Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
truth_n	worthy_a	write_n	write_v	27	3	4.7869	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A25846	Logic, or, The art of thinking in which, besides the common, are contain'd many excellent new rules, very profitable for directing of reason and acquiring of judgment in things as well relating to the instruction of for the excellency of the matter printed many times in French and Latin, and now for publick good translated into English by several hands.; Logique. English. 1685	Arnauld, Antoine, 1612-1694.; Nicole, Pierre, 1625-1695.	1685 (1685)	Wing A3723; ESTC R7858	106,112	258

LOGIC OR THE ART OF THINKING IN WHICH Besides the Common are contain'd many excellent New Rules very profitable for directing of Reason and acquiring of Judgment in things as well relating to the Instruction of a Mans self as of others In Four Parts The First Consisting of Reflections upon Ideas or upon the first Operation of the Mind which is called Apprehension c. The Second of Considerations of Men about Proper Judgments c. The Third of the Nature and various kinds of Reasoning c. The Fourth Treats of the most profitable Method for demonstrating or illustrating any Truth c. TO WHICH Is added an INDEX to the whole BOOK For the Excellency of the Matter Printed many times in French and Latin and now for Publick Good translated into English by SEVERAL HANDS LONDON Printed by T. B. for H. Sawbridge at the Bible on Ludgate-hill 1685. AN ADVERTISEMENT OF THE AUTHOR THIS Small Treatise is altogether more beholding for its Birth to Fortune or rather to an Accident of Divertisement then to any serious Design For it happen'd That a Person of Quality entertaining a Young Nobleman who made appear a Solidity of Judgment and a Penetration of Wit much above his years among other Discourse told him that when he himself was a Young Man he had met with a Person from whom in fifteen days time he had learnt the greatest and most material Part of Logic. This Discourse gave occasion to another Person then present and one who was no great Admirer of that Science to answer with a Smile of Contempt That if Monsieur would give himself the trouble he would undertake to teach him all that was of any use in the so much cry'd up Art of Logic in four or five Days Which Proposal made in the Air having for some time serv'd us for Pastime I resolv'd to make an Essay And because I did not think the vulgar Logic's either Compendiously or Politely written I design'd an Abridgment for the particular use of the Young Gentleman himself This was the only Aim I had when I first began the Work nor did I think to have spent above a day about it But so soon as I had set my self to work so many new Reflections crowded into my Thoughts that I was constrain'd to write 'em down for the discharge of my Memory So that instead of one day I spent four or five during which time this Body of Logic was form'd to which afterwards several other things were added Now tho it swell'd to a greater Bulk of Matter then was at first intended yet had the Essay the same success which I at first expected For the young Nobleman having reduc'd the whole into four Tables he learnt with ease one a day without any assistance of a Teacher Tho true it is we cannot expect that others should be so nimble as he who had a Wit altogether extraordinary and prompt to attain whatever depended upon the Understanding And this was the accidental occasion that produc'd this Treatise But now whatever censure it may undergo in the World I cannot be justly blam'd for committing it to the Press since it was rather a forc'd then voluntary Act. For several Persons having obtain'd Copies of it in Writing which cannot well be done without several Errors of the Pen and understanding withal That several Booksellers were about to Print it I thought it better to send it into the World corrected and entire than to let it be Printed from defective Manuscripts But then again I thought my self oblig'd to make divers Additions which swell'd it above a Third Part believing the Limits of the First Essay too short for a Public View And to that purpose we have made it the Subject of the following Discourse to explain the End which we propose to our selves and the reason why we have included so much variety of Matter THE TRANSLATORS TO THE READER THE Common Treatises of LOGIC are almost without number and while every Author strives to add something of his own sometimes little to the purpose sometimes altogether from the matter the Art is become not only Obscure and Tedious but in a great measure Impertinent and Vseless Thus the Schoolmen may be said to have clogg'd and fetter'd Reason which ought to be free as Air and plain as Demonstration it self with vain misapplications of this Art to Notion and Nicety while they make use of it only to maintain litigious Cavils and wrangling Disputes So that indeed the common LOGICS are but as so many Counterscarps to shelter the obstinate and vain-glorious that disdain Submission and Convincement and therefore retire within their Fortifications of difficult Terms wrap themselves up in Quirk and Suttlety and so escape from Reason in the Clouds and Mists of their own Raising For remedy of which we are beholden to this Famous Author who has at length recover'd this Art then a noble Science when not Pedantic from Night and Confusion clear'd away the Rubbish that oppress'd it and prun'd off those Vnderwoods and superfluous Boughs that overshaded and ecclipsed the light of true Reason so that now LOGIC may be said to appear like Truth it self naked and delightful as being freed from the Pedantic Dust of the Schools It has had this Influence upon the World already that several Books have been already Written from the Rules of this LOGIC not only by the Author himself no less Celebrated for his Writings then for many other worthy Actions that recommend him to the Commonwealth of Learning Nor is his diligence in this particular less to be applauded for having cleans'd the Augean Stables of so many Systems from studied Barbarism and Delirium For which reason this LOGIC was thrice Reprinted in France so great was the satisfaction in those Parts and likewise Translated into Latin for Vniversal Benefit and now is rendered into English as being a Small Treatise no less Vseful for the Conduct of Human Life than to instruct and guide us wandring in the Labyrinths of Unsettl'd Reason Let not the Reader slightly pass these Pages over but seriously digest This Art of Thinking and being digested let him disperse the Applications into all the Judgments which he makes of Things and into all the Actions of his Life if Knowledg and Understanding be his Aim THE FIRST DISCOURSE Shewing the DESIGN Of this New Logic. THERE is nothing more worthy of Esteem than soundness of Judgment and an exact measure of Wit to discern between truth and falshood All the other faculties of the Mind are of singular use but exactness of Reason is universally profitable upon all occasions and in all the employments of Life For it is not only in the Sciences that it is a difficult thing to discern truth from error but also in all those affairs and actions both of the Body and Mind which are the subjects of human discourse There is in every one a signal difference while some are true and some are false and therefore it

Instruction another for Flattery another for Reprehension Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to but that it should peirce and run through ' em Nor would any one think it well that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov'd should answer Sir speak lower I hear you well enough For 't is the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof and it is necessary to imprint that Idea in the mind of the Servant which the Master would have it make But sometimes these accessory Ideas are fix'd to the words themselves for that usually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce ' em And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signifie the same thing some are injurious some are mild some modest others impudent some honest others dishonest for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree men have affix'd other Ideas which are the cause of this variety And this observation may serve to discover a peice of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown upon 'em which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives For example if they are accus'd of Ignorance or Imposture presently they cry out for being call'd ignorant and falsifying fellows which is not reasonable because that the words do not signifie the same thing for the Adjective ignorant and falsifiing beside the signification of the offence which they discover they include the Idea of Scorn whereas the Substantives of ignorance and imposture denote the thing to be such as it is without aggravation or extenuation And we might instance other things that would signifie the same thing after such a manner as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the others charge And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of unless some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency Hence also may be understood the difference between a plain and a figur'd Stile and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely when they are express'd by a figure then if they were restrain'd to a plain manner of Speech Which proceeds from hence that figur'd expressions besides the principal thing signifie the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth For example of this half Verse of Virgil Vsque adeone mori miserum est were express'd simply and without a Figure Non est usque adeo mori miserum Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force and the reason is because the first Expression signifies more then the second for it does not only express the thought that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die but it represents also the Idea of a Man as it were provoking death and undauntedly looking it in the face which without question is a great and lively Accession to the signification of the words Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impression in the Hearer for the mind is only instructed by the verity of Ideas but she is not rous'd but by the representation of Affections sivis me flere dolendum est Primum ipse tibi If thou wouldst have me weep it first behoves thy self to grieve But as figur'd stile not only signifies the things themselves but also those affections of the mind which we conceive in meditating and speaking we may judge from thence the use which we ought to make of it and what are the Subjects most proper for it Visible it is that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters meerly speculative which we contemplate with a calm and placid Eye and which produce no motion in the Mind For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul when Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no way mov'd such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature and seem to be a kind of Convulsion For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous then the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts upon all manner of Subjects and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions then upon truths the most weighty and necessary for Salvation On the other side when the Subject of the Discourse is such that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind it is a fault to deliver himself in a jejune and frigid stile and without any manner of motion Therefore Divine Truths not being simply propos'd only to be known but much more to be belov'd reverenc'd and ador'd by Men without doubt the noble elevated and figur'd manner of Elocution observ'd by the Holy Fathers is much more proportionable to the Subject then a flat and meager Stile like that of the Scholastics since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know but also endeavours to raise in us those Sentiments of Love Reverence and Affection which the Fathers had for those Truths when they wrote and which representing to us the Image of that Holy disposition must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us Whereas the Scholastic stile being plain and contenting it self with the Ideas of the Naked Truth is nothing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity which render it not only less profitable but less delightful since the soul it self is more delighted in observing the motions of her affections then in acquiring knowledg Lastly 't is by means of this Observation that we may resolve that famous Question among the Ancient Philosophers whether there be any words to be counted unchast And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoicks who justify'd that we might make use indifferently of any words though impudent and obscene They were of opinion saith Cicero in a Letter which he wrote upon this Subject that there were no words that were either nastie or obscene for they say that the obscenity proceeds either from the things or it is in the words It does not proceed simply from the things because they may be express'd in other words that are not esteem'd so nauseous nor is it in the words consider'd as they are because it happens ofttimes that one word signifies two things and so in one signification it may be nauseous in another well enough approv'd But all this is no more then a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence that those Philosophers did not consider those accessory accidents which the mind adds to the principal Ideas of things for from thence it comes to pass that one and the same thing may be express'd honestly by one sound and lasciviously by another if one of the sounds has

false tho we may oppose certain Instances wherein they may stray from the Truth but to be satisfy'd if they may be extended from others beyond their just limits that they ought not to be taken too rigorously according to the Letter 2. OBSERVATION There are some Propositions that ought to pass for Metaphysically Universal tho they may admit of Exceptions that is when those Exceptions are exotic and such as according to common use are not comprehended in those Universal Terms As when I say All Men have two Arms. This Proposition ought to pass for true according to ordinary use And it would be but mere brangling to oppose against it that there have been Monsters who were Men though they had four Arms. It being plain that there was nothing intended concerning Monsters in these general Propositions and that the only meaning of the Assertion was that according to the order of Nature all Men had two Arms. In like manner it may be said that all Men make use of words to express their thoughts but that all Men do not make use of writing Nor would it be a rational Objection to contradict the truth of the Proposition by instancing dumb People because it is evident though the sence be not express'd in words that it was not meant of such as had a natural impediment to make use of sounds either clude it will not be amiss to speak of another sort of Knowledge which ofttimes is no less certain nor less evident in its manner then that which we draw from Authority For there are two general ways by which we know a Thing to be true The first is the knowledge which we have by our selves whether we have attain'd it by Observation or Ratiocination whether by our Sences or by our Reason which may be generally term'd Reason in regard the Sences themselves depend upon the judgment of Reason or Knowledge the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools for all manner of knowledge of an object drawn from the same object The other way is the Authority of Persons worthy of credit who assure us that a thing is so Tho of our selves we know nothing of it Which is call'd Faith or Belief according to the words of St. Austin for what we know we owe to reason for what we believe to Authority But as this Authority may be of two sorts either from God or Men so there are two sorts of Faith Divine and Human. Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error because that God can neither deceive us nor be deceiv'd Human Faith is of its self subject to error for all Men are Lyars according to Scripture And because it may happen that he who shall assure us of the certainty of a thing may be deceiv'd himself Nevertheless as we have already observ'd there are some things which we know not but by a Human Faith which nevertheless we ought to believe for as certain and unquestionable as if they were Mathematically demonstrated As that which is known by the constant relation of so many Persons that it is morally impossible they should ever have conspir'd to affirm the same things if they were not true For example Men have been naturally most averse from conceiving any Antipodes nevertheless though we never were in those places and know nothing of any Antipodes but by human Faith he must be a Fool that does not believe ' em And he must be out of his wits who questions whether ever there were any such Persons as Caesar Pompey Cicero or Virgil or whether they were not feigned Names as Amadis de Gaul True it is that it is a difficult thing to know when Human Faith has attain'd to this same assurance and this is that which leads Men astray into two such opposite Deviations So that some believe too slightly upon the least report Others ridiculously make use of all the force of their wit to annul the belief of things attested by the greatest authority when it thwarts the prejudice of their understanding And therefore certain Limits are to be assign'd which Faith must exceed to obtain this assurance and others beyond which there is nothing but uncertainty leaving in the middle a certain space where we shall meet with certainty or uncertainty as we approach nearer to the one or the other of these Bounds Now then if we do but compare the two general ways by which we believe a thing to be true Reason and Faith certain it is that Faith always supposes some Reason For as St. Austin says in his 122. Epistle and in several other places we could never bring our selves to believe that which is above our reason if reason it self had not perswaded us that there are some things which we do well to believe tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'em Which is principally true in respect of Divine Faith For true Reason teaches us that God being truth it self he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Mysteries whence it appears that though we are oblig'd to captivate our Understanding in obedience to Faith as saith St. Paul yet we do it neither blindly nor unreasonably which is the original of all false Religions but with a knowledg of the Cause and for that it is but a reasonable Act to Captivate our selves to the Authority of God when he has given us sufficient Proofs such as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents which oblige us to believe that he himself has discovered to Men the Truths which we are to believe As certain it is in the second Place that divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Understanding then our own Reason And that upon this Dictate of Reason it self that the more certain is to be prefer'd before the less certain and that is more certain which God assures us to be true then that which Reason perswades us when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us then the nature of our own Reason to be deceiv'd CHAP. XIII Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith THE most customary use of sound Judgment and that faculty of the Soul by which we discern Truth from falshood is not employ'd in speculative Sciences about which so few Persons are oblig'd to spend their time and yet there is no occasion wherein it is more frequently to be made use of and where it s more necessary then in that Judgment which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men. I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad worthy of applause or reproof for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity but of judging of the Truth or Falshood of human Events which may only be referr'd to Logic whether we consider 'em as past as when we only endeavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not or whether we consider 'em as being to come

then the endeavours of some persons of this latter Age to prove that St. Peter never was at Rome They cannot deny this Truth to be attested by all the Ecclesiastic Writers and those the most ancient as Papias Dionisius of Corinth Caius Irenaeus Tertullian against whom there is not any one that has made the the least Contradiction Nevertheless they imagine they can ruin this Truth by Conjectures for example because St. Paul makes no mention of St. Peter in his Epistles written to Rome and when they are answer'd that St. Peter might be then absent from Rome in regard he is not said to have fix'd his seat there as being one that often travail'd abroad to Preach the Gospel in other places they reply that this is urg'd without any Proof which is Impertinent because the Act which they oppose being one of the most confirm'd Truths in Ecclesiastical History it is sufficient for those that uphold it to reconcile these pretended Contrarieties as they do those of the Scripture it self for which as we have shew'd Possibillity is sufficient CHAP. VII An Application of the preceeding Rule to the Belief of Miracles THE Rule which we have explain'd is without doubt of great Importance for the well regulating our Reason in the belief of particular Acts. For want of the due Observation of which we are in great danger of falling into the two dangerous extremities of Credulity and Incredulity For example there are some who make a Conscience of questioning any Miracle because they have a fancy that they should be oblig'd to question all should they question any and for that they are perswaded that it is enough for them by knowing that all things are possible with God to believe whatever is told 'em touching the Effects of his Omnipotency Others as ridiculously imagin that it is in the Power of the Understanding to call all Miracles in question for no other reason because so many have been related that have prov'd to be false and therefore there is no more reason to believe the one than the other The Inclination of the first is much more tolerable than that of the latter tho true it is that both the one and the other argue equally amiss They both depend upon common Places The first upon the Power and Goodness of God upon certain and unquestionable Miracles which they bring for proof of those that are called in question and upon the Blindness of Libertines who will believe nothing but what is proportionable to their Reason All this is very good in it's self but very weak to convince us of a particular Miracle For God does not always act according to his Power nor is it an Argument that a Miracle was wrought because others of the same nature have been wrought And we may do well to believe what is above our Reason without being oblig'd to believe all that Men are pleas'd to obtrude upon us as being above our Reason The latter make use of common Places of another sort Truth says one of 'em and Falshood appear with Countenances alike the same Gate the same Steps we behold with the same Eyes I have seen the rise of several miracles in my Time And tho' they vanish'd in the birth yet we cannot but foresee the Train they would have gathered had they liv'd to their full Age. For it is but to find out the end of the Thread and to cut it into as many peices as we please and there is not a greater distance between nothing and the smallest thing in the World then there is between this and the greatest Now the first that were intoxicated with this beginning of Novelty coming to spread their History find by the opposition which they meet with where the difficulty of Perswasion lodges and make it their business to Fucus over that part of a false Peice Particular Error first causes publick Mistake and afterwards publick mistake causes particular Error Thus the whole Structure of the miracle by some pull'd down by others upheld and by addition enlarg'd at length grows up to a considerable Pile So that the most remote Witness is better instructed then he that lives close by and the last that heard of it better confirm'd then the first Publisher This Discourse is ingenious and may be profitable to prevent us from being led away with every Idle Report But it would be an Extravagance from hence to conclude generally that we ought to suspect whatever is said of Miracles For certain it is that what is here alledg'd relates only to those things which are taken up upon common Fame without enquiring into the original cause of the Report And we have no reason to be confident of what we know upon no better grounds But who so blind as not to see that we may make a common place opposite to this and that at least upon as good a Foundation For as there are some miracles that would deserve but little credit should we enquire into their Original so there are others that vanish out of the memories of Men or which find but little credit in their judgments because they will not take the pains to inform themselves Our understanding is not subject only to one sort of distemper but several and those quite contrary There is a sottish stupidity that believes all things the least probable But there is a conceited presumption that condemns for false whatever surpases the narrow limits of the understanding Sometimes we hunt after trifles and neglect things of greatest moment False stories spread themselves every where while true ones can hardly get liberty to creep abroad Few Persons have heard of the miracle that happen'd in our time at Faramonstier in the Person of a Nun so blind that hardly the Balls of her Eyes were left in her Head who recover'd her sight by touching the Reliques of St. Fara as I am assur'd by the Testimony of a Person that saw her in both conditions St. Austin affirms that many real miracles were wrought in his time that were known but to few and which though most remarkable and wonderful spread no farther then from one end of the Town to the other Which induc'd him to write and relate in his Sermons to the People such as were most certain And he observes in his Twenty second Book of the City of God that in the single city of Hippo near Seventy Miracles were wr●●●●● within two years after the Building of a Chappel in Honour of St. Stephen besides a great number of others which he did not commit to writing which however he testifies to be true upon his knowledge We therefore see that there is nothing more irrational then to guide our selves by common places upon these occasions whether it be in rejecting all Miracles or embracing all And therefore we must examin 'em by their particular Circumstances and by the credit and knowledg of the Reporters Piety does not not oblige a Man of Sence to believe all the Miracles