Commonalty 31â— â— c. The first Doubt Whether there be any necessary use of Humane Laws 312 4. c. The second Doubt Whether it belongeth to a Law-giver to command the Acts of all Virtues and to forbid all Vices 315 â— c. The third Doubt Of what importance the intention of the Lawgiver is to the effect of the obligation 320 2. c. The fourth Doubt Of the changing of Laws 322 5. The fifth Of the changing of the form of the whole politick Government 326 6. The sixth Doubt How that Axiom The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood 329 The Summary of the tenth Lecture â— c. A rehearsal of some things already spoken 334 4. The genuine sense of this Aphorism viz. The Safety of the People is the supreme Law is again debated and resolved 146 7. What is to be understood by this word Safety 340 8. c. And what by the word People 342 11. c. When words collâ—ctive are to be taken collectively and when to be taken Discretively 345 13. The Safety of the People doth include also the safety of the King 348 14. c. And his safety especially 349 16. In every Common-wealth there must be necessarily some Authority which is to be above all Law 351 17. c. Which cannot belong to any other but to the Prince only 353 19. The original of this Aphorism is examined 355 20. What Subjects may do in this case and how far they may act 357 22. An Illustrious example of it 359 THE END THE FIRST LECTURE In which the Definition of Conscience is propounded and unfolded 1 COR. 2. 11. What Man knoweth the things of a Man but the Spirit of Man which is in him I. THat the power of Conscience is very great a Cicero pro Milone either in the respect of Fear or Confidence hath been of old declared by wise and learned Men and more neerly and abundantly attested by the sence and the experience of all Men. It is therefore the more to be lamented that many while greedily they imploy all their studies in the knowledge of things indifferent are in so dark an ignorance in the knowledge of their own Consciences notwithstanding there is no where to be found a more faithful Admonisher or a more diligent Accuser or a Severer Witnesse or an uncorrupter Judge or a sweeter Comforter or a more importunate Enemy That therefore I may instill into the Minds and Ears of the ingenious that old and so often repeated instruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Know thy self and divert them a little from the too immoderate desire of a more unprofitable knowledge gradually by inviting them to a greater care and study of their Consciences I thought it would be a work worth the labour if I should a little more diligently inquire into the use Nature of Conscience and in this place according to my obligations communicate to you my Auditors those Meditations which I shall find most observable on this Subject I have determined therefore in this first Lecture to lay open the Nature of Conscience by defining it and in my following Lectures by the Almighties permission I will expound unto you the use and office of the Conscience especially as it reflecteth on things to be done and that in a double respect the first to the rule of the Law to which it ought to be Subject and the other in respect to former actions over which it is ordained to govern II. But the method of defining being twofold the one Synthetical or by the way of Composition when by due weighing of every part of the premises the definition at last is perfectly collected the other Analytical and by way of resolution which doth take asunder every peice of the definition and open and unfold that which at first was propounded entire Although the former may peradventure seem more convenient to the order of Nature yet I have made choice of the latter which I conceive more fit for instruction Thus therefore I do briefly define Conscience Conscience is a faculty or a habit of the practical understanding by which the mind of Man doth by the discourse of reason apply that light with which he is indued to his particular moral Actions In this definition two things do preferre themselves to observation First the name of the thing defined which is the voyce of the Conscience it self Secondly the particular members of the definition which are all those that are ordinary in the definition of the qualities of the first and second Species that is to say the Genus the Subject the Object and the proper Act. III. As to the Name of the thing defined it is observed by learned men that in all the old Testament there is not found a Hebrew word which precisely and peculiarly doth signifie the Conscience But the Hebrews according to their custom of speaking as often as mention is made of Conscience they make use of one of those two words to expresse it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first whereof is known by all to signifie the Heart and the other the Spirit of Man According to this is that of Solomon in the fourth of Proverbs Prov. 4. 23. Keep thy Heart with all diligence as if he should have said Le every one have a diligent care of his own Conscience And in the seventh of Ecclesiastes where according to the old interpretation the words are â—ccle â— 23. Thy Conscience knoweth that thou thy self hath often cursed others And according unto the Translation of Tremellius thy Mind is Conscious It is in the Hebrew Text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Thy Heart knoweth And in the new Testament especially in St. John in whose writings there are many Hebraisms the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Heart is often put for the Conscience as John 1 3. 1 John 3 21. If our heart condemneth us not that is if our Conscience doth condemn us not it being the proper office of the conscience to condemn or not to condemn the guilty person standing before the tribunal of Justice From this proceeds that common allusion of St. Bernard and others Conscientia quasi cordis scientia The Conscience is the hearts consciousness The conscience also in the holy Scripture oftentimes by the Hebrews and the Gâ—ecians is called and expressed by the name of Spirit I will only instance two places for what needs any more in a thing so evident In the Old Testament Proverbs the 18 and the fourteenth verse The Spirit of man will sustain his infirmity but a broken Spirit who can endure As if he should say a man of a sound and unstained conscience will endure with as much courage as patience whatsoever calamities shall befall him but an afflicted and guilty conscience is a burden insupportable And then in the new Testament I shall make use
the Law of God that is particular determinations of the general Rules which the Law of Nature and the word of God have exhibited indeterminatly wisely accommodated to the Condition Utility of certain people according to the consideration of Times and Places For Examples sake The Law of Nature doth teach in general that we are to offer an Injury to no man and he who doth so is bound to make restitution but to descend to the specialty what injury he hath done unto his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge and let in his Cattel into his Grounds and what is the restitution to be made for such an Injury is not determined by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law And the Scripture doth openly hold forth that wicked men are to be punished by the Magistrate Rom. 13. 4. and in other places But what kind of wickednesse the Magistrate is to punish what punishment to afflict and after what proportion is no where defined in the Law of God Power being transmitted to Princes Law-makers by God to define of themselves by Laws well constituted what accordting to their wisdome they shall find most safe and profitable to the Common-wealth The Rights therefore and the Laws of God and of a Legislator and a Judge are distinct and proper to themselves and disposed in so excellent an order that the Precepts and Commandments of God which are general and indeterminate are by the Law-maker determined and accommodated to certain Species of persons and actions and being so determined by the Laws the Judge doth effectually apply them to the particular causes of persons actions so that if a Legislator should make a Law which is not complacent to the Law of God he is to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law and if a Judge in any particular Cause shall pronounce Sentence which is not congruous to the Law constituted by the Prince he is to be judged himself to have pronounced an unjust Sentence IV The second Doubt is whether a Law-maker be obliged if possibly he can effect it to command all the acts and offices of all Virtues and to forbid all Sins of whatsoever nature they are or if he cannot all whether he be bound to command and forbid as many of both kinds as possibly he can The Reason of the Doubt is because there is nothing more conducing to the proper end of the Law which is the common good than as much as possibly may be that all the Citizens may be good and none of them evil Therefore it is the part of a Law-maker who always is to have before his eys this end which is the common good to take all possible care he can to command the practice of all Acts of all Vertues that so all his Citizens may be good to forbid all Sins whatsoever that there be no unrighteousnesse amongst them and the two chief of the Apostles doe seem to require this of the political Magistrate Rom. 13. 3 4. St. Paul hath these words Do good and thou shalt have Praise but if thou dost evil fear for the Magistrate is a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil that is on him who doth any manner of evil And St. Peter in his first Epistle second Chapter and fourteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the punishment of evil doer◠but the Praise of them that do well that is of all well-doers and of all evil-doers For that which is pronounced indefinitely is equipollent to an universal it is consonant to the Rule of the Logicians in a necessary matter and to the will of God who forbiddeth the Magistrate the acceptation of Persons V. For answer I say first and generally that the Law-maker is bound to use his utmost Indeavour that his Citizens be all of them good men and none of them evil and by consequence to command all Acts of Vertues and to forbid all Vices so far as the Reason of the Beginning from whom and the End for which he worketh doth require but beyond that he hath no obligation at all For the Beginnining and the End in the operations of all work they naturally or work they freely are the adaequate measure of all Intermedial Acts so far as those Acts are proportionate conformable with the Beginning from whence they proceed with the End to which they tend The Acts therefore of Commanding and Forbidding and others in which the Exercise of the legislative Jurisdiction doth consist must be proportionated both to their Beginning in whose Vertue they are done to wit the Higher Powers granted by God and to their End for whose sake they are done to wit the Common Good A Law-maker therefore ought so far to command prohibit permit and to perform all other Dutyes as they are agreeable to the power granted to him by God and is expedient for the Commonalty which God hath committed to his change VI. But these considerations are general and indefinite To satisfie therefore the Doubt propounded we must descend to something which is more particular but which howsoever may rely on this general foundation I say therefore in the second place the acts of Virtues and Vices some of them being internal of which nature are the freer acts of the Will as to will and not to will and the movings of the affections to love to hate to grieve and if there be any other cogitations and intentions of the heart and mind and some of them being external of which sort are all the commanded acts of the will and the indeliberate motions of the affections which are exercised by bodily Organs as to see to speak to strike to plunder and innumerable others the Legislative power is only exercised on the outward acts but not on the inward A Law-maker may therefore command the payment of a debt the restitution of stollen goods and the outward worship of God He also may forbid Theft Adultery Manslaughter Blasphemy and the like But he cannot command the loving of his Neighbour the confidence to be had in God the contempt of the world nor prohibit the coveting of his Neighbours goods unchast cogitations the hate of his Neighbour and the Atheism of the heart The reason is because to determine of internal actions is neither proportionate to the beginning from which nor to the end for which the Legislator worketh For Almighty God hath only permitted to the Magistrate the Government of the external man and hath reserved to himself alone the knowledge and judgment of the inward actions and the inspection into the hearts of men for the Legislator and the Judge is the same as we have already proved by the testimony of St. James and the Legislative power would be altogether ineffectual to obtain its proposed end if it were only directive and coactive First therefore seeing an external Court cannot understand nor judge of inward actions And secondly seeing it were a vain thing to command or prohibit that
by a Law which when it is committed we are not able to punish And thirdly seeing the external operation of good works and the external declination of evil ones doth suffice to the outward felicity of a Republick it followeth that a Legislator or a Law-maker neither wisely can nor rightly ought either to command or to forbid the internal actions of Virtues or Vices In which regard as in many others the Law of God and Christ which requireth Truth Purity Sincerity in the inward parts and restraineth and checketh the highest and first inordinate motions of the Will and punisheth as well Sins thought on as Sins committed doth most infinitely excell the most excellent Laws of men And therefore David in the 19 Psalm saith that the Law of God is perfect and undefiled and the Law of Christ is as the maker of it is described to be in the fourth of Hebrews A word lively and mighty in operation and sharper than a two-edged Sword and entreth through even to the dividing asunder of of the heart and Spirit and of the Joynts and Marrow and is a Discerner of the thoughts and intention of the hearts VII I say in the third place that Humane Laws may de Jure or by Right command all the outward Acts of all Vertues and forbid all the outward works of sin but they cannot do it de facto The Reason of the first member is because there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice in the whole Nature and in every Species of it so disposed but that the commanding or the forbidding of it according to the Condition of Affairs and Times may be ordinated to the publiek good Therefore not only the Acts of Justice properly so called as some will have it but the acts also of all other Vertues whatsoever may become the due object and matter of the Law And this I remember to be the observation also of Aristotle and if I be not much mistaken he giveth Instances of it in the Acts of Fortitude and Temperance As if by a military Law it were ordained that none of the Souldiers should run from his Colours or from his ingaging with the Enemy or throw away his Arms or as if by another a Law of frugality or moderation the excess in banquetting were prohibited or as if there were a Command that none should exceed in the bravery of his habit or in the greatness of his retinue or in the Ornaments of his House The Reason of the latter member is because there is so great a variety even of the Species themselves much more of the Degrees both of the Offices of Vertues and the Acts of Sin that if the Law-makers should provide a Caution for every one of them the very multitude of the Laws would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to be endured VIII I say in the fourth place that a Law-maker is not obliged to this viz. To forbid all the evil that he can forbid or to command all the good It will suffice that the greatest and most remarkable of both kinds are to be contained in the Laws and which are so conjoyned with some extraordinary publick profit that unless somthing were determined of them there must necessarily follow some great and grievous Evil which would prove extremely incommodious to the Common-wealth for amongst the lusts of the Flesh the Allurements of the world the temptations of the Devil and the diâ—positions of men so fruitful of all manner of Iniquities may we so much as dream of a Platonick or an Eutopian Commonwealth we are to think we have done well enough if we stick not too deep in the mire For it is necessary that in every Common-wealth some evils should not be prohibited but tolerated and many good things not commanded but left to every mans discretion and that many things of both kinds should be passed by by the Laws lest being too unseasonably active to remove one evil we peradventure make way for more and greater to arise IX The third Doubt is concerning the Intention of the Law-giver whether and how far it is required to the effect of obliging Which is to demand If a Prince out of no foresight or intent to Justice or to the publick good at all being either carryed away by hatred or ambition and the meer lust or ruling or by avarice or any other depraved desire of an impotent mind should give a Law to his Subjects whether they are bound in Conscience to obey it The answer is easy they are obliged to obey it if there be no other impediment that is if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power and the Law it self be otherwise just and according to the Law of the Nations duely debated and sufficiently promulgated I say therefore in the first place that as in Artificials the End of the work and of the person wotking is not always the same as in the building of a House the End of the work that is of the House is that it may be a commodious habitation for the master of it but the End of the Carpenter is that he may get some gain thereby Just so in a Common-wealth it may come to passe that the Law-maker may intend his own advantage and yet the Law it self may tend to the publick Good X. Peradventure you will object that an indirect End or Intention doth always corrupt the work and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker doth vitiate the Law which was his work To answer this objection I say in the second place that an evil intention doth always blemish the work as the work speaketh the action of the person working but it doth not always blemish the work as it is the effect of the operation These two therefore the Action it self and the Perfection of it differ not a little amongst themselves although they are commonly called by the same Name In the same manner as the Effecting and the Effect it self The building of the House and the House builded are both of them called the work of the Carpenter although the one of them is but an action transient and the other after the house is finished an action permanent A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work of the Lawmaker that is his own Act which makes the Law and which for the defect of a good end is not without fault but it corrupts not the work of the Legislator that is the Law made by him if that which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the Common good So for all the evil intention of the Judge a Sentence pronounced by him either for favour or for hatred is firm and valid if the said sentence in it self considered appeareth not to be unjust For as rightly St. Augustine hath it potest ex libidine imperantis sine libidine obtemperari We may without any lust obey the lust of the Commander XI I say in the third place Suppose that a Law be not only made with an evil
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred
long use and Custome which is as it were another nature Fourthly by reason of the depraved affections which do ecclipse our judgments and do hinder the right use of them From these and many other causes it is so obvious unto men to erre to fall and to be deceived that it hath been long agoe a proverb Humanum est errare It is the property of a man to erre XXVI Adde to this in the second place that not we our selves do not alwayes sincerely judge of their piety and wisdome whose Judgments we do desire to follow it being very customary with those men who permit themselves to be governed by the arbitration of other men to make choice of such Conductors whom they before are confident will lead them in that way in which before hand they had determined to go themselves Thus doth Satan hold fast unwary men being as it were inclosed in his circle If you demand of them why they suppose such a thing to be true and right they answer Because this or that wise and godly man hath so taught us If you again shall demand of them how they do know their Teacher to be a pious and a prudent man they answer or at least would so answer if they would speak according to their hearts because he thinketh as we do think Et sapit mecum facit Jove judicat aequo The man is wise and doth as I intend And judgeth rightly having Jove his friend Many there are indeed who do measure the piety of other men not according to the practice of the duties of a Christians life and by the works of righteousnesse Mercy Charity and Devotion but by an affection to that faction to which they have bequeathed themselves and by the hatred to another party to which they professe themselves to be Enemies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith the Apostle 2 Tim. 4. 3. They shall heap up unto themselves Teachers according to their own desires The Metaphor following is most proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when their ears do itch they seek those that will tickle them and thus the same doth befall them which in the old proverb is expressed Muli se mutuo scabunt One Mule doth scratch another XXVII Thirdly the word of God doth expressely forbid us to subject our Consciences to the judgment of any other or to usurp a Dominion over the Consciences of any one Ne vocemini Rabbi unus est enim vester 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magister Praeceptor Doctor Unctor Christus Be not ye called Rabbi for one is your Master who is Christ the word in the original signifies as well School-master Tutor Leader as Master And my brethren be you not many masters saith St. James Chap. 3. verse 5. To this purpose is that of St Peter in his first Book Chap 5. verse 2. Feed you the Flock of God which is committed to you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as holding forth a light before them that is the Doctrine of the true faith and the example of a godly life but not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not as excercising a domination and an uncontrouled empire over the Clergy or the people of God And again 1 Cor. 7. 23. Empâ—i estis pretio nolite fieri servi hominum You are bought with a price be you not made the servants of men that is do not submit your Consciences to be governed by the Authority of any man according to his pleasure and command XXVIII From these things which are thus stated and proved to give you now some few Corallaryes and those in a few words it followeth in the first place that the insupportable pride and tyranny of the Pope of Rome ought most deservedly to be hated by every true Christian who by arrogating an infallible judgment to himself and to his chair doth by that name exercise an usurping power and domination over the Consciences of men and pretendeth so much right thereunto that if he should say virtues were vices and vices virtues all Christians are bound under the penalty of mortal sin to submit to his judgment without the least doubt or scruple We are therefore with all thankfulnes to acknowledg the great and Singular goodnes and mercy of Almighty God who for these many years hath freed us and our fore-fathers and the Church of England from so unconscionable a Tyranny and hath again restored us to our just liberties XXIX But we must all of us and every one of us take heed that being freed now from that Tyranny we do not stoop our necks to a new bondage least we be found not so much to have shaken off our yoak as to have changed it Quae bellua ruptis Quùm semèl effugit reddit se prava catenis Horat. Like to the Beast who having broke his chain Fondly returns to have it on again 2 Satyr 9. It doth indeed concern us highly if seriously we would provide for the peace of our own Consciences or of the Church and Common-wealth to take care least what heretofore was spoken of the Church of Corinth I am of Paul I of Apollos and I of Cephas be not heard of us I am of Luther I of Calvin I of Arminius and I of Socinius No let God be true and every man a Lyar He is not worthy to be Christs Disciple who is not the Disciple of Christ alone The simplicity and sincerity of the Christian Faith hath suffered a great prejudice since we have been divided into parties neither is there any hope that Religion should be restored to her former vigour and purity until the wounds made wider by our daily quarrels and dissentions being anointed with the Oyl of Brotherly Love as with a Balsome shall begin to close again and to grow intire into the same unity of Faith and Charity XXX In the third place we are to take heed lest being too indulgent to our depraved affections we do suffer our selves to be so drawn aside into the admiration of some men that we wholly depend upon their Authority Jude 1◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In which words the Apostle with a finger pointeth at the very Fountain of all this evill For this perverse admiration of Names hath no other Spring from whence it floweth but from this desperate self-admiration viz. whiles every man studyeth his own profit is ambitious of Honour and pursueth vain-glory and esteemeth no otherwise of all other men than according to the advantage he may receive from them And his Judgement being corrupted with these sordid affections he is most ready to admire those persons whom he thinks will be most ready to advance his Profit Honour Glory and his other inordinate desires And the very same thing another of the Apostles whom already I have cited doth expressely intimate they did choose unto them Master 2. Tim. 4. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to their own desires XXXI Neverthelesse that due Authority may be given to the Catholick Church