Generals Chamberlains and the like and those cannot justly be laid aside out of those places that they are born to and have by Inheritances without great and just cause of disinheriting be produced SECT IV. The eleventh Inference affirmed where there is no Law there is no transgression and consequently no punishment HIs eleventh is most true That to the Sâ—veraign is committed the power of punishing and rewarding according to Law or if there be no Law I fear to joyn with him here to punish where is no Law according as he shall judge meet to conduce to the deterring of men from doing disservice to the Commonwealth This I like not sin is the transgression of a Law where no Law no sin therefore no punishment His last Inference is after a long preamble That it belongs to the Soveraign Power to give Titles of Honour I agree with him in this clause but observe that his twelfth eleventh tenth ninth Inferences are all page 92. SECT V. Mr. Hobbs his Objection and Answer approved Kings more incommodated then Subjects from the burthen of their Crimes and their account to the King of Kings I Have thus briefly touched upon these particular Inferences which he calls the right of a Soveraign and having câ—nsâ—red them any man may easily look through that which follows in that Cap. but in the latter end of that Cap. page 94. he seems to answer an Objection â— A man may here object that the condition of Subjects is very miserable as being obnoxious to the lusts or other irregular passions of him oâ— them who have so unlimited a power in their hands and commonly they who live under a Monarch think it the fault of Monarchy c. not considering saith he that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other I think he speaks truth in almost all this whole Paragraph but as a Christian man who is assured there is a God a Heaven and Hell I may say that as all Subjects must whilst they are in this world have incommodities so Kings have many more their Crowns are made of Thorns and their Scepters too heavy almost for men to bear because they have a mighty accompt to make up to their King the King of Kings of the good or evil in their Government with which words I end this Cap. and come to his next which is Cap. 19. entituled thus Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution and of Suâ—cession to the Soveraign Power CHAP. XIII SECT 1. Mr. Hobbs his expression of Representative not proper and diminutive of Soveraignty Two Questions raised about the divisions of Commonwealths left to the judgment of others HE begins this Cap. with an Exposition of that ancient division of a Commonwealth into Monarchical Aristocratical and Democratical which he affirms to be the only forms by which any Commonwealth is governed and in the hottom of this 94 page he proves it thus For the Reprâ—seâ—itative must needs be one man or more and if more then it is â—ither the Assembly of all or but of a part When the Representative is one man then it is a Monarchy when an Assembly of all that will come together then it is a Democracy or popular Commonwealth when an Assembly of a part only then it is Aristocracy Other kinds of Commonwealths there can be none for either one or more or all must have the Soveraign Power which I have shewed to be indivisible I will not here contend against that word Representative which I have oft already spoke against and cannot be a fit word to express a Soveraign for it makes him to be but an Image or Creature of the people whose Supreme he is But for that division of a Common-wealth which he propoâ—eth although it is so honoured by the universality of Writers in Politicks that it were not modesty in any particular man to deny it yet give me leave to put a Question I will not be peremptory in it Why since a Commonwealth is the whole Body Politick and consists in the whâ—le Regiment from the King to the Cottager why there may not be thought of some division in respect of subordination as well as in respect of the Supreme But I will leave the answer to some younger head who may have leisure to examine it and raise another Question Since the division is made only out of the quantity or number which constiâ—ute a Supreme why may not some things be thought upon concerning the quality of it which may give a new and another illustration to that condition of a Supreme For although this term of the quality of a Supreme is not usually expressed in the notion of the thing yet the matter and sense of that word is often delivered by them as Tyranny for Monarchy by the first of which they understand a Monarch governing without Law so Oligarchy for Aristocracy as Mr. Hâ—bbs expresseth in the following words page 95. SECT II. Tyranny and Monarchy different forms of Government Miscalling alters not the nature of the thing Oeconomical Government consisteâ—t with Anarchy THâ—re be other names of Gâ—vernmeâ—t in the Hâ—stâ—ries and Bâ—oks of Pâ—licy as Tyranny and Oligarchy but they are not the names of other forms of Government but of the same forms misliked Indeed in the first they are divers forms to govern by Laws or without Laws differing forms differing in the very essential acts of Government In the second you may find a great difference in the persons the one being enabled to his place by his vertue the other by riches only or such like accommodations But let us consider what he adds for saith he They who are discontented under Monarchy call it Tyranny and they who are displeased with Aristocracy call it Oligarchy they who find themselves grieved under a Democracy calâ— it Anarchy which signifies a want of Government and yet I thâ—nk no man believes a want of Government to be any new kind of Government I believe what he saith hath truth they will miscall them so but yet this proves not that these miscallings are not founded upon a truth A vertuous man is branded with calumny and yet for all that a vertuous man and a vicious man differ although the vertuous man be abused so differ these Governments one from another What he speaks of Dâ—mocracy and Anarchy was ingenious but unapplicable to any the other And although in the strictness of that word Anarchy it is not possible to allow any Government yet if it be appliâ—d to Political Government it may notwithstanding granting it there consist with Oeconomical Government And when a Democracy is grown loose that the Authority in relation to the whole Commonwealth is lost yet Government may be found in Families What he adds is not of great moment when he saith Nor by the same reason ought they to believe that the Government is of one kind when they like it and another when they dislike it or are oppressed by the Governours
assents of the People who at the least pretended with the highest protestations that men could make that they would live and dye with them in the maintenance of their Rights and yet in one six weeks they made likewise such another protestation to the next Usurpers Here you may discern how weak a Foundation this popular Covenant yields to his Leviathan nor need he bâ—ast more of the strength than the Right of his Authority for certainly any buzze put into the Peoples head of misgovernment which no Government can be free from in the execution will put Seditious Spirits into them and men who love to fish in troubled Waters may with ease raise these Rumors so that it seems to me to appear that such a tottering and unconstant foundation as the Peoples universal Covenant should not be the support of such a mighty structure as is a Leviathan which should be perpetual What I have said of the whole may more abundantly be affirmed of any part because they will be as unconstant as the whole or more SECT VI. The People cannot give Power conjunctim AND for what was interposed of the People Conjunctim is impossible according to his Principles for there can be no Conjunction before this Covenant they are according to his Doctrine at War one with another until that And it is a strange thing to imagine that so many several heads contending one with another about Superiority and the ingrossing the World to their particular Interests should concenter with one mind to the exaltation of the same Person or Persons to whom they would submit themselves and their conditions by a total desertion of them both Nay indeed a man cannot do it for it being Jus naturale a natural Right as he himself hath expressed before Chap. 14. pag. 65 and 66 to which I have spoke already something he cannot lay down his Natural Right until he lay down his Nature and therefore indeed he cannot by this Doctrine give away his Right to be King to any other but if he can devest himself of his Nature yet he in express termes saith That a man cannot give over his Right to resist by force wounds and imprisonments with which he cannot live contentedly and may not the same be said of a Kingdom perhaps that man cannot live contentedly without being King surely then it is not probable to think that men will so put off their Jura naturalia neither indeed can they do it by his Polity SECT VII The manner of the Resignation makes it impossible BUT then consider the Resignation it self it is far more unreasonable to think that reasonable men should do it Consider the particulars To own all Leviathans actions as if every particular of the People were Author of it To submit their Judgments to his Judgment their Wills to his Will I thought it had been obedience enough for Subjects to submit their persons to his Government but to own all his actions which may be wicked was not to be exacted from any Subject yea if we will allow his Doctrine delivered before it is worse for then we must be Authors of his actions he but our person imployed in them as he speaks pag. 82 and therefore not his own I but saith he in order to their peace I cannot assent to that for many Supreams have done horrid things in order to the publique Peace as Murders Sacriledges oppressions to which although my person may submit yet neither shall my Judgment approve nor my will consent for although when he doth wickedly I will not do so too and Rebel yet neither will I by consent to them justifie his Acts by conspiring in his sin his Vertues shall not save me and I am confident his vices cannot damn me which yet they would if I assented to them I go on with him This is saith he more than consent or Concord it is a real Vnion of them all in one and the same person made by Covenant of every man with every man in such manner as if every man should say to every man I authorize and give up my Right of Governing my self to this man or assembly of men on that Condition that thou give up thy Right to him and Authorise all his Actions in like manner If this be the only way to live in Peace I chuse War which is the hatefullest thing in the World but Sin But this last Phrase of Authorizing all his Actions whom I cannot rule nor controul nay perhaps not come at to Petition is such a forsaking of Humanity and contempt of the glorious means of Salvation as no man with a face of Piety dare affirm to be fit I shall handle these things more fully shortly CHAP. III. SECT I. This cannot be the only way to establish a Government THIS done saith he the multitude so united in one Person is called a Common-wealth in Latine Civitas Thus he But if this only make a Common-wealth or Civitas there was never any in the World nor ever will be as shall be shewed more largely hereafter More true is that which follows This is the Generation of that great Leviathan I mean his Book for to vent this extremly wicked folly he wrote this Book and except in this Book a Common-wealth was never called Leviathan a name from which never man expected good he proceeds or rather to speak more Reverently of that mortal God to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and safety I answer we owe him nothing there was never such a Power Erected I shall omit what follows in that Chapter and come to his 18. Chapter which is page 88. CHAP. IV. SECT I. His definition of a Common-wealth disproved first because not practicable HE begins with a definition of a Common-wealth by Institution thus A Common-wealth is then said to be instituted when a multitude of men do agree and Covenant eveevery one with every one that to whatsoever man or assembly of men shall be given by the greater part the Right to present the Person of them all That is to say to be their Representative every one as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it shall Authâ—rize all the Actions and Judgments of that man or assembly of men in the same manner as if they were his own to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves and be protected against other men This is but a Dream of his there was never such a thing nor is it practicable this Book was writ in English and therefore proper for English men suppose then we were in the first State without a Soveraignty we are none of the greatest Common-wealths in the World yet is it possible that here in this Kingdom there should convene such Multitudes of men such an Universality as by him is required to make this Covenant which he labours to prove in his second part De Corpâ—re Politi Cap. 3. Numb 2. because saith he there Nor can an action be Attributed to
more or less for his linking of his actions to God Almighty nay if his discourse be true Subjects have as great liberty as Kings for all their actions are alike necessitated by this Chain Here Reader I thought to have ended with his Politicks having as I think digged up his Foundation and then the Building must fall but meeting so many wicked interpretations of Scripture and so many abominable conclusions in Divinity intermixed with his Political discourses I am forced to proceed with some of them lest the Reader should be unhappily seduced but not prosecute them word by word as I have done but skipping from one hill to another leaving the lesser work and Mole-hills to be censured by any man who hath more leisure and spare time and to that purpose remove with me to the next page 109. about the middle where he begins thus CHAP. XX. SECT I. Mr. Hobbs his impious Proposition in this Paragraph discovered and censured Injustice and iniquity the same The Subject not Author of the actions of his Soveraign The Soveraign granting the former Proposition cannot kill an Innocent justly No man hath power to take away his own life justly Neither Subjects nor Kings have right to any thing but from God who gives not power to either to shed Innocent Blood The Law of Nature deserted by Mr. Hobbs to the murther of an Innocent His disapprobation of Scripture censured NEvertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the Soveraign Power of Life and Death is either abolished or limited I conceive by Soveraign Power he means the power of the Soveraign and that Authority not limited by any Law which being violated he should do unjustly for this sense the sequel of this discourse will apparently justifie and then I say it is a wicked Proposition as will appear by the examination of his reasons which he enters upon in the following words For it hath been already shewn that nothing the Soveraign Representative can do to a Subject on what pretence soever can properly be called injustice or injury Yes he hath shewn it with a nice and learned distinction betwixt Injustice and Iniquity concerning which I may justly say they are hardly two words but not two things as I have shew'd But what doth he mean by a Soveraign Representative here I think he hath delivered that all Soveraigns are Representatives of the people What he can mean by this addition of Representative I know not but he explains himself in the words following Because saith he every Subject is Authâ—r of every act the Soveraign doth so that he never wanteth right to anything otherwise then as he himself is a Subject of God and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature The first part I have spoken to heretofore and shewed that every Subject is not Author of the Soveraigns acts where he saith he hath shown it But now I shall go further and prove that if they were Authors of his acts yet by their Authority he cannot kill an Innocent justly which I do thus The people cannot authorize him to act any thing which they themselves have not just power to do but the people conjunctim or divisim have no just power to take away an innocent mans life therefore they cannot authorize him The major is grounded upon that invincible Axiom No man gives what he hath not therefore if they have not that power they cannot give it The minor will be proved thus Before a Commonwealth be instituted no man hath just power to take away anothers life as is most evident I but they may answer every man hath power over his own which every man may yield to the Soveraign 〈◊〉 rejoyn No man hath just power to take away his owâ— life he may give his goods but not his life God is the God of life and hath given no private man Authority to cut off his own life and therefore undoubtedly he cannot give power to another which he hath not himself And if there were no other argument against his popular Constitution of a Supreme this were enough for confutation of it for there must be a power of life and death in a Common-wealth upon the emergency of great iniquities it cannot subsist else And so I pass to the second part of that conclusion which is Otherwise then as he himself is the Subject of God and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature There is much folly if not wickedness in these few words First I say neither Kings nor any man hath right to any thing but as they are Gods Subjects The earth is the Lords and all that is in it and to whom he giveth it they have right to such pieces and none else He is King of Kings with a much greater Prerogative then they can have over their Subjects They can have no power therefore or right to act any thing which is not a power delegated from him and certainly he can never shew me any power given to Kings by God to shed innocent blood Secondly it is a strange phrase used by him and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature First because the Law of Nature in particulars is to preserve not to take away life in general and concerning Commonwealths to reward Virtue and punish Vice when this wicked book would have it the Law of Nature to kill an Innocent yea a virtuous person Secondly consider that being bound because he is Gods Subject to the Law of Nature and only that he should not be bound to Gods positive Laws in Scripture a distinction which he himself makes use of and therefore may more powerfully be retorted to him but he loves not Scripture and this odious expression of his is most abominable SECT II. Mr. Hobbs his Proposition in this Paragraph examined and censured His dubious expressions discovered from his former Assertions and refuted Scripture seldom cited by Mr. Hobbs but to give a celour and Authority to Impiety Jephta's rash Vow examined The execution of that Vow impious Jephta's Sacrifice no President for others HE goes on And therefore it may and doth often happen in Commonwealths that a Subject mâ—y be put to death by the Command of the Soveraign Power and yet neither to the other wrong There is one shift in this Proposition by which it may be justified as thus That a Soveraign may punish a Delinquent who formally did him no wrong or an inconsiderable one that is to the Prince himself but for an injury to another of his Fellow Subjects as for robbing or burning his Neighbours house But as it seems by that argumentative word therefore which must relate to the precedent matter he may do it when the murthered Party hath done no wrong to any body and then it is wickedly false he gives instances two or three We will examine them next As saith he when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed in which and the like cases he that â—o dyeth had liberty to do the
illustration or explication of that law writ in our hearts as he himself seems to allow hereafter therefore that law being clear Thou shalt not kill and this killing an innocent being the most detestable of all other it is most clearly not only against the equity but the letter that is that sence which the law intends for the law of nature directs and commands that vertue and vertuous men should be rewarded and incouraged and vice punished Thou shalt not kill for the satisfaction of thy passion whom the law doth not direct but if the law command killing lest the Common-wealth be hurt by so wicked a person lest vice may be nourished then the law kills not thou who art an executioner of the law And therefore to kill an innocent is a monstrous crime whom no law kills he gives an instance again as was the killing of Uriah by David yet it was not an injury to Uriah but to God yes the greatest injury could be done to him No saith he not to Uriah because the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself Shew that concession or gift from Vriah and it will go a great way to my satisfaction nay certainly there was never such a concession from Uriah or any Subject that the King shall kill him being an innocent It is not good for the Common-wealth that any have such a power because by such a wicked act the Commonwealth loseth a worthy member as was vriah but that abominable false foundation of the only way of instituting a Common-wealth by the popular election that impossible error leads him into many more but suppose vriah yielded such a power yea if it had been done by such a consent as he expressed yet they had no power over their own lives and therefore could not impower him over them especially when embodied into a Common-wealth for his country hath a share in every Subjects life and good subjects well-being by which it is amended and bettered so that he must needs do an injury to others by such an act for it is wrong and again all justice that man should suffer by weldoing This may suffice for the first piece of that sentence now we will examine the second CHAP. XX. SECT IV. Davids sin in murthering Uriah a sin against God because an injury to man St. Ambrose explained David his soveraignty freed from the punishment of sin but not from the guilt of it Rom. 13. 4. the first epistle of St. Peter 2. 14. explained The former assertions proved against Mr. Hobbs by the authority of S t. Basil S t. Chrysostome St. Hierom and St. Augustin The authors sence of these words tibi soli peccavi Mr. Hobbs his variation from the authority and reading of England The former conclusions recapitulated and asserted against Mr. Hobbs from the meaning of this text A And yet to God because David was Gods Subject and prohibited all iniquity by the law of nature Well now let us consider why this was iniquiâ—y for no other reason certainly but because it was injustice done to another man The law of nature prescribes all and nothing but in justice if it be towards God it is called religion which payes to God the duty which we owe him and is set down in the four first commandements of the Decalogue but all the justice which is due to man is set down in the six latter I must then tell him that that act of Murther in David was not a sin against God but only out of regard that it was an injury to man for therefore the law of nature written in mens hearts and the positive law of God was against it because it was unjust for man to do it so that the reason why it was an offence against God being only because it was an injury to man it must follow that it cannot be an injury to God but it must likewise be an injury to man I but saith he it was against God because King David was Gods subject Yet give me leave although King David was Gods subject yet it doth not follow that in murthering his fellow subjects he did no injury to them no more than the Kings subjects officers or Judges under him may be said in condemning innocent blood to injure only the King and not the person whom he so murthered it is most evident therefore that that sin was against both God and man But he brings scripture for what he writes which distinction David himself when he repented the fact evidently confirmed saying To thee only have I sinned Which text you may read Psalm 51. 4. and to â—nderstand the sence of it let us reflect upon the story of this Psalm as it is recorded with 2 Sam. 12. where we may observe that after he had committed these hainous sins of adultery and murther God sent Nathan the Prophet to him and he told David his own story under a Parable of a Rich man who took a poor mans lamb from him to entertain his friend with it This was a picture of Davids crime was not this injustice Consider then in the 9. verse where he acquaints the King with Gods sentence against him he doth not lay to his charge only that he had offended God but that he had killed vriah the Hittite with the sword and had taken his wife to be his wife and had slain him with the sword of the Children of Ammon so that the sins of David were against men for though all sin is against God even the trespass against men is therefore a sin because against Gods law yet it is a sin against men and therefore prohibited by Gods law because unjust to men I speak of all such sins which are suâ naturâ in their own nature sins of which kind murther is then let us look to the 14. verse of this Psalm Deliver me from blood-guiltiness O God Blood-guiltiness what is that Nothing but the guilt of that sin which he had committed by that murtherous act of killing Vriah and therefore as a murtherer is guilty of the crime untill he is absolved of his Judge and his only Judge God Almighty had acquitted him he untill then was guilty of blood of murthering Vriah Well then undoubtedly that was an unjust act let Mr. Hobbs say what he will or can But I will do him right he goes not alone in this opinion but hath St. Ambrose a person of great honour both for judgment and integrity along with him and because I will urge this argument to the full I will say he was no Court parasite one who would flatter Kings into sin as was evident in that contest he had with the Emperour Theodosius in which was apparent both an incomparable Emperour and a pious and zealous Prelate This St. Ambrose utters some things in his book called Apologia David like Mr. Hobbs where in his tenth Chap. at the beginning he expounds these words tibi soli peccavi Rex utique erat nullis
the Multitude unless every mans hand and every mans will not so much as one excepted have concurred thereto It seems he would have it in writing that he requires every mans hand to be put to it And so likewise Num. 3. The first thing therefore they are to do is expresly every man to consent to do something by which something he understands this project of Leviathan so that it is evident he means every particular singula generum which is an imposible fiction the very meeting is impossible And then that all these who meet with so many self-ends and particular Interests and so many weak capacities should consent in any thing is most incredible I will give him all the Scope I can he may say that they may meet as they do to elect Knights for the Parliament they may meet in Shires and choose Representatives which may act for them I could ask who must divide those Shires that must be done by a Supreme Then consider if that should be granted they must choose little Leviathans first which must represent these their particular Shires before the great one is chosen And then consider this hath a great unfitness if not an impossibility with it which was fore-seen by our State and therefore only such men who had forty shillings free-hold were adjudged fit to have voices in these Elections which heretofore was a very considerable Estate and yet I believe scarce ever half of those met at any Election But then let us look about and we shall find much the greater company without the lists of that condition besides Women and Children which have as great Interests in the Common-wealth as others So that this fancy of his was not only not practised but not practicable in such a Kingdom as this of ours When men write Romances they should write things possible to be and then they are useful to the Reader for they are of such things which a mans life may meet with at some time or other but impossible fictions are such as can be profitable to no man and therefore it was a vain thing for him to deliver such a conceipt and not vain only but ill to deliver it in such a peremptory Rule as to make it seem the only way of Instituting a Soveraign SECT II. Mr. Hobbs his definition inconsistent with Reason BUT let us proceed and we shall find it appear by every word more inconsistent with reason Can a man think that men such numbers would ever consent so fully to forsake themselves and their own reason and wills as to submit themselves either to man or men in such an ample manner as to esteem his Princes Judgment or his Will for his own In that great height of Infallibillity to which the Pope in many mens Judgments is attained they put the Pope in Cathedrâ when they say he is Infallible and afterwards dispute what that Cathedra is But out of this Cathedra he may err in his Judgment and they must not approve of that he may sin with his will and they must not consent to that But Mr. Hobbs confines his Leviathan to no Chair but absolutly pronounceth him free from Error both in Judgment and Will Nay that is not all but we must allow yea authorize his Errors in both and this is the Foundation upon which all his Politiques are built by which let a man endeavour all vertue and Religion in his own person yet he may perpetrate all the horrid villanies in the World in anothers person whose actions he is bound to Authorize and then by them and for them perish everlastingly which I am perswaded not only no Christian but no Turk Mahemetan Indian the most barbarous persons in America or any unknown Country can be induced to do and yet this by him is made the ground-work of all Politique Government SECT III. Right not derived by this supposed Institution from the Consent of the People HE proceeds from this Institution of a Common-wealth are dâ—rived all the rights and faculties of him or them on whom Soveraign Power is conferred by the consent of the People Assembled To this I have answered that there was never any such thing and therefore no right or faculty can be derived from hence nor indeed ever will be Ex nihilo nihil fit that which hath no being cannot cause any thing Nay I may say further that there was never any Power conferred by the People of which I expect an opportunity to speak more fully hereafter for although we may find Common-wealths altered and set up by the Rebellious force and violence of great numbers of the people yet those who got the Soveraignty at such times had it not by any such Institution as is here described by the peoples authorising that Person to these Actions he is exalted to but from the Peoples subserviency obtained by his wit or fraud to his great Ambition Here I might put an end to his Politiques with a little enlargement upon this Subject for the Foundation being destroyed the building must fall But I will touch upon his Inferences which will make this Foundation appear more weak CHAP. V. SECT I. Mr. Hobbs his first Inferrence affirmed the Soveraign absurdly termed the person of the People HE first infers that because they Covenant it is to be understood that they are not bound by a former Covenant to any thing repugnant thereunto This must be most true not of this Covenant only but all other Covenants No man can alieâ—â—te any Estate twice without his leave to whom he alienated it first and so where one has disposed his allegiance to one he cannot take it away and dispose it to another afterward I like the conclusion that follows also thus And consequently they that have already instituted a Common-wealth being thereby bound by Covenant to own the Actions and Judgments of one cannot lawfully make a new-Covenant amongst themselves to be obedient to any other in any thing whatsoever without his permission And therefore they who are Subject to a Monarchy cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude nor transfer their Person from him that beareth it to another man or Assembly of men This hath truth with it out of the grounds formerly spoke of But this senseless name of calling their Soveraign their persâ—n or to found the Allegience to their Soveraign upon their Covenant which never was nor could be is to make it extreamly weak and his reason is most illogical and without force for saith he They are bound every man to every man to own and be reputed Authâ—r of all that he that already is their Soveraign shall do and judge fit to be done so that one man dissenting all the rest should break their Covenant made to that one man which is injustice I do not understand the consequence of this Argument That if one man dissent all the rest should break the Covenant made to that man for
observe there that God was pleased to reveal to Abraham his intended destruction of Sodom Abraham after he had undertaken to plead for them in the twenty fourth verse puts the Question Peradventure there will be fifty righteous within the City wilt thou also destroy and not spare the City for the fifty righteous that are therein Then in the twenty fifth verse That be far from thee to do after this manner to slay the righteous with the wicked and that the righteous shall be as the wicked that be far from thee shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right In which you may observe that Abraham in a bold manner did dare to intimate that God himself should have done amiss not right but unjustly in punishing the righteous with the wicked and shall we be afraid to say that Leviathan can do unjustly when they shall slay the righteous as the wicked which many of them have done If we consider all the Species and several sorts of injustice we shall find that they may and have prepetrated them They have broke the equity of distributive Justice in preferring base and unworthy people and neglecting yea punishing vertuous men for Commutative Justice they have taken against Law and Equity other mens Estates they have neglected to pay their due debts and what can be more unjust then those they may therefore do unjustly nay what is more by how much their power is greater by so much they are enabled to do more injustice and I may add other mens injustice may prove theirs not only out of his vain principles because all Judges in his Dominion act by his Authority even in those Causes where they judge wickedly But because he is the Supreme and should take care for his inferiour Officers that they do their duties which if he knows they do not and yet neglect to correct them for amendment they will prove his wickedness We know the Judgment upon old Eli who was a vertuous and good man in himself and the Leviathan of that Nation then yet the Judgment of God was upon him for not using severe Justice to his Sons when he knew their faults as you may observe in 1 Sam. 2. 27. So that it is apparent that they may do injustice more then others and indeed if he cannot be unjust neither can he be just for contraries are belonging to the same subject he who cannot be vicious cannot be vertuous and contrary acts in any man will by degrees eat out any vice or vertue nor can men call it vertue in any who cannot do ill But I think there is now enough said to this I will pass to his fifth Inference which is this CHAP. IX SECT 1. Mr. Hobbs his fifth Inference The Proposition asserted The reason of this Inference weak and invalid FIfthly and conseâ—uently to that which was said last No man that hath Soveraign Power can justly be put to death or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects be punished â— This conclusion is most true because he is Supreme and to put to death or punish are acts only of Supremacy But his reason and the only means which he useth to obtain this excellent conclusion is so false that unless it should be confuted we may think so excellent a truth had a weak support his reason follows For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraign he punisheth another for the actions committed by himself I have oft spoke of this by this consequence a King cannot punish a wicked Judge a rebellious General and the like as I have often said before And if the Supreme should urge to these instances that this Judge or this General acted implicitly against the Authority granted by the Supreme the same answer may be returned to him from his Subjects when he doth that which is contrary to their good or peace so that although this conclusion is most necessary to the establishment of peace and happiness in any Kingdom yet when it is urged only by such fallacious Inferences it makes the Readers imagine that the greatest and most weighty things in Polity are dubious SECT II. He that hath right to the end hath not right to all the means to attain that end but only to such mediums as are just and legal HE infers presently upon the bottom of this conclusion And because the end of this Institution is the peace and defence of them all and whâ—soever has right to the end has right to the means it belongeth of right to him Whatsoever man or Assembly that hath the Sâ—veraignty to be Iudge of the means of peace and defence to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to beâ—d ne â— I spare putting down every word For answer hereunto know That as I have oft observed he exceedingly often abuseth this general Rule he who hath right to the end hath right to some means but not to all A man hath right to his house in anothers possession right to get it peaceably by Law and not by force A Supreme or under him his Judge hath right to punish Felons but he hath no right to butcher any man without a legal Tryal no though the fact were seen by him so that he hath right to all legal means to obtain this end but not any other Let us change the person and this will appear most manifestly every man hath right to the peace and good of the whole Kingdom without which he cannot live contentedly and happily and he ought to use his endeavour for the obtaining and preserving it but it must have this little addition of lawful means if he have right to prâ—cure it by illegal means it will open a gap and give countenance to all Rebellion for there was never any Rebellion which had not that specious pretence of the peace and good of the Publick which otherwise could not be obtained and therefore although he who hath right to the end hath right to some means of obtaining it yet not to all And this I am confident may fully satisfie the following part of that Paragraph CHAP. X. SECT I. Mr. Hobbs his sixth Inference examined and censured The Soveraigns Commands in point of Religion submitted to the Commands of God NOw I am come to the 91 page where he proceeds Sixthly it is annexed to the Soveraignty to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse and what are conducing to peace and consequently on what occasions how far and what men are to be trusted withall in speaking to multitudes of people and who shall examine the Doctrines of all Books before they be published The drift of all this Inference is to place the Government of Religious Dâ—ctrine in establishment of Doctrine in Religion whether by preaching or printing to be in the Soveraign I shall have opportunity to enlarge upon this conclusion hereafter when I shall meddle with his Divinity but will not let it pass now but speak a little to make way for that