God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
From hence there doe arise diverse effects in the Soul from the Conscience reproving accusing and condemning a great sadnesse and trouble of mind remorses terrours and torments and on the other side from the excusing defending and absolving Conscience there proceeds an extraordinary peace and tranquility an unspeakable joy and solace an erected hope an unstartling confidence and a most stedfast and unshaken constancy of mind The third application of Conscience doth look on things future that are to be done in which the Conscience doth proceed as a Law-giver Schoolmaster and Admonisher or a Counsellour And in this manner of proceeding the offices and Acts of Conscience are to dictate to oblige to incite to retract these are the principle Acts of Conscience to whose voice incouraging to righteousness whosoever shall give ear he shall not fear her as a witnesse or as a Judge XXVIII I have now finished what I conceived necessary to be spoken concerning the nature of Conscience in which I have been longer I fear but certainly more obscure then either I would or ought to be if the Subject could otherwise have born it or then I hope I shall be in the following Lectures concerning the use of Conscience But truly all disputation concerning the faculties and Potentia's of the Intellective soul is intricate and perplexed as most grave and learned men have already complained of it both because the things themselves are something more remote from sensible matter and motion as also by reason of their mutual relation and connexion But peradventure you will say unto me by your Definition you have rather obscured then any ways illustrated a thing that is manifest and vulgarly known which is in the daily use and in the mouth of all men truly in this I cannot deny the objection so empty are the studies and cogitations of men and so weak are all our endeavours Those things which are before our feet and eyes which of themselves do jump into our thoughts and sences those things which are not unknown to the Cobler and the Weaver things which the most illiterate men do think they understand Odi ego in quit definire facilius est mihi videre in alterius definitione quid non prob m quà m quicquam beâ—è definiendo 〈…〉 August 2. de Ord. 2 and indeed in some measure do understand them the same things are not understood by the greatest of the Philosophers and the most refined wits are here at a stand VVhat Clown almost is there that thinks himself so wretchedly silâ—y as not to give you a perfect account of what is Time or Place or Motion and the like into the diving into and the unfolding of the Nature whereof Profound Accute Angelick Seraphick Doctors have for many ages past exercised and are still exerciseing themselves and after so much sweat and labour have not yet attained their desired Gole In time I am and of time I speak and yet I know not what time is saith St. Augustine of time In which I cannot sufficiently admire the infinite wisdome of the Almighty by this means beating down all humane pride Gal. 6. 3. and presenting to mortals as in a miror that empty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeming wisdom by which they would appear to be something when they are indeed nothing Hor. 1. Epist miserably deceiveing their own hearts that so men might learn metiri se modulo 7. Rom. 12. 30 ac pede suo to measure themselves by their own Last their own Module not to be wiser than it becommeth them but to be wise unto sobriety acknowledging their own foolishness that to God alone may be the glory of his wisdome THE SECOND LECTURE In which it is declared that in the Conscience of a good Intention there is not such a Protection that a man might safely rest therein ROM 3. 8. And as we are blamed and as some affirme that we say why do we not evil that good may come thereof whose damnation is just THat the mind of man doth contain something in it of Divinity is with a great consent confessed by the wisdome of the Anâ—ients Horat. 2. Satyr 2. who have termed it to be Divinae particulam aurae a particle of the Divine Ayre â—pictetus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and have affirmed that our minds have been taken from the immortal Gods and are pure as Heaven it self Nay some of them rising higher and speaking more boldly have not been afraid to say that the mind is God himself and have raised Temples to it as to a Diety 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Menander in Plutarch and Ovid Mens quoque Numen habet Menti aedâ—s in Copâ— tolio vid. Cic 2. de nat deor Liv. lib. 23. and Seneca Quid aliud voces animam quam Deum inhumano corpore hospitantem What else will you call the mind but a God lodging in a humane body In which words as some of them seem to have most reference to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the substance of the soul which being void of matter and bulk and free from Death and Corruption Plutarch in quaest platon Ovid. 2. Fast Senec. Epist 31. and endued with understanding and the liberty of will doth seem rather to come nearer to the nature of immortal Gods then of corporal things so the others do reflect upon that Power and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against energetical Virtue which we call the Conscience And from hence it is of Menanders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Xenocrat apud Aristot 2. Top. 6. To mortals every ones Conscience is a God And in this sence the Lord said that he had placed Moses as a God to Pharoah because he did inculcate into Pharoah the will of God he did excite Pharoah to the performance of it Mâ— minâ—rit Deum se ad ibere testem id est ut arbitâ—o méntem suam Cic. 3. Offic. and for not obeying it he did prosecute him with continual plagues and in the same sence it may be said that God hath given to every particular man a proper Conscience to be as a God unto him which in Gods steed as the Preacher of his eternal Law should dictate to him what he ought to do and what to avoid and which sollicitously should importune him to the performance of these duties which are commanded Exod. 8. 1. and severely should call unto him for an account of his actions good or evil which should extort from the most wicked an acknowledgement of the Divine Justice as a most just Judge should discern and assign unto every one either rewards or punishments according to their deserts for by nature the state of Conscience is placed as it were in the middle betwixt both beneath God but above Man subject unto God as a Hand-maid but set over man as a Mistresse II. From hence it is that Conscience is taken into a double consideration as
long use and Custome which is as it were another nature Fourthly by reason of the depraved affections which do ecclipse our judgments and do hinder the right use of them From these and many other causes it is so obvious unto men to erre to fall and to be deceived that it hath been long agoe a proverb Humanum est errare It is the property of a man to erre XXVI Adde to this in the second place that not we our selves do not alwayes sincerely judge of their piety and wisdome whose Judgments we do desire to follow it being very customary with those men who permit themselves to be governed by the arbitration of other men to make choice of such Conductors whom they before are confident will lead them in that way in which before hand they had determined to go themselves Thus doth Satan hold fast unwary men being as it were inclosed in his circle If you demand of them why they suppose such a thing to be true and right they answer Because this or that wise and godly man hath so taught us If you again shall demand of them how they do know their Teacher to be a pious and a prudent man they answer or at least would so answer if they would speak according to their hearts because he thinketh as we do think Et sapit mecum facit Jove judicat aequo The man is wise and doth as I intend And judgeth rightly having Jove his friend Many there are indeed who do measure the piety of other men not according to the practice of the duties of a Christians life and by the works of righteousnesse Mercy Charity and Devotion but by an affection to that faction to which they have bequeathed themselves and by the hatred to another party to which they professe themselves to be Enemies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the Apostle 2 Tim. 4. 3. They shall heap up unto themselves Teachers according to their own desires The Metaphor following is most proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when their ears do itch they seek those that will tickle them and thus the same doth befall them which in the old proverb is expressed Muli se mutuo scabunt One Mule doth scratch another XXVII Thirdly the word of God doth expressely forbid us to subject our Consciences to the judgment of any other or to usurp a Dominion over the Consciences of any one Ne vocemini Rabbi unus est enim vester 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magister Praeceptor Doctor Unctor Christus Be not ye called Rabbi for one is your Master who is Christ the word in the original signifies as well School-master Tutor Leader as Master And my brethren be you not many masters saith St. James Chap. 3. verse 5. To this purpose is that of St Peter in his first Book Chap 5. verse 2. Feed you the Flock of God which is committed to you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as holding forth a light before them that is the Doctrine of the true faith and the example of a godly life but not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as excercising a domination and an uncontrouled empire over the Clergy or the people of God And again 1 Cor. 7. 23. Empâ—i estis pretio nolite fieri servi hominum You are bought with a price be you not made the servants of men that is do not submit your Consciences to be governed by the Authority of any man according to his pleasure and command XXVIII From these things which are thus stated and proved to give you now some few Corallaryes and those in a few words it followeth in the first place that the insupportable pride and tyranny of the Pope of Rome ought most deservedly to be hated by every true Christian who by arrogating an infallible judgment to himself and to his chair doth by that name exercise an usurping power and domination over the Consciences of men and pretendeth so much right thereunto that if he should say virtues were vices and vices virtues all Christians are bound under the penalty of mortal sin to submit to his judgment without the least doubt or scruple We are therefore with all thankfulnes to acknowledg the great and Singular goodnes and mercy of Almighty God who for these many years hath freed us and our fore-fathers and the Church of England from so unconscionable a Tyranny and hath again restored us to our just liberties XXIX But we must all of us and every one of us take heed that being freed now from that Tyranny we do not stoop our necks to a new bondage least we be found not so much to have shaken off our yoak as to have changed it Quae bellua ruptis Quùm semèl effugit reddit se prava catenis Horat. Like to the Beast who having broke his chain Fondly returns to have it on again 2 Satyr 9. It doth indeed concern us highly if seriously we would provide for the peace of our own Consciences or of the Church and Common-wealth to take care least what heretofore was spoken of the Church of Corinth I am of Paul I of Apollos and I of Cephas be not heard of us I am of Luther I of Calvin I of Arminius and I of Socinius No let God be true and every man a Lyar He is not worthy to be Christs Disciple who is not the Disciple of Christ alone The simplicity and sincerity of the Christian Faith hath suffered a great prejudice since we have been divided into parties neither is there any hope that Religion should be restored to her former vigour and purity until the wounds made wider by our daily quarrels and dissentions being anointed with the Oyl of Brotherly Love as with a Balsome shall begin to close again and to grow intire into the same unity of Faith and Charity XXX In the third place we are to take heed lest being too indulgent to our depraved affections we do suffer our selves to be so drawn aside into the admiration of some men that we wholly depend upon their Authority Jude 1◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In which words the Apostle with a finger pointeth at the very Fountain of all this evill For this perverse admiration of Names hath no other Spring from whence it floweth but from this desperate self-admiration viz. whiles every man studyeth his own profit is ambitious of Honour and pursueth vain-glory and esteemeth no otherwise of all other men than according to the advantage he may receive from them And his Judgement being corrupted with these sordid affections he is most ready to admire those persons whom he thinks will be most ready to advance his Profit Honour Glory and his other inordinate desires And the very same thing another of the Apostles whom already I have cited doth expressely intimate they did choose unto them Master 2. Tim. 4. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to their own desires XXXI Neverthelesse that due Authority may be given to the Catholick Church
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
force and Vigor of a Law which lest it may seem to make a way for tyrannical Domination being ill understood hath heretofore been thus expounded by our Country-man Bracton What pleaseth the Prince that is not every thing which headily and out of the heat of his troubled mind is suddenly conceived and resolved upon but that which by the Counsel of his Peers his Royal Assent giving Authority unto it and deliberation and a debate being had thereon shall maturely and rightly be defined Cui 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 legibus ipsis legum vim imponendi potestatem Deus dedit Finch Nomotech in Epist dedic And in our Laws In the dayly proceedings in our Courts of Pleas the Laws according to the solemn Form of Appellation are called the Kings Lawes for no other Cause as our Lawyers have informed us but because the Kings of England are the Fountains of Justice and Laws and the Laws themselves in the reading of them professing it because from Almighty God they have granted to them an autocratical or a self-Ruling Power of giving force unto the Laws themselves that they may passe for and be esteemed as Laws This is so plain that we need not take any further pains in producing more witnesses XI And indeed this were enough and might give abundant satisfaction were it not for the impudence of an idle person that conceals his own Name who by a ruinous and a nasty fiction and which was never heard off in the world before these unhappy times hath endeavoured to cast a mist over so clear a light by raising an Invention of I know not what coordinate Power And to flatter the nefarious Counsels and Endeavours of some Neotericks in these dayes which being destitute of all defence of Right were nevertheless for the time to be supported by some specious pretence although never so weak and slender he doth in a Book published for that purpose earnestly labour to make the people sensible of that wild Philosophy which hither to had been imposed on them by way of contradiction viz. That the King being supreme and having no equal is notwithstanding at the same time not supreme and hath an equal yet is it not so much to be admired as lamented that there were found some who greedily snatched at and imbraced this ridiculous Invention as slid down from heaven and indeed because it concerned their Interest that the people should be seduced into such a false Belief they therefore suffered themselvs to be so insnared by this grosse Sophism as to become guilty of the foulest Perjury For what can deserve to be called Perjury if this be not Perjury in the highest Nature As to acknowledge and constitute a Power equal to him in his Kingdom whom in expresse words you have sworn to be the only and the supreme Power in the Kingdom Away then with this our so absurd Coordinator and with all his portentuous Jugglings and having so cleanly rid our hands of him let us proceed XII The said position or Conclusion is thirdly proved by reason the chiefest Act of Governing doth require the chiefest Power for every Act being the exercise of some Power doth presuppose in the Agent a Power proportionate to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the making of Laws is the supreme chief Act of Governing It cannot therfore be excercised unless by a person who is invested himself or who by his virtue and authority doth derive unto another the supreme power and jurisdiction over the Commonalty subjected to him For seeing there are two most noble parts and Species of jurisdiction and publick power and remarkable above the rest viz. the Legislative power and the power Judicial both of which consist in jure dicundo that is in pronouncing the Law from whence the name of jurisdiction doth proceed but with this difference that the jurisdiction of the Judge is the speaking of a Law only as it is already given or exhibited but the Jurisdiction of the Lawgiver is the speaking of a Law that is as yet unmade and remaineth still to be exhibited it followeth that the power of the Judge is far more narrow and not of such a noble extension as that of the Law-giver It is the office of the Judge to speak and give Laws unto the people by a Law already made but it is the office of the Law-giver to give Laws unto the Judge himself and to ordain a new Law which may be a Rule unto him in his seat of Judicature the Judge is obliged to pronounce according to the prescript of the Law constituted The Law-giver out of the plenitude of his power doth prescribe and constitute the Law which the inferiour Judge is no lesse bound for the future to observe than the people themselves It is therefore no wayes inexpedient that the judicial power being a power of an inferiour nature be ordinarily exercised by an inferiour person but it is as necessary as expedient that the supreme architectonical power of making Laws should be excercised by none but only by that person who hath in his hands the supreme power and so much of the first Doubt XIII The second demand or Quaere is Whether the consent of the people be required to the obligation of the Law For by what hath been already spoken a man may peradventure conceive that the power of making Laws doth pertain unto a Prince by so absolute and full a power that the Subjects have no part in this great affair and in whatsoever he determineth there remaineth nothing for the people to do but to perform his commands and to humble their necks under the yoak of his obedience And indeed according to the lusts of those who heretofore bore sway it may appear by their sic volo sic jubeo that this excesse of command did take such place amongst the Kings of former ages when the meer arbitrations of Princes stood for Laws that the name of a Tyrant of an innocent at the first and of an honest signification did grow at the last into a great ignominy by the foul abuse of so saving a power and even in our days it doth convey somthing that is horrid into our ears as often as we hear it spoken But that some consent of the people is at least required I have both heretofore manifested and it is granted by all of the most approved Authors that I have read Insomuch much that the Jesuits themselves the most stout Defenders of the Popes oecumenical omnipotence and which by them is by no limits to be included do yet hold that many in Germany and other places are to be excused for the non-observing of the Laws of the Council of Trent and the Bulls of the Sea of Rome only upon this Account that those Laws were never received into use amongst those Nations I affirm therefore and it is the common received opinion that the Laws propounded and instituted by a Prince or the Head of a Commonalty do not
Degree is the expresse Consent of the People to a Law propounded to them by the Prince and they consent unto it being asked that is when a Prince having prepared at home the matter of the Law by the Counsel of wise men and though not perfectly drawn it up yet he hath run it over and put it into some Form and transmitted it to his Subjects to be further examined that nothing may openly be contained in it that is either inconvenient or absurd requiring withall that they or a great part of them if they find it to be advantagious to the Common-wealth would confim it with their Suffrages that so by their Consents it may pass into a Law and this in some manner was heretofore the Custom of the Romans their Common-wealth yet standing And from this asking the Rogation of their Laws received its original A word most frequent amongst the best of the Writers of the Roman affairs XXVII The last and highest Degree which is the greatest and indeed the true Liberty of the People by which we Brittans have so long been happy even unto envy under excellent Kings and had we not out of our stupid Ingratitude made our selves unworthy of so great a blessing we had continued still most happy is the expresse Consent of the People before the enacting of the Law when the prescribed Form thereof a just and deliberate Debate being first had of the words and the matter of it and approved by the House of Peers the Suffrages of the House of Commons conjoined with them is at last exhibited to the Kings Majesty to whom alone the chief Power of making Laws doth belong that being by him confirmed if it seem good unto him it may have the Power and Vertue of a Law or otherwise it may be made void and be esteemed no Law which manner of enacting of Laws being most prudently devised by our Forefathers and brought even unto our times by so long a Series of Kings and years hath been found by the Use and Experience of all Ages past so profitable to the Common-wealth that if unseasonable Counsels had not been taken to speak no more of it for the removing of the old Marks and Limits from their right Places our Churches Universityes The King The People The Common-wealth and every private Family had by the blesâ—â—ng of God yet flourished which now by his most just Judgment do goe to wrack and every day do suffer more and more And I do believe that a better way cannot easily be thought upon by the wit of man to moderate on the one side the Power of Kings and to check and to restrain on the other side the Licence of the People XXVIII The fourth Doubt followeth of the Laws of lesse Commonalties for examples sake of Cities Universities Colleges and Schools which besides the Laws common to all the Subjects of the Kingdom do rejoice in their own private Laws Rights and Statutes The Question is to what Persons the Power of making their Laws doth pertain and being made whom and to what they oblige The answer is not difflcult I say therefore in the first place these Societies Corporations and Colleges being all Members of the great Body of the Kingdom and are contained in it as the inferiour orbes of the Heavens are contained in the Superiour it is not lawfull for any College or Society or for the Governours or Oversers of them to make private Laws for their own use which may be contrary or any ways prejudicial to the publick Laws of the whole Kingdom I say in the second place that seeing by the grant of Princes and their special grace and indulgence these societies are incorporated enjoy no other Rights Privileges or prerogatives besides those which it is manifest have been granted to them by a long praescription of time or by the Charters Letters Patents of the King it is to be concluded that all the Legislative power which is derived from them is a derived not a primitive power is at last to be resolved into the supreme power of the King as the true original of it and therefore the said Societies and Governors of them cannot according to their own will either constitute or actually exercise any power in the making of Laws unlesse according to the manner and the measure of that power vouchsafed by the indulgence of the Prince I say in the third place that Laws made by private Colleges and corporated Societies according to the tenor of the power granted them by the King do oblige all the Members of the said Societies and of all those that are under their jurisdiction or Government and none but those directly of it self and by its own force but by the Virtue of the Kings supreme Majesty on whose authority they rely and from which they receive all their force they do in some sense and indirectly oblige all and every Subject of the whole Kingdome but there is not the one and same account nor degree of these two obligations For these Laws oblige those of their own Society to the diligent observation of them but the others unto this that they do no ways violate or diminish them or hinder the observation of them XXIX The fifth Doubt is of Ecclesiastical Laws in the Species of them And that new Laws may be made concerning Rites and Ecclesiastical things and persons and of all Circumstances of outward external worship belonging to Order Honesty and Edification besides those delivered by Christ and his Apostles in the word of God is a thing so manifest and consentanious to Reason that he will hardly clear himself from the suspition of a perverse and obstinate Spirit who being dry and sober will deny it but since the time that the Divines have divided themselves into several parties it cannot easily be agreed upon amongst them to understand unto whom it doth belong to make Ecclesiastical Laws The Papists who would have the Clergy to be exempted from all jurisdiction of the Civil Magistrate of which controversy we cannot here dispute do affirm that Bishops only and amongst them the chief Bishop especially whom they call the Bishop Oecumenical hath the right and power to make Laws which may not only oblige the Consciences of the Clergy but of the Laity also and that without any consent or licence of the politick Magistrate There are some who the person only but not the opinion being changed do embrace this Tenet as also many others of the Papists who notwithstanding do professe themselves most bitter enemies unto Popery but in the mean time the Disciplinary Reformers our new Davusses do disturb all things and having taken away all Power Authority and Ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the King they do challenge it only to themselves and to their own Classes and Conventions The Erastians on the other side and our new Reformers no lesse than they under the pretence of Reformation having altogether disinvested the Clergy of all Ecclesiastical