Selected quad for the lemma: virtue_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
virtue_n	act_n	office_n	power_n	1,539	5	6.7111	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A60941	Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's book, entituled A vindication of the holy and ever-blessed Trinity, &c, together with a more necessary vindication of that sacred and prime article of the Christian faith from his new notions, and false explications of it / humbly offered to his admirers, and to himself the chief of them, by a divine of the Church of England.	South, Robert, 1634-1716.	1693 (1693)	Wing S4731; ESTC R10418	260,169	412

which Relation is founded partly upon its Original Designation and partly upon its Natural Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound And this Relation to the Compound I affirm the Soul to retain even while it is separated from it as is evident from what both Philosophers and Divines hold concerning the Soul viz. That even in its Separation and Disjunction from the Body it yet retains a strong Appetite and Inclination as well as an Essential Aptitude to return and be re-united to it Which Re-union also we know will be effected at the great and last Day But you will say Does not the Scripture in Heb. 12. 23. speaking of Blessed Souls in a state of Separation from the Body call them The Spirits of Just Men made perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And if those Just Men were made Perfect must it not have been in respect of the Perfection of their Souls since their Bodies were then rotting or rather rotten under Ground And if they derived this Perfection from their Souls must not their Souls have been eminently perfect themselves which rendred them so And if perfect can we deny them the Perfection of Personality which as we have shewn in Rational Beings carries in it the greatest Natural Perfection To all which I Answer That the Perfection here spoken of is not Natural but Supernatural and relates only to the Consummation of their Graces and not to the manner of their Subsistence Which being the only Thing now in dispute this Scripture which speaks only of the former can make nothing at all to the present Purpose Having thus evinced that the Soul notwithstanding its Self-Consciousness is neither during its Conjunction with the Body nor its Separation from it properly a Person and having withal shewn the grounds and Reasons upon which I conclude it impossible to be so I shall however think it worth while something more particularly to examine as I promised this Author's extraordinary and peculiar Notions of Person and Personality as he applies them to the Soul even while it is joined with the Body also And first in the 268th Page he discourses of it in this manner All the Sufferings says he and Actions of the Body are attributed to the Man though the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour and Governing Power and Constitutes the Person These are his words and they contain a very pleasant way of arguing though wholly contrary to the common known Rules of Philosophy For according to these one would and must have concluded That for this very Reason That all the Actions and Sufferings of the Body and he ought to have added of the Soul too are ascribed to the Man therefore the Man himself to whom these Personal Acts are ascribed must indeed be the Person and that for the same reason also the Soul cannot be so But our Author has a way of Reasoning by himself For says he The Soul is the Person because it Constitutes the Person But for that very Cause say I The Soul is not the Person For whatsoever Constitutes a Person must do it either efficiently or formally That is either as a Principle producing it or a Principle compounding it As for the first way whatsoever Constitutes a person efficiently must do it either by Creation or Generation but this the Soul as much a Superiour Power as it is is not able to do For will any one say That the Soul can either Create or Generate the Person or to speak more plainly the Man who is the Person And then for the other way by which it may be said to Constitute a Person to wit formally This it can do no otherwise than as it is a Constituent Part and therefore only as a Partial and not a Total Adequate Cause of the Constitution That is in other words the Soul as the Form must concur with the Body as the Matter to the Constitution of the whole Person of the Man But then for that very Reason again the Soul cannot possibly be a Person since it contributes to the Constitution of the Person only as a Part which by reason of its Incomplete Being can upon no Principle of Philosophy be a Person And I would fain have this profound Philosopher give me but one allowed Instance where one Person is the constituent Principle of another But to examine the forementioned Assertion yet more particularly since this Man so peremptorily says That the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour Power and Constitutes the Person I must tell him That the Superiour Power is not therefore the sole Power and consequently cannot solely Constitute the Person which yet this Author pretends it does If indeed he had said That the Soul as the Superiour Power bears the chief and principal part in the Constitution of a Person this had been sence but by no means sufficient for his purpose for still this would not prove the Soul to be a Person which he contends for but on the contrary by proving it to concur thereto only as a Part demonstrate it upon the same Account not to be a Person But this is not all for in Page 169. he calls the Mind of Man a Person and thus Discourses about it Faculties says he Vertues and Powers have Personal Acts and Offices ascribed to them only upon the Account of their Unity and Sameness with the mind in which they are which is a Person and Acts by them Now this also is very odd and strange could any thing in this Author which is odd be strange too For the thing Asserted by him amounts to neither more nor less than this That Powers Faculties and Vertues have personal Acts ascribed to them upon the account of their Unity and Sameness with that which it self neither is nor can be a Person as we have abundantly proved That the Mind of Man taking it in his sense for the Soul cannot be And for his further Conviction I could tell him of something which has personal Acts very remarkably ascribed to it and yet neither for being it self a Person nor for its Unity and Sameness with the Mind in which it is and which sometimes acts by it And that if he pleases to turn to 1 Corinth 13. he will find to be that notable Grace and Virtue called Charity which being but an Accident I believe that even this Author himself will not affirm to be a Person and I am sure as little can be said for any Unity or Sameness that it has with the Mind which it is lodged in Since though it should be utterly lost the Mind would nevertheless retain all the Essentials of a Mind and continue as truly a Mind as it was before Which I think is but an ill Argument of any Unity or Sameness between the Mind and that and this being indubitably true all that this Author here discourses about personal Acts being ascribed to the Mind and about their Identity with the Mind as the

Reason of it is with equal mistake and impertinence alledged by him in this case For he might and should have known That personal Acts are often ascribed to Faculties Vertues and Graces not in strict propriety of Philosophical speaking but Tropically and Figuratively by a Figure which he shall hear further of hereafter called Prosopopoeia which represents Things that are not Persons speaking and doing as if they were so But besides this there are here two Things which this Author takes for granted which yet such dull Mortals as my self will be apt a little to demurr to As First That he takes the Mind and the Soul of Man for one and the same thing whereas very Learned Men both Grammarians and Philosophers hold That in Men there is a great difference between Animus and Anima and that as Anima imports the Spiritual Substance which we call the Soul so Animus signifies only a Power or Faculty viz. The Supreme Intellectual Reasoning Governing Faculty of the Soul or at least the Soul it self considered as exerting the forementioned Acts. But whether it be one or the other we have sufficiently proved against this Author That neither of them can be a Person The other Thing here supposed by him is the Unity or Sameness of the Powers or Faculties of the Soul with the Soul it self which yet the Peripateticks generally and most of the School-men with Thomas Aquinas in the Head of them do positively deny and think they give very good Reason for such their Denial For if Substances and Accidents are Beings really distinct and if Qualities be Accidents and the Powers and Faculties of the Soul come under the second Species of Quality as Aristotle reckons them then it is manifest that they are really distinguished and that there is no Identity between them Nor does there want a further Reason for the same For since the bare Substance or Essence of the Soul considered nakedly in it self may rationally be supposed undetermined and therefore Indifferent to all those Acts or Actions that naturally proceed from it and since withal bare Objects can of themselves neither enable nor dispose the Agent to exert any Action there seems a Necessity of asserting the Intervention of some Third Thing distinct from both which may thus enable dispose and determine the Soul to exert it self in such a particular way of acting rather than another sutably to the several Objects which shall come before it which thing is properly that Quality residing in the Soul which we call a Faculty or Power And this to me seems the true Philosophy of the matter But I need not here press the Decision of the Case one way or other as not directly affecting the Point in debate between us Only I thought fit to suggest these Remarks to check this Author 's bold unwary way of dictating and affirming in things disputable and dubious and to remind him how much it becomes and concerns one that writes Controversies to be more liberal in his Proofs and less lavish in his Assertions But before I quit this Point about the Personality of the Soul since this Author has so absolutely and expresly affirmed That the Soul or Mind of Man is a Person and given this for the Reason of it That being the Superiour Governing Power in Man it does as such Constitute the Person over and above the Arguments which have been already brought for the Confutation of it I desire to leave with him two or three Questions which seem naturally to rise from this Wonderful Position As First Whether the Soul or Mind of Man be one Person and the Man himself Another Secondly Whether the asserting of the Soul to be a Person because it Constitutes the Person does not infer so much viz. That the Soul is the Person that Constitutes and the Man the Person that is Constituted unless we will say That the Soul Constitutes it self a Person And then Thirdly Whether to say or assert this does not infer Two distinct Personalities in the same Soul one in order of Nature before the other viz. That by which it is it self formally a Person and that other which by its Constituting it self a Person is Constituted and caused by it But since it is too hard a Task to drain any one Absurdity especially a very great one so as to draw forth and represent all its naturally descending Consequences I desire the Author with the utmost if Impartial strictness to compare the foregoing Questions with his own Assertion and to see First Whether they do not directly spring from it And next Whether the Matter couched under the said Questions if drawn out into so many Positive Propositions would not afford as many Intolerable Defiances to Common Sense Reason and Philosophy But thus it is when Men will be Writing at Thirty and scarce Thinking till Threescore But to proceed and shew That it is not only the Soul or Mind of Man which our Author dignifies with the Name and Nature of a Person but that he has almost as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a Person as K. Charles the Second had in making almost every Person he met with a Knight So that it was very dangerous for any one who had an Aversion to Knighthood to come in his way our Author out of the like Over-flowing Communicative Goodness and Liberality is graciously pleased to take even the Beasts themselves into the Rank and Order of Persons in some imitation I suppose of the Discreet and Humble Caligula so famous in History for making his Horse Consul And for this Let us cast our Eyes upon Page 262. where he has these words worthy in sempiternam rei memoriam to be wrote in Letters of Gold A Beast says he which has no Rational Soul but only an Animal Life as a Man has together with an Humane Soul is a Person or Suppositum or what you will please to call it But by your favour Good Sir the Matter is not so indifferent for Person and Suppositum are by no means the same Thing and I pity you with all my heart that you should think so For any single Complete Nature actually subsisting by it self is properly a Suppositum but not therefore a Person For as Subsistence superadded to Nature Constitutes a Suppositum so Rationality added to Suppositality Constitutes a Person which is therefore properly defined Suppositum Rationale or Intelligens as we have sufficiently shewn already in our Second Chapter So that to call a Beast a Person is all one as to call it a Rational Brute Which this Author who can so easily reconcile Contradictions or which may serve him as well swallow them may do if he pleases and so stand alone by himself in this as well as he says he had done in some other Things But others who think themselves obliged to use Philosophical Terms only as Philosophers intended them dare not venture to speak thus for fear Aristotle should bring an

case abundantly sufficient St. Cyril of Alexandria says expresly Christ's saying that he is in the Father and the Father in him shews the Indentity of the Deity and the Unity of the Substance or Essence And so likewise Athanasius Accordingly therefore says he Christ having said before I and my Father are one He adds I am in the Father and the Father in me that he might shew both the Identity of the Divinity and the Unity of Essence And so again St. Hilary The Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father by the Unity of an inseparable Undivided Nature By which Passages I suppose any Man of sense will perceive That the thing which the Fathers meant and gathered from those words of our Saviour since expressed by this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was no Unity of Mutual Consciousness which they never mention but an Unity of Essence or Nature which they expresly and constantly do Nor does this very Author deny it as appears from his own words though he quite perverts the sence of the Fathers by a very senceless Remark upon them Page 125. lines 20 21. This Sameness or Unity of Nature says he might be the Cause of this Union in the Divine Persons viz by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not explain what this Intimate Union is Now this Author has been already told That the Question here is not what explains this Union but what this Union is But besides this his mistake of the Question I desire him to declare what he means by the Cause of this Union as he here expresses himself For will he make an Union as he calls an Unity in the Divine Persons by Sameness of Nature a Cause of their Intimate Union by a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mutual In-being of them in each other and affirm also this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the same thing with Mutual Consciousness If he does so he makes the same thing the Cause of it self For the Sameness of Nature in the three Persons and their Mutual In-being or Indwelling are the very same thing and the same Unity though differently expressed But however if we take him at his own word it will effectually overthrow his Hypothesis For if the Sameness of the Divine Nature in the three Persons be as he says the cause of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be the same with Mutual Consciousness it will and must follow That this Sameness or Unity of Nature can no more consist in Mutual Consciousness than the Cause can consist in its Effect or the Antecedent in its Consequent And this Inference stands firm and unanswerable against him But as to the Truth of the Thing it self though we allow and grant the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons and the Mutual In-being or In-dwelling of the said Persons in each other to be the same Thing yet we deny That this their Mutual In-being is the same with their Mutual Consciousness But that their Mutual Consciousness follows and results from it and for that cause cannot be formally the same with it And so I have done with his 3d. Argument which he has drawn from the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and is indeed nothing else but a bold down-right Perversion of Scripture and a gross Abuse of the Fathers 4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of St. Austin who though he does not as our Author confesses Name this Mutual Consciousness yet he explains a Trinity in Unity as he would perswade us by Examples of Mutual Consciousness particularly by the Unity of three Faculties of Understanding Memory and Will in the same Soul all of them Mutually Conscious to one another of the several Acts belonging to each of them And his 9th Book is spent upon this Argument In which he makes the mind considered with its knowledge of it self and its love of it self all three of them as he says but one and the same Thing a faint Resemblance of the Trinity in Unity And this is what he Argues from St. Austin To which I Answer First That Faint Resemblances are far from being solid Proofs of any Thing and that although similitudes may serve to illustrate a thing otherwise proved yet they prove and conclude nothing The Fathers indeed are full of them both upon this and several other Subjects but still they use them for Illustration only and nothing else And it is a scurvy sign that Proofs and Arguments run very low with this Author when he passes over those Principal Places in which the Fathers have plainly openly and professedly declared their Judgment upon this great Article and endeavours to gather their sence of it only from Similitudes and Allusions which looks like a design of putting his Reader off with something like an Argument and not an Argument and of which the Tail stands where the Head should For according to the true Method of proving things the Reason should always go first and the Similitude come after but by no means ought the Similitude ever to be put instead of the Reason But Secondly To make it yet clearer how unconclusive this Author's Allegation from St. Austin is I shall demonstrate That this Father does not here make use of an Example of Mutual Consciousness by shewing the great disparity between the thing alledged and the thing which it is applyed to and that as to the very Case which it is alledged for For we must observe That the Mutual Consciousness of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity is such as is fully and entirely in each Person so that by virtue thereof every one of them is truly and properly Conscious of all that belongs to the other Two But it is by no means so in those three Faculties of the Soul Understanding Memory and Will For though the Understanding indeed be Conscious to all that passes in the Will yet I deny the Will to be Conscious to any Thing or Act that passes either in the Understanding or the Memory and it is impossible it should be so without exerting an Act of Knowledge or Intellection which to ascribe to the Faculty of the Will would be infinitely absurd It is true indeed That one and the same Soul is Conscious to it self of the Acts of all these three Faculties But still it is by virtue of its Intellectual Faculty alone that it is so And the like is to be said of its Knowledge and of its Love of it self For though it be the same Soul which both Knows and Loves it self yet it neither knows it self by an Act of Love nor loves it self by an Act of Knowledge any more than it can Will by an Act of the Memory or Remember by an Act of the Will which is impossible and amongst other proofs that it is so it seems to me a very considerable one That if a Man could remember by his Will this Author in all likelyhood would not forget