whoever does well understand the Trade of War will never put Affairs to the greatest hazard when they can be carried on with the less In our sinful Times in England when Robert Earl of Essex marched to the Relief of Glocester his Highness Prince Rupert whose high Genius in War admirable Valor and great Judgment has made him justly to be esteemed both by his Friends and Enemies a General of the very first Form would not stay in his Works before that City but leaving most of his Infantry in them advanced with his Cavalry to meet the relieving Army on the Downes which doubtless he had defeated as several of the chief Officers of it have owned to me had not some Brigades of the Earl of Essex's Infantry done almost Wonders on that occasion These and many other the like Instances make it seem to me even a kind of Maxim in War That a besieging Army which has onely an ordinary and vast Line of Circumvallation to cover it ought not to stay in it but to give the Relief Battel or raise the Siege before the Relief be too near it being in my poor opinion altogether unadviseable to stay as if you would fight when you are resolved not to do it for whatever Army retreats from another thereby evidences that he apprehends his Enemies which highly encourages them and does not a little deject your own Forces who therefore are the more prone to be disorder'd if vigorously push'd and to be disorder'd is almost the next step to being defeated so that early Retreats where the Resolution is taken not to fight is most eligible for why should you hazard to be engaged when you resolve to avoid it Though I cannot say that the besieging Army quitting an ordinary Line has alway had success in giving or offering Battel to the Relieving Army for that depends on many Circumstances and unforeseeable Accidents yet the Arguments appear to me very strong for the doing of it and Actions ought not to be judged of onely by the Event but by the Reasons which make them to be undertaken I cannot observe in all the Wars which Caesar madâ—… that he committed any one oversight so clearly deserving that name as when at Dirachium he enclosed with a prodigious Line for its circumference the Army of Pompey which was much greater than his own and consequently might when he would force his passage in one part of it because all Caesar's vast Line was to be equally mann'd and provided for where Nature made it not inaccessible which could not but disperse his Troops to such a distance as render'd them not only useless when Pompey should attack any one place of them from within with his whole Forces but exposed them to be cut off by parts when Pompey got out So that it was believed the War had that day been ended had Pompey been a General who had known how to improve a Victory And if Caesar whose own Conduct was so excellent whose Soldiers were so valiant and expert as he himself writes That their knowledge and experience was such as they could prescribe unto themselves what was to be done as well as any Commander could teach them could not on tryal justifie so vast yet weak a Line when it could then only be assaulted from those within it how should any other General rationally hope to justifie an ordinary Line and of great Circuit when it is at once vigorously attempted both from the Field and from the Town for the strongest Sallies from the Town are when the Relief fights the besieging Army Experiment might teach what Reason did not But lest some who peruse this Treatise may think I have forgot how much I have already spoken of the great advantages which are derived from an Armies being intrenched though but as it were within a Parapet well flank'd by my now writing so much against an Armies trusting to an ordinary Line of Circumvallation I shall desire him to consider there is a very great difference between an Army which is posted in an Intrenched Camp and one which is posted within such a Line of Circumvallation though the Works should be of equal strength For an Army intrenched lodges so compactly and close and has comparatively so little Ground to defend and no Enemy to attack them from within that all the Forces of it are at hand in a moment to justifie their Intrenchment against all Assaults from without but an Army within such a Line of Circumvallation is necessarily so far disperst to make good every part of it not knowing where the real Impression will be made and has so many Troops only to attend the Sallies of the Garison that if once the Line be entred it is impossible to bring Forces from such remote distances so expeditiously to drive them out as the assaulting General can bring his in to prevent all considerable Imbodyings to resist him without which it were unadviseable for the defending General to design it and ruinous to attempt it Having thus set down my own opinion for giving Battel to a relieving Army rather than to oppose it in a large and ordinary Line of Circumvallation with the needful Cautions to be observed in choosing to do it and having both by the reason of the thing and by examples endeavor'd to manifest why my opinion therein is taken up and having also given my Reader nine general Maxims which are to be observed in giving Battel I shall now close this Chapter and this Tome with some other Particulars which in my belief are not unworthy his perusal and seem to me fit to be observed before in and after a Battel as being built on Reason or Experiment Before the fighting of a Battel the Field Mark and the Field Word ought still to be given to every one of your men the first is That you may be able to distinguish afar off who are Friends and who are Enemies the second is That when you come to Rally you may make your Rallyment of those onely who are of your own Troops which else might consist partly of your Enemies men who might to shelter themselves get into your Ranks as if they were of your Army And thereby not only preserve themselves but also when you fight again contribute to destroy you by killing some of your Officers which lead you on or by breaking your Ranks just as you were going to Charge and thereby also save themselves when they had done you all the mischief they could For in the hurry and confusion of a Fight private Soldiers must have some very apparent Field Mark to enable them to distinguish Foes from Friends else much mischief may too likely ensue And because such Field Marks wherever you place them are not still visible on all sides of the Head or Body of every one who wears them The Field Word is also given For it often happens that in a Battel the Field Mark is by accident lost by many out of their Helmets or Hats
much better Cultivated and Refin'd as render'd it as impossible to set down Standing Rules and Maxims for making War as to take the utmost height of one who is still growing Or whether the great Commanders of those Ages differ'd in opinion as to the Methods and Principles of War and therefore would write no Set Treatise on that Subject lest thereby they should raise a War of the Pen. But from whatsoever Cause or Causes it proceeded which is above my skill to determine yet doubtless their Silence therein is to be Lamented For we are thereby depriv'd of the Experience of our Ancestors for many Ages And Experience is not only the Greatest but the Truest Teacher even as much as the Practice surpasseth the bare Theory It is very worthy of Observation though the present way of Fighting and of Arming our Soldiery be very different from what was practis'd by the Greeks and Romans who were in their Times the Great Masters of the Military Art yet the Famousest Captains of the Latter and the Present Age take the Ancients but especially Iulius Caesar for their Example in all the Noblest and Best Principles of War whose Commentaries are not enough to be extoll'd both for the Modesty and Policy of them And 't is to the Experience of those Famous Nations that we owe most of that Discipline which now on our own Tryals we have judged worthiest to be observed and imitated For though the use of all Fire-Arms and of Cannon were Intirely unknown to them which has much alter'd the manner of making War And though they Fought with their Files exceeding deep which we with much Reason have Alter'd yet as to the Main we owe to them most of our Knowledge And the Difference seems Little more than between Old-fashion'd Plate hammer'd into New where though the Form is chang'd yet the Substance remains When I mention an intire Treatise of the Art of War I intend thereby The Method of Choosing of the Soldiery Arming Educating and Disciplining The Well ordering of Garisons Wayes of Marching an Army How to Camp within a Line or without any Quarter in Villages Attack or Defend Quarters Give Battel or to Avoid it Besiege Approach Assault and by Breach of Cannon or Mine to Carry or Defend Towns and Fortresses with all the Appendages which belong to those several Branches of the Military Art Which Generals include many important Particulars worthy the knowledge of every one who takes upon himself the profession of a Soldier For though the Name of a Soldier is common yet it is Rare to find the Thing itself I have therefore by way of Essay thought fit to set down what I have learnt by Reading by Discourse and by my own Experience having had the Honour and Misfortune to have been an Officer and Commander for above Four and thirty years much of which time I did not Act by the Example of others but by weighing the Reasons by which others did or pretended to Act embraincg what on Examination I found Rational and rejecting what others did only because they were taught it For Reason ought to be prefer'd before Customs which are not founded on it ever submitting my Opinions to all such who oppose them by stronger Arguments than those I have built mine upon For I much more desire to follow what is the Best than that others should follow me if my Maxims are not such Whatever else this Essay may produce yet I hope this one Good may be caused by it even that of Inviting some Abler Person to undertake the Work whereby if mine should not prove advantageous yet it may produce what will be so and effect that by another which it wanted strength to perform of itself Of the Choice and Educating of the Soldiery WE are not so careful either in the Education of our Youth for the War or in the Choice of Men to be Soldiers as the Ancients were The Greeks had publick Masters or Teachers not only to instruct their Youth in the use of Arms but also publick Schools for that end the Teachers they called Tactici the Schools Gymnasia and it was even a Reproach and Ignominy to any who had not learnt to handle his Arms in those Gymnasia's erected and endowed for that End Nay some have with Reason believed that while their Youth were Training up in those Schools they were Fed and Lodged as if they had been actually on Duty in the Field which doubtless was a Method worthy of Praise and Imitation For thereby not only in an instant they were able to form an Army of a Soldiery expert in the use of their Arms but also to have it consist of Men accustomed to the Dyet and Incommodities of War For without the latter the former would have been of little and short benefit since to know how to use Arms and not to have Bodies inured to Hardships would have been very little Significant if not Destructive But we when we raise Men compose our Soldiery of Volunteers and Prest Men both generally unexpert in the use of Arms and unaccustomed to the hardships of War whereby if suddenly after their being Listed they should be led on Service they would be expos'd to Defeats and the Countries they are to defend to Ruine His Majesty that now Reigns has done more towards the redress of this great Evil than all His Predecessors having by Act of Parliament setled the Militia in the Cities and Countries whereby many are instructed in the use of their Arms But this yet is far short of what the Greeks did practise For our Trained Bands especially in the Countries rarely meet to Exercise and then return at Night where they feed well and lie warm whereas the Greeks had Schools constantly to teach their Youth to fit them for War before they were called to it and were also accustomed to the Fare and Lodgings of Soldiers the last of which our Trained Bands are too much strangers unto Besides to be taught to handle Arms and to endure hardship during Youth makes men more dext'rous in the former and more robust as to the latter than middle-aged men can be who at those years do but begin to learn To which I must add That our Volunteers generally except such young Gentlemen as Honour desire of Knowledge and hope of Preferment call to the War consist of such as go to it because they have not wherewithall to subsist in Peace and indeed are but too frequently debauched idle Persons who having lived in Excess and Laziness are the less capable to undergo the Life of Soldiers And as to those which are Prest they have still a hankering to return are commonly grumbling that they have been Prest and not minding to become Soldiers are not studious to learn a Profession which they never intend to practise The Turks who possess the Empire of Greece in imitation perhaps of the Grecians Gymnasia's erected in Constantinople in the time of Amurath the First their Colledge of
been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
thereof in War they were no longer obliged to bear Arms unless it were for the guarding and defence of the City and then were usually called Emeriti It was also a standing Rule among them that none could attain to the dignity of one of the Four and twenty Military Tribunes that had not actually served at least Five years in the Wars and this favour also was only extended to the first Fourteen of them who were chosen out of the Four and twenty and for the remaining Ten none could be Elected that had not served Eleven years in the Infantry or Fifteen years in the Cavalry which proves how much more the Romans esteem'd the Foot-service than the Horse Four Legions alwayes compos'd a Consular Army and commonly they had two such Armies annually this was the Primitive Institution And though through the exigency of their Affairs they had often more than eight Legions at once entertained yet the rest were distributed to and commanded by their Pretors Proconsuls and other Chiefs When Hannibal was in Italy they had at once Twenty three Legions on foot and Iulius Caesar had Ten Legions at once in the Wars against the Gaules but this was when the vigor of the Laws declined or the very Being of their Commonwealth was at stake Of the Four Legions which compos'd a Consular Army Two of them were alwayes of the Allies and they were chosen just as those in Rome had been only the Allies as the need required were bound to send the double number of Horse because their Countries being much larger than the City Territories were abler to furnish the Army with Horse Before they proceeded to the Election of Soldiers they divided the Four and Twenty Military Tribunes to the Four Legions in this manner Of the Fourteen youngest Tribunes they appointed Four of them to the First Legion Three to the Second Four to the Third and Three to the Fourth And of the Ten ancientest Tribunes they appointed Two for the First Legion Three for the Second Two for the Third and Three for the Fourth by which every Legion had six Military Tribunes and in every Legion the younger and elder Tribunes were dispersed The Four and twenty Tribunes thus chosen and appointed they drew the Tribes by Lots out of the first they chose four Soldiers of the equallest goodness they could out of which four the six Tribunes of the first Legion chose one the six Tribunes of the second Legion chose one the six Tribunes of the third Legion one and the six Tribunes of the fourth Legion had the remaining one After this they chose other four Soldiers as equally good as they could out of the first Tribe and then the Tribunes of the second Legion chose one first the Tribunes of the third chose next the fourth next and the first had the one Soldier remaining And thus they did alternatively till the Legions were composed out of all the Tribes so that the first Legion had no advantage in the choice of its Soldiers over the other three but though this was a tedious way of choosing yet it was a very impartial one and proves they stuck at no trouble when it was to do equally to all After the Foot Soldiers were chosen the Censors chose the Cavalry The choice of the Private Soldiers being thus made the Tribunes of every Legion made every Soldier one by one swear to obey and do all that should be commanded him by his Superiors which was perform'd by every mans raising his right hand and holding the thumb of it upright The Tribunes then divided every Order of the Soldiers into Centuries and Cohorts out of every one of which they made two Elections each of ten men the first Election as the most honourable assisted at general Councils of War and were in effect what the Captains are in our times those of the second were in the nature of Lieutenants and though those of both the said Elections were called Centurions yet the former were called First Centurions those of the last Second Centurions After this the said Centurions chose their Vexillarii who were in the nature of the Ensigns of our times but there were two of them to every Cohort Then they made choice of Twenty Tergiductors who were those that ordered the Rear of the Cohorts whereby they had to every Cohort two Chiefs in the Head and two in the Rear besides their Vexillarii A Roman Legion was usually divided into five Orders the Infantry made four viz. the Velites Hastati Principes and Triari the Cavalry one every one of these four Orders of Foot were divided into ten Companies those of the Infantry were called Centuries Cohorts or Manniples those of the Cavalry Turmae Every one of the three first Orders of the Infantry consisted of twelve hundred Soldiers which were divided into ten Companies every one of which consisted of One hundred and twenty Soldiers The fourth Order that of the Triari consisted but of Six hundred Soldiers which made ten Companies each of sixty Soldiers The Horse of a Roman Legion were but three hundred which made ten Troops each of thirty so that usually a Roman Legion consisted of Four thousand two hundred Foot and three hundred Horse divided into forty Companies and ten Troops They have as I said before often varied in their number but this has most usually been the quantity of Soldiers Foot and Horse which composed a Roman Legion The Military Tribunes commanded their Legions by turns two at a time for two months together and so alternately it went round There is great variety of Opinions amongst ancient Authors about the Names of Centuries Cohorts and Manniples But 't is thought they were but several Appellations of the same thing though in some places of Titus Livie one may find a distinction from the Cohorts to the Centuries and from the Centuries to the Manniples which many think did proceed from the Legions being sometimes increased to six thousand nay to seven thousand men and therefore such Subdivisions have been made We are left much in the dark as to the choice of the Soldiery amongst the Greeks whether it be by reason that the times in which they were most famous be remote or that the Language is not so generally understood as the Latin or that the Romans having Conquer'd them supprest all traces of their methods therein yet their Gymnasia's and their Tactici evidence enough they were sufficiently careful in that important particular for none can expect to have a good Orchard who has his Trees out of a bad Nursery T is worthy observation that we seldom or never read that the Greeks or the Romans prest Soldiers for the Wars which is a thing so frequent in most Countries in our times and possibly most in England of any Kingdom I cannot fancy that this does intirely proceed from their being more Martially inclined than the English were and are who without flattery to my Countreymen I think are as little apt to fear
much and if but moving a few paces the mischief is probably in some degree to be run into then so much the more care ought to be taken that as few paces may be so marched as possibly you can contrive I cannot see any solid Objection can be made hereunto in reference to your Artillery for those usually being drawn in the Front of your Battalions till you come to place them where they are to do execution they may be advanced still before the Front of your Army though you should march it but in one Line till you come near the Enemy but this as all things I write I shall chearfully submit to better judgments If you are desirous to come to a Battel with your Enemy and that he endeavors to shun it by constant Intrenched Campings and by having good Magazines and Arsenals with or near him and a plentiful Countrey at his devotion behind him which is usually the best Game of him whose Countrey is invaded for he has little reason to give you Battel when by keeping unfought with you cannot safely enter far into his Countrey leaving his Army intire behind you I say in such a case you ought by often Removings to try for an opportunity to give him Battel for since he is to attend your motions sometimes an occasion to fight him unexpectedly both to him and you may be offer'd you Sometimes also by your suddenly sitting down before a Garison of his and endangering the taking of it he may be induced to give you Battel which he would not do but in hope to prevent such a loss Sometimes it may be adviseable for you if you are much his Superior in strength with as little Baggage as possible and with as much Bread as your Men can carry and with Herds of fat Cattle to be driven with you which last is a Provision that carries it self to make Inroads into his Countrey both to destroy and pillage it this may provoke him to follow you lest his Countrey esteem him careless in the defence of it and thereby you may find opportunities to fight him And sometimes by your invading parts of his Territories at a considerable distance from those places where he has formed his Magazines either necessitate him to remove from them or else expose to your Army those Countries of his which you fall upon As Caesar by the like method drew Pompe from his Magazines and Fleet at Dirachium and made him follow him into Thessaly by which means Caesar won his famous Battel of Pharsalia I look upon it as a Maxim in War never to have the Army of the Invaded Countrey to give Battel to the Invading Army but on very great necessity or on very great advantages for the Invaded by losing a Battel may lose his Countrey but the Invader by losing one will but lose his Hopes his Baggage and as many Men as are kill'd in the defeat and few discreet Gamesters will play their All against little or nothing comparatively Therefore as the Invaded must still be careful to avoid a Battel so the Invader must still be forward to offer it on any fitting terms for should he not nothing else will keep up his Reputation which of all humane things ought most carefully and jealously to be kept up and increased in War In my private thoughts I cannot readily believe that any Kingdom can easily be Conquer'd where the true Principles and Methods of War are alwayes observed unless some great internal Revolutions of Affairs or general Revolts of Subjects should occasion such a misery And therefore whatever I have heard to the contrary I freely own I cannot be brought to believe that this present fatal War kindled almost all over Europe will have such great Progresses as some of more sanguine Complexions than I am have believed or rather fancied for though France has the formidablest League against it that perhaps was ever yet made in Europe against any one Monarch of it yet I cannot find the Advances of his Confederated Enemies are very considerable nor can I believe they will be for the Reasons formerly mentioned in this Book and also because he does by Intrenched Incampings and providing timely and plentifully for his Armies to eat frustrate in effect all the great Enterprises of his Enemies which is practicably to perform the solidest Maxims of War and whoever he be that can stedily observe them will find the necessary benefits which will result to him thereby unless a higher Power does turn the Wisdom of Man into Foolishness and against that stroke there neither is or can be any defence I shall now offer to Consideration three Particulars more which are I think useful to be observed previously to a Battel The first is That Orders be given that no chief Officer who commands a Squadron or Commissioned Officer who leads one with him have that Horse he Charges on advanced above the length of his head before the Front Rank of his Troopers My Reason for it is this Because if those who lead Squadrons to the Charge be before the Front Rank they either without cause adventure to be shot by their own Men behind them or hinder some of them from firing or which is far worse when both Bodies come to the shock such as are out of the Ranks and between both Bodies are needlesly exposed even when they are of most use to those Men they command and consequently the whole Army In answer to this I know some have said It does not a little animate the Squadrons to see the Officers which command them lead them on eight or ten Paces before the first Rank and then just as they are going to mingle to fall into it But I must say I believe good Soldiers need not such Airy Animations and the Bad will not fight well though they have more substantial ones Besides I believe it does rather Disanimate than Encourage Soldiers who have any consideration when they see those Officers whose Conduct they relie upon â—…ive them so ill an impression of it as doing a vain thing by which also they may too probably incapacitate themselves to command their Men when they are likely to have most need of being order'd to the best advantage either as to their Rallying if discomposed in the Charge or an orderly Pursuit if successful To which also may be added these two other Considerarations If the Officers advancing some Paces before their Men be a great Animating them may it not be a greater Disanimating of the Soldiery to see them when ready to Charge put themselves into the first Rank For their going before their Squadrons while there is no danger and the returning when there is will in all likelihood make the latter Action dishearten more than the former can encourage for all Animations are more effectual when the danger is at hand than when it is remote When the Squadrons advance to Charge the Troopers Horses and their own Knees are as close as they