Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
virtue_n	contract_n	oblige_v	yield_a	30	3	17.7168	5	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A86417	Philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society. Or, A dissertation concerning man in his severall habitudes and respects, as the member of a society, first secular, and then sacred. Containing the elements of civill politie in the agreement which it hath both with naturall and divine lawes. In which is demonstrated, both what the origine of justice is, and wherein the essence of Christian religion doth consist. Together with the nature, limits, and qualifications both of regiment and subjection. / By Tho: Hobbes.; De cive. English	Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679.; Vaughan, Robert, engraver.	1651 (1651)	Wing H2253; Thomason E1262_1; ESTC R202404	220,568	406

distinction between Counsel and Law from the difference between Counsell and Command Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing it self which is advised but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander For it is not properly said Thus I will and thus I Command except the will stand for a Reason Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes not for the thing it self but by reason of the advisers will the Law is not a Counsell but a Command and is defined thus LAW is the command of that Person whether Man or Court whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience as the Precepts of God in regard of Men of Magistrates in respect of their Subjects and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist may be termed their Lawes Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth Counsell to them who have no power To follow what is prescribed by Law is duty what by Counsell is free-will Counsell is directed to his end that receives it Law to his that gives it Counsell is given to none but the willing Law even to the unwilling To conclude the right of the Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives Counsell the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed II. They confound Law and Covenant who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or forms of living determined by the common consent of men Amongst whom is Aristotle who defines Law on this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the City declaring every thing that we ought to doe which definition is not simply of Law but of the Civill Law for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the consent of men nor yet the Lawes of Nature for if they had their originall from the consent of men they might also by the same consent be abrogated but they are unchangeable But indeed that 's no right definition of a Civill Law for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person one will or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills if for one person those words common consent are ill placed here for one person hath no common consent neither ought he to have said declaring what was needfull to be done but commanding for what the City deolares it commands its Subjects He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes some certain formes of living but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man and therefore are no Lawes before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell have sufficient remedy against the rest who otherwise are not likely to keep them Lawes therefore according to this definition of Aristotle are nothing else but naked and weak contracts which then at length when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power shall either become Lawes or no Lawes at his will and pleasure Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes which he ought not to have done for Contract is a promise Law a command In Contracts we say I will do this In Lawes Doe this * Contracts oblige us Lawes vie us fast being obliged A Contract obligeth of it self The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done before we are obliged to doe it But in Law we are first obliged to performe and what is to be done is determined afterwards Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City commanding every thing behoofefull to be done which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art 9. to wit that the civill lawes are the command of him whether man or Court of men who is endued with supreme power in the city concerning the future actions of his Subjects Contracts oblige us To be obliged and to be tyed being obliged seems to some men to be one and the same thing and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none indeed More cleerly therefore I say th●… That a man is obliged ●y his contracts that is that he ought to performe for his promise sake but that the Law tyes him being obliged that is to say it compells him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law III. They confound Lawes with Right who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law That which is prohibited by the divine Law cannot bee permitted by the civill neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law be prohibited by the civill notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right that is to say that which may be done by divine Right doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour although they cannot enlarge them now naturall liberty is a Right not constituted but allowed by the Lawes For the Lawes being removed our liberty is absolute This is first restrained by the naturall and divine Lawes the residue is bounded by the civill Law and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns and Societies There is great difference therefore between Law and Right For Law is a setter Right is freedome and they differ like contraries IV. All Law may be divided first according to the diversity of its Authors into Divine and humane the Divine according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men is twofold naturall or morall and positive naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them to wit their naturall Reason and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold Positive is that which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government and divine worship and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes his peculiar people Again the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men which alone hath obtained the title of the I aw of nature and that of Cities which may be called that of Nations but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations The precepts

the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature That every man in dividing Right to others shew himselfe equall to either party By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selves then we grant to others We may take lesse if we will for that sometimes is an argument of modesty But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others we are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse then another For he that by favouring one before another observes not this naturall equality reproaches him whom he thus undervalues but it is declared above that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature The observance of this Precept is called EQUITY the breach Respect of Persons The Greeks in one word term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 XVI From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh Those things which cannot be divided must be used in common if they can and that the quantity of the matter permit every man as much as he lists but if the quantity permit not then with limitation and proportionally to the number of the users for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature XVII Also what cannot he divided nor had in common it is provided by the Law of nature which may be the twelfth Precept that the use of that thing be either by turns or adjudged to one onely by lot and that in the using it by turns it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it For here also regard is to be had unto equality but no other can be found but that of lot XVIII But all lot is twofold arbitrary or naturall Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders and it consists in meer chance as they say or fortune Naturall is primogeniture in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were given by lot or first possession Therefore the things which can neither be divided nor had in common must be granted to the first possessour as also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature XIX The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is That safety must be assured to the Mediators for Peace For the reason which commands the end commands also the means necessary to the end But the first dictate of Reason is Peace All the rest are means to obtain it and without which Peace cannot be had But neither can Peace be had without mediation nor mediation without safety it is therefore a dictate of Reason that is a Law of nature That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace XX. Furthermore because although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature and should endeavour to keep them yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions to wit whether what was done were against the Law or not which we call the Question of Right whence will follow a fight between Parties either sides supposing themselves wronged it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto some third and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in deciding the controversie And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Arbiter It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third XXI But from this ground that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the controversie we gather that the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally and what is just onely for Peaces sake and accidentally and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would do It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature That no man must be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause XXII From the same ground sollowes in the seventeenth place That no man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part for the like reason swayes here as in the foregoing Law XXIII But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe to wit whether that bee done or not which is said to bee done the naturall Law wills that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike that is because they affirm contradictories that hee believe neither He must therefore give credit to a third or a third and fourth or more that he may be able to give judgement of the fact as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters and Iudges of fact That where firm and certain ●ignes of the fact appear not there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both Parts XXIV From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood That no contract or promise must paste between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed by vertue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part nay or be oblig'd to judge according to equity or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall The Judge is indeed hound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature re-counted in the 15. Article To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact Such compact therefore would be in vain Besides if giving wrong judgement he should contend for the equity of it except such Compact be of no force the Controversie would remain after Judgement given which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter who is so chosen as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge be to dis-eng●g'd which is its 19 precept XXV Farthermore forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason so as unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature it is manifest that he who knowingly or willingly doth ought whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed or weakned he knowingly and willingly breaks the Law of nature For there is no difference between a man who performes not his Duty and him who does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to doe it But

they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty who doe that which disturbs the mind from its naturall state that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and Gluttons we therefore sin in the 20 place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse XXVI Perhaps some man who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation and safegard of our selves will say That the deduction of these Lawes is so hard that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known and therefore neither will they prove obliging for Lawes if they be not known oblige not nay indeed are not Lawes To this I answer it 's true That hope fear anger ambition covetousnesse vain glory and other perturbations of mind doe hinder a man so as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these Lawes whilst those passions prevail in him But there is no man who is not somettmes in a quiet mind At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know though he benever so rude and unlearn'd then this only Rule That when he doubts whether what he is now doing to another may be done by the Law of Nature or not he conceive himselfe to be in that others st●ad Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact being now cast into the other scale disswade him as much And this Rule is not onely easie but is Anciently celebrated in these words Quod tibi ●ieri non vis alteri nè feceris Do not that to others you would not have done to your self XXVII But because most men by reason of their perverse desire of present profit are very unapt to observe these Lawes although acknowledg'd by them if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates those not practising the same surely they would not follow Reason in so doing nor would they hereby procure themselves peace but a more certain quick destruction and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it It is not therefore to be imagin'd that by Nature that is by Reason men are oblig'd to the * exercise of all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd We must therefore conclude that the Law of Nature doth alwayes and every where oblige in the internall Court or that of Conscience but not alwayes in the externall Court but then onely when it may be done with safety The exercise of all these Lawes Nay among these Lawes some things there are the omission whereof provided it be done for Peace or Self-preservation seemes rather to be the fulfilling then breach of the Naturall Law for he that doth all things against those that doe all things and plunders plunderers doth equity but on the other side to doe that which in peace is an handsome action and becomming an honest man is dejectednesse and poornesse of spirit and a betraying of ones self in the time of War But there are certain naturall Lawes whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self for I cannot understand what drankennesse or cruelty that is Revenge which respects not the future good can advance toward peace or the preservation of any man Briefly in the state of nature what 's just and unjust is not to be esteem'd by the Actions but by the Counsell and Conscience of the Actor That which is done out of necessity out of endeavour for peace for the preservation of our selves is done with Right otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Law and an injury against God XXVIII But the Lawes which oblige Conscience may be broken by an act not onely contrary to them but also agreeable with them if so be that he who does it be of another opinion for though the act it self be answerable to the Lawes yet his Conscience is against them XXIX The Lawes of Nature are immutable and eternall What they forbid can never be lawfull what they command can never be unlawfull For pride ingratitude breach of Contracts or injury inhumanity contum●ly will never be lawfull nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull as we take them for dispositions of the mind that is as they are considered in the Court of Conscience where onely they oblige and are Lawes Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the Civill Law that what 's done with equity at one time is guilty of iniquity at another and what suits with reason at one time is contrary to it another Yet Reason is still the same and changeth not h●r end which is Peace and Defence nor the meanes to attaine them to wit those vertues of the minde which we have declar'd above and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome or Law whatsoever XXX It 's evident by what hath hitherto been said how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd because they require the endeavour onely but that must be true and constant which who so shall performe we may rightly call him JUST For he who tends to this with his whole might namely that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to it a Just Man XXXI All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the Morall Let us see wherefore this is true We must know therefore that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination or aversion of them by whom they were given But the inclinations of men are diverse according to their diverse Constitutions Customes Opinions as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense as by tasting touching smelling but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life where what this man commends that is to say calls Good the other undervalues as being Evil Nay very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing Whilst thus they doe necessary it is there should be discord and strife They are therefore so long in the state of War as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites they mete Good and Evill by diverse measures All men easily acknowledge this state as long as they are in it to be evill and by consequence that Peace is good They therefore who could not agree concerning a present doe agree concerning a future Good which indeed is a work of Reason for things present are obvious to the sense things to come to our Reason only Reason declaring Peace to be good it followes

In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country because he is tyed to observe those of the latter CHAP. VIII Of the Rights of Lords over their Servants I. What Lord and Servant signifie II. The distinction of Servants into such as upon trust enjoy their naturall liberty or slaves and such as serve being imprison'd or bound in fetters III. The Obligation of a Servant arises from the liberty of body allow'd bim by his Lord. IV. Servants that are bound are not by any Compacts tyed to their Lords V. Servants have no propriety in their goods against their Lord. VI. The Lord may sell his Servant or alienate him by Testament VII The Lord cannot injure his Servant VIII He that is Lord of the Lord is Lord also of his Servants IX By what means Servants are freed X. Dominion over Beasts belongs to the Rights of nature I. IN the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive or fram'd Government as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many who by Contract and Faith mutually given have oblig'd each other Now followes what may be said concerning a naturall Government which may also be call'd Acquired because it is that which is gotten by power and naturall force But we must know in the first place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of men Where such a Right is gotten there is a kind of a little Kingdome for to be a King is nothing else b●t to have Dominion over many Persons and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom a Little Kingdome a Family Let us return again to the state of nature and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth and suddainly like Mushromes come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of ano●her whereof the first is if by mutuall Contract made between themselves for Peace self-defences sake they have willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man or Councel of Men of this we have already spoken The 2d is If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars or overcome or else distrusting his own forces to avoid Death promises the Conquerour or the stronger Party his Service i. e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him in which Contract the good which the vanquisht or inferiour in strength doth receive is the grant of his life which by the Right of War in the naturall st●te of men he might have depriv'd him of but the good which he promises is his service and obedience By vertue therefore of this promise there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquisht to the vanquisher as possibly can be excepting what repugns the Divine Lawes for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him is simply and without any restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever Now he that is thus tyed is call'd a SERVANT he to whom he is tyed a LORD Thirdly there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man by Generation of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter II. Every one that is taken in the War and hath his life spar'd him is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord for every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty as to be able if he desir'd it either to flie away or quit his service or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within P●isons or bound within Irons and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely but by the peculiar name of Slave even as now at this day un serviteur and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord aris●th not from a simple grant of his life but from hence rather That he keeps him not bound or imprison'd for all obligation derives from Contract but where 's no trust there can be no Contract as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life whereby the Lord affords him his corporall liberty so that if no obligation nor bonds of Contract had happen'd he might not onely have made his escape but also have kill'd his Lord who was the preserver of his life IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants a● are restrain'd by imp●isonm●nt o●bonds are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given above because those serve not for the Contracts sake but to the end they may not suffer and therefore if they flie or kill their Lord they offend not against the Lawes of Nature for to bind any man is a plain signe that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by any other obligation V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not then over one that is bound for he hath a Supreme Power over both and may say of his Serva●t no lesse then of another thing whether animate or inanimate This is mine whence it followes that whatsoever the Servant had before his servitude that afterwards becomes the Lords and whatsoever he hath gotten it was gotten for his Lord for he that can by Right dispose of the Person of a man may surely dispose of all those things which that Person could dispose of There is therefore nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord yet hath he by his Lords distribution a propriety and Dominion over his own goods insomuch as one Servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant in the same manner as hath been shewed before that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme Authority but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow subject VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself and all that belongs to him are his Lords and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases the Lord may either sell lay to pledge or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant according to his own will and pleasure VII Farthermore what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive Government namely that he who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury is true also concerning Servants because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord wherefore whatsoever he doth it is done with their wills but no injury can be done to him that willeth it VIII But if it happen that the Lord either by captivity or voluntary subjection doth become a Servant or