Selected quad for the lemma: word_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
word_n	according_a	ghost_n	holy_a	5,602	5	4.6486	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A48160	A letter to a friend concerning a postscript to the Defense of Dr. Sherlock's notion of the Trinity in unity, relating to the Calm and sober enquiry upon the same subject	Howe, John, 1630-1705.	1694 (1694)	Wing L1639; ESTC R3143	19,814	66

no parts if partiri whence they are so called must not and herein he cannot so fool the whole Christian World as to make it concur with him lose its signification to serve a turn Tho' the things be real there partibility is not real If any indeed will call them parts beeause they may be conceived or contemplated apart as parts meerly conceptible are no prejudice to the perfection of the Divine Being so are such conceivable parts acknowledged by this Author himself in express words we cannot comprehend an infinite Being in one Thought and therefore must as well as we can contemplate him by parts God can as little admit to be a part of any thing as to have any thing a part of him And yet 't is no prejudice to the Dignity and Perfection of his Being to conceive of him conjunctly with other things as when we make him a part subject or predicate of a Proposition All his disputation therefore against parts and composition in the Deity is against a figment or no present adversary For my part I am of his mind and I should be obliged to thank him that this once he vouchsafes to let me be on his side when he knows I am if he did not take so vast pains to make others not know it How hard a thing is it for an angry man especially when he knows not why to write with a sincere Mind But hath he in all this fervent bluster a present concern at this time for the Honour of the Divine Being as God forbid I should think he never hath what is that he supposes injurious to it Is it the words parts and compounds or is it the things supposed to be united in the Divine Being The words he knows to be his own and let him dispose of them more ineptly if he can tell how parts that were never put together never parted nor ever shall be the one or other i. e. that never were or will be parts And a compound of such parts But now for the things upon which he would obtrude these words three Essences natures or if you please Infinite minds or spirits signified by the Names of Father Son and Holy Ghost in eternal union but distinct in the Being of God Let us consider his disputation against them united or in union according to its double aspect First upon the Hypothesis or Supposition of them Secondly upon himself First Consider his Disputation as levell'd against the Hypothesis or supposition of such distinct essences natures minds spirits in necessary eternal Union in the Divine Being And one of his arguments against it is in those words of his One principal argument against it here put out parts and composition which are his own and we have no more to do with them is that God is eternal and unmade and whatsoever hath parts saies he hath such essences in it must have a maker And here let him prove his consequence and his business is done viz. both ways as will be seen by and by But let him shew the inconsistency between a things having such distinct essences naturally and necessarily united in it as the supposition to be argued against is and before ought to have been justly stated and it 's being eternal and unmade But how that is to be evinced I can not so much as guess confident affirmation against the most obvious Tenour of Gods own Word is of little account who shall ascend into the heavens or fathom the depths or can have that perspection of God's incomprehensible nature as without and visibly against his own revelation to be able without great rashness to pronounce so concerning him But so toyish an Argument as here follows is worse than the Position i. e. when one shall say that for ought we know there may be three distinct Essences by an eternal unmade union united into one in the Being of God any man should say and be so vain as to expect to be regarded that because they are united by an eternal and unmade union therefore they are not united by an eternal and unmade union If there be not a Contradiction in the terms to disprove a thing by it self is to say nothing or is all one with proving a thing by it self He proceeds to what hath no thing in it like an Argument but against his own Conceit of parts and that very trifling too There can be but one eternal nature in God But if there be three there must be three This 't is now come to proving his Point by its self Here he makes sure work to have nothing deny'd but then nothing is prov'd no advance is made if there be three there must be three But if there be three what eternal parts There must be three different Natures or else they would be the same What tho' distinct But this supposes some body said the first And who himself therefore he is disproving himself If I had said so I would have deny'd his consequence for there may be similar parts Whereas by different he seems to mean dissimilar He says not only distinct but different natures Now you have that wonderful thing talk'd of some times but never brought to view before a distinction without a difference 'T is strange how any things should be distinct and no way different What distinguishes them if they differ by nothing This different apply'd to this present Case is his own word coined to introduce a Notion that is not new to Christians only but to all Man-kind If by different Natures he means as he seems of a different kind who thought of such a difference But I trow things that differ in number do as truly differ however essentially cohaering tho' not so widely His next is that though we have a natural notion of an eternal Being we have no notion of three eternal Essences which again I put instead of his parts which necessarily coexist in an eternal union Doth he mean we are to disbelieve every thing of God whereof we have not a natural Notion Then to what purpose is a Divine Revelation Is this Notion of God pretended to be Natural 'T is enough if such a Notion be most favoured by his own Revelation who best understands his own Nature and there be no evident natural Notion against it He forgot that he had said Defence p. 5. If every thing which we have no positive Idea of must be allow'd to contradict Reason we shall find contradictions enow adding We must confess a great many things to be true which we have no Idea of c. He adds once more we have no notion of an eternal and necessary existence but in an absolutely perfect and infinite nature but if there be I here again leave out his three parts because I design to consider if there be any thing of strength brought against what was supposed possible by the Enquirer not against his fiction which I trouble not my self any further with three spiritual Beings