Parliament the King 'T is true the King abjures any intention of making Warre against his Parliament but what he intends against the malignant party in or out of Parliament is not exprest and the King abjures invasive Warre against them but whether he think not himself first invaded already is not exprest and the specifying of a faction in Parliament of some few malignants secures none for none can plead force and none ought to plead folly in Treasons of this nature and the major part of the Houses can neither plead absence or dissent and those which can must not be their own purgators Besides the act of Sir John Hotham is disputable the King adjudges it Treason the Parliament adjudge it no Treason and the King has not declared whether he will refer this to the tryall of the sword only or to some other tryall and if so To what kinde of tryall the judgement of a Parliament shall be submitted If we call another Parliament to judge of this so we may appeal in infinitum and why another should be cleerer then this we cannot imagine If we could constitute a higher Court for this appeal so we might do in infinitum also but we know no higher can be imagined and if we appeal to a lower that were to invert the course of nature and to confound all Parliaments for ever if we call all the Kingdom to judge of this we do the same thing as to proclaim Civill Warre and to blow the Trumpet of generall confusion And if we allow the King to be the sole supream competent Judge in this case we resigne all into his hands we give lifes liberties Laws Parliaments all to be held at meer discretion For there is in the interpretation of Law upon the last appeal the same supremacy of power requisite as is in making it And therefore grant the King supream interpreter and t is all one as if we granted him to be supream maker of Law and grant him this and we grant him to be above all limits all conditions all humane bonds whatsoever In this Intricacy therefore where the King and Parliament disagree and judgement must be supream either in the one or other we must retire to ordinary justice And there we see if the King consent not with the ordinary Judge the Law thinks it fit that the King subscribe rather then the Judge And if this satisfie not We must retire to the principles of Nature and there search whether the King or Kingdom be to be lookt upon as the efficient and finall cause and as the proper Subject of all power Neither is the oath of supremacy indangered hereby for he that ascribes more to the whole universality then to King yet ascribes to the King a true supremacy of power and honour above all particulars Nor is our allegiance temerated For when the Judge on the Bench delivers Law contrary to the Kings command This is not the same thing as to proceed against the Kings person upon any judgement given against him The King as to His own person is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doingâ— nor is He accountable for ill done Law has only a directive but no coactive force upon his person but in all irregular acts where no personall force is Kings may be disobeyed their unjust commands may be neglected not only by communities but also by single men sometimes Those men therefore that maintain That all Kings are in all things and commands as well where personall resistance accompanies as not to be obeyed as being like Gods unlimitable and as well in evill as in good unquestionable are sordid flatterers And those which allow no limits but directive only And those no other but divine and naturall And so make all Princes as vast in power as the Turk for He is subject to the directive force of God and natures Laws and so allow subjects a dry right without all remedy are almost as stupid as the former And those lastly That allow humane Laws to obleage Kings more then directively in all cases where personall violence is absence and yet allow no Judges of those Laws but the King Himself run into absurdities as grosse as the former I come now to those seven doctrines and positions which the King by way of recapitulation layes open as so offensive And they run thus 1. THat the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law So that all the right of the King and people depends upon their pleasure It has been answered That this power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferiour Court or else all suites must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament 2. That Parliaments are bound to no precedents Statutes are not binding to them Why then should precedents Yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honor of a Parliament 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publike necessity without the King and dispose of anything They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdom is in distresse They may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accounted by the vertue of representation as the whole body of the State 4. That no Member of Parliament ought to be troubled for treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicions only And when leave may be seasonably had and when competent accusers appear not in the impeachment 5. That the Soveraign power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose But to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that He preferres dangerous men and prosecutes His loyall Subjects 6. That levying forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanied with his presence is not levying warre against the King But warre against His authority though not person is warre against the King If this were not so The Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining Himself and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose the King T is denyed That any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairly elected To stand in comparison with these I shall recite some such positions as the Kings papers offer to us And they follow thus 1. THat regall power is so derived from God and the Law as that it has no dependence upon the trust and consent of man and the King is accountable therefore to God and His other Kingdoms not to this And it is above the determination of Parliaments and by consequence boundlesse 2. That the King is supream indefinitely viz. As well universis as singulis 3. That the King has such a propriety in His Subjects Towns Forts c. As is above the propriety of the State and not to be seized by the Parliament though for the publike safety 4. That so farre as the King is trusted He is not accountable how He performs So that in all cases the Subject is remedilesse 5. That the being of Parliaments is meerly of grace So that the King might justly have discontinued them and being summoned they are limited by the writ and that ad consilium Only and that but in quibusdam arduis And if they passe the limits of the Writ they may be imprisoned That if the King desert them they are a voyde assembly and no honour due to them nor power to save the Kingdom That Parliamentary priviledges are no where to be read of And so their representation of this whole Kingdom is no priviledge nor addes no Majesty nor authority to them That the major part in Parliament is not considerable when so many are absent or dissent That the major part is no major part Because the fraud and force of some few over-rules them That Parliaments may do dishonourable things nay treasonable Nay That this hath been so blinded by some few malignants That they have abetted treason in Sir John Hotham Trampled upon all Law and the Kings prerogative And sought to inslave the whole Kingdom under the Tyranny of some few And sought the betraying of Church and State And to the same erected an upstart Authority in the new Militia and levyed warre upon the King under pretence that He levies warre upon them That Parliaments cannot declare Law but in such and such particular cases legally brought before them That Parliaments are questionable and tryable elsewhere These things we all see tend not only to the desolation of this Parliament but to the confusion of all other And to the advancing of the King to a higher power over Parliaments then ever He had before over inferiour Courts Parliaments have hitherto been Sanctuaries to the people and banks against Arbitrary tyranny But now the meer breath of the King blasts them in an instant and how shall they hereafter secure us when they cannot now secure themselves Or how can we expect justice when the meer imputation of treason without hearing tryall or judgement shall sweep away a whole Parliament nay all Parliaments for ever And yet this is not yet the depth of our misery For that private Councell which the King now adheres to and preferres before Parliaments will still inforce upon our understandings That all these doctrines and positions tend to the perfection of Parliaments And all the Kings forces in the North to the protection of Law and liberty I finde my Reason already captivated I cannot further FINIS
have too much wrong done them for what is more plain then this That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke then the Turks do under their most absolute Emperours Neverthelesse if we consider the noble Trophees of Rome which it gained under Consuls and conditionaâ—e Commanders we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixt government And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom being but the torn relique of a small Nation yet for their defence would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter under the Conduct of a Generall much limitted Neither have those straitned Commissiâ—ns yeelded any thing but victories to the States and solid honour to the Princes of Orange and what more the mightiest Monarchs of our age have atchieved or enjoy'd besides the filling of a phantasticall humour with imaginary grandour I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage but I know there are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such I desire to be most studious of In some things I know t is dangerous to circumscribe Princes but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure and scarce any hope at all of benefit and amongst other things the choice of publike Officers if the State have at least some share therein with the King what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King is not in me to foresee but if it have no share experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King I see great good but no harm at all that can ensue either to weaken the Crown or disturb the subject thereby But it will be said in the next place If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject yet it diminishes his own Right and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty This is grounded upon a great mistake for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill as well as to save and to have a kinde of a Creators power over Subjects but the truth is such power procures much danger to ill Princes and little good to any for it begets not so much love as fear in the subiect though it be not abused and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love Were Hannibal Scipio c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not independent surely no they were the lesse feared and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved Or were Alexander Pyrrbus c. the more honoured or beloved because they were independant I believe the contrary and that they had lived more gloriously and died lesse violently if a more moderate power had rendred them lesse insolent in their own thoughts and lesse feared in other mens Was Caesar the private man lesse successefull in his Warres or lesse dear in all his souldiers eyes or lesse powerfull in his Countrey-mens affections then Caesar the perpetuall Dictator No if the Imperiall Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar 't was not excellence nor true glory 't was but the externall complements of pomp and ostentation and that might perhaps blow up his minde with vanity and fill the people with 〈◊〉 it could not make Caesar a nobler gallanter greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was I expect no lesse then to be laught at at â—ourt and to be hâ—ld the author of a strange paradox by those men which stick not to say That our King is now no more King of Scotland then he is King of France because his meer pleasure there is not so predominant in all cases of good and evill whatsoever but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it and what not and what proceeds from vain and what from true glory and wherein the naturall perfection of power and honour differs from the painted rayes of spurious Majesty and Magnificence To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in poynt of prerogative then any other in Europe except ours And if the splendor and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious wise magnanimous warlike subjects I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France and that he is so to the meer ingenuity of Government I ascribe it But some will allow That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely and voluntarily as he did is not dishonourable in a Prince but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so is ignoble And this is as much as to say That Law though good yet quateâ—â—s Law is burthenous to mans nature and though it be so but to corrupted nature in asmuch as it retains from nothing but that which nature in its purity would it self restrain from yet corrupted nature it self is to be soothed and observed I have done with this point 't was spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws his Laws by his Lawyers and it might have been added his subjects Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws In this Policy is comprized the whole act of Soveraignty for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges and not violated by power and where Parliaments superintend all and in all extraordinary cases especially betwixt the King and Kingdom do the faithfull Offices of Umpirage all things remain in such a harmony as I shall recommend to all good Princes The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham or interpret the meer shutting of Hull gates and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses to be any preparation for Warre and Invasion against him at York and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying Warre against Him under pretence of His levying Warre against them This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the Kings preparations in the North be onely sutable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no and whether the Parliament be in danger of the Kings strength there or no Or whether is more probable at this time that the King is incensed against the Parliament or the Parliament against the King or that the King is more intentive to assayl the Parliament or the
for this Prince was wise fortunate just and valiant beyond all his Predecessors if not successors also and therefore it is the more glory to our freedomes that as weake and peevish Princes had most opposed them so that he first repaired the breaches which the conquest had made upon them And yet it is very probable that this Law was farre ancienter then his raigne and the words lex stabilita notissima seemes to intimate that the conquest it selfe had never wholly buried this in the publike ruine and confusion of the State It should seeme at this time Llewcllins troubles in Wales were not quite suppressed and the French King was upon a designe to invade some peeces of ours in France and therefore he sends out this summons ad tractandum ordinandum faciendum cum Prelatis Proceris aliis incolis Regni for the prevention of these dangers These words tractandum ordinandum faciendum doe fully prove that the people in those dayes were summoned ad consensum as well as ad concilium and this Law quod omnes tangit c. shewes the reason and ground upon which that consent and approbation is founded It is true we finde in the raigne of Edward the third that the Commons did desire that they might forbeare counselling in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matters in debate were concerning some intestine commotions the guarding of the Marches of Scotland and the Seas and therein they renounce not their right of consent they onely excuse themselves in point of counsell referring it rather to the King and his Counsell How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent or counsell I do not know for at last they did give both and the King vvould not be satisfied vvithout them and the passage evinces no more but this that that King was very wise and Warlike and had a very wise counsell of vvarre so that in those paticulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted as perhaps the more knowing men Now upon a due comparing of these passages with some of the Kings late Papers let the vvorld judge whether Parliaments have not beene of late much lessened and injured The King in one of his late Answers Alleadges that his Writs may teach the Lords and Commons the extent of their Commission and trust which is to be Counsellors not commanders and that not in all things but in quibusdam arduiis and the case of Wentworth is cited who was by Queene Elizabeth committed sitting the Parliament for proposing that they might advise the Queene in some things which she thought beyond their cognizance although Wentworth was then of the House of Commons And in other places the King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when he withdrawes himselfe to be rightly named a Parliament or to have any power of any Court and consequently to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men Many things are here asserted utterly destructive to the honour right being of Parliaments For first because the Law had trusted the King with a Prerogative to discontinue Parliaments therefore if he did discontinue Parliaments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this was no breach of that trust because in formalitie of Law the people might not assemble in Parliament but by the Kings writ therefore in right and equity they were concluded also so that if the King would not graunt his Writ when it was expedient he did not proove unfaithfull or doe any wrong to the people for where no remedy is there is no right This doctrine was mischievous to us when the King had a Prerogative to difuse Parliaments and if it be not now exploded and protested against may yet bee mischievous in the future dissolution of Parliaments for that power still remaines in the Kings trust and if to goe against the intent of trnst be no wrong because perhaps it is remedilesse our Trienniall Parliaments may prove but of little service to us Secondly when Parliaments are assembled they have no Commission to Counsell but in such points as the King pleases to propose if they make any transition in other matters they are liable to imprisonment at the Kings pleasure witnesse Wentworths Case A meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law for some of her actions were retracted and yet without question Queene Elizabeth might do that which a Prince lesse beloved could never have done There is a way by goodnesse and clemency for Princes to make themselves almost unlimitable and this way Queene Elizabeth went and without doubt had her goodnesse and Grace beene fained shee might have usurped an uncontroleable arbitrary lawlesse Empire over us The Sunne sooner makes the travailour desert his Cloake then the wind And the gracious acts of soft Princes such as Tiberius did at first personate if they be perfectly dissembled may more easily invade the subiects liberty then the furious proceedings of such as Caligula was but we must not be presidented in apparent violations of Law by Queene Elizabeth for as generall reverence gave her power to doe more then ordinary so her perfect undissembled goodnesse upon which her reverence was firmely planted made the same more then ordinary fact in her lesse dangerous then it would have beene in another Prince In this point then leaving the meere fact of Queene Elizabeth wee will retire backe to the ancient Law and reason of Edward the first and wee thereby shall maintaine that in all cases wheresoever the generality is touched the generality must bee consulted Thirdly if the Lords and Commons bee admitted to some Cognizance of all things wherein they are concerned yet they must meerely Counsell they must not command and the King Reasons thus that it is impossible the same trust should bee irrevocably committed to Vs and our Heires for ever and yet a power above that trust for so the Parliament pretends bee committed to others and the Parliament being a body and dissolvable at pleasure it is strange if they should bee guardians and controlers in the manage of that trust which is granted to the King for ever It is true two supreames cannot bee in the same sence and respect but nothing is more knowne or assented to then this that the King is singulis major and yet universis minor this wee see in all conditionall Princes such as the Prince of Orange c. And though all Monarchies are not subject to the same condition yet there scarse is any Monarchy but is subiect to some conditions and I thinke to the most absolute Empire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary That the safetie of the people is to bee valued above any right of his as much as the end is to bee preferred before the meanes it is not just nor possible for any nation so to inslave it selfe and to resigne its owne interest to the will of one Lord as that
Monarchy than in a Republique But tracing this no further I will now rest upon this that whatsoever the King has alleaged against raising of Armes and publishing of Orders indefinitely is of no force to make Sir Iohn Hotham or those by whose authoritie hee acted Traytours unlesse it fall out that there was no ground nor necessitie of such defence So much of danger certaine I will now suppose the danger of the Commonwealth uncertaine the King sayes the Parliament denyes the King commands the Parliament forbids The King sayes the Parliament is seduced by a traiterous faction the Parliament sayes the King is seduced by a Malignant Party the King sayes the Parliament tramples upon his Crowne the Parliament sayes the King intends Warre upon them to whether now is the Subject bound to adhere I will not insist much upon generall presumptions though they are of moment in this case for without all question 't is more likely that Princes may erre and have sinister ends then such generall conventions of the Nobility Gentry and Commonalty so instituted and regulated as ours are in England The King does highly admire the ancient equall happy well poyzed and never enough commended constitution of this Government which hath made this Kingdome so many years both famous and happy to a great degree of envie and amongst the rest our Courts of Parliament and therein more especially that power which is legally placed in both Houses more than sufficient as he sayes to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny But how can this be if the King may at His pleasure take away the being of Parliament meerely by dissent if they can doe nothing but what pleases Him or some Clandestine Councellours and if upon any attempt to doe any thing else they shall be called Traitors and without further arraignment or legall proceeding be deserted by the Kingdome whose representations they are what is there remaining to Parliaments are they not more servile then other inferiour Courts nay are they not in a worse condition then the meanest Subject out of Parliament and how shall they restraine tyranny when they have no subsistance at all themselves nay nor no benefit of Justice but arbitrary Surely if these principles hold they will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other Kingdome wee have long groaned for them but we are likely now to groane under them but you will say the King hath a power of dissent he may use it at his pleasure if hee have none then he is a meere Cypher and the Parliament may tyrannize at pleasure either the one or the other must bee predominant or else by a mutuall opposition all must perist and why not the King predominant rather then the Parliament We had a maxime and it was grounded upon Nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe and no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole Kingdome or exercise any tyranny nor is there any possibility how it should The King may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments for none knowes better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well-ballanced a Monarchy then they do and it hath been often in their power under great provocations to load that rule with greater fetters clogs but they would not Let us marke but the nature the right the power the wisedome the justice of Parliaments and we shall finde no cause to suspect them of such unmatchable treasons and conspiracies as are this day and never was before charged upon them for our Chronicles makes it apparent that there is scarce any other Nation wherein Monarchy has been more abused by rash inconsiderate Princes then in this nor none at all wherein it hath been more inviolably adored and loyally preserved from all diminution I wish it were not some incitement to those execrable Instruments which steale the Kings heart from us that they thinke the Religion of Protestants too tame and the Nation of the English too incensible of injuries but I hope God will the more tenderly resent these things The composition of Parliaments I say takes away all jealousies for it is so equally and geometrically proportionable and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts therein that no one can be of any extreame predominance the multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility and Gentry prefer it as much beyond Democracy and we see the multitude hath onely a representative influence so that they are not likely to sway and yet some influence they have and that enough to preserve themselves from being overswaid We also in England have not a Nobility and Gentry so independent and potent as in France Germany Denmarke c. Nor as they were here immediately after the Conquest by reason of their great Feoffes whereby to give Lawes either to the Crowne or the people but they stand at such faire and comely distances between the King and people and also betweene themselves that they serve for an excellent Skreene and banke as the Kings words are to assist both King and people against the encroachments of each other And as the middle Region of the aire treats loving offices betwixt heaven and earth restraining the fumes and exhalations of Sea and Land that they ascend not too high and at the same instant allaying that restlesse Planets scorching flames which else might prove insufferable to the lower Elements So doth both Houses of Parliament as peaceably and sweetly arbitrate betwixt the Prince and his poorest Vassals and declining Tyranny on the one side and Ochlocracy on the other preserving intire to the King the honour of His Scopter and to the people the patrimony of freedome Let us not then seeke to corrupt this purity of composition or conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King when they have no power but derivative the one more depending upon the King and the other upon the people but both most excellently to affect the good of the whole and to prevent the exorbitance of any one part Next the right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of goverement can be advantage to them in that temporary capacity except they could each one obtaine an hereditary Crowne which is a thing utterly impossible Next their power is meerely derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done and if wee conceive that they may by fraud gaine their consent nothing can withstand them Lastly their wisedome hath beene ever held unquestionable and their justice inviolable no Prince that ever cast himselfe thereupon was defrauded no Prince that ever declined the same proved prosperous In sum Parliamentary
government being used as Physicke not dyet by the intermission of due spaces of time has in it all that is excelleut in all formes of Government whatsoever If the King be an affector of true liberty he has in Parliament a power as extensive as ever the Romane Dictators was for the preventing of all publike distresses If the King be apt to intrude upon the common liberties the people have hereby many Democraticall advantages to preserve themselves If Warre bee here is the Unitive vertue of Monarchy to encounter it here is the admirable Councell of Aristocracy to manage it If Peace be here is the industry and courage of democracy to improve it Let us now see how Kings usually governe without Parliaments especially such as are ruled by Councell averse from Parliaments I need not speake of France and other Countries where together with these generall Assemblies all liberty is falne to the ground I need not travell further then our stories nay I need not passe beyond our owne Times my discourse will be endlesse if I doe The wisest of our Kings following their owne private advise or being conducted by their owne wills have mistaken their best Subiects for their greatest enemies and their greatest enemies for their best Subiects and upon such mistakes our iustest Kings have often done things very dangerous And without upbraiding I may say that this King by the fraud of such as have incensed him against Parliaments and his most loyall people hath so far been possest with a confidence in the zeale of Traytors that he hath scarse ever yet enioyed that grandour and splendor which his Ancestors did enioy He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of his own Subiects and yet that Army which he went to destroy and advanced their colours against him was more loyall than that which himselfe commanded and yet both were more loyall than those fatall whisperers which ingaged them so one against the other if the whole Kingdome of Scotland had been more hearkened to rather than some few malignants of the Popish and Prelaticall faction the King had sooner found out the fidelity of that whole Kingdome and the infidelity of that wicked faction But as things then stood the King was as much incensed against them as he is against us now and he that did then perswade him that the Scots were no Rebels seemed as great an enemy as he doth now that shall defend the innocency of Sir John Hotham there was no difference at all betwixt that ease of the Scots and this of ours the King attributed then as much to his own conscience and understanding as he doth now and he attributed as little then to the publike Votes of that Kingdome as he doth now to this only in this our condition is the more unhappy because that so fresh and memorable experiment doth not at all profit us but still by a strange kinde of relapse the King seemes now the more firmly to relie upon his own private reason and counsell the more cause he hath to confide in publike advertisements and the more he professes to doe contrary the maine question now is whether the Court or the Parliament gives the King the better Councell the King sayes he cannot without renouncing his own conscience and reason prefer the Parliaments Councell before the Courts and that which the King here calls Conscience and reason can be nothing else but meere private opinion for if the Councell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation For example the Parliament conceives that such and such ill offices have been done to frame parties and unite forces against the Parliament the State and therfore they desire that such Townes and Forts and the publick Militia may be intrusted to the custody and command of such Noblemen and Gentlemen as they confide in the Kings secret Court-Councell suggests against this that this request incloseth at reasonable intention in it and that the ayme is to wrest all power out of the Kings hand that he may be forced to depose himselfe the effect of this is no more but to let the King know that they are more wise and faithfull than the Parliament and that hee may doe royally to hearken to them in condemning the Lords and Commons of most inexpiable unnaturall impossible Treason for they must needs love him better then the Parliament but he cannot hearken to the Lords and Commons without offering violence to his owne reason and conscience here we see the misery of all if Princes may not be led by their owne opinions though infused by obscure whisperers when they scandall the loyalty of whole kingdomes without cause rather then by the sacred and awfull councels of whole Nations they are denyed liberty of conscience and ravisht out of their owne understandings And yet if Princes may be admitted to prefer such weak opinions before Parliamentary motives and petitions in those things which concerne the Lives Estates and Liberties of thousands what vain things are Parliaments what unlimitable things are Princes what miserable things are Subiects I will enlarge my selfe no longer upon this endlesse Theame Let us look upon the Venetians and such other free Nations why are they so extreamly iealous over their Princes is it for feare lest they should attaine to an absolute power It is meerely for feare of this bondage that their Princes will dote upon their owne wills and despise publike Councels and Laws in respect of their owne private opinions were not this the sting of Monarchy of all formes it were the most exquisite and to all Nations it would be the most desirable Happy are those Monarchs which qualifie this sting and happy are those people which are governed by such Monarchs I come now to the particularities of our own present case for it may be said that though publik advise be commonly better than private yet in this case it may be otherwise some men have advised the King that the Parliament hath trayterous designes both against his Person Crown and not to be prevented but by absenting himselfe denying his influence and concurrence frustrasting and protesting against their proceedings is invalid and seditious and laying heavy charges of Rebellion upon them to this advise the King hearkens so the Parliament requests and advises the contrary and now in the midst of all our calamities of gasping Ireland and bleeding England the Parliament seeing that either they must make use of their legislative power and make ordinance to secure some Forts and settle the Militia of the Kingdome in sure hands and to prevent the seducers of the King or else two Kingdomes should probably bee lost they doe accordingly The King proclaymes to the contrary notwithstanding The question then as I conceive is this onely whether or no the King hath any just cause to suspect the Parliament of Treason
and can make appeare to the world as some of his Papers mention wherein they have attempted or plotted any thing against his person and Crowne which was the onely motive why hee sought to absent himselfe from London and to possesse himselfe of Hull and to frame such an impeachment against some of both Houses if this can be affirmed and proved the Parliament shall be held guilty in all their Votes Ordinances and Commissions concerning Sir John Hotham and the Militia c. Although it be the first time that any free Parliament was ever so criminous but if this cannot bee prooved it must be granted that according to the Votes of Parliaments the Kings departure did by frustrating Parliamentary proceedings in a time of such calamitie and distresse greatly indanger two Kingdomes and whosoever advised the King to that departure and to the charging of Treason since layd upon the Parliament and all such as have obeyed them in seeking to prevent publicke mischeefes are as pernicious enemies to this State as ever received their being from it The businesse of Hull is most instanced in let that be first survayd Sir John Hotham is to be lookt upon but as the Actor the Parliament as the Author in holding Hull and therefore it is much wondered at that the King seemes more violent against the Actor then the Author but since through the Actor the Author must needs be pearced if the Act be found Treason let us consider of circumstances the same act may be treasonable or not if such and such circumstances vary for example to possesse a Towne and shut the gates against a King is Treason if there be not something in the act or in the intention or in the Authoritie of him that shuts the gates to qualifie and correct the nature of Treason in that act The first thing then to be lookt on is that the King was meerely denyed entrance for that time his generall right was not denyed and no defying language was given no act of violence was used though the King for divers houres together did stand within Musket shot and did use termes of defiance and this makes the act meerely defensive or rather passive And therfore how this should administer to the King any ground to leavy guards at Yorke many men wonder or that it should seeme the same thing to the King as if hee had beene pursued to the gates of Yorke Did the King without any feare treate Sir John Hotham as a Traytor in the face of his Artillery and after to enter Hull with twentie Horse onely unarmed and continue such a harsh Parley so many houres and yet when hee was in Yorke in a County of so great assurance could nothing but so many bands of Horse and Foot secure him from the same Sir John Hotham The next thing considerable is the Parliaments intention if the Parliament have here upon turned any of the Townesmen out of their estates or claymed any interest in it to themselves or have disseized the King utterly denying his right for the future or have made any other use of their possession but meerely to prevent civill warre and to disfurnish the Kings seducers of Armes and Ammunition let the State bee branded with Treason but if none of these things bee by any credit though their enemies should bee judges the most essentiall propertie of Treason must needs here bee absent in this act The next thing considerable is the Parliaments Authoritie if the Parliament bee not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe if it bee not the supreame judicature as well in matters of State as matters of Law if it be not the great Councell of the Kingdome as well as of the King to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases Ne quid detrimenti capiat Respub let the brand of Treason sticke upon it nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevayled or if their grounds of jealousie were merely vaine or if the jealousie of a whole kingdome can bee counted vaine or if they claime any such right of judging of danger and preventing them without the Kings consent as ordinary and perpetuall and without any relation to publike danger let the reward of Treason be their guerdon But if their authoritie be so sacred their intention so loyall their act free from offensive violence and if the King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand or by coming without such considerable Forces in so unexpected a manner let not treason be here misplaced Had Faux falne by a private mans Sword in the very instant when he would have given fire to his trayne that act had not bin punishable and the Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authoritie yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason and he is not comprehensive of the value of a whole State nor of the vigour of our nationall union which does not so interpret it how much more unjust then is it that the whole State of England shall be condemned of Treason for doing such an act as this when its owne safetie wherein none can have so much interest as it selfe was so highly touched Let not all resistance to Princes be under one notion confounded let the principles and ingredients of it be justly examined and sometimes it will be held as pious and loyall to Princes themselves as at other times it is distructive and impious Let us by the same test try the actions intentions and authoritie of the Papists now in Ireland and compare them with this businesse at Hull and we shall see a diametricall contrarietie betweene them Their actions are all blood rapine and torture all ages all sexes all conditions of men have tasted of their infernall crueltie Their intentions are to extirpate that Religion which hath indeavored so long to bring them from Idolatry and Atheisme and to massacre that nation which hath indeavoured so gently to reduce them from poverty and beastiall barbarisme Their chiefe leaders in this horrid tragedy are Jesuites and meere Bandettoes and the Authority of King Parliament and Magistracy is the principall thing which they strike at and seeke to overwhelme in this deplorable deluge of blood such a direct contrariety then being betwixt the true Rebells in Ireland and the misnamed Rebells here in England the same men which condemne the one if they would be true to themselves they ought to commend the other for we have had experience often in England and other nations have had the like that Kings have marched forth amongst their enemies to encounter with their friends so easily are they to be flattered into errour and out of errour to seeke the ruine of those which ayme at nothing but perdition And yet questionlesse when Richard the second was invironed with the Forces of Spencer and his confederates vowing to sacrifice their blood in his