this matter h◠proceeds to discourse of Moral Vertue o◠Grace and of Religious Worship with hi◠wonted reflections upon and reproache of Non-conformists for their ignorance about and villanous misrepresentation of these things which seem more to be aimed at◠than the Argument it self I must here with again that our Author had more perspicuously stated the things which he proposeth to debate for the subject of his Disputation But I find an excess of Art is as troublesome sometimes as the greatest defect therein From thence I presume it is that things are so handled in this Discourse that an ordinary man can seldom discern satisfactorily what it is that directly and determinately he doth intend beyond reviling of Non-conformists For in this Proposition which is the best and most intelligible that I can reduce the present Discourse unto the Supream Civil Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of men in morality or with respect unto moral vertue excepting only the subject of it there is not one term in it that may not have various significations and those such as have countenance given unto them in the ensuing Disputation it self But contenti sumus hoc Catone and make the best we can of what lyes before us I do suppose that in the medium made use of in this Argument there is or I am sure there may be a Controversie of much more importance than that principally under consideration It therefore shall be stated and cleared in the first place and then the concernment of the Argument it self in what is discoursed thereupon shall be manifested It is about Moral Vertue and Grace their coincidence or distinction that we are in the first place to enquire For without a due stating of the conception of these things nothing of this Argument nor what belongs unto it can be rightly understood We shall therefore be necessitated to premise a brief Explanation of these terms themselves to remove as far as may be all ambiguity from our Discourse First then the very name of Vertue in the sense wherein it is commonly used and received comes from the Schools of Philosophy and not from the Scripture In the Old Testament we have Vprightness Integrity Righteousness doing Good and eschewing Evil Fearing Trusting Obeying Believing in God Holiness and the like but the name of Vertue doth not occur therein It is true we have translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a vertuous Woman and once or twice the same word vertuously Ruth 3. 11. Prov. 12. 4. Chap◠31. 10 39. But that word signifies as 〈◊〉 used strenuous industrious diligent and hath no such signification as that we now express by vertue Nor is it any where rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the LXX although it may have some respect unto it as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and peculiarly denote the exercise of industrious strength such as men use in Battail For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is vis robur potentia or exercitus also But in the common acceptation of it and as it is used by Philosophers there is no word in the Hebrew nor Syriack properly to express it The Rabbins do it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies properly a measure For studying the Philosophy of Aristotle and translating his Ethicks into Hebrew which was done by Rabbi Meir and finding his vertue placed in mediocrity they applyed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express it So they call Aristotles Ethicks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Book of Measures that is of vertues And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are boni mores Such a stranger is this very word unto the Old Testament In the New Testament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 occurs four times but it should not seem any where to be taken in the sense now generally admitted In some of the places it rather denotes the excellency and praises that do attend Vertue than Vertue it self So we render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praises 1 Pet. 2. 9. as the Syriack doth also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praises and the same Translation Phil. 4. 9. renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If there be any vertue by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 works glorious or praise worthy 2 Pet. 1. 9. It is a peculiar gracious disposition operation of mind distinguished from Faith Temperance Patience Brotherly kindness Godliness Charity c. and so cannot have the common sense of the word there put upon it The word Moral is yet far more exotick to the Church and Scripture We are beholding for it if there be any advantage in its use meerly to the Schools of the Philosophers especially of Aristotle His Doctrine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commonly called his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Moralia his Morals hath begotten this name for our use The whole is expressed in Isocrates to Demonicus by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the vertue of manners If then the signification of the words be respected as usually taken it is vertue in mens manners that is intended The Schoolmen brought this expression with all its concerns as they did the rest of Aristotles Philosophy into the Church and Divinity And I cannot but think it had been well if they had never done it as all will grant they might have omitted some other things without the least disadvantage to Learning or Religion However this expression of Moral Vertue having absolutely possest it self of the Fancies and Discourses of all and it may be of the Understanding of some though with very little satisfaction when all things are considered I shall not endeavour to dispossess it or eliminate it from the Confines of Christian Theologie Only I am sure had we been left unto the Scripture expressions of Repentance towards God and Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ of the fear of God of Holiness Righteousness living unto God walking with God and before him we might have been free from many vain wordy perplexities and the whole wrangle of this Chapter in particular had been utterly prevented For let but the Scripture express what it is to be Religious and there will be no contesting about the difference or no difference between Grace and Moral Vertue It is said that some judge those who have Moral Vertue to want Grace not to be Gracious But say that men are born of God and do not commit sin that they walk before God and are upright that they cleave unto God with full purpose of heart that they are sanctified in Christ Jesus and the like and no man will say that they have not Grace or are not Gracious if they receive your Testimony But having as was said made its entrance amongst us we must deal with it as well as we can and satisfie our selves about its common Acceptation and Use. Generally moral Vertues are esteemed to be the Duties of the second Table For although those who handle these matters more accurately do not so straiten or confine them yet it is certain that in vulgar
so unto the right apprehension of what is at present under Debate First therefore Grace in the Scripture is taken for the free Grace or favour of God towards sinners by Jesus Christ. By this he freely pardoneth them their sins Justifieth and accepteth them or makes them accepted in the Beloved This certainly is distinct from Moral Vertue Secondly It is taken for the effectual working of the Spirit of God in and upon the minds and souls of Believers thereby quickning them when they were dead in trespasses and sins Regenerating of them Creating a new heart in them implanting his Image upon them neither I presume will this be called Moral Vertue Thirdly For the actual supplies of Assistance and Ability given to Believers so to enable them unto every Duty in particular which in the Gospel is required of them for he works in them both to Will and to Do of his own good pleasure As yet the former distinction will appear necessary Fourthly For the effects wrought and produced by this Operation of God and his Grace in the hearts and minds of them that believe which are either habitual in the spiritual disposition of their minds or actual in their operations all which are called Grace It may be our Author will be apt to think that I Cant use Phrases or fulsome Metaphors But besides that I can confirm these distinctions and the necessity of them and the words wherein they are expressed from the Scriptures and Ancient Fathers I can give them him for the substance of them out of very Learned Divines whether Systematical or no I know not but this I know they were not long since Bishops of the Church of England We are now in the next place to inquire into the mind of our Author in these things for from his apprehensions about them he frames a mighty difference between himself and those whom he opposeth and from thence takes occasion and advantage afresh to revile and reproach them First Therefore he declares his judgement that the Moral Vertues which he treats of do consist in Mens observance of the Law of Nature of the Dictates of Reason and Precepts thereof Secondly That the Substance yea the whole of Religion consists in these Vertues or Duties So that by the observation of them Men may attain Everlasting Happiness Thirdly That there is no actual concurrence of present Grace enabling Men to perform these Duties or to exercise these Vertues but they are called Grace on another account Fourthly That his Adversaries are so far from making Vertue and Grace to be the same that they make them inconsistent And these things shall we take into a brief examination according as indeed they do deserve The first of them he plainly and more than once affirms nor shall I contend with him about it So he speaks pag. 68. The practice of Vertue consists in living suitably to the dictates of Reason and nature and this is the substance and main design of all the Laws of Religion to oblige mankind to behave themselves in all their actions as becomes creatures endowed with Reason and understanding and in wayes suitable to Rational beings to prepare and qualifie themselves for the State of Glory and immortality This is a plain description both of the Rule of moral Vertues and of the nature of them The Law of Reason and nature is the Rule and their own nature as acting or acted consists in a suitableness unto Rational Beings acting to prepare themselves for the state of immortality and Glory The first end of all vertue no doubt We need not therefore make any farther inquiry into this matter wherein we are agreed Secondly That the Substance yea the whole of Religion consists in these Moral Vertues he fully also declares pag. 69. Moral Vertue having the strongest and most necessary influence upon the end of all Religion viz. mans Happiness it is not only its most material and useful part but the ultimate end of all its other Duties though I know not how the practice of Vertue in this life can be the Vltimate End of other Duties and all true Religion can consist in nothing else but either the practice of Vertue it self or the use of those means and instruments that contribute unto it So also p. 70. All Duties of Devotion excepting only our returns of Gratitude are not essential parts of Religion but are only in order to it as they tend to the practice of Vertue and Moral Goodness and their goodness is derived upon them from the Moral Vertues to which they contribute and in the same proportion they are conducive to the ends of Vertue they are to be valued among the Ministeries of Religion So then the whole Duty of Man consists in being vertuous and all that is injoyned him beside is in order thereunto Hence We are told elsewhere that outward Worship is no part of Religion again pag. 76. All Religion must of necessity be resolved into Enthusiasm or Morality the former is meer imposture and therefore all that is true must be reduced to the latter But we need not insist on particulars seeing he promoteth this to confirmation by the best of Demonstrations i. e. an induction of all particulars which he calls a Scheme of Religion wherein yet if any thing necessary be left out or omitted this best of Demonstrations is quickly turned into one of the worst of Sophismes Therefore we have here no doubt a just and full Representation of all that belongs to Christian Religion and it is as follows pag. 69. The whole Duty of Man referrs either to his Creator or his Neighbour or Himself All that concerns the two last is confessedly of a moral nature and all that concerns the first consists either in Praising of God or Praying to him The former is a branch of the Vertue of Gratitude and is nothing but a thankful and Humble temper of mind arising from a sense of Gods greatness in Himself and his Goodness to us So that this part of Devotion issues from the same vertuous quality that is the Principle of all other resentments and expressions of Gratitude only those acts of it that are terminated on God as their Object are stiled Religious and therefore Gratitude and Devotion are not divers things but only differing names of the same thing Devotion being nothing else but the Vertue of Gratitude towards God The latter viz. Prayer is either put up in our own or other mens behalf if for others it is an act of that Vertue we call kindness or Charity if for our selves the things we pray for unless they be the comforts and enjoyments of this life are some or other vertuous qualities and therefore the proper and direct use of Prayer is to be instrumental to the Vertues of Morality It is of Christian Religion that this Author treats as is manifest from his ensuing Discourse and the Reason he gives why Moral Vertues are stiled Graces Now I must needs say that I look
things are all I can observe that are offered in the confirmation of it First That these things of morality moral Vertues are of more importance in Religion than the outward worship of God which the amplitude of power before asserted is now reducing to a respect unto Secondly That there is much more danger of his erring and mistaking in things of morality than in things of outward Worship because of their great weight and importance These things are pleaded p. 28. And elsewhere up and down That any thing else is offered in the confirmation of this consequent I find not And it may be some will think these proofs to be very weak and feeble unable to sustain the weight that is laid upon them For it is certain that the first Rule that he that hath power over the Greater hath so over the Lesser doth not hold unless it be in things of the same nature and kind and it is no less certain and evident that there is an especial and formal difference between these things namely moral Vertues and Instituted Worship the one depending as to their Being and discovery on the light of Nature and the dictates of that Reason which is common to all and speakes the same language in the Consciences of all mankind the other on pure Revelation which may be and is variously apprehended Hence it is that whereas there is no difference in the world about what is Vertue and what is not there is no Agreement about what belongs to divine Worship and what doth not Again lesser things may be exempted from that Power and Authority by especial priviledge or Law which hath the disposal of greater committed into it and intrusted with it As the Magistrate amongst us may take away the life of a Man which is the greatest of his concernments the name of his all for fellony but cannot take away his Estate or Inheritance of Land which is a far less concernment unto him if it be antecedently setled by Law to other uses than his own And if it cannot be proved that the disposal of the Worship of God as to what doth really and truly belong unto it and all the parts of it is exempted from all humane Power by special Law and Priviledge let it be disposed of as who so will shall judge meet Nor is the latter consideration suggested to inforce this consequent of any more validity namely that there is more danger of the Magistrates erring or mistakes about Moral Vertue than about Rites of Worship because that is of most concernment in Religion For it is true that suppose a Man to walk on the top of an high house or Tower on a plain floor with battlements or Walls round about him there will be more danger of breaking his neck if he should fall from thence than if he should fall from the top of a narrow wall that had not the fourth part of the heighth of the house But there would not be so much danger of falling For from the top of the house as circumstantiated he cannot fall unless he will wilfully and violently cast himself down headlong and on the top of the Wall it may be he cannot stand with the utmost of his heed and endeavours The Magistrate cannot mistake about Moral Vertues unless he will do it wilfully They have their station fixed in the world on the same ground and evidence with Magistracy it self The same evidence the same common consent and suffrage of mankind is given unto Moral Vertues as is to any Government in the World And to suppose a supream Magistrate a Law-giver to mistake in these things in judging whether Justice and Temperance or Fortitude be Vertues or no and that in their Legislative capacity is ridiculous Neither Nero nor Caligula were ever in danger of any such mis-adventure All the Magistrates in the World at this day are agreed about these things But as to what concerns the Worship of God they are all at variance There is no such Evidence in these things no such common suffrage about them as to free any absolutely from failings and mistakes so that in respect of them and not of the other lyes the principal danger of miscarrying as to their determination and administration Supposing therefore the Premises our Author layes down to be true his Inference from them is feeble and obnoxious to various impeachments whereof I have given some few Instances only which shall be increased if occasion require But the Assertion it self which is the foundation of these consequences is utterly remote from Accuracy and Truth It is said that the Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of Men in reference unto Moral Duties which are the principal parts of Religion Our first and most difficult inquiry is after the meaning of this Proposition the later after its truth I ask then first whether he hath power over the Consciences of men with respect unto Moral Vertue and over Moral Vertue it self as Vertue and as a part of Religion or on some other account If his power respect Vertue as a part of Religion then it equally extends it self to all that is so by Vertue of a Rule which will not be easily everted But it doth not appear that it so extends it self as to plead an obliging Authority in reference unto all Duties For let but the Scheme of Moral Duties especially those whose Object is God given us by our Author be considered and it will quickly be discerned how many of them are exempted from all humane cognizance and Authority and that from and by their nature as well as their use in the World And it is in vain to ascribe an authority to Magistrates which they have no power to exert or take cognizance whether it be obeyed or no. And what can they do therein with respect unto Gratitude to God which holds the first place in the Scheme of Moral Vertues here given in unto us We are told also p. 83. That in matters both of Moral Vertue and Divine Worship there are some rules of Good and Evil that are of an Eternal and unchangeable obligation and these can never be prejudiced or altered by any humane power because the reason of their Obligation arises from a necessity and constitution of nature and therefore must be 〈◊〉 perpetual as that but then there are other rules of Duty that are alterable according to the various accidents changes and conditions of humane life and depend chiefly upon contracts and positive Laws of Kingdoms It would not be unworthy our inquiry to consider what rules of Moral Duty they are which are alterable and depend on accidents and contracts But we might easily find work enough should we call all such fond Assertions to a just examination Neither doth the distinction here given us between various Rules of Moral Vertue very well answer what we are told p. 69. namely that every particular Vertue is therefore such because it is are semblance and imitation of some