and why not Certainty as well as Assurance I know no reason but that you have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause But you go on and tell us That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds Faith in your own words stands still upon its own Basis and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer when we have throughly examin'd it Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty but to the particular Articles of Faith i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority now these Propositions are of several Kinds 1. Some that are more clearly expressed therein but such as might be attained to by the Light of Reason without Revelation And such are the fundamental Principles of natural Religion viz. The Being of God and Providence and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State These Mankind may attain to a Certainty in without Revelation or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the Scriptures Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of Certainty from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being or the Visions of a Dream make a true History which are your own Expressions And for the Soul he cannot be certain but that Matter may think as you affirm and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality and consequently Immortality from its Operations But for all this say you his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith For before there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty all that is lost and instead of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds when the subserviency of Reason is taken away as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished Is it at all probable that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation For in Matters of Revelation there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it And the first is that there is a God but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Certainty by Ideas and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation when he is made Uncertain by his own Way whether there be a God or no Besides to suppose Divine Revelation we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World but here we find that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this because he doth not know but Matter may think and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an Exalted Fancy or the Heats of a disordered Imagination as Spinoza affirmed Again before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times but conveyed down to us by an Universal Tradition But now what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things I do not mean that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact which it were most unreasonable to expect but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain for I think I have proved that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas And I was in the right when I said this Way tended to Scepticism and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith But this is an Imputation you take very ill and say that I have brought no Argument for it but only that my great Prejudice against this Way of Certainty is that it leads to Scepticism Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word This is very strange when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132 to which no Answer at all is given And so I leave it There are other Propositions or Articles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture and we are to enquire whether the Assurance of Faith as you call it be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas can retain their Certainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed And by this which I am now to make out let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove when you say Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please it touches not your Faith the Foundation of that stands as sure as before and cannot be at all shaken by it Of this we shall judge by some important Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas The first shall be that of the Resurrection of the Dead The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Identity which I take to
Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united and not to those Individual Particles So St. Paul For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done whether it be good or bad Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance but that Body in which these things were done How could it be said if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection as its Body that they were the things done in or by the Body Curcellaeus his Copy reads it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Complutensian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Fathers so took it either way it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended if there were no necessity of the same Body If there be no Resurrection of the Dead then is not Christ raised It seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before And the Apostle lays so much weight upon it that he saith if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain doth he mean if there were not the same personal Identity as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection That cannot be his meaning for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul He saith He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once What He was this It was Christ that died Yes the Person of Christ but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance but the same Consciousness and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance there was no necessity of the same Body And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body But Thomas said Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails and put my Finger into the print of the Nails and thrust my Hand into his side I will not believe The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body but there will be no such proof at the great Day And there is no Reason there should since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours but of the Certainty of it because he rose as the first Fruits Christ the first Fruits afterwards they that are Christs at his coming St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body and it is of great Consequence as to this Article to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds But some Man will say How are the Dead raised up and with what Body do they come First he shews that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation They sow bare Grain of Wheat or of some other Grain but God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him and to every Seed his own Body Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that proper Body which belongs to it every Seed having that Body in little which is afterwards so much inlarged and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination but it hath its proper Organical Parts which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are yet it hath been found by the most Accurate Observations that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith that we sow not that Body that shall be but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root Stalk Blade and Ear that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove that a Man is not the same because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states yet that Man would be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm that it was not the same Man And you grant that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants alters not the Identity and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant so that in things capable of any sort of Life the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity if its Organization and Life be the same and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness From whence it follows that to make the same Body no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it And you grant likewise That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body if Life were continued and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body Not from the Consciousness of the Soul but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united For saith he It is sown in Corruption it is raised in Incorruption It is sown in Dishonour it is raised in Glory It is sown in Weakness it is raised in Power It is sown a Natural Body it is raised a Spiritual Body Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be
be this from your own words 1. That the Identity of living Creatures depends not on a Mass of the same Particles but on something else for in them the variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity for which you instance in the growth of an Oak and a Horse 2. That the Identity of a Man consists in nothing but a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body 3. That Personal Identity i. e. the sameness of a Rational Being lies in Self-consciousness and in that alone whether it be annexed only to one Individual Substance or can be continued in a Succession of several Substances 4. That those who place Thought in a purely material animal Constitution void of Spirit do place Personal Identity in something else that Identity of Substance as Animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life and not of Substance 5. That it matters not to this point of being the same self whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances 6. That in this Personal Identity of Self-consciousness is founded all the Right and Iustice of Reward and Punishment Happiness and Misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself not mattering what becomes of any Substance not joined to or affected with that Consciousness 7. That the Sentence at the Day of Iudgment will be justified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear or what Substances soever that Consciousness adheres to are the same that committed those Actions and deserve that Punishment for them This I suppose to be a true and just Account of your Sense of this Matter and so the Article of the Resurrection is Resolved into your Idea of Personal Identity And the Question between us now is Whether your Certainty of this Matter from your Idea have no influence on the Belief of this Article of Faith For the main of your Defence lies upon this Point Whether your Method of Certainty by Ideas doth at all shake or in the least concern the Assurance of Faith which you absolutely deny and affirm That Faith stands upon its own Basis and is not at all altered by your Method of Certainty and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation and the very same Credibility that it had before Now I take this Article of the Resurrection of the Dead to be an Article of Faith and we are to consider whether if your Method of Certainty by Ideas do hold in this Matter it continues as firm and in the same Credibility it had before I shall not urge you with the Sense of our own or other Christian Churches in this Point of the Sameness of the Body in the Resurrection of the Dead But I shall continue my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith and the main Point is Whether according to that it be not necessary for the same Substance which was united to the Body to be raised up at the last Day I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Disease as if a Fat Man falls into a Consumption I do not say the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration but that which I suppose is implyed in it is that it must be the same Material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here You mention the Hypothesis of those who place Thought in a purely Material Animal Constitution void of Spirit but you agree that the more probable Opinion is that this Consciousness is annexed to the Affection of one Individual Immaterial Substance It is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable Opinion but it seems without any Certainty as to the Truth of it For you have told us what the Effect of Probability is viz. That it is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false rather than the contrary and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no Certainty but only some Inducements to receive it for true Thence I cannot but observe that we have no Certainty upon your Grounds that Self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance and consequently that a Material Substance may according to your Principles have Self-consciousness in it at least that you are not certain of the contrary Now I pray consider whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Resurrection For if it may be only a Material Substance in us that thinks then this Substance which consists in the Life of an Organiz'd Body must cease by Death for how can that which consisted in Life be preserved afterwards And if the Personal Identity consists in a Self-consciousness depending on such a Substance as cannot be preserved without an Organiz'd Body then there is no Subsistence of it separate from the Body and the Resurrection must be giving a new Life To whom To a Material Substance which wholly lost its Personal Identity by Death So that here can be no Personal Identity at all unless you say the very same Life which was long since at an end can be Reproduced Which I suppose you will not assert But let us take the more probable Opinion which I think certain viz. That Self-consciousness depends upon an Immaterial Principle in us and then the Question is How far the Scripture determines the sameness of the Body at the Resurrection i. e. of that Material Substance which was vitally united with that Immaterial Substance in this Life The Doctrine delivered by our Saviour is that All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation What is the meaning of all that are in their Graves Doth this relate to any other Substance than that which was united to the Soul in Life Can a different Substance be said to be in the Graves and to come out of them Is it not material as you say whether the present Self be made up of the same or other Substances If it be not so to your Idea of Identity it is as to the Sense of our Saviour's Words unless you can make it out that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it But it may be said That if these Words be taken strictly they confine the Resurrection to those Particles of Matter only which were in the Grave if not then they may extend to another Substance I answer that by comparing this with other places we find that the
clear Ideas that Body and Extension are the same thing and therefore if there be Extension in Space there must be Body But you say those that do so either change the signification of Words and so render it a doubtfull Idea or they confound very different Ideas with one another and so can never come to Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas But you conclude that the clear and distinct Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from Body Here we see you pretend to a clear and distinct Idea But it falls out very unluckily for the Way of Ideas that the first starter of this Way of Certainty is as positive that the Idea of Space and extended Body are the same So that here we have clear and distinct Ideas both Ways And is not this an admirable Method of Certainty when in one of the plainest Ideas which depend upon our Senses the greatest Defenders of Ideas differ so fundamentally What can other Men hope for in this Way of Ideas if such Men can agree no better in one of the most evident to our Senses But then we must consider who hath the better Reason This is not Certainty by Ideas but by Reason upon them which is another thing Let us go to Reason Is that Reason built only on some intermediate Idea which makes it clear I find intermediate Ideas on both sides and urged with equal Assurance Des Cartes saith that from Extension we rightly conclude a Body to be a Substance because it is a Repugnancy that there should be an Extension of Nothing and therefore if there be Extension in Space there must be Body And he proves it from the Idea of Body for if we cast off all such things as are not necessary to Body as Hardness Colour Gravity Heat and Cold and all other Qualities we shall find nothing to remain but Extension and therefore nothing but Extension is in the Idea of Body which being likewise in Space the Idea of Body and Space are the same But say you on the other side I appeal to every Man 's own Thoughts whether the Idea of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity as it is from the Idea of a scarlet Colour 'T is true that Solidity cannot exist without Extension but this hinders not but they are distinct Ideas One appeals to Thoughts and the other to Reason Had Des Cartes no Thoughts Yet his Reason convinced him that whatever Thoughts he had he must be perswaded by Reason which was the true Idea You say that is a clear and distinct Idea that a Man's thoughts dictate to him to be so No saith Des Cartes that only is the true Idea which a Man comes to by the Exercise of his Reason and he look'd upon those others as meer Ideas of Imagination and not Rational Ideas So that here we have another Work to do and that no easie one which is to distinguish the Ideas of Imagination from those of Reason and what way have you laid down to prevent so great a Mistake Of what Rules have you to judge how far Imagination is to be allowed in the Matter of Ideas For in all Objects of Sense the Impression is made upon the Imagination which is the Seat of Ideas that come in by Sensation now here lies a very considerable Difficulty how far Reason is to judge of these Ideas or Imagination For if all our simple Ideas of things without us come in by Sensation then one would think those Ideas are to be allow'd which come in that Way and so the Impressions of Fancy are to be the Standard and Rule of Certainty which I think you will not affirm But what Rule then have you when and where and how far you are to correct the erroneous Ideas of Imagination I cannot deny but you were sensible of the Difficulty from the Ideas of Imagination and thus you propose it To what purpose is all this stir Knowledge say you is only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas but who knows what those Ideas may be Is there any thing so extravagant as the Imagination of Men's Brains Where is the Head that hath no Chimaera's in it Or if there be a sober and wise Man what difference will there be by your Rules between his Knowledge and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World They both have their Ideas and perceive their Agreement and Disagreement one with another Let us now consider the Answer you give to it and by that we shall better judge of your Way of Certainty Your general Answer is that if our Knowledge of our Ideas terminate in our Fancies our Assurance would go no farther than that of Dreams or the Visions of a heated Fancy But our Knowledge is real only so far as there is a Conformity between our Ideas and the Reality of Things All this is undoubtedly true But you say How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas know that they agree with Things themselves There indeed lies the Difficulty but how do you remove it There are two sorts of Ideas you say we may be sure agree with things And these are worth the knowing 1. The first are simple Ideas which since the mind can by no means make to it self must necessarily be the Product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural Way and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are adapted to From whence it follows that simple Ideas are not Fictions of our Minds All that can be proved from hence is no more but that the Objects of our Senses do make those Impressions upon them that from them we may be certain there are such things without us which produce those Impressions And this is all you mean when you say that you are certain these Ideas are no Fictions of our Brains But let us apply this to the present Case Our Senses truly inform us of a Distance between Bodies and so far we are certain of an Idea of Space but the Question about the Idea of Space goes farther viz. Whether the Idea of Space imply something or nothing How can nothing be extended If it be something extended it must be Body and so Space and Body are the same And so your simple Ideas give no manner of satisfaction in this Matter 2. All our complex Ideas except those of Substances you say being Archetypes of the Mind 's own making not referr'd to the Existence of any thing cannot want any Conformity necessary to real Knowledge for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self can never be capable of a wrong Representation nor mislead us from the true Apprehension of any thing by its dislikeness to it Where are we now What in the Way to Certainty still Methinks it seems to be too intricate and winding to be that plain Way What is
appear from your self which will farther discover the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas And the Reasons I go upon are these 1. That you confess that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident 2. That there may be contradictory Opinions about some Ideas which you account most clear and distinct 3. That granting the Ideas to be true there is no Self-evidence of the Connexion of them which is necessary to make a Demonstration 1. That some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident by your own Confession Among these you cannot deny those of Matter and Motion of Time and Duration and of Light to be very considerable But I shall prove from your self that we can have no Intuition of these things which are so obvious to us and consequently can have no Self-evident Ideas of them As to the Idea of Matter That you tell us consists in a solid Substance every where the same and a Body is a solid extended figured Substance Now there are two things concerning Matter which I would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of And those are 1. The Manner of Cohesion of the Parts of Matter concerning which you have these Words For since no Body is no farther nor otherwise extended than by the Vnion and Cohesion of its solid Parts we shall very ill comprehend the Extension of Body without understanding wherein consists the Vnion and Cohesion of its Parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the Manner of Thinking and how it is performed I would have any one intelligibly explain to me how the Parts of Gold or Brass that but now in fusion were as loose from one another as the Particles of Water or the Sands of an Hour-glass come in a few Moments to be so united and adhere so strongly one to another that the utmost force of Men's Arms cannot separate them A considering Man will I suppose be here at a loss to satisfie his own or another Man's Vnderstanding And can you then imagine that we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter Or that it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it by the help of any intervening Idea The Idea of Solidity or firm Cohesion of Parts cannot be said to come from the Idea of Matter it self for then there could be no such thing as fluid Matter Whence then comes the distinction between these Ideas of solid and fluid Matter That there is such a Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter is evident now what other Ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident how this Solidity and Matter came to have this Agreement with each other Is it by the Density or Compactedness of the Matter in a little Compass But that is as hard to give an account of viz. how some Parts of Matter come to take up so much less Room and to stick closer than others Is it by bare Rest of the Parts But how comes the Resistance of solid Bodies to come only from Rest Is it from the Pressure of the Ambient Air No you say that in Truth the Pressure of an ambient Fluid how great soever can be no intelligible Cause of the Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter So that we are not to look for any thing like a Demonstration of the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter 2. And as little are we to expect it as to the Divisibility of it which was the other thing I hoped to find demonstrated in the Way of Ideas For you tell us that the Notion of Body is cumbred with some Difficulties which are very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us And among these you particularly instance in the Divisibility of Matter which you say whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum it involves us in Consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent Consequences that carry greater Difficulty and more apparent Absurdity than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance So that I think it is vain to expect a Demonstration in the Way of Ideas as to this Matter The next is that of Motion Concerning which you tell us that the Definition of the Schools is exquisite Iargon That of the Atomists is but putting one Synonymous Word for another viz. that Motion is a Passage from one Place to another for Passage may as well be defined a Motion from one Place to another And the Cartesian Definition that it is the successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another will not prove a much better Definition of Motion when well examin'd And what is there so evident as Motion So that if our Ideas fail us in so plain a Case what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our Senses As to Time and Duration you say that the Answer of a great Man to one who asked what Time was Si non rogas intelligo which amounts to this the more I set my self to consider it the less I understand it might perhaps perswade one that Time which reveals all other things is it self not to be discover'd This shews that there is no Self-evident Idea of Time But here you offer to furnish us with as clear and distinct Ideas as of many other which are thought much less obscure However then it is plain that we have not the Knowledge by Intuition but by rational Deduction For you proceed from the Idea of Succession to that of Duration by observing a Distance in the Parts of Succession and then from observing Periodical Motions we get Ideas of the Measures of Duration as Minutes Hours Days Years c. From hence we proceed to imagine Duration not yet come and such to which we can always add from which comes the Idea of Eternity and by considering any Part of Duration with Periodical Measures we come to the Idea of what we call Time in general So that the Idea of Time in general is so far from being known by Intuition that many Steps are to be taken in order to it and some such as one would hardly have thought of As how the Idea of Succession should arise from a Train of Ideas in our Minds You say it is because we have no Perception of Duration but by considering the Train of Ideas that take their Turns in our Vnderstandings What think you of those People that fail'd not in reckoning the Succession of Time right for many Years together by Knots and Notches on Sticks and Figures without ever so much as thinking of Ideas or any thing like them But besides such Arbitrary Measures of Time what need any Recourse to Ideas when the Returns of Days and Months and Years by the Planetary Motions are so easie and so universal If a Man hath no Perception of Duration when he sleeps yet the Time runs on and Nights
not the Point whether when we consider them with respect to Place there can be such a thing as Identity of Place to two different Bodies But whether we cannot consider two several Individuals of Mankind without particular Regard to Place Which I say we may and for this Reason because Relation to Place is an external Difference but the real Distinction of Individuals doth not relate to any Accident of the Body because the Individual consists of the Union of Soul and Body and you cannot judge of the Existence of the Soul by the Place of the Body You say that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of Time we are sure be it what it will that it is that very thing and not another which at that Time exists in another Place how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other Respects And in this consists Identity But I think the Identity of Man depends neither upon the Notion of Place for his Body nor upon the Soul consider'd by it self but upon both these as actually united and making one Person Which to me seems so clear and intelligible that I can imagine no Objection against it I am certain you produce none My next Words are And here lies the true Idea of a Person which arises from that Manner of Subsistence which is in one Individual and is not communicable to another In your Answer to this I pass over the trifling Exceptions about the Dissyllable Person and the true Idea and Signification of the articulate Sound and about here and herein c. being resolved to keep to what appears material And the only thing of that kind is that according to my Sense of Person it will as well agree to Bucephalus as to Alexander and the Difference will be as great between Bucephalus and Podargus as between Alexander and Hector all being several Individuals in the same common Nature but for your Part you cannot understand that Bucephalus and Podargus are Persons in the true signification of the Word Person in the English Tongue And whoever desired you should For I expresly say that a Person is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar Manner of Subsistence And again For a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature So that it is impossible to apply my Notion of Person to any irrational Creatures although they be Bucephalus and Podargus And I think a Man must strain hard to make such Objections so directly against that Idea of a Person which I set down And it is very easie to understand the Difference between a Distinction of Individuals as such and of intelligent Individuals and that Manner of Subsistence in them which makes them distinct Persons But you say that I affirm that an individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person than the proper Definition of it and yet afterwards I make it to be the Definition of a Person that it is a compleat intelligent Substance To this I answer That in the former Place I give an Account of the Reason of Personality which I say lies in the Manner of Subsistence and not in the intelligent individual Substance which is rather supposed to the making of a Person For that which critically distinguishes the Person is the Reason of Personality but when we come to give a common Definition of it there is no such Necessity of insisting upon the Reason of the Difference but upon the common Acception of it Person And upon that Account I call it a complete intelligent Substance because although the Soul be so in it self yet we take Person with Relation to Soul and Body united together And so the Identity of Person must take in both not only here but at the Resurrection And thus I have gone through all that I could find that seem'd material in the Dialogue between you and your Friends as to this Subject and I assure you I have omitted nothing which I apprehended had any Appearance of Difficulty in it And I find not the least Reason to be unsatisfied in the Account I had given of the Difference of Nature and Person but I still think that it doth tend very much to the right Apprehension of the Doctrine of the Trinity as I hope doth farther appear by the foregoing Discourse And now to come to a Conclusion of this whole Debate For I intend not to draw this Saw any longer having done as much as I think sitting for my self to do I saw no Necessity of writing again for my own Vindication as to your first Charge which I was contended to leave to the Reader 's Judgment But in the Conclusion of my former Answer I had said That as you had stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I endeavour'd to defend This you call a new Charge against your Book and you complain that I do not specifie the Particulars wherein I apprehend it may be of such dangerous Consequence and you blame me for this saying without shewing that it is so and that all the Reason I give is that it is made use of by ill Men to do mischief that when I say it may be it shews only an Inclination to accuse and proves nothing that Danger may be apprehended where no Danger is that if any thing must be laid aside because it may be ill used you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept and lastly that the Imputation of a Tendency to Scepticism and to the overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith are no small Charge and that you cannot see any Argument I have brought that your Notion of Ideas tends to Scepticism These things laid together made me think it necessary to do that which I was unwilling 〈◊〉 do till you had driven me to it which was to shew the Reasons I had why I look'd on your Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them as inconsistent with it self and with some important Articles of the Christian Faith What I have now done I thought it my Duty to do not with respect to my self but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith which I do not charge you with opposing but with laying such Foundations as do tend to the Overthrow of them of which we have had too much Experience already and may have more if your Way of Certainty by Ideas should obtain Which I cannot think it will among such as are capable and willing to judge impartially I have now done with this Matter And as some may think it the first Part of Wisdom not to begin in such Disputes and I am of their Mind if they did not touch the Christian Faith so they cannot but judge it the next as I do to know when to make an End I am Sir Your