statute the Plaintiff not knowing of the Play and though it be pleaded that the Bond was taken pro Securitate and not for satisfaction of a just Debt it was held well enough like the Case of Warns and Ellis Yelv. 47. Warns owed Alder 100 l. upon an usurious Contract and Alder owed the Plaintiff Ellis 100 l. for which they were both bound and in an Action of Debt brought upon this Bond Warns pleads the Statute of Vsury between him and Alder and Ellis replyed as the Plaintiff here and upon a Demurrer it was adjudged for the Plaintiff by thrée Iudges because the Plaintiff had a real Debt owing him and was not privy to the Vsury And upon this Case the Court relyed and said the Reason of it governed this Case at the Barr whereupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Tissard versus Warcup INdebitatus Assumpsit for 750 l. laid out by the Plaintiff for the use of the Defendant Vpon Non assumpsit pleaded there was a Tryal at the Barr and the Evidence was that the Defendant and another now deceased farmed the Excise that the Mony was laid out by the Plaintiff on the behalf of the Defendant and his Partner and that the Defendant promised to repay the Mony out of the first Profits he received Curia And by the Opinion of the whole Court this Action would not lie 1. Two Partners being concerned the Action cannot be brought against one alone he ought in this Case to have set out the death of the other But if Iudgment be had against one the Goods in Partnership may be
particular Estate to support it for it shall descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen 't is not like a Remainder at the Common Law which must vest eo instanti that the particular Estate determines but the Learning of Exeecutory Devises stands upon the Reasons of the old Law wherein the intent of the Devisor is to be observed For when it appears by the Will that he intends not the Devisee to take but in futuro and no disposition being made thereof in the mean time it shall then descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen but if the intent be that he shall take in praesenti and there is no incapacity in him to do it he shall not take in futuro by an executory Devise Sid. 153. pl. 2. A Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere is good and it shall descend to the Heir in the mean time for the Testator could not intend he should take presently he must first be in rerum natura 3 Co. 20. a. 1 Inst 378. a. If an Estate be given to A. for Life the Remainder to the right Heirs of B. this is a contingent Remainder and shall be governed by the Rules of the Law for if B. dye during the Life of A. 't is good but if he survive 't is void because no Body can be his right Heir whilst he is living and there shall be no descent to the Heir of the Donor in the mean time to support this contingent Remainder that so when B. dies his right Heirs may take In this Case a Fée did vest in Benjamin presently and therefore after his death without Issue the Defendant is his Heir and hath a good Title if not as Heir at Law yet she may take by way of Executory Devise as Heir of the Body of her Father which though it could not be whilst he was living because nemo est haeres viventis yet after his death she was Heir of his Body and was then of Age at which time and not before she was to take by the Will That Elizabeth the general Heir had only an Estate for years till Benjamin should or might be of Age And so by the Opinion of the whole Court Iudgment was given for the Defendant Evered versus Hone. SPecial Verdict in Ejectment wherein the Case was thus viz. A Man hath Issue two Sons Thomas his eldest and Richard his youngest Son Thomas hath Issue John Richard hath Issue Mary The Father devised Lands to his Son Thomas for Life Constructi-of Words in a Devise and afterwards to his Grandson John and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he die without Issue Male then to his Grandaughter Mary in Tail and charged it with some Payments in which Will there was this Proviso viz. Provided if my Son Richard should have a Son by his now Wife Margaret then all his Lands should go to such first Son and his Heirs he paying as Mary should have done Afterwards a Son was born and the Question was whether the Estate limited to Thomas the eldest Son was thereby defeated And the Court were all clear of Opinion that this Proviso did only extend to the Case of Mary's being intituled and had no influence upon the first Estate limited to the eldest Son Anonymus IN the Exchequer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor Executor of an Executor de son tort not liable at Law the Lord Treasurer and two Chief Iustices the Case was thus viz. The Plaintiff had declared against the Defendant as Executor of Edward Nichols who was Executor of the Debtor The Defendant pleads that the Debtor died intestate and Administration of his Goods was granted to a Stranger absque hoc that Edward Nichols was ever Executor but doth not say or ever administred as Executor for in truth he was Executor de son tort The Plaintiff replies that before the Administration granted to the Stranger Edward Nichols possessed himself of divers Goods of the said Debtor and made the Defendant Executor and dyed and the Defendant demurred and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but reversed here for an Executor of an Executor de son tort is not lyable at Law though the Lord Chancellor said he would help the Plaintiff in Equity But here Administration of the Goods of the Debtor was granted before the death of the Executor de son tort so his Executorship vanished and nothing shall survive The Lady Wyndham's Case IF Flotsam come to land and is taken by him who hath no Title the Action shall not be brought at the Common Law and no Proceedings shall be thereon in the Court of Admiralty for there is no need of Condemnation thereof as there is of Prizes By the Opinion of the whole Court of Common Pleas. Rose versus Standen Action where misconceived by the Plaintiff and Verdict against him no Barr to a new Action IN Accompt for Sugar and Indigoe the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit a quantum meruit and an insimul computasset for 100 l. due to him for Wares sold to which he pleaded Non assumpsit and that there was a Verdict against him and then averrs that the Wares mentioned in that Action are the same with those mentioned here in the Action of Accompt The Plaintiff demurred and it was said for him that he had brought his former Action on the Case too soon for if no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case on the Insimul computasset will not lye and so the former Verdict might be given against him for that Reason Ex parte Def. But on the contrary the Defendant shall not be twice troubled for the same thing and if the Verdict had been for the Plaintiff that might have been pleaded in Barr to him in a new Action Curia 2 Cro. 284. But the Court were of another Opinion that this Plea was not good and that if the Plaintiff had recovered it could not have been pleaded in Barr to him for if he misconceives his Action and a Verdict is against him and then brings a proper Action the Defendant cannot plead that he was barred to bring such Action by a former Verdict Antea Putt and Roster Postea Rosal and Lamper Ante. because where 't is insufficient it shall not be pleaded in Barr as in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded another Action upon the same Bond and the Iury found Non est factum the Entry of the Verdict was that the Defendant should recover damages eat inde sine die but not quod Querens nil capiat per Breve so no Iudgment to barr him 2 Cro. 284. But pending one Action another cannot be brought for they cannot both be true If no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case upon an Insimul computasset would not lye the Insimul computasset implies an Accompt and upon Non assumpsit pleaded the Defendant might have given payment in Evidence and for that
reason the Iury might find for him 'T is true he might have pleaded Plene computavit which is the general Plea But it may as well be presumed that the Verdict was against the Plaintiff because the Action would not lye and the Matter being in dubio the Court will intend it against the Pleader he not having averred to the contrary and so they held the Plea to be ill DE Termino Paschae Anno 30 Car. II. in Communi Banco Osborn versus Wright ACtion on the Case for words Viz. The Plaintiff declares that she was unmarried but about to marry one J. S. and that the Defendant to hinder her Marriage spoke these Words of her Viz. She is a Whore a Common Whore and N's Whore per quod maritagium amisit The Iury found the Defendant guilty of speaking the Words but that she did not lose her Marriage thereby and it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that these Words are not actionable being only Scolding and of that Opinion was all the Court and Iudgment was arrested Hambleton versus Justice Scroggs alios In Camera Scaccarii Serjeant at Law whether Priviledge to be Sued only in the Common-Pleas AN Assault and Battery was brought against the Defendants in the Kings-Bench to which one of them pleaded that he was a Serjeant at Law and so ought to have his Priviledge to be sued by Bill in the Common Pleas and in no other Court To this Plea the Plaintiff demurred and Iudgment was given in my Lord Chief Iustice Hales's time by the Opinion of him and the whole Court of Kings-Bench That a Serjeant at Law might be sued there and was not suable in the Court of Common-Pleas only 2. That in this Action the Defendant should not have his Priviledge because it was brought against him and another And afterwards a Writ of Error was brought upon this Iudgment returnable before the Lord Chancellor and Chief Iustices of the Kings-Bench and Common-Pleas and the Errors were argued before the two Chief Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Chancery Lane Mr. Holt for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error Ex parte Quer. That a Serjeant at Law is to be sued only in the Court of Common-Pleas and not elsewhere because there is an absolute necessity of his Attendance there He is sworn and no other person can plead at that Bar and therefore if he should be sued in any other Court Vaugh. 155. it would be an Impediment to the Business of that Court where not only the Officers but their Servants have Priviledge In the 11th of E. 4. 2. There was some discourse about the Priviledge of Serjeants at Law where it was held that he is not to be sued in that Court by Bill but by Original but either way he is to have his Priviledge So the Servant of an Officer is not to be sued by Bill Cro. Car. 84. but he is still to have the Priviledge of the Court and so had Serjeant Hedley's Clerk in the Reign of King Charles the first The Serjeants receive a kind of Induction to the Bar and have a place assigned them and that they ought to have Priviledge the very Words of the Writ are observable Viz. mentioning a Serjeant at Law ex officio incumbit in Curia illa And though it hath been said and given as an answer to that Case in Cro. Car. That where the Serjeants Clerk was Arrested in an Inferior Court as in that Case he was there he shall have Priviledge but not against the other great Courts in Westminster-Hall this is a difference never yet taken notice of in any Book nor doth the Writ warrant this distinction 2. He shall have his Priviledge though he be joyned with another because the Action is joynt and several and the one may be found guilty and the other acquitted and it would be an easie way to oust a Man of his Priviledge if it might be done by joyning him with another who hath none 14 H. 4. 21. But the Person with whom the Serjeant is joyned may be sued in the Common-Pleas likewise so that he shall not hinder him from having Priviledge who of right ought to have it 10 E. 4. 15. Offley contra As to the first point Ex parte Def. the Court of Kings-Bench agreed that a Serjeant at Law shall always have the Priviledge of the Court of Common-Pleas against all Inferiour Courts but not against the other Courts in Westminster Hall for he may be sued in any of them A Serjeant is not like the Common Officers of the Court for they are to be attendant there and no where else but a Serjeant at Law is not confined to that Court alone he may be assigned of Council in any other Court and doth usually put his hand to Pleas both in the Kings-Bench and the Exchequer but a Philazer or Attorny of that Court cannot practise in his own Name in any other All Cases of Priviledge ought to be taken strictly And that which was cited concerning the Priviledge of a Serjeants Clerk is not like this because the Arrest was in an Inferiour Court In the 11 E. 4. 2. b. The Chief Iustice of the Kings-Bench came to the Common-Pleas Bar and told a Serjeant who he had assigned for a Pauper That if he would not come into that Court and plead for his Clyent he would forejudge him so that if he could be fetch'd out of the Common Pleas and carried to the Kings-Bench he is not confined to that Court alone In the 5 H. 5. nu 10. Complaint was made that the Subjects of the King were not well served in his Courts the Parliament thereupon Ordered that one Martin and others should take upon them the Dignity of Serjeants at Law so that it appears that their Business lies in other Courts as well as in that of the Common-Pleas 2. As to the second Point Here is a joynt Action for any thing that appears to the contrary 2 Rol. Abr. 275. pl. 4. and the Plaintiff may proceed against one in the Kings-Bench and therefore the other shall be ousted of his Priviledge if he have any in the Common-Pleas Moor 556. 20 H. 6. 32. North Chief Iustice said That he always took it to be an uncontroverted point That a Serjeant at Law should be sued only in the Court of Common-Pleas by Bill he is bound by Oath to be there and when he brings a Writ of Priviledge 't is always out of that Court and no other Curia advisare vult The Attorny General versus Sir John Read In Scaccario INformation A special Verdict was found Disability by a Statute ought to be removed by the Party to enable himself to execute an Office The Case was thus Viz. Sir John Read 1 Apr. 24 Car. 2. was by Sentence in the Spiritual Court divorced a Mensa Thoro and for Non payment of Alimony was excommunicated Afterwards it was Enacted by the Statute of 25 Car. 2.
in the Common-Pleas And it was now said for the Plaintiff in the Errors That it doth not appear by the Pleadings whether the Plaintiff in the Prohibition would discharge himself by a Praescription in non decimando or in modo decimandi for the Grant from the Prior being the foundation of his Title he could not thereby be discharged because a Deed before Memory cannot be pleaded unless it hath been allowed in a Court of Eyre or some Court of Record since Memory and this Deed being dated in the Reign of King Henry the I. which was 65 years before the time of Memory by the Common Law that beginning in the Reign of Richard the I. whatever is before that time cannot be tried by Law if it had been allowed in Eyre or in some of the Courts of Record it may be pleaded but no usage in pais can confirm it But supposing the Deed to be good the Plaintiff hath alledged a Grant of a portion of Tythes which he cannot have for at the Common Law a Lay-man was not capable of Tythes in prender for no one had capacity to take or receive them Jones 369. 2 Co. 49. save only spiritual persons for which Reasons a Lay-man could not prescribe in non decimando but in modo decimandi he might because there is still an annual recompence in satisfaction thereof 2. 'T is not alledged that the place where c. was parcel of the Demesus of the Mannor therefore for what appears it might have been always in Tenancy and though a Prescription to a modus by the Lord for himself and all his Tenants is good Cro. Eliz. 599. because it might have a lawful beginning for the Lands at first might be all in his Hands before it was a Mannor and so much paid for the Tythes thereof yet such a Prescription by a Tenant is not good 3. He hath alledged payment to the Prior and afterwards to the King and so would infer a Modus to which he hath not positively prescribed but by an old Deed upon payment of 5 s. to all those whose Estates c. And this will not do for unless the Modus doth go to the person who by Law ought to have Tythes or unless it be for his benefit 't is not good as where it was alledged that he ought to be discharged because time out of memory he employed all the profits of the Land for the Repairs of the Body of the Church and to find necessaries c. this was not a good Modus 1 Roll. Abr. 649 placito 8. because 't is no recompence for the Parson But it was said by Saunders for the Plaintiff in the Prohibition That by the Suggestion there was a good Title alledged to be discharged of Tythes for 't is set forth that the Prior had a portion of Tythes and the Lands simul semel and being a Corporation they might prescribe for Tythes in prender and the Tythes being well in them they may well grant it to Fitzherbert paying 5 s. and constant payment being alledged ever since 't is a good Title As to the Deed t is true 't is dated before the time of Memory but yet 't is pleadable because 't is a private Deed and so need not be allowed in Eyre or in Courts of Record for such as are not to be pleaded unless allowed there are only Grants of Franchises and Liberties from the King but the confession of the Deed to be beyond Memory and the constant payment of 5 s. is a sufficient title to the Plaintiff if the Deed is not pleadable and if it is then 't is a good discharge that way And as to the Objection that the Modus is payable to a wrong person there are many such which are not paid to the Parson of the Parish but to Lay-men But in this Case it doth appear that there was a Modus in the Prior which being received till it came to the Crown 't is good although now paid to others so that for that reason the Spiritual Court ought to be prohibited and of that Opinion was all the Court for if a Modus be payable to him who hath the Right of the Tythes though it be not to the Parson of the Parish 't is well enough especially where the Plaintiff as here alledgeth it to be Portio Decimarum belonging to the Prior so that it cannot be said that the Parson hath not quid pro quo for he had nothing at first This Composition was made with the Prior and the Plaintiff is only to shew payment to him and to those who have his Right And as to the date of the Deed 't is pleadable though time out of memory because 't is a private Deed but Grants of Franchises and Liberties must be allowed in Eyre and so is my Lord Rolls to be understood in his Abridgment Whereupon Iudgment was affirmed FINIS A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in these REPORTS A. Abatement WHERE it shall be taken in Barr 64 65 Action on the Case Where two matters are laid in two Counties the Action may be brought in either by Pleading 23 Process is directed to six Coroners one of them commits a Tort the Action lies against all of them 23 24 It lies for an Acquittal upon an Indictment for a Trespass 52 306 It lies for these Words viz. I dealt not so unkindly with you when you stole my Corn 58 It doth not lye against the Sheriff for returning a Cepi Corpus paratum habeo though the Party doth not appear 85 86 Action Misconceived by the Plaintiff and a Verdict against him no barr to a new Action 294 Accord Where 't is pleaded it must be averred to be executed in all points 44 Accompt After 't is stated an Insimul computasset and not Indebitatus Assumpsit doth lye 44 Acquittal After an Acquittal for a Trespass an Action on the Case will lie 306 Act. Who is to do the first Act 76 203 Act of God of the Party and of a Stranger where it excuses the Obligee 204 Act of Parliament Affirmative words therein where they shall have the force of a negative 40 Where it restores the Common Law 't is to be taken favourably 73 Private Acts must be taken strictly 57 71 Administration Of a Chose en Action of a Feme Covert whether grantable to the Husband or to be distributed amongst the Kindred 20 Pleaded without saying loci istius Ordinarius and held good 65 Where an Executrix dies before Probate it shall be committed to the next of Kin of the Testator 101 It cannot be granted where there is an Executor 149 Where 't is committed to the Debtee in Execution how she shall be discharged 315 Administrator sells the Term an Executor appears who refuses yet the Vendee of the Term hath no Title 148 149 Amerciament Must be made upon the Sheriff if Defendant doth not appear at the Return of the Writ 84 Amendment Not allowed after
Where 't is good without the word tunc where not 129 Of words where the Pronoun pro makes the Contract conditional 33 34 F. Factor WHere he cannot sell but for ready Mony 100 101 Factum valet quod fieri non debet 194 Failure Of Record certified 246 Feoffment To Uses the Estate is executed presently 208 209 Fine Of Lands in a Lieu conus good 49 In a Scire facias to have such Fine excuted the Vill must be named 48 Good by Estoppel levied by a Remainder man in Tail 90 No Uses can be declared of such Fine ibid. Fine sur concessit the nature and effect of it 110 111 112 By such a Fine nothing shall pass but what lawfully may 111 Fines shall work a disseisin where they can have no other interpretation 112 Fines in Criminal Cases must be with Salvo contenemento 150 Flotsam Where it shall be sued for at Common Law and not in the Admiralty 294 Forbearance And doth not say from the making of the promise hucusque held good 24 Formedon In Descender the difference in pleading between that and a Formedon in Remainder or Reverter 94 25 Fraction Where an Estate shall pass by Fractions where not 114 115 G. Gaming WHat Acts amount to make it penal within the Statute 54 Not within the Statute where the Security is given to a third person 279 Grant of the King Where a false recital shall not make it void 2 3 Where the first description is full the misrecital afterwards shall not make it void 2 3 4 He may grant what he hath not in possession 107 Where words shall be rejected rather than his Grant shall be void ibid. Where an Advowson passeth though not named 2 Where a thing will pass by general words ibid. Misrecital where it doth not concern his Title shall not make the Grant void 2 3 Grant of a common Person Of the next Avoidance where it shall not bind the Successor 56 Must be taken according to usual and common intendment 193 Grant where the word in a Deed will make a thing pass by way of Use 253 Guardian In Socage where a doubt is of his sufficiency he may be compelled to give Security 177 H. Harmless vide Condition COndition to save harmless the Plea indempnem conservavit generally is not good 240 305 Habeas Corpus Cannot be granted by the Court of Common Pleas in Criminal Cases 198 199 306 Heir Where he takes by the Will with a Charge he comes in by Purchase and not by Descent and the Lands shall not be Assets 286 Where a general Replication to Riens per descent is good 50 51 Where he shall have a thing though not named 93 Hors de son Fee When to be pleaded 103 I. Ieofails THE Statute of 16 and 17 Car. 2. helps a misrecital in a proper County but not where the County is mistaken 24 An immaterial Issue not arising from the matter is not helped after a Verdict 137 Inducement Not such certainty required as in other Cases 70 Indebitatus Assumpsit Where it will not lie for want of Privity 262 263 Imparlance Tout temps prist not good after an Imparlance 62 Implication Where a Man shall have an Estate for Life by Implication 208 Imprisonment False Imprisonment will not lye against a Judge for committing of a Jury Man for finding against Evidence 218 It lies not against an Officer for refusing Bail but a special Action on the Case lies against the Sheriff for it 32 Information Upon the Statute of Philip and Mary for taking away a Maid unmarried within the Age of sixteen years 128 It will not lie where the Punishment is executed by the Statute 302 Infant When he may make a Will 315 Interest Where 't is vested in the King 53 Where it differs from an Authority 79 What words give an Interest 80 81 Where the word Interest signifies the Estate in the Land 134 Intention Of the Parties where to be considered 76 77 80 111 116 234 280 281 310 Where a thing shall be intended and where not 227 280 282 Grants where they shall be taken according to common intendment 193 Ioynder in Action Covenant to two not to do a thing without their consent one may bring the Action 82 Issue Where Time shall be made parcel of the Issue 145 Iudge and Iudgment Judge cannot fine a Jury for finding against Evidence 218 Action will not lie against him for what he doth judicially though erroneously 221 Judgment may be avoided by Plea without a Writ of Error 308 Iustification Vide Pleading Where 't is local you must traverse both before and after 68 Under a Lease for the Life of another Man and doth not averr that the Life is in being ill 93 Where 't is not local a Traverse makes the Plea naught 270 271 By vertue of a particular Estate you must shew the commencement of it 70 Where it is general and yet good 144 In Assault Battery and Wounding and saith nothing to the Wounding not good 167 Of a Servant by Command of his Master and good ibid. In Assault Battery and Imprisonment for 11 l. 10 s. the Defendant justifies by a Warrant for the 11 l. and saith nothing of the 10 s. not good upon Demurrer 177 Where 't is but of part the general words Quoad residuum transgressionis will not supply the rest 259 K. King THE Defendant cannot justifie in a Scandalum Magnatum brought upon the Statute of R. 2. because the King is a Party tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso 166 Where his Title is not precedent to that of the Ter-tenant the Lands of his Receiver shall not be charged by the Statute of 13 Eliz. 247 248 Difference between the Case of the King and of a common person 263 A person disabled by Outlary may sue for him but not for himself 267 Where an Interest is vested in him it shall not be divested by a general Pardon 53 L. Lease BY a Bishop and more than the old Rent reserved good 57 Where it shall be made by the words Covenant Grant and Agree and where not 80 81 Lessee for years assigns over his whole Term whether Debt will lie on the Contract or not 174 175 Liberties What is meant by the Word 48 Limitation of Action Extends to Indebitatus Assumpsit though not named in the enacting Clause 71 72 73 Statute no Barr where the Sheriff levyed Goods by a Fieri Facias and did not pay the Mony within nine years 212 Doth not extend to an Action on the Case Indebitatus Assumsit Quantum meruit and Insimul computasset 311 312 Limitation of Estate What are good words to take by Purchase from a Stranger 210 211 Limitation of Estate when void makes the Estate absolute 227 Livery Secundum formam Chartae where good or not 78 79 M. Mannor WHere a thing becomes in gross it can never after be united to it 144 What may be appurtenant to it ibid. N. Negative WOrds must
praedicto loco c. but doth not say tempore quo c. for a Herriot tempore quo c. being left out and so doth not say a Herriot was due at the time of the taking of the Goods But he answered That that was usual and common and of that Opinion were all the Iustices and so it was held good It was farther objected That here is a variance between the Avowry and the finding in the Special Verdict The Avowant says that the Rent was 12 s. and 4 d. and the Iury find that it was but 3 s. and 1 d. He also saith that the Herriot was due upon every Alienation without notice and they find it due with or without notice But to that he said the Iury have doubted only of the last Point for the Avowry was not for Rent but for the Herriot so the substance is whether he had good cause to distrein for the Herriot or not Postea And as to that the Substance is sufficiently found like the Case in Dyer 115. Debt upon Bond for performance of Covenants and not to do waste the Breach assigned was that the Defendant felled twenty Oakes who pleads Non succidit viginti quercus praed ' nec earum aliquam the Iury find he cut down ten yet the Plaintiff recovered for though the intire Allegation of the Breach was not found because ten did not prove the issue of twenty literally yet the Substance is found which is sufficient to make the Bond forfeited So in Trespas where the Plaintiff makes a Title under a Lease which commenced on Lady-day Habendum à Festo c. and the Issue was non demisit modo forma the Iury found the Lease to be made upon Lady-day Habendum à confectione and so it commenced upon Lady-day and not à Festo c. which must be the day after the Feast yet 't was adjudged for the Plaintiff because the * Moor 868. Yelv. 148. Substance was whether or no the Plaintiff had a Lease to intitle himself to commence an Action Hob. 27. But in Ejectment or Replevin such a Declaration had been naught because therein you are to recover the Term and therefore the Title must be truly set out and in Replevin you are to have a Retorn̄ habend ' but in Trespas 't is only by way of excuse Sed quaere A second Reason is because both Plaintiff and Defendant in pleading have agréed the matter in this particular for both say the Rent was 12 s. and 4 d. 'T is a Rule in Law That what the Parties have agreed in pleading shall be admitted though the Iury find otherwise 2 Ass pl. 17. 18 E. 3. 13. b. 2 Co. 4. Goddard's Case Iurors are not bound by Estoppel ad dicend ' veritatem for they are sworn so to do unless the Estoppel be within the same Record but here that which is confessed cannot be matter of Issue not being Lis contestata It has beén objected that in 33 H. 6. 4. b. the Plaintiff brought Debt for 20 l. the Iury found the Defendant only owed 10 l. and the Plaintiff could never recover But that must be intended of a Debt due upon Contract and there the least variance will be fatal 38 H. 6. 1. As to the second variance 't is not material for 't is not true as the Avowant hath said for if the matter in issue be found the finding over is but surplusage both the Verdict and the Avowry agree that the Defendant may take a Distress in case of Alienation without notice And so he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Judgment for the Defendant The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Defendant for what is agréed in pleading though the Iury find contrary the Court is not to regard and here the substance of the Issue as to the second Point is well found for the Defendant Iudge Atkins told Serjeant Wilmot who argued for the Plaintiff that he had cited many Cases which came not up to the matter and so did magno conatu nugas agere for which reason I have not reported his Argument Smith versus Feverel Case for surcharging a Common THE Plaintiff brought an Action on the Case against the Defendant setting forth that he had right of Common in A. and that the Defendant put in his Cattel viz. Horses Cows Hogs c. ita quod Communiam in tam amplo modo habere non potuit The Defendant pleads a Licence from the Lord of the Soil to put in Averia sua which was agreéd to comprehend Hogs as well as other Cattle in the most general sense The Defendant demurs and after Argument the Court were all of opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff because the Defendant in his Plea hath not alledged that there was sufficient Common left for the Commoners for the Lord cannot let out to pasture so much as not to leave sufficient for the Commoners And though it was objected that the Plaintiff might have replyed specially and shewn there was not enough yet it was agreed by the Court that in this Case he need not because his Declaration to that purpose was full enough and that being the very Gist of the Action the Defendant should have pleaded it It was held indéed that in an Action upon the Case by the Commoner against the Lord he must particularly shew the Surcharge but if the Action be brought against a Stranger such a shewing as is here is sufficient North Chief Iustice said and it was admitted that the Licence being general ad ponend ' averia it should be intended only of Commonable Cattel and not of Hogs Sed contra if the Licence had been for a particular time Anonymus A Man devises Land to A. his Heir at Law Devise and devises other Lands to B. in Fee and saith If A. molest B. by Suit or otherwise he shall lose what is devised to him and it shall go to B. The Devisor dies A. enters into the Lands devised to B. and claims it the Court were of Opinion that this Entry and Claim is a sufficient breach to entitle B. to the Land of A. It was also agreed that these words If A. molest B. by Suit c. make a Limitation and not a Condition Pl. Com. 420. the Devise being to the Heir at Law for if it were a Condition it descends to him and so 't is void because he cannot enter for the breach 3 Co. 22. Cro. Eliz. 204. Wellock and Hamonds Case Paying in the case of the eldest Son makes a Limitation Owen 112. So in the Case of Williams and Fry in an Ejectione firmae in B. R. lately for Newport-House A. deviseth to his Grand-daughter Provided and upon Condition that she marry with the consent of the Earl of Manchester and her Grandmother 't is a Limitation 2dly It was agreed That an Entry and Claim in this Case was a sufficient molestation for when the