TERM In the 19. of KING JAMES in COMMON BENCH Easter Term. 19. Jac. IT was said by Warberton Iustice that in the time when Anderson was chief Justice of this Court that it was adjudged that where a Coppiholder alleadged a custom within a Mannor to be that every Coppiholder may cut trees at his pleasure that this custome is against common Law and also his opinion was that where a custome was alleadged to be that if a Tenant in antient Demesne devise his land to another without other words expressing his intent that the devisee shall have the fee simple Hobert inclined to this opinion and by Hutton and Winch he shall have fee by the custome and accordingly it was adjudged Norton against Lakins Ent. Hill Jac. NOrton against Lakins Ent. Hill 18. Jac. in debt upon an obligation the condition was to stand to the arbitrement of J. S. and the Defendant pleaded that he made no arbitrement the Plantiff shewed the award and the breach And the case in effect was that the Plantiff and the Defendant put themselves upon the arbitrement of J. S. of all matters between them till the first of March 18. Iac. and he made an award that each shall release to the other matters and differences between them till the ninth day of March 18. Jac. and it was argued by Serjeant Henden that the award is void for by their release the obligation upon which this action is brought is discharged but it was ruled to be a good award for though it shall be void for that part of the award yet it shall be good for the rest but Winch doubted of the case Reynolds against Poole Ent. Hill 18. Jac. Rot. 641. REynolds against Pool Ent. Hill 18. Iac. Rot. 641. Reynolds libelled in the spiritual Court against Pool for the Tithes of a Park and Pool prayed to have a prohibition and he shewed that he and all those whose estate he had in the Park had held this as a Park till the 11. of Eliz. at which time it was disparked and that time beyond memory c. the occupiers had used to pay to the vicar of the parish a Buck in Summer and a doe in winter in lieu and satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Vicar And it was argued by Serjeant Henden that this is not a sufficient cause to grant a prohibition because that now the Park is destroyed and sowed and so the prescription fails for it was annexed to the Park secondly the question is for the Tithes of corn and those do appertain to the Parson and not to the Vicar and he cited a case between Hawk and Collins in this Court there the prescription was that he and all those whose estate he had had used to pay to the Vicar a certain thing in leâ—u and satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Parson and for this a prohibition was denyed Sherley he had preserved that he had used to pay this to the Vicar and this shall be intended for Tithes due to the Vicar and not to the Parson Serjeant Ashley to the contrary and that the prescription is good for this extends to the soyle and not to the Park Hobert said that Tithes of corn are sometime payable to the Vicar and not alwayes to the Parson for put the case that at the time of the derivation of the Vicarage out of the Parsonage the composition was that the Vicar shall have the Tithes of that Park in thâ—s case by reason of such general terms he shall have the Tithe of hay corn deer or any other thing which grows in that And the composition being made before time of memory no man can say but that it was made in such manner and the case of Okenden Cowper in this Court in which the Court was divided differed from this case for there the prescription was to pay a Buck arising and coming out of the Park and there was no deer left in the Park and Hutton agreed for there he destroyed his own prescription and he agreed with Bracies case put after for there was a contrariety in the prescription Warberton the case of Bracie in this Court was that the Parson libelled against him for the Tithe of corn where this was due to the Vicar and not to the Parson and denyed him for that reason for he may not plead the title of another man and the Parson and the Vicar ought to agree among themselves but in our case no Tithes are to be set out and for that reason he may plead this but it seems to me that the prescription shall go to the soyle and not to the Park when it is destroyed he shall pay Tithes in kind as a garden or an orchard so long as it is used as a garden or an orchard that the occupier of that shall pay a peny now if this be ploughed and converted to other use he shall pay Tithes in kinde and Hobert agreed to the case of the garden or orchard for the penny is paid for the herbs or fruite Winch was absent and Hutton said that the prescription shall go to the soyle and the Vicar by prescription may have the herbs of the glbe of the Parson Hobert the Park is only an appellation or name of land and this name or appellation may not pay Tithes but the land it self and put the case that a man had al-wayes paid 10. s. for the Tithes of a meadow and after he sowed that with corn here for the payment of this 10. s. he is discharged Warberton I deny the case of the meadow and so it was adjorned Bartlet against Bartlet Trin Jac. Rot. 1784. TR. 18. Iac. Rot. 1784. Richard Bartlet brought an action upon the case against Thomas Bartlet and he declared upon an accompt and shewed that the Defendant was found in arrerages in 20. l. which he promised to pay when he should be requested and now the Plantiff had not laid any day or place of request in his declaration and Ashley moved in arrest of Iudgement that the declaration is not good for the request is also parcel of the promise but Hobbert chief Iustice said that when a man brings an action upon the case for a thing which was originally a debt the Plantiff need not lay any time or place of the request but when the action is brought for a Collateral thing there he ought to lay a day and place of the request and so it was adjudged according in the same case King against Bowen Ent. Trin. Jac. Rot. 1755. KIng againk Bowen entered Tr. 18. Iac. Rot. 1755. William King brought an action upon the case against Iohn Bowen for these slanderous words spoken of him King is a false foresworn knave and took a false oath against me at a commission at Witham and the Defendant Iustified the words and it was found for the Plantiff and Henden said that it had been alleadged in arrest of Iudgement that the words are not actionable and he said
covenanted with Sir Edward Sackvil to levy a fine to him of that land before the fine acknowledged the eldest brother dyed and the question was whether the youngest shall be compelled to levy the fine and presidents were commanded to be searched concerning that matter Note that it was said that where a commission issued out of the Court of wards to 4 persons or to any 2 of them and one of them refuse to be a Commissioner and the other 3 sit as Commissioners and he who refused was sworn and examined by them as a witness and ruled that this is good for though he refused to be a Commissioner yet he is not excluded to be sworn as a witness In evidence to the Iury the case was that Tenant in taile bargained and sold his land to I. S. and his heires and I. S. sold to the heire of the Tenant in taile being of full age and Tenant in taile died and the heire in taile claimed to hold his estate and the doubt was whether he was remitted or no Hobert was of opinion that after the death of the Tenant in taile that the heire is remitted for if Tenant in taile bargain and sell his land the issue in taile may enter and where his entrie is lawful there if he happâ— the possession he shall be remitted Hutton and Warberton Iustices contrary For at the first by the bargain and sale the son had fee and then the estate of the son may not be changed by the death of the father he being of full age when he took this estate and this was in an Ejectione firme of land which concerns Sir Henry Compton and the Lord Morley and Mounteagle White against Williams VVHite brought an action of accompt against Williams as his Bayliff to his damages 100. l. the Defendant pleaded he never was his Bayliff and it was found against him and the Iudgement was given that he should render an accompt and at the day the Defendant made default Ideo consideratum est per Curiam quod Querens recuperet versus predict Defendent 42. l. 10. s. and upon that the Defendant brought a writ of error and assigned for error that the Court gave Iudgement of the value without inquiring of the value and it was holden by Gaudy and Fenner only present that the Iudgement ought to be given which the Plantiff had counted of Baron Altham contrarie for the Court may in discretion give a lesser summe Hill 43. Eliz. B. R. vide 14. E 3. Accompt 109. 20. E. 3. 17. Sir George Topping against King VVA st was assigned in the cutting of Elmes and other Trees to such a price and Iudgement was given for the Plantiff by nihil dicit and a writ of inquiry of dammages issued upon that and the Iury found to the dammages of 8. s. and upon this Davies the Kings Serjeant moved to have a new writ of inquiry and that the old writ shall not be returned for the dammages are too litle Winch said all is confessed by the nihil dicit Hobert The Iury here have found the value and presidents were commanded to be searched and Hobert said that if an information is for ingrossing of 1000 quarters of corn and Iudgement is given by nihil dicit and a writ of enquiry issues which findes him guilty of 100. yet this is good And not that at another day the case was moved again it was between Sir George Topping and King and it was said if a man recover in waste by nihil dicit and a writ of inquiry issues the Iury in this case may inquire of the dammages but not of the place wasted for this is confessed and so are the presidents according and Hobert said if the Defendant is bound by the nihil dicit as to the place wasted for what cause shall not he be bound as to the dammages and by all the Court if the jury finde dammages only to 8. s. the Plantiff shall not have Iudgement for it ought to be above 40. s. Hob. this is in the discretion of the Court in this case and it was also said in this case that upon the grant of all the trees and after the grantee cut them and new ones grow upon the slumps which in time will be trees that in this case the grantee shall have them also by Hobert Wetherly against Wells in an action for words VVEtherly against Wells in an action upon the case for these words thou hast stollen hay from Mr. Bells racks and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of Iudgement because he had not shewed what quantity was of that and perchance it may be of so little a value that it is not fellony and the rather because it is hay from the Racks but Hobert contrary that Iudgement shall be given against the Defendant for the Plantiff for it hath been adjudged lately in this Court that where a man was charged with petty Larceny to steal under the value of 12. d. that an action of the case will lie for the discredit is not in the value but the taking of that with a fellonious intent and yet it had been adjudged in this Court that where one said of another thou art a thief and hast stolen my trees that in this case an action will not lie but this is by reason of the subsequent words trees for it is said Arbor dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit And Winch said that it had been adjudged actionable to say thou art a thief and hast stolen my corn and yet perchance not exceed 2. or 3. grains and Warberton said that it had been adjudged in the Kings Bench that where one said thou art a thief and stollest the corn out of my field that no action will lie The Earl of Northumberland and the Earl of Devon NOte that in the case of the Earle of Northumberland and the Earle of Devon execution issued out for dammages recovered against the Bayliff of the Earle of Northumberland by the name of I. S. of D. and there was I. S. the father and I. S. the son and the father being dead the son issued his writ of Idemptitate nominis and he prayed to have a supersedeas and Warberton demanded of Brownlow if he had any such president to award a supersedeas in such case who answered no and Warberton and Hutton being only present said that they will advise of that Sir George Sparke Prescription IN a Replevin for the taking of a horse in 5. acres of land in such a place and the Defendant avowed as Bayliff to Sir George Spark and shewed that Sir George Spark and all those whose estate he had in the land had used time beyond the memory of man to have herbage and pasturage in all the 5. acres when that was not sowen and upon this plea the Plantiff demurred Ashley argued for the Plantiff that the prescription is void and this is not
Kingsmil agreed to this In evidence to the Iury in a replevin brought by I. S. against one Bennet for the taking of beasts and the Defendant made Conusance and he said that Mr. Potts was seised of 6. acres of land and granted a rent charge out of that to one William Pots his son in taile and for rent behinde he avowed and the issue was that the rent did not pass by the grant and Hobert said that in this case the avowant ought to prove that the grantor was seised of 6. acres or more and not of 4. or 5. acres if he will maintain his issue in this case Action upon the case for words he innuendo the Plantiff stole the Tobacco out of his Mrs. shop Finch moved the declaration was not good because he had not averred that there was a communication concerning him before and where the person is incertaine there the innuendo is void Hobert and Winch held that to be good but then Hobert moved that the declaration was not good because he said the Tobacco in his Mrs. shop and had not averred that there was Tobacco there to which also Winch agreed but if he had said that he had stolen Tobacco out of his Mrs. shop such declaration without any averment is good but here the words the had altered the sense and so there ought to be an averment and Winch said that if he had said that he had stole 2 or 3 pound of Tobacco out of his Mrs. house this had been good without any averment for the certainty appears and it was adjourned Trin. 19. Jac. Sir George Stripping in Wast SIir George Stripping brought an action of waste and an estrepment was awarded to the Sheriff of Kent to prohibit him to make waste and the Sheriff returned the writ executed accordingly and now there was an affidavit made to the Court that since the estrepment he had cut down certaine Willowes which grew upon the bank of the River by which a bank fell down and a meadow adjoyning was overflowed and upon this affidavit Davies moved for an attachment against the Defendant for it appears by this affidavit that waste is committed for the cutting of willowes in this case is waste because that they support the bank as if they grew neer a house Hobert and Winch being only present that this is a waste in law but yet no attachment shall be awarded because that this appears only by affidavit and is only the collection of the party and this doth not appear by pleading or by the recorâ— of the Sheriff and Brownlow said that in this case he ought to have a Pond which was granted Maior against two Bayliffs ACtion of false imprisonment was brought by Major against 2 Bayliffs of a corporation who pleaded not guilty and at the nisi prius the Plantiffe was nonsuite and now Serjeant Richardson moved upon the Statute of cap. 5. 7. Iac. for double costs and that upon the very words of the Statute and the question was whether the costs ought to be taxed by this Court or by the Iustices of Assize Hobert said that upon the nonsuite the Iustices of Assize might have commanded the Iury to have taxed the single costs and then the same judge might have doubled them and that within the words of the Stat. but if the judge grants this then upon his certificate the double costs shall be assessed for otherwise the party shall be without any remedy and Brownlow ch Prothonotary agreed with that as to the certificate that this Court shall assesse the Costs and Brownlow had a president according Mich. 19. Jac. Grice against Lee. GRice against Lee in an action upon the case and the Plantiff declared that he being long time before and still is seised in fâ—e of certain messages and lands in Layton Buzard in the County of Bedford and that to these messuages he had a common appendant time beyond memory c. in 600 acres of waste called Layton Heath and had common in 600 acres of wood in Layton aforesaid and that the Defendant had made certaine conney borroughs and which the aforesaid couneys where he had not made any mention of any conneys before eat up the grass and that the Defendant had inclosed the said wood by which the Plantiff had lost the profits and the Defendant as to the digging of the heath for coneys said that E. 3. granted to the Dean and Cannons of Windsor that they and their successors haberent in omnibus terris dominicalibus liberam Warrennam sibi tunc et successor et in posterum conferendam And that the 20. E. 4. the Duke of Suffolk and his wife granted to them the said Mannor of Layton whereof the said Heath is parcel and said that 22. E. 4. it was enacted by Parliament that all charters made by King E. 3. to the Deane and Canons of Windsor shall be good and that the said Deane and Cannons of Windsor being so seised of the Mannor of Layton and of the Heath in the 3. H. 7. erected a free warren and that by mean conveyance the said D. and C. conveyed that to the Defendant and so justified the making of the said coney borroughs by vertue of the charter of E. 3. and as to the 600. acres of wood he justified by the licence of the father of the Plantiff who then was seised of the common and upon these pleas in barre the Plantiff demurred and Serjeant Richardson took exception because that it is not expressy alleadged that hee was seised of the house and land to which the common is appendant at the time of the making of the conney borroughs for he only said that a long time before the erection of the conney borroughs and yet he is seised which immplies that he was seised before and after but not at the time of the warren made and for this he cited the Book of entries where waste was brought and he counted of a lease for life to the Defendant and a grant of the revertion and an attornment of the Tenant and that the Defendant had made waste and ruled to be evil because he had not alleadged that this was after the attornement and so in Stradlings and Morgans case and he cited a judgement 5. Iac in C. B. Adkinson brought an action of trespass against I. S. and declared quod per multos Annos jam preteritos he had exercised marchandize and that the Defendant such a day said of him that he was a Bankrupt and it was adjudged that the declaration was evil because he had not alleadged that he exercised marchandize at the time of the speaking of the words and he said that the cause of the judgement was entered upon the roll and the same case he could shew to the Court and Hobert desired to sâ—e that for he doubted much of the law of the same case to which Winch and Hutton agreed and Richardson said that as to that which may be said that a fee
see more after Vpon an elegit the Sheriff returned that to be executed and the extent of the Church of St. Andrews Al 's St. Edes and Attoe prayed the Sheriff may amend this and make that Andrews only for that is the true name Hobert and the Court if this be the true name the alias dictus is surplusage and will not hurt the return of the writ Hill 19. Jac. C. P. Allen against Brach Ent. Hill 19. Jac. ALlen against Brach upon the reading of a record in a replevin the case was Tennat of a Coppihold for life in which the custome was that the wife shall have her widowes estate and the husband was attaint of fellony and executed and whether the wife in this case shall have the widowes estate was the question upon the demurrer Winch being only present seemed that not without a special custome In an action upon the case the Plantiff shewed that he was possessed of a Wind mill sufficiently repaired and that he at the instance and request of the Defendant let that to I. S. and in consideration thereof the Defendant promised to pay the rent and that the Mill should be left in sufficient repair except the Sayles and he averred that he had let that to I. S. accordingly and that he had not paid the rent nor left that sufficiently repaired and Serjeant Hendon said that the declaration is not good first because that the Plantiff had shewed that he was possessed of a Winde Mill and had not shewed of what estate and it may be this was only at will and then the lease is void Hutton Iustice it is good notwithstanding this exception for the shewing that he was possessed was surplusage and if he had shewed that he let for years and never shewed that he was possessed yet this is good and if the lessee never enter yet the assumpsit lyâ—â— secondly Hendon moved that the promise was to pay the rent and to leave the Mill sufficienty repaired except the sailes and the Plantiff averred that he had not repaired and never made mention of excepting the Sailes and here the jury found the Defendant guilty of all and had given entire damages and it appears by the Plantiffs own shewing that he shall no have any action at all for the sails for they are excepted and therefore though the promise is good for the rent yet it is not for the not reparation and the damages are intire Winch and Hutton Iustices only present held this good after verdict and judgement was given according Wright against Black and Black VVRight against Black and Black in an action upon the case and the Plantiff declared that he was of good fame and that the Defendants such a day and yeare at the Sessions of Norwich preferred a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff felloniously stole two bundles of vetches and also they maliciously incited one I. S. to give in evidence to the grand Iury that this was Billa vera and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Richardson first because the Plantiff had not averred in his declaration that the Bill was found but only that he preferred a Bill of indictment against him containing such a thing and this is not good as 21. E. 4. 41. one pleaded a pattent of exemption and this was pleaded quod inter alia continetur and ruled no expresse grant was pleaded and so evil and so Browning and Beestons case Com. 173. there a condition was pleaded that in such an indenture it was contained that if such a thing was not made then the lease shall be void and evill because he had not expresly averred what the condition was and so in our case to say the Defendants preferred a Bill of indictment containing that the Plantiff stole 2. bundles of Vetches this is only in nature of a recital and no direct affirmation that there was such an indictment and this declaration doth not agree with the precedents and therefore it is evil secondly admit this to be good yet as this case is the Plantiff may not have an action upon the case but an action of conspiracy against both Thirdly the declaration is not good because it sets forth that the Defendants incited I. S. to give in evidence to the grand jury that this was Billa vera and had not averred that he was sworn and then though an action may lye for the other yet because the action is brought for all and damages are entire all shall be void and the Plantiff shall not have judgement for any and lastly he said the action it self in this case will not lye because the indictment was not found but only an evidence and an acquital before the grand jury and this is lawfull being in an ordinary course of justice and prayed that the Plantiff may have judgement in the case Attoe contrary First the Plantiff here may not have a writ of conspiracy for the indictment was not found but yet if we should admit that he may have a writ of conspiracy yet he may as this case is have an action upon the case at his election which was granted by Justice Winch as to this point and yet he said that this action upon the case is in the nature of a writ of conspiracy and for that reason there ought to be some act made or else an action of conspiracy will not lye upon a bare attempt Attoe an action upon the case will lye upon this attempt for by this the Plantiff is defamed as much as if the Defendants had said that he had stole 2. bundles of Vetches and this is more then a defamation by word and though the indictment was not found yet an action upon the case lyes as 10. Jaco B. R. Whorwoods case against S. and R. declared that the Defendant preferred a Bill of indictment containing such a thing without any eo quod c. and the Bill not found and yet an action upon the case lyes very well upon this attempt without an express averment of an eo quod because that the indictment was not found but otherwise it is where the indictment is found there it is not good containing such a thing as my brother Richardson had said without an eo quod and the same case of Whorwood was adjudged accordingly and it was also affirmed in the exchequer chamber upon a writ of error brought there and he also cited a case 14. Iac. in B. R. Rot. 236. Demey against Ridg where was a Bill of indictment for the stealing of a horse and the Bill was not found and yet adjudged that an action upon the case will lye for that Richardson said that the indictment is not found here and therefore it was no slander and so was adjudged in a case in the 44. of Eliz. in the Kings Bench which was one Jeroms case Justice Hutton said that it seemed to him that the action
Winch seemed to agree and Hobert said that the writ of contra formam donationis was given to the Founder or Donor by the Statute and not by the Common Law but in the principal case the judges said they would advise of that and gave day over to argue that again Auditor Curles case before ANd now at this day the case of Auditor Curle was moved again in arrest of judgement by Hendon and he said Auditor Curle brought an action upon the case against Tuck and he shewed in his declaration the erection of the Court of Wards by the Statute of 32. H. 8. and that it was ordained by the same Statute that those persons which shall be ordained Auditors of the same Court shall be sworn and take an oath and that such a time the Plantiff was sworn an Auditor and that to the office was 2. s. due to be paid for the ingrossing of Feodaries and that the said Plantiff exercised the said office honestly and justly and with the fees and the profits of the same he maintained his family and that the Defendant such a day and at such a place having Communication with the Plantiff concerning his behaviour in his office said to him you have received money for the engrossing of Feodaries and I will prove that to be Cousenage and tunc et ibidem said you are a Couzner and live by Couzning and Hendon after verdict for the Plantiff moved in arrest of judgement first he said the office appertains to 2. Auditors as appears by the Statute of 32. H. 8. and by Auditor Curles case and if that appertain to 2. then this doth not appertain to the Plantiff alone and secondly the Plantiff had expresly laid in his declaration what fees are due to the office for the engrossing of Feodaries and then when it appears by his own shewing that the fees were due and that the Defendant said of him that he took money for the engrossing of Feodaries this may not be any scandall to him and he cited Suaggs case Coo. 4. where the Plantiff shewed that his wife was living and that the Defendant said of him that he had killed his wife here in this wise no action lies for it appears by his own shewing that the wife was alive and so no scandal and so in our case when he had shewed that such fees were due for the engrossing of Feodaries it was no scandal to him for the Defendant to say that he took money for the ingrossing of them and thereby the words are general of Couznage and they may have other interpretation as the Couzning at the Cock pits or the like and then those general words shall not be applied to his office and not left to such an exposition as is equivocal and he vouched Serjeant Heales case Mr. Heales Warrants have undone many a man and adjudged that an actition lies because it had relation to his profession but he said that this was afterwards reversed in the Exchequer chamber because the word Warrants is general and may be applied to other things but Winch interrupted him and said that it was not reversed for error then Hendon alleadged Yardleyes case 11. Jac. in C. B. where one said to another is Yardly your Attoâ—ney your Attorney is a briving knave and took 20. l. of you to Cozen me and the opinion was that an action will not lie and Winch interrupted him again and said it was adjudged the contrary and after Hendon alleadged Eliots case against Brown Hill 17. Jac. B. R. thou hast made false writings between I. S. and his brother and adjudged that an action lies and he cited Mallard against Wise for these words 10. Jac. Mallard is a knave and forged my husbands Will against his minde and ruled that no action lies and so 13. Jac. Harvey against Boking and he applied all those cases that the words ought to scandalize him in his office and profession for if words by any intendment may have relation to any thing else they shall not be interpreted to have relation to his office and therefore here the words are too general also he shewed that when the Plantiff had said that the Defendant such a day having communication concerning him in his office said you have received money for the engrossing of Feodaries which is Coznage and tunc et ibidem said you are a Cozner and live by Cozning these words tunc et ibidem shall not have relation to all but only to the last words and cited 5. H. 7. 8. to that purpose and so he concluded against the Plantiff Attoe Serjeant to the same purpose but his only argument was because the Plantiff had alleadged that the fees were due to him and so no scandal according to Snags case But it was resolved by Hobert and Winch being only present for Hutton was in the Chancery and Iones was not yet returned from Ireland that the Plantiff shall have judgement and first it was agreed by them and by Hutton the day before that tunc et ibidem shall have relation to the same time that the first words were spoken and secondly by Hobert and Winch though the office appertaines to 2. yet this is a scandal to him for the scandal is to the person and not to the office and the persons are distinct and several though the office is joynt and they may not joyn in an action for of the other no words are spoken and so they agreed that this objection is of no force and as to the other objection which was made by Hendon and by Attoe Hobert said that true it is as had been cited but he said for his part he never was nor yet is satisfied in the Law of that case for be she in life or not yet the scandal is the same to the standers by who perchance did not know that she was living and so the scandal never the less but admitting the case to be good Law yet our case differs from the reason of that for in our case he had shewed that 2. s. fees were due to him for the ingrossing of Feodaries and the Defendant said that he took money for the ingrossing of Feodaries which is Couzning and so shall be intended that he took more then was due and this is extortion and as to Eliots and Browns case he agreed that to say he had made false writings no action will lie for it is no scandal to him in his profession for it doth not appertaine to an Attorney to make writings no more then it appertaines to an Appothecary to give Physick and so it is no scandal to him in his profession and he agreed the case of Mallard against Wise he forged my husbands Will no action will lie for the words are repugnant and contrary for if it be forged it is not the Will of her husband but in our case the words had a plaine sence to common understanding and shall be intended to refer to his office for if he
had said that he took money for ingrossing of Feodaries which is desceit without question that had been actionable but there may not be Couzning without desceit And he cited Boxes case where one said of an Attorney that he was a maintainer of suits and a Champerter action lies for it shall be taken to be a scandal to him in his profession for though an Attorney may maintain suites yet he ought not to be a Champerter and he further said that he who will maintain an action for words ought to be scandalized in his publick profession and he cited a case which was in the Kings Bench Brad against Hay and the Plantiff declared that he was Bailiff to such a one and that he had the buying and the selling of his Corn and that the Defendant said of him that he sold by false measures and adjudged that no action lies for it is not a scandal to him in his publick profession and so 36. Eliz. one said of a Merchant that he kept a false debt book and because he may be a Merchant without a debt book it was ruled that an action doth not lie but if he had said of him that he deceived men by buying and selling these words had been actionable and he said that two things are required to every publick profession science and fidelity and when a man who hath a publick profession is scandalized in either of those an action of the case lies and cited Palmers case of Lincolns Inne he being a Lawyer 't was said to him by one that he had as much Law as a Iackan-apes and adjudged to be actionable for it is a scandal to him in his profession and so Sir Miles Fleetwoods case where he who is Plantiff in this action was Defendant in that he being receiver of the Court of Wards one said to him Mr. deceiver hath Couzned the King and hath dealt falsly with him and adjudged that an action upon the case lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had Couzned him or dealt deceitfully with him but yet because it appears to the Court that he might deal deceitfully and Couzen the King therefore actionable and he cited Birchleys case you have dealt corruptly an action lies and yet he did not shew wherein he had dealt corruptly and here he had said he was a Couzner by the receipt of money which is an express scandal to him in his office Winch accordingly to every office of trust is a condition in Law annexed that he deal honestly and justly and he cited Wingates case in the Kings Bench one said to another is Wingate your Attorney and the other said that he was and the other replied take heed and follow him well for else he will make you throw your purse over your bosome and it was adjudged that an action lies for it is a scandal to him in his profession and it shall be taken as much as if he had said he will make you spend all the money in your purse if you look not the better to him and so applied this to the principal case and in this case judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff in the action if no other cause be shewed before such a day An action upon the case was brought for these words the Plantiff did load a ship of my Fathers with Barley and did steal and Couzned 7. quarters thereof in measure and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement that the word Cozned being joyned with the word stole had taken away the force of that and made it but Cozning but Hutton contrary and that it shall be understood that he stole 7. quarters in measure and quantity and Winch seemed to agree and it was adjourned and an other day awarded that an action lies Godfrey Wade Alias Mack-Williams case GOdfrey Wade and others in an ejectione firme and the case upon a special verdict was to this effect Henry Mack-Williams the father was seised of land and being so seised he conveyed that to the use of himself for life the remainder to his wife for life the remainder to the heires of their two bodies engendred the remainder to the heires of the bodie of Mack-Williams the Feoffor and the remainder to his right heirs in fee and he had a son by his wife named Henry and 5. daughters and he died and afterwards the son in the life of his Mother by deed indented leased to White-Head for 31. years rendring rent and afterwards he leavies a fine to the use of himself and his heirs in fee and died and after whose death the Mother suffered a recovery within six moneths in which 4. of their husbands were vouched and the recovery was to the use of the feme for life the remainder to every one of the daughters in fee and the sole doubt was whether the lease made by Henry the son is defeated by this recovery and it was argued by Harvey Serjeant that the lease shall stand good notwithstanding this recovery suffered by the Mother for he said that Henry Mark-Williams being issue in tail and also being heire to the remainder in fee who made this lease by indenture in this case this lease issues as well out of the estate taile as out of the reversion in fee and the fine leavied in the life of his Mother binds and bars the estate taile at the time of the fine and then the lease being drawn out of the reversion in fee which discended to the daughters after the death of their brother this reversion shall be charged with the lease and the recovery had not destroyed that and this case will differ from Capels case for it is agreed if tenant in tail bee the remainder in fee and he in remainder in fee granted a rent charge and after Tenant in tail suffer a recovery by this the rent is destroyed for there he who suffered the recovery was Tenant in tail in possession but in our case when the son had leavied a fine in the life of his Mother by this fine the tail is destroyed and the Mother is become Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct which is only an estate for life in quantity and then though she suffers a recovery yet this doth not destroy the lease made by Tenant in tail when there was also a fine leavied to confirm that Secondly he argued that when the issue in tail in the life of his Mother made a lease for yeares by indenture and then leavied a fine and died and then the Mother being Tenant in tail and joyntress within the Statute of 11. H. 7. as in our case she is and she suffers a recovery and vouches the daughters in reversion and lessee for years enters after the death of the feme by force of 11. H. 7. for lessee for years is a person who may enter within the express words of that Statute which gives entrie to any person
the lessee of the Mannor or to the Bishop was the question and it was argued by Serjeant Hendon that this appertaines to the Plantiff and not to Wood and as to that the single point is a Bishop is seised of a Mannor in the right of his Bishoprick and lets parcel of that for life whether the reversion of this parcel be alwayes parcel of the Mannor notwithstanding this lease and he argued that it was not and yet he agreed that if another let as aforesaid the reversion continues alwayes parcel of a thing in possession and that in the case of the King himself as appears by Dyer 230. if the King lets parcel of a Mannor for life the reversion of this parcel passeth to the King for the reversion had all times continuance in the same capacity and no alteration is made of this by force of the lease but where the lease for life is a discontinuance there he gaines a new reversion and this shall not be parcel of the Mannor and for that if a man is seised of a Mannor in the right of his wife and he lets parcel for life this is a discontinuance and he had gained the reversion in his own right and for that reason the reversion may not be parcel of the Mannor as appears by 18. Assises and also he held if Tenant in taile lets parcel of a Mannor for life that were the reversion of this parcel is not parcel of the Mannor for the cause aforesaid and so in our case when the Bishop granted parcel which is not grantable by the Statute now he had discontinued the reversion and had gained a new fee simple which may not be parcel of the Mannor so long as this new fee simple had a continuance and this was his first reason And secondly he argued from the intent of the parties because the intent was that the lease to Wood shall be good and if the reversion of the 20. acres pass to Wood this will make all the lease void for no rent may be reserved out of the reversion but out of the land it self 3. Assise Placito ultimo a Bishop let land and a hundred rendring rent the rent issues out of the land and not out of the hundred and so here it issues out of the land and not out of the reversion which made the lease all void and so he concluded the first point that the reversion of the 20. acres did not pass to Wood the lessee of the Mannors Secondly when the Bishop lets 20. acres of ground rendring rent and this is not confirmed by the Dean and Chapter as it ought and after he lets the Mannor and the successor accepts the rent of the Mannor this acceptance shall not make the lease of the 20. acres to be good admitting that the reversion do pass and when the Bishop had made a lease for 3. lives he may not contract for the reversion and when a lease is meerly void in the creation there no acceptance afterwards may make that good but admitting this to be against him yet the lessee shall not have the Herriot for they are not appendant to the reversion but due only by way of Covenant and the words are yielding c. and this being a Collateral thing it shall not go with the reversion and the Herriot here may not be had without it be delivered by the lessee for life Secondly it is paid only in the name of a Herriot and this is not Herriot service Thirdly it is to be paid upon the death of a stranger and not upon the death of the lessee and all this proves this Herriot to be collateral and he cited Rawlins case a lease for years paying for a fine 20. l. this is a summe in gross and shall not pass with the reversion and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Attoe contrary and yet he agreed the case of the husband and wife and of the Tenant in tail for here the lessor gaines a new fee simple but in our case when the Bishop lets for life this is not any wrong for the successor may enter and he shall have this lease not in his natural capacity but alwayes in his politique capacity and for that there is an apparent difference between the cases and for that reason he held that the reversion was parcel of the Mannor and so passed to the lessee and as to that which had been said that the intent of the parties was only that the Mannor in possession and not the parcel in reversion should pass to the lessee for that is most beneficial to the lessor to this he answered that by express words this is granted and no construction shall be made contrary to the very express words of the grant and here though the Defendant had not any title at all to the Herriot yet the Plantiff shall not have a trover and conversion for this because that he himself had not right to this and for that reason judgement shall be given for the Defendant and he also argued that the lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and then the acceptance extends to this see 37. H. 6. the lease of a Priâ—r 2. E. 6. Bâ— Abbots case Vpon which authorities he said cleerly by the Common Law this lease of the reversion is not meerly void but voidable and for that the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter after the Statute of the first of Eliz. had not altered that and for that a lease after the Statute shall not be meerly void and see Lincolns Colledge case Coo. 3. and in our case there is a possibility that the lessee of the Mannor may survive the cestui que vies of the 20. acres and that possibility is sufficient to make this good out of the reversion for then the lessor may distrain for his rent but where no possibility of a distress is there no rent may be reserved as in Iewels case the lease was void for there was no possibility that the lessor shall ever distrain but in our case the lease for years is good for the lessor is not without his remedy for he may have an action of debt upon this reservation 1. H. 4. 2. there a measnalty in gross was let rendring rent and good for by possibility the Tenant may die without heires and yet this is a remote possibility 12. E. 3. execution 112. a reversion granted by fine in tail rendring rent is good and Coo. 5. Elmers case that a reversion being let for life rendring rent is a good reservation at the Common Law and he held without question that where a Bishop is seised of a Mannor which consists part of freeholders and part of Copiholders that a lease of the Mannor rendring rent is good and in our case the reservation of the rent is intire and shall bind the successor and as to that which had been said that the Herriot is Collateral and shall not go with the reversion to this he
and to be forth comming and for that reason he ought to appear within a convenient time when the Plantiff demands him which Hobert also granted but he said that there needs not any demand if the course of the Kings Bench is contrary and Iones Iustice said that he had a judgement given in the Kings Bench that the bail is forfeit after default is assigned in the principal and Winch said that the course of the Kings Bench is that default ought to be assigned in the principal upon the return of the Capias before the Bail shall be charged and it was agreed if that course be there it shall be observed here also but it was said by Hutton that there ought to be a scire facias awarded and returned against the Bail before the Bail is forfeit and it was adjourned until another time that they might see presidents Cyprian Web against Barlow CYprian Web brought a replevin against Barlow and the Defendant avowed as lessee for life of the Mannor of Froston to which the Plantiff is a Copiholder of a Copihold of the same Mannor and that 15. Iaco. in mense May he girdled and cut a tree in the middle upon his Copihold and that the steward Anno Supradicto charged the homage to finde this by which he had forfeit his Copihold and the Defendant being Lord of the Mannor distrained his beasts damage feasant and the Plantiff said that the custome of the Mannor is that every Copiholder may lap and girdle absque hoc that he cut the tree and upon that the Defendant demurred and Attoe argued for the Plantiff in the replevin that this is no cause to forfeit the Coppihold for though the steward did charge the homage to finde that yet it doth not appear that he gave any proof of that And secondly the forfeiture is alledged to be in May and the Court was holden in April before which was impossible which the Court granted as to that last point and for that the Plantiff had judgement East 21. Jac. C. P. Thorntons case in a Prohibition THornton prayed a prohibition to the Arches and the case was such one had a recovery in a quare Impedit and he had a writ to the Bishop against Thornton upon which A. his Clark was admitted c. and after the recoverer died and Thornton supposing his heir to be in the ward of the King and that the said A took another benefice without sufficient qualification by which the Church was void by Cession and he attained a presentation of the King and he was admitted c. by the Lord keeper being within the Diocess of Lincoln and A. sued him in the spiritual Court and Thornton prayed a Prohibition and it was granted per Totam Curiam for without question there ought nothing to be questioned in the spiritual Court after the induction of the partie and whether it is a Cession or no doth properly belong to the Common Law and Iones cited a judgement in Williams case according note that by the constitution of Otho and Othobon that institution and induction is voidable in the spiritual Court if no Prohibition be prayed Sheldon against Bret. IN a quare Impedit between one Sheldon and Bret Hutton said that we in Chancery have adjudged that the grant of the next avoydance for money when the Parson was sick in his bed ready to die is Simony for the Statute is if the contract be made directly or indirectly by any way or means Fleming against Pitman FLeming brought an action of Covenant against Pitman and he declared upon an indenture and that the Defendant Covenanted to serve him honestly and faithfully as an apprentice in the mystery of Drapery for seven years and that he had defrauded him of his goods c. the Defendant pleaded the Statute of the 5. of Eliz. that none shall be an apprentice to any of the most worthy trades among which Drapery is one except his father have freehold to the value of 40. s. per annum to be certified to the place in which he is to be apprentice by three of the Iustices of the peace of the same County and this certificate to be inrolled in the Town book and he pleaded that no such certificate was made and he pleaded the branch of the Statute of the 5. of Eliz. which made every retainer contrary to the form of this Statute to be void and the Plantiff replied that he had 40. s. per annum and the Defendant rejoyned that he had not 40. s. per annum upon that the Plantiff demurred because the Defendant said in his rejoynder that he had not 40. s. per annum and in his plea he pleaded no such certificate and the Iustices c. Hutton Hobert and Iones said that the retainer is good though there is not any such certificate or inrolment if re vera the father had 40. s. per annum for the intent of the Statute is that sufficient mens sons should be apprentises which is observed if the father had 40. s. per annum and Winch cites Englefields case upon the Statut 28. Eliz. cap. 3. that every one which claims by a conveyance from a Traitor shall bring in his conveyance to the Chequâ—e to be inrolled and yet if it be brought in though it be not inrolled the intention of the Statute is fulfilled and Iones cited a case in Banco Regis 18. Eliz. Robins case upon the Statute of 21. H. 8. of Pluralities where it was adjudged that a dispensation is good though it is not inrolled and yet there are as strong words of inrolment as may be And after in Trinity term 21. Iac. the same case was argued again by Attoe for the Plantiff and by Hitcham for the Defendant and per totam Curiam at that time it was agreed cleerly that this is a departure but for the second point whether the pleading of the certificate were good or no that was the doubt and Iustice Hutton thought there ought to be a certificate precede the indenture or otherwise that shall be void but Hobert as to that would not give his opinion but he seemed as Hutton and Hobert chief Iustice took exception to the laying of the action for he thought the Statute of the 5. of Eliz. shall not be intended so strong against infants as to make Collateral covenants to be good but Attoe moved that this covenant is incident to the retainer to serve truly and faithfully and yet if it were a Collateral covenant yet he had lost the advantage of that by his pleading as in debt upon an obligation against an infant if he plead non est factum he shall not have advantage of his Infancy to which Hobert also agreed but he said this is not like to our case for here it appears by the Count of the Plantiff that the Infant was but of the age of 15. years at the time of the retainer of which the Court ought to take notice and here the
have Dower because the feme is dowable of them for this sufficeth to say that he had assets generally 7. Ed. 2. Dower 184. out of which I conclude that this voucher is not like to other vouchers but this is onely to secure the estate of the Purchasers and then as to the president I answer first it was found there that the vouchee had nothing and also it was never debated for a writ of error was brought of that and nothing done for this was referred to Arbitrement and so I pray that no writ of seisin may be awarded and the Court semed to be of opinion that the judgement may be conditional chiefly Hobert and Iones vehemently but now they said because that judgement is once given they are not to reverse their own judgements and to give another judgement and now it is as if he had no assets but yet that doth not aide an erroneous judgement given before and therefore if the Tenant will be relieved he ought to bring his writ of error but it was said that if this judgement was to be given again this was as it should be because that is all one now as if he had not assets and the judgement stood as it was Potter against Brown NOw the case of Potter and Brown was moved again and Hendon took two exceptions as before first for default of averment and secondly the words are not actionable for it was adjudged in Lanes case if one say of another that he is as arrant a Thief â—s any is in the Goal of Warwick this is not good without averment that there are Thieves in Warwick Goal and here it shall be so for the law doth not suppose that there are Thieves in England and besides here in this case the subsequent words do qualifie the other for the words under the for ought to be of such a thing as is Theft and that is not so in our case Serjeant Richardson to the contrary the last words do not qualifie but rather aggravate them for he gives a reason of his speach and this taking is to be understood with a fellonious intent for the first words do charge him to be a Thief and therefore the last words shall be intended that he took them with a fellonious intent for he did not only charge him in the general but in particular but the Court c. Hobert Hutton and Winch said that the Plantiff shall not have judgement because he failes of averment for he did not say expresly that he is a Thief but as arrant a Thief as any is in England and we are not to enquire after words except they are plain for if one say he was in Warwick Goal for stealing of a Horse adjudged not to be actionable and we may not presume that there are Thiefes in England and so judgement was arrested Adams against Ward INtra Trin. 21. Iac. Rot. 1845. note that it was said in an action upon the case between one Adams and Ward an Attorney that whereas one Hennings sued Adams in an action of debt and Adams retained Ward to be his Attorney and gave him warrant to plead the general issue and Ward suffered the judgement by nihil dicit that this was not any cause of an action except it was by Covin and for that if Adams had not laid in his declaration that this was by Covin he should not have recovered and at another day it was agreed that the Covin was not traversable by Plea but only in evidence at the Bar. Cook against Cook in Dower IN a writ of Dower between Cook and Cook they were at issue and at the day of nisi prius the Defendant pleaded that the demandant had entred and was seised and yet is seised since the last contrivance c. Octabis Sancti Hillarii ultimo quo die continetur usque ad hunc diem c. vicesimum diem Februariâ— which in verity was the day of the nisi prius and it was demurred upon this Plea for two causes the first was because he had not shewed that the Tenant was disseised for otherwise it shall not abate the action and to say that the demandant was seised was not sufficient for though this implies so much that the other was disseised yet here it ought to be expresly alledged but the Court spake nothing to this but Winch thought this to be very good according to Dyer 76. there the entrie is pleaded only and yet good but they resolved that the pleading of the continuance is not good for it is from one Term to another nisi prius justiciarii Venerint c. and he ought to have precisely shewed that but the question now was whether the demandant shall have judgement to have seisin or have apetite Cape only and Iustice Hutton said that it was adjudged in Sir Henry Browns case that if a man pleaded an insufficient Plea after the last continuance there the Plantiff shall have judgement as if the first issue had been tried for him and for this he cited the new book of entries fo 57â— and this may not be a judgement by default for they both appeared and therefore he shall have the same judgement as if the first issue had been tried for him and it was said in this case though the Defendant did demur generally yet this is very good The residue of Trinity Term in the 22. year of King James GOdsel an Attorney brought an action upon the case for words and he laid in his declaration that the Defendant spoke those words among other Master Godsel is a knave for he forged false deeds for which he was imprisoned at York and should have lost his ears and the jury found only these words Godsel is a forger of writings and deserves to lose his ears and Hendon moved in arrest of judgement that the words which are found are not the words in the declaration for the words were there that he forged deeds and it is only found to be writings and it was adjudged in this Court between Brown and Ellis that for saying an Attorney had forged writings no Action will lie for they are too general and besides it doth not at all appertain to him to make writings and so for Nowels Case he is Cooped up for forging of writings and it was adjudged not to be actionable and so to say he is a forger of writings by which he had cozned fatherless Children the words are not actionable because he did not say Deeds and upon this motion and reason the judgement in this case was arrested This case is Entred Hillarie the 21. Jac. Roll. 550. Sir George Trenchard against Peter Hoskins TRenchard brought an Action of Covenant against Peter Hoskins and declared upon an indenture bearing date the 19th of September 44. of Eliz. made between Iohn Hoskins father of the Defendant and the Defendant on the one part and the Plantiff on the other parte by which they bargained and sold certain lands to the
this rent for this is forced in by the name of land which is absurd and contrary and here is not any fine levied directly of the rent nor any Silver of the King paid for that but only by the judgement of consequence and now for the Statutes of fines whether it is a fine within these Statutes and I hold that it is not and I am of opinion that if the rent had been behinde before all the dayes of proclamation pass and the issue had accepted that he is remitted and the same law is if Tenant in taile of such a rent and he acknowledge such a fine with proclamations and the proclamations pass now if his issue had accepted the rent before the proclamations passed he is remitted and now for the Statute of 32. H. 8. that is not taken by equitie because it is a Statute of explanation which regularly may not be inlarged and so appears in Butler and Bakers case and now for the agreement it self that is not any thing for this is by a contrary name which may not be good like to the case of the Lord Cromwel for there was an agreement to raise a rent by fine but here is an agreement to pass a rent by another name and will any man say that if a man agree to levie a fine of rent by the name of an advowson that this will pass the rent and I think that the case of Thornton is good law and so is also the case which is put after that of the advowson and yet I agree if Tenant in tail do accept a fine with render to another for years that shall bar him because that doth not work a discontinuance but otherwise where it is for life and so in my opinion the rent remains and the avowant shall have judgement The argument of the Lord chief Justice Hobert HObert to the contrary the short question is whether the rent is extinct by the fine of the land and I hold that it is and it is agreed it is a bar against the parties themselves though not against the issue and that being granted I see no second reason wherefore the issue shall not be barred and first I am of opinion that this plea of not comprised it is not good because this fine doth work by way of release but it was said at the bar that things ought to pass litterally in a fine which I denie and also every informalitie of a fine which is cause to reject that is not a cause to frustrate that when that is levied and the words of the Statute are of any lands Tenements or hereditaments any wise intailed and if there be any word in the conveyance which will carry that it is sufficient and it shall be put upon the construction of the law and as to that that the fine shall be according to the writ of covenant but I say if there be no writ of covenant then there is no departure but it was said that the Silver of the King was not paid which I also denie for it was paid inclusively and the words of the Statute are of any thing any wise intailed and Tenant in taile had as great power to pass that by fine as Tenant in fee simple and for the case of Thornton I know he was a learned man but let it suffice that he was so esteemed but for his opinion I do utterly denie that and I do denie the case put by my brother Hutton of the Piscary for I hold if a man had a Piscary in another mans land and levies a fine of that by the name of land this will pass the Piscary clearly and so the same if a man have an office appertaining to land intailed and a fine is levied of that by the name of the land this shall bar the issue and I denie that Statutes of explanation shall alwayes be taken litterally for it is impossible that an Act of Parlâ—ament should provide for every inconvenience which happens and so the case of Godfrey and Wade adjudged that the fine of the youngest son may not bar the eldest and yet within the words the eldest was heir to him but this word heir shall be expounded as his heir and so we use to expound the Statute of 4. H. 7. which is an original Statute and bindes parties and privies and here the eldest brother is not privie for he claimes before him and so I conclude that the rent is gone and judgement was given accordingly Sir Robert Hitcham against Brooks SIr Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King brought an action upon the case against Brooks and set forth in his declaration that he was one of his Majesties Serjeants at law and that the Defendant spoke these words of him I doubt not but to prove he innuendo Sir Robert Hitcham hath spoken treason and upon not guiltie pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hendon first because it is not a direct affirmation that he spake treason but he doubts not but to prove that like to Penticosts case which was adjudged here where one Baker said of him I will prove that Penticost was perjured and no action will lie because he did not directly affirm that he was perjured Secondly because he had not shewed when he spoke those words and perchance it was in his infancie or lunacie or before the general pardons Thirdly here is not any allegation of any conference had of the King before and the speach of Treason is not Treason but when there is an intent to commit that and words shall be taken in the best sence as the case of Stanhop Cook 4. and so in the case between the Earl of Shrewsbury and Sir Thomas Stanhop one laid to Sir Thomas Stanhop that the Earl is a subject nay said Sir Thomas that is his grief and adjudged those words are not actionable and yet the words might be taken as if he had repined to have a Soveraign but the words were taken in the best sence Finch to the contrary this is more then a bare affirmation for he said he doubted not but to prove that asmuch as if he had said I am sure of that and Mich. 16. Iac. Sidnams case where one said I think in my conscience that if Sir Iohn Sidnam might have his will he would kill the King and all his good subjects and adjudged upon a writ of error brought of that the words are actionable and so in Whorewoods case so sure as you beleeve that God rules the world and that the King rules the Kingdome so sure did Whoorwood steal such goods and adjudged to be actionable and yet perchance the partie to whom he spake did not beleeve either of them and so Woods case 18. Iac. I will call him in question for killing of a man I will pawn my shirt but I will hang him and so here and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Ashley Serjeant contray words which may be taken
in a double sence shall be taken in the best sence and it shall be intended he spoke Treason in putting of a case or in speaking that after another and yet he offended not and so if he had said that he had written or printed Treason for so do the printers of the King and the Clark of the Crown and so I conceive that the Plantiff shall not have judgement Easter 1. Carol. ANd Serjeant Bawtrey the Term following argued for Serjeant Hitcham that it was plain that the Defendant spoke the words with a full intent to take away his life and to speak Treason is to speak ex corde suo and not that which another spake and now in Easter Term 1. Carol. judgement was given for the Plantiff by Hobert Hutton Harvey and Crook with one accord and they said the limitation of the time is not material for if it was spoke in his infancie c. Brook ought to have shewed that and Crook cited Walgraves case 32. Eliz. in B. R. one said of him that he was not a good subject and adjudged because he spoke them maliciously and he being one of the privie chamber that the action will lie and so 5. Iac. Blanchflower and Alwood thou haste spoke Treason and shall be hanged for that adjudged to be actionable and the 7. Iac. Barford against Prowse thou haste spoken Treason and I will prove that adjudged to be actionable and judgement was given for the Plantiff according Pleadal against Gosmore PLeadal brought an action against Gosmore for the taking of his Colt and fettering him by which the Colt was much the worse and the Defendant justified and shewed that the Colt was taken within such a Mannor which was the Counteses of Hartfords and that she had estrayes within the same Mannor and he justified the taking as Bailiff to her and shewed that he fettered him to the end to keep him from doing harm because he was wild and Serjeant Attoe demurred in law and he said that a man may not fetter an estray because he shall be paid for his keeping and for the hurt that he did and he cited a judgement 8. Iac. in this Court Rot. 1749 between Harvey and Blacklock for the taking of his horse and the fettering him by reason of which he fell into a ditch and was drowned and the other justified the taking as an estray and he fetred him to one of his own horses because he was wild and they both fell into a ditch and were drowned c. and adjudged to be no Plea and the reason which the Lord Cook gave was because he shall be paid for the keeping of him and for his damage and of this opinion was Hobert in the case at the bar but Winch Hutton and Harvey contrary that he may fetter him as he may his own horse and for the case which was alledged they said that there was no proclamation pleaded and so the justification was not good and judgement was entred for the Defendant and this was the last case that ever Iustice Winch spake to in the Court for he being a man not more admired for his profound learning then he was reverenced for his pietie and integritie died upon Friday following being the fourth day of Februarie in the morning as he was making readie to go the Hall Elizabeth Davis against Hawkins THere was a case between Elizabeth Davis and Hawkins in the spiritual Court for defamatorie words and sentence was given against the Plantiff who appealed to the Arches and judgement was given for the Plantiff and 12. d. costs and then came the general pardon and the Defendant did appeal to the deligates and there the second sentence was affirmed and greater costs given and the Defendant did plead the general pardon and they would not allow of that and now it was moved for a prohibition and these points were debated by the Councel and agreed by the Court c. by Hobert and by Harvey that though this suit and sentence is only for to make the partie to denie the words and confess his fault in some publick place yet it is in effect as if it were meerly at the suit of the King for reformation and this is a new invention which they had found out to take away the benefit of the pardon of the King and now to the new costs which were taxed by the deligates they were not taken away by the pardon for though the first offence was yet because this new suit was not only to quash the sentence for the offence but also for the costs ergo these new costs were assigned for the unjust vexation for he was the cause of the removing of that and so they may do for the unjust vexation but not for the first offence The End A perfect Table of the Principal matters contained in this Book A ACcompt against a Bailiff to the damage of 100. l. and judgement to accompt he makes default what judgement shall be given 5. Accompt what is a good Plea in bar therein 9 An action upon the case where a request and the time and place thereof necessary and where not 2 Action for saying the Plantiff is a false for-sworn knave and took a false oath at a Commission 2 3 Action for saying thou art a Thief and hast stolen 20. load of my furzes lieth not 3 10 Action for c. thou hast stolen Hay from Mr. Bells Racks and judgement for the Plantiff 6 Action upon the case upon a promise what is a good consideration a quaint difference taken 7 8 Amendment of a judgement where and within what time good matter 89 Award where good in part and void for the rest 1 Action for words that the Plantiff stole Tobacco out of his Mrs. shop not good without averring that there was Tobacco there 15 Attachment denied upon an affidavit 15 16 Audita Querela where it lieth against one Feoffee and where before an Ouster 20 23 Action upon a promise what consideration is good therein to forbear 22 23 Action upon the case for procuring the Plant to be indicted for stealing Vetches where it lieth and if it ought to be a writ of conspiracie 28 54 An action by an Auditor for saying you are a Cozner and live by Coznage 33 39 40 41 An action for saying the Plantiff loaded a ship with Barley and stole 7. quarters of it by measure it lieth 41 Avowrie for rent granted to the father and that it was arrear to his son good without saying in whose time it was arrear 48 Action upon the case to save the Plantiff harmless for keeping a prisoner good without saying he was lawfully arrested 48 49 In avowrie for rent upon a lease by the father the son claimeth by discent the Plantiff saith the father devised the reversion to another the jury found a devise only of two parts judgement given for the Avowant 49 50 Amendments not allowed upon indictments actions popular or penal Statuts and
that he agreed if one say of another that he was foresworn in a Court which is not a Court of record that none action will lye because the party is not punishable for that in perjury but in our case the commission issued out of the high Commission Court which Court to the examination of witnesses is in nature of a temporal Court and had been confirmed by act of Parliment and Serjeant Harvey argued to the contrary that the first words are not actionable and then the subsequent words are uncertain and yet if one say of another that he was foresworn at the Common Pleas barre the words are actionable for it shall be intended that this was upon examination in the execution of Iustice Hobert if a man is foresworn in a Court Baron before the Steward this is perjury but in our case the words are altogether uncertain for it doth not appear what authority the Commissioners had nor yet in what manner he was forsworn and Iustice Hutton said if one man say of another he was foresworn before the Bishope of S. this is not actionable but if one say of another that he was forsworn before the Bishop of S. upon examination by him by vertue of a Commission issuing out of the Chancery this is actionable and Hutton agreed to the case of the Court Baron the same Law by him if that be in a Court Leete but in the principal case Iudgement was arrested Wase against Pretty Ent. Hill 16. Jac. Rot. 1716. WAse against Pretty Ent. Hill 16. Iac. Rot. 1716. in an ejectione firme the case was that one joynt Coppiholder did release to his companion and the question was whether this is good without surrender and admittance for it was objected if this shall be good then a Coppihold shall pass without the assent of the Lord but it was resolved by Hobert Warberton and Winch Hutton being absent that the release is good and Warberton said that by Littleton if 3. Ioyntenants are and one of them release to another he to whom the release is made is in by the releasor but if there are but two then he is in by the Lord or from the first conveyance Winch if two Ioyntenants are in capite and one release to the other the King shall not have a fine for this Alienation but Hobert said that the practice is otherwise at this day but he said that when one joynt Tenant releases to another he is in by the first conveyance and in the case in question the release shall be good without surrender and admittance for the first admittance is of them and of every of them and the ability to release was from the first conveyance and admittance it seems if a Tenant in Capite alien upon condition and afterwards he enters for the condition broken he shall not pay a fine for such an alienation Hitcham Serjeant said that if land be given to two upon condition that they shall not alien and one releaseth to the other this is no breach of the condition Hobert if the King grant you his demeasnes you shall not have his Copihold Winch said that it was adjudged in this Court that where one erected a house so high in Finsbury fields by the wind mills that the wind was stopped from them that it was adjudged in this case that the house shall be broken down Goddard against Gilbert GOddard brought an action upon the case against Gilbert for these words thou art a thiefe and hast stolen 20 loads of my furzes and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hitcham that these words are not actionable for though the first words of themselves had been actionable yet when those words are coupled with other words which do extenuate them it is then otherwayes for if a man say thou art a thiefe and hast stollen my apples or my wood it shall be intended that the apples and the wood were growing and he said there is no difference to say in this case you are a thiefe and have stollen 20 loads of my furzes but it was said by Iustice Warberton that the furzes shall be intended to be cut for that is the most natural and proper signification of the words and Hobert chiefe Iustice said that it is true that it is the most proper signification of the words but yet they are furzes when they are growing as well as when they are cut down and Hobert chief Iustice said if a man say of another thou art a thief and hast stollen my corn in this case the words shall be taken in the better sence and judgement in the principal case ought to be arrested and it was the opinion of him and of Winch that there is no difference where a man said thou art a thief and hast c. and thou art a thief for c. ut supra but it was adjourned Winch Iustice said I was of counsel in the Kings Bench in a case where a man had a window in the backside of his house and another man erected a wall within a yard and half of that in his own ground and adjudged in an action upon the case that the wall shall be broken down Warberton certainly this was an antient house but Winch said that made no difference It was ruled that after imparlance in debt upon an obligation the Defendant shall be received to plead that he was alwayes ready to pay notwithstanding it was strongly urged 13. Eliz. Dyer 306. is to the contrary Gilbert Lewings against Nicholas March. GIlbert Lewings brought an action of covenant against Nicholas March and deâ—lared that Charles Cornwallis had granted the next avoydance to the Church of D. to Thomas March and that Nicholas March was his Executor and that Nicholas March assigned this to Gilbert Lewings his executors and assignes to present to the same Church when that shall become void and covenanted that the same person who shall be so presented by him shall have and enjoy that without the let or disturbance of the said Charles Cornwallis or Nicholas March or any of them or any by their procurement and after Gilbert Lewings presents I. S. and after I. W. presented an other claiming the first and next avoydance by the procurement of Charles Cornwallis and ruled that the declaration was not good for it ought to say that Charles Cornwallis granted to I. w. the next avoydance and procured him to disturbe and that by his procurement he was disturbed Athow It seems to me to be but little difference to say he disseised me by the procurement of I. S. and he commanded I. S. to disseise me and he did that accordingly at his command Sir Edward Sackvil against Earnsby VPon a motion made by Sir Randal Crew in the behalf of Sir Edward Sackvil against Earnsby the case was that two brothers were seised of land to the eldest for life the remainder to the youngest in tail and they
it is that if the Lord had seisin of more then the very services in this case it may not be avoyded in avowry and no fall tenure shall be avoyded c. but when he joyns another falsity and that is in the quantity of land now the false quantity of the rent had made the tenure traversable and the judgement was commanded to be entred accordingly Trin. 19. Jac. Thomas Bull Executor c. against Fankester THomas Bull Executor of William Bull brought an action against Fankester and declared that the Defendant enfeoffed his Testator in certaine land and that he covenanted for him and his heirs that he was seised of a good estate in fee and he alleadged the breach upon which they were at issue and now Attoe moved in arrest of judgement first because the Plantiff sueing as Executor had not shewed the Will for it hath been adjudged here that if a man bring an action as executor and do not shew the Will that the Defendant may demurre upon that because it is matter of substance but Hobert said it is very good because the Defendant had admitted him to be responsible but it is true he might have demurred upon the declaration as we often times adjudged here secondly Attoe said that the covenant being made with the heire the executor shall not have an action of covenant for it is annexed to the land which was granted by Hobert and Winch being only present in the Court. Note that it was said at the barre and agreed by Hobert that if the debtor make the dettee his executor he may now retain in debt against him and safely plead plene administravit if he had no other goods and shall not be driven to his special plea and so it had been agreed often times in this Court Parson and Morlees case PArson and Morlees case it was said that the Lord Chancellour presented to a venefice which belonged to the King which was above the yearly value of 20. l. per annum and this was referred to Hobert chief Iustice and to Tanfield chief Barron to certifie whether this was meerly void it remained good till it was avoyded Harris against Wiseman HArris had procured a prohibition against Wiseman who had libelled in the spiritual Court against the Plantiff for a frat in the Church which did belong to his house and it was said by Hobert and Winch only present that a man or a Lord of a mannor who had any Isle or a seat in the Church c. and he is sued for that in the spiritual Court he shall have a prohibition but not every common parishioner for every common seat and upon the first motion at the barre in this case day was given over to the Defendant to shew cause wherefore that a prohibition shall not be granted and the Defendant not having notice of that after the day the Plantiff had a prohibition and now after the day he shewed a good cause and upon that a supersedeas was granted to stay the prohibition in that case Aylesworth against Harrison AYlesworth against Harrison in debt against an executor the question was whether he may plead plene Administravit and give in evidence a debt in which the Testator was indebted to him or whether he may plead the special matter that plea amounting but to the general issue and it was argued by Harris Serjeant the Defendant may plead the special matter and shall not be bound to the general issue to leave that to the lay people who may suppose such a retainer to be an administration and he vouched the 15. E. 4. 18. if a man illiterate seale a deed which is read to him in another manner c. and he delivers that as an escrow to be delivered over as his deed upon conditions performed and this is delivered over before the conditions performed he may in this case plead the special matter and conclude so not his deed or if he will he may plead the general issue of non est factum and so is 39. H. 6. in dower the Tenant said that before marriage the husband infeoffed him and that after the Tenant let to him at Will and that the husband continued possession during his life absque hoc that he was seised of such an estate of which she might have dower and exception was taken there because that this only amounts to the general issue and yet ruled to be good for the lay people may conceive such a continuance of possession during the life of the lessee to be such an estate of which the wife may have dower if this were put upon the general issue and in our case because he had liberty to plead specially or generally he prayed that the Defendant may be admitted to plead specially and that he may not be bound to the general issue Serjeant Hendon to the contrary if one plead a plea which amounts to the general issue see Layfields case Coo. 10. and though in Woodwards case commentaries there was such a plea pleaded yet this doth not prove the contrary for in the same case no exception was taken by the Plantiff and presidents do prove that the Defendants in this kind have been compelled to plead the general issue Hobert if no special matter may be alleadged to the contrary the Defendant shall be compelled to plead the general issue and this is good discretion in the Court to take away the perplexity of pleading because one plea is as good as the other to which Winch being only present agreed and it was ordered that the Defendant here plead accordingly In debt against the heire upon the obligation of his father and in the declaration the Plantiff omitted these words obligo me et hered es meos c. and after error brought the Plantiff prayed that this might be amended because it was the misprision of the Clark only Hobert and Winch said that this shall not be amended for it is a matter of substance but because the clark who made this misprision was a good clark day was given over c. Widdow Archers case IN debt against the Widdow of Archer being executrix of her husband and the Plantiff declared that neither the Testator in his life nor the executrix after his death had paid that omitting those words licet saepius requisitus c. and evil but this omission was amended Sir Edward Grubham against Sir Edward Cooke SIr Edward Grubham brought an audita querela against Sir Edward Cooke upon a recognizance of 4000. l. and this was acknowledged to the use of his Mother and shewed that the conusor had infeoffed him and another in the land and that the conusee had sued execution only against him and it was found for the Plantiff and it was so moved in arrest of judgement by Ashley Serjeant first because he had not shewed in this audita querela when the Statute was certified nor yet the Teste nor yet the return of the writ of extent
the words are found generally but yet admitting that the last words are actionable yet the Plantiff shall not have judgement for the damages are intirely given and for that reason void see more and Bedles case cited in Osborns case Cook 10. Harris Serjeant to the contrary for an Auditor is an officer of trust and he took an oath when he entered into his office and his receiving fees which are not due are also extortion and the words of Cousâ—â—age shall have also relation to the office as in Barkleys case you are a corrupt man an action lyes and Haywel and Stakleys case of a Iustice of the peace and Sir Miles Fleetwoods case he being receiver of the Court of wards one called him Mr. deceiver and ruled action lies and tunc et ibidem shall have relation to the same time in which the said words were spoken and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff and it was adjourned till another time See after Good against Bawtry GOod brought an Ejectione firme against Bawtry for ejecting him of certain lands in Creeting St. Maries in Creeting St. Olaves and in Creeting omnium sanctorum and a Venire facias issued to try the issue to Summon 12. men de vicineto de Creeting St. Mary Creeting St. Olaves and Creeting omnium omitting Sanctorum and it was now moved in arrest of judgement by Attoe Serjeant that the Venire facias was not good for it ought to be of all the Creetings and the Court blamed the Clark very much for his negligence but it was adjourned till another time A man lett an advowson for 40. years and the lessee covenanted that he would not alien without the assent of the lessor and he shewed all the matter because he had aliened to I. S. without his assent and the Defendant pleaded that he had not aliened without his assent and upon that they were at issue and it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement because he had not laid that the alienation was by deed for an advowson may not pass without deed and Hobert said if a man will declare in an ejectione firme of a lease made by the husband and the wife without deed this is not the lease of the wife without deed or yet if the Defendant will plead not guilty or non dimisit and this is found for the Plantiff the Plantiff shall have judgement for this shall be intended to be by deed which was granted by Winch Iustice being only present that the breach was well laid and he alleadged a president 43. Eliz. a man avowed and had not shewed that this was by deed and the Defendant pleaded non concessit and found for the avowant and he had judgement but Hobert denyed this case but afterwards in the principal case it was adjudged that the breach was well laid and the Plantiff had judgement In a formedon in reverter the Tenant was essoyned and the vouchee also appeared the case was essoyned and he had day over till octabis Michaelis And then the Attorney of the Defendant would have been essoyned and it was argued by Hendon Serjeant that he shall not be essoyned and yet he agreed if the vouchee had not appeared the Tenant might have been essoyned againe 13. E. 3 essoyne the 8. and the same Law of the vouchee be returned tarde but if the vouchee appeare and is essoyned there the Tenant shall not be essoyned againe and so is the express â—ook of the 3. H. 7. 17. 9. E. 3. 39. and the reason is because by the appearance of the vouchee the Tenant is out of the Court c. and it was adjourned till another day and at that day it was resolved by the Court that the Attorney shall be essoâ—ned and this was upon the view of a like judgement in the case of the Earl of Clanrickard and Hobert said that in that case the Roll of the 3. H. 7. was searched for and could not be found and Towse urged 22. H. 6. and 13. E. 3. essoyne 8. Sir Henry L. Warden of the Fleet. RIchardson Serjeant moued for the warden of the Fleet Sir Henry L. and his motion was that whereas one I. S. was in execution in the Custody of the Warden of the Fleet for 300. l. and he made an escape and he at whose suite he was in execution brought an action upon this escape against the Warden of the Fleet and he shewed that the Warden upon fresh suit had taken him again and he prayed that the Plantiff may not proceed in his action for though the Warden of the Fleet may plead this though the action was brought before the retaking of the party yet he prayed for the saving of charges that the action may be stayed and he said that there was such a case in this Court against Harris deputy Warden to Sir Henry L. upon such an escape and he pleaded to the issue and after he retook the prisoner and in this case the Court had also relieved Harris if the issue had not been joyned but Hobert let the Plantiff be brought here present in Court and then we will speak to that point Gell against White Gell against White and others and he declared in action of Trespass but the writ was general but the declaration was quare vi et armis bona et catalla sua ceperunt et asportaverunt viz. tertiam partem unius dishei plumbei Anglice the third part of a dish of lead Ore and it was moved that the Plantiff shall not have judgement for the variance between the writ and the declaration and though it is objected that here is nor any original writ at all for in verity there was not any yet the declaration is contrary to it self for if in a replevin the Plantiffs writ is de bonis et Catallis and his declaration is of a taking of a horse this is not good and so here bona viz. tertiam partem c. for this particular thing may not be said to be goods and Chattels and Harris Serjeant moved that the Attorney might be banished the Court for declaring without a writ according to the express book 20. H. 6. Hobert good reason adjourned till another time Anne Buckley against Simonds Mich. 18. Jac. Rot. 2120. ENtered Mich. 18. Jac. Rot. 2120. Anne Buckley was Plantiff in a Quare Imp. against Simonds and the case in effect was that Andrew Buckley Grandfather of the husband of the Plantiff did Covenant by indenture with Preston that before such a day his Son should marry the daughter of Preston And Covenanted to convey 6. l. 13. s. per Annum of rent issuing out of land to hold to them during the life of the Covenanted and his wife and after this he Covenanted for him his hetres and assignes that after the death of the Covenantor and his wife the land to which the advowson in question is appendant shall remain come and be unto the said
after verdict and no exception taken by the Defendant yet we as Iudges of the case may take notice of that ex officio and give judgement against the Plantiff and the 3. Iustices agreed that here is a condition by which the reversion is vested in them but it is in the Plantiff till performance of that which not being performed by them within the time limitted the Plantiff ought to have the rent and though the Will is that it shall be with the advise of the overseers and no advise is found yet that is at the peril of the Executors who ought to give notice of that to the overseers being to their advantage and for that see 21. H. 6. 67. 46. E. 3. 5. 18. E. 3. 27. 11. H. 4. 13. which cases were cited by Serjeant Harris at the barre and they agreed that the overseers shall not have the reversion for though it was devised to them yet that was upon the refusal of the Executors and no refusal is found but only a non performance of the condition and also the devise is tied to them upon condition to do that within 6. moneths which ought to be performed in convenient time at the least though it be in case of a Will and so they concluded that the Plantiff had right as to the matter in Law but that judgement shall be given against him upon the matter supra and it was resolved that this was not aided by any Statute of Ieofailes for this is a mistrial but another point was moved whether the Plantiff shall pay costs within the Statute of the 23. H. 8 or 4. Iac. the words of the Statute are if the Plantiff be nonsuite or verdict given against him upon a lawful trial but here it was resolved that he should not pay costs for no verdict is found against the Plantiff but rather for him and judgement is given against him because he mistook his action and in Bishops case Coo. 5. judgement was given against the Plantiff upon a material variance in the verdict and no costs was given and it is not only out of the letter of the Statute but also out of the intent for it may not be imagined that the Plantiff had stirrd an unlawful suite when the matter which he declares is found for him and that Statute is not taken by equity as Hutton said for it hath been agreed here that if Executors are nonsuite or judgement given against them upon a verdict they shall not pay costs within the Statute of the 23. H. 8. or 4. Iac. and so is the constant practise for the Statute speaks of any contract or specialty made with the Plantiff or between the Plantiff and Defendant and the Executor brings an action upon the contract of another and in the principal case judgement was entered that the Defendant should go without day and that he shall not have costs against the Plantiff Bret and Ward NOte upon evidence to a Iury between Bret and ward upon the dissolution of a Vicarage in the County of Warwick which was part of the Priory of Dantry where the Pope by his Bull gave to the Vicar minutas decimas et alteragum and it was certified by the Doctors that alteragum will pass to the Vicar Tithe wool c. and the usage was shewed in evidence and the Copie of the Popes Bull and the Court would not credit that without seeing the Bull it self and so the Plantiff was nonsuite and the Iury was discharged Bacon against Weston BAcon brought an action of debt upon an obligation against Weston as an Administrator to one Okes and he pleaded that the said Okes such a day and year in his life time acknowledged a judgement to him in the Kings Bench upon an indebitatus est of 1500. l. and died and that he retained so much of the goods to satisfie himself and that over that 1500. l. he had put 40. s. and it was moved that he ought to plead the general issue and give this matter in evidence as he may well but it is a mischief to the Plantiff to take issue upon that for then he ought to say that he had assets Hobert true he may give this in evidence or he may plead that the judgement was not satisfied or defezanced but we may not compel him to change his plea except he will assent Potter against Brown POtter brought an action upon the case against Brown for these words he innuendo the Plantiff as is arrant a thief as any is in England for he did break open the Trunck of the Plumbers standing in my Lord of Suffolks Hall with another mans tools and took out 20. l. and upon a general issue it was found for the Plantiff and damages given to twenty pound and Hendon Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement First because for want of an averment that there are Thiefs in England and it had been adjudged that if A. say of B. he is as arrant a Thief as any is in Warwick Goal yet B. ought to aver that there are Thieves in Warwick Goal but it was holden by the Court viz. by Hutton Winch and Iones that there needs not any such averment and the difference is when the words do relate to a particular place and when to an entire realm and the same law when it is tied to one kinde of fellony for it is very well known that there are Thieves in England and any in other realm and Hendon moved that the last words extenuate the former for the latter shew that he took that as a trespas for he did not say that he stole 20. l. out but took it out and so it shall be intended that he took it as a trespasser as to say B. is a Thief for he took money out of my Pocket implies a trespass and he is a thief for he took my horse this shall be supposed that he took him as a trespasser and Hutton said that till the time of Hen. 8. there was not any actions brought for words and to the end to settle peace he thought words not to be taken so largely and favorably in giving way to unruly tongues and to the unbridled humours of men but rather strictly to curb them for their evil language see after East 22. Jac. C. P. Easter Term in the 22. year of King James in the Common Pleas. VPon Wednesday being the 25th day of April and the first day of this Easter Term which was the first day which I came to Report and it was agreed by the Court the same day that if one come to the Bar to make his law in debt brought against him upon a simple contract that the Plantiff shall be demanded and if he will be nonsuit he may and then the Defendant shall not recover costs against him but as I have heard that this was to have been intended where the Plantiff was an executor or Administrator and not of any other Leonard Barley against Foster BEtween
the year and afterwards the money not being paid Hickman sued forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Sir William Fish directed to the Sheriff of Bedfordshire for 210. l. and now upon a habeas Corpus Sir William Fish was brought to the bar and Serjeant Crawley moved for a supersedeas for him because the writ emanavit improvide c. and by the Court it is a cause to discharge him of the execution for the Capias ought to have issued for 200. l. only and he ought to have sued a scire facias though this was after the year because the Proces was not continued but they said withall it was in their discretion whether they will grant a supersedeas for they may put the Defendant to his writ of error It was ruled that if an action of debt was brought and the venire facias to trie the issue is in placito debiti and so is the habeas Corpus and the Pannel but in the Iury Roll of the nisi prius at the latter end of the jurata there it is placito transgressionis and agreed in this case this is amendable or in this case it is good without amendment Wen against Moore THomas Crew Serjeant did move in arrest of judgement where one Wen brought an Action upon the case against Moore and upon non assumpsit it was found for the Plantiff and he said that the Colloquium was laid to be at Bourn in the Countie of Lincoln and the venire facias was de Vicineto de Born without the letter u. and for that reason that they are several Towns therefore error for if the entire Town is omitted the trial is insufficient but the Court held this to be very good without amendment and shall be intended to be the same Town It was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Finch that where one had brought an Action upon the case against one and shewed that the Defendant in consideration of 12. d. given to him by the Plantiff he assumed and promised that if the Plantiff may prove that he cut quandam arborem upon the land of Sir Francis Vain tunc crescent that he would give to him 10. l. and this being proved by the Plantiff it was now moved in arrest of judgement that quandam arborem is an individual tree and it ought to be aliquam arborem and another cause was alledged because it was not shewed that this was upon the land of Sir Francis Vain then growing but only he had said growing and that may be for perchance he purchased the land afterwards and before the Action brought and so it might be growing though not tunc crescent at the time of the promise but the Court c. Winch Hutton and Harvey seemed that the declaration was good for they said there is no question if quandam had been out this had been good for it is the singular number and he that certain or be that incertain yet by the verdict it is made certain that this is a tree and also those words tunc crescent do refer to the time when the tree was feld and not to the promise Holman against Sir Thomas Pope and Elizabeth his wife SErjeant Hendon moved in a case where an Action was brought by one Holman against Sir Thomas Pope and Elizabeth his wife as daughter and heir to Sir Thomas Watson and pending the writ Pope died and he moved that the writ ought not to abate because it is brought against her as daughter and heir where the land is assets in which the husband had nothing like to the case of an Executrix who brings her action in her own name and the name of her husband and pending the writ the husband dies the writ shall not abate but Justice Harvey said this case of Executors was adjudged against him and Hobert chief Justice was of opinion that the writ shall not abate but day was given over in that case Sir Thomas Holbeach against Sambeach IN the case between Sir Thomas Holbeach and Sambeach in a replevin where a demurrer was joyned the case was this one being Tenant for life and he in remainder in tail joyned in a grant of a rent in fee out of that and then they joyned in the levying of a fine to a stranger and his heirs and in this case it was said that the estate of the grantee of the rent which before was determinable is now made absolute and a judgement was also cited to be in that case lately adjudged to which the Court seemed to agree and they said if this be the point they will give judgement presently Crompton against Philpot. HEndon Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement in a case for Philpot a crier of this Court where one Crompton had recovered 40. l. damages against him in an action upon the case for words spoken against Crompton c. he innuendo the Plantiff stole a ring and had been hanged for that but for me and it was said in the first place that it doth not expresly appear that the words were spoken of the Plantiff himself neither is this introduced by any precedent Colloquium as it ought for otherwise the innuendo will not aide it but in veritie the declaration was that the words were spoken de eodem Richardo innuendo c. and also he said that the words are not actionable because that no value is exprest but it was ruled if that were but petie Larcenie the action lies but the Court gave no absolute opinion in the case for they were willing to compound for the poor man The residue of Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James Brown and Ware against Barker BRown and Ware brought an action agaist Barker and they declared that whereas there was a suit depending between the Plantiffs and other Coppiholders of such a mannor in the Chancery against Brook their Lord and that one Woolsey was there Clark and that he for his fees and for the procuring of a decree had disbursed 14. l. and that there being a Communication between the Plantiff and the Defendant concerning the same he being a Coppiholder of the same Mannor that in consideration that they would pay to Woolsey 14. l. he would pay to the Plantiffs 40. s. upon request and the Plantiff shewed that they had paid the 14. l. and that the Defendant had not paid the 40. s. Licet postea saepius requisitus fuisset and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plantiffs and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Crook Serjeant First because he is a stranger to the suit for he had not alledged that the Defendant was a partie and then it is no consideration but this was over-ruled because they paid the 14. l. upon his request the second exception was that this postea saepius requisitus was not sufficient in this case because that he ought to express the certaintie when and the place where the request was made
to be good for though that shall be void for the interest yet it shall be good for the residue and then the non payment is a breach of the condition for where an award is made for a thing against the law and for another which doth stand with the law this is good for one and void for the others so here Secondly this award is not for interest but rather for the damage for the forbearance of the money but admit that this were for direct usury yet that is not void my brother Bridgman had cited a case where an assumpsit for usury was void I know well what the judgement was for I was of Councel in the case and much was said in that against usury and Glanvil was cited Lib. 9. cap. 14. which said that an usurer did forfeit his goods but that is to be intended of such who live by the common oppression of the people and there was not any precedent found where a contract for usury was void Noy the 26. Ed. 3. 24. debt is brought for money given for usury and admitted and the Statute of the 13. Eliz. and 37. H. 8. which were made against usury shall be frivolous if such contract shall be meerly void for they made only such contracts to be void as were made for above 10. in the 100. and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff An action upon the case was brought for calling one thief and the other did justifie the words and said that he was possessed of a Heifer which was privately taken from him and that upon search he found that in the possession of the Plantiff with his ears cut off and marked with the Mark of the Plantiff and it was ruled that this was not a good justification for the matter is not sufficient but he ought to have expresly averred that the Heifer was stole from him and accordingly it was adjudged Hill 22. Jac. C. P. Hillary Term in the two and twentieth year of King James in the Common Pleas. THe residue of the case between Cooper and Edgar and now this Term Serjeant Crook argued the case for the Plantiff and after a recital of the case he said that the general question is whether the Lady Cesar had any estate by this fine or whether the old estate for life remains for if she had the one or the other then it shall be against the Plantiff and he said the points which I will insist upon are four First whether these words do make a precedent or a subsequent condition for if the uses do not arise till there be a failing of the payment then it is on my side but if the uses do arise before then indeed it is against me and I hold that no use will arise till there is a default in payment in which I will observe that the words are all in one period and one sentence and till the first of September the use wil remain in Robert Foyne for here the same is voluntarie and it is without any consideration and then what doth the Law say till the condition was performed the use was in him and his heirs the grand doubt is whether si here made a precedent or a subsequent condition and I hold that si is alwayes a note of a precedent condition if it may stand with the law and with the intentions of the parties but if it doth cross either of those then that is a subsequent condition and yet I agree if si is annexed to an estate which passeth by liverie then this is a subsequent condition and the same if it be annexed to a grant which is executed but if it is annexed to a grant which is executory then that is a note of a precedent condition and so is Bracton lib. 2. fol. 190. where there is an example and the placing that first or last is not material and in the case of an use which is executory as this is there till the if is performed nothing will pass Plowden 172. nay the case of 14. H. 8. by Brooks and by Brundwel if I covenant that another shall have my land when he marries my daughter no use will arise till he marrie her and the case of Colthirst proves my difference both the wayes for the lease was made to Henry and his wife for life the remainder to William si ipse inhabitaret c. and if he die in the life of Henry or his wife that then it shall remain to Peter there the first si is a precedent condition for if he do not die in the life of them then Peter shall take nothing by that and to this purpose there is a notable case 13. H. 6. 7. where a man made two his executors and if they did refuse to administer then he made two others within 3. moneths after his death and ruled that in the mean time they are not executors and yet si was placed in the subsequent place there and there was a case H. 33. Eliz. between Iennings and Cawman where a man made his will and devised his lands to his son for 3. years and afterwards appointed that if his wife whom he made Executrix did not suffer him to injoy that for 3. years that the son shall be executor and the question was whether the feme was executor in the mean time and there Anderson said that this was a precedent condition but the other Iustices were against him because it was a thing of continuance and there they agreed the case of Colthirst that the word si ipse inhabitaret are a subsequent condition because it is a thing of continuance which may be infringed and broken every year and there was a case in this Court 29. Eliz. Rot. 854. between Iohnson and Castle where a man devised his term to his youngest son if he lived to the age of 25. years and did pay to his eldest brother so much money and agreed no estate passeth till the age of 25. years and payment of the money and the reason was that a devise executory may depend upon a precedent condition and so here the use is executory and nothing passeth till there is a failing of the payment like to the case of the 15. H. 7. where a grant is made upon condition that if the Grantee perform such a thing he shall have such an Annuitie there nothing doth pass presently and so 21. Ed. 3. 29. where a man was bound in an obligation not to infeoff when he came to the house of Ancestor c. vide the case and here in our case because the condition is that if he do not pay that then she shall have it to her and her heirs therefore it is a precedent condition and if the use had been limited to him if he marrie his daughter such a day in the mean time no use will arise because the limitation is to him upon a thing not executed and this being all in one sentence no use will arise in the
ought to maintain the award but to shew the breach for it shall be otherwise if it be found against him and then Hendon answered to the other exception that this is not for direct usury but is rather for the damage which he sustained by the forbearance of the money and yet if it were for interest it is good and then as to that which now had been agreed by my brother Bridgman that contracts and obligations for usury are good I say then by the same reason an award for that is good for whatsoever a man may contract for the same thing may be awarded if the contract will bear that and usury is not malum in se but only malum prohibitum and is good by our law and here in this case though the Arbitrator was deceived in the summe yet after the award made it is altogether certain and an implied recompence is sufficient in this case but the Court said that the casting up of the accompts did not make an award for it is not a good Calculation but the ending of the controversies that doth make the award but yet the opinion of the Court in this case was that the award was good for an Arbitrement shall not be taken absolutely upon the bare words and the Court did command the parties to come before them upon the morrow in the Treasury and as it seems this was for mediation to make an agreement for the opinion seemed to be for the Plantiff The case of Hilliard and Sanders argued by the Court. IUstice Harvey this Term did argue the case of Hilliard and Sanders which see before and after a brief recital of the case he said that his opinion was that the avowant shall not have return because that by the fine of the lands the rent is extract and I am induced to be of this opinion by two things the first is the agreement and tâ—e other is the favourable exposition of the Statute of fines to settle repose and quiet and I will first shew the efficacie of fines at the common law 21. Ed. 4. the Pryor of Binghams case it is laid for a ground and rule in law if a thing be contained in a fine either expresly or implicitly this is very good and so is 44. Ed. 3. 22. 37. H. 6. 5. for a fine is no more then an agreement and therefore it is called in latin Concordia and then see if by any words you may pass this rent by the fine and though the word rent is not there yet if it be so infolded in the lands that is good with that it is very good and for that 3. H. 7. 16. 17. 21. H. 7. proves that by a feofment of the land the rent doth pass and wherefore not by fine then and this shall be within the Statute of 4. H. 7. and 32. H. 8. and a case may be out of the Statute of 32. H. 8. and yet be within the Statute of the 4. H. 7. as the 2. Ed. 3. in Dyer though the feme after the death of the husband she may enter upon the discontinues of the husband yet if she do not within 5 years she shall be barred and now you see that the construction of these Statutes was alwayes to settle repose and quietness for if such a construction should be made according to the opinion of Chornton in Smith and Stapletons case then it will be mischievous and for his opinion it was only in the way of arguing and yet I conceive he had the good opinion of the Reporter and without all question it is a case of as hard a construction as that is of Archers case where the heir who nothing had in the land in the life of his father did levie a fine this is a bar for ever and the reason is because it is of a thing which is intailed and he cited a case in Bendloes Reports where a discontinuee was disseised by Tenant in tail who levied a fine and the discontinuee entred and then proclamations passed that in this case the issue was barred truly I do agree the case of 36. H. 8. that that a fine levied of land did not bar him who had title of Common or a way the reason is because there is no privitie but in our case there is a privitie and by Margaret Podgers case a Coppiholder is within this Statute and in our case the rent passeth especially in regard of the agreement as in the Lord Cromwels case and he cited a case primo Jacobi between Gage and Selby in an ejectione firme where Gage was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine to I. S. in fee and after he levied another fine to the use of himself for life the remainder over and his brother brought a writ of error to reverse the first fine and ruled that he may not for the second fine had barred him of any writ of error and so I conclude the fine had extinguished the rent The argument of Justice Hutton to the contrary HUtton contrary the fine had not barred the rent in which I will consider the nature of fines at the Common Law and they were of mightie and great esteem and force as appears by the great solemnitie which is used in them as is prescribed in the Statute of fines 18. Ed. 1. de modo Levandi fines and he agreed that such a fine by Tenant in fee simple will pass that inclusively for by the release of all his right in the land a Signiorie is gone I agree also that a fine is but an agreement but yet it must work according to the nature of the thing as upon a writ of Measne or of right of advowson a fine may be levied and yet it is not levied of the lands but of the advowson or Signiorie and so if the writ of covenant be one thing and the agreement of another thing then it is not good and first I will prove that at the Common law fines have been rejected when the writ of covenant did not contain the thing of which the fine is to be be levied and if at the Common law a fine was levied of rent there ought to be a writ of covenant of that 18. Ed. 2. fines 123. and there the rule is given that it is against reason to hold covenant of that which never was and the rent there never was before but ought to begin then and yet it is clear a man may create a rent by fine but he shall not have a writ of covenant of that when it was not in esse before and because the concord may not varie from that therefore it was not received 38. Ed. 3. 17. Knevet put the rule that a fine may not be of more then is in the writ of covenant and when a fine is properly levied of that it is by way of release Fitz. fine 100. and so I conceive here the rent doth not pass Secondly here no man may plead that any fine is levied of
REPORTS OF THAT REVEREND AND LEARNED JUDGE SIR HUMPHRY WINCH KNIGHT Sometimes one of the JUDGES of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Containing many Choice Cases and excellent matters touching Declarations Pleadings Demurrers Judgements and Resolutions in points of LAW In the foure last years of the Raign of King JAMES faithfully Translated out of an exact french Copie with two Alphabetical and necessary Tables the one of the names of the Cases the other of the principal matters contained in this Book LONDON Printed for W. Lee D. Pakeman and G. Bedell and are to be sold at their Shops in Fleetstreet 1657. COVRTEOVS READER THe principal end in publishing Books is the profit which redoundeth to others and what improvement can there be either more noble in it self or of greater advantage to the receiver then that of knowledge and especially of the Lawes of this Nation in which you live and by which your actions ought to be regulated the studie of other learning being private fitter for Vniversities then Common wealths fuller of contemplation then experience and more laudable in Scholers themselves then beneficial unto others if therefore either benefit will prevail with you or delight perswade you then I beg favour to speak with some confidence you will finde both those desired motives in this solid Book to Court you the Author of the greatest part of them was for many years a grave Judge of the Court of Common Pleas reverend for his learning and integritie and honourable for his imployment of whose death The death of Justice Winch 4. Febr. vide fol. 125. and great worth you will finde a deserved testimonie near the end of these Collections some eminent and judicious Pen unhappily by time buried in oblivion hath made some addition of Cases to our great Author no less quaint then useful which being found in one entire exact french copie you have here with all deligence faithfully rendered in English for publick use touching the errors which may occur in this Tract be pleased to distinguish some being of more consequence then others the first you will finde particularly corrected in the usual place after the end of this Book and the rest an easie judgement may in Transitu rectifie which is hoped are not many this copie comming to some ingenuous hands it was thought fit to expedit the printing thereof to prevent other spurious Copies in prejudice of the publick especially at this time wherein the press is prostituted to so much ignorance and lawless libertie and now to speak a modest word of the merit of this work not only as an invitation to the buyer and for his benefit but rather with due respect to the memory of our Author who is hoped will live in this posthumous issue and surely it is no small prejudice to the professors of Law that the rest of his labours are abortively smoothered The Cases herein you will finde well polished in the stating and solidly canvased in the debating both the Bench and Bar of that Court with leave be it spoken being then as well supplied with deep Sages of the Law as in divers years either before or since expect matter here not eloquence and the grateful nutriment of the understanding rather then the pleasing condiments of Rethorick to tickle the Phantasie Farewel A Table of the several names of the cases contained in this Book A AYlesworth against Harrison 19 Widdow Archers case 20 Allen against Brach 27 Avis against Genney 65 Adams against Ward 90 Austin against Beadle 113 Ashley against Collins 114 B BArtlet against Bartlet 2 Bull against Fankester 19 Buckley against Simonds 35 Bishop of Glocester against Wood 46 57 Batterseys case 48 Bulloign against Gervase 58 Buckley against Simonds 59 Brigs case 65 Bret and Ward 70 Bacon against Weston 70 Barley against Foster 71 Boone and the Bishop of Norwich 72 Blunt and his wife against Hutchinson 73 Bray against Sir Paul Tracie 79 Baker against Baker 100 Brown and Ware against Barker 102 Bubles case 103 C AUditor Curle for words 33 39 Clotworthy against Mitchel 49 Countess of Berk. against Sir Peter Vanlore 77 Cook against Cook 90 Crompton against Philpot 102 Cooper against Edgar 103 104 c. 115 116 D DUncombe against the Bishop of Winton 7 Duncombe against the Universitie of Oxford 11 Davies against Turner 18 Dodderidge against Anthony 52 Davies Eliz. against Hawkins 125 E EArl of Northumberland and Earl of Devon 6 Ewer and Vaughan 8 Empson against Bathurst 20 50 F FLemming against Pitman 63 Fosters case 72 Ferrers against English 73 G Goddard against Gilbert 10 Grice against Lee 16 Sir Edward Grubham against Sir Edward Cook 20 23 Gratwick against Gratwick 23 Good against Bawtrie 34 Gell against white 35 Gage against Johnson 53 Grasier against wheeler 76 Good against Good 78 Goldingham against Sir John Sands 81 88 Godsals case 90 Gibson against Ferrers 114 120 H HArrington against Harrington 9 Harris against wiseman 19 Doctor Hunt against Allen 25 Hill against Waldron 29 Hoels case 30 54 Harvey against the hundred of Chelsam 66 Hasset against Hanson 66 Heath against Trist and Cawtrel 73 Holman against Tuke 80 Hickford against Machin 82 83 c. Hickman against Sir William Fish 100 Holman against Sir Thomas Pope and his wife 102 Holbeach Sir Thomas against Sambeach 102 Hilliard and Sanders 109 110 111 121 122 Holt and Rand against Holt 112 Hitcham Sir Robert against Brooks 123 124 I IOhnson against Norway 37 K KIng against Bowen 2 L LEwings against March 4 LLewellings case 11 Sir Henry Lelloe warden of the Fleet 35 M MAior against two Bailiffs 16 Maps against Sir Edward Sidley 22 Mabies case 23 Mackwilliams case 41 Mankleton and Allen 73 Marriots case 78 Methol against Peck 112 N NOrton against Lakins 1 Napper Sir Robert 74 87 O OXford and his wife against Goldington 64 Over and her husband against Tucker 82 P POtter against Turner 7 Parson and Morlee 19 Pleadal against Gosmore 67 124 125 Potter against Brown 70 89 Priest and King 77 Portington and Beamond 79 R REignolds against Pool 1 44 Rives case 48 S SAckvil against Earnsby 4 Sir George Spark 6 Savil against Thornton 13 Sir George Stripping in waste 15 Spencers case 57 Sparrow against Sowgate 61 Sheldon against Bret 63 Summers case 66 Stephens and Randal 77 Summers against Dugs 80 Sheis against Sir Francis Glover 100 T TOpping against King 5 Tutter against Frier 7 Trehern against Claybrook 26 69 Thorntons case 63 Theakers case 71 Thorns case 76 Trenchard Sir George against Hoskins 91 92 93 V VAnheath against Turner 24 W WAste against Prettie 3 White against Williams 5 Wetherly against Wells 6 Wright against Black 28 54 Whitgift against Sir Francis Barrington 31 Webs against Barlow 62 Sir Michael Wharton and Sir Edward Hide 72 Westley against King 75 Weaver against Best 75 Woodley against the Bishop of Exeter and Manwaring 94 95 96 c. Wen against Moore 101 EASTER
if they sue here they must bring their actions several for they may not joyn here in an action and therefore it is good discretion in the Court to deny the prohibition Pastons case it was said by Hobert that a Coppiholder may hedge and inclose but not where it was never inclosed before and agreed by him and Warberton that a Coppiholder may dig for Marle without any danger of forfeiture but he ought to lay the said Marle upon the same Coppihold land and not upon other land and this was upon the motion of Hendon Serjeant In a case which concerned the Lady Mollineux and Fulgam the case was in an Ejectione firme that the Iury found the defendant guilty of 10. acres and the judgement was entered of 20. acres and upon that the defendant brought a writ of error in B. R. and now the Plantiff prayed that this might be amended and Finch argued that this ought to be amended and he cited a case Pasch 8. Iac. Rot. 525. Iohn Chilley was Plantiff in debt and recovered and the judgement was that the aforesaid Henry Chilley should recover c. and upon that error was brought in the exchequer chamber and that was assigned for error and yet after Pasch the 9th Iac. this judgement was amended in the Kings Bench and Iohn inserted for Henry and diminution was alleadged and the first judgement was affirmed in the exchequer chamber and he cited a case M. 8. Iac. Rot. 1823. in C. B. dower was brought of 4. Gardens and judgement was given to recover in 3. and upon this error was brought and yet this judgement was afterwards amended and he cited a case Pasch 17. Iac. between Sherley and Underhil in a Qu. Impedit where it was amended after error brought and he vouched one Masons case 12. Iac. in an action upon the case against the husband and the wife for words which were spoke by the wife and judgement was given against them and that the wife capiatur where it should be husband and wife Capiantur and yet this was afterwards amended Hendon contrary after error is assigned it may not be amended in point of substance and the case of Chilley may be good Law for the misnaming only et praedictus Henricus where was no Henricus before could not have other signification or intendment then Iohn who was named before in the record Warberton and Hutton the misnameing Henry for Iohn is matter of substance cleerly and then Hendon said that now the judgement shall not be amended because the prayer of the Plantiff to have that amended came too late because it is after error brought and diminution alleadged and the record certified and then both the parties are concluded but if only a writ of error was brought and no diminution was alleadged that then the judgement may be amended and he said that he had not found in any book where any amendment was after diminution alleadged as here and he cited 22. E. 3. 46. in dower it was assigned for error that no warrant of Atturney was entered for the Defendant and ruled that this may not be assigned for error aâ—ter a scire facias sued see 4. E. 4. 32. but Hobert chief Iustice said that it shall be a brave case that our judgements shall be made good or bad at the pleasure of Clarks and we shall not be able to amend them to which Warberton also agreed And day was given over to speak to that again and after in the same Term this judgement was amended per Curiam Action of debt upon a bond and the Condition was to save the obligee harmless of a nomine poenae against Mary Moore and he pleaded that he had saved him harmless and per Curiam this is not good for if he will plead in the affirmative as here he ought to shew how he had saved harmeless but if he had pleaded in the Negative as he might well then non damnificatus is a good plea generally Harrington against Harrington in accompt HArrington brought an action of accompt against Harrington and declared of the receipt of moneys by the hands of a stranger and the Defendant pleaded in barre a gift of the same money afterwards by the Plantiff to him and it was argued by Towse that this was no plea in barre of an accompt but it is a good discharge before Auditoâ—s and he cited 28. H. 6. 7. Hendon to the contrary and said the opinion of Brian chief Iustice 21. E. 4. is that he may plead that in barre of accompt and Warberton Iustice being only present agreed for by the gift it is his own moneyes and herefore he may plead that in barre It was said by Warberton that if an Advowson is holden of the King and the Tenant alien without licence that the King may not seise that without office which was granted by Hobert and by Winch only present and in the same case by Warberton that a scire facias issuing against the Alienee will not intitle the King but ought to be an office found and it was also said in the same case by Serjeant Iones that the ordinary shall have 28. dayes to examine the ability of one who is presented by the canon Law and the same Canon Law is that the Patron shall not present another during the 28. dayes Goddard against Gilbert GOddard brought an action upon the case against Gilbert thou art a thief and hast stolen 20. load of my furzes and upon non culpabilis pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hitcham for where words may be taken in a double sense one actionable and another not actionable they shall all times be taken in the better sense and in our case to take furzes may be fellony and it may be not fellony for if they are growing they are not fellony and it shall be intended that they were growing rather then cut down and no man will presume that any will take 20. loads of furzes with a fellonius intent because the carriadge of them is visible to all the world for it shall not be intended that he carried those in the night and so he prayed that the Plantiff may be barred Attoe Serjeant contrary words which implies a double signification shall be taken in the worser sense which tends most to the disgrace of the party for they shall be supposed to be spoken in malice and so with a purpose to defame the party and he cited a case Trin. 2. Iac. B. R. Rot. 663. Kellam against Monest thou art a thief and hast stolen my corn and adjudge to be actionable Hobert Warberton and Winch contrary for words shall be taken in the better sense and not in a strained sense to punish the party which spake them as if one say to another I wonder you will eat or drink with him for he hath the pox now every one that heareth that will suppose that he means the french pox and yet in
a legal signification it shall not be taken but in the better sense for the small pox but Warberton said that if one say of another that he is laid of the pox an action lyes for it is intended the french pox and Winch said that those actions of slander were known to law but of late times and for that 26. H. 8. it was thought that an action would not lye for calling another thief and in the principal case judgement was commanded to be entered quod Querens capiat nihil per brevem suum and note that I saw Hobert shew presidents to Winch in a paper which were delivered to him by the Plantiff and drawn by his Councel and he said to Winch that by those it seemed that in the Kings Bench they made a difference between for and and as had been said before and he marvailed much at that In a Capias Ulagatum before judgement the Sherif returned that I. S. and I. N. rescoused the party c. and Attoe moved that the retorn was not good for there ought to be additions by which they may be sued to the outlawry but Hobert and the Court hold this to be good without addition for no statute nor book will compel the Sheriff to give additions in this case And it was said that if the Sheriff in this case retorn that the party himself simul cum I. S. and I. N. made the rescouse that this is not good but in the principal case it was ruled that the return was good and the rescousers which were present were committed to the fleet Homan and Hull were rescousers Vpon the reading of the record the case was that an executor brought an action against one upon a promise made to the Testator in which the executor was nonsuite and 3. l. costs given against him and the Defendant bruught an action of debt upon that recovery against the executors and upon this it was demurred in law and Serjeant Towse said that there are two causes of the demurrer first whether the Defendant shall be charged as executor and is not named executor and secondly whether upon the nonsuite of an executor the Defendant shall have costs by the statute of the 23. H. 8. Hobert chief Iustice said to him you say well Note that it was said by Hobert chief Iustice that if a man dies intestate and he to whom the Administration appertaines is sued by others which pretend to be Administrators and sentence is given against the right Administrator and costs given against him the costs shall not be of the proper goods of the Administrator but of the goods of the intestate as the costs which are spent in the spiritual Court for the provate of a Testament shall be only of the goods of the Testator Hutton if the Legatee sue in the spiritual Court for a Legacy and recovers the costs which he shall recover shall not be of his own goods but of the goods of the Testator and no prohibition shall be granted for any such sentence given in the spiritual Court Hobert to the contrary for if by such means the goods of the Testator are so wasted that the debts and legacies of the Testator may not be discharged a prohibition shall be granted and in every case where the sentence in the spiritual Court crosseth the common law a prohibition lyes and he said that in the case of one Barrow in this Court it was his opinion and the opinion of the rest of the judges that if Administration be committed by force of 21. H. 8. and the Administrator pay all the debts and Legacies that in this case the ordinary had not power to dispose of the rest of the goods to the children of the intestate but they shall remain to the Administrator and that by the very intention of the Statute of 21. H. 8. but Hendon said that he could shew a president of that and the Court desired that they might see that if any such president were LLewellings case VPon the reading of a Record in the case of LLewelling the condition of the obligation was that the obligor should surrender his Copihold land to the use of the obligee and he pleaded that he had surrendered that and upon that plea the Plantiff demurred and it was adjudged upon the opening of the case by Warberton and Hutton being only present in the Court that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff for the plea in barre is not good because the Defendant had not shewed when the Court of the Lord was holden Duncombe against the Vniversity of Oxford In a Qu. Impedit in which Duncombe and others were Plantiffs who were grantees of the King against the University of Oxford and the case was Hill 18. Jac. that Sir Richard weston was seised of an advowson in grosse inter alia and was convict of recusancy and a Commission issued to seise two parts of his land and goods and they seised this advowson inter alia and the King granted the advowson to the Plantiffs and the Church became void and they presented and were disturbed by the University of Oxford and their Clark upon which they brought a Qu. Impedit upon which a demurrer was joyned and Serjeant Iones argued for the Plantiff and there was two points in the case first whether an advowson in grosse is given to the King by the Statute of the 28. of Eliz. and the Statute is that the King shall seise the lands tenements hereditaments of such a recusant convict and whether by the same statute an advowson in grosse shall be seised and he held that it shall for though perchance the word lands and Tenements will not carry that being an advowson in grosse yet this word hereditament will carry it to the King by force of the Satute for it appears by dyer 350. that if the King grant an advowson by the name of an hereditament that in this case this will pass the advowson and for that Coke 10. Whistlers case the King by the grant an of hereditament grants an advowson by such words to a common person then by the same reason a common person may grant that to the King by the same words but it may be objected that because an advowson in grosse is not valuable therefore it is not given to the King and upon this doubt upon the Statute of Wills â— H. 8. the question was whether an advowson was devisable by the name de bonis et Cattallis fellon Butler and Bakers case that they are not devisable for it is not valuable but the 4th Iac. between Taverner and Gooch which case may be seen in the new book of entries that an advowson was devisable before the Statute 5. H. 7. 37. it shall be assets 9. H. 6. 55. recovery in value lyes of that but admit that this is only a thing of pleasure for the advancement of a friend yet that shall be given by the Statute to the King But the second
plea for the Plantiff to say that he was seised till the Defendant disseised him absque hoc that C. enfeoffed him and for that reason he ought to traverse the feofment made by B. for the other was but a mean conveyance see Dyer 107. in Trespass the Defendant conveyed to the donee by 5. or 6. discents by dying seised of the estate taile in every of them the Plantiff confessed the intaile and conveyed to him by feofment made by the heir of the donee which was a discontinuance and took traverse to the dying seised of the same feoffor and ruled to bee evil for he ought to traverse the most antient discent 43. H. 3. 7. Secondly it is evil because he had confessed the seisin of E. 6. and the grant by the same King to Wyat and so had confessed and avoyded the seisin of the same King and then the Law will not suppose that E. 6. purchased that again and for that the traverse of his dying seised is evil when he had sufficiently confessed and avoided that before as Dyer 336. in Vernons case a discent was pleaded to the heire from his ancestor the other party said that the ancestor devised that to him absque hoc that this discended to him as son and heire and ruled to be evil for a traverse needs not when he had confessed and avoyded that before Vide 14. H. 8. Sir William Meerings case 26. H. 8. 4. by Fithzherbert but Brook in the abridgement of the same case said that if the traverse is evil then he had waved the plea before and all was evil 7. E. 4. by Littleton for hereby the representation of Queen Eliz. she had gained the inheritance to the Crown and then the traverse being evil he had waved the former plea which was good without traverse and this seisin in the Crown is not answered but by way of argument as here 14. H 6. 17. he ought to traverse absque hoc that he died in his homage 20. E. 4. 5. 35. H. 6. 32. Serjeant Iones to the contrary and as to that which hath been said that the presentment is alleaged to be in jure coronae and the confessing the presentment is a plea by way of argument to which he answered that the record is not so but the seisin of the advowson is alleadged by discent to Elizabeth Queen by force of which she was seised in jure coronae and Iones argued that the traverse is good for every plea in barre ought either to be traversed and denied or confessed and avoided and here that ought to be traversed Dyer 208. 312. in avowry for a rent charge and seisin was alleadged in the grantor of the land in fee and the Plantiff said he was seised in taile he ought to traverse that he was seised in fee and a good traverse Hill 2. Iac. in C. B. Rot. 1921. Edwards against D. it was pleaded that such a man was seised in fee of a rent charge and the other confessed that he was seised in fee and that a long time before he enfeoffed one I. S. there he ought to traverse that he was seised at the time of the grant see the new book of Entryes Tavener and Gooches case in a Qu. Impedit And a note by the Lord Cooke also he said that after the grant there may be an usurpation and so the dying seised in the case of an advowson in gross ought to be traversed â—e 21. E. 4. 1. 20. E. 4. 14. and as to that which hath been said against the protestations he answered it ought to be traversed and for that the rest ought to be taken by protestation and in some cases the conveyance is traversable see Cromwels and Andrews case And so he concluded and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Note that he said that it was adjudged in that Court 2. Iac. in the case of the Bishop of Winchester that two usurpations gaine the advowson from the King And the reason was because the King by an usurpation may gaine an advowson in him out of a Common person and if the King Vsurpe and the right patron present he is remitted Hobert by such usurpation the possession is gained from the King but not the right and note that upon the argument in the principal case by Bawtry and Iones it was ruled by Hobert Warberton and Hutton that if the Defendant do not shew better cause by such a day judgement shall be given against him and Hutton said that he had studied the case and found no doubt but that the traverse is good Winch was absent in the Chancery M. 19. Iac. C. P. IT was moved for a prohibition by Harris Serjeant to the Court of Audience because that the Plantiff was sued there for saying to one thou art a Common Quean and a base Quean and Harris said that a prohibition had been granted in this Court for saying to one that she was a piperly Queen and it was the case of Man against Hucksler and Finch said though the words are not actionable in our Law they are punishable in the spiritual Court for the word Quean in their Law implies as much as whore but Hobert said that this word Quean is not a word of any certain sense and is to all intents and purposes and individuum Vagum and so in certain see more after Note that it was said by Justice Warberton that it was adjudged in the case of one Ablaine of Lincolns Inne that if a man made a lease for years rendering rent and the lessee or a stranger promise upon good consideration to pay the rent that in this case no action upon the case will lye for it is a rent and is a real thing and Hutton Justice being only present agreed this was upon the motion of Finch Serjeant Mic. 43. Eliz. in the Kings Bench in an action upon the case he declared how he let certain land to the Defendant for years in consideration of which the Defendant promised to pay him for the farm aforesaid 20. l. and Hitcham moved that the action will not lye because it appears to be for a rent for which an action of debt lyes but by Gaudy Fenner and Clench it is not a rent but a summe in gross and for that reason because he promised to pay that in the consideration of a lease cleerly an action upon the case lyes but Sir John Walter replyed that a writ of error was brought of this case of Simcocks in the exchequer chamber and the matter in law was assigned for error and it was ruled that no action upon the case will lye for Walmsley said this was a rent for of necessity there ought to be supposed a commutation between the lessor and lessee and that the lessor demanded of the lessee how much he would give for that and then he answered 20. l. this made an entire contract and for that reason an action of debt lyes and not an action upon the case and Savil and
secondly the Plantiff had not shewed himself the party agrieved because he had not shewed an ouster and before an ouster no audita querela lyes for the purchasor but otherwise for the heir as 17. assise 24. Hobert and Winch only present the liberate is an ouster of it self Empson against Bathrust EMpson against Bathrust in an action of debt upon an obligation of 23. l. the condition was to pay 20. l. and the Defendant pleaded the Statute of the 23. of H. 6. cap. 10. that no Sheriff may take an obligation by colour of his office in other manner or form then is there prescribed by the Statute and he shewed that a Statute of 200. l. was acknowledged to him the Defendant by I. S. and that this was extended by the Plantiff being sheriff and that it was agreed between one Charles Empson brother to the Plantiff and the under-sheriff before the liberate executed that the Defendant should enter into the said bond to the use of the Plantiff the Plantiff confessed this and pleaded the Statute verbatim where upon the Defendan demurred and Hendon argued for the Defendant and said there is 3 points in the case first when the sheriff doth take an obligation with penalty for money which is given to him for his fees which are due by the Statute of the 29. of Eliz. whether this be good within the Statute the second point is when the Sheriff extends the Statute and the conusee enters into bond for the payment of his fees after the extent and before the liberate returned whether this is good and thirdly where the Satute gives 12. d. in the pound for the first 100. l. and if that exceed then but 6. d. whether this shall be taken but only 6. d. in the pound for all that exceeds a hundred pound or whether he shall have 12. d. for the first 100. l. and 6. d. for the rest and if any of these 3. points be against the Plantiff he shall not have judgement And first Hendon argued that this bond with penalty is out of the Statute of the 29. Eliz. for first in our case the bond is void by the 23. H. 6. for it is taken to another and not to the Sheriff and besides the same Statute doth not extend to any obligation with penalty and then it never was the intent of the 29. of Eliz. that any other should be taken or after another manner and the Statute of the 23. H. 6. was made only to prevent the extortion of the Sheriffs and of their officers as may appear by a particular recital of the Statute and yet he agreed that by the equity of the same Statute he shall have 4. d. for every warrant as appears by the new book of entries and then he said if the Sheriff take other fees or in other manner it is extortion and for that by 21. H. 7. if he takes an obligation or covenant which tends to extortion the law will meet with that and he relyed much upon Manninghams case Com. 65. where it is said the Sheriff may take a bond with a great penalty for the appearance of the party but not for his fees by the Stat. of 23. H. 6. for that Stat. as to fees is not repealed by the 29. Eliz. and so he concluded this bond with penalty for his fees was extortion and void by 23. H. 6. which is not repealed by the 29. Eliz. and by consequence void for that Statute was not made to punish them but to prevent all extortion in them and this Statute is penued strictly to prevent any thing which had but any colour of extortion like to the Statute of the 13. of Eliz. cap. 8. against usury if any evasion be made by any indirect dealing to avoid this yet the Statute will meet with that as appeares in Claytons case and for that reason he concluded this bond with a penalty to be void But admitting the bond to be good the Sheriff had not taken that in due time for before the liberate there is no compleat execution but otherwise in the case of a Statute Merchant for there needs no liberate of it self see the books of entries 59. the difference agreed by which it is apparent that before the liberate there is no compleat execution and the words of the 29 of Eliz. are for the serving and the executing c. so that before execution the Sheriff shall have nothing for this word for implies a condition precedent as an annuity pro consilio impenso he ought to shew that he had given counsel and yet it is true that this Statute of the 29. Eliz. hath made a contract between the Sheriff and the party that hath execution and he may have his contract for it is a contract in law and so it was resolved but he shall not have that before execution as was holden Pasch 14. Iac. Rot. 5. 39. B. R. Pierpoint against Bowley that the Sheriff shall be bound to redeliver the fees to the party if it be not fully executed by which it is apparent that before execution no fees are due to the Sheriff and as to the third he argued that the Sheriff shall have only 6. d. in the pound when that exceeds a hundred pound for the intent of the Statute is to put that incertainty and not to make fractions but it will be objected the inconvenience that will ensue upon this construction for then the Sheriff shall have as much for the executing of 100. l. as for 200. l. to this he answered that this may well be for it is the words of the Statute and for authority in that point he cited the case of Fosset and the Sheriff of Nottingham Pasch 36. Eliz. Rot. 1301. where this very point came in question indeed no judgement was given in the case but the opinion of the Court was as he had argued and so he prayed judgement for the Defendant Bawtry Serjeant to the contrary and he argued briefly as to the first point that the obligation with penalty was taken for due fees for it is a due debt and then what reason is there that he shall not take an obligation for a due debt and as to the second point he argued that the bond was well taken before execution for the words of the Statute are that the Sheriff shall not take of any either directly or indirectly for that which he shall leavy or extend in execution c. and this word for implies a taking before or after 21. H. 7. saith that the prisoner shall be discharged paying his fees and this payment ought to be before discharge and the common law said that an hostler may retaine a horse for his meat in this case payment ought to be for his meat before the delivery of his horse and Coo. 5. Graies case there Popham said if a man had pot water by prescription paying 6. d. in this case he ought to pay before he hath the water for otherwise the
owner had not any remedy and so here he doubted that when the Sheriff made execution whether he shall have any remedy or no and therefore it is good conscience to allow him to take a bond for that before he make execution for otherwise a great inconvenience may insue for perchance after the extent and before the liberate the parties may agree and then the Sheriff shall not have any thing for all his paines which he had taken in the extent which never was the intent of the Statute but it may be objected that in this case the Sheriff may have an action upon the case against the debtee or the conusee if he make such composition I answer yet this is a great hinderance and trouble to the Sheriff to prosecute the suite and it shall be very inconvenient to allow that the Sheriff shall be allowed no other remedy and then for the third point he argued that the Sheriff shall have 12. d. in the pound for the first 100. l. where the bond exceed 100. l. and 6. d. for that which exceeds for otherwise as the case is he shall have nothing at all for the first hundred pounds for the words of the Statute are if the same be above 100. l. then he shall have 6. d. so that 6. d. only shall be taken for that which is above 100. l. and nothing for the first hundred if this construction shall be made and he also remembred the objection made by Hendon and so concluded that judgement ought to be given for the Plantiff Hobert said cleerly the Sheriff may take a single bill for his fees and that is the ordinary course also he read the Statute of the 29. Eliz. that it shall be lawful to the Sheriff c. and said the words of the Statute made a contract in law for which an action of debt lyes for the Sheriff and he â—â—id to Serjeant Bawtry that the second point will be found to be against him and for the third point that the Sheriff shall have but 6. d. for all in the case the summe exceed 100. l. and so they thought judgement ought to be given for the Defendant and Iustice Winch said that the reason wherefore the summe of 12. d. in the pound is given if that not exceed 100. l. is because that it is as much labour to the Sheriff to execute 100. l. as it is for 500. l. Maps and Maps against Sir Isaac Sidley MApps and Mapps brought an action upon the case against Sir Isaac Sidley upon a promise and shewed that one named Holdish was indebted to the Testator of the Plantiffs in 12. d. upon a bond which became due and that the Defendant in consideration that the Plantiffs will forbear to prosecute a suit upon the same obligation he promised to pay that and the Plantiffs shewed that they had forborn him till such a day c. and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Hitcham Serjeant of the King that this declaration is not good for this forbearance ought to be for ever and not a temporary forbearance only for the Defendant by his promise had made the debt his own as if the assumpsit promise had been to forbear to come to my house this ought to be a perpetual forbearance and here the assumpsion of the Defendant amounts to a release in law to the principal and yet he agreed if this had been generally that he had forborn and had not shewed he had forborn ill such a day the declaration had been good Hobert if the promise had been to forbear till such a day there he may sue the dettee if he do not pay it the day and it was adjourned Mich. 19. Jac. Mabies case MAbies case Hobert in Parson Mabies case if I let my rectory excepting my glebe the exception is void for no rectory may be without glebe and the same law of a mannor excepting the demeasnes but he may except parcel of the glebe and good but in pleading the lease of a rectory this shall be taken for the whole rectory and not for parcel Gratwick against Gratwick GRatwick brought a formedon in remainder against Gratwick and the Tenant pleaded that the day of the purchase of the writ and yet he the Plantiff is seised of the moity of the land in demand and it was argued by Serjeant Harvey that this is no good plea for he ought to shew of what estate he was seised and he may be seised by vertue of a Statute and he vouched the 39. E. 3. 7. Hobert if he had said that he was seised in his demeasne as of fee or as of freehold this had been good and a seisin by force of a Statute is no seisin at all and Hutton said if Tenant plead entry in part pending the wriâ— he ought to say that he entered and expulsed the other for otherwise it is not good and I conceive that the Court inclined that in the principal case that the plea for the cause aforesaid being of a general seisin was not a good plea. Sir Edward Grubham against Sir Edward Cooke AT another day the case of Sir Edward Grubham and of Sir Edward Cooke was moved againe and it was objected by Ashley that the declaration in the audita querela is not good because he had not shewed the day of the Testee and of the return of the writ execution in certainty but only by process such a day out of the Chancery which is not good but he ought to plead all the record of the extent in special and he offered to shew a president of that and secondly he had not shewed the execution of the liberate by which the land was delivered and so there is no express allegation of a grievance Richardson the presidents in the old book of entries are according to our declaration and Hutton vouched the 9. H. 6. and 39. H. 6 and in an action of debt upon a judgement he needs not recite all the record but he may begin at the judgement and as to the second point they all agreed that the party may have an audita querela before an ouster and yet here the showing that it was delivered to the conuser by the liberate is a sufficient averment of the ouster for it may not be delivered without an ouster and ruled that the Plantiff shall have judgement if the Defendant do not shew other cause by such a day Vpon a Capias Vtlagatum the sheriff returned that the party which was arrested had a protection from Lord Stafford who was a Lord of the Parliamen and it was moved by Serjeant Hitcham that the return was not good for the protection of a Lord of the Parliament is not good in a Capias Utlagatum which concerned the King and by Winch Iustice only present in Court the return is cleerly naught and day was given over to the Sheriff to amend his
return and this was granted by Hobert chief Iustice at another day this Term Peter Vanheath against Turner PEter Vanheath brought an action against Turner and declared upon the custome of Merchants that if any Merchant over the sea deliver money to a factor and make a bill of exchange under his seal and this is subcribed by the Mr. or by any of the company of such Merchants that the Merchant himself or all the company or any one in particular may be charged to pay that and he shewed that one Morgan was factor of the company of which the Defendant was one and that the said Morgan did substitute one Greenway to whom the Plantiff delivered 100. l. upon a bill of exchange to which bill one Bounder being one of the company set to his hand in England and so the action accrewed to the Plantiff The Defendant pleaded nihil debet per legem and upon that the Plantiff demurred in law and the question was whether the Defendant may wage his law and it was argued by Serjeant Harvey that he shall not wage his law for this is only an action upon the case and sounds only in nonfesance and here is no privity between the Plantiff and Defendant for the bill was made over the sea and subcribed here in England and he shall not charge the Defendant without a special custome so that it is plaine that it is custome which made the Defendant lyable and if the Defendant do not pay for this no action of debt lyes but only an action upon the case and every plea ought to conclude to the point in action and for that in trover and conversion non culp is a good plea and yet he may traverse the finding for this tends to the issue and is good and so in debt upon a lease for years nihil debet is a good plea or non dimisit for the cause aforesaid but when the plea doth not tend to the point in issue it is otherwise for he ought to traverse that which tends to the point in issue and in our case the Defendant may traverse the custome or give answer to the nonfesance but he shall not wage his law and an action lyes upon this contract against the Mr. for this and so he concluded that judgement ought to be given for the Plantiff Harris Serjeant contrary this non payment is not a non fesance in the Defendant and here the Defendant may not plead not guilty or non assumpsit for no promise was made and it is a general rule in law that where a man may traverse the conveyance there he shall not wage his law see 5. H. 7. but here the Defendant may not traverse the conveyance Ergo he may wage his law and 5. H. 7. the successor of an Abbot shall have his law of a contract made with his predecessor and he said that the book of the 23. E. 3. is not law Hobert chief Iustice if the Bayliff at the common law make a substitute the substitute is not chargeable but here the custome will bind the law Secondly he laid 2. or 3. Merchants trade over the sea who made a factor there who takes money there and gives a bill and this is subscribed by one of the company that this should bind all or any of the company is not a good custome and the custome of Merchants is part of the common law of this Kingdome of which the judges ought to take notice and if any doubt arise to them about there custome they may send for the Merchants to know there custome as they may send for the Civillians to know there law and he thought that the Defendant ought to be admitted to wage his law for the delivery of the money made a contract in law and as he may have an action of debt so without question he may have an action upon the case and so count upon a promise and then the Defendant may not wage his law Mich. 19. Jac. C. P. Doctor Hunt against Allen. DOctor Hunt brought an action of debt upon an obligation of 100. l. against the heire of Edmond Allen and the condition of the obligation was that whereas the testator Edmond Allen in the first year of the raigne of the King hath given and granted to the Plantiff the presentation to the Church of D. if therefore the said Edmond Alllen from time to time shall make good the said grant from all incumberances made or to be made by him and his heirs that then c. and the grantor dyed and the Church became void and the heire of the grantor presented and whether this was a breach of the Condition was the question and Hobert chief Iustice and Winch being only present thought this tortious presentation to be no breach of the condition but this extends only to lawful disturbance by the heire and by the pleading here it appears that though the heire presented yet he had no right to present because that his father had granted that before and then the presentation of the heire is as a meer stranger And those general words will not extend to a tortious disturbance by the heire but Hobert said that the words shall have such a construction as if it had been said that he shall enjoy the same from any act or acts made by him or his heires and in this case there ought to be a lawful eviction to make a breach of the condition but otherwise if the condition had been that he shall peaceably enjoy from any act or acts made by him or his heires in that case a tortious disturbance would have been a breach of the condition but it was adjorned till another time Information was for that one such his apprentice departed out of his service and the Defendant received and retained him without a testimonial from the Mr. contra formam Statuti And so he demanded 5. l. the Defendant pleaded nihil debet per patriam and it was found against him and now Hendon Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement that an apprentice is out of the clause of the Statute of the 5th of Elizabeth and that the same Statute extends only to servants and to labourers retained within that Statute for the statute saith be it enacted that no person or persons that depart out of service without shewing of a testimonial as is above remembered and this branch as is above remembered had only reference to the next clause before and the same branch before makes only mention of certaine trades in which an apprentice as in our case is not included and the certificate set down within the Statute proves that an apprentice is not within the Statute for the words are I. W. servant to such a one c. and so it extends to servants and not to apprentices and secondly he said the information is not good because he had not shewed in what trade this apprentice served and perchance he was retained in such a trade as is not
seisin of the homage and therefore perchance it will be hard to finde my antient president they adjourned and at another day Hutton and Winch being only present judgement was given for the avowant against Whitgift and Hutton said that he had spoke with the other Iustices and they agreed Vpon a motion made by Towse the case was this a man made a lease for one year and so from year to year during the Will of the lessor and lessee rendring rent and the lessee died and the rent was behinde and by Winch being only present if the rent is behinde in the time of the lessee and he dies an action of debt is maintainable against his Executor in the detinâ—t only and so I conceive if that was behinde after his death he may have an action in the debt and the detinet or in the detinet only to which Brownlow agreed Secondly Winch said that when a man made a lease for a year and so from year to year at the pleasure of the parties that this is a lease for 3. years and not for two Thirdly he doubted if the lessee hold over his term so that he is tenant at sufferance what remedy the lessor had for his rent Vpon the reading of a record the case was that a Scire facias issued against the land Tenant to have execution of a judgement given against Ferdinando Earl of Darby in the 15. Eliz. and the Defendant pleaded that a long time before the said Ferdinando any thing had in the land one Edward Earl of Darby was seised of the land and being so seised 3. Mar. infeoffed I. S. to the use of the Lord Strange and his wife in tail the remainder over to the said Ferdinando and made the said Ferdinando heire to the estate taâ—le and pretended that by this meanes the land should not be liable to this judgement because it was intailed to Ferdinando and of such estate he died seised the Plantiff traversed the feofment made by Edw. Earl of Darby and the jury found that the feofment was made by Edward Earl of Darby to the same persons as the Defendant had pleaded but this was to the use of the feoffor for life the remainder over to the Lord Strange and his wife the remainder as before and whether this shall be intended the same Feofment which the Defendant had pleaded was the question because the estate for life was omitted and upon the special verdict that was the question and Attoe said that if the jury had found this feofment made to other feoffees though the estate had agreed this should be found against the Defendant and Winch Iustice said that there was such estate found as had taken away the execution or extent and the estate for life is not material but it was adjourned till another day A man Covenanted to make such assurance as shall be devised by the counsel of the Plantiff so the same assurance be made within the county of Norff. or the Citty of Norwich and the Plantiff assigned the breach and shewed that in this case his Councel devised that a fine should be leavied of the same land which was not done and it was moved by Serjeant Attoe that in this case the breach was not well laid because he had not shewed where his councel devised that the fine should be leavied In the case of a prohibition in case of a libel in the Ecclesiastical Court for the tithes of Cattles the Plantiff alleadged that those Cattle of which Tithes were demanded are for his Dairy and for the plough and Winch being only present said that the parson shall not have Tithes of such Cattle but if he bred up Cattle to sell it is otherwise secondly the Plantiff in the prohibition alleadged that time beyond memory the parishoners had paid a half peny for the Tithe of a Calf and a penny for a Cow and that upon a day limitted they use to bring this to the Church and to pay this to the Vicar and now the Vicar had libelled in the spiritual Court against them to compel them to bring it home to his house and Winch said that this is no occasion of a prohibition for they agree in the modus but vary in the place of payment and this is not matter of substance and for that reason no prohibition will lie Vpon the reading of a record the case was that the father made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his son and his wife and to the heires of the body of the son and this was for a joynture for his wife and the father died and the son also died and whether this was a good joynture was the question for all this matter was pleaded in barre of dower brought by the wife and it was ruled to be no good joynture for the feme notwithstanding that the father died in the life of his son and Hutton said if a man made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his Executors for years the remainder to his wife for a joynture this will be no good joynture within the Statute of joyntures though the feme here had the immediate franktenement In an action of debt against an Administrator who pleads outlawry in the Testator and it was moved that this was no plea for he had taken the Administration upon him Winch a man who is outlawed may not make an executor for if he meet with his goods he shall answer for them to the King and for that reason it seems to be a good plea 3. H. 6. 32. and Brownlow chief Prothonotary said that he could shew a president 27. Eliz. where this is adjudged to be no plea and Iustice Winch said to him shew that president if any such be and upon Tuesday after he shewed that and then Winch agreed Auditor Curle for words AUditor Curle brought an action upon the case and in his declaration he set forth the Statute of 32. H. 8. for the erection of the Court of Wards and that the same Statute appointed the Auditor of the same Court and shewed that the Plantiff was an Auditor of the same Court and that the Defendant such a day and at such a place said of him you have taken money for ingrossing of feodaries innuendo accompts and tunc et ibidem you are a Cozner and live by Cozning and I will prove that to be Coznage and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Finch Serjeant of the King that the Plantiff shall not have judgement upon this verdict for the first words are not actionable for the taking of money for the ingrossing of feodaries are insensible and then the inuendo will not help nor aid that also the words in the second place are not actionable because he had not said that he was a Cozning officer and so he had not expresly applied that to his office and
son and his wife and upon a demurrer the question was whether this Covenant did raise a present use to the Son and to his wife or whether this only rests in Covenant and Harris Serjeant argued that no present use will arise by this Covenant for first all other Covenants in the indenture are in the future for the words are that the lands shall remain and come c. and therefore till the death of the Covenantor the fee simple is in him and no use will arise for it shall be in the election of the Covenantor what estate he will make to his Son for he himself shall interpret his intent and the difference in our books is when the words are in the present tense and when in the future and for this he cited 22. H. 7. by Iustice Rede if a man Covenant that land shall discend remain or revert he said this did not give any present interest because the wors are in the future and it is in the election of the Covenantor how and in what manner the land shall pass and there he put the case that if I give my horse or my Cow to I. S. there the Donee had election to take at his pleasure the one or the other because the words are in the present tense but if the words are that I will give a horse or a Cow there the Donor had election which he shall have because the words are in the future the Lord Borroughs Covenanted 34. H. 8. Dyer 55. with another in frank marriage with his son that immediately after his death his son shall enjoy the use of his land of inheritance according to the course as then they stood and the question was whether the see simple was presently out of the Covenantor and the opinion was that it was not because it was but a Covenant and did not change the fee simple and so is Dyer 96. Sir Thomas Seymor promised and Covenanted by indenture in consideration that the Covenantee had granted land to him that he would leavy a fine to Wimbish and Pennoy of other lands which fine should be to Sir Thomas Seymor for life the remainder to the Covenantee in taile and no fine was levied and the question was whether any use was raised by this Covenant to the Covenantee and the opinion of the book is that not because it is in the future and he cited the 20. H. 7. 10. the Duke of Buckingham in consideration that the Lord Henry his brother was to marry the Lady Wiltshire he Covenanted with Bray and with others that the Mannors of D. and of S. shall be to the Lady and to her heirs of her body begotten by the said Lord and after the Duke granted to the Lord Henry and his wife for their lives and it was argued whether this second grant is good or no for if it is then the first Covenant will not work to raise an use to the feme and the book left that as a quere and if it be then he argued that in the principal case no present use is raised but that this rests meerly in Covenant and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Serjeant Hendon to the contrary for he thought this will raise a present use and that this was the intent of the parties that this should raise a present use for the intent was to advance them first during their lives with the rent and after the death of the Covenantor and his wife with the land it self and therefore of necessity this will raise a present use for a bare action of Covenant may not be any advancement at all and the rather here because they who take benefit of this are strangers to the Covenant and not Preston himself for as it appears by 3. H. 7. a stranger shall not take benefit by a Covenant and therefore he said the intentions of the parties was to raise an use for otherwise there shall be no advancement at all And further the words in the indenture are Covenant and grant and if no use is raised then this word grant is idle and every word shall be so expounded that they may take effect and the word Covenant is insufficient of it self to pass an estate in land or to have any estate in signification other then to a meer Covenant and to be obligatory as is put Co. 2. Cromwels case Tirrels case there vouched a lease for years provided and it is Covenanâ—ed and agreed there the Covenant is a condition and also a Covenant and 8. Ass 1. 12. it is agreed that if I Covenant that an other shall have my land for 7. years this a good lease of the land it self and it was adjudged here Tr. 2. Jac. Rot. 1696. accordingly and in our case this word Covenant and grant is also sufficient to raise an use and to give an interest in the land it self and yet he agreed that if there was an other act to be made by the Covenantor or the Covenantee that then no use will arise but it shall rest only in Covenant Dyer 162. there are Covenants between the Lady Vere and Sir Anthony Wingfield her son that the said Lady would convey to her son by a recovery and that after 6. moneths the said Sir Anthony shall make an estate to his Mother for life and there it is doubted whether the use is changed within the 6. moneths and it was holden that it was not Mich. 20. Jac. C.P. for then it is impossible that the Covenants should be performed and in that case it is in the power of the Covenantor to make an act that the Covenants shall not be performed and therefore Covenants will not raise an use but in our case no act of the Covenantor may hinder that this use shall arise and therefore good and for that the difference is Dyer 296. which is entered 11. Eliz. the Roll of which I have seen the father upon the marriage of his son promised to the friends of his wife that after his death his son shall have his land to him and his heirs and the book is ruled that this did not change the use and the reason was this Covenant was by words and not in writing but it was not doubted if this Covenant had been by writing but that the Covenant will raise an use which is all one with our case and so was Callard and Callards case 37. Eliz. stand forth Eustace reserving to my wife and my self I give to thee and thy heires and there it was doubted whether any use will arise to the son and ruled that not because this was by words only but it was also agreed that if these words had been by writing they had been sufficient to raise an use to the son and he cited Dyer 232. before the Statute of the 27. H. 8. A Covenanted and agreed with B. that upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the other that he would retain his land for life and that
who hath an interest and see for that Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case and Dyer 148. Thirdly he held that though it should be so that lessee for years may not enter by force of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. yet he may falsifie a recovery by the Statute of the 21. H. 8. which enables lessee for years to falsifie as well as lessee for life and it appears by the verdict that the sole intent of this recovery was to defeat the lease for years for this was suffered within 6. moneths after the death of Henry Mark-Williams the son and also the recovery was to the very same uses which they were before and therefore the lessee may falsifie the recovery it is true in Capels case the lessee of him in remainder may not falsifie a recovery suffered by Tenant in tail though it was suffered of purpose to defeat the lease for years but in our case the lease for years doth not enure by vertue of the estate tail for that is bound by the fine but this issues out of the reversion in fee and for that reason the lessee shall falsifie this recovery in an ejectione firme or in an avowry and he cited Kings case Hill 37. Eliz. B. R. Rot. 293. Tenant in tail infeoffed his son and after he disseâ—sed him and afterward leavied a fine of that with Proclamations the son entered upon the Conusee and made a feofment and the Proclamations passed and the feoffee of the son let for years and then the father and the son died and the issue in tail brought a formedon and recovered and it was agreed that lessee for years may falsifie this recovery and he said that he had seen a Note in Iustice Manwoods Study that it was agreed in his Circuit that lessee for years to begin at a day to come may falsifie a recovery and so be concluded his argument Hendon Serjeant to the contrary and he divided the case in three points First when Tenant in tail had issue a son and a daughter or two sons and the eldest son in the life of his father who is Tenant in tail levies a fine and dies without issue whether this shall binde the youngest son and he thought that it should not and yet he agreed that an estate tail may be barred by a fine though he who leauied the fine was not seised at the time of the estate tail and this by the very words of the Statute of the 32. H. 8. see the case of fines Coo. 3 and Grants case vouched Lampets case and so is the case of Hunt and King 37. Eliz. cited by my brother Harvey and so he agreed cleerly if the son who leavies the fine survives the father who was Tenant in tail that then in this case this binds the estate tail for ever and the reason is upon the very words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. or any was intailed to the Ancestor of the issue in tail and in this case when the issue doth survive the Ancestor and dies this shall binde the issue because it was intailed to him who leavied the fine who was his Ancestor for he may not make any Conveyance to the estate tail except he make mention of him who leavied the fine because that he survived the father who was Tenant in tail but when he who leavies the fine dies in the life of his father viz. the eldest son then the youngest son may convey an estate taile to him without making mention of his eldest brother and this appears by the 46. E. 3. 9. 4. H. 6. 10. 11. H. 7. 6. see the case of Buckner Coo. 8. from which cases he inferred that if the youngest brother may have an action at the Common Law without making mention of his eldest brother then such a construction shall be made of this word Ancestor in the Statute of 32. H. 8. that it shall be taken for such an Ancestor by whom the issue in tail claimes and for no other Ancestor and for this he put the case if land be given to a man and to his heirs females begotten of his body and he had issue a son and a daughter and the son leavied a fine and died this shall barre the estate tail for the cause aforesaid and for authorities in this kinde he cited the reports of Dallison of Eliz. printed at the end of Ashles Tables in Stamfords case in the end of the same case where the very difference is agreed Mich. 29. Jac. C. P. where the eldest son dies in the life of the father and where not and Hobert demanded of him by what warrant those reports of Dallison came in print And then Hendon cited the opinion of some of the judges in the case of Zouch and Banfield and see Coo. 3. the case of fines according to this difference and he said that Sir George Browns case will warrant that in the very letter of it for there it is said that no issue inheritable by force of the tail may enter after the fine by which he inferred that if he is such an issue that is not inheritable he is out of the Statute and so he concluded the first point that the fine being leavied by the eldest son in the life of his Mother that shall not barre the estate tail Secondly he argued that as this case is the feme is not within the Statute of the 11 H. 7. because that at the time when she suffered a recovery she was seised of an estate in general tail by force of the remainder which was limitted to her and her husband and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred which took effect in the feme at the time of the death of the husband and this being an estate in tail of the purchase of the huband which took effect in remainder this may not be a joynture within the Statute of of the 27. H. 8. and then if she be not a joynteress within that Statute though this estate was of the purchase and of the acquisition of her husband yet this is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. for the words are any woman who had any estate in dower or in tail joynt with her husband of the purchase and of the acquisition of the husband which words of the purchase of the husband had relation to Tenant in dower or to a woman who was a joyntress and was not the intent of the Statute to make such a remainder to be within the danger of the Statute when the husband himself in his life may dock this by a recovery and therefore it is not within the Statute And as to the Third point he argued that admitting that she was a joyntress within the Statute of the 27. H. 8. yet when the feme suffers a recovery with the assent of him in remainder in fee this recovery is out of the body of the Statute of 11. H. 7. any which shall discontinue or release with warranty and
that all such recoveryes shall be void and shall be taken for fained recoveries and this may not be imagined a fained recovery where he in remainder in tail is vouched by him who is Tenant for life Jennings case Coo. 10. and such recovery as is there resolved is out of the Statute of the 14. Eliz. and is good by the Common Law and so in our case but admitting this to be within the Statute of the 11. of H. 7. yet the proviso of the same Statute had made that good for there is an express proviso that a recovery with the assent of the heir inheritable if this appear upon Record this shall not be within the Statute and in our case this is with the assent of the heir inheritable and also this appears to be of record and so the recovery is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. See Doctor and Student a book which was written but a litle time after the making of this Statute and Dyer 89. Vernons case and he said that the intent of the same Statute and of the proviso of the same Statute was to have issues and heirs and not termors who had only a future interest to falsifie recoveries and so he concluded that the recovery is out of the same Statute and that the proviso of the same Statute had made that good by the assent of the heir but admitting this should be against him that this recovery shall be within the Statute yet the lessee in our case shall not falsifie nor take advantage of the forfeiture by force of the same Statute but it hath been objected by Harvy that the wife in this case had only an estate for life or Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct and he answered that the resolution in Beamounts case Coo. 119. is contrary for it is there expresly agreed that she was Tenant in tail after the fine leavied by the issue and so was it also resolved in Pophams case 9. Eliz. but there it was doubted whether she was Tenant in tail within the 32. H. 8. who might make a lease but all agreed that she was Tenant in tail who may suffer a recovery and binde the remainder and then when the feme suffers such a recovery as in our case that recovery shall take away a term for years which was made by the issue in tail Mich. 20. Jac. C. P. in the life of his mother notwithstanding she was a joynteress within the 11. H. 7. also he said that this lease for years being made by Henry Mark-Williams the son who was heir to the estate in tail and also to the reversion in fee being made by deed indented rendring rent this shall be a lease which issued out of the estate in fee simple and not out of the estate tail and this shall be out of the estate tail by estoppel being by deed indented for an estate shall not enure partly by way of interest and this lease to begin after the death of the feme he may not take advantage of the forfeiture for though the words of the Statute are that all such recoveries shall be void yet this shall not be void without entry and he who will have benefit by this ought to be mabled to enter presently so soon as the recovery is suffered for as there ought to be a person in esse who shall take benefit of the same Statute as appears by Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case so there ought to be a present estate in esse at the time of the recovery for the words of the Statute are to whom the interest shall appertain but in our case the interest doth not appertain to the lessee who had only a future term and therefore he shall not take the benefit by any forfeiture within the Statute of 11. H. 7. and the rather in our case because there is a rent reserved also all this matter is found by special verdict what estate the son haâ— when he made the lease by indenture Dyer 244. Coo. 155. and Bredons case in Treports case lessee for life and he in reversion by indenture let for years this is no estoppel and it shall be said to be the lease of one and the confirmation of the other and here the lease shall be said to issue out of the reversion in fee and not out of the estate tail and he vouched a case adjudged 10. Jac. when Flemming was chief Iustice of the Kings Bench between Errington and Errington and the case was that a man conveyed land to the use of himself and his wife in tail the remainder to his right heirs and had issue a son and a daughter and he died and the son let for years to begin after the death of his Mother and he died without issue and the daughter leavied a fine and the wife who was Tenant in tail died and the question was whether this lease for years issued out of the estate tail by way of estoppel for then the Conusee shall not avoid this but it was adjudged this lease was drawn out of the reversion in fee and the Conusee of the daughter shall avoid that which is all one with our case but admit that this lease is good by estoppel out of the estate taile yet he shall not take benefit of the forfeiture within 11. H. 7. and this differs from Sir George Browns case for there the Conuser entered by vertue of a remainder and not by the estate tail which passed to him by estoppel and upon that he concluded that if this is an estate meerly by estoppel he shall not have benefit by that Pope and Reynolds before NOw the case between Pope and Reynolds which see before was moved again by Ashley for the Plantiff in the prohibition and the case was that he was owner of a Park and the Park had been time beyond memory replenished with deer till the 10th of Eliz. at which time that was disparked and that the owners had used before the disparking to pay a Buck in Summer and a Doe in winter in full satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Vicar and the Parson had libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tithes in kinde and also traversed the prescription and it was found for the Plantiff in the prohibition and it had been moved in arrest of judgement that notwithstanding this prescription is found for the Plantiff yet he shall not have judgement for two causes First because gross Tithes belong to the Parson and not to the Vicar for the Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage to this he answered that for the most part every Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage but it is a meer non sequitur that this doth for the Vicarage and the Parsonage may have several patrons Fitzh 45. also a Vicarage may be time beyond memory as in our case 40. E. 3. 2. 7. and Fitz. juris utrum a Vicar may have a juris utrum and
for the third part as in debt upon a lease for years and it is found that he had not cause to demand all the rent but that tâ—is ought to be apportioned yet he shall have judgement for the residue and so here Ashley Serjeant to the contrary the jury have found for the Plantiff for the avowant had avowed for all and he alleadged 26. Assise where in an assise the seisin and the diseisin was found and yet because there was no Tenant found of the Frank-tenement the Plantiff shall have judgement and as to that that had been said that the avowant shall have retorn for part he denied that for now it appeared by the special verdict that the avowant and the devisee are Tenants in Common and Tenants in Common ought to joyn in avowry and for that reason the avowant shall not have return for any part but he ought to replead Dyer 177. see the book Hobert said that without question in this case if the jury had given a general verdict this had been against the Plantiff for it was not devised if all was not devised according to the issue and then if it would have been against the Plantiff in this case of a general verdict the special verdict shall be construed to be of the same nature in law and it shall be adjudged by us against the Plantiff for generally where the general issue shall be against any of the parties there the special verdict shall be of the same degree and Winch and Hutton agreed and by Winch who pleads in the affirmative ought to prove all to be true as in the case of Soper which had been remembred by my brother Hendon and by Hutton every issue which is taken upon absque hoc ought to be precisely found and as to the second point he held that the avowant shall have return for part for here the jury haue found the third part of the reversion in him and by that there appears a sufficient certainty to the Court to make an apportionment then if the Court may make an apportionment the avowant shall have return for so much as is due to him but if the apportionment is to be made by the jury and not by the Court there the avowant shall not have return for the third part but if it was in debt for 40. l. and the jury finde 20. l. the Plantiff shall have judgement of that part to be apportioned by the jury and so in Trespass if part be found for the Plantiff he shall have judgement for the demand is by writ but in our case it is an avowry and it is a certain issue and for that reason the avowant shall not have return for the third part adjourned Hutton alledged 28. H. 8. 32. and at another day judgement was commanded to be entered for the avow an t Hobert and Winch being only present Note that if a man make a lease of several parcels of land in a Town and this is for the trial of a title in an ejectione firme he ought to enter into every part of those several and to leave a servant or other to keep the possession till he had entered into every parcel and then to deliver the lease of all and this is good Empson and Bathrust before THe case of Empson against Bathrust was moved again by Harris and he praied judgement for the Plantiff and it had been said that this obligation is void by the Statute of the 23 H. 6. but he held that this Statute did not extend to this obligation for it is only where a sheriff takes a bond of any person which is in his ward and yet he said he never found in any book the Sheriff might exact any fee of any person for he is an officer of the King but 21. H. 7. he may prescribe to have a bare fee but the Statute of 23. H. 6. appoints little fees in some cases Secondly he argued in this case that the Sheriff may take a bond for by 29. of Eliz. this is a due debt to the Sheriff and then if the Sheriff give the partie day till another day it is good reason he shall have a bond for that for his security Thirdly he held that the Sheriff may take this bond of the party after the extent and before the liberate by the Statute of the 29. Eliz. for otherwise perchance when the Sheriff had made the extent perchance the Conusee will not sue out the liberate and so the Sheriff shall be defeated of all his labour and travel taken in the extent and in the last place he said that in case the summe exceeded a 100. l. the Sheriff shall have 6. d. in the pound for that which exceeds and 12. d. for the first hundred pound but it was resolved by Hobert Winch and Hutton that judgement shall be given against the Plantiff and first they agreed this obligation not to be within 23. H. 6. for the partie was not in the ward of the Sheriff and so was resolved in Bewfages case Secondly it was agreed by the said 3. Iustices that the Sheriff may not take his salary appointed by the Statute till a compleat execution viz. till the liberate for the words of the Statute are in the negative and doth not establish the fees but only tolerates them and Hobert said if the Sheriff made an extent and before the liberate a new Sheriff is chosen then in this case the new Sheriff shall have the fees appointed by the Statute and not the antient Sheriff and by Hobert if the Conusee sue an extent and then refuse to sue the liberate to the intent to defraud the Sheriff of his fees the Sheriff shall have his remedy by his action upon the case and by Hutton if the Sheriff return upon the extent that he is ready to deliver that to the Conusee this is sufficient to intitle him to his action upon the case and thirdly it was holden by Hobert and by Winch that the Sheriff shall have but 6. d. in the pound for all if it exceed 100. l. for so was the intent of the Statute but Hutton said that the Common practise is otherwise and Hobert said that he did not value that for he knew well enough that the Sheriff will rather take more then less then their fees and though it had been said that if such a Construction shall be made then the Sheriff shall have as much for executing 100. l. as 200. l. to this he said the Sheriff ought to take this subject to this casually for it is the very words of the Statute and lastly it was resolved by Hobert and Winch that the obligation was void by the Common law and extortion and a taking by the Colour of his office see Dive and Manninghams case and Hobert said that every bond that is taken for any thing which is malum in se is void by the Common law and this extortion is malum in se and so void by
that then his two sons shall pay them and if it happen that either of them die before his debts and legacies paid or before either of them do enter into his part that thou the other shall have all the land in fee and after the devisor died and in the life of the mother the eldest son released to the youngest all his right title Claim and demand to the land which was devised to him by his father and after the wife died and two points came in question in this case First whether this limitation is good Secondly whether the release is good and it was argued by Richardson Serjeant that this limitation of the Statute by way of devisee is good and he vouched Dyer 330. Clarks case and 4. Eliz. Goldley and Buckleys case a man devised to his son and his heirs provided that if his personal estate did not suffice to pay his debts and legacies that then his lands shall be to another and he vouched Brown and Pells case which was adjudged in Banco Regis the case was that a man had two sons William the eldest and Thomas the youngest and he devised his lands to Thomas his son and his heirs provided that if Thomas died without issue living that then William shall have the land and it was resolved that this was good to William by way of executory devise and in that case doubt was moved whether if Thomas suffer a recovery whether this shall take away the estate of William and it was holden by all the Court except Doderidg that it shall not but all agreed that this devise upon the future contingency is good and so he concluded that if the youngest son die in the life of the Mother and before the legacies are paid the land shall remain to the Plantiff according to the intent of the devisor but the other doubt is when the Plantiff did release all his right and claim to the other whether this release will extinguish this future possibility and he held that it will not and he said that he had seen the case of Lampet Coo. 10. and there the release of a possibility is penned as in our case and if any word discharge this possibility it is this word right but if the resolution of that book had not been against him he would have argued that this right was not sufficient to extinguish this future possibility but that there ought to be a more apt and proper word but he said he would not argue against books but he said that which he would insist upon was the distinguishing of possibilities for there are two manner of possibilities the one is Common and ordinary the other is more remote and forreigne And first there is a possibility which is Common and necessary and this depends upon an ordinary casualty as a lease for life the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. for it is apparant that the right heirs of I. S. may take by this and such a possibility may be released and a possibility which is remote and forreigne is as if a lease be made for life the remainder to another during the life of the lessee for life or a lease for life the remainder to the Corporation of B. those remainders are void but yet by possibility they may be good for in the first case the Tenant for life may enter into religion and in the latter case the King may make Corporations and yet because such possibilities are not usual the remainders are void see Coo. 2. Chamleys case where such a remote possibility may not be released if a man give land to one which is married and to another woman which is married and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred this is a good estate tail for there is a common possibility that they may intermarry but if the gift be to a man and to two women who are married and to the heirs of their bodies ingendred they shall not have an estate tail executed for it is a remote and forreigne possibility and an imbrodery of estates which the law will not allow nor respect see the Rector of Chedingtons case that such a possibility as in our case may not be released for first here the mother ought to be dead before the Plantiff shall have land Secondly legacies ought to be paid Thirdly Thomas ought to be dead and till all these possibilities hap the Plantiff shall have nothing in the land and for that it is a remote possibility which is not gone by the release for as it is said when a possibility shall be gone by a release there ought to be a good foundation upon which the release may operate secondly the possibility which is released ought to be necessary and Common but in our case it is not necessary that the son shall enjoy it in the life of his mother and also the mother may in a short time pay the legacies and then neither of the sons shall have the land by which circumstances it is apparant that this is not a Common or an ordinary possibility but is a remote and forraigne expectancy which shall not be gone by this release and this differs from Lampets case for there was a possibility of a Chattel which as it may easily be created so it may easily be destroyed but in our case it is a franktenement which as that requires a greater ceremony in the creation and for that it will require a greater matter to destroy and to extinguish that and it is said in Woods case cited in Shelleys case Coo. 1. that if a man covenant with A. that if I. S. infeoffed him of the Mannor of D. that then he will stand seised to the use of him and his heirs of the Mannor of B. and the Covenantee died and the said I. S. infeoffed the Covenantor in such case the heir shall be inward and yet it is only a possibility which descends which possibility of an use may not be discharged or released and yet in that case there was a possibility which is more Common and ordinary then in our case for there was a possibility that I. S. should make the feofment and so say a good foundation upon which the release may operate and he put the case that I. shall let for so many years as I. S. shall name if I. S. name it is good and yet he held if I. S. release before the nomination that this release is meerly void because he had only a possibility and as to Digs case Coo. 1. there a power of Revocation may be released and good reason for the Covenantor who released had the bird in his own hand and for that it was no remote possibility but there it is said that if the power be limited to an estranger there the stranger may not release and he also agreed Albanies case for there the power to release was upon the death of a man only but in our case it is upon death and other
contingencies by which these remote possibilities shall not be released Hoes case Coo. 5. there a release of all actions and demands to the Bailee made this void and in the case of Brown and Pell which was remembred before it was the opinion of all the Court against Judge Doderidge that where the devise was to the son in fee and if he died without issue living that then his eldest brother shall have that if in this case the second son suffer a recovery yet this had not destroyed the possibility which the eldest brother had to have the land and if a common recovery which is matter of record and the common assurance of the realm will not take away this possibility a fortiori a release which is but matter of fact and so he concluded and prayed judgement for the Plantiff Bawtry to the contrary and he said that if this remainder shall be good then the inconvenience which the judges had alwayes endeavoured to take way shall be on foot again as in the case of Chamley and Corbets of springing uses for if it shall be lawful for a man to limit a fee upon a Collateral condition or limitation then there shall be a perpetuitie and for this if any litteral construction shall be made upon such conveyances this will introduce dangerous events to inheritances and for that he held that limitation to the Plantiff to be meerly void for when the land is devised in fee this devisee by this had an absolute estate in fee and it shall be strange to give this to another though this be by way of devise for though the will of every man shall be supplied by the intent of the devisor yet his intent ought to stand with the rules of the law and otherwise his intent shall revert and for that he cited 29. H. 8. a man made two executors provided that one of them shall not administer here the intent did plainly appear and yet because the intent is contrary to the power which the law gives to every executor therefore it is void and it is put for a bare rule in Corbets case that such a conveyance which a man may not make in his life time by act executed he may not make by his Will but a man may not make such a conveyance by act executed in his life time for as it is said in Colthirsts case if a man let for life the remainder for life upon condition that if the first lessee do such a thing that then the land shall remain over to a stranger this remainder is void for when the land is given before this second limitation is meerly void and also the case is put that if a man give lands in fee upon condition the remainder over this remainder is void for the other had an estate in fee before by which it is apparant that when an estate is one time lawfully vested in any certain person there no limitation may give that to a stranger by any act executed in his life at the common law and then it shall not be good by way of devise 28. H. 8. Dyer a term was devised for years the remainder over and it was adjudged by Baldwin and by Shelley that the remainder in that case is void for when the devisor had given his term he may not limit this remainder over though this be by way of devise and this may be good law notwithstanding Lampets case for there the lease was devised and not the land and for that reason may be a difference and he vouched the case which was remembred by Richardson 29. H. 8. 33. and then as to the second point he held that the release was good admitting the first point to be against him for if the eldest son had any right by this release then this word right in the release will destroy and extinguish that and this possibility is not remote and forraigne for the condition or limitation is annexed to the estate and is not a subsequent condition which creates an estate and this depends upon an ordinary casualty which is common to all men and the payment of debts and of legacies is incident and common to every executor and as for Albanies case Coo. 1. the case was that a man had a power to revoke uses upon the death of a stranger without issue and resolved that this power may be released and yet his power depended upon two contingencies death and death without issue and the case is also there put if A. infeoffe B. upon condition that if B. Survive C. and then if A. and his heirs pay to B. 10. l. that then he shall enter in this case there are many contingencies involved in one conveyance and yet it is there said that these contingencies may be released and in Lampets case Coo. 10. there are six reasons wherefore such a contingencie may be released and our case is within all the reasons which are there mentioned for the words in the release as have been remembred by my brother Richardson are all one with our case and the first reason is because this is a Chattel which as it may be easily created so it may be easily destroyed to this he gave answer that this remainder of a Term was an interest to him who released and so in our it is an interest of a remainder to the Plantiff and for that the release is good Secondly it is a maxime in Law that every land may be charged one wayes or another and we are within this reason also for if this estate be in the Plantiff then this may be released Thirdly the foundation of every act ought to be regarded for Grants case there vouched destroyes the possibility with a fine by reason of the original act the fourth reason there remembred is because that if the devisee had been dead his Executor shall have the interest the same reason in our case if the Plantiff had been dead before the remainder or the contingencie hap yet his heir shall have that See Shelleys case the fifth reason is the legacie was in present though this was to take effect in futuro and so in our case the Will is in present though the state is to take effect in futuro and sixthly it shall be against reason to establish such a perpetuity of a Chattel and so in our case it shall be against reason to establish a perpetuity of a franktenement and the release is very well penued for it is of all his title right and claim to the reversion and remainder which the father devised to the Plantiff and so the release is not general but this is a particular and special release of that which was devised to him by his father and Hoes case Coo. 5. is not like to our case for first there the duty was altogether incertain and secondly the condition there did precede the duty but in our case the condition is annexed to the estate and so he concluded and
covenantor shall have an estate for life and so the law makes in that case fractions of estates as the case of the Lord Seymor Dyer 96. seems to accord with this and besides those two books he said he could not finde any book which will warrant that and for that reason he held those two books to be no law for if I Covenant that my son shall have my land after my death this will not raise an estate to me by implication for life and an estate to my son and so by such means to change my estate in fee for an estate for life without more words for the word covenant in his proper and native signification is only obligatorie and yet it had been alwayes conceived sufficient to raise an use to him who is not partie to that as if I covenant with a stranger that I will stand seised of my land to the use of my son this will raise an use to my son and yet neither my son nor the covenantee may have an action of covenant but an use will very well arise to my son as if a man bargain and sell his land in consideration of 100. l. paid by I. S. though in this case the consideration ariseth from a stronger yet that will pass the use to the bargainee and in case of covenant it is not this word covenant only which creats the use but it is rather the agreement of the parties which is testified by the covenant for if sufficient agreement appears there will not need this word covenant as if I will agree and declare to stand seised to the use of my son by which it appears that the word covenant is onely declarative of the intentions of the parties and then in the principal case the covenant is not that the son shall have the land but that the land shall come remain and be to him and those words are incertain as 21. H. 7. redert come or discent and for that reason it is all one with the law of the same case and then void to raise any use for the incertainly and then when Andrew Buckley covenants that his son shall have his lands and no words to inforce his intention and for that reason the intention shall be lyable to an action of covenant and not to change his estate which he had in fee for an estate for life by this covenant but if he had expresly covenanted that in consideration of marriage of his son that he would hold his land for life and after this should be to his son this will change the estate which was in fee for an estate for life but in our case the covenant being general and left to the indifferent construction of the law the word covenant shall be taken in his proper and native signification and this is obligatorie and so he concluded that this covenant being at the first to grant a rent and was executory and the last part of that is executory for assurance and the limitation of the estate to the son being intangled between these two Covenants this shall be of the same nature and by consequence the covenant is obligatorie only and will raise no use to the son and so he concluded that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff and it was commanded to be entered accordingly Sparrow against Sowgate IN debt by Sparrow against Sowgate who declared that the Defendant became Bail for one Richard Sowgate in Banco Regis against whom the Plantiff had brought a Bill of debt of 77. l. and now the Defendant bound himself in a Recognizance of 77. l. upon which the action is now brought that in case judgement should be given against the said Richard Sowgate that he shall satisfie the said judgement or render his bodie to prison for in this case no part was impossible for after the judgement the principal may render himself in B. R. to the Marshal for the redemption of his suretie and that is the Common course there as he said but he agreed the case to be otherwise if a scire facias issue out of the Kings Bench against the Bail for there the death of the principal is a good plea for a scire facias doth not lie there till default is assigned in the principal in his not comming upon the capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be when he is dead Note that but yet before any capias it is clear he may have an action of debt Sir Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King to the contrary and he alledged this to be the constant course in the Kings Bench that the Bail is never chargable till there is default assigned in the principal upon the recorn of the Capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be here for the principal is dead and he agreed the case of the other side that when a man is to do two things though the one is become impossible yet he ought to perform the other but when it is in the election of one to make either the one or the other then it is otherwise see Dyer 262. and so he concluded for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice said that it is inconvenient that the Plantiff shall be forced to sue his Capias ad satisfaciendum against the partie before he have execution against the Bail for perchance he will sue a fieri facias or an elegit against him and that the Corps of the partie will not satisfie him and Browlow Prothonotary said that it had been adjudged in this Court that such plea is not good Winch the course of the Kings Bench is that default shall be assigned upon the retorn of the principal before the Bail shall be charged and though the Plantiff refuse to take his bodie after he had made his election to take his fieri facias or elegit he shall never more resort to the Bail which was granted by Hobert and Hutton as to that last point and it was holden by all the Court that if the principal render his bodie though the Plantiff refuse to take that yet that is a discharge of the Bail and also it was agreed by Hutton Hobert and by Winch that if the course of the Kings Bench be such that the Bail shall not be forfeit till there is a default assigned in the principal the same course also shall be followed here and per Curiam if the course of the Kings Bench be such that such Capias is necessary to be awarded that then a convenient time shall be allowed for the principal to render his bodie gratis and if the principal do die before such time the Bail is discharged but it was said by Winch if he die before convenient time and the Capias is awarded that such death shall not discharge the Bail note that Iones Iustice said that he thought in this case that it is necessary that the principal render himself gratis for when he is let to Bail the law supposeth him to be alwayes in custodie
against Hutchinson and made title to present to the Church in the right of his wife and after the issue joyned and before the venire facias the wife died and the Plantiff shewed that himself had took out a venire facias in his own name and upon that Harris demurred in law because he supposed that the writ was abated but Winch was of opinion that the writ was not abated because this was a Chattel vested in the husband during the life of the wife Ferrers against English IN an action upon the case upon a promise between Ferrers and English and upon non assumpsit it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement that the venire facias was not well awarded for it was proecipimus quod tibi venire facias Duodecim liberos et Legales homines Coram Henrico Hobert apud Westmonasterium where that ought to be Coram Iusticiariis nostris and therefore the writ being insufficient it is not amendable and for that he cited the case where the venire facias was awarded to th Coroner and that ought to be awarded to the Sheriff and this adjudged to be erroneous this case was answered that this was the custome and there was a case alledged to be adjudged 30. Eliz. between Cesor and Story where a Capias did issue out of this Court in this form Ita quod habeas Corpus ejus Coram Iusticiariis omitting apud Westmonasterium and this was reversed for error but this was answered to be in an original which ought to be precise in every point but Serjeant Crook said that because this was but judicial process and the trial is taken upon the habeas corpus that it is amendable for in all cases where the roll is right though there be an error in the venire facias yet this is amendable Sir Robert Nappers case A Rent was granted to Sir Robert Napper and if it happen that this annual rent to be behinde that then the land shall at all times be open and subject to distress of the Grantee according to the true form and effect of the said indenture and upon all the pleading a demurrer was joyned and the sole doubt was whether the last words were a distinct covenant by themselves for if they are then the obligation is forfeit for the lands are not open to distress because that the mother of Sir Robert held that till the age of 24. years or whether they are part of the former covenant and then the former worde will qualifie that because there was not any act made by him to the contrary and it was argued by Bawtrie that they are all one covenant for they charge the land with the Annuitie and he covenants that this shall be open to distress and it is all one matter and thing and is therefore a covenant and where one covenant doth depend upon another there one expounds the other so Dyer in Throgmortons case 151. and he urged many cases which are cited there and he cited the Lord Cromwels case where words of proviso are placed between words of covenants yet they will work according to the intent of the persons and there it is said that ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fiat relatio and so it appears to him that this referred to the estate which Sir Thomas had from his father and that he made nothing to impeach or to alter that and he cited the case of Sir Moile Finch though by the fine the Mannor of Beamstone was destroyed yet in the said indenture free egress and regress was reserved to the Courts for the Lady Finch afterwards an other fine was levied of all the lands and Tenements except the Mannor of Beamstone where in verity that was destroyed before and yet the judges did construe this to be a good exception because this was in verity the intent of the parties and there they made a construction upon the covenants which did lead the fine and upon the latter indenture which did direct the others and so the principal case in Althams case the judges did not only adjudge upon the first words of the lease but upon altogether and he cited the case of Hickmote where the exception extends to all the parties of the precedent deed and Hendon argued to the contrary that they were several covenants and yet he granted all the cases cited by Bawtrie but said they all stood upon this difference where it is a joynt thing and where it is a several thing as here and for that reason that ought not to be applies to that for they are distinct sentences and not joynt as is expressed in Sir Henry Finches case Coo. 6. and they ought to be construed as distinct covenants for otherwise they shall not take effect at all for then he had not any remedy for the rent which is expresly against the intentions of the parties and Crawley Serjeant said that if the two first covenants were according to the title and the last was only conditional if the rent was behinde that then it should be open to distress and the Court seemed that they were several covenants but judgement was respited for that time and the same Term the case was moved again by Hendon that they were distinct covenants and that this was the scope of the indenture and the intention of the parties that this should begin presently and secondly the two covenants are of several natures and if the third covenant be not several then it is idle for all is implied in the first and day was further given to advise of that but the opinion of the Court seemed to be for the Plantiff See after Trin. 22. Iac. Westlie against King VVEstly against King in debt the bond did bear date the 11th of February 18. Iac. and this was to perform an award Ita quod the ward be made before Easter of all controversies depending between them in the Star chamber and the Defendant pleaded that there was no award made in the mean time and the other shewed the award and assigned the breach and the Defendant replied that before the award was made c. upon the 16th of March they discharged the Arbitrators and so concluded as at the first they made no award and now Serjeant Davenport moved that he had not maintained his bar quod non fecerit tale arbitrium and have given the discharge in evidence for now it appears that the bond is forfeit but Hutton said that the Plantiff ought to have shewed this discharge and so he had shewed the forfeiture and he said further that the rejoynder is an affirmation of the bar if they were discharged then they made no award and this notwithstanding shewed a forfeiture of the bond but not upon the point which the Plantiff had alledged and Winch said though this is is so yet it appears that the Plantiff had cause of action by all the record before and day was given over in the case
sold them the debtor may accompt it his follie that he sold them not before the day of the suit but if in our case the money is payable presently he had then no time to sell them for certainly the meaning of the Statute was in this to give time to the Conusor to allien and to sell his goods and so of a recognisance taken before the chief Iustice upon the Statute of the 23. H. 8. without question a day ought to be limitted when that shall be paid and there ought to be the seal of the partie and the seal of the King and the day of the payment specified and my first reason wherefore this Statute is void is because when an act of Parliament limits jurisdiction or power to any inferiour man he ought to pusue his limitted jurisdiction precisely in all the substantial points as the Statute of Magna Charta limits that he shall hold his turn viz. the Sheriff within one moneth after Michaelmas or Easter now if he hold that but 2. dayes after it is void And the reason is he ought to pusue this limitted jurisdiction and then what difference is between those several jurisdictions and I cannot compare that to a better case Cook 10. then to Neufages case upon the Statute of the 23. H. 6. if the Sheriff do take an obligation for an appearance if it do not appear in the condition when the day of appearance is then this obligation is void for the day of appearance ought to appear expresly and not to leave this to the construction of the law and then what difference is there between our case indeed contracts may be many times made good by reference but so may not a Recognizance and yet 17. Edw. 4. a man made a contract to give so much for Corn when he saw that and the contract by the Iustices was awarded void because that no day was set when that should be paid and see the book which is I conceive that if the contract had been to pay when he took the Corn it had been good and so here if a man had such a jurisdiction he ought to pursue that precisely and for that the day in all those cases ought to be observed and a fortiori in our case and an other reason is out of the presidents in all times and though there may be some few which doth pass sub silentio yet I do not value them according to Slades case Cook 4. and 5. Edw. 4. and all the subsequent Statutes since the Statute of Acton Burnel are but declarations and additions to this Statute and as Grants case upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. nay that is not only a Statute of explanation but is also an original Statute but the Statute of 34. H. 8. of Wills is meerly a Statute of explanation and for that reason in Buckler and Bakers case is Cook 3. that Act to be construed precisely according to the word and no new interpretation may be made of that and for an answer to that which my brother Iones said that here is a day equevolent to an express day for it is implied in law to be paid presently according to the case of an obligation but I say that in this case there is a diversitie in our books in the case of an obligation 14. Edw. 4. 14. H. 8. 29. and other books whether this is payable presently or upon request and therefore in a case so dubious it is not fit to make an ignorant Maior to judge another case by the rule of this case being so dubious and so doubtful for if in this case it be not payable without a request then this is matter of fact and not triable before him nay the Statute of mercatoribus it self appoints that the day be mentioned and so both the Statutes do mention that there ought to be a day of payment appointed and fixed in the Statute and then wherefore shall we make construction that an implyed day will so serve the turn and in the Statute de mercatoribus the form of the writ is set down which doth expresly mention a day and so I think there is not any doubt but that if it were a Recognisance upon the Statute of of 23. H. 8. for default of day it shall be void and so in our case and so he said the audita querela lies well The argument of Justice Winch. VVInch to the contrary and because the effect of his argument was to the same purpose with that of justice Iones and of the Lord Hobert I will report that but briefly and he said that he held this to be within the Maiors jurisdiction for the purpose and the entent of this Statute is to give securitie to the Merchant creditor and for that reason the day is not material but I will insist upon two things veritatem facti and considerationem legis here is a good contract and for that it ought to be paid presently and if there had been no other matter but this that it had been payable at a day past this had been good for the mistake of the Clark must not make any Statute to be void but yet I grant if this were part of the jurisdiction this ought to be pursued precisely as the law doth prescribe but a pettie addition or omission so that be not in point of substance will not hurt that and this is not part of the jurisdiction but it is to the Statute according to the intentions of the parties and the day is only part of their agreement but it hath been said that this had been idle for the Statute shall not be taken so to pay presently but I say the contrary for though he had not his money in his hand yet he will not trust him but will have his securitie and yet I agree to the difference before that there ought to be a time certain and not to be proved after by averment and here when no time is fixed this is payable presently but there shall need to be a request then I hold it is out of the Statute and when Satutes are obscure they ought to be interpreted according to the rules of the common Law and as to the case of an obligation it is payable presently and we ought to intend that the Maior takes notice that this ought to be paid presently for ignorance of the law is not supposed of any besides if this Statute be absolutely void then the partie is without remedy and in such a case we ought to bâ— favourable in our expression and so I conclude against the audita querela The argument of the Lord chief Justice Hobert HObert chief Iustice to the same intent I hold that the Statute is good and we ought to beware how we destroy assurances except it be upon good and sure grounds and it is a perilous case to make an ignorant man to lose his right by a slip and we ought to be the more warie
Plantiff in Hammond which indenture rehearseth that King Henry the eight was seised of this land in his demeasne as of fee in the right of his Crown from him conveyed that to Ed. 6. who in the 7. year of his Raign by his letters patents bearing date at Westminster he granted that to one Fitz Williams to Hilton in fee as by his letters patents may appear they being so seised by indenture which bore date c bargained and sold that to Henry Hoskins and to Proud also recited that Proud releaseth to the said Hoskins all his right as by the said release may appear and conveyed that to Iohn by discent and so the said Iohn being seised he and his son Peter made this conveyance to the Plantiff upon a good consideration in which they did covenant with the Plantiff in this manner and the said Iohn and Peter for them and there heirs do Covenant and grant to and with the Plantiff c. that they the said Peter and Iohn Hoskins according to the true meanâ—â—ing of the said indenture were seised of a good estate in fee simple and that the said Iohn and Peter or one of them have good Authoritie to sell that according to the intent of the said indenture and that there was no reversion or remainder in the King by any Act or Acts thing or things done by him or them and the Plantiff laid the breach that neither Iohn nor Peter had a lawful power to â—â—ll the Defendant pleaded that Iohn had a good power to sell that according to the intent of the said indenture notwithstanding any Act or Acts made by him or his faâ—her or by any claiming under them and upon that the Plantiff demurred and the case was now argued by the Court and Iones Iustice began and said that his opinion was that the Plantiff shall be barred the case being upon construction of covenants and the sole question is whether they are several covenants or only one covenant and I held that they are all one covenant and those words for any Act or Acts do relate to the two other precedent sentences and so it is all but one covenant though this stand upon several parts for if these words were placed in the fore-front there had been no question but that this had been but one covenant and this made no difference when it is set before and when it is set after and the repeating of that had been toutalogie for if I covenant I will build a house at Dale Sale and a vale of Brick here Brick shall refer to them all because it is tied in one entire sentence and covenant and so if I covenant with you that I will goe with you to Canterbury to Salisbury and Coventrie here the word goes relates to all 3. as in the case of Sir Henry Finch the rent was granted out of the Mannor of Eastwel and not of the Messuage lands and Tenements lying and being in the Parish of Eastwel or else where in the same Countie belonging thereto and resolved that land which is not parcel of the Mannor is not charged with the rent because it is all but one sentence and one grant and cited the case of Althams case and Hickmots case where special words will qualifie general words where they are all in one sentence and so I conceive they are but one covenant Cook 8. 9. especially in the intents of the parties and upon the intents of all the parties of the deed for when a deed is doubtful in construction the meaning must be gathered from all the parties of that but yet that is tied with two cautions that it be not against any thing expressed by the said indenture but only in case where it is doubtful Cook 2. 5. so Cheineys case and Baldewins case a habendum will destroy an implied premisses Cook 4. but not an expressed and so in Nokes case an express particular covenant qualifies the generalty of the implyed covenant like to the case which was 32. Eliz. in the Court of Wards between Carter and Ringstead Cook 8. where Carter was seised of lands in Odiham and of the Mannor of Stoy and there covenanted that he would Levie a fine to his son of all his lands in Odiham in tail and for the Mannor of Stoyes that should be to the use of his wife now these subsequent words drew that out of the tail according to the intent of the parties and so in our case and I also take an exception to the form of the declartion for he conveyes that to Fitz Williams and to Proud and Hoskins by the name of all his lands and Tenements which were in the tenure of Anne Parker and did not aver that these lands for which the Covenant was made were in her hands and for that it is not good and for these reasons I conceive the Plantiff shall be barred The argument of Hutton Justice HUtton to the contrary I hold that they are 3. several Covenants and yet I agree the cases afore cited and the reason is they are all included in one sentence for it is the care of the Purchasor that he had an owner of the land before he purchase for that which is the ground of assurances that he is seised in fee and hereafter that the Covents that this is free from incumberances made by him and that he had good title to alien which strikes at the very root of assurances and my first reason is because here are several parties and they covenant that one of them is seised of a good estate and that they or one of them had power to alien that for it may not stand with the intents of the indentures to buy of him who had no title and might not sell and also the last Covenant is meerly in the negative that they have made no Act or Acts by which the reversion shall be in the King and that is all one as if the word Covenant had been added in every clause of the sentence and Covenants in law may be qualified by express Covenants but if a man made a lease for years upon condition to pay 20. l. in this case an entrie by the law is implyed for default of payment but yet if it added that if it be behinde he may enter and retain till he is satisfied of the 20. l. now in this case this had taken away the implyed Covenant and condition but every express Covenant must be taken most beneficially for the Covenantee and in Nokes case it is said that an express Covenant controuls an implied one but he may use either of them at his pleasure and election and I grant Henry Finches case to be good law for there is not any clause or sentence till after the Alibie but yet in Dyer 207. they are distinct sentences and shall receive several constructions and so here the matter being several they shall receive divers constructions and he Covenanted that
he was seised in fee and that he had power to alien that and this was to encourage the Purchasers and for the form he needs not aver that this was in the hands of Anne Parker for he had confessed that in the bar that he came lawfully to that and besides the Covenant is broken though he never was seised and so I conceive that the Plantiff shall have judgement Winch to the same intent it is true if it had been all but one Covenant then if it had been no question this had not been broken but I think they are several Covenants like to the case of Sir Robert Napper lately adjudged also the first two Covenants are in the affirmative and the other in the Negative and for that they ought to be answered with several pleas and these kinde of assurances are the Common assurances and therefore they ought to be interpreted favourably for the Purchasers and Iohn was not deceived in these Covenants for they brought down upon the deed an estate in fee and it is also agreed if the word Covenant and grant had been divers times added to the several clauses then they had been several Covenants and now it is all one word and made those to be several Covenants and words of relation never will controul that which is certainly put down before and so he concluded in this case the Plantiff shall have judgement to recover Hobert chief Iustice to the contrary every deed ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed as a general issue out of the evidence and intent ought to be picked out of every part and not out of one Word only and here Peter joyned with his father to strengthen the assurance and Iohn had not only his own estate but the estate of Proud and it is plain he never meant to intangle himself with other Conveyances then those which he and Proud had made and I hold this to be no independent Covenant and it is all bound with one clause S. for any Act or Acts made by them c. and it is confessed if these words had been placed in the forefront that then they should relate to all and it is as clear as if they were and the first reson is that the intent appears only to undertake for himself because he should but have part of the land and for that he was to warrant his evidence and to that end he was to deliver to him his title at large in the said indenture and here he had made the Plantiff privie to every several conveyance of that to inform the Purchaser of it and will you also intangle him with a covenant you might have taken notice of his title and it appears to be the very intents of the parties that you should take notice of the title and inform your selves concerning the same Secondly this is a sentence which may be taken both wayes and I say it is agreed that if it had begun with these words notwithstanding any Act or Acts c. that then it shall be all construed by this and I never saw any difference I grant they are several Covenants in point of fact but not in point of obligation for there are not several words of binding nay I say if he had released this last he had released all but it hath been said that one is in the negative and the other is in the affirmative but I do not value that and it hath been said that this is the Common assurance of the Realm and if other construction shall be made then no man shall be sure of his own we had given him leave to say that no reversion nor remainder is in the King by any Act by him made and the King may not have any reversion and he seised in fee also this clause standing indifferent whether this shall be referred to all or not and then the question is how the Court will adjudge of that for my part I take it that this may stand with the intent of all the parties of the deed but take that as you take it that this destroyes all for if he is absolutely seised in fee what matter is where the reversion is and yet if the reversion was in the Crown and not by his Act you confess that may not charge him which is expresly against the first Covenant if this be distinct by it self but take that indifferently and all the parties will stand together Nappers case hath no affinity with this for questionless there were several Covenants for in that indenture it did not appear what estate Sir Thomas Eearsfield had and for that reason nothing might be collected out of that but he had a present estate but in our case all is contained in the bodie of the indenture and Nokes case is a strong case and stronger then the case at the bar is for thereupon construction of all the parties of the deeds the special warrantie controuls the general warranty and the reason is no man will take an express special warranty when the intent is that he shall have a general warranty there was a case lately ajudged between the Earl of Clanrickard and his wife against the Countess of Leicester where the Lady pleaded that she was Tenant in Dower where in veritie she had the revesion in fee expectant upon a Term for life and they conveyed all the estate the Lady had in Dower and then they covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Lord of Leicester and his heirs during the life of his wife and then Covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Earl of Leicester and his heirs for ever in the aforesaid land and it was resolved that though such Covenant will raise an use to the partie who ought to have that and so the reversion will pass if there had been no more words now it was but during the life of the Lady for that third part for the Covenant was but to strengthen an estate and not to convey it and so he concluded that the Plantiff should be hard and after it was said by the Court that this case was not of weight to be brought into the Exchequer Chamber and therefore the Court advised that the parties would agree quere for the residue in the Exchequer Chamber concerning that Entred Hill 18. Jac the case of Comendams Richard Woodley against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering RIchard Woodley brought a quare Impedit against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering who was Parson of the said Church and he declared that Arthur Basset was seised of an acre of land to which the said Advowson was appendant in his demeasne as of fee and that he the 13. Octobris 13. Eliz. granted the next advowson to one William Manwood who was then incumbent in the said Church who by his will 20. November made one Harcourt his executor
years notwithstanding his advancement and he resigned during the 3. years and issue there taken upon the resignation and this case proves all the partes of our case first that the King may dispence and that by his dispensation he is compleat person to resign and if he do resigne during the years the King shall not have the prerogative to present again for that was satisfied with the dispensation and also when the King came to his prerogative by subjects means he ought to take that as it falls for otherwise he loses that quite vide Bastervils case Coo. 7. and another reason is if it be not satisfied then the King shall have another which is mischievous and this being a new case such president is not to have more favour then the necessitie of the Law will require and so my opinion is that it is all one as if it had for life and there is a good case 9. Ed. 3. 20. where the King had 2. presentments vide the case but it was upon another reason but the case of 21. H. 7. 8. Frowike where the grantee of the next avoydance had judgement to recover and the incumbent resigned so that it is the second presentment yet the Plantiff shall have the effect of his judgement and he had a writ to the Bishop quere the application for I did not well heare that but in our case if the prerogative of the King was not satisfied yet it ought to appear that when he presented Gee he had no title but that was an usurpation and if the King was not satisfied then the Plantiff shall not have judgement for then Gee was an usurper and upon that declaration the Plantiff shall be barred but now for the last point admit that the King was satisfied of his prerogative by his presentation of Gee whether the Plantiff had lost his course I think he had in the first place the words of the devise are the first the next avoydance which shall hap after the death of Athur Basset now it hath been objected that the King had the first by his prerogative and therefore he shall have the second I think in this case Brook presentation 52. is a strong case where a presentation was granted to one and after to another when the first is void and ruled that the second grantee shall not have the second and so Dyer 35. it ought to be taken according to the words for otherwise he shall not have any for modus et Conventio uniunt Legem and the case of quare Impedit 152. proves something to this purpose for a man had 4. advowsons and granted the next which should hap of them to I. S. and he died and the heir assigned the wife for her Dower one Mannor to which the advowson was appendant which first became void and ruled that the Grantee shall not have that against the feme and then it was moved by Thorpe that he shall have the second but Shard said certainly never which proves that if the turn of the Grantee was taken from him by the indowment of the feme he had lost that for ever the like case is the 15. H. 7. 7. 14. H. 7. 22. moved by Mordant that the Grantee of the third shall have the fourth when the wife is indowed of the third which case is brought to prove a case which without question is not law and that is that the King being Gardian of the Grantee of the next avoydance and he grant that in this case the heir shall have that at his full age which without question is now law for by the same reason his course may be the 20. but there are two rules from this which seem to cross this opinion one rule is that the words of the grantor shall be taken most strong against himself and the other that the Grantor shall not be received to avoid his own grant as it is said in Davenports case Coo. 8. but yet these rules are to be intended where the words are compleat for as the case is the 13. Ed. 3. Grant 65. that where the husband and his wife are joynt Tenants for life and he in reversion grant the lands only which the husband held in this case nothing passeth for the reversion was expectant upon a lease which the husband and wife held nay I will cite one case where a man by his own Act shall avoid his own grant in a quare Impedit Elmes against Taylor where a man was seised of the Mannor to which the advowson was appendant and he granted the third next avoydance and after against his own grant he usurped and it was adjudged that by this usurpation he had gained the advowson to be appendant to his Mannor again and that the Grantee had lost his course and so the case in Dyer 283. where the Church was void and the patron granted the next avoidance tunc vacant to another and this pro hac unica vice tantum and there resolved that the grant was not good and that it should not extend to another and so in our case it shall not extend to a second another reason is if the King had a prerogative he is bound and every derivative estate under him for he shall not be in better case then the grantee for he was bound by the law of the land and for that it is equitie and it is Iustice that the estate of the grantee should be bound and so in this case like to the case in Plowden 207. and Dyer 231. where by Act of Parliament the possessions of an Abbot were bound now if afterwards the Abbot made a lease for years or granted the next avoydance and then after they came to the King he shall avoid the grant for the interest of the Grantor was bound by Act of Parliament and see the case of the universitie of Oxford Coo. 10. where a man before he was a recusant convict he granted the next avoydance and after he became a recusant convict and then the Church became void now the grantee shall not present for his interest was bound by Act of Parliament and so he must take it and here it behoves him to take that as it is bound with the prerogative of the King and so upon all the matter he hath lost his title and he concluded that the Plantiff shall be barred The argument of Justice Winch. WInch Iustice of the same opinion but because his argument was much to the purpose of that with Hutton and the Lord Hobert therefore I will not Report that verbatim and Winch said I will speak to the last point which was moved by my brother Hutton and I hold that where he had the first granted to him now he shall have none at all for it is punctually expressed that he shall have the first and that shall not extend to the next which may be granted but I grant if two coparceners had an advowson and the eldest presented and
years then this is void by resignation and so is the case of Packhurst that when he resignes during the years of the Commendam the Patron shall have that and not the King and so also my opinion is clear that if he had died within the 6. years limitted by the Commendam that the King shall not have that for then it is void by death and not by the assumption of the Bishoprick which book proves directly that a Commendam may be aswel for years as for life but yet I do not hold that upon those temporary Commendams if the Bishop continued Parson during the years and made no Act to impeach that then is a void cause S. the assumption of the Bishoprick and then when that is determined the supension is determined and it is void by the original cause S. by the assumption of the Bishoprick and this Commendam doth not turn the second or first Patron to any prejudice for the incumbent is still in by the presentation of the Patron and the determination of the Commendam is not any cause of the avoidance of the benefice but this is quasi non causa which is causa stolida as the Logicians do term it but in this case the assumption is the cause of the Cession and it is like to the case of 25. Ed. 3. 47. where the King brought a quare Impedit against the Arch-Bishop of York for a Prebendary vide the case and ruled in that case that the confirmation of the King had not taken away his title to present and the reason was because the confirmation had not filled the Church but continued that full which was full before and here this temporarie Commendam may not restrain the King to present afterwards for this is not a presentation and therefore may not take away the title of the King and here the Plantiff hath not well expressed it for he hath not shewed in this Court that the presentation of the King was lawful neither that Chardon held that by vertue of the Commendam for all the 6. years but only that the Church became void by the Laws of England and that is not sufficient and then if all before were for the Plantiff yet the question is whether he hath lost his turn and I think that he hath omnis argumentatio est à notoribus and the first is better known then the second and the second may not be the first and there when the devise gave him the first it is idle to say that he shall have the second for that departs from the meaning of the words and in every grant the law implies quantum in se est and no man may say that the devisor did intend to warrant that from antient Titles and so the Lord Hobert concluded his argument and said his opinion was that the Plantiff shall be barred and judgement was commanded to be entred accordingly Mich. 22. Jac. C.P. Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James in the Common Pleas. DAvenport moved for the amendment of a Record where a recovery was suffered of lands in Sutton in the Countie of York and the indenture of bargain and sale was by the right name and the indenture of uses by the right name but the writ of entrie was of the Mannor of Sulton and upon the examination of the parties to be recovery that the recovery was to no other uses then is expressed and mentioned in the said indenture this was to be amended Sheis against Sir Francis Glover SHeis brought an action upon the case against Sir Francis Glover and shewed for the ground of his action that where one Harcourt was bound to the Plantiff in a Recognizance c. upon which the Plantiff took forth an elegit and the Defendant being the Sheriff of the Countie took an inquisition upon that upon which it was extended but he refused to deliver this to the Plantiff but yet he returned that he had delivered that and upon that he brought his Action and upon not guiltie pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Hendon and the reason he shewed was because he laid his action in an improper Countie for though the return was in Middlesex where the Action was brought yet because the land lies in Oxfordshire where the seisin ought to be delivered the place is Local and for that the Action ought to be brought there and now Serjeant Breamston argued that the Action was well brought in Middlesex for this being but a personal thing he may bring that in either of the Counties as 14. Ed. 4. 13. Ed. 4. 19. expresly in the point and to the second objection that had been made that an Averment may not be against the return of the Sheriff to that Breamston answered that in an other Action an Averment may be against the return of the Sheriff though not in the same Action as 5. Ed. 4. but it was agreed to have a new trial by the preservation of the Iustices for otherwise it seemed the opinion of the Court was that the Plantiff shall have judgement upon the reasons urged by Serjeant Breamston Mary Baker against Robert Baker an Infant in Dower MAry Baker brought a writ of Dower against Robert Baker an Infant who did appear by his Gardian and he pleaded that his father who was husband of the demandant was seised of a Messuage and of land in Socage and devised that to the demandant for her joynture in full satisfaction of all Dower and he shewed that after the death of his father the demandant did enter into the said Messuage and land and was seised of that by vertue of the devise and to that the demandant did replie by protestation that he did not devise and for plea confessed the seisin of the husband and her own entrie but she further shewed that the Infant who was then Tenant was but of the age of 14. years and that she entred as Gardian in Socage to the Infant and disagreed to accept of that by vertue of the devise and traversed the entire and the agreement and it was said by the Court that his bar is good though it had been more pregnant to have alledged that she entred virtute legationis praedictae and so was seised and after it was said that the Replication was very good without the traverse for this was not expresly set down but that was but meerly the consequence of the plea which in veritie was not traversable Hickman against Sir William Fish HIckman had judgement for 600. l. and 10. l. damages against Sir William Fish and he acknowledged satisfaction for 410. l. of the said debt and damages and after there was an agreement between them that if Sir William did not pay the residue by such a day that then it should be lawful for Hickman to take out execution against the said Fish without suing of any scire facias though it was after
in Plowdon and the 5. Ed. 4. 41. and yet I grant that an Act of Parliament may make a thing void which was good but so may not a fine and so held the verdict had not aided that The residue of Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James ANd now he argued to the third point which is the great point whether those words if Robert do not pay make a subsequent or a precedent condition and I hold that it is a precedent condition and this interpretation stands best with the intentions of the parties for before Ann had an estate for life and Robert in fee and if a present use will arise then Ann shall have all presently and leave nothing to Robert but if the uses do forbear setling till the first of September and arise according to payment and all the doubt stands upon this word if which is some time taken as a limitation as if a man gives land to another and to the heirs of his body and if he die without issue then to another there if is a limitation as it is in Bestons case but here this refers to a contingencie and therefore it is a condition and saving the opinion of Hide and of Mountague in Colthursts case I hold that if there was a condition and regularly if is a note of a precedent condition and I will first prove that by Logick for the word are an intire Hypothetical proposition S. the use shall be to An if c. and in this is a Histeron proteron invertio ordinis partium that the consequent should be before the Antecedent in this manner if Robert do not pay 10. l. to Anne the first of September then it shall be to the use of Anne and so quelibet pars in Loco proprio redigenda est and then if it is so it is no doubt but this is a precedent condition and he cited Wheelers case 14. H. 8. a man granted his Term if he could procure the good will of his Lessor and this was adjudged to be a precedent condition and so is Bracton Lib. 2. cap. 6. if the condition is in futuris then it is alwayes precedent as to do talem rem si dederis mihi 10. s. there it is said valet donatio sed suspenditur tanquam c. and if we observe quite thorough Wheelers case this is alwayes a note of a precedent condition and yet I grant that in some case it may be a note of a subsequent condition but that is quando impediatur c. as in the principal case in Colthirst si vellet inhabitare there of necessitie this ought to be a subsequent condition Now the next point is whether the condition is discharged by the the death of Robert before the first of September and I hold that it is for If distinguisheth as if the word had been that if Robert do not pay yet if he die before the day he is discharged of the payment for there was not any default in him for all Humane contracts must give way to this Statute of mortalitie Statutum est omnibus mori and there was not any default in the heir of Robert for he was not bound to pay and therefore he needs not to do that being to his prejudice but my chief reason is upon the general rule of all conveyances for our law in its institution was a Law of mercy and will indeavour to iustifie Acts made in obedience to that and to excuse defaults of disobedience and this is the reason of Master Littletons case if a feofment is made upon condition that if the feoffor pay 10. l. such a day c. now that being to reduce an estate is not taken litterally but if the heir or executor pay that this is sufficient to reduce the estate and so it may be paid at other places and to other Parsons and so if the condition is to be performed of the part of the feoffee there his feoffee may pay that The next point is whether any notice is requisite and he held that there ought to be notice because the heirs are ignorant of that and in some case where a man is bound to take notice of that yet by the Act of Law that shall be discharged as in Sir Andrew Corbets case but now for that last point Cook 4. whether the antient estate for life is gone and it is clear it was gone by the Common Law but the question is whether it is within the saving of the Statute of the 27. H. 8. and I hold it is not for this is repugnant to the estates conveyed and to the uses limited true if this had been a lease for years then it had been saved as is resolved in Lillingstons case Cook 7. and Dyer 344. but this being a freehold confounds the nature of the fine if it shall be saved for the nature of such a fine is to carry a Franktenement and this is repugnant to the uses limited for it is presently in Anne and her heirs if Robert do not pay and for that if the Franktenement is saved there is no uses limited of that which is contrary to the intent of the parties and also here the Conusee took an interest by the fine and for this it is out of the saving of the Act of Parliament and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Serjeant Finch Recorder of London LEinuage Finch Serjeant and Recorder of London contrary and after a Recital of the case said that I think judgement ought to be given for the Defendant it is usually said finis finem imponet Litibus but here our fine had not that sence for that had been questioned in all the Courts of Westminster and now it is come to this Court where we ought to have begun for this is the proper Court to determine the right of inheritances ergo spero sumus in Loco proprio and therefore shall be at rest and the case upon this special verdict stands upon two points First whether by the indenture and fine the Lady Cesar had gained the inheritance Secondly if she had not gained the inheritance whether she had kept her first estate and for the first there are three pertinent points moved by my brother Crawley to which I will add a fourth First whether the words make a precedent or subsequent condition Secondly whether the death of Robert had discharged that and that is become impossible Thirdly admit that this is become impossible whether the use will arise to the Lady Cesar and I hold that it will arise to the Lady Cesar Fourthly whether any notice is requisite and here first by the way whether an infant may limit the uses of a fine I will not argue that for so it is resolved in Beckwiths case and so is it cited in Mary Portingtons case to be adjudged and there was one Lewes case 26. Eliz. before Wray and Anderson and the reason is apparant that
when the law had adjudged by inspection him to be at full age when he levies a fine he shall never come after the fine is levied and said that he was within age at the time of the limitation of the uses nay I will cite one case to shew how cautelous and warie the law is in adjudging by inspection Poynts case where an infant brought a writ of error to reverse a fine and day was given till Octabis Mich. to be adjudged by inspection and before the day the Term was adjourned till Mense Michael but between Octabis Mich. and Mense Mich. he came of full age and yet upon Octabis Mich. upon the Essoyne day Justice Crook took his inspection de bene esse and it was ruled that now he may not avoid the fine but he was forced to compound for the Land and so the 6. Iac. was one Randals case who reversed a Statute by reason of his minoritie by audita querela and the last judgement for some error in that was reversed and then he brought a new audita querela when he was of full age and he cited all the proceedings upon the first and adjudged that the audita querela doth lie and so here when the law inables him to levie a fine the same inables him to declare the uses and now for the first point whether this be a precedent or a subsequent condition for that is the fair Helena for which we fight and yet I agree with my Brother Crawley that in some Cases there shall be a transposition of Terms and the parts in the proposition in some cases if is a note of a subsequent condition and for this the judgement of the case in Colthirsts case where a remainder was limited si ipse inhabitare vellet and to be a subsequent condition and so I will not denie but that if a man make a feofment in fee upon condition that if the feoffee pay 20. s. then he shall hold to him and his heirs it is no question but the fee simple passeth and it is a subsequent condition to reduce that but secondly this doth better agree with the intents of the parties and for the first the fine is levied to the use of the Conusee and the Conusee is now in by the Common Law but defeasable upon condition afterwards Secondly the intents of the parties plainly do appear that he shall have the land to the use of her and her heirs if Robert do not pay 10. l. and if he doth then to other uses now if no former use had been expressed by which this will result those last words will and I say no mean use will result but it shall be to the use of the Conusee and those words for ever though they adde nothing to the estate of Anne yet they serve to shew the intentions of the parties that if he do not pay then it shall be to the use of Anne and her heirs and if he paid then that she should have that for life but it is absolutely against the intents of the parties that she shall have neither and for that of necessitie to supplie the intents of the parties this shall be a subsequent condition like to the case where a man levies a fine to the intent that the Conusee suffer a recovery against him now of necessitie to have the intents of the parties fulfilled the fine shall be to the use of the Conusee for this time though none is expressed for otherwise it would result and so in this case that the intentions of the parties may be performed this shall be a subsequent condition The residue of the argument of Serjeant Finch NOw for the second point admit that this is a precedent condition whether by the death of Robert before the first of September the condition is become impossible to be performed because that the letter of the condition is that if Robert Foyn pay to the said Anne c. and I hold others are inabled in Law to perform that and that Robert his heirs or Executors may pay that and a thing which is implied or supplied by the Law is aswell as if it had been expressed as between Corbet and Cottow 39. Eliz. a bond to appear such a return of the Term at Westminster and the Term is adjourned before the day to Hartford and ruled that he ought to appear where the Term is and so in many cases where the words are short and curtailed the law will supplie that 41. Ed. 3. 17. a feofment to two to infeof another if one die the survivor may make that and yet it was not said that the Survivor may and so is Brook joyntenants 62. and conditions 290. words in the Copulative may be taken in the disjunctive and there cannot be a more apt case then Littleton fo 76. where though there are the words of the feoffor and the feoffee only yet the heirs of the feoffor or the feoffee of the feofee may perform that for the words being so the Law supplies them and if there is any difference between our case and Littletons then our case is the strongest for Littletons case are to defeat an estate which shall be taken strictly and if his case be taken so favourably then much more in our case and we see the words taken strictly when they are to defeat an estate as that 3. of Eliz. a lease was made for years upon condition that if lessee do not pay then that the lessor or his Assignes may enter and afterwards the lessor granted the Reversion and now adjudged that the grantee may not enter because it failes of the word heirs in the reservation of the condition and for that reason the lessor had but an estate for life in the condition which he may not transfer to another because he had not fee in the condition and there was a case adjudged Pasch 41. Eliz. where a man was bound to infeof the obligee and his heirs and in this case the obligee died and the Executors sued the obligation and adjudged that they shall be barred because he made an estate to the heirs of the obligee and so is the principal case of the 10. H. 7. and Dyer 14. where a man covenanted that he will build a house his Executors may make that and so here it may be performed by his heirs and therefore it is not discharged and now for the third point admit that it is become impossible whether the use will arise and I hold that it will arise and in that I take this difference between a fine or feofment and an obligation upon condition to make such Acts for the condition of the obligation is taken onely for the benefit of the obligors and therefore if that do become impossible by the Act of the law the obligation is saved but here the limitation of the uses are the words of the Conusor and therefore shall be taken more strongly against him in which I put this case if a man
mean time the second point is whether the heir of Robert Foyne may pay that or is bound to perform that then the law dispenceth with that for it is limited if Robert do not pay and so it is personall to him like to the case in Plowden when a thing is reserved to be made by the person of a man no other man may perform that neither the heir nor yet the Executor as in Dyer 66. 8. H. 4. 19. 21. Ed. 3. 29. where the heir is not named he is not charged and 10. Ed. 4 12. 11. Ed. 3. 16. and so in this case because it is personally limited to Robert Foyn and ergo if he do die there the law will not compel the heir and that is the reason of Littletons case fol. 76. for there though the father Morgaged and the son is not named in the condition yet because he had an interest in the condition he may perform that and so the case fol. 77. the feoffee of the feoffee may perform that though it is annexed to the first feoffee only and this is for the salvation and safety of his estate and in the first case being in A. Morgage the law said that the heir shall not be prejudiced but when it is a voluntarie Act and in point of discretion to the father there the son may not perform that and here the law had prevented the father in the point of election ergo it is discharged and it is like to the case of the Countess of Arundel where a thing is annexed to the person of a man no other may perform it and so here the heir may not perform that for it is discharged by the death of Robert Thirdly admit that he may perform that then the question is whether default of notice may not excuse and here the Lady was a partie to this condition in the indenture and here the ignorance of the fact may excuse and when the law doth put a man upon a necessitie there it will excuse him as 44. Ed. 3. 61. and 50. Ed. 3. 39. and so the Law will not impose a necessitie of notice upon him The residue of the case of Cooper and Edgar by Serjeant Crook BVt Crook said that he being heir is bound to take notice but for answer to that I will cite you one express case Francis case Cook 8. for there the heir was not bound to take notice of the proviso in the feofment without notice given to him of it Winch that case directly complies with our case and so Farmers case Cook 3. lessee for years in possession levies a fine that doth not bar the reversioner because he continued in possession at the same time and he had not notice of that and here if the Ancestor had not died seised there had been some colour that he might have had notice and this differs from Littletons case where the heir may pay the Morgage that in that case he ought to take notice at his peril because he did not die seised Corbets case and see 4. Coo. 8. where land is given to executors to take the profits there resolved that default of notice doth not hurt them but they shall hold against the heir now for that last point whether the estate for life is saved by the Statute of the 27. H. 8. or whether it is gone by the acceptance of the fine and I think it is gone and yet I agree if it had been lessee for years it had been within the saving of the Statute because he is but a conduit pipe to convey that but in our case when it is by limitation of the use then it will not be saved because that it is by her own provision that the use is so limited to her and so the law will not aid that and by the common Law it is an express determination of the estate 1. H. 7. also the cases of Tenant for years being within the saving of the Statute doth in no sort help this case for it may well stand with the estate but out of the freehold the uses do arise and besides the law will not provide for him who had not provided for himself as 5. H. 7. 7. if a man made a gift intaile rendring rent the Law will not raise any other tenure and it is a rule in law that a man shall not take an estate by implication where he had expresly limited an estate to himself and to that purpose there was a good case Hill 13. Eliz. between Richmond and Bowcher where a lease was made rendring rent to the lessor his executors and his assigns and there the lessor died and it was ruled in that case that the Executors nor the assignes shall not have that nor the heir for it was not reserved to him and in 16. Iac. one Farmers case where such a lessee for years took a feofment with an intent to suffer a recovery but he continued in possession two terms after before he suffered the recovery and yet it was adjudged the Term for years was saved but here he being Tenant of the freehold this may not stand with the limitation of the uses and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Davenport Serjeant DAvenport to the contrary after a Recital of the case said that he thought this to be a subsequent condition for here are two uses limited and so there is two conditions for the first if if he do not pay this is subsequent and the estate doth proceed but the other is precedent and the estate is subsequent and the sole difference when if makes a precedent and when a subsequent condition is upon the words for in this case words make the case and if the estate is limited first and then the condition seems annexed in words to determine that in that case it is a subsequent but if the Act is first appointed to be made and then the estate is limited by express words there the estate will not begin till the tunc is performed and so is the very difference 14. H. 8. 22. and there the principal case is adjudged to be subsequent and upon that difference is 15. H. 7. and Coo. 7. where the estate is first limited and then the condition is after that and the meaning of the parties was that the Lady shall have the fee if the other will not redeem that and I desired to be tried by no other cases then those which my brother Crook had cited Mary Portingtons case si is a proper word to determine an estate and then the estate ought to be before and for the difference between things executed and things Executory under favour that is no difference but that is as the words are placed and I denie the case of Executors put by my brother Crook and so I say it is a present estate but it is defeasable after by payment but now for the second point whether it was discharged by the death of Robert or whether
the heir may pay that and I think that its impossible to avoid Mr. Littleton and my brothers difference of Morgage is no difference and Littleton saith that the heir may perform that because he hath an interest in the condition and the reason is not because he is charged and so the case of the feoffee may perform that and yet in both cases it is annexed as personally as it may be and Sect. 337. no mention is made of the Morgage but it s in this case if the condition had been that a stranger should pay that then this is meerly personal and so is Hill 28. Eliz. between Waltham and Ashworth if an heir is bound to perform a condition then a stranger may not perform that but any who had an interest as Gardian in Soccage or Chivalry and here by reason of the interest of the heir by the non-payment he had broken the condition for this is an hereditarie condition or limitation by which the heir had an interest now for the third point whether he is bound not having notice and I do conceive that because the notice is ancestrel and he was partie to that and so there was an original notice upon the agreement which is also hereditarie and discends to the heir and that shall force him to take notice of that at his perill but if it had been collateral to the father there I grant that will not binde the son without express notice as in Francis case for there was not any Act by which the father was bound to take notice and I desire no better case then Sir Andrew Corbets case Fourthly the estate for life is not drowned by the common law neither by the Statute for it is grounded upon the Condition and so there is not any Surrender in the case and when an agreement is that such a fine shall be levied now that shall be understood to be meant only of the reversion and he cited Sharingtons case where Tenant for life levied a fine upon conusance of right to him in reversion to the use of others there because it might not appear to be otherwise the estate of the Conusee was saved and Farmers case where a lease was made to Farmer for years rendring rent and after he bargained and sold the reversion for 41. years and then made an indenture between the lessor and the lessee and one of the bargainees that the recovery shall be suffered to the use of them and their heirs and adjudged the reversion for years was saved and so I pray judgement for the Defendant The argument of Serjeant Finch Pasch 1. Carol. ANd the following Term the case was argued by Henage Finch Serjeant of the King for the Plantiff and he said the first point is whether this made a precedent or a subsequent condition in which there had been much Logick used and it had been said that it is a rule in law that when a state is first limited and there are words of condition to devest that in that case there is a subsequent condition which ground I will not denie but I denie that here the estate is first limited for though that seems to be in words yet it is not in the intents of the parties but here first I will note an ordinary difference in our books that proviso and sub conditione are notes of a subsequent condition si of a precedent condition as appears by Mr. Littleton and the reason of this difference is because proviso and sub conditione make a full proposition and so doth not the word si and I compare that with Henry Finches case where aut and alibi never begin a sentence and so si never made an entire proposition but the proposition is that the fine shall be to the use of the Lady if Robert do not pay which is an Hypothetical proposition knit with a copulative conjunction and then the antecedent ought to be si for all doth depend upon that but it hath been objected that this is not an antecedent for it is put in the last place but I say put that where you will si will rule the sentence and will have a construction in the first place S. if Foyn do not pay 10. s. the first of September then that shall be to the use of the Lady and her heirs and there are many cases where si being so transposed will make a precedent condition 1. H. 4. 4. where the Iudges will receive the Attorney of the vouchee if his Master will consent there he is no Attorney till he do assent 3. H. 6. 71. per Martin a man made another his Executor if he will be bound to I. S. in that case before he is bound to I. S. he may not maintain an action as an Executor and so by those authorities 7. Ed. 3. 41. 14. H. 8. Whistlers case and Dyer 159. now for the second point whether by the death of Foyn the condition is discharged and I hold that it hath discharged that and I hold Littletons case where a day is limited and where not will aid me and I conceive that in many cases where Acts are not judicially annexed to the person of a man yet they may be discharged by the death of the parties if they are Colateral Acts and put the case that the use had been so limited that if I. S. do not pay so much money before c. now if I. S. do die before the day it is no question but that the condition is discharged and also if it had been limitted in this manner if Foyn do not pay this to a stranger ther by death also it is discharged and the difference I conceive is when the money is to be paid as a duty and where as a penaltie and this difference I learn of Mr. Plowden in the argument of Sir Thomas Treshams case reported by the Lord Cook and also by the Lord Dyer and by Dyer it is said that such a summe of money to be paid to the feoffes is not my duty and therefore I say this Colateral Act is meerly discharged by the death of Foyn and Littleton seems to implie so much for in all the cases of Morgages he saith that the Executor or heir may pay that but when he comes to such a feofment made to the feoffee to pay money on his part he said that if he alien the land the partie himself or the vendee may pay that but not the heirs nor Executors of the feoffees and there was a case 18th Eliz. in this Court A. levied a fine to B. and his heirs upon condition that if he pay so much to the son of A. when he comes to the age of 18. years then to the use of B. and if not to A. and his heirs and the son died before the day and the opinion was that B. shall have that now for the last point whether the estate for life is gone and I hold that it is and here he agreement of
the parties hinders the operation of the law and that law will not provide for him that provides not for himself and the Lady her self was partie to the limiting of the uses and she covenanted that she will be seised by vertue of the fine and under the condition in the indenture and so it is a plain Surrender of her former estate and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Serjeant Hendon to the contrary HEndon contrary there are 3. points First whether this be a precedent or a subsequent condition and I conceive it is subsequent and here the indentures being but to declare the uses of the fine and not to create any use ergo it shall be guided by the intents of the parties appearing in them and so is the Earl of Rutlands case Cook 5. and Dyer 357. and Shelleys case and the meaning of the parties was not to raise any use to Robert but only a possibilitie to reduce that by the performance of the condition and first it is here said that the Conusee shall be seised to the uses hereafter expressed and under the conditions and then the use ought to preceed the condition for no man may stand seised under the condition except the condition is subsequent to the use to arise Secondly when is the use to arise to Robert surely when he payes 10. s. and then in the mean time the use is to the Lady and her heirs for tunc had here relation to when as it is said in Boles case Cook 3. and in Grants case cited in Loves case Cook 10. and 17. Ed. 3. 1. all which cases prove that tâ—en had relation to when and before this when he had nothing and this doth appear to be the agreement of the parties and now for the words themselves I take it that they make a subsequent condition and so it is here limited in intention and for that in matter also and it is said in Colthirsts case in Plowden that if the estate doth first pass reducible upon condition then it is subsequent and here it is limited to the Conusee and his heirs if the Conusor do not pay but here it hath been said is inversio verborum and the consequent is placed before the Antecedent and this hath been proved by Logick I never knew cases in law to be expounded by Logical and Grammatical learning but by the intentions of the parties and here I conceive that the estate is vâ—sted in the Conusee by the fine and so the condition is subsequent but admit it is Executory and I say concerning that there are these differences that if the state of the thing granted is executory and that the condition of the thing granted is Executory and the condition is to remain with the estate so long as the estate doth remain the condition is precedent 28. E. 3. 2 4. 3. 1. H. 6. 32. but if the condition be but one time to be executed and that not contained with the estate then it is subsequent 10. Eliz. Dyer Calthorps case but here our estate is executed for it is expresly limited to the Lady Cesar and her heirs which takes away all implied uses so that no implied use shall result in the mean time and so 75. Assises land given to a man and to his heirs if he have heirs of his body now this if is subsequent and so I conceive that it is not a condition simply but a conditional limitation for it appears by Mr. Littleton because it is no otherwise expressed and another reason is because the condition is annexed to the future time ergo that is subsequent and yet I grant there is a difference betwixt such an estate conditional annexed to an interest and where it is is annexed to an authoritie it may be precedent but for an interest it is subsequent as is the case of Bracton lib. 2. fo 3. and now for the second point whether the heir may and ought to perform that and I do conceive that he is and it is not annexed to the person because it is real and doth arise with the land Secondly yet the law doth expect who ought to have performed that but it is the performance it self which the law doth respect 4. E. 3. 2. such condition real which doth arise with the land and in such a case no notice is in that case requisite and the last point is whether the estate for life is gone and I hold that it is saved by the common law of England for the fine only is as the grant of the reversion by the explanation of the indenture and then there is no surrender in the case but when the condition is performed the estate for life doth remain and so was it resolved in Mr. Mansors case and yet I agree that a litle matter will make a surrender and Mr. Ruds case where lessee for years of an advowson was presented by the Patron that was a surrender but the Statute of the 27th of H. the Eighth at the end saved that though it is to her own use for the words of the saving are to every person and their heirs which hereafter shall be seised to any use all such former rights c. possession c. as they might have had to their own use in any lands whereof they be seised to any other use whatsoever and so upon the whole matter I do conceive that judgement ought to be given for the Defendant The residue of the case of Gibson and Ferrers NOw the case of Gibson and Ferrers which see before was argued again by Serjeant Bridgman and he said as before the award is not good for the interest and yet he now agreed that covenants bonds and contracts for usury are good in law but yet it may not be awarded 17. Ed. 4. 5. if a man do submit to Arbitrators they may not award that he and his wife shall levie a fine but if the partie himself do promise that this is good and shall binde the wife to perform that and besides he said that here is an award made only of one side and nothing is allowed to Ferrers and so not good 9. Ed. 4. 29. 29. H. 6. 22. and I pray that the Plantiff may be barred Hendon to the contrary and he argued if an award be good in any part though it be not in that which is assigned for breach yet it is good upon such plea of nullum fecerit arbitrium and the other shews an award and assignes the breach in this case the breach is not traversable for it is of the form and not of the substance of the action but to that the Court did presently answer that the cause of the action is the breach of the award and this he ought to make apparent to the Court for otherwise he shall not have any action and though the breach is not traversable yet it is of the substance of the action for upon such plea pleaded he not only
if one be named in the venire facias Gregory is returned George there needs not amendment if it be in a Tales otherwise in a principal pannel 66 Action for words he is as arrant a Thief as any is in England the Plantiff needs not aver that there are Thieves in England for the difference is when the words relate to a particular place and when to an intire Realm and so when it is tied to one kinde of fellonie 70 89 Action upon the case where it lieth for a malitious prosecution at the Sessions 73 An action by the Obligee for the Obligor saying he had forged the bond but if he had said to another that he was a forger and had forged false writings no action lies 76 Action upon the case upon a contract in London to Table with the Plantiff at A. in N. and he then and there assumed to pay 4. s. by the week where the action must be brought 78 An action upon a promise against a Parson in consideration that the Plantiff would better his Tithes by Planting hops that he would allow him 40. s. an acre for his charge if that be a good consideration 80 Action upon the case where it lieth against an Attorney for convinous pleading 90 Action by an Attorney for saying he had forged writings and deserved to lose his ears lieth not 90 91 An action against a Sheriff whethâ—r it lies in the Countie where the return of the extent was made or where the land lies 100 Averment against the Sheriffs return where good and where not 100 Amendment where the venire facias habeas Corpus and the pannel agree but the Jury Rolâ— differs 101 Action of the case upon a promise 101 Action for saying the Plantiff stole a ring and had been hanged but for me lieth 102 Action upon a promise where the time and place of the request ought to be expressed 102 103 112 113 Aâ—bitrators amongst other things award interest mony whether good for all or part 114 120 Action by Serjeant Hitcham for saying I doubt not but to prove Sir Robert Hitcham hath spoken Treason 123 124 B A Bail where he is not liable to the judgement until default be in the principal or if the principal die 61 62 C A Commission to 4. or 2. of them and one refuseth the other sit the 4th may be a witness 45 Condition to save harmless he plead in the affirmative he must show how 9 A Coppiholder releaseth to his Companion it is good without admittance 3 A Coppiholder where he may inclose or dig for Marle and where not 8 A Covenant to injoy without the let of the Grantors c. or by their procurement 4 A Custome for a Coppiholder to cut trees at his pleasure is void 1 If Tenant in antient Demesne devise his lands the Devisee shall have fee 1 Covenant See fine Costs where they shall be given against an Administrator 11 A Condition to surrender coppihold he pleads he did it not good because he shewed not when the Court was holden 11 A Commission to seise for recusancie they seise an advowson the Kâ—ng grants to I. S. who presents and is disturbed by the Universitie of Oxford to whom the presentation belongs 11 12 13 Costs upon a Nonsuit at a nisi prius whether assessible by the Court or by the Judge of Assize 16 Common claimed to 600 acres and certain Messuages and lands and that he was disturbed by digging common Borrowes and doth not say he was seised at the timâ— much good matter 16 17 Custome of Merchants in Bills of Exchange varietie of good matter 24 Condition to free the nâ—xt avoidance from incumbrance the Grantors heir presents if that be a breach 25 Custome to have a widdowes estate and the husband is attainted if it holds 27 Condition that I. S. shall levie a fine to the Obligee who sued not a writ of Covenant the Plantiff replies that before c. I. S. had made a feofment of c. whether the Obligee must sue a writ of Covenant 29 30 A Condition contingent where extract by release 30 31 54 55 56 Covenant to make assurance by advice so that it be within Norfolk or Citie of N. a fine is advised not good because not shewed where it should be levied 32 33 Covenant not to alien an advowson without assent the Plantiff saith he had aliened c. good although he had not said by deed 34 Covenant where it raiseth a present use and where not 35 36 37 59 60 Custome touching Marchants and nationall lawes 52 Church shall be repaired by him who hath land there though he be no inhabitant but not lyable for the ornaments thereof 53 Coppiholder what act by him will make forfeiture 62 Covenant by a draper against his apprentice for defrauding him the Defendant pleads the Statute 5. Eliz. and that thereby there ought to be a certificate that his father had 40 s. per annum freehold which was not done here 63 64 If a Coppiholder sels his land to a Lessee of the Mannor it is good 67 Condition in a Will where nothing vesteth till it be performed 69 Costs not to be paid where the Plantiff mistakes his action 69 Covenant brought by an Executor the Defendant pleads giving of an horse in full satisfaction which the Testator accepted 76 A Court of equitie if it doth decree against a maxime in law as benefit of Survivorship a prohibition lieth 79 Covenant that he was seized of a good estate in fee and had good authoritie to sell and that no reversion was in the King c. 91 92 93 Condition where it shall be precedent and where subsequent 105 106 107 108 c. 115 116 c Costs not discharged although the offence be pardoned 125 Commendam See King D IN dept after imparlance alwayes ready is a good Plea 4 Distress gone as to the nomine Paenae if the rent be expired 7 A Declaration where it shall be mended in matter of substance 20 Damages where good in part especially after verdict 27 28 Debt against an Administrator who pleads outlawrie in the intestate no good Plea 33 58 A man soweth land and deviseth to I. S and dies before severance whether the devisee or Executor shall have the Corn 51 A Devise for years if an entrie by him must be pleaded 53 Declaration see new assignment Dower a Tenant pleads a fine levied by her husband and that the wife had not claimed within the Statute 4. H. 7. she replied she brought a writ which abated and this writ now brought was by Journeys accompts 66 Debt for rent must be brought by a privie in estate only where the land lies otherwise of a Privie in estate and contract 69 Debt upon a bond the Plantiff saith he had not paid the money and did not say nor any part thereof good for that must come of the other part to shew 72 Debt upon a bond to perform an award the Defendant