Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
virtue_n	body_n	soul_n	unite_v	970	5	9.6533	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29500	An essay in morality written by G.B. to his friend H.P., Esquire ; in which the nature of virtue and vice is distinctly stated, their respective reasonableness and unreasonableness demonstrated, and several useful conclusions inferred.	G. B. (George Bright), d. 1696.; Plumptre, Henry.	1682 (1682)	Wing B4672; ESTC R18007	26,324	158

nolition of it or the volition of its absence and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good may be called Charity or if there be any fitter Name 3 The third Object causing delight to us is power to do what one pleaseth to make any thing consequent upon ones will of which three degrees Liberty Equality Superiority Now to have pleasure arising from hence the onely Object of our volition is an action of pride the onely Object of our habitual inclination the vice thereof To refuse it as before or will its absence is Humility 4 Mere Activity and Life and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls such as is for example mere Contemplation and Knowledge Sense Imagination strong Passions intense Volitions or Resolutions And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names some kinds of it may 5 Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions or Motions of our Bodies to which our Souls are united suaves Corporis Commotiones as some have called them which I know no common name to signifie them by unless Titillation may be allowed These as Cartes thinks create pleasure to the mind as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body Of this sort are all Sensations amongst which are those of Health Calmness and Serenity other bodily tempers many corporeal passions such as Love Joy Hope Acquiescence c. Nay I may say all perhaps for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres Nerves and Spirits delight and please but also the Sense Perception Life and some kind of action of the Soul So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects one Corporeal t'other Intellectual and indeed most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies the entire Object of our Volition is an act of Sensuality and to be habitually enclined thereto the Vice But to refuse this Self-pleasure or to will its absence is Sobriety or Temperance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 6 The perfection of a mans nature of all his Faculties which may be referred to the first and amongst the rest the Rectitude Honesty Probity of his Actions and Inclinations or his Virtue may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him Now even to have this delight usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience nay let me adde that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward and from the possession of it too I say to have this the entire Object of our Volition Intention Inclination or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought is a sin and vice which wants a name as doth its opposite Virtue Finally not to insist upon this distribution I have made which I brought onely for example of some general Heads as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us and consequently correspondent Appetites which are numberless So many sorts of sins or vices may there be they all may be reduced to some general heads and those heads divided and these again subdivided c. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects usually comprehended under three viz. God All created or finite Beings besides our selves under the name of our Neighbour though we know little of any other or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind and lastly our selves The Volition of the Universal Good our last end therefore may be resolved into three parts viz. The love of God The love of ●ur Neighbour The love of our selves Or Piety Charity and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns And by Love I mean not Gratitude but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved whether the good be an absent or present good To will an absent good and desire it for the person we love can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves not to God who we know cannot want any thing But to will a present good may be to God also We may will approve rejoyce delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature which he always doth and cannot but possess 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually although but one of them may be first regarded As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour we ought at least habitually to will it not onely because thereby we do good to him but also because it pleaseth God and it is our own perfection and will be for our own greater good so to do although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoyned that we may and ought always habitually to believe when we endeavour to effect the one the other will necessarily follow Thus for example to love God the Volition of good to him or the rejoycing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon and flows therefrom from his Being and from his most perfect Nature and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection Comfort Reward So again if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour we may be sure it pleaseth God and is best for our selves And so Lastly our own greatest good truly as to Intension Extension and Duration or our greatest perfection and happiness is in and by loving of God and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour 29. It may be further observed that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever which do effect the Universal good have been used to be called Virtues without any consideration of the end of the Action or the ultimate Object thereof and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual vertues The other sort of Volitions which have their due end or due ultimate Object considered as such having the name of principal or inherent Virtues So for example to apply the mind to attention and consideration pursuit after or love of the Truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are accounted Virtues because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones Such again are to judge rightly and truly especially concerning other men i.e. always onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves not because we imagine so Although the end of

hankering before there be any express Volition that which is usually signified by such phrases I could find in my heart to do such a thing and that of Foelix to St. Paul Thou hast almost perswaded me to be a Christian And for the fourth this one thing evinces it viz. That there is a great difference between men in the facility readiness and strength to their actual inclinations and Volitions before they actually exist Of this facility in one man which is not in another there must be some present cause in one man which is not in another and this I call an Habitual Inclination or Volition It is most certain there is something in two men accustomed to two things with delight when they have no actual Inclination and Volition in them which upon the proposal of those two different objects doth produce two different or contrary actual Inclinations and Volitions and this not only in the Mechanisms of their Bodies by which those objects excite corporeal passions of love or delight but in the Soul too and most often contracted by the frequent actual inclinations impressed upon the Soul by these passions and sometimes without them But it is enough that it is agreed by all men that there is an actual difference inherent and present in the Soul between a Drunkard and an Ambitious man even when they are asleep or their Volition and actual inclination are employed about other things which then appears when the proper objects of their respective appetites and habitual inclinations are proposed to them As for all other humane Actions which have been called imperate or Actions commanded by and consequent upon Volition except Volition itself for one Volition may have for its object another Volition such as are Attention Consideration Judgment motion of the parts of the Body or Bodily Action in which is Speech or Words I meddle not at present with them only suggest that there is nothing of Moral good or evil of inherent Virtue or Vice in them they are indeed mostwhat though they may be dissembled signs thereof and of its degrees nor are they so much as what in the Twenty ninth Article or Paragraph we term instrumental or eventual Virtues or Vices any further than they include Volition For example there is neither Virtue nor Vice in attention or judgment which are actions of the Mind nor in Speech Gesture Motion which are actions of the body but only in the Volition or act of the Will which commands or effects them 4. Now of these three last viz. Actual Volition Actual and Habitual Inclination the perfection and defect may be considered which perfection and defect of Volition for example and so of the rest can be only in two respects viz. 1. Of the Object 2. Of the Action 5. And first concerning the Object of Volition it is to be noted that at the same time it can be but one though that one may consist of several parts which may be successively regarded For example a man cannot will and regard at the same precise time his Neighbours good and his own Reputation as two distinct separate co-ordinate things but he may will them both together as making up or composing one entire Object like as the Eye can see but one Object at the same time painted at the bottom thereof consisting of many parts the whole it may see together confusedly and but one point distinctly 6. Moreover that the only Object of Volition and so of the rest is bonity or good only not evil is manifest from universal experience All which goodness or what is convenient congruous eligible desirable for by all these may bonity or good be described is of two kinds 1. That of the End 2. That of the Means That of the End hath been usually called jucundum delectable or pleasant good or pleasure delight although this very pleasure hath some further use is likewise a means to excite encourage and fortifie the Operations of the Mind which again mediately and immediately may produce new pleasure That of the means is called bonum utile or profitable good to obtain the end of delectable good of which the kinds are numerous 7. The goodness of the means is nothing but its Conducibility to or Causality of the end which indeed is the goodness of the end in the means it is the same there is nothing eligible in the means to obtain any end but the goodness of the end it self Of this profitable good bonum honestum or honest good is one sort or kind as we shall presently understand 8. And to add this for the present the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or pulchritude and beauty of Virtue in whatsoever it consists talked of so much by Platonists is another sort and is only therefore good because it is so congruous or delectable an object to the Mind or some way or other hath in it some causality of pleasure or delight 9. As for delectable good which is as hath been said the only object of Volition it is better understood by every mans experience than by all the descriptions that can be given of it such as Aristotle's perfection of the Minds Operation and Eudoxus's perfect and grateful assension and acquiescence Plato's passion affection and diffusion of the mind and the repose of the Will in some convenient good and many others some of which are contrary each to other as when some say it is Motion and some say it is the Rest and Repose of the Mind It is more to our purpose to observe that it hath indefinite degrees and that in three respects only and no more viz. 1. In Extension as to Subjects 2. Intension 3. Duration Of which to take the extremes only the lowest degree in the first respect is the good of one single Soul the highest that of all Spiritual Beings existant usually comprehended under God our Neighbour and our selves where by Neighbour we understand all Rational Creatures at least We actually indeed know a most inconsiderable part of Mankind only our own Family Town or Countrey to whose greatest good notwithstanding if we direct our Volition it is a sign we implicitely will that good which is absolutely the greatest and that if any greater good were within our view and comprehension we should will that expresly and actually In the second respect we want both conceits and words for the lowest and highest degree In the third respect the lowest degree is that good which is momentany the highest Eternal 10. Wherefore the greatest delectable good absolutely is that which is so in extension intension duration or the Eternal happiness of the whole Vniverse considered as one thing and as Cartes considered Motion in the Material world 11. After which it is easie to observe that the greatest and first perfection of Volition in respect of the Object is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good or to have it for its Object and contrariwise the greatest defect thereof is to be directed