is called Moral Good Evil Holiness and Sin bonum honestum inhonestum Virtue and Vice and by an hundred other Names viz. When Volition hath for its Object the greatest good actually or habitually known immediately or mediately then is that Volition Morally good honest or virtuous but when it hath any other lesser delectable good for its Object and some good it must have then it is Morally Evil or a Sin Whence it appears that Sin is a Defect only or a Negation for the Defect of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation of Volition to its Object which is always delectable good is only this that it hath not for its Object the greatest good 16. I have before just hinted That this Moral Good is also a kind of bonum utile or profitable good that is to say it is a means of or hath in it some degree of Causality of delectable good For Volition of any good hath at least a tendency to effect it which is some degree of Causality and in us it hath no more like as the Nisus in Bodies to Motion is something and is a tendency which hath some degree of Causality of Motion in it as appears from this that if you remove the impediment only Motion presently follows and that there is plainly difference between two Bodies one of which hath the other hath it not But in God it always actually efeffects it and God by his power doth generally upon occasion of our Volition make actually existent delectable good or those things which cause it and in this consists all the goodness of Moral Good or all its Eligibility or that which makes it the Object of any Volition or its perfection for by perfection I mean bonum utile or profitable good that which doth perficere or effect delectable good On the contrary the evil of Sin or that for which it is not eligible and refusable is the privation of a tendency to or Causality of Delectable Good Virtue therefore is a tendency to an infinite good Sin a privation of it 17. Sin then is no small or light thing being in one respect plainly an infinite evil For whereas our Volition may and ought to have for its Object an infinite Delectable Good in respect of Extension Intention and Duration the greatest Eternal Felicity of the Universe and consequently tends to it and hath some Causality thereof in it When this our Volition is sinful or hath any lesser good for its Object there is a deprivation of all this In this sence that of the Schoolmen is true That Sin is a Conversion of the Will from an Infinite Good to a Finite one 18. But this is not all though the Evil or Mischief of Sin immediately be privative yet often by necessary consequence it is positive also as when one wills any Delectable Good to himself which cannot be effected without the positive inconvenience grief hurt misery of another For example if any one should be of such a temper as to be delighted with anothers pain or suffering and consequently will and desire it in order to that end which is called pure Malice Or if unlimited power to do what he listeth and consequently to do Mischief called Tyranny please him or if being pleased with Superiority and Eminency in any thing as in Power Riches Knowledge Happiness in order to this his Superiority he takes away from any person what he hath of all these and these appetites may be so boundless that they cannot be satisfyed but by an infinite mischief As if any Being that he might be infinitely superiour to all in happiness or in the possession of any good should not only take from all all they possessed but make all besides himself the most extreamly miserable And there have been such Monsters among Men some of the Roman Emperors and others who have advanced very far in this prodigious wickedness Historians report Tiberius to have been so delighted with Cruelty that he was termed Lutum sanguine maceratum a lump of Clay soaked in Blood after which he more thirsted than strong drinks notwithstanding that he loved them so well as to have the Name of Biberius Caldius Mero instead of Tiberius Claudius Nero. They tell us also that Caligula made it the diversion of his Meals to see men racked and Beheaded and that Nero set the City of Rome on fire that he might have the glory of Re-building it and having it called after his own Name Neropolis Dangerous certainly it is to begin to lay aside a certain tenderness of others good and to be careless what mischief we do to any body so we may gratifie our own Appetites Though our power may be short and insufficient yet our Minds may be soon debauched to such a degree as first to be content to molest or incommode our Neighbour then to ruine him then to undo and destroy whole Families Cities and Nations for the sake of some small paltry pleasure of our own and at last to delight in it 19. A second perfection of Volition we have said to be in respect of the Action which is two fold The first is Intension Force and Strength of which it is certain there may be various degrees in the Actions of Spirits The greatest good viz. That of the whole Universe ought to have the greatest strength of Volition that can be which is no less than Infinite And here is a necessary defect in all Finite Rational Beings whatsoever only God who is Infinite in Power Force Action hath this to his Nature alone it belongs all other Beings fall infinitely short of him and therefore may be said too to be faulty in compare with him In the other perfection of our Volition viz. the having its due Object an Infinite Good God hath made us capable of being perfectly like himself but here the most perfect of his Creatures are at an infinite distance from him The greatest degree of this perfection is to will the Universal good or rather the greatest good with all the vehemency zeal and force our Minds are capable of and contrariwise a great degree of the opposite defect is to will the Universal good the most remisly but a greater degree not to will it at all and the greatest of all it seems both in respect of the Action and Object together to will the least good with the greatest force and vehemency Of this intension and firmness of our Volition and likewise our actual and habitual inclination to the Universal good the passions of desire after love to and delight in so doing and being are the causes and the effects too and therefore signs according to their respective degrees and the being thus affected towards Piety Charity Humility Spirituality and all other instances thereof is that which is signified by the phrases of Virtues being natural to us it being the Temper Complexion Constitution of our Minds it s being a living and vital principle producing fruits and effects of outward
where there is no Law there is no transgression because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal or the Apostle may mean by Law not strictly an act of some Will concerning anothers Action and Will but an obligation to will or do any thing a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such there always is whenever any will exist being a relation betwen the Will and its due Object the Universal good Besides St. Paul may mean comparatively the Transgression or Sin is much less where there is no express known Law 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium or Free-will for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest or any lesser good or no which I do not deny yet most certainly whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good there is a defect in that Volition come it from what cause it will though it should be the effect of some other Being without it which by his power was able so to determine it or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted 24. It follows likewise that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof and should not place it in the willing the greatest good but in willing some particular or which is most common some personal good as self-preservation this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin and would not be capable of any reward i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end his own greatest personal good without regard to God or others and accordingly should Will and Act this would be a vitious man And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride c. permit a man so to err is not here to be determined and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes if not wilful Errors that men might securely indulge their lusts of some late new Modellers of Morality to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed the one the advancing of their personal good to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions the other the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb or to enlarge their own Sence the greatest measures of the Conveniencies Comforts and Pleasures proper to this bodily life In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things and made Vice to be Virtue Or because according to the same mens Doctrine every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general only through ignorance is oft out of the way they have made no Vice at all substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence 25. What hath been said of Volition may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual 't is according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated viz. by three things 1. It s direction to its right Object the Universal Good 2. The force and strength thereof 3. It s constancy or frequency in the Soul each of which hath degrees so that it is easie to set down certain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man For example sake only He is the worst man in the first respect who is habitually inclined to and in love with the meanest or least delectable good in the second respect who is the most vehemently inclined thereto in the third respect who is perpetually or constantly so Contrariwise he is the best who hath the greatest good absolutely or the Eternal Felicity for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intension of the Vniverse or all Beings existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination or who is habitually inclined thereto and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature and then constantly and perpetually It is easie to see what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes in all the three respects The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment but to know our selves and consequently to apply them And since Denominatio fit à Majore he only is to be called a good man who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good than to any one or more particulars And this was or might have been the reason why Martyrdome was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith even though he was not actually Baptized was thought to expiate all former bad life and to be undoubtedly saved or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven because such his suffering death or parting with life itself deemed the greatest personal good amongst men rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess and consequently to disobey God was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God and consequently to that which was right just and good than to any other thing in the world besides Nor may it be here amiss to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination Bent and Propension to any certain Object to be so forcible and strong as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object nor may a man be able to divert suspend or withhold his actual Volition consent or embrace from it when it is proposed Though by prudent contrivance these Habitual Inclinations generally I do not say all may also by degrees be weakned and at last quite extinguished and destroyed 26. 'T is as easie hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names For one way and the most common is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure whether that particular Good be in a mans self or in another as the Subject whether it be mine or anothers but it is usually if not always a mans own from its various Causes or Objects And it seems there may be six general ones I do but now suggest not determine 1 The possession of any Good in general so esteemed many things thus onely please 2 The pain mischief evil suffering of another Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith let others consider but I see no reason why it is not possible Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause is called Malice to be habitually inclined thereto Maliciousness but the renouncing of this or the
nolition of it or the volition of its absence and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good may be called Charity or if there be any fitter Name 3 The third Object causing delight to us is power to do what one pleaseth to make any thing consequent upon ones will of which three degrees Liberty Equality Superiority Now to have pleasure arising from hence the onely Object of our volition is an action of pride the onely Object of our habitual inclination the vice thereof To refuse it as before or will its absence is Humility 4 Mere Activity and Life and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls such as is for example mere Contemplation and Knowledge Sense Imagination strong Passions intense Volitions or Resolutions And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names some kinds of it may 5 Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions or Motions of our Bodies to which our Souls are united suaves Corporis Commotiones as some have called them which I know no common name to signifie them by unless Titillation may be allowed These as Cartes thinks create pleasure to the mind as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body Of this sort are all Sensations amongst which are those of Health Calmness and Serenity other bodily tempers many corporeal passions such as Love Joy Hope Acquiescence c. Nay I may say all perhaps for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres Nerves and Spirits delight and please but also the Sense Perception Life and some kind of action of the Soul So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects one Corporeal t'other Intellectual and indeed most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies the entire Object of our Volition is an act of Sensuality and to be habitually enclined thereto the Vice But to refuse this Self-pleasure or to will its absence is Sobriety or Temperance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 6 The perfection of a mans nature of all his Faculties which may be referred to the first and amongst the rest the Rectitude Honesty Probity of his Actions and Inclinations or his Virtue may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him Now even to have this delight usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience nay let me adde that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward and from the possession of it too I say to have this the entire Object of our Volition Intention Inclination or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought is a sin and vice which wants a name as doth its opposite Virtue Finally not to insist upon this distribution I have made which I brought onely for example of some general Heads as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us and consequently correspondent Appetites which are numberless So many sorts of sins or vices may there be they all may be reduced to some general heads and those heads divided and these again subdivided c. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects usually comprehended under three viz. God All created or finite Beings besides our selves under the name of our Neighbour though we know little of any other or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind and lastly our selves The Volition of the Universal Good our last end therefore may be resolved into three parts viz. The love of God The love of â—ur Neighbour The love of our selves Or Piety Charity and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns And by Love I mean not Gratitude but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved whether the good be an absent or present good To will an absent good and desire it for the person we love can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves not to God who we know cannot want any thing But to will a present good may be to God also We may will approve rejoyce delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature which he always doth and cannot but possess 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually although but one of them may be first regarded As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour we ought at least habitually to will it not onely because thereby we do good to him but also because it pleaseth God and it is our own perfection and will be for our own greater good so to do although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoyned that we may and ought always habitually to believe when we endeavour to effect the one the other will necessarily follow Thus for example to love God the Volition of good to him or the rejoycing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon and flows therefrom from his Being and from his most perfect Nature and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection Comfort Reward So again if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour we may be sure it pleaseth God and is best for our selves And so Lastly our own greatest good truly as to Intension Extension and Duration or our greatest perfection and happiness is in and by loving of God and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour 29. It may be further observed that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever which do effect the Universal good have been used to be called Virtues without any consideration of the end of the Action or the ultimate Object thereof and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual vertues The other sort of Volitions which have their due end or due ultimate Object considered as such having the name of principal or inherent Virtues So for example to apply the mind to attention and consideration pursuit after or love of the Truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are accounted Virtues because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones Such again are to judge rightly and truly especially concerning other men i.e. always onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves not because we imagine so Although the end of
AN ESSAY IN Morality Written by G. B. to his Friend H. P. Esquire In which the Nature of Virtue and Vice is distinctly stated Their respective Reasonableness and Unreasonableness demonstrated And several useful Conclusions inferred LONDON Printed for John Wright at the Crown on Ludgate hill 1682. The CONTENTS Artic. 1. WHatever is in the Soul◠of Man reduced to two Heads viz. Action and Passion 2. Action in the Soul of two sorts 1. Assent or Judgment 2. Volition 3. In Volition Four things only to be considered 1. The Faculty 2. The Action 3. An Actual Inclination 4. An habitual Inclination 4. Of the three last the Perfection and Defect may be considered 5. The Object of Volition at the same time but one 6. The Object of Volition is only good of two sorts viz. that of the end or delectable good and that of the means or profitable good 7. The goodness of the Means is the goodness of the End 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sort of profitable good 9. Delectable good hath indefinite degrees in Extension Intension and Duration 10. The greatest delectable good absolutely is the Eternal Happiness of the whole Universe 11. The first perfectionof Volition is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good 12. That this is a perfection 13. That it is possible desirable may be in the highest degree delightful 14. To have a less good than absolutely the greatest for the Object of our Volition is a defect 15. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation of Volition to its Object is Moral good and evil 16. This Moral good is a kind of bonum utile 17. Sin privately an infinite evil 18. And it may be so positively 19. A second perfection of Volition is strength force zeal 20. A third Constancy 21. The just moderation of it seems a fourth 22. Moral good and evil depend not upon any Beings's will 23. Nor upon the freedom of Will 24. Possible to will the rectitude of an action and yet to sin 25. A man to be estimated good or bad according to his Habitual Inclination 26. A general distribution of Virtues called inherent 27. Another from the parts of the Universal good 28. These to be all taken together and considered as one 29. Instrumental or eventual Virtues 30. When it may be true that Virtus consistit in medio 31. The nature and degrees of this sort of Virtues 32. It is not true that Virtutes sunt connexae 33. How to determine which Virtues and Vices are the greatest 34. Actual inclinations and propensions may be sinful 35. The reason for the manner of writing and the Style of this Essay To his Honoured Friend H. P. Esquire Dear Sir I Perceive your very inquisitive and searching Genius hath not permitted you to rest satisfied with what hath been commonly taught and received in many Questions which you think of the greatest concernment to be truly and clearly resolved at least of much more than most of those which ordinarily now adays employ the busie thoughts and pens of Men. And as they have given you some trouble and care so I understand by you that they are likely to give me some too For you are pleased to believe that I may have been not altogether a stranger to thoughts about such matters and that peradventure I may have fallen upon something either as to Matter or Method or both which might a little contribute to your light and ease though I scarcely know any man who stands in less need of it than your self Perhaps our free and frequent mutual Entertainments with Discourses of such nature the most delightful and profitable use of friendship have given occasion to your kind opinion and put you upon making further tryal Sir I must own it to be my Perswasion also that the Questions you proposed are all of them of importance and some of them of absolutely the greatest and that they ought to be determined with more clearness certainty and which is hugely considerable to short-liv'd Mortals with more brevity than hitherto for all't I know they have been But I cannot own myself to be the person in Parts Health or Leisure so happy as to promise you the performance of any great matter at present whereby I might be serviceable to you and answer either your desire or expectation Nevertheless upon your Request and Command which go a great way with me backed I acknowledge with some suspicion and presumption that something might be done I have attempted one of them which I have been the most impatient to be satisfied in my self as appearing to me of the vastest consequence and yet delivered as I thought such was my unquiet curiosity if you please with but too much mistake confusion and defect in the best Writers and of greatest name and therefore long and often before I received your command it had been in my thoughts The question is what should be the perfection of our Active power or Will of its Actions or Volitions of its actual and habitual Inclinations or in one word of our Manners and not only of ours but of any intelligent being existent and therefore even of the Divine Nature it self I mean of its Volitions and Decrees not of any inclinations which including some imperfection belong not thereunto Many in my judgment have been the mistakes and errors in Divinity and Natural Philosophy but especially in Morality and Politicks for want of a right understanding in this Question some of which I am sure upon perusal of this will not escape your Observation I have delivered what I had to say in almost Mathematical Method beginning at the most simple Notions which are the most plain and undoubted and then proceeding to what is more compounded so that that which follows generally depends upon and supposeth the knowledge of what is before I have also endeavoured that my style be simple short and clear without any ornament or finery of words which may darken the Sense or divert the Attention though it be not so common and sometimes perhaps uncouth for a reason which you 'l meet withal at the end of the Essay But I did not think it this time expedient to go any further than to point out the way of composing a System of Ethicks from these Principles which I know at your leisure you can easily do your self As for what is done I must request the favour of you to read over the whole which is but short before you pass judgement of any part for the prevention of needless dissatisfaction and scruple After all I must crave leave to remember ourselves of that which we have often agreed in namely how little the clearest and most certain knowledge of these things will signifie without the practice and that a generously honest man whose Soul is animated and imbued with Virtue acting according to these principles from a publick and universalized spirit though they lye not so neatly and orderly in his head is infinitely
hankering before there be any express Volition that which is usually signified by such phrases I could find in my heart to do such a thing and that of Foelix to St. Paul Thou hast almost perswaded me to be a Christian And for the fourth this one thing evinces it viz. That there is a great difference between men in the facility readiness and strength to their actual inclinations and Volitions before they actually exist Of this facility in one man which is not in another there must be some present cause in one man which is not in another and this I call an Habitual Inclination or Volition It is most certain there is something in two men accustomed to two things with delight when they have no actual Inclination and Volition in them which upon the proposal of those two different objects doth produce two different or contrary actual Inclinations and Volitions and this not only in the Mechanisms of their Bodies by which those objects excite corporeal passions of love or delight but in the Soul too and most often contracted by the frequent actual inclinations impressed upon the Soul by these passions and sometimes without them But it is enough that it is agreed by all men that there is an actual difference inherent and present in the Soul between a Drunkard and an Ambitious man even when they are asleep or their Volition and actual inclination are employed about other things which then appears when the proper objects of their respective appetites and habitual inclinations are proposed to them As for all other humane Actions which have been called imperate or Actions commanded by and consequent upon Volition except Volition itself for one Volition may have for its object another Volition such as are Attention Consideration Judgment motion of the parts of the Body or Bodily Action in which is Speech or Words I meddle not at present with them only suggest that there is nothing of Moral good or evil of inherent Virtue or Vice in them they are indeed mostwhat though they may be dissembled signs thereof and of its degrees nor are they so much as what in the Twenty ninth Article or Paragraph we term instrumental or eventual Virtues or Vices any further than they include Volition For example there is neither Virtue nor Vice in attention or judgment which are actions of the Mind nor in Speech Gesture Motion which are actions of the body but only in the Volition or act of the Will which commands or effects them 4. Now of these three last viz. Actual Volition Actual and Habitual Inclination the perfection and defect may be considered which perfection and defect of Volition for example and so of the rest can be only in two respects viz. 1. Of the Object 2. Of the Action 5. And first concerning the Object of Volition it is to be noted that at the same time it can be but one though that one may consist of several parts which may be successively regarded For example a man cannot will and regard at the same precise time his Neighbours good and his own Reputation as two distinct separate co-ordinate things but he may will them both together as making up or composing one entire Object like as the Eye can see but one Object at the same time painted at the bottom thereof consisting of many parts the whole it may see together confusedly and but one point distinctly 6. Moreover that the only Object of Volition and so of the rest is bonity or good only not evil is manifest from universal experience All which goodness or what is convenient congruous eligible desirable for by all these may bonity or good be described is of two kinds 1. That of the End 2. That of the Means That of the End hath been usually called jucundum delectable or pleasant good or pleasure delight although this very pleasure hath some further use is likewise a means to excite encourage and fortifie the Operations of the Mind which again mediately and immediately may produce new pleasure That of the means is called bonum utile or profitable good to obtain the end of delectable good of which the kinds are numerous 7. The goodness of the means is nothing but its Conducibility to or Causality of the end which indeed is the goodness of the end in the means it is the same there is nothing eligible in the means to obtain any end but the goodness of the end it self Of this profitable good bonum honestum or honest good is one sort or kind as we shall presently understand 8. And to add this for the present the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or pulchritude and beauty of Virtue in whatsoever it consists talked of so much by Platonists is another sort and is only therefore good because it is so congruous or delectable an object to the Mind or some way or other hath in it some causality of pleasure or delight 9. As for delectable good which is as hath been said the only object of Volition it is better understood by every mans experience than by all the descriptions that can be given of it such as Aristotle's perfection of the Minds Operation and Eudoxus's perfect and grateful assension and acquiescence Plato's passion affection and diffusion of the mind and the repose of the Will in some convenient good and many others some of which are contrary each to other as when some say it is Motion and some say it is the Rest and Repose of the Mind It is more to our purpose to observe that it hath indefinite degrees and that in three respects only and no more viz. 1. In Extension as to Subjects 2. Intension 3. Duration Of which to take the extremes only the lowest degree in the first respect is the good of one single Soul the highest that of all Spiritual Beings existant usually comprehended under God our Neighbour and our selves where by Neighbour we understand all Rational Creatures at least We actually indeed know a most inconsiderable part of Mankind only our own Family Town or Countrey to whose greatest good notwithstanding if we direct our Volition it is a sign we implicitely will that good which is absolutely the greatest and that if any greater good were within our view and comprehension we should will that expresly and actually In the second respect we want both conceits and words for the lowest and highest degree In the third respect the lowest degree is that good which is momentany the highest Eternal 10. Wherefore the greatest delectable good absolutely is that which is so in extension intension duration or the Eternal happiness of the whole Vniverse considered as one thing and as Cartes considered Motion in the Material world 11. After which it is easie to observe that the greatest and first perfection of Volition in respect of the Object is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good or to have it for its Object and contrariwise the greatest defect thereof is to be directed
good actions In the Scripture it is the Spirit living according to the Spirit and being led by the Spirit and delighting in the Law of God according to the inward man and the new man created after God because the Object that pleaseth is a Spiritual thing and because it is according to the Word of God dictated by the Spirit of God and from the influence or efficiency of Gods Spirit in us Here may be noted that the degree of the strength of our Volition and inclination to the Universal good and in order to that of our passions ought at least to exceed that which is to any other particular good or else it will be ineffectual Whence it may be further usefully observed That they are not always to be deemed or termed good men who in Pulpit Church or private Conversation not only appear but really are very zealous and affectionate in Religion because they generally are of passionate Tempers in other matters and may perhaps have greater affections and consequently inclinations to other Objects A man of a more calm and sedate temper in Religion provided that the greatest degree of affection he hath be directed to his duty may be a good man when one of a more boisterous and passionate one whatever he is vulgarly taken for may be indeed a bad man The one shall more steadily and constantly do his duty than the other In like manner when a man sins deliberately it is a sign of a greater bent strength and intension of the inclination of the Will to its undue Object and of a less to Virtue when he sins by surprize or on a sudden it is not so much a sign thereof But these and many other things usually treated of in Morality may with a little consideration be easily and distinctly determined from the foregoing Conclusions and a wary observation and experience of the operations of our Minds 20. The second Perfection of our Volition and inclination in respect of the Action is Constancy Continuance or Duration So that in this respect the highest degree is to have the Volition and Inclination perpetually and eternally directed to the absolutely greatest good the lowest to have them so directed but for one moment or the least of time This perfection of the Action of Volition belongs only to God who always actually so wills for he is always the same without any change but of habitual inclination may be in us and other rational Creatures So that there are only these three general perfections of Virtue The first the direction of Volition and Inclination to their right Object the second that they be with the greatest force or strength any Nature is capable of the third that they be the most perpetual and constant or continued and lasting or in three words Sincerity Generosity Constancy 21. And yet there seems to be another perfection of Volition in respect of the Action and that is the just moderation of it to the various parts of this Universal good i. e. When we will any part thereof knowingly to will it more or less in due proportion to the share of goodness that is in it compared with another part and the defect contrariwise will be to will a less good more than a greater and the greatest defect is when we will the least part more than all the rest for example a moment of the least pleasure to our selves before the Eternal Felicity of God and all the world besides And this may be not only when any two parts are inconsistent one with another as when I will to gratifie my self in that which displeaseth God and is mischievous or hurtful to my Neighbour but also when they are consistent nay conjoyned together and they are altogether the Object of my Will Thus if a man builds an Hospital or gives any Alms to the Poor he knows this action will please God benefit others procure himself Reputation and he doth it for all these reasons he wills all this good together as one but here that of these which he may most will that which he chiefly intends is his Reputation and his own pleasure therefrom which ought to be possibly without compare the least regarded though somewhat But in truth this is but a sign of that perfection and defect of Volition which is in respect of the Object or of the Action For if a man wills only his own good or only to please God exclusively one to the other the defect seems to be in not having the Universal good but some particular good for the Object of his Volition because both and more should be taken together But if a man wills one good composed of more parts and wills that part most which in truth is the least good either he doth it knowingly or ignorantly if knowingly which is most frequent whatever pretences men may make then the defect is in not willing the greatest good and consequently it is a defect in respect of the Object before-mentioned for he cannot but know that it tends to a lesser Good to will a lesser more than a greater If ignorantly and erroneously judging that the greater Good which is indeed the lesser the ignorance is either through some present defect in the actual Volition or habitual inclination to the Universal good ones Duty Right Honest or it is not if it be it is plain where and what the defect is viz. in the Action or Inclination before-mentioned if it be not then there is no defect in the present Volition at all whatever may have been in former Actions of the Will by which such ignorance may be contracted but only in the Understanding the Volition may have for all that its due Object viz. the greatest good 22. From these propositions it follows that the nature of this defect of Volition or of Sin depends not upon any Law or upon any Beings Will whatsoever though its existence doth because it being only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation it cannot exist actually unless the subject thereof do namely some Will or other but though we suppose no other Being in the World besides one and no antecedent Will yet these which have been before-mentioned would be perfections and defects whensoever it exists It is true that Laws may be the signs of what is just and unjust right and wrong but not the efficient causes any otherwise than a Subject is the efficient cause of the existence of its property as is but now said These Laws also are sometimes necessary inseparable signs sometimes in several degrees contingent and probable only according to the knowledge and justice of the Law-maker Those which are certainly Laws of God who is infallibly wise and immutably just are most inseparable and certain signs of what is just and right but those which are any other Creatures are more or less probable ones Laws do not make but suppose the thing just which they command It is true also what the Apostle St. Paul saith That
these actions may be no other than the pleasure and delight a man takes in such conduct of himself in such temper and actions or some personal and proper good and therefore indeed are inherently vitious according to our sense of Virtue and Vice So likewise Liberality or the distribution of many good things to others considered without its end I mean the inward Volition of so doing or the action of the Will of which the outward bodily action is a Signe and Effect onely and belongs not to this present discourse 30. And 't is here only that it is generally true that Virtus consistit in medio i.e. there may be too much or too little of such actions and habits both which extremes do not effect the Universal good but are of more ill than good consequence Thus for example A man may attend too much sometimes and to some things or too little he may give too much or too little the first of which is called prodigality the second parsimony or covetousness But it is false and absurd to say this of Virtue as it is before defined for there can be no excess therein Nay some of these very actions may have no excess as Justice rightly desined and Faith 31. Those of this sort of actions and habits are called Virtues which are observed and believed to have more good effects than evil ones in the total sum Insomuch that if they have very few more good than bad consequences they are termed mean Virtues as Frugality if very many and great ones then they are called great Virtues such as Justice or giving to every one his due i.e. that to each particular and consequently to ones self also as to quality quantity time and all other respects of giving it which is most for the Universal good Meekness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or slowness to be moved to anger or returning evil when provoked by infirmities ill actions or injuries to our selves or others Clemency or an omission of part of punishment Forbearance and long sufferance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a delay of punishment or of returning evil for a long time after many injuries Forgiveness or an omission to punish or return any evil for injuries at all Bounty Courage Veracity consent to the Constitution and Administration of Government or entring into a Society where some may be on purpose set apart and appointed for finding out and improving and securing what is for the common benefit of that Society and particularly for the arbitration of all differences which the Jews call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges or Government and make it one of the seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah or of those whose advantages of benefit to Mankind were so easily and well known that all men who had the use of Reason and Natural light only allowed and commanded them But there is no greater instrumental or eventual Virtue than Christian Faith or to be a Believer by which I mean Obedience to Jesus in Gods Name which consists of or contains two things 1. An assent to all things Jesus or those commissionated and inspired by him taught and delivered as infallibly true And 2. A practising all he hath commanded Better words than these we have not to express these two particulars by though both indeed are doing and practising commands For the precepts of Christian Faith contain the most sincere and generous and constant inherent Virtue as also the greatest instrumental or eventual ones The very first part alone or Assent is generally in various degrees a great instrumental Virtue Some habits again there are whose advantage of good or bad effects is so uncertain that it is disputed whether they be Virtues or not Some at some times say they are and others say not For example Facetiousness and Taciturnity And for the same reason it is hardly yet determined or determinable whether some dispositions and actions be Vices or Vitious or no viz. because the advantage or excess of good or bad consequences of either side is yet unknown Such perhaps may be Scrupulosity or an aptitude to examine the lawfulness of every the smallest action not in respect of the end only for that is easily known but of the effect which is mostly difficult often impossible to know So also Separation from some particular corrupted Church Some may think Separation some Communion the greatest mischief Such individual actions also may be called indifferent These for their very being such are not by any man to be done at all and a man is always to do that which is not indifferent or to act because he judgeth upon so much consideration as is fit to be allowed or sufficient for things of no more importance that of his action there may be more good than bad consequences and more good consequences than of his omission of it or doing any other action at that time Those actions also are by some termed indifferent which though they are at one time in some circumstances of best effect and therefore to be done yet in others 't is confessed they are not If so there may be a great many degrees of Indifferency Some actions may be more some less indifferent than others in respect of frequency and number of conveniencies or good effects Some may be for the most part of many and great good consequences and effects but seldom of any hurtful ones and those but small and few On the contrary some may more generally be very inconvenient and noxious yet sometimes convenient and useful Some lastly may be near equal All which hindereth not but that every one of these individual actions according as with all their circumstances they are judged to be of most good or bad consequences are as much to be done or not to be done at that particular time as if they were of that sort of actions which were perpetually to be done or abstained from And these are the things generally about which the World with an unproportionate confidence dissent and quarrel and contend unto wounds and death itself 32. Many other are the useful inferences which may be made from these few Observations and many the Questions determined thereby As only for instance sake It is an ordinary Question among the Writers of Ethicks and it may be of some importance whether Virtutes sunt connexae all Virtues are connected so that if there be one in any Subject there are all To which it is easily answered that they are not For it is plain that a man may have a more strong and prevailing habitual inclination to his duty to that which is just and right to please and obey God to the Universal good than to some one or more certain Objects but not than to some other So some men especially if advanced in years may prefer their duty and acting according to Conscience before any sensual pleasures but not before Riches Reputation Dignity Power Self-will c. They may have so little inclination to the former as
easily to subject it to their Conscience but so violent and impetuous to the latter that they are not to be governed or commanded by their Conscience or a judgement of and habitual inclination to their duty They may be as is usually said perhaps Covetous Vain-glorious Ambitious Proud and Obstinate but not Voluptuous and on the contrary to speak in the received style some may be very insensible of Glory or Greatness but furiously carried to the pleasures of Sense And hence it appears that the Characters which Historians have given of some men may be true namely that there was in them Magnae Virtutes nec minora Vitia great Virtues and as great Vices But it is as plain that it is an ordinary mistake of some persons who say that every man hath the seeds and roots of all particular Vices in his nature if by those words they mean an inordinate and immoderate habitual inclination or appetite And I know not what they can mean else unless it be a bare capacity but then there would be the seeds of all Virtues as well as Vices For there may be so many sins as there are Appetites and so many Appetites as there are Objects and there are some objects from which the Souls of some men have a natural aversion and this is to be understood not only of individual objects but also of some kinds of them and consequently of some kinds of sins 33. But it is a Question of much greater consequence what Virtues and Vices are the greatest and who are the most Virtuous or Vicious persons For according to our right information and judgement herein our Opinions and Actions our Inclinations and Behaviour our Rewards and Punishments towards men ought principally to be directed and governed Now Vices or Sins to take only that part are to be estimated either according to their principle and end or according to their effect and consequence or they are either inherent or eventual as hath been before said In respect of the principle or end there is no one kind or sort of sin universally greater than another for there may be as great an excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self-love in one sort as in another and that is the greatest sin in this respect in which there is a greater excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or habitual inclination to ones proper and personal good above Universal Charity or above the habitual inclination to the Universal good Thus there may be as great excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in sensuality as in pride or malice I say it may be so though more generally it is reasonably believed and supposed that there is more in these two last and that because there are usually more and greater mischievous effects to others visible and known to him that is guilty of them than in the first whence one must needs have a less regard to the good of others compared with his own than the other But in respect of the effect or consequence there is always a great difference between the kinds of sins and one is much worse than another Thus Malice and Ambition are much greater sins than Vain-glory or Sensuality especially some kinds of it such as the immoderate love of Bodily Exercises Divertisements and Pastimes In particular or rather individual sins or ill actions there may be always difference both in respect of the principle and the effect So a particular sin of Malice Spight and Revenge may be much greater and more heinous than a sin of Intemperance or Fornication both in respect of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self-love in opposition to the good of others and in respect of the hurtful and noxious effects and consequences Sometimes a particular sin may be greater in respect of the effect than another but not in respect of the principle Thus one act of Pride or Malice in any man may have many more mischievous consequences upon it than an act of Intemperance or Fornication but yet there may be less of the excess of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in that than in this the man perhaps being ignorant of many of the ill Consequences thereof whereas in this he saw them and yet committed the sin We ought to distinguish between the greatness of a sin and of a sinner He is not always in Gods account who knows the inclinations of the Soul certainly the greatest sinner who commits the greatest sin I mean he is not always the most guilty of an inherent sin who is the most guilty of the greatest eventual sin and on the contrary one man may be inherently or in respect of the principle more sinful and vicious in the commission of a less eventual sin than another in the commission of a greater Thus oft-times he may be a worse man or a greater sinner inherently who is guilty of Vain-glory which seems to have so few more evil than good consequences upon it and therefore to be a less Eventual sin than Fornication or Intemperance than he who is guilty of Fornication or Intemperance 34. So likewise it hath been disputed whether actual inclinations and propensions or as some call them appetites to sin concupiscences without consent of the Will or actual Volition be sinful To which it is to be answered that it is plain they are sinful But withal that the Wills not consenting or rather the actual nilling and refusing them because they are sinful is a certain sign of the Superiority or Prevalency just at that time of its habitual inclination to that which is right and honest as the not regarding at all and not attending whether they be sinful and not checking them if they seem so to be is a sign of the contrary For there may be not onely divers but contrary habitual inclinations in the Soul at the same time But as for mere thoughts or suggestions of what is sinful or unlawful as of Revenge or Lust or Vain-glory there can be no sin in them And when they are assentedto or delighted in the sin is not in those thoughts but in the actual Volition or Inclination of the Will It is not a sin for example for a man to have such a thought as this Mischief thou such a man because he once mischieved you Do such a thing because such persons will speak well of and applaud you for such a performance For such a thought is but an Object of my Understanding and proposed to my Will perhaps it is not in my Will in which onely is sin If it were a sin barely to have such a thought then it would be so if I had it conveyed to me by reading or hearing of such words which no man can think Nevertheless the emerging or springing of such thoughts from our selves is a very probable sign of habitual sinful inclinations in us For it is a sign though not a necessary one of some corporeal Passion of Love or Delight or Desire conjoyned to such Thoughts and Objects or