doth nothing auaile to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall both vnited in one totall bodie whereof CHRIST onely and no earthly creature is the head For the reason why the bodie in man is subiect to the soule is because the bodie and soule doe make one essentiall compound as the Philosophers doe call it whereof the bodie is the matter and the soule is the forme and consequently the bodie must of necessitie and by a naturall sequele be subiect to the soule as euery matter is per se and of it own nature subiect to the form with which it maketh one essentiall compound but the temporal spiritual power or earthly Kingdomes and the spirituall kingdome of Christ as they make one totall body wherof Christ onely is the head doe not make one essentiall compound whereof one is as the matter and the other as the forme but they doe make one integrall compound as the Philosophers doe call it in that manner as the bodie of man is compounded of eyes eares tongue hands feete which are called by the Philosophers integrall and not essentiall parts of mans bodie but in an integrall compound it is not necessary as I shewed before f Cap. 6. nu 10. that one part be subiect to another although all must be subiect to the head as it is apparant in the eyes eares tongue hands and feet of mans bodie whereof none is subiect one to the other although all be subiect to the head Seeing therefore that the temporall and spirituall power are onely integrall parts of the totall body whereof Christ onely is the head it is euident that from hence no probable argument can be drawne to proue that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall but that both of them are vnited and subiect to Christ the inuisible head of them both 7. Thirdly although I should also grant that this were a fit similitude in all things and that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall in that manner as the body is subiect to the soule of man yet this manner of subiection would nothing auaile to proue that the spirituall power could either directly or indirectly dispose of temporalls depriue temporall Princes of their temporall liues or dominions vse temporall punishments or exercise any temporall action but it is rather a very fit similitude to conuince the flat contrary For as I will easily grant that the soule hath power to command or forbid the body to exercise any corporall action when it is necessarie or hurtfull to the end not onely of the soule but also of the body which last clause Card. Bellarmine cunningly omitteth for that it fauoureth as you shall see the Popes direct power to command temporalls as to see to heare to speake and such like actions which are subiect to the command of mans will I say which are subiect to the command of mans will for that there be many corporall actions which are not in the power of mans will to command as are all the actions of the nutritiue vegetatiue and generatiue powers But if the body by any let or hinderance can not or if it were possible would not doe that corporall action which the soule would willingly haue the body to doe as to see to heare to speake or to goe the soule hath no power of her selfe either directly or indirectly that is either for the good of the body or for the good of the soule to do that corporall action as to see heare speake or goe without the concurrence of the body it selfe 8. Neither hath the soule any power to inflict any corporal punishment by way of coercion or constraint that is to punish actually with corporall punishment any member of the body without the concurrence of some one or other member thereof but onely by the way of command that is to command some one member to punish it selfe or an other member as the hands feete or head to put themselues into fire or water or the hands to whip the shoulders to close thy eye-lids to stop the eares not to put meate into the mouth and such like which if the bodily member by any let or hinderance can not or if it were possible would not doe the soule hath done all that is in her power to doe for that she cannot of her selfe doe any corporall action without the concurrence of some corporall member but the most that she can doe concerning any corporall action or punishment is to command the body to concurre with her to the doing of that corporall action or punishment I said if it were possible for that there is such a naturall necessarie and intrinsecall subiection of the body to the soule that the body cannot resist the effectuall command of the soule in those things which are subiect to her command and therefore I said that if it were possible that the body could resist the command of the soule yet the soule of her selfe hath not power to exercise any corporall action without the concurrance of a corporall organ which manner of subiection is not betweene the temporall and spirituall power for that this subiection being in diuerse persons hauing free will is free and voluntarie and therefore the command may be resisted but the former being of the body to the soule making one only person who hath free will is necessarie and naturall and therefore can not be resisted 9. In the like manner I will easily grant that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall or rather that temporall Princes who haue temporall power but not as they haue temporall power are subiect to spirituall Pastours who haue spirituall power in such sort that the spirituall Pastour hath power to command the temporall Prince to do those temporal actions belonging to his temporall power which are necessarie to the end of the spirituall power and to forbid him those actions belonging to his temporall power which are repugnant to the end of the spirituall power which is eternall saluation which if hee refuse to doe and will not obey the command of the spirituall Pastour the spirituall Pastour can not by vertue only of his spirituall power exercise any temporall or ciuill action belonging to the temporall or ciuill power without the consent or concurrance of the temporall power Neither can the spirituall Pastor inflict any temporall or ciuill punishment by way of coercion constraint or compulsion that is punish actually with any temporall or ciuill punishment without the consent concurrance of the temporall or ciuill power but only by the way of command that is he hath power to command the temporall Prince who only hath supreme temporall authoritie to punish himselfe or his subiects with temporall or ciuill punishments if they vse their temporals to the hurt and preiudice of the spirituall power or the end therof although I doe willingly grant that the spirituall Pastour hath power to punish the temporall Prince or his subiects with spirituall
also by depriuing him of the sword as in the like case the Councell of Lateran often cited doth teach which one Councell is to be preferred before all the Barclaies or Iohns of Paris all men doe thinke who are not mad 28. Is not this thinke you a trim answere The question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine in this place was not concerning the Councell of Lateran wherof I will treat beneath * Part. 3. cap. 9. seq and plainely shew that notwithstanding all the clamours of my Aduersaries the said Councell hath neither defined or supposed for certaine nay or supposed at all that the Pope hath power to depose Soueraigne Princes as D. Schulckenius doth here collect from thence but the question was onely concerning the authoritie of S. Bernard And I prooued clearely out of S. Bernards wordes that although the Pope as Pope hath power to command or forbid in some cases the vse of the materiall sworde yet that he hath power as he is Pope to vse it himselfe or to depriue the Emperour of the vse thereof which implyeth a power to vse it himselfe this I said could not be proued but rather the contrarie out of those words of S. Bernard who doth not only say that it is not fitting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword as D. Schulckenius would mince his words but that it is forbidden the Pope to draw foorth or vse the materiall sword Now D. Schulckenius passeth ouer S. Bernard and flyeth to the Councell of Lateran to proue that if the Emperour refuse at the Popes command to vse the materiall sword he may by the Popes authoritie bee depriued of the vse thereof whereas the present question was only concerning the opinion of S. Bernard and not what was the doctrine of the Councell of Lateran in this point whose authoritie I doe asmuch respect either as Card. Bellarmine or any other Catholike is bound to doe But it is an easie matter to wrest the words of the Councell of Lateran or any other to their purpose contrary to the true meaning of the Councell and then to crie out ô the Councell of Lateran which is to be preferred before all Barclaies and Widdringtons c. whereas we doe asmuch respect the authoritie of the Councell of Lateran or any other as they do although we doe not so much respect their ouer wrested collections which they to serue their owne turnes doe gather from any Councel or text of holy Scripture contrarie to the plaine proper and true sense and meaning of the words But to such shiftings and windings euen learned men are sometimes brought when they will make their vncertaine opinions and priuate expositions of holy Scriptures or Councells to be infallible grounds of the Catholike faith 29. Lastly but the foundation saith D. Schulckenius of Widdringtons errour is for that he thinketh that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour by reason of the faith and free promise which the Emperour gaue and made to the Pope according to the similitude which a little before he put concerning one who promised an other to spend his life and all his goods in defence of him But this foundation is false because the authoritie of the Pope ouer Christian Princes doth not proceed from their onely promise or faith which they haue giuen but from the law of God by which law the Pope is made by Christ the Pastour of all his stocke the chiefe of all his familie the head of all his body and the Rectour of all his Church Wherefore it is no maruaile if from false foundation he conclude a falshood to wit that S. Bernards words do not onely not fauour the Popes temporal power but are flat contrarie to it What I beseech you could be spoken more cleerely for the Popes temporall power then that which S. Bernard said that the temporall sword is the Popes and that both swords are the Churches and that the temporall sword ought to be drawne foorth at the Popes becke And as for Ioannes Parisiensis there is no great reckoning to be made of him whatsoeuer he saith both for that he is repugnant to the Councell of Lateran and many others and also that other his errours are condemned by the Church in the common Extrauagant Vas electionis and lastly for that either he denieth only the Popes direct power in temporalls or else he doth plainly contradict himselfe 30. But truely it is strange that learned men and who pretend to maintaine nothing but truth dare aduenture to auouch so bouldly and in such publike writings so manifest vntruths and which they themselues in their consciences can not but see to be plain and palpable vntruths I very often and that of set purpose did affirme in my Apologie and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words that the Pope as Pope hath power to command temporall Princes in temporals in order to spirituall good and yet this man to make his Reader beleeue that I doe teach flat heresie blusheth not to affirme in an other place n Pag. 256. that I deny that the Pope as Pope hath power to commaund temporall Princes in temporalls in order to spirituall good So likewise I did oftentimes in my Apologie affirme o Num. 90.91.181.223.341 and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words that the Pope as Pope hath power by the law of God and for that he is appointed by Christ to be the supreme spirituall Pastour of the Catholike Church to constraine and punish all disobedient Christians both Princes and people with spirituall and Ecclesiasticall punishments and yet now this man to perswade his Reader that I teach heere a manifest errour is not ashamed to affirme that I am of opinion that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour in regard onely of the free promise which the Emperour hath made to the Pope And therefore D. Schulckenius neither dealeth truely nor sincerely and both deludeth his Reader and also wrongeth mee in affirming that to bee my doctrine which I expressely impugne and that to be the foundation of my opinion which hee is pleased to call an errour which I in expresse words and that oftentimes haue denied 21. For as I doe willingly grant that although a temporall Prince hath power to command and with temporall punishments to compell if neede require his temporall subiects to make and sweare an expresse promise of that true faith loyaltie and temporall allegeance which by the Law of God and nature they doe owe to their lawfull Prince yet I doe not affirme that a temporalll Prince hath power to constraine his rebellious subiects by vertue onely of the promise which they haue made but by vertue of his supreme temporall power which hee hath as hee is a supreme temporall Prince by the Law of God and nature So also I do willingly grant that although the Pope hath power to command and with spirituall punishments to compell if neede require all Christian Princes and
people to make and sweare an expresse promise of that the true faith loyalty and spirituall allegeance which as they are Christians and members of the mysticall body of Christ they doe owe by the Law of God to the supreme spirituall Pastour and visible head of this mysticall bodie and Church of Christ and the Emperour at his coronation taketh such an oath neuerthelesse I doe not affirme that the Pope hath power to constraine and punish disobedient Princes and people by vertue onely of the promise which they haue made to the Pope of their spirituall obedience but by vertue of his supreme spirituall power which he hath by the Law of God and his Pastorall authority giuen to him by our Sauiour Christ Iesus 32. True it is that the Reader might the better vnderstand that to command one to vse a temporall thing and to vse it himselfe to command one to dispose of temporals and to dispose of them himselfe are very different things and that the one doth not necessarily follow from the other I brought a familiar example of one who either by promise or by some other obligation and yet D. Schulckenius taketh hold onely of the promise and cleane omitteth the other obligation is bound to dispose and giue his goods or life at anthers command who notwithstanding this promise or other obligation doth still keepe the property dominion and right ouer his goods and life in such sort that the other cannot be vertue of his commanding power which he hath ouer him and them take them away and dispose of them without his consent but if hee will not dispose of his goods at the others command according as by vertue either of his promise or of some other obligation he is bound to doe the other may complaine to the Magistrate that hee will punish him for his offence or cause him to performe his promise so far forth as the coerciue power of the Magistrate doth extend From which I concluded that considering to haue the power to command the vse of the temporall sword and to haue a power to vse it or to depriue of the vse thereof are two different things neither doth one necessarily follow from the other although the Pope as Pope hath according to S. Bernard power to command the Emperour to vse the temporall sword yet it doth not therefore follow that if the Emperour will not vse the temporall sword at the Popes command the Pope as Pope can vse it himselfe or depriue the Emperour of the vse thereof which implieth a power to vse the same but onely that the Pope being a spirituall Prince or Pstour may punish the Emperor for his contempt with spirituall punishments which only doe belong to the coercive power of the supreme spirituall Prince Pastor of the spirituall kingdome Church of Christ 33. Thus therefore you haue seen that S. Bernard doth nothing fauour but it is rather flat contrarie to the Popes power to vse the temporall sword neither could he scarse speake more cleerely against the same then he hath done For although it be cleere that the temporall sword is according to S. Bernard the Popes in some sort and doth belong to the Church in some sort which words in some sort D. Schulckenius heere cunningly omitteth and that in some cases it must be vsed at the becke direction or declaratiue command of the Pope yet the aforesayd limitations of S. Bernard that it is the Popes and belongeth to the Pope in some sort that it is to be vsed for the Church but not by the Church with the hand of the Souldier and not of the Priest at the becke indeede of the Pope but at the command of the Emperour and that our Sauiour commanded and not only counselled S. Peter to put vp his sword into the scabard do plainly shew that according to S. Bernard the Pope as Pope cannot vse the temporal sword nor constrain a temporall Prince by vsing temporall punishments which doth imply a power to vse the temporal sword 34. And for D. Barclay and Iohn of Paris to omit our learned Country-man Alexander of Hales whose words I related before p Num. 18. who doe giue the very same answere which I haue giuen to the aforesaid words of S. Bernard of whose authoritie although Card. Bellarmine heere doth make very small reckoning yet I do plainly confesse that in this controuersie concerning the Popes authoritie to vse the temporall sword and to dispose of all temporals in order to spirituall good I doe more regard their authoritie then I doe Card. Bellarmines speaking with all dutifull respect for that in my opinion they haue handled this question more soundly more cleerely and more sincerely then he hath done Neither is their doctrine repugnant to the Councell of Laterane but onely to the particular exposition which som few especially of late yeeres who haue scraped together all the authorities of Fathers Councells Scriptures facts and decrees of Popes which may seeme any way to fauour the Popes temporall authoritie haue wrested out the words of the said Councel contrarie to the plaine sense of the words and the common vnderstanding of all ancient Diuines who neuer vrged this authoritie of the Councell of Laterane although it hath beene so long publikely extant in the body of the Canon Law But it is now adaies a common fault euen among Catholike Diuines and those also who not perceiuing their owne errour doe accuse others of the same to alleadge in confirmation of their opinions the holy Scriptures and sacred Councels vnderstood according to their owne priuate spirit and meaning and then to cry out against their brethren who mislike their opinions that they haue the holy Sriptures and sacred Councels on their side and that therefore their doctrine is of faith and the contrary hereticall and that their Aduersaries doe oppose themselues against the holy Scriptures and decrees of the Catholike Church whereas wee doe regard with all dutifull respect the holy Scriptures sacred Councels and decrees of the Catholik Church the authority of which consisteth in the true and authenticall sense not in the letter or in the expositiō of any priuate Catholike Doctour which exposition others doe contradict and do oppose our selues only against their vncertaine opinions and expositions of holy Scriptures or sacred Councells grounded vpon their priuate spirit and vnderstanding contrary to the true proper and plaine meaning of the words 35. And although this Ioannes Parisiensis or rather another Iohn of Paris liuing at the same time and surnamed de Poliaco as I said before q Part. 1. ca. 3. nu 7. seq was cōpelled to recall in open Consistory at Auinion before Pope Iohn the 22. certain errors which he maintained cōcerning confession and absolution of whose authoritie neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine in the latter Editions of his controuersies notwithstanding those his errours maketh some rekoning seeing he citeth him as a Classicall Doctour in fauour of his opinion
the rest of the Apostles is according to the intention of Christ 29. But truely although there may be alleadged some probable congruities wherefore our Sauiour might grant some speciall prerogatiue and priuiledge of exemption to S. Peter whom he had chosen to be the first and principall head and gouernour of his Church rather then to the rest of the Apostles as likewise the Diuines doe yeeld probable congruities wherefore God almighty might giue to the B. Virgin Mary whom he had chosen to be the mother of his immaculate Sonne a speciall prerogatiue and priuiledge of exemption from originall sinne but whether he did grant that priuiledge or no it cannot certainely be proued neuerthelesse for my owne part I doe not see any probable likelihood that our Sauiour should giue to the rest of the Apostles and much lesse to all Cleargie men any speciall priuiledge of exemption from all ciuill subiection to temporall Princes And therefore the most part of the Schoole Diuines yea also and of the Iesuites themselues doe hould that Cleargie men are directly subiect to the ciuill lawes of temporall Princes in all those thinges which are not repugnant to their state nor to the Ecclesiasticall Canons and consequently that they are not exempted from all subiection and obedience and from the directiue or commanding power of Secular Princes but that they are bound not onely by force of reason but also by vertue of the law and of their due obedience to obserue such ciuill lawes 30 A fourth reason which Card. Bellarmine bringeth m In tract contra Barcl cap. 3. pag. 50 wherefore he recalled his former opinion and why the Apostles were not de iure subiect to temporall Princes is because they are appointed by God Princes ouer all the earth as wee read in the 44. Psalme For although that principality was spirituall not temporall yet it was true principallity and farre more noble then temporall principallitie But this reason is not sufficient for as I obserued in my Apologie n nu 68. seq the same man being considered diuerse waies may be subiect and superiour subiect in temporalls and supreame in spirituals and contrariwise neither is temporall subiection repugnant to spirituall authority nor temporall authority repugnant to spiritual subiection neither from hence doth it follow that either temporall authority it selfe is subiect to spirituall power or spirituall power subiect to temporall authority but onely that the same man who is superiour in temporalls is subiect in spiritualls and who is superiour in spiritualls is subiect in temporalls as the same man who is a Musition may be subiect and seruant to a Physition or contrariwise and yet it doth not from hence follow that Musicke it selfe is subiect to Physicke or contrariwise 31 And if Card. Bellarmine doe answere as he doth in his Schulckenius n Pag. 172. that when the powers are equall it may perchance fall out that the same compared diuerse waies may be subiect and superiour but if the powers be vnequall and one subordained to an other as are spirituall and ciuill power it cannot fall out that the same man be subiect to him who is his superiour this answere is also as insufficient as the former First for that the temporall power it selfe is not subordained to the spirituall as I haue shewed before for otherwise temporall Princes should not onely in spiritualls but also in mere temporalls be subiect to spirituall Pastours as if Musicke it selfe be subiect to Physicke a Musition as he is a Musition and in all thinges belonging to Musicke should be subiect to Physicke and consequently to a Physition as he is a Physition Secondly for that it is the common opinion of the Schoole Diuines and also of the Iesuites that Cleargie men are subiect to the directiue temporall power or command of temporall Princes 32 Thirdly for that there is no repugnance but rather a necessary consequence that spirituall Princes not as they are spirituall Princes but as they are true parts and members of the temporall common wealth should be subiect in temporall affaires to temporall Princes for euery member saiâ—h Card. Bellarmine o Liâ— de Monachis cap. 19. ought to be subiect to the head and Cleargie men besides that they are Cleargie men are also citizens and parts of the ciuill common wealth as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth in an other place p Lib. de Clericis cap. 28. and the King is head of the politike or ciuill body as also in his Schulckenius he expresly affirmeth q Pag. 339. Fourthly for that Card. Bellarmine is also now of opinion at least wise he was when he wrote against D. Barckley that it is probable that the Priests of the old law who had true spirituall power and were true spirituall Princes were subiect to Kinges and therfore for this reason to recall his former opinion and especially to condemne it as improbable were both to contradict himselfe and also to condemne of temeritie the learnedst Schoole Diuines of this age and also of his Societie 33 These be all the principall reasons which I can finde in Card. Bellarmine for which he was moued to recall his former opinion and to condemne it as improbable which how probable they be or rather very insufficient to moue such a learned man as Card. Bellarmine is to forsake the Schole Diuines and to fly to the Canonists who as pope Pius the fift sincerely confessed r Nauar. super cap. non liceat Papaâ— 12. q. 2 55. 3â— nu 6 doe attribute to the Pope more authoritie then is fitting and to censure so rigorously and rashly the learnedst Catholikes of this age and also of his owne Societie of temeritie I remit to the iudgement of the discreete Reader as also to consider whether reason or affection to aduance the Popes authoritie moued him not onely to recall his former opinion but also to condemne it as improbable 33 Lastly that the Reader may haue some knowledge of the true state of the question concerning the authority of spirituall Pastors to exempt Clergy men from the power of Secular Princes for that some Diuines are of opinion that from the exemption of Clergy men a strong Argument may bee drawne to pâ—oue that a spirituall Prince or Pastor hath power to depose or depriue a temporall Prince who is subiect to him in spiritualls of his temporall Kingdome and Dominions First therefore the true state of the question betwixt mee and my Aduersaries is not concerning the exemption of Cleargie men by way of command for I doe willingly grant that a spirituall Prince or Pastor as hee is a spirituall Pastor hath power to command a Christian Prince who is subiect to him in spiritualls not to exercise his temporall power in some cases if the necessity of the Church or Christian Religion doth require it ouer the persons of Clergy men who are his temporall Subiects so that if a secular Prince should disobey the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastor hee should offend against the vertue of
Religion for the which offence his spirituall Pastor might punish him with Ecclesiasticall censures and of this manner of exemption by way of command and spirituall coercion all the Canons and Decrees of Popes and Councells which doe signifie imply or suppose that Clergy men may by the authority of the Church without the consent of temporall Princes bee exempted from secular powers either touching their persons or their goods may bee very well vnderstood I said if the necessity of the Church doth require it for at this present I will not enter into particulars what manner of necessity is required that a spirituall Pastor may impose such a command vpon his temporall Prince 34 But the controuersie betwixt mee and my Aduersaries betwixt those Catholikes who are so vehement for the Popes power to depose Princes and those on the contrary side is whether spirituall Pastors as they are spirituall Pastors or by vertue of their spirituall power haue not onely by way of command and spirituall coercion but also by way of sentence authority to exempt without the consent of Princes Clergy men who before were subiect to them in temporalls from the directiue and coerciue power of secular Princes in such sort that after the sentence of such exemption bee giuen Clergy men are no more the subiects of that secular Prince for that his spirituall Pastor doth depriue him of that ciuill power which before the sentence hee had ouer Clergy men And what is said of particular Bishops in respect of Princes who are their spirituall children is to bee vnderstood of the Supreme spirituall Pastor in respect of all Christian Princes who are subiect to him in spiritualls This is the true state of the question 35 So that the Reader may clearely perceiue that although from the first manner of exemption by way of command and spirituall coercion no good argument can be drawne to proue that the spirituall power can depose Princes and depriue them of their Regall authoritie by way of sentence yet there is great coherence betwixt these two questions concerning the power of spirituall Pastors to depose Princes by way of sentence and their power to exempt by way of sentence Cleargie men from all subiection to Secular Princes For the first question is whether the spirituall power can by way of sentence depriue temporall Princes of all their temporall power and absolue all their Subiects from their temporall alleagiance and the second is whether it can depriue them of some part of their temporall power and absolue some of their subiects from their temporall allegiance And therefore those Catholikes who doe grant the second will easily grant the first and who doe grant the first must of necessity grant the second for that there can be no sufficient reason alleadged why the spirituall power can in order to spirituall good depriue Princes of some part of their Regall authoritie and not of all and absolue some subiects from their temporall allegiance and not all and if it can depriue oâ— all iâ— must needes follow that it can also of some part And contrariwise those Catholikes who affirme that the spirituall power cannot exempt ot absolue Cleargie men from their temporall allegiance and subiection to temporall Princes must consequenily affirme that it can not exempt or absolue all subiects from their temporall allegiance and who affirme that it can not absolue or exempt all subiects from their temporall allegiance nor depriue a temporalâ— Prince of all his Regall authority will easily affirme that it cannot exempt or absolue Cleargie men from their temporall alleagiance and subiection nor depriue a temporall Prince of any part of his Regall authority 36 But some doe greatly vrge this obiection If the spirituall power can command temporall Princes not to exercise their temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men without the consent of their Ecclesiasticall superiour it doth consequently follow that a temporall Prince doth offend if he transgresse the iust and lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour and therefore it seemeth that a temporall Prince hath no power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men after such a command supposing it to be lawfull vnlesse wee will grant that a temporall Prince hath power to commit sinne and to transgresse the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour 37 To this obiection wherewith I haue knowne diuers men of learning to bee somewhat perplexed those Catholikes who deny that the spirituall power can depriue by way of sentence a temporall Prince of his Regall Authority either wholly or in part may easily answer in this manner that if a temporall Prince doth excercise his temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Clergy men against the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour hee sinneth indeed against Religion and the generall vertue of obedience in that hee vseth his power contrary to the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour but hee doth not sinne against the speciall vertue of legall or morall iustice in vsing his authority ouer them who are not his subiects and ouer whom hee hath no temporall power and Authority in that manner as another man who is not their Prince should offend Neither is it vnvsuall for a man to commit a sinne in doing that which in respect of iustice hee hath power and authority to doe 38 As for example it is a sinne against the vertue of liberality for one to giue away his goods prodigally although if wee respect iustice hee hath true and full power to giue them away for that he giueth nothing but that which is his owne and therefore that prodigall guift although it be vnlawfull yet is not vniust as iustice is taken not as it comprehendeth all vertues in generall but in particular for a speciall vertue and one of the foure Cardinall vertues So also it is a sin against the vertue of temperance to giue money to commit an vnhonest act and yet the gift is not vniust for that hee giueth nothing but his owne and which according to iustice hee hath power to giue So likewise if a Ghostly father command his penitent to giue a certaine part of his goods to the poore in satisfaction of his sinnes if the penitent doe bestow them otherwise then hee was commanded hee sinneth against the vertue of Religion and Sacrament of pennance in transgressing his Ghostly fathers lawful command but he committeth no iniustice because hee giueth that which is his owne and which if wee regard the vertue of iustice hee hath power to giue neither doth the command of his Ghostly father depriue him of the right dominion property and power which he had before ouer those goods 39 Lastly if the Pope should vpon iust cause suspend a Priest from the Altar or a Bishop from his Episcopall function and consequently forbid the Priest to consecrate and the Bishop to giue orders if they should disobey the Popes lawfull command they should sinne against the
vertue of Religion in vsing their power vnlawfully but they should not sinne for doing that which they haue no power to doe as hee who is no Priest or Bishop should in consecrating or giuing orders offend for that the power of a Priest to consecrate and of a Bishop to giue orders cannot either wholly or in part bee taken away from them by the Pope So likewise although a spirituall Pastor should for iust cause forbid a temporall Prince who is his spirituall child and subiect to excercise his Regall power and authority ouer Clergy men if that temporall Prince should heerein transgresse the command of his spirituall Pastor supposing it to bee lawfull hee should indeed offend against religion in vsing his Regall power and authority contrary to the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastor which command was imposed for the motiue of Religion neuerthelesse hee should not offend against iustice in doing that which hee hath no power and authority to doe in that manner as another man who is not their Prince should by depriuing them of their goods or punishing their persons if they transgresse the lawes offend For that it is not in the power of a spirituall Pastor to depriue a temporall Prince either wholly or in part of his Regall power and temporall Soueraignty 40 Wherefore if wee respect the power it selfe and the vertue of legall or morall iustice a temporall Prince hath full ample and supreme royall power and authority ouer Clergy men notwithstanding that his spirituall Pastor should for iust cause command him not to exercise his Regall power vpon the persons of Clergie men who doe offend his lawes but if wee respect rhe vse and execution of the power and the vertue of religion the vse indeed of his power in the aforesaid case is so limited by the lawfull command of the spirituall Pastor that the Prince vsing his power ouer Clergy men sinneth against Religion for that hee disobeyeth the lawfull command of his spirituall Superiour which was imposed for the motiue of religion but not against iustice for that hee doth not excercise his Regall power but vpon those who are his Subiects and doe owe vnto him true loyalty and temporall obedience 41 And truely if the aforesaid obiection were of force that the temporall Prince hath no power or authority ouer Clergie men who are subiect to him in temporalls against the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour because he hath no power to sinne it would likewise follow that a suspended Bishop or Priest haue no power to giue orders or to consecrate because they haue no power to sinne and a penitent hath no lawfull right or power to sell or giue away his goods against the lawfull command of his Ghostly Father because he hath no power to sinne and a man hath no power or right to giue money to a dishonest end or to giue away his goods prodigally and consequently they should be restored back againe because he hath no power to sinne I will say nothing at this time how farre Cleargie men either by the priuiledges of Christan Princes or by the Ecclesiasticall Canons are de facto exempted both in their goods and in their persons from ciuill powers but onely I thought good at this time to set downe the true state of the question among Catholikes concerning the authority of spirituall Pastours to exempt Cleargie men from the temporall power of Christian Princes that thereby they may clearely perceiue what kinde of argument may be drawne from the exemption of Cleargie men to proue the Popes power to depose Princes and by way of sentence to depriue them wholy of their Regall authoritie 42 Thus you haue seene in what manner temporall thinges are subiect to spirituall temporall endes to spirituall endes temporall power to the spirituall power the temporall sword to the spirituall sword the flesh to the spirit the Moone to the Sunne and temporall Princes to spirituall Pastors and that from the subiection and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall no good argument can be brought to proue that the Pope by vertue of his spirituall power can dispose of temporalls depose temporall Princes or punish temporally by way of coercion but onely that in order to spirituall good he can command temporalls and punish temporally by way of command but by way of coercion onely with spirituall and not with temporall punishments And by this which hath bene saide the Reader may easily vnderstand the true sense and meaning of a certaine proposition which Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius doth often inculcate as though there were some great mystery lye hidden therein to proue the Popes power to depose temporall Princes to wit that a Christian Prince is a child of the Church and subiect to the Pope not onely as he is a Christian man but also as he is a Christian Prince and the same he affirmeth of a Christian â—awyer of a Christian Souldier of a Christian Physitian and so of the rest 43 For all these three propositions A Christian Prince as he is a Christian Prince is a child of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours A Christian Prince as he is a Christian is a Child of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours and a Prince as he is a Christian is a Childe of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours haue one and the selfe same sense and so likewise of a Christian Lawier of a Christian Soldier of a Christian Physitian c. For the true meaning of them all is that Christianitie and not Regall authority or the knowledge of lawe warfare or Physicke is the cause why a Prince a Lawier a Soldier a Physitian and all other men of what trade soeuer they be are Children of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours and that therefore they are to be directed and instructed by spirituall Pastours not precisely in the rules of ciuill gouernment in the rules of lawe warfare or Physicke but onely in the rules and principles of Christian doctrine and how they ought to gouerne ciuilly and vse their knowledge and trades according to the rules and precepts of Christian Religion which if they refuse to doe they may be corrected and punished by spirituall Pastours with spirituall or Ecclesiasticall punishments 44 But from hence it doth not follow that either temporall power the knowledge of the lawe warfare or physicke are among Christians per se subiect to the spirituall power but onely per accidens as I haue often declared and in those thinges which doe concerne or belong to Christian Religion or that spirituall Pastours can by vertue of their spirituall power correct or punish Christian Princes Lawiers Soldiers Physitians c. by depriuing them by way of sentence of their Regall authoritie of their skill and knowledge in the lawes in warfare or Physicke which they did not receiue from the spirituall power but onely by depriuing them of the Sacraments and such like spirituall benifites of which they
that the Pope hath no such authoritie Must the opinion of Card Bellarmine or of Suarez or of any other learned Catholike be a rule of reason to all other learned Catholikes or to bee accounted by all Catholikes the principles of the Catholike faith All Catholikes doe confesse that the Pope hath authoritie to excommunicate a Christian King and that Subiects are not bound to obey an excommunicated King in those things which the Censure of Excommunication of it owne nature and by the institution of Christ doth forbid but to absolue Subiects from their temporall allegiance either by vertue of Excommunication which being a spirituall Censure hath neither of it owne nature nor by the institution of Christ such a temporall effect or by the sentence of depriuation this many learned Catholikes with the State of France doe affirme not to belong to the Popes spirituall authoritie to binde or loose 16 True also it is that all Christians are subiect to the keyes of the Church but these keyes are spirituall not temporall of the kingdome of heauen and not of earthly kingdomes neither is any Christian excepted from that authoritie which Christ gaue to S. Peter by those words whatsoeuer thou shalt loose c. But those words are not to be vnderstood of temporall but onely of spirituall bindings and loosings as I haue often shewed neither did any of the ancient Fathers euer extend the keyes of the Church to the absoluing of Subiects from their temporall allegiance or to the depriuing of Kings and Princes of their temporall liues libertie kingdomes or goods as by some Catholikes of these latter ages contrarie to the true meaning and institution of Christ and to the vnderstanding and practise of the primitiue Church they haue been violently wrested To that whatsoeuer thou shalt loose c. I answer saith Ioannes Parisiensis according to S. Chrysostome Rabanus that by this is not vnderstood any power to be giuen but spirituall to wit to absolue from the bond of sinnes For it were foolish to vnderstand that by this is giuen a power to absolue from the bond of debts and much lesse from that great and high debt of temporall allegiance 16. These be all the exceptions which D. Schulckenius taketh against those authorities which I broght in my Theologicall Disputation Now let any indifferent Reader iudge whether he hath sufficiently answered those authorities or rather by cauilling and shuffling laboured cunningly to shift them off and whether Mr. Fitzherbert might not blush to affirme so boldly that D. Schulckenius to whom he cunningly also as you haue seene remitteth his English Reader for his answer to those authorities hath answered particularly to euerie one of them and prooued cleerely that diuerse of them make flat against Widdrington and many nothing at all for him being truely vnderstood and that some others are worthily reiected being either so absurd that they are easily confuted by the circumstances of the places alledged or else heretikes as appeareth by their doctrine in other things or knowen Schismatikes who liuing in the times of the Emperours or Kings that were deposed wrote partially in their fauours of which sort neuerthelesse there are very few so that of all the Authours that Widdrington hath scraped together to make some shew of probabilitie in his doctrine hee hath no one cleere and sufficient witnesse to iustifie the same which how true it is or rather most cleerely false I remit to the consideration of the indifferent and iudicious Reader 17. For the testimony of Iohn Trithemius a learned and vertuous Catholike who expressely affirmeth that it is a controuersie among Schoolmen as yet not decided by the Iudge whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperour or no partly hee reiecteth partly that word Schoolemen hee ridiculously expoundeth to be Historiographers Grammarians Poets as Sigebert Valla Dante 's who neuerthelesse are by Trithemius himselfe related to be also excellent Diuines and partly to repell his testimonie he falsely grossely and vnaduisedly taxeth him with errours committed in his historie and for proofe thereof he remitteth his Reader to Posseuine who as you haue seene both in that and also other points of historie hath shamefully erred himselfe and neuerthelesse that which Trithemius affirmeth Iacobus Almaine a famous Schoole-Diuine and classicall Doctour of Paris who liued also in those daies confirmeth to be true whose words D. Schulckenius doth cunningly passe ouer without any answer at all Albericus a Classicall Doctour of the canon and ciuill Law for that hee deliuereth his opinion with submission is ready to recal it if it should prooue erroneous as euery good Catholike ought to doe he will haue to speake wauering and altogether doubtfull Ioannes Parisiensis a most learned Schoole-Diuine partly he will haue to make nothing for my opinion and yet he confesseth that Parisiensis is of opinion that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue a Prince of his Kingdome by a iuridicall sentence of depriuation which neuerthelesse is the maine and sole point which I contend to prooue and partly to cleane ouerthrow his testimony he taxeth him without sufficient ground of many errours which errours neuerthelesse although he should haue maintained doe cleerely confirme this doctrine against the Popes power to depose Princes The testimony of Mr. D. Barclay a famous learned and vertuous Catholike he no more regardeth then of an heretike To M. Blackwell and those other English Priests he answereth nothing The Records of the generall assembly of the States of France related by Bochellus with such particular circumstances that no man can misdoubt of them for a friuolous reason hee accounteth incredible The testimonie of Petrus Pithaeus a very learned Catholike and a diligent searcher of antiquity by Posseuines confession affirming that France hath euer held for certaine that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose their King also for friuolous reasons hee vtterly reieiecteth which neuerthelesse the late proceeding of the Court of Parliament against his and such like bookes hath sufficiently confirmed And if this manner of answering authorities is to bee admitted who may not easily shift off any authorities whatsoeuer especially when they shall haue their trumpetters to extoll all their writings and answers to the skie and to depresse their aduersaries and who shall seeme to make against them whether they be liuing or dead euen to the pit of hell appeaching them of heresie errour schisme and such like hainous crimes 18. Many other authorities I brought in my Apologie which doe cleerely contradict Card. Bellarmines doctrine which onely I tooke vpon mee to confute whereof some of them doe expressely affirme that the Church of Christ hath onely a spirituall and not a temporall sword Others that temporall Princes are in temporall affaires next vnder God and to bee punished with temporall punishments by God alone and that the temporall power is independant of the spirituall Others that neither Childerike was deposed nor the Romane Empire translated from the Graecians
among Christians is not per se and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power is for that in his Schulckenius he affirmeth h Pag. 276. ad nu 140. That among the Heathen Romanes the ciuill power was subiect to the spiritual power of a false religion and a little beneath if the ciuill power saith he be ioyned with a false Ecclesiasticall power that is of a false Religion as it was in the Heathen Romane Common-wealth then it is actually subordained to a false Ecclesiasticall power and if it bee ioyned with a true Ecclesiasticall power as in the Christian and Catholike Church then it is actually subordained to a true Ecclesiasticall power Now what Philosopher or Diuine will affirme that a true ciuill power is per se and of it owne nature actually ordained subordained or referred to a false Ecclesiasticall power that is of a false Religion or to the worshipping of false Gods Therfore this subiection subordination or relation of true ciuill power to the spirituall proceedeth from the intention of him in whom the ciuill power doth reside who according to his faith and religion bee it true or false referreth his true ciuill power to a true or false Religion to a true or false worshipping of God and not from the nature or any intrinsecal propertie of the true ciuill power it selfe which as it is the same in Infidels and Christians or in whatsoeuer subiect it be so also of it own nature hath the same end as well in Infidels as in Christians to wit temporall peace to which of it owne nature it is alwaies referred And therefore I doe not onely say but also I doe cleerely prooue and that out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds to which neuerthelesse I being only an answerer and not an opponent was not tied that neither the ciuil power being only a naturall power nor the end of ciuill power which is temporal peace being onely a naturall end is per se and of it owne nature subiect or subordained to a true supernaturall power or end but onely by the intension of him in whom the ciuill power doth reside 9. Now you shal see how wel D. Schulckenius proueth the contrarie But wee prooue the contrary saith he i Pag. 329. ad nu 162. because the end of the spirituall common-wealth is euerlasting saluation which is the last end the end of the temporall common-wealth is the peace of the Citie or Kingdome which is not the last end but a mediate end But all ends are subordained per se and of their owne nature to the last end and in vertue of it they doe mooue as all efficient causes are subordained per se and of their owne nature to the first efficient cause and in vertue of it they worke whatsoeuer they doe worke See S. Thomas 1â— 2â— q. 1. ar 6. 10. But to this argument I answered before that the last create end of the spirituall common-wealth which is a companie of men vnited by Baptisme in that manner as I declared before is eternal saluation to which they ought to referre all their powers both temporall and spirituall and all their actions both in generall and particular but I denied that the last end of the temporall power it selfe although it bee conioyned in one the selfe same subiect with true spirituall power is eternall saluation but onely temporall peace in the common-wealth to which of it owne nature it is onely referred as to her last end although by the intention of him in whom true ciuill and spirituall power doth reside it ought to bee referred to eternall saluation as to the last end of a Christian man but not as to the last end which the temporall power it selfe hath per se and of it owne nature Neither hath D. Schulckenius proued the contrary but rather in his Reply to my answere hee in expresse words confirmeth what I haue said For in his answere to the authority which I brought out of S. Augustine hee affirmeth That the last end of one particular will power or science is their act or operation and therefore it cannot of it owne nature be referred to eternall saluation as to the last end vnlesse D. Schulckenius will admit that the same particular power hath of it owne nature two last ends or a later end then the last which implieth a manifest contradiction but it must onely be referred extrinsecally to eternall saluation by the intention of him in whom the particular power doth reside 11 True it is That all create ends are subordained per se and of their nature to that end which is simply and absolutely the last end and doe moue in vertue thereof as all efficient causes are subordained per se and of their owne nature to that which is simply and absolutely the first efficient cause and in vertue thereof they doe worke whatsoeuer they do worke But this efficient and finall cause of all created things is not the eternall saluation of men but God a mighty who is Alpha Omega principium finis the beginning and end of all created things both naturall and supernaturall both vnreasonable and reasonable of accidents and substances of all powers and of all things wherein powers doe reside and who is glorified not onely by the eternall saluation but also by the eternall damnation of men God alone is simply and absolutely the last end of all created things to whome all naturall things are of their owne nature lastly referred as to the first Authour and last end of nature and supernaturall things as to the first Authour and last end of grace and glory Neither can naturall things of their owne nature be referred to any supernaturall create end as is eternall saluation but onely by the will and intention of him who by the helpe of supernatural grace shall referre and eleuate them aboue their nature to a supernaturall end Neither doth S. Thomas in that place affirme the contrary but rather most cleerely confirmeth what I haue said for there he only disputeth how euery man by his wil intention and desire referreth all good things which hee desireth to the last end 12. Marke now I beseech you D. Schulckenius his second proofe which is no whit better then the former Moreouer is not the body saith he k Pag. 330. per se or of it owne nature for the soule why then are not corporall things per se or of their owne nature for spirituall things And whereas my Aduersarie Widdrington seemeth to say that euery temporall end is per accidens or accidentally referred to a spiritual end as by man who worketh for an end it is ordained to a spirituall end it is altogether false For oftentimes wicked men doe ordaine spirituall things to temporall of whom the Apostle saith whose God is their belly and by this a temporall end is per se and of it owne nature alwaies ordained to a spirituall end but by accident and against nature by the
the disiunction must be hereticall to make the whole disiunction to be heretical is to be vnderstood but it is a conditional disiunctiue which importeth a free choice or election of the will or which is all one a free power to chose whether part of the disiunction we please to the verity of which conditionall disiunctiue is required that you may choose whether part of the disiunction you please and if it be hereticall to affirme that it is in the free power of the will to choose whether part of the disiunction we please the whole disiunction or disiunctiue proposition implying such a condition or free election without doubt is hereticall 19. Now that this disiunction or being placed in the aforesaid proposition is in common sense according to our English phrase equivalent to h The Latine word aequi-pollet in this place of my Theolog. Disputation is not well translated into English it doth import it should be it is equiualent a copulation or such a disiunction which leaueth a free power in the Subjects to choose whether part they will that is to depose the King or if they please to murther him will most euidently appeare if both in common speech and also in the lawes of the Realme we diligently consider the proper and vsuall signification of this word may when there followeth the coniunction disiunctiue or And this may be shewed by almost innumerable examples whereof some of them wee will here set downe As for example you may stay here or depart You may eate or drinke You may buy wine or oyle You may goe to such a place by land or by water You may buy that land in fee-farme or by lease The King by vertue of an Act of Parliament may take of conuicted Popish Recusants twenty pounds for euery moneth or the third part of all their lands The Sheriefe may presently hang a theife condemned to die or delay his death for some small time If any person hold any lands of an other Lord then of the King by Knights seruice hee may giue dispose or assure by his last will and testament two parts of the said lands holden by Knights seruice or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearely valew of two parts If a man by his last will and testament ordaine that his Executors may bestow twenty pounds vpon the poore or repaire such a bridge it is in the free power of the Executors to choose whether of those two they please Finally in clauses of reuocation where the words are that one may by any deed in his life time or by his last will and testament reuoke the said vses and limit new it is in his power and choice to doe it by the one or by the other as he shall please And in infinite such like examples the verb may implieth a free power to choose either part of the disiunction one pleaseth neither can there scarcely be alledged any one example wherein the coniunction disiunctiue or immediately following the verbe may is not so taken 20. Wherefore the plaine and vsuall meaning of the aforesaid proposition Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Prpe may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or which is all one Subiects may depose or murther their Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope for that in this last onely the verbe passiue is changed into the actiue is that it is in the free choice of the Subjects to depose or if they will to murther such Princes So that if it be hereticall to affirme as without doubt it is that it is in the free power of Subjects to depose or murther such Princes because it is hereticall and against the expresse word of God to affirme that they may murther them the aforesaid position consisting of that disiunction is herepicall and therefore it may without any danger at all of periurie be abiured as hereticall 21. From hence it may be gathered first that according to the common and vsuall vnderstanding of our English phrase there is a great distinction betwixt these two verbs may and can For can doth vsually signifie a power in generall whether it be naturall or morall but may for the most part importeth a morall power to wit if it be vsed alone without any coniunction following it most commonly it signifieth a lawfullnes to do the thing proposed As I may doe this signifieth that it is lawfull for mee to doe this but if there follow it a a coniunction copulatiue or disiunctiue it implyeth a choice or free power to choose whether part of the disiunction or copulation one will Seeing therefore that the Latine verbe possum implyeth a power in generall whether it bee naturall or morall and according to the thing affirmed or denyed it is limited to a naturall or morall power as in this proposition Ignis potest comburere The fire hath power to burne it signifieth a naturall and necessary power in the fire to burne and in this potest homo eligoâ—e bonum aut mâ—lum A man hath power to choose good or euill it signifieth a morall and free power from hence it followeth that this proposition Subiects may depose or murther their Prince being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope is not so properly and significantly translated into Latine by the verbe possum Sabditi possunt deponere aut occidere suum Principem excommunicatum c. as by the substantiue of possum or by the verbe permittitur to wit in potestate est subditorum or permittitur subditis Principem suum excommunicatum vel depriuatum per Pontificem deponere aut occidere It is in the power of Subiects or it is permitted to Subiects to depose or murther their Prince being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope And therefore the Latine translation of this Oath doth not by the verbe possum significantly expresse the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe may contained in the aforesaid Position vnlesse either the coniunction copulatiue and be put in place of or to wit Principes per Papam excommunicati vel depriuati possum per suos Subditos deponi occidi deposed and murthered as Cardinall Bellarmine and Antonius Capellus haue it in their bookes translated or else there bee vnderstood a condition of the free-will to choose whether part of the disiunction they please to wit possunt deponi per suos Subditos aut si velint occidi bee deposed or if the Subiects will be murthered 23 Secondly from hence it is also gathered that in a disiunctiue proposition wherein is implyed a condition of the will to choose freely either part of the disiunction it maketh all one sense whether the coniunction copulatiue and or the disiunctiue or bee vsed For both of them doe signifie a free power to choose which part one pleaseth and so the coniunction disiunctiue hath in sense the vertue and force of a copulatiue the copulatiue of a disiunctiue Wherfore when the ancient Fathers
affirmatiue to be a negatiue and a negatiue to be an affirmatiue an vniuersall to be a particular and a particular to be an vniuersall k As this vniuersall affirmatiue proposition all men are sensible is by putting not in the begining not all men are sensible made a particular negatiue So that the meaning of the aforesaid negatiue proposition is by reason of that negatiue aduerbe not made ambiguous and may haue this sense that Subiects may neither depose nor murther such Princes who be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope which proposition so vnderstood is not of faith neither in very deed contradictory to the proper and vsuall meaning of the former affirmatiue which is abiured in the Oath And therefore no meruaile that this Author was desirous to fly from the affirmatiue to the negatiue 30. Supposing therefore that contradiction according to the approued doctrine of Aristotle l Lib. 1. de interpretat Cap. 4. is an affirming and denying of the selfe same thing in the selfe same manner I answere that this negatiue position Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may not be deposed or murthered by their Subiects is contradictory to that affirmatiue position which is abiured in the Oath if the verbe may be taken in the same manner or sense in the negatiue as it is taken in the affirmatiue And then as the affirmatiue is hereticall so the negatiue is of Faith For as the sense of the affirmatiue is as I haue shewed before that it is in the free choise of Subiects either to depose such Princes who be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope or if they will to murther them which is false hereticall and against those expresse words of Scripture Thou shalt not kill Kill him not c. So the sense of the negatiue contradictory must be that it is not in the free choice of Subiects to depose such Princes or if they please to murther them which proposition is most true and contained in the expresse word of God because it is not in their free power to murther them as is manifest by the former places of holy Scripture 31. And thus much concerning the first and principall Answer which I thought good to set downe at large both for that the Reader may the better iudge of my Answer and also of M. Fitzherberts Reply who taketh no other particular exception against the Oath besides the generall Doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes which he will needs haue to bee a poynt of faith and therefore not to bee denyed by any Catholike and also for that there be some Catholikes who although they be of opinion as was the Author of that English Dialogue that there is nothing against faith contained in the oath and that the Doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not a poynt of faith but in Controuersie among Catholikes notwithstanding the Popes Breues or any other decree of Pope or Councell which are vrged to the contrary yet they can hardly be perswaded but that by reason of that word hereticall that clause of the Oath is vnlawfull and cannot bee taken without periury as the Author of that Dialogue did by the aforesaid Argument pretend to demonstrate 32 Now you shall see what exceptions M. Fitzherbert taketh against this my Answer First hee saith m nu 10. that I contend de lana caprina and labour in vaine to proue that the English word may in a disiunctiue proposition implyeth a freedome to choose whether part we list of the disiunction wherein also by the way he saith that I abuse strangers in seeking to perswade them that the Latine verbe possunt in the Latine Translation of the Oath doth not sufficiently expresse the nature of the English word may in this clause Principes per Papam excommunicati vel depriuati possunt per suos subditos vel alios quoscunque deponi aut occidi Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other whatsoeuer 33 But first who seeth not that this question to wit whether this proposition Princes which are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may bee deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other be such a disiunctiue proposition which implyeth a free election in the Subiects or others to choose whether they will depose or murther such Princes is both a question of great moment and not de lana caprina also that I haue not laboured in vaine to proue but by the common vnderstanding of the words in vsuall speech and in the lawes of our Realme sufficiently proued that the verbe may in an affirmatiue disiunctiue proposition when there followeth the coniunction disiunctiue or implyeth a freedome to choose whether part of the disiunction wee list as by many examples both in common speech and by the lawes of our Realme I haue cleerely conuinced neither can there scarcely be alleadged any one example wherein the coniunction disiunctiue or immediatly following the verbe may in an affirmatiue proposition doth not imply a free election to choose which part of the disiunction we please 34. Secondly it is not true that I haue abused the Latine Reader in seeking to perswade him that the Latine verbe possunt in the Latine Translation of the Oath doth not sufficiently expresse the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe may contained in the aforesaid position vnlesse either the coniunction copulatiue et bee put in place of aut as Card. Bellarmine Anton. Capellus now lastly F. Suarez haue it in their bookes translated or else there be vnderstood a condition of the free will to choose in that clause deposed or murthered by their Subiects which part of the disiunction the Subiects please But M. Fitzherbert rather abuseth his English Readers who vnderstand not Latine in affirming the contrary For the Latine verbe possum doth by his proper signification as I haue said import a power in generall whether it bee naturall or morall and according to the matter it is limited to a naturall or morall power but the verbe may is by his proper signification limited onely to a morall or free power free I meane not as free is all one with morall but if there follow the coniunction copulatiue or disiunctiue to choose whether part of the disiunction wee please and if the verbe may doe sometimes signifie a naturall power as in this the fire may burne wood or straw it is by reason of the matter or of the thing affirmed or denyed and not by vertue of the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe may And howsoeuer when the verbe may goeth before the coniunction disiunctiue or it doth properly and vsually signifie a choice freedome or indifferency to take either part of the disiunction 35. But marke here the cunning I dare not say fraude and falsehood of my Aduersary for that hee checked mee before for falling very foule vpon him in saying that he
meruaile that in conditionall disiunctiue propositions which follow the nature of copulatiues and not of pure or absolute disiunctiue propositions whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part is not by vertue of the coniunction affirmed of the other I say by vertue of the coniunction for that both in absolute and also in conditionall disiunctiues as likewise in copulatiue propositions it may fall out that by reason of the matter or of the thing affirmed or denyed the same falshood which is affirmed of the one part is affirmed also of the other but this is not to vse the Logicians phrase vi forma or vi coniunctionis by vertue of the forme or by force of the coniunction but vi materiae by reason or vertue of the matter as I declared before So that you see the more M. Fitzherbert meddleth with these Dialecticall questions which are cleane out of the spheare of his knowledge the more hee discouereth his vnskilfulnes 76 But yet hee will still goe on to bewray his ignorance and want of Logike For marke how vnlearnedly hee goeth about to proue that what I said of that clause of the Oath deposed or murthered to wit that it is a conditionall disiunctiue proposition and did signifie a free election to take either part of the disiunction may also bee said of other clauses of the Oath wherein neuerthelesse it is manifest that or is a pure disiunctiue and that whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other As for example the Oath bindeth the takers thereof to sweare that the Pope hath no power or authority to depose the King which is as much in effect as that the Pope may not lawfully doe it Therefore let vs make the proposition so and lay it downe with the other disiunctiue clauses which follow immediately and to make the whole like to that clause that is now in question let vs conceiue it thus 77. I abiure h nu 18. this doctrine as false that the Pope may depose the King or dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes or dominions Or authorize any forraigne Prince to inuade or annoy him Or discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance to his Maiestie Or giue licence to any of them to beare armes raise tumults or to offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person c. 78. Here now i Nu. 19. it cannot be denyed that or is disiunctiue in all these seuerall sentences in such sort that which of them soeuer any man doth teach hee teacheth according to the intent of this oath a false doctrine notwithstanding that the word may goeth before or and mplieth a free election to choose any one of them in so much that if a man should say onely that the Pope may authorize a forraine Prince to inuade his Maiestie he is condemned by the oath to speake no lesse vntruely then if hee should say that the Pope may depose his Maiestie or giue licence to any to offer violence to his person 79. Therefore k Nu 20. if Widdrington apply the words impious and hereticall in the other clause to the doctrine of murthering onely and not also to the doctrine of deposing Princes why may not he or any man else doe the like in the foresaid example and offirme that the last member and part thereof which denieth the Popes power to giue licence to offer violence to his Maiesties person is onely abiured as false whereby the former parts or clauses concerning the Popes power to depose his Maiestie or to dispose of his kingdomes or to giue licence to forraigne Princes to inuade or annoy him which are principall points of the oath would be superfluous and to no purpose So as it is manifest that the words of the oath deposed or murthered being considered according to their proper and vsuall signification in the clause where they are and compared also with the other clauses parts and circumstances of the oath cannot admit Widdringtons interpretation who applieth the note of heresie to the Murther and not also to the deposition of Princes Thus much concerning the words of the law or oath 80. Behold now how vnlearnedly Mr. Fitzherbert and yet his ignorance is the lesse excusable for that he might haue seene the weakenesse of his argument in my Theologicall Disputation where the Authour of the aforesaid English Dialogue obiecteth the like argument but in a contrary manner argueth from the truth of a conditionall disiunctiue proposition which is negatiue de dicto to the falshood of a conditionall disiunctiue which is affirmatiue de modo and frameth an oath of his owne inuention far different in sense from the oath prescribed by his Maiestie which neuerthelesse hee pretendeth to haue the same sense and signification with his new deuised oath For the oath prescribed by his Maiesty is a negatiue proposition de dicto to wit that the Pope hath not any power or authoritie to depose the King or to dispose of any his Maiesties Kingdomes or Dominions or to authorize any forraine Prince to inuade or annoy him or to discharge any of his Subiects of their allegiance and obedience to his Maiestie or to giue licence to any of them to beare armes raise tumults or to offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person c. And all this I must acknowledge to be true and therefore I called this whole proposition negatiue de dicto and affirmatiue de modo And the sense of this oath is cleere to wit that the Pope hath not any lawfull power to doe any one of these things so that if the Pope hath power to doe any one of them the whole and entire disiunctiue proposition consisting of those particular clauses is by vertue of the forme of words and of the coniunction disiunctiue or or rather nor not true but false I say by vertue of the forme of words for that the negation not going before and hauing a power to distribute to vse the Logicians phrase or to deny all that followeth it maketh all those disiunctiue coniunctions or which follow to be equiualent to nor or neither which as I say being a distributiue signe is to be resolued as euery Logician knoweth by the coniunction copulatiue and and not by the disiunctiue or for which cause some Grammarians doe also hould that the coniunction nor or neither is not a disiunctiue but a copulatiue coniunction 81. But the oath which Mr. Fitzherbert hath framed is a proposition negatiue de modo and affirmatiue de dicto to wit that the Pope may or which according to his owne exposition is all one that it is in the Popes free and lawfull power to depose the King or to dispose any of his Maiesties Kingdomes or dominions or to authorize any forraine Prince to inuade or annoy him or to discharge any of his subiects of their allegiance and obedience to his Maiestie or to giue licence to any of them to beare armes raise tumults or to
offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person c. and this whole or entire disiunctiue proposition consisting of all these particular branches M. Fitzherbert will haue to be abiured as false Now hee that hath but any small skill in Logicke may easily perceiue a great difference betwixt the sense and meaning of these two oaths or propositions For in the oath prescribed by his Maiestie wee may by vertue of the words and from the force and signification of the disiunctiue coniunction or which as I haue shewed before is by reason of the precedent negation not equiualent to nor necessarily inferre that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King nor to dispose of any his Maiesties Kingdomes or Dominions nor to doe any other of those things there mentioned and therefore he that granteth that the Pope hath power to doe any one of those things there mentioned must consequently graunt that the whole or entire oath or proposition consisting of all those particular clauses is false 82 But in the oath inuented by my Aduersary although indeed by vertue of the matter we may well conclude that the Pope hath neither power to depose the Kinge nor to dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes or dominions nor to doe any other of those thinges there mentioned for that all and euery one of those thinges which are denied to the Pope in that totall oath or proposition may also be denied to him in seuerall oaths or propositions yet hy vertue of the words and from the force and signification of the disiunctiue coniunction or which as M. Fitzherbert himselfe doth grant maketh there a conditionall disiumctiue proposition implying a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please we cannot rightly conclude that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King nor to dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes or dominions c. 83 For what man can be so ignorant as to imagine that these two propositions make the same sense or that the first doth rightly inferre the second It is false that it is in my free and lawfull power to doe this or that therefore it is true that I may lawfully neither doe this nor that My Aduersary can not deny but that it is false that he had lawfull freedome to deale sincerely or corruptly in this his Reply therefore by his owne manner of arguing he must grant that it is true that he had lawfull freedome neither to deale sincerely nor corruptly in his Reply Likewise he cannot deny but that it is false that it is in the free and lawfull power of creatures to honour or blaspheme God of Priests to eate or sleepe before they say Masse of Souldiers to fight or fly when their Country is inuaded by the enemie and to exemplifie in our owne matter of the Pope to depose or murther Princes as murther is taken for an vnlawfull Act Will he therefore inferre from thence in that manner as he argueth here that it is therefore true that creatures may lawfully neither honour nor blaspheme God that Priests may lawfully neither eate nor sleepe before they say Masse that Soldiers may lawfully neither fight nor flye when their Country is inuaded and that the Pope may lawfully neither depose Princes nor murther them as murther is taken for an vnlawful act Wherfore if my Aduersary will but keepe still the same forme and the same disiunctiue coniunction or and alter but a little the matter by adding onely to the end of the affirmatiue oath framed by himselfe this clause or to murther his Maiesty he will quickly perceiue his error and he will not deny but that the oath with that addition is very false and neuerthelesse he dare not from thence conclude the truth of the negatiue or that therefore it is true that the Pope hath not any power neither to depose the King nor to dispose c. for that he granteth that the Pope hath lawfull power to depose the King and to dispose c. onely he denyeth that the Pope hath power to murther him as murther is taken for an vnlawfull act 84. But the causes of M. Fitzherberts errour are manifest First for that he for want of Logike doth not as it seemes consider the difference betwixt the forme and the matter of an hypothiticall proposition and what is required to the truth or falshood of a disiunctiue or copulatiue proposition as well by vertue of the forme as of the matter For to make a pure or absolute disiunctiue proposition to be true it is sufficient by vertue of the forme that one part of the disiunction be true but to make it false both parts must be false Contrariwise it falleth out in a copulatiue proposition for to make it true both parts of the copulation must be true and to make it false it sâ—fficeth by vertue of the forme or by force of the copulatiue coniunction that one onely part be false although by reason of the matter both parts also may be false but this is impertinent to the forme Secondly he doth not consider that a conditionall disiunctiue proposition which implyeth a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please followeth the nature of a copulatiue and not of a pure common or absolute disiunctiue proposition Thirdly he doth not consider that whatsoeuer is taken or to vse the Logicians phrase supposeth distributiuely as euery negation doth distribute and deny whatsoeuer followeth that negation is to be resolued by a copulatiue and not by a disiunctiue coniunction 85. Fourthly he doth not consider that to make a copulatiue proposition or such a disiunctiue which is equiualent to a copulatiue to be hereticall it sufficeth that one onely part be hereticall Fiftly he doth not consider that although to make a pure common or absolute disiunctiue proposition to be false it is necessary that both parts of the disiunction be false yet it is not necessary that both parts be false in the same degree of falshood for that the one part may be impossible the other not the one part hereticall and the other not and that therefore the same kinde of falshood which is affirmed of the one part is not necessarily affirmed of the other Lastly he doth not consider how vicious a kinde of arguing it is from the falshood of an affirmatiue conditionall disiunctiue proposition to conclude the truth of a negatiue whereby he would make his affirmatiue oath inuented by himselfe to haue the same sense with the negatiue oath prescribed by his Maiesty And his ignorance herein is the lesse excusable for that the insufficiencie of this his argument he might haue seene declared in my Theologicall disputation where I clearely shewed as you haue seene before how vnsoundly the Author of that English Dialogue vrged the like argument which my answere to that argument is also here altogether concealed by M. Fitzherbert And therefore I will giue him this charitable aduise that if he haue any care of his credit and
reputation he doe not hereafter so bouldly aduenture to meddle with these questions belonging to Logike except he haue the helpe and furtherance of some of his company more skilfull herein then himselfe least that by granting one inconuenience he fall according to the ancient prouerbe into a thousand absurdities 86. By this it is euident first that although the Oath ordained by his Maiesty and the Oath framed by M. Fitzherbert containe the same disiunctiue clauses and so they doe both agree in the matter yet they differ greatly in the forme and in the sense and vnderstanding of the disiunctiue coniunction or For in the Oath prescribed by his Maiestie that which by vertue of the forme and by force of the coniunction or which in all those particular sentences is equiualent to nor I doe acknowledge to be true is that the Pope hath not power to doe any one of all those thinges mentioned in those disiunctiue clauses and that which I acknowledge to be false is that the Pope hath power to doe any one of all those thinges as either to depose the King or to dispose of his Dominions and so forth And therefore although to those clauses were added also this clause or to murther his Maiesty yet my Aduersary cannot affirme that it would change at all the truth or falshood of the whole oath or entyre proposition but if the oath were true before it would also be true now and if it were false before it would also be false now 87 But if the oath which M. Fitzherbert hath framed that which by vertue of the forme and by force of the coniunction or which as he himselfe confesseth implyeth a free election to chose any one of those seuerall sentences or clauses I acknowledge to be true is that the Pope hath not power to doe all those thinges mentioned in those clauses or which is all one to doe which of all those thinges he shall please and that which I acknowledge to be false is that the Pope hath power to doe all those thinges mentioned in those clauses or which is all one to doe which of all those thinges he shall please And therefore if to those clauses of M. Fitzherberts new deuised oath should be added also this clause or to murther his Maiesty he cannot denie but that his oath or entyre disiunctiue proposition which before in his opinion was false is now by adding that clause made true and therefore that it is false that the Pope hath power to murther his Mâ—iestie The adding of which clause doth clearely shew the manifest difference betwixt the forme of these two oaths and the different signification of the coniunction or in both of them albeit in the matter of all the particular clauses and propositions they doe both agree 88 Secondly by this also it is easie to answere the demand which M. Fitzherbert propoundeth to wit wherefore the word hereticall in the doctrine and position of his Maiesties oath may be referred to the doctrine of murthering Princes and not of deposing them and the word false may not with the like reason in the oath or intire disiunctiue proposition which my Aduersary hath framed be referred to the last member and part thereof which denyeth the Popes power to offer violence to his Maiesties person and not to the former concerning the Popes power to depose his Maiesty For if wee regard the forme of both propositions and the vertue or force of the disiunctiue coniunction or which implyeth a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please and therefore to make the whole disiunctiue proposition to be false and hereticall it sufficeth that one onely part thereof be false and hereticall as they both agree in the forme and in the sense of the disiunctiue coniunction or as it is sufficient by vertue of the forme to make that affirmatiue position Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other to be hereticall so also to make this affirmatiue proposition which my Aduersary hath framed The Pope may or which is all one it is in the Popes free and lawfull power to depose the Kinges Maiesty or to offer violence to his Royall person to be false it sufficeth by vertue of the forme and by force of the disiunctiue coniunction or that one onely part of the disiunction be false But the onely difference is in the matter And therefore if the doctrine of deposing Princes be not so clearely and properly hereticall as is the doctrine of murthering them the word hereticall may with better reason be referred to the doctrine of murthering then of deposing But because the doctrine which teacheth that the Pope may depose his Maiesty as also that he may offer violence to his Royall person are false although perchance the latter be false in a more high and manifest degree of falshood then is the fotmer therefore the word false may by vertue of the matter but not by force of the coniunction disiunctiue or in the oath framed by my Aduersary be referred to both 89. I say in the oath framed by my Aduersary for as these two particular propositions are set downe in the oath ordained by his Maiestie both of them are not onely by vertue of the matter but also by reason of the forme and by force of the coniunction or which is equiualent to nor affirmed to be false as I declared before So that it is manifest that these words of the oath may be deposed or murthered being considered according to their proper and vsuall signification in the conditionall disiunctiue clause where they are and compared also with the other clauses parts and circumstances of the oath may very well admit the interpretation which I haue made and the application of heresie taking heresie in a strict sense may be applyed onely to the murther and not also to the deposition of Princes although it may also in a proper sense and wherein many learned Catholikes doe take the word heresie be applyed to both as I will shewe beneath l Nu. 106. et seq And thus much concerning the wordes of the law and oath 90 Now for his Maiesties meaning or intention in that clause which was the second rule assigned for the interpretation of the oath the same saith M. Fitzherbert m Nu 12. according to the doctrine of Suarez which Widdrington approueth is to be gathered principally by the words and which as you haue seene being to be taken in their proper and common sense doe shew that his Maiesties meaning was no other but to ordaine the abiuration of both parts of that clause alike that is to say as truely impious and hereticall 91 But contrariwise I haue cleerely shewed before that according to the proper and vsuall signification of the words the common vnderstanding of men and the receiued doctrine of the Logicians to make a copulatiue proposition or a conditionall disiunctiue which followeth