Linguistic DNA - Concept Modelling Demonstrator

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
war_n	king_n	law_n	levy_v	3,963	5	11.2983	5	true

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91336	A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in His Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, Pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences, particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings own interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, Anno Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this book entituled, A Political catechism, be printed. John White.	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.; Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.; England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I); England and Wales. Parliament.	1643 (1643)	Wing P416; Thomason E104_8b	14,645	17

Constitution of the Kingdom to doubt but those things which the King grants afterward to be the particular Priviledges of each House and of both are their certain Priviledges according to Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound without peradventure or shift 2. That the Priviledges which the King challenges to Himself The Priviledges that the King challengeth are so far to be yielded unto as they are consistent with the acknowledged priviledges of both Houses are to be yeilded to only so far forth as they are consistent with the acknowledged Priviledges of the two Houses because the Monarchy being acknowledged to be a regulated Monarchy and the Government mixt of Aristocracy and Democracy as well as Monarchy it is the Priviledges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the mixture and so they must Regulate and Interpret the Priviledges of the King and not the Priviledges of the King Regulate or Interpret theirs save only to the maintaining still the Regal Dignity and the Succession according to Laws Q. 15. What Priviledges doth the King challenge to himself The Government trusted to the King by the Law of the Kingdom and challenged by the King A. The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King Power of Treaties of War and Peace of making Peers of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Judges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Commissions for raising men to make War abroad or to prevent or provide against Invasions and Insurrections at home Benefit of Confiscations power The Priviledges above mentioned are only so far trusted as that they be not prejudicial to the priviledges of Parliament in cases of necessity of pardoning and some other of like kind are placed in the King page 18. Observ 1. That all these are ordinarily in the King Experience and Custom Teaches even those that know not the Law by reading but by what hath been noted before and follows after it is to be understood only so as not to prejudice the Priviledges of the Houses of Parliament especially in cases of Necessity of which hereafter Also 2. It is acknowledged here that the Government Trusted is to be according to the Laws and so all these Things The Government trusted to be according to the Laws are not absolutely in the King as for instance Pardons the Law denies power of Pardoning wilful Murther And Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some private Lords of Mannours 3. If Government only according to Law be trusted to To resist notorious illegal violences is not to resist Kings Authority the King then to resist Notorious Illegal Violences is not to resist the Kings Authority Q 16. For what end is this Authority trusted to the King and placed in him For the Subjects sake their Rights are vested in the King A. For our Subjects sake these rights are vested in us page 17. The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it page 19. The good of the Subject is to be preferred Observ 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchial Greatness of the King the End is ever more considerable then the Means Salus Populi Whosoever councells the King against the good of Subject is an enemy to King and Common-wealth is suprema Lex 2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the good of his Subjects is the Kings Enemy as well as the Common wealths by attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his Authority Q. 17. To what purpose especially are the priviledges of the The purpose and intention of the priviledges of both Houses house of Commons and the house of Peers A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his private Favorites and Followers c. page 19. The Law presupposes such cases to fallout and on whom the blame is imposed Observ 1. The Law then supposes that such Cases fall out though it then Charge the Blame upon those Favorites and Followers and not upon the King as we shall see by and by 2. We need not wonder then why Private Frivorites and No wonder if Favorites be such Enemies to Parliaments priviledges Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Priviledges which are on purpose to hinder their gains Of which also more anon 3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems to be Trusted The trust to be reposed in the two houses by Law when they declare that Power is made use of for the hurt of the People and the Name of publick necessity made use of for the Gain of Private Favorites and Followers and the like Quest 18. What are the special priviledges of the House of The special priviledges of the house of Commons Commons towards this A. The House of Commons an Excellent conserver of The House of Commons more caareful for the Subjects then the King c. Liberty is solely intrusted with the first propositions concerning the Leavies of Moneys which is the Sinnews as welt of Peace as of War c. page 19. Observ 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more careful for the Subjects Liberties then either the King or the House of Peers Strange that the house of Commons should fight against liberty and propriety of the Subject 2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive as the Kings Declarations would perswade that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them and protect them 3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed neither for Peace nor No moneys may be levyed either for Peace or War or under pretence of publick necessity without the Commons first propound it War no not under Pretence of Publick Necessity as Ship-money and Monopolies were without the House of Commons first propound and grant it 4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of Liberty it must needs have some Power in some Cases to Levy Money even without the Kings consent or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Liberty at all Of If the house of Commons be a Conserver of Liberty it must have power in some cases to leavy Money c. which likewise more anon Q. 19. But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have actually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Priviledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty A. With the Impeaching of those who for their own The House of

be obeyed for Preventions as well as Resâ—â—rint of Tyranny 4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety and they have Legal Power to command the People to this purpose not only when Arms are actually raised against them but when they Discern and accordingly declare a Preparation made towards it for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their power til Arms are Actually raised against them they may in all likelihood find it too late not only to Prevent but even to Restrain the Power of Tyranny 5. Then they have Legal Power in such Times of danger to put into safe hands such Forts Ports Magazines Ships and Power of the Militia as are intended or likely to be â—ntended to Introduce a Tyranny for else they cannot have Legal power in times of danger to put into safe hands Forts Ports Magazines ships c. Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyranny 6. Then they have Legal Power to Levy Moneys Arms Legal power to leavy moneys Arms Horse Ammunition of the subjection such cases of danger without or against the consent of the King c. Horse Ammunitions upon the Subjects in such cases of Danger even without or against the Kings Consent for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him to protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to Introduce Tyranny that ever he will consent to Levies of Moneys against those Favorites and Followers of his or to the raising Arms against them especially he being still in their hands and among them and not with his Parliament and without such Levies of Moneys c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to prevent or restrain sufficiently the Power of Tyranny 7. They that have made the Protestation to maintain and In all these things acknowledged by the King clearly following from his acknowledgments all men may see the power and priviledges of Parliment defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament may see in all these Things acknowledged by the King and clearly Following from his acknowledgeenents what is that Power and what are Priviledges of Parliament which they have so solemly in the presence of Almighty God Vowed Promised and Protested to maintain c. 8. And finally since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully declared their Intentions in settling the Militia securing Hull and the Magazine there and the Navy That since the two houses have so often declared their intentions in settling the Militia sâ—â—uing of Hull c. at Sea with Ports and Forts and afterward in Raising Arms under the Commanp of the Earl of Essex and last of all Levying Moneys by voluntary Contributions and Assessments they have only used that Legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents and for the Prevention and Restraint of the power of Tyranny of all which they are the All men may see that they have only used that legal power which is in them for punishing delinquents prevention and restraining of Tyranny c. Legal Judges and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applyed do agree with the words of his Majesties answer the to 19 Propositions I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular Page 17. We call God to witness that as for our subjects Conceening the Government of the Kingdom sake these Rights are vested in Us so for their sakes as well as for our own we are resolved not to quit them nor to subvert though in a parliamentary way the ancient equal happy well-poysed and uever-enough-commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom Three kinds of Government amongst men There being three kinds of Government amoust men Absolute Monarchy Aristoceacy and Democracy and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences The providence of our Ancestors hath so moulded the Government of this Kingdom as by a mixture of all three kinds to give the convâ—â—iences of them all c. page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Aucestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdom as far as humane prudence can provide the conveniences of all three without the inconveniences of any one as long as the Ballance bangs even between the three Estates and they run joyntly on in their proper channel begetting Uerdure a Fertility in the meadows on both sides and the over-flowing of either on either side raise no Deluge or Inundaâ—ion The ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny The ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Diviâ—ion The Ills of Democracy are Tumuls Violence and Licentiousness The good of Monarhy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head to Resist Invasion from abroad and Insurrection at home The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Councel in the Ablest persons of a State for the publick benefit The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and industry which Liberty begets In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a King How the Laws of this Kingdom are made by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people all having free Votes and particular priviledges The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the Trust â—eposed in the King King Power of Treaties of War and Peace of making Peers of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Judges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Coâ—missions for raising men to make War abroad or to provent and provide against Invasions or Insurrections at homâ— benefit of Confiscations power of pardoning some more of Concerning the extent of the Princes liberty the like kind are placed in the King Again page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this â—igh and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his privats Favorites Followers to the dotriment of his people the house of Commons an excellent conserver of Liberty but never intended for any share in Government or the chusing of them that should govern is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys which is the sinews as well of peace as war and the impeaching of those The Trust reposed in the house of Commons who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King have violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at least not to serve him to the contrary and the Lords being trusted The Trust of the Lords with a Judicatory power are an excellent screen bank between the Prince people to assist each against any incroachments of the other by just judgments to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three Page 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both The sufficiency of the power placed in both houses Houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyrauny since this would be a total Subversion of the Fundamental Laws and that excellent constitution of this Kingdom which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy to a great degree of envy since to the power of punishing which is already your hands according Incroachment of Power to Law if since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them and all the rest Page 22. Our answer is Nolumus Leges Angliae muâ—ari But this we promiâ—e that Careful to preseeve Laws we will be as careful of preserving the Laws in what is supposed to concern wholly our Subjects as in what most concerns our self For indeed we profels to believe that the preservation of every Law concerns Vs those of obedience being not secure when those of protection are violated FINIS

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