Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
virtue_n	faith_n	hope_n	theological_a	1,178	5	12.4996	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A15308	A cleare, sincere, and modest confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate reply of T.F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite Wherein also are confuted the chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against Widdrintons [sic] Apologie for the right, or soueraigntie of temporall princes. By Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.	Preston, Thomas, 1563-1640.	1616 (1616)	STC 25598; ESTC S120047	267,609	417

of that singular opinion and of one onely Doctor and seeth it to bee grounded vpon the authoritie of one onely Doctor hee ought not to account it probable to this effect that he may prudently follow it in practise against his owne and the common opinion of all others 46 But if it be not a singular opinion and of one onely Doctour although the learned men of the contrarie opinion doe vrge for their doctrine some law decree or definition which the contrarie part hath seene and examined and hath in some sort answered therevnto it is lawfull for any learned man according to Vasquez to follow in practise that other lesse secure and lesse common opinion against his owne opinion albeit it be the more secure and common opinion For when we perceiue saith Vasquez that the Authors of the contrarie opinion haue seene and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion and haue obserued that obiection taken from that law or decree and haue endeauoured to answer them and that they were not convinced by them we may iustly thinke that we may prudently and lawfully follow in practise the opinion of those other men against our owne neither ought wee to suppose that our reasons are euident demonstrations and which doe make the contrarie opinion to be voide of all probabilitie 47 And this doctrine of Vasquez is euident in the question concerning the superioritie of the Pope aboue a Generall Councell which hath been so long debated betwixt the Doctors of Rome and Paris For both of them affirme that their opinion is grounded vpon holy Scriptures is confirmed by the practise and decrees yea and definitions of Generall Councels and yet both of thē because they are approued by learned Catholike Diuines are probable although as Nauarra h In cap. Nouit de Iudicijs notab 3. nu 84. out of Ioannes Maior a learned Diuine of Paris relateth that the opinion of the Parishioners is not permitted to bee defended at Rome nor the opinion of the Romanes to bee defended at Paris And therefore into what fowle tearmes trow you would my Aduersarie breake if the Doctors of Paris who doe resolutely hold that the Pope is inferiour to a Generall Councell should argue against Card. Bellarmine and others of his opinion in the same manner as this fowle mouthed man who hath still in his mouth absurd ridiculous impertinent foolish impudent temerarious impious hereticall or erroneous that their doctrine hath not onely beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages but also it is grounded vpon holy Scriptures confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Counsels but especially of the famous Councell of Constance which did not onely ordaine the practise of it in some cases and therefore necessarily suppose and firmely beleeue but did also expressely define and consequently command all Christians to beleeue the verity of that doctrine and that therefore Card. Bellarmine is falne into heresie for not beleeuing that doctrine which that famous Generall Councell beleeued defined and ordained to be practised and also to be beleeued 48 By this it is apparant that Vasquez doctrine is to be vnderstood generally of all cases questions and opinions which are in controuersie among learned Catholikes although one or both parts doe pretend their doctrine to be of faith and to be grounded vpon the authoritie of holy Scripture or some decree of Pope or Generall Councell and that learned Catholikes ought not according to Vasquez to bee easily condemned of temeritie and much lesse of errour or heresie who doe not follow the more common the more probable and the more secure opinion of other Catholike Doctors although this common opinion seeme to some followers thereof to be an vndoubted doctrine and to be confirmed by some Decree Law or Canon of Pope or Generall Counsell which Decree Law or Canon those learned Catholikes haue seene examined and answered although their answeres doe not satisfie the contrarie side And conformably to this doctrine did Vasquez as I obserued in my Theologicall Disputation dispute that question whether there be any habits which are infused by God alone For although he expressely affirmeth that it is the constant without controuersie and vndoubted opinion of the Schoole-Diuines that there bee certaine vertues called Theologicall Faith Hope and Charitie which of their owne nature are infused by God alone and that some Doctors as Andreas Vega doe hold this doctrine to bee of faith and the contrarie to be hereticall or erroneous endeauouring to proue the same not out of the Councell of Vienna which did onely declare it to be the more probable opinion but out of the Councell of Trent yet Vasquez would not condemne the contrarie opinion not onely of heresie as my Aduersarie would cunningly perswade the Reader but not so much as of temeritie From whence I inferred that according to Vasquez doctrine which my Aduersarie fraudulently concealeth the constant without controuersie and vndoubted opinion of Schoole-Diuines and which some of them thinke to be a point of faith may sometimes bee reiected without any note not onely of heresie or errour but also of temeritie which doctrine doth cleerely satisfie the common argument drawne from the authoritie of learned men who hold the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to bee a point of faith and consequently the oath to bee repugnant to faith and saluation And thus much concerning the first and second point of my Aduersaries fourth Admonition 49 As touching the third point it is apparantly vntrue and very iniurious to Catholikes and to Catholike Religion to affirme that the Arrians or any other heretikes may well pretend a farre greater probabilitie for the establishing of their heresies then may I and those other Catholikes who hold it probable that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes For besides that the Arrian heresie was expressely condemned in the first eight Generall Counsels and afterwards in many others and the Arrians haue euer been accounted heretikes by ancient Fathers and all other Catholikes wheras there cannot be alledged so much as any shew or colour of any one definition of a Generall Councell wherein the doctrine which denyeth the Popes power to depose Princes is condemned for hereticall but all the proofes that my Aduersaries alledge that the Pope hath such a power are onely ouer-wrested similitudes facts examples inferences and supposisitions of their owne drawne from the authoritie of holy Scriptures Popes or Councels when the Philosophers and Diuines doe affirme that the authoritie of learned and skilfull men sufficeth to make the doctrine or opinion probable which they approue they vnderstand of learned and skilfull men approuing a doctrine belonging to the art which they professe according to that vulgar maxime vnicuique in sua arte perito credendum est we must giue credit to euery man skilfull in his art 50 So that in a point of Law the authoritie of skilfull Lawiers and not of skilfull Physitions in a point of Physike the

also by depriuing him of the sword as in the like case the Councell of Lateran often cited doth teach which one Councell is to be preferred before all the Barclaies or Iohns of Paris all men doe thinke who are not mad 28. Is not this thinke you a trim answere The question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine in this place was not concerning the Councell of Lateran wherof I will treat beneath * Part. 3. cap. 9. seq and plainely shew that notwithstanding all the clamours of my Aduersaries the said Councell hath neither defined or supposed for certaine nay or supposed at all that the Pope hath power to depose Soueraigne Princes as D. Schulckenius doth here collect from thence but the question was onely concerning the authoritie of S. Bernard And I prooued clearely out of S. Bernards wordes that although the Pope as Pope hath power to command or forbid in some cases the vse of the materiall sworde yet that he hath power as he is Pope to vse it himselfe or to depriue the Emperour of the vse thereof which implyeth a power to vse it himselfe this I said could not be proued but rather the contrarie out of those words of S. Bernard who doth not only say that it is not fitting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword as D. Schulckenius would mince his words but that it is forbidden the Pope to draw foorth or vse the materiall sword Now D. Schulckenius passeth ouer S. Bernard and flyeth to the Councell of Lateran to proue that if the Emperour refuse at the Popes command to vse the materiall sword he may by the Popes authoritie bee depriued of the vse thereof whereas the present question was only concerning the opinion of S. Bernard and not what was the doctrine of the Councell of Lateran in this point whose authoritie I doe asmuch respect either as Card. Bellarmine or any other Catholike is bound to doe But it is an easie matter to wrest the words of the Councell of Lateran or any other to their purpose contrary to the true meaning of the Councell and then to crie out ô the Councell of Lateran which is to be preferred before all Barclaies and Widdringtons c. whereas we doe asmuch respect the authoritie of the Councell of Lateran or any other as they do although we doe not so much respect their ouer wrested collections which they to serue their owne turnes doe gather from any Councel or text of holy Scripture contrarie to the plaine proper and true sense and meaning of the words But to such shiftings and windings euen learned men are sometimes brought when they will make their vncertaine opinions and priuate expositions of holy Scriptures or Councells to be infallible grounds of the Catholike faith 29. Lastly but the foundation saith D. Schulckenius of Widdringtons errour is for that he thinketh that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour by reason of the faith and free promise which the Emperour gaue and made to the Pope according to the similitude which a little before he put concerning one who promised an other to spend his life and all his goods in defence of him But this foundation is false because the authoritie of the Pope ouer Christian Princes doth not proceed from their onely promise or faith which they haue giuen but from the law of God by which law the Pope is made by Christ the Pastour of all his stocke the chiefe of all his familie the head of all his body and the Rectour of all his Church Wherefore it is no maruaile if from false foundation he conclude a falshood to wit that S. Bernards words do not onely not fauour the Popes temporal power but are flat contrarie to it What I beseech you could be spoken more cleerely for the Popes temporall power then that which S. Bernard said that the temporall sword is the Popes and that both swords are the Churches and that the temporall sword ought to be drawne foorth at the Popes becke And as for Ioannes Parisiensis there is no great reckoning to be made of him whatsoeuer he saith both for that he is repugnant to the Councell of Lateran and many others and also that other his errours are condemned by the Church in the common Extrauagant Vas electionis and lastly for that either he denieth only the Popes direct power in temporalls or else he doth plainly contradict himselfe 30. But truely it is strange that learned men and who pretend to maintaine nothing but truth dare aduenture to auouch so bouldly and in such publike writings so manifest vntruths and which they themselues in their consciences can not but see to be plain and palpable vntruths I very often and that of set purpose did affirme in my Apologie and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words that the Pope as Pope hath power to command temporall Princes in temporals in order to spirituall good and yet this man to make his Reader beleeue that I doe teach flat heresie blusheth not to affirme in an other place n Pag. 256. that I deny that the Pope as Pope hath power to commaund temporall Princes in temporalls in order to spirituall good So likewise I did oftentimes in my Apologie affirme o Num. 90.91.181.223.341 and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words that the Pope as Pope hath power by the law of God and for that he is appointed by Christ to be the supreme spirituall Pastour of the Catholike Church to constraine and punish all disobedient Christians both Princes and people with spirituall and Ecclesiasticall punishments and yet now this man to perswade his Reader that I teach heere a manifest errour is not ashamed to affirme that I am of opinion that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour in regard onely of the free promise which the Emperour hath made to the Pope And therefore D. Schulckenius neither dealeth truely nor sincerely and both deludeth his Reader and also wrongeth mee in affirming that to bee my doctrine which I expressely impugne and that to be the foundation of my opinion which hee is pleased to call an errour which I in expresse words and that oftentimes haue denied 21. For as I doe willingly grant that although a temporall Prince hath power to command and with temporall punishments to compell if neede require his temporall subiects to make and sweare an expresse promise of that true faith loyaltie and temporall allegeance which by the Law of God and nature they doe owe to their lawfull Prince yet I doe not affirme that a temporalll Prince hath power to constraine his rebellious subiects by vertue onely of the promise which they haue made but by vertue of his supreme temporall power which hee hath as hee is a supreme temporall Prince by the Law of God and nature So also I do willingly grant that although the Pope hath power to command and with spirituall punishments to compell if neede require all Christian Princes and

it doth denote or signifie a free election to choose either part he is to vnderstand that the same may also be said of other clauses in the Oath wherein neuerthelesse it is manifest that or is a pure disiunctiue and that whatsoeuer is affirmed of one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other As for example c. 71. But obserue good Reader first how this man still harpeth vpon the same string to make thee belieue that I affirme the coniunction disiunctiue or in the words may be deposed or murthered not to be a pure or absolute but a conditionall disiunctiue coniunction whereas I doe make no such distinction of an absolute and conditionall disiunctiue coniunction but onely of an absolute and conditionall disiunctiue proposition For that which I affirme is that although the coniunction or in those words may be deposed or murthered be a pure true and if we may call it so an absolute disiunctiue coniunction yet in them and whensoeuer else it immediately followeth the verbe may it maketh as I haue often said according to the common and vsuall signification of our English phrase such a disiunctiue proposition which implyeth a free choise to take both parts or either part of the disiunction if we please for which cause I call it a conditionall disiunctiue proposition which in very deede for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition followeth the nature of a copulatiue proposition and not of the common disiunctiue proposition whereof the Logicians treate which therefore I call an absolute disiunctiue proposition for that it implyeth no such freedome of election or condition of the will to choose if we please either part of the disiunction the nature and condition of which absolute or common disiunctiue proposition is such that to the truth thereof according to the receiued doctrine of the Logicians it is sufficient that one onely part of the disiunction be true although the other be most false and hereticall and to make such an absolute disiunctiue proposition to be false and hereticall it is necessarie that both parts be false and hereticall As for example this disiunctiue proposition God is iust or vniust is a most true and certaine proposition although the former part of the disiunction only be true and of faith and the second part be false and hereticall 72 But contrarywise it hapneth in a copulatiue proposition for to make it true both parts must be true but to make it false and hereticall it sufficeth that one onely part be false and hereticall and therefore this proposition God is iust and vniust is a most false and hereticall proposition although the former part of the proposition be most true and of faith And if perchance both parts of the copulatiue proposition be false and hereticall as in this God is vniust and vnmercifull this is not by reason of the forme or by vertue of the coniunction vniting both parts in one entire proposition but by reason onely of the matter for that both parts of the proposition being taken seuerally by themselues in two entyre propositions are false and hereticall as this proposition being taken it by it selfe God is vniust is an hereticall proposition and so likewise is this God is vnmercifull 73 Now as I haue often said a conditionall disiunctiue proposition whch implyeth a free choice to take both parts of the disiunction if wee please although it be a true disiunctiue proposition by reason of the disiunctiue coniunction or yet for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition it followeth the nature quality of a copulatiue and not of a common disiunctiue proposition for which reason I affirmed that although it was a disiunctiue proposition yet by reason of the choice freedome or indifferency to take either part of the disiunction it was equiualent to a copulatiue proposition And therefore this proposition God may be iust or vniust speaking of externall iustice or iniustice or which is all one it is in the power of God or God hath free power to doe externall acts of iustice or iniustice is a most false and hereticall proposition although the former part of the disiunction bee true And if perchance it happen that both parts of the disiunction be false and hereticall as in this God may be vniust or vnmercifull this is not by vertue of the forme and by force of the disiunctiue coniunction implying an indifferency to both parts of the disiunction but by vertue of the matter for that both parts of the disiunction beeing taken seuerally by themselues in two entire propositions are false and hereticall So that you may see a manifest difference betwixt an absolute and conditionall disiunctiue proposition and betwixt these two disiunctiue propositions God doth workes of iustice or iniustice and God may doe workes of iustice or iniustice for the first is true and the second false the first is an absolute disiunctiue and the second a conditionall and followeth the nature and condition of a copulatiue and not of a pure or common disiunctiue poposition 74 Secondly obserue how vnlearnedly M. Fitzherbert doth insinuate that in a pure disiunctiue proposition whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other For if hee had but any small skill in Logicke he would quickly haue perceiued how grossely he is mistaken and that according to the common and approued rule of the Logicians the most true and necessary disiunctiue proposition is when the one part of the disiunction is contradictory to the other as this proposition God is iust or not iust is a most true and necessary proposition and yet the first part of the disiunction is of faith and the second hereticall And if perchance hee doe say that hee meant onely of such disiunctiue propositions in which both parts of the disiunction are false and consequently the whole disiunctiue proposition is false this also is manifestly vntrue 75 For although to make a pure absolute and ordinary disiunctiue proposition to be false it is necessary that both parts of the disiunction bee false yet it is not necessary that both parts bee false in the same degree or with the same kind of falshood as in these examples either God is vniust or Card. Bellarmine is vnlearned both parts of the disiunction are false and yet the first is hereticall and impossible the second not hereticall nor impossible but contingent either London is not or Hierusalem was not both be false yet the first is onely repugnant to humane truth and the second also to diuine Likewise either S. Peter was not head of the Apostles or hee was a direct temporall King of the whole Christian world both are false but not in the same degree of falshood So that in these and infinite others which might bee alleadged it is not true that whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other And therefore no