Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n
Text snippets containing the quad
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A30233
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Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.; Institutionum logicarum libri duo. English
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Burgersdijck, Franco, 1590-1635.; Gentleman.
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1697
(1697)
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Wing B5640; ESTC R2989
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157,345
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300
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or Use is the best those things themselves are the best and by how much they are the better by so much are they the better And so the Mind than the Sense because the Operation of this is the better and the Architectonical Art than the Shooe-making because a House is better than a Shooe and Virtue than Riches because the Use of this belongs to the Soul and of those to the Body c. Ninthly From the End and Means these And first that to which more agrees the End to that more agrees the Means and so on the Contrary So you may prove any one has more Ingeny Books Leisure Industry because he is more Learned or more Learned because more Ingeny Leisure Industry c. Secondly the End is better than its Means as Health than Physick Add to this another and that is That which for its own sake is desirable is better than that which for another's or also that whick for the Sake of Opinion or Ostentation So you prove that Learning is â—â—tter than a Library Friends than Riches Health than Beauty c. Thirdly that which approaches nearer to the End is better than that which is farther off So the Art of Commanding is better than that of Horsemanship because approaching nearer to the Victory Fourthly that which is referred to the better End that it self is the better So Aristotle makes good That Wisdom is better than Virtue Moral because leading to the speculative Felilicity which he says is so much better than the Practical by how much Eternal are to be preferred before Perishing Things Book 10. Ethick Cap. 5. Tenthly From the Subject and Adjunct and first That which is in the Nobler Subject that if good is better and if bad worser than that which is in an Ignobler So Virtue is better than Health and Vices worse than Diseases because the Mind is Nobler than the Body Secondly that from which the Subject is Denominated Good is better than that from which not So a Good that 's Honest is better than that which is Profitable because from that we are named Good and from this not c. Thirdly of those both which make the Subject good that is the best which affects it with the most Goodness So Virtues Theological viz. Faith Hope and Charity are to be preferred before Civil Fourthly that which is conversant about the best Object that it self also is the best So Philosophy is better than Medicine because that 's about the Mind this only the Body Fifthly that is best from which follows the greatest Good or least Evil and upon this Account it is Cicero prefers Book 1. of his Offices the Counsel of Solon by which the Areopagites were set up before the Victory of Themistocles at Salamis because that but once profited this would be always profitable to the Common-Wealth c. 11. From the Disparates this viz. When of Two we deny the One to be in us that so we may assume to our selves the Other that we esteem to be best which we would have seem to be in us So because for the most Part People deny themselves to be Laborious that they might seem Ingenious it shews that to be Ingenious they esteem better than to be Laborious c. 12. From the Contraries these viz. First that which recedes the farther from its Contrary that is more so So that is whiter which has the least Mixture of Blackness Secondly that whose Contrary is worst that it self is best and so on the Contrary As if Improbity be worse than Diseases then Probity must be better than Health Thirdly that whose Absence Decease or Loss is worse that it self is best and so on the Contrary As if the Loss of a good Estimation be worse than that of Money then a good Estimation is a greater Good than that of Money c. 13. From Major Minor and Equal these viz. First that which is more so than the greater that is more so than the less And Secondly likewise if the less be more so then so will the greater So if Health is a greater Good than Riches and Virtue be better than Health then will it also be better than Riches Thirdly if one of the Equals be more so then also will the other be more so Fourthly and also that that which is more so than one of the Equals that also will be more so than the other For Example If of two Weights equal one be heavier or lighter than a Third then also the other will be so or if that third be heavier or lighter than one of them it will be also heavier or lighter than the other c. Fifthly if one Genus be more so than another that which is in the most excellent will be more so than that which is in the less As if Science be better than Art then the most Noble Science will be better than the most Noble Art Sixthly if an absolute Predicate agree with an absolute Subject of its own Nature the Increase or Increment of the Predicate will agree with the Increase or Increment of the Subject As if what is honest be good that which is more so will be better and most best I said of its own Nature because if the Predicate agree not to the Subject in this manner the Canon will deceive us For it does not follow because the Exercitation of the Body is good that therefore the more the better and most best because Exercitation is not of it self and in its own Nature good but so far as it is moderate c. 14. From like and unlike this viz. that which is most like to that which is such or more such that also it self is more such and so on the Contrary So Ajax is esteemed to be more valiant than Ulysses because more like to Achilles the most valiant of the Grecians But here observe that the Similitude be instituted in its proper Genus For it does not follow if any one be more like to Achilles in Auger that therefore he should be more valiant but only more wrathful c. 15. By Testimonies Problemes Comparate are to be confirmed after the same manner as are the Absolute For as by Aristotle 's Testimony it may be proved that Covetousness is an Evil so may it also that it is worse than Prodigality c. So that for Canons Comparate here in this Place there is no need unless perchance for the Discernment of Authority of Testimonies this Canon should be observed viz. That what God says is more credible than what Man the Wise than the Vulgar more than few Skilful than Unskilful and what any one testifies against himself than what for himself c. 16. And these are the Comparate Canons which contain the Designation of a certain Place either Apertly or Hiddenly In all which the same Limitations are to be understood which are added to the Absolute Canons to which they answer For Example The first Canon Comparate from the Conjugates
Tenth Chapter of the Book of Categories and many other places Sometimes for Cloathing as Book IV. of the Metaphysicks Chap. 20. whence also the last Category is call'd the Category of Having Amongst Physicians it is taken for a Habit of Body whether Good or Evil. Hence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or a firm Constitution of Body such as of old the Gladiators and Champions had And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a bad Constitution but in this place it is taken for the first Species of Quality which we have defin'd 2. § A Habit is said to be an adventitious Quality because not flowing from the Essence of the Subject or its Principles but from elsewhere and is either infus'd by God as Faith Hope Charity Prophecy Gift of Tongues c. or acquir'd by frequent Acts. Acquir'd Habits are either in Body as a good Habit of Body acquir'd by Industry or in the Mind and these either in the Understanding as Sense Intelligence Wisdom Prudence and Art or in the Appetite as Vertues and Vices Moral 3. § Disposition in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 either signifies the Order of that which hath Parts as in Book IV. of the Metaphysicks Chap. 19. or any Quality which prepares Matter for the Reception of Substantial Form or any Quality of the first Species In which Sense the Philosopher says Chap. 8. of the Categories where he disputes of Quality Every Habit is a Disposition but not every Disposition a Habit. Or Lastly A Habit beginning and imperfect which is the signification of this Place 4. § A Habit differs from a Disposition because inhering deeper in the Subject it becomes more permanent and lasting than it For a Disposition as it is soon occasion'd so it is soon mov'd and chang'd as Aristotle speaks in the recited Place Ax. 5. Natural Power is a Quality not obvious to the Sense by which a Subject of its own Nature is apt to do or bear Ax. 6. Impotency is a diminish'd Power 1. § Natural Power in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differs from the third Species of Quality because not obvious to the Senses as that is The same differs from Habit both because it is from Nature Habit elsewhere and because it only renders the Subject fit to do or suffer Whereas Habit also renders a Subject propense and that to do expeditiously and with facility 2. § Natural Power is also divided by Aristotle Book IV. of his Metaphysicks Chap. 12. into Active and Passive Both are defin'd in this manner Some Power is said to be a Principle of Motion or Mutation in another as it is another some from another as another That is Active This Passive For Example The Power of Generating moving from Place to Place Heating Building c. is an Active Power But Softness is a Passive Power to Cutting or Section 3. § To these may be added a certain mixt Power which because a Principle of Mutation in it self is at the same time Active and Passive as the Intellect and Will c. From this Power flow Actions immanent as to Understand and Will c. From Active Transient or passing out 4. § Besides which Natural Power is either First or Second The first is that which flows immediately from the Form of the Subject The Second a disposition only of the Matter and Apparatous of the Organs with which the former exercises its Functions For Example The Faculty of Seeing as it flows from a Sensitive Soul is the First Power but as it consists in the Structure and Temperation of the Eye it is the Second The first Power cannot be taken away from any Subject or diminish'd The second be both taken away and diminish'd When therefore Impotency is said to be diminish'd Power the second Power is to be understood 5. § To the Second Power are to be recall'd all Nature's Gifts as well those of the Mind as Ingenuity Aptness Memory as those of the Body as Strength Hailness of Constitution c. Such Gifts as these if they are very imperfect as if any one be of a dull Wit slippery Memory c. are said to be Impotences if wholly absent they are not Qualities but Privations meerly Ax. 7. Patible Quality is that which effects a Passion in the Sense Ax. 8. Which if it soon vanishes is said to be a Passion 1. § Patible Quality in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not so called because the Subject suffers any thing from it in which it is but because it effects a Passion in the Senses Hitherto belong the Five proper Objects of the outward Senses viz. Light Colour Sound Smell Taste and the Tactile Qualities such as the Four First Qualities viz. Heat Cold Moistness Driness and those which arise from these as Gravity Levity Rarity Density c. every one of which Qualities affects a particular Sense Colour the Sight Sound the Hearing Heat the Touch c. In which they are different from Figure and Form which effect a Passion in more Senses than one c. 2. § If the Patible Quality soon perish as Paleness from Fear or Redness from Shame it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Passion because it comes with a Passion And so it comes to pass that Regard being had more to the Passion than to the Quality arising from the Passion they are not so much said to be Quales that is affected so and so with a Quality as to have suffered something as Aristotle says Cap. 13. of the Categories Ax. 9. Figure is a Quality arising from a Term of Magnitude Ax. 10. Form is a Figure with a Colour Form in Greek is term'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Figure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Form is either Substantial or Accidental Substantial Form belongs to the Category of Substance Accidental Form in general is nothing else but an Accident which like a Form inheres in its Subject In this Place every Accidental Form is not understood but only that which consists about every thing or which in the Superficies of a Body appears to our Eyes and Touch. 2. § And altho' Figure and Form are often confounded yet in this Place they are wont so to be distinguished as that Figure is given to things Mathematical in which nothing is considered but Magnitude Form to things Physical in which also Colour is considered To Figure belong Triangle Circle Square Sphaere Cylinder and other Appellations of Mathematical Figures and Affections of continued Quantity To Form Comliness Deformity c. Ax. 11. The Notes of Quality are Three First Quality has a Contrary 1. § So Vertue to Vice Heat to Cold are Contrary Contrariety is only found in the First and Third Species not in the Second and Fourth unless Fairness and Deformity seem Contraries which yet belong to Form Ax. 12. Quality admits of more and less 1. § That is is intended and remitted For one thing is hotter or less hot than another colder or less cold This