Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
virtue_n faith_n patience_n temperance_n 4,895 5 11.5543 5 true
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A53733 Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion. Owen, John, 1616-1683. 1669 (1669) Wing O817; ESTC R14775 171,951 414

There are 3 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

this matter h● proceeds to discourse of Moral Vertue o● Grace and of Religious Worship with hi● wonted reflections upon and reproache of Non-conformists for their ignorance about and villanous misrepresentation of these things which seem more to be aimed at● than the Argument it self I must here with again that our Author had more perspicuously stated the things which he proposeth to debate for the subject of his Disputation But I find an excess of Art is as troublesome sometimes as the greatest defect therein From thence I presume it is that things are so handled in this Discourse that an ordinary man can seldom discern satisfactorily what it is that directly and determinately he doth intend beyond reviling of Non-conformists For in this Proposition which is the best and most intelligible that I can reduce the present Discourse unto the Supream Civil Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of men in morality or with respect unto moral vertue excepting only the subject of it there is not one term in it that may not have various significations and those such as have countenance given unto them in the ensuing Disputation it self But contenti sumus hoc Catone and make the best we can of what lyes before us I do suppose that in the medium made use of in this Argument there is or I am sure there may be a Controversie of much more importance than that principally under consideration It therefore shall be stated and cleared in the first place and then the concernment of the Argument it self in what is discoursed thereupon shall be manifested It is about Moral Vertue and Grace their coincidence or distinction that we are in the first place to enquire For without a due stating of the conception of these things nothing of this Argument nor what belongs unto it can be rightly understood We shall therefore be necessitated to premise a brief Explanation of these terms themselves to remove as far as may be all ambiguity from our Discourse First then the very name of Vertue in the sense wherein it is commonly used and received comes from the Schools of Philosophy and not from the Scripture In the Old Testament we have Vprightness Integrity Righteousness doing Good and eschewing Evil Fearing Trusting Obeying Believing in God Holiness and the like but the name of Vertue doth not occur therein It is true we have translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a vertuous Woman and once or twice the same word vertuously Ruth 3. 11. Prov. 12. 4. Chap● 31. 10 39. But that word signifies as 〈◊〉 used strenuous industrious diligent and hath no such signification as that we now express by vertue Nor is it any where rendred 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the LXX although it may have some respect unto it as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and peculiarly denote the exercise of industrious strength such as men use in Battail For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is vis robur potentia or exercitus also But in the common acceptation of it and as it is used by Philosophers there is no word in the Hebrew nor Syriack properly to express it The Rabbins do it by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies properly a measure For studying the Philosophy of Aristotle and translating his Ethicks into Hebrew which was done by Rabbi Meir and finding his vertue placed in mediocrity they applyed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to express it So they call Aristotles Ethicks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Book of Measures that is of vertues And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are boni mores Such a stranger is this very word unto the Old Testament In the New Testament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 occurs four times but it should not seem any where to be taken in the sense now generally admitted In some of the places it rather denotes the excellency and praises that do attend Vertue than Vertue it self So we render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praises 1 Pet. 2. 9. as the Syriack doth also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 praises and the same Translation Phil. 4. 9. renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If there be any vertue by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 works glorious or praise worthy 2 Pet. 1. 9. It is a peculiar gracious disposition operation of mind distinguished from Faith Temperance Patience Brotherly kindness Godliness Charity c. and so cannot have the common sense of the word there put upon it The word Moral is yet far more exotick to the Church and Scripture We are beholding for it if there be any advantage in its use meerly to the Schools of the Philosophers especially of Aristotle His Doctrine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commonly called his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Moralia his Morals hath begotten this name for our use The whole is expressed in Isocrates to Demonicus by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the vertue of manners If then the signification of the words be respected as usually taken it is vertue in mens manners that is intended The Schoolmen brought this expression with all its concerns as they did the rest of Aristotles Philosophy into the Church and Divinity And I cannot but think it had been well if they had never done it as all will grant they might have omitted some other things without the least disadvantage to Learning or Religion However this expression of Moral Vertue having absolutely possest it self of the Fancies and Discourses of all and it may be of the Understanding of some though with very little satisfaction when all things are considered I shall not endeavour to dispossess it or eliminate it from the Confines of Christian Theologie Only I am sure had we been left unto the Scripture expressions of Repentance towards God and Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ of the fear of God of Holiness Righteousness living unto God walking with God and before him we might have been free from many vain wordy perplexities and the whole wrangle of this Chapter in particular had been utterly prevented For let but the Scripture express what it is to be Religious and there will be no contesting about the difference or no difference between Grace and Moral Vertue It is said that some judge those who have Moral Vertue to want Grace not to be Gracious But say that men are born of God and do not commit sin that they walk before God and are upright that they cleave unto God with full purpose of heart that they are sanctified in Christ Jesus and the like and no man will say that they have not Grace or are not Gracious if they receive your Testimony But having as was said made its entrance amongst us we must deal with it as well as we can and satisfie our selves about its common Acceptation and Use. Generally moral Vertues are esteemed to be the Duties of the second Table For although those who handle these matters more accurately do not so straiten or confine them yet it is certain that in vulgar
Goodness miraculously inspire the first Converts of Christianity with all sorts of Vertues but that He doth not still continue to put forth in any actually the Efficacy of his Grace to make them Gracious Holy Believing Obedient to himself and to work in them all suitable actings towards himself and others Then farewell Scripture the Covenant of Grace the Intercession of Christ yea all the Ancient Fathers Counsels Schoolmen and most of the Jesuites themselves Many have been the disputes amongst Christians about the Nature of Grace the Rule of its Dispensation the manner and way of its Operation its Efficacy Concurrence and Co-operation in the Wills of men but that there is no dispensation of it no operation but what was miraculous in the first Converts of the Gospel was I think untill now undiscovered Nor can it be here pretended that although the Vertuous qualities of our minds and their Exercise by which is intended all the Obedience that God requireth of us in Principle and Practice that we may please him and come to the enjoyment of him are not said to be called Graces only on the account mentioned For as in respect of us they are not so termed at all so if the term only be not understood the whole discourse is impertinent and ridiculous For those other Reasons and Accounts that may be taken in will render that given utterly useless unto our Authors intention and indeed are altogether inconsistent with it And he hath given us no reason to suppose that he talks after such a weak and preposterous a rate This then is that which is here asserted the Qualities of our minds and their Exercise wherein the Vertues pleaded about and affirmed to contain the whole Substance of Religion do consist are not wrought in us by the Grace or Spirit of God through the Preaching of the Gospel but are only called Graces as before Now though here be a plain contradiction to what is delivered but two pages before namely that we pray for some or other Vertuous qualities that is doubtless to be wrought in us by the Grace of God yet this present discourse is capable of no other interpretation but that given unto it And indeed it seems to be the design of some men to confine all real Gifts and Graces of the Spirit of God to the first Ages of the Gospel and the miraculous operations in it which is to overthrow the whole Gospel the Church and the Ministry of it as to their use and efficacy leaving Men only the Book of the Bible to Philosophize upon as shall be elsewhere demonstrated Our Author indeed tells us that on the occasion of some mens writings in Theology there hath been a buzz and a noise of the Spirit of God in the World His expressions are exceedingly suited to pour contempt on what he doth not approve not so to express what he doth himself intend But I desire that he and others would speak plain and openly in this matter that neither others may be deceived nor themselves have occasion to complain that they are mis-represented a pretence whereof would probably give them a dispensation to deal very roughly if not despightfully with them with whom they shall have to do Doth he therefore think or believe that there are not now any real Gracious Operations of the Spirit of God upon the hearts and minds of men in the world that the dispensation of the Spirit is ceased as well unto ordinary Ministerial Gifts with its sanctifying renewing assisting Grace as unto Gifts miraculous and extraordinary that there is no work at all of God upon the hearts of Sinners but that which is purely moral and perswasive by the word that what is asserted by some concerning the Efficacy of the Grace of the Spirit and concerning his gifts is no more but a buzz and a noise I wish he would explain himself directly and positively in these things for they are of great importance And the loose expressions which we meet with do give great Offence unto some who are apt to think that as pernicious an Heresie as ever infested the Church of God may be covered and clocked by them But to return In the sense that Moral Vertue is here taken I dare boldly pronounce that there is no Villany in the Religion of those men who distinguish between Vertue and Grace that is there not in their so doing this being the known and avowed Religion of Christianity It is granted that whereever Grace is there is Vertue For Grace will produce and effect all Vertues in the Soul whatever But Vertue on the other side may be where there is no Grace which is sufficient to confirm a distinction between them It was so in fundry of the Heathen of old though now it be pretended that Grace is nothing but an occasional denomination of Vertue not that it is the cause or principle of it But the proofs produced by our Author are exceedingly incompetent unto the end whereunto they are applyed For that place of the Apostle Gal. 5. v. 22 23. The fruit of the Spirit is Love Joy Peace long-suffering Gentleness Goodness Faith meekness Temperance Though our Author should be allowed to turn Joy into cheerfulness peace into peaceableness Faith into Faithfulness as he hath done corruptly enough to accommodate it to his purpose yet it will no way reach his end nor satisfie his intention For doth it follow that because the Spirit effects all these Moral vertues in a new and gracious manner and with a direction to a new and special end in Believers either that these things are nothing but meer Moral Vertues not wrought in us by the grace of God the contrary whereof is plainly asserted in calling them fruits of the Spirit or that where-ever there is Moral Vertue though not so wrought by the Spirit that there is Grace also because Vertue and Grace are the same If these are the Expositions of Scripture which we may expect from them who make such out-cries against other mens perverting and corrupting of it the matter is not like to be much mended with us for ought I can see upon their taking of that work into their own hands And indeed his Quotation of this place is pretty odd He doth not in the Print express the words as he useth and as he doth those of another Scripture immediately in a different character as the direct words of the Apostle that no man may charge him with a false Allegation of the Text. Yet he repeats all the words of it which he intends to use to his purpose somewhat altering the expressions But he hath had I fear some unhappiness in his Explanations By Joy he would have Cheerfulness intended But what is meant by cheerfulness is much more uncertain than what is intended by Joy Mirth it may be in Conversation is aimed at or somewhat of that nature But how remote this is from that Spiritual Joy which is recommended unto us in the Scripture
things are all I can observe that are offered in the confirmation of it First That these things of morality moral Vertues are of more importance in Religion than the outward worship of God which the amplitude of power before asserted is now reducing to a respect unto Secondly That there is much more danger of his erring and mistaking in things of morality than in things of outward Worship because of their great weight and importance These things are pleaded p. 28. And elsewhere up and down That any thing else is offered in the confirmation of this consequent I find not And it may be some will think these proofs to be very weak and feeble unable to sustain the weight that is laid upon them For it is certain that the first Rule that he that hath power over the Greater hath so over the Lesser doth not hold unless it be in things of the same nature and kind and it is no less certain and evident that there is an especial and formal difference between these things namely moral Vertues and Instituted Worship the one depending as to their Being and discovery on the light of Nature and the dictates of that Reason which is common to all and speakes the same language in the Consciences of all mankind the other on pure Revelation which may be and is variously apprehended Hence it is that whereas there is no difference in the world about what is Vertue and what is not there is no Agreement about what belongs to divine Worship and what doth not Again lesser things may be exempted from that Power and Authority by especial priviledge or Law which hath the disposal of greater committed into it and intrusted with it As the Magistrate amongst us may take away the life of a Man which is the greatest of his concernments the name of his all for fellony but cannot take away his Estate or Inheritance of Land which is a far less concernment unto him if it be antecedently setled by Law to other uses than his own And if it cannot be proved that the disposal of the Worship of God as to what doth really and truly belong unto it and all the parts of it is exempted from all humane Power by special Law and Priviledge let it be disposed of as who so will shall judge meet Nor is the latter consideration suggested to inforce this consequent of any more validity namely that there is more danger of the Magistrates erring or mistakes about Moral Vertue than about Rites of Worship because that is of most concernment in Religion For it is true that suppose a Man to walk on the top of an high house or Tower on a plain floor with battlements or Walls round about him there will be more danger of breaking his neck if he should fall from thence than if he should fall from the top of a narrow wall that had not the fourth part of the heighth of the house But there would not be so much danger of falling For from the top of the house as circumstantiated he cannot fall unless he will wilfully and violently cast himself down headlong and on the top of the Wall it may be he cannot stand with the utmost of his heed and endeavours The Magistrate cannot mistake about Moral Vertues unless he will do it wilfully They have their station fixed in the world on the same ground and evidence with Magistracy it self The same evidence the same common consent and suffrage of mankind is given unto Moral Vertues as is to any Government in the World And to suppose a supream Magistrate a Law-giver to mistake in these things in judging whether Justice and Temperance or Fortitude be Vertues or no and that in their Legislative capacity is ridiculous Neither Nero nor Caligula were ever in danger of any such mis-adventure All the Magistrates in the World at this day are agreed about these things But as to what concerns the Worship of God they are all at variance There is no such Evidence in these things no such common suffrage about them as to free any absolutely from failings and mistakes so that in respect of them and not of the other lyes the principal danger of miscarrying as to their determination and administration Supposing therefore the Premises our Author layes down to be true his Inference from them is feeble and obnoxious to various impeachments whereof I have given some few Instances only which shall be increased if occasion require But the Assertion it self which is the foundation of these consequences is utterly remote from Accuracy and Truth It is said that the Magistrate hath power over the Consciences of Men in reference unto Moral Duties which are the principal parts of Religion Our first and most difficult inquiry is after the meaning of this Proposition the later after its truth I ask then first whether he hath power over the Consciences of men with respect unto Moral Vertue and over Moral Vertue it self as Vertue and as a part of Religion or on some other account If his power respect Vertue as a part of Religion then it equally extends it self to all that is so by Vertue of a Rule which will not be easily everted But it doth not appear that it so extends it self as to plead an obliging Authority in reference unto all Duties For let but the Scheme of Moral Duties especially those whose Object is God given us by our Author be considered and it will quickly be discerned how many of them are exempted from all humane cognizance and Authority and that from and by their nature as well as their use in the World And it is in vain to ascribe an authority to Magistrates which they have no power to exert or take cognizance whether it be obeyed or no. And what can they do therein with respect unto Gratitude to God which holds the first place in the Scheme of Moral Vertues here given in unto us We are told also p. 83. That in matters both of Moral Vertue and Divine Worship there are some rules of Good and Evil that are of an Eternal and unchangeable obligation and these can never be prejudiced or altered by any humane power because the reason of their Obligation arises from a necessity and constitution of nature and therefore must be 〈◊〉 perpetual as that but then there are other rules of Duty that are alterable according to the various accidents changes and conditions of humane life and depend chiefly upon contracts and positive Laws of Kingdoms It would not be unworthy our inquiry to consider what rules of Moral Duty they are which are alterable and depend on accidents and contracts But we might easily find work enough should we call all such fond Assertions to a just examination Neither doth the distinction here given us between various Rules of Moral Vertue very well answer what we are told p. 69. namely that every particular Vertue is therefore such because it is are semblance and imitation of some