Moral Essays Wherein some of Mr. LOCKS AND Monsi r. Malbranch's Opinions are briefly examin'd Together with an ANSWER To some CHAPTERS in the Oracles of REASON CONCERNING DEISM By Ja. Lowde Rector of Settrington in Yorkshire YORK Printed by I. White for Fra Hildyard and are to be sold by Brab Aylmer at the Three Pidgeons in Cornhill and Tho. Bennet at the Half Moon in St. Pauls Church London 1699. To the Right Honourable John Earl of Bridge-water Viscount Brackley Baron of Ellesmere Lord Lieutenant of the County of Bucks and one of His Majesties most Honourable Privy-Council My Lord TItles do not so much make some Men great as show them to be so Gold has an intrinsick value in it even before the Stamp thus the Honours of your Family and the Favours and Smiles of your Prince which yet are very great Happinesses are not the essential Ingredients of your more solid and intrinsick Nobility Vertue and Piety are the great Ornaments and Stability of the Throne it self nor is it a less Happiness to a Kingdom when Nobles inherit their Fathers Vertues together with their Fortunes Thus should I have look'd upon that long Train of Vertues which your Lordship takes more pleasure in practising than in having them recounted almost as hereditary to you if thereby I might not seem to lessen your personal Title to 'em and I hope you will give others leave to express what they are so intimately sensible of the great Benefit and Advantage they receive by such benigne Influences My Lord I shall not here attempt any thing by way even of your Lordships just Character because the greatness thereof and your own native averseness from all such Panegyricks do wholly discourage me herein so that this will be the pâ—culiar Câ—aracter of this Epistle Dedicatory that it comes as fâ—r short of the real worth of its Patron as others usually exceed â—t Only your Lordship must pardon me and others if in this declining state of Religion and Piety in the World we call in the Aids and Assistances of such Examples as are able not only to recommend the practice of Vertue to others but also to render it even Honourable in the midst of a perverse Age. But I am afraid that I am injurious to the Publick whilst I thus employ your precious Minutes if perhaps you vouchsafe to give this short Address the reading I shall now only take this Opportunity gratefully to acknowledge those many Favours which by the long Experience of many Years I have received from you it is to Your Lordship and Noble Family that I owe these happy Retiremenrs wherein I shall not be wanting to this part of my Duty to pray for your long Health and Happiness and that God would long continue your Lordship to us a great Example of all Vertues and a great instrument of publick and private Good This is and shall be the constant Prayer of My Lord your Lordships most obliged and most obedient Servant Ia. Lowde THE PREFACE PRefaces are now grown so customary that Readers generally think themselves neglected without 'em otherwise I should not have concerned my self herein the subject matter of these Papers not affording any great occasion for such an Address I hope thou wilt not impute it to any pragmatical conceitedness if I thus fill up some vacant Minutes not wholly taken up in the employment of a Country Cure with such Meditations as these Besides the Civility of Mr. Locks Answer on the one Hand and the concerns of Truth on the other did in a great measure call for some suitable Reply I did not indeed for some time think the Controversie betwixt him and me considerable enough to trouble either him or my self with these disputes and some perhâ—ps may think so still but so it happen'd that a friend of mine lately ask'd me whether I was really satisfied and convinâ—'d with what Mr. Lock had writ in his Preface in answer to my former Treatise I told him I was not whereupon he reply'd that then Mr. Lock had taught me in his late Controversie with the learned Bishop of Worcester that good manners requir'd me to acknowledge the honour he did me in taking notice of what I formely writ and that I was bound in Civility to represent the Reasons why I cannot bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with his for it seems a piece of â—ullenness and disrespect to remain dissatisfied and not acquaint those from whom they may most reasonably expect information why they are so And further when I consider'd that several others viz. J. S. and Mr. Becconsall had variously disputed those little Controversies betwixt Mr. Lock aâ—d me I humbly conceived I might be allow'd more fully to explain my Sense and Meaning therein and then leave the whole with the judicious and impartial Reader where it must rest at last Another design of these Papers is to shew the weakness of the Pretences and the inconclusiveness of the Deists Arguments I mean such as they themselves have of late made use of in their own Defence and I have the rather chosen to answer some of those short Letters in the Oracles of Reason both because I hope this may be done without any great tediousness to the Reader and also because this is not liable to any of those Objections that the dry method of the Scholastick Ob. and Sol. as it is sometimes call'd is liable uâ—to The Deists here plead their own cause and if it prove not so strong as was expected they have no Body to blame but themselves for it and if they think it has suffer'd by any personal failures they may at their own pleasure employ better Advocates I do not here pretend to advance any new Notions but only with as much strength and clearness as I can to defend the old and therefore I know what I here write is not like to meet with any general good reception in such a curious Age as this only I hope there may be some in the World who will not think the worse of Truth because it is gray headed Truth being always of the elder House for though Antiquity has not been so successful in â—inding out Hypotheses of Natural Philosophy yet I thiâ—k it has been more happy in setling Morality npon its true Foundations I am not for venerable Nonsense being preferr'd before new Sense nor yet am I for venerable Sense being slighted in respect of new Nonsense it is the greatest instance of folly imaginable to run out of one extream into anotâ—er and though the former Ages have been too much led by Authority and addicted to antient Errors yet it will not hence follow that all new Notions are true I am apt to believe that some Opinions now prevailing in the World owe their reception therein to the positiveness of their Patrons and to the silence of those of the contrary perswasion rather than to any strength of Reaâ— on â—hat would be found in 'em were they duly
exâ—min'd there are some whose Notions are so iâ—â—ricâ—â—e and their expressions so much out of thâ— common Road that many times they do facere intelligendo ut alij saltem nihil intelligant what I here design therefore in these Papers is clearneâ—s and perspicuity for however deep the pit might be wherein the Ancients plaâ—'d Truth yet I never heard that it was muddy so that what is said of the method of Salvation by the Gospel Rom. 10. 8. may be apply'd generally to all things of a moral Nature the word is nigh thee even in thy Mouth and in thine Heart The learned and judicious Author of the Occasional Papers Paper 1. Pa. 4. tells us that it would be of great Service both to Religion and good Manners to have ill Books as they are publish'd consider'd calmly by Men of Temper I would only propound it further to Consideration whether it might not be convenient also somewhat to enlarge the design and not only take notice of ill Books as he calls them such as either directly or by natural and easie consequence tend to undermine our Faith or corrupt our Manners not only I say to take notice of such but also of the more material mistakes even of good ones the best and wiâ—est Men mâ—y â—ometimes be mistaken in their principlâ—s or dâ—duâ—tions â—rom thâ—m and it is no dâ—sparagement â—or any one to acknowledge it There is one thing further wherein I must beg thy pardon theâ—e Dâ—â—courâ—es want one great ornament of all Compoâ—ures Essays themselves not being excepted that is my transitions are not so soft and well connected as they ought to be this I am very sensible of what the Reason hereof may be I know not whether it be my want of Skill which I rather think nobis non licet esse tà m disertis or want of leisure my other employments not suffering me to apply my Self to these thoughts but at certain intervals or my natural but I confess very culpable indifferency both as to Style and Method however it is if this be any satisfaction to thee I do willingly acknowledge my fault herein Nor must thou expect full and just Discourses upon Each of those Points I here mention neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring herein fully to exhaust a Subject I have no other end or design in these Papers but only the search and defence of Truth and if in any thing I be mistaken and who can seâ—vre himself from mistakes I shall think my self oblig'd to any one who shall with candour and calmness show me my Error Mr. Lock 's Epistle to the Reader examin'd so far as concernes the Law of fashion and innate notions in his second Edition of his Essay of humane understanding WHAT benefit or advantage as to the concernes of truth and usefull knowledge the World may receive by that little difference in Dispute betwixt Mr. Lock and me I know not yet herein I hope we have given an instance of the possibility of manageing a controversie without hard words or unhansome Reflections and if even this was more generally observed it would very much advance the interest of truth however of Love and Friendship in the World among persons of different Opinions I do not in the least question the truth and sincerity of what he there professes that he is always ready to renounce his own and receive the opinion of others according as truth appears on either side yet I hope he will pardon me if I take the freedom to say that the Instance he there gives of altering of his opinion in reference to the last determination of the will of Man doth not seem to come up so fully to his purpose seeing he doth not there so much quit any Opinion of his own to embrace that of anothers as to renounce the common opinion of most tho then believed by him to entertain an Opinion I think purely his own Mr. Lock there complains that his meaning is often mistaken and that he has not always the good Luck to be rightly understood This is a common complaint in such circumstances and I think I may also lay a just claime to a share therein but if I have mistaken his meaning in any thing whatever the cause might otherwise be I do insist upon this in my own vindication that it was not out of any wilful designe And I furthâ—r assure that Learned Man that I never did think my self nor went about to insinuate to others that it was my Opinion of him that he absolutely held no reall difference or distinction betwixt Vice and Vertue I did only ask this question there Whether if Men should place their commendation or blame on that sâ—ide which deserv'd it not whether that would alter the nature of things This I conceiv'd might either set the thing in a clearer light in it self or give him occasion so to do I there also farther appeal'd to himself Pa. 17. of his 1 st Edition where I suppose he did not only declare the sense of the Heathen Phylosophers but his own too upon this Subject when he grounds the reason of Mens keeping their word not upon the approbation of the place Men live in But upon the honesty and dignity of the thing it felf I did also read and consider those other places where he doth positively assert the unchangeable Rules of right and wrong only I must confess I did much wonder how so Learned a Man should go so near as I thought to contradict himself in other places where his expressions seem'd at least to me then to infer the the Rules of Vice and Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature perticularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159. Vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publique esteem is vertue But instead of is Virtue in the 1 st Edition it is now is called Vertue in the Second therefore I suppose he say's That the 2d Edition will give me satisfaction in the point and that this matter is now so express'd as to show there was no cause of scruple It may be so exprest now perhaps that there is no cause of scruple tho that I much question but it will not sollow hence that â—here was none but rather the contrary because he has alter'd his Expression in such a materiall point But he tells us That he was there not laying down morall Rules but showing the Original and nature of morall Ideas For my part I dare scarce trust my own eyes against his word I shall here quote part of the Paragraph which he here refers to P. 157. § 6. Of these moral Rules or Laws to which Men generally refer and which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions there seeme to me to be three sorts Here he seemes to me to call 'em morall Rules but whether he meanes the same thing by morall Rules here that he meanes in his Epistle that
such Principles or propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation I have hitherto been upon the explaining Part in observance of his demand I hope he will now give me leave to deâ—ire him to explain some things in his assertions which sâ—â—m not so easy and obvious to apprehend Pa. 318. The kâ—owledge of our own being we have by Intuition the Existence of a God reason clearly makes known to us the knowledge of the existence of other things we can have only by sensation here he assignes 3 several ways of acquiring Knowledge and in the same Pa. he says the notice we have by our senses of the existence of things without us thoâ— it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason c. Pa. 312 Man knows by an intuitivâ— knowledge that bare nothing cannot proâ—â—ce any real being Now intuitive knowledge was never suppos'd to be acquir'd by sensation or by any reflexion upon materiall mpressions and indeed here he himsâ—â—f acknowledges the same Now that which I would desire him to explain to himself or others is 1. How this intuitive Knowledge thus asserted is reconcileable with what he sayâ— Pa. 44 24 where sensation and reflexioâ— are made the Originals of all Knowledge 2. I would desire him to explain how any impressions from outâ—ard objects or any operations of the mind about these impressions reflected on by it felf can produce in Man any â—nowledge or sense of Moral good or evil or of the difference betwixt them I know he tells us that supposing a God and such a creature as Man is from the relation that one bears to the other honour will necessarily bâ— due to God from Man I grant this but I do not see how he can come to this knowledge from any sensible impressions from without or by reflexions of the mind â—ereupon When he has a litle more fully explain'd these things I suppose there will be very litle difference betwixt him and me in this particular anâ— that he will in some measure be forc'd to acknowledge with me Pa. 53. that the Soul the free use of our understandings first suppos'd has a native power of finding or framing such Propositions the truth or knowledge whereof no way depends upon the evidence of sense or observation But I must remember that what that Learned Man writ was only by way of Esâ—ay and I would desire the Reader to look upon what I write too here in the same manner Only I think that an Essay like a Town or Fortress once attempted or besieg'd ought eitâ—er to be well defended or fairly given up and thus much in Answer to Mr. Lock I shall here further take notice of a Cavil of the Atheists who make it an Objection against the being of a God that they do not discover him without any application in spight of their corrupt wills and debaucht understandings if such a God say they as we are told of had Created and Form'd us surely he would have left upon our minds a native and indelible inscription of himself whereby we must need have felt him even without seeking and believ'd in him whether we would or no. I shall first consider this as a mere Cavil of the Atheists tho' as it is manag'd by some it seems rather to be made use of as an Argument against the natural impression of God upon our minds than any proof against his being And here we may obsâ—rve 1. That if the confession of Atheists will add any thing to the Cause in hand they themselves do grant that it was a thing reasonable and becoming that God should leave some Natural Character of himself upon the Souls of Men but the unreasonableness of the Cavil consists not in the impression it self but in the suppos'd indelibleness and Irresistibility of it but I hope we shall be able to account for that by and by 2. Atheists themselves are sometimes forâ—'d more especially at their Death to acknowledge a God whether they will or no and this is a fair probable Argument at least of this natural inscription 't is true God may more imeâ—iâ—tely work such effects upon Mens mind but his ordinary and regular way of acting is by means viz. by restoring Conscience to its Natural freedom which before was debauch'd and blinded by bad Principlâ—s and worse Practices thâ—se Natural noâ—ions of good and evil and the sence of our Obligation hâ—reunto being now more at liberty and their consciences more frâ—ely excusing or accusing them tho' I do not hâ—re exclude the influences of Gods Holy Spirit But 't is here Reply'd that God has endued Mankind with powers and abilitys of Natural light and reason by which he cannot miss of the disâ—overy of a God and this is suâ—â—â—â—ient and therefore such an Original impression would not be necessary But what if there be other Arguments to prove the being of a God must we then reject this as useless Suppose an Atheistical Person should object against such a particular Epistle or Chapter in Holy Writ that it is not Canonical Scripture must we therefore givâ— up the Point because perhaps there is Scripture sufficient to Salvation without it But they say that such an impression would have rendred the belief of a God iâ—resistible and necessary and thereby bereav'd it of all that is good and acceptable in it But how do they prove that this impression would make the belief of a God irresistible and necessary may there not be such an impression upon our minds as may rather gently incline than forcibly constrain to belief May it not be such as that the power and efâ—icacy of it mâ—y be in a great measure rebated by wilful wickedness and vicious Practices May there not be such a thing as Divine Grace tho' at the same â—ime we do not believe it to be irrisistible But they tell us that such a radical truth that God is and springing up with the very Eâ—seâ—â—e of our Souls is not pretended to by Religion But doth Religion pretend any thing to the contrary But supposing which yet will not be easily granted that the Scripture doth not either suppose or assert this naturall inscription oâ— signature of God upon our minds yet doth Religion forbid us to make use of any Argument that may be piouâ—ly or rationally credible for the proof of a God Scripture doth not go about to prove the being of God by Philosophicall arguments this was not the desigâ— of Moses or the Prophets or the Apostles any other ways than as the History of the one and the Prophesies and Miracles of the others do sufficiently demonstrate it and theâ—efore t is no argument against such a Naturall impression or idea of Godâ— because the Scripture doth not particularly insist upon it for that purpose The Scripture doth argue as strongly as any the most accute Phylosopher can do but then it is rather to prove
imagin'd that the inference from hence would have been either 1 st That then there are no such things as these Native Inscriptions or 2 ly That they are not serviceable in order to supply the defects of reason or 3 ly That they were exempt from the disquisitions of reason but it s none of these but only this Then reason it self will answer all the ends and designes of a reasonable being But if it does this seemes only to extend to the Christian World reason does but very indifferently perform this among the Heathens But he says It does it as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind But how doth he prove that the Heathens may not thank those Native impressions that they are not sunk lower into Barbarisme than indeed they are or supposing that they did enjoy a greater and freer use of reason than I am afraid they do yet how doth he prove that they owe the light of truth and obligation to duty merely to their rationall enquirys in contradistinction to or seperation from these innate notions or not rather to the benign influence that these later however in conjunction with the former have upon them But pa. 76. He says That the Doctrine of innate ideas must be laid aside since we cannot conceive that a wise Creator should establish any ordinance without some special ends and use annex'd to it I mean such as are not served any other way But to this I answer 1 st That what he there supposes is not yet sufficiently demonstrated viz. That Men generally may as well come to the knowledge of their Duty by such rational enquirys as they may by these native inscriptions 2 ly How doth he prove that it is inconsistent with the wisdom of Divine providence to appoint the joint concurrence of two things as in this case naturall inscription and rational deduction as meanes in order to the same end they mutually supporting defending and confirming each other Pa. 77. In a word then tho' the sacred language seems to favour the notion of native inscriptions yet it may be justly râ—solved into metaphor and figure c But it is some advantage to the notion that the sacred Language favours it especially since the assertors thereof are defenders of that Text and found their opinion upon it And therefore 't is not sufficient for him to say that the Sacred Language may be resolved into a Metaphor but he must prove that it must necessarily be so interpreted and here the assertors of these Inscriptions may more justly say that the Text may be understood in the plain obvious and literal sense of the words therefore there is no need no occasion of a Metaphor I do not here speak any thing to derogate from the excellency and usefulness of those powers and facultys that God has endued us with in order to discover a rule of action yet I can scarce be perswaded that the mere exercise of reason in those circumstances of time and place before mentioned will do it as clearly and as effectually as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind tho' I do not say that any such digest is thus recorded only some of the primary original and fundamental Laws of Nature or some greater stroaks thereof are originally communicated to the Soul yet in a way suteable to the nature of the things thus communicated and to the nature of the Soul the Subject of ' em But here if I may speak my own private conjecture I think these rational enquirys by the use of our facultys may better serve the designes of truth than they can those of goodness and be more available for the founding of intellectual and notional rather then Moral and practical Principles upon Pa. 75. He says that if it be allow'd that probabilitys may determine our judgments in this matter the doctrine of innate Ideas is rather to be rejected than retain'd But if probabilitys will avail any thing I doubt not but the Doctrine of innate Ideas has its probabilitys too as 1. Since this Doctrine of native Ideas or inscriptions he means the same by both is not matter of mere indifferency but has a very useful influence both upon natural and Reveal'd Religion is it not therefore the more probable to be true And further â—s it probable that the Apostle Ro. 2. 15. would positively and plainly say that this Law of Nature was written upon the hearts of the Gentiles if it really and truly was not â—o 2. Is it probable that God would leave the Gentile World to the guidance of that reason which in their circumstances could not be any tolerable direction to 'em either in the ways of truth or holyness without some other at least more probable means to keep em if possible from sinking too much below themselves 3 d. This is the most that can be said against the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or natural inscription that there is no need they say of having recourse hereunto reason it self sufficiently serving for those purposes without it Now this is such an argument as may perhaps be urg'd with equal force against all the Moral that is no small part of the Gospel for may not nay do not some Men say that there was no need of any such Revelation reason it self they say had done that without it But perhaps it may seem too much a receding from the Divine Authority of Scripture to plead that over again by probabilitys which 't is granted on all hands is favourd by plain expressions of Scripture But Mr. Becconsal in his Chapt. of Parental love and affâ—ction Pa 122. speaking of the lower Order of Creatureâ— says they as well as we must conclude that Parental Love is the effect of some peculiar propension wove in with the Frame and Constitution of our beings and Pa. 126. For a Man to love and cherish his Offspring is certainly the result of an inward Propension Now I do not know that the assertors of Innate Principles do understand any thing more by them then what is here granted 'T is true indeed it follows but the exercise of it from the consideration of the close affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood is a work of reason But is it the less Innate because it is also rational Or may not a Man actually love his Child out of that inward propension so to do thoâ— at the same time he doth not consider that affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood But the ground and reason of the difference betwixt Mr. Becconsal and me in this particular seems to be this Pa. 74. that he thinks the Doctrine of Innate Ideas or practical Principles serves not any real purposes of Religion and I think it does Mr. Lock in his Reply to what I had said concerning Innate Notions imploys the most of his discourse upon that which is least considerable he sâ—irmishes about the outworks but never enters into the
of Sir Charles Woosley's but I must Beg leave to tell him that it it not his busines to answer Arguments unless they be such upon which the Issue and success of our cause depends And here 1 We assert the truth of the History of the Gospel as to matter of fact 2. This suppos'd we say it certainly proves the Divinity of the Doctrine and a Supernatural Revelation contain'd therein Here he must prove the falseness of the one and the in-consequence of the other and what ever he doth less than this it is altogether nothing to his purpose no ways tends to make good his cause Tho' I do not say that he has Answered Sir Charles his Arguments I think he has not but suppose he had Sir Charles never design'd the whole cause should depend upon these two he might urge 'em as further confirmations of the thing he was then about but he did not lay the whole stress of the cause upon ' em I shall make some short remarks upon his Answer to the 2 d. Argument Pa. 206. The Argument is this Propitiation for our Offences must be supernaturally discovered or else we can come upon no certain terms of acceptation with God In answer to this he tells us that all the World who have agreed upon the fault agreed upon the compensation viz. Sorrow and true Repentance and reason dictâ—tes this without revelation I wonder why he should say that all the World is agreed upon this point when all the Christian World differs fâ—om him in it that is tho' they grant that Sorrow for sin and Repenance are necessary conditions in order to our being reconcil'd to God yet they do not exclude but necessarily include the satisfaction of Christ. And whereas he says that Reason dictates this without Revelation I answer that tho' Reason may dictate a natural propensity and inclination in God to pardon and forgiveness yet we cannot come to God upon such certain terms of acceptation as we may do upon the assurance we have by Divine Revelation and that for these two reasons 1. Guilt is naturally full of fears and jealousies but Natural Religion is not so fully suited to answer and take away all these as Christianity is as might easily be made appear 2. Natural reason cannot so fully assure us of the truth and sincerity of our Repentance as it doth or may convince us of the heinousness of our many sins and repeated provocations against God and I think Natural Religion doth not dictate Sorrow and Repentance for sin any further a means of reconciliation with God than as it is sincere But he tells us now that more in all Ages haâ—â— agreed that Lustrations and Sacrifices without repentance were nothing c. Before he had said that all in all Ages were agreed c. Now only more were so But it will be hard here rightly to compute the number of Voices and it is probable it may go against him here too since there is scarce any whole Nation in the Heathen World without Sacrifices and Lustrations by Lustrations I mean whatever is outward and Ceremonial or if there be t is probable they are without Repentance too But he sayes that bare Repentance is a sufficiâ—nt compensation for an Infinite Offence against an Infinite Being is what our Adversarys deny and therefore point us to an Infinite Sacrifice for sin viz. Iesus Christ But we do not point to any other Sacrifice or propitiation for sin than what God himself has pointed them to and that with such clearness and evidence as to matter of fact as is beyond the possibility of their ever proving the contrary and here will return the force of that Argument Which like a dead weight hung about the neck of Deisme will at last â—ink it viz. The necessity they lye under of proving the History of the Gospel and the Doctrine therein contain'd to be false I would willingly assert the necessity of Christs satisfaction as far as possible only not to introduce a fatality into the Divine nature or to destroy the liberty of God's acting herein Therefore I do not well understand what Mr. Norris meanes when he tells us pa. 4. Of his Reason and Faith that the necessity of Christ's satisfaction ought to be grounded on the Essential order and justice of God Was Christ's coming into the World made necessary by any other essential order or justice of God different from his own free good will and love to Mankind That Sin should not go unpunish'd was highly agreeable both to the wisdom and justice of God but yet we should be carefull not to entertain any opinions herein which may seem to lessen the riches and freeness of Divine goodness in sending his Son into the World for Mans Redemption And when we have asserted the truth of Christs satisfaction in offering himself a sacrifice for Sin doth it any way derogate from the glory of God or rather is it not highly agreeable to his manifold wisdom Ephe. 3. 10. Thereby also to accomplish some other subordinate ends of Divine providence such as were yet truly worthy of God to propound and not unworthy of Christ to undertake But he tells us pa. 207. That till all who profess Christianity agree whether Christ be a propitiation or no I need not goe about a further confutation of this Argument But this seemes rather a slight way of shuffling off than Answering the Argument but is it indeed a sufficient Answer to any Doctrinal point to say that all who profess the same Religion are not agreed in that particular I may then tell this Gentleman who asserts Repentance only a sufficient propitiation for Sin against God that till all who profess Deisme agree in this particular I need not go about any further refutation of it For the Author of the summary account of the Deists Religion pa. 89. Tells us that some thing further besides repentance viz. Obedience for the future ending in an assimilation to God is required in order to the reinstating a Man after Sin in God's favour The Socinians indeed will not allow Christ in a strict and proper sence to be a Sacrifice or propitiation for Sin But will it therefore follow that it is not a truth because these Men deny it If what Limborch says pa. 108. Of his Amica Collatio cum Iudaeo Speaking of the two Natures in Christ be true Ad huc non credunt Sociniani satis sunt Christiani If Socinians be Christians enough than there is very little required of a Man in reference to his Credenda To make him a Christian. What remains is either much what the same with what has been already conâ—idered before or something which seems his own peculiar way of arguing against himself that so he might return the more easy Answers But I am afraid I have already tired my Reader in prosecuting these little things I cannot in justice or Charity suppose these Gentlemen such Deisis as border more immediately upon
we know all things for that intellectual Light which is in us is nothing else but a participated similitude of that increated Light in which the eternal Reasons are contain'd Now I do not see that this is any acknowledgment at all of our seeing all things in God in that way that Monsieur Malbranch and Mr. Norris explains it that the Soul knows all things that is universals wherin Aristot. did aâ—sert all Science truly so call'd to consist these things we know in their eternal Reasons but he adds by the participiation of which we know all things so that we do not see them under that formality as they arâ— in God but as by participiation these eternal Reasons are deriv'd to us for that intâ—llâ—ctual Light that is in us is nothing but a participated similitude of that inâ—reased Light in which the eternal Reasons are â—ontain'd that is originally in God but derivatively or by way oâ— participation in us so that I am perfectly of Aquinas's Opinion according to this Interpretation which whether it be more true in it sâ—lf or more â—ikely to be Aquinâ—s's mâ—aning is lâ—ft to the Reader to judge But if this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch be a truth it has the least appâ—arance of Truth of any in the whole World all our outward Sâ—nsâ—s give Tâ—stimony against it and our inward faculties do not in the least seem to favour it we compare Ideasâ— and disâ—ourse and draw consâ—quences from â—ormer Prâ—mâ—sâ—s just acâ—ording to the mâ—thoâ—s of the other Hypothesis but if it be said that after the use of all these means that notwithstanding we see and know all things in God one might be almost perswaded to think that either God would have made these means under the superintendence of his own Providence effectual to those ends they seem at least design'd for or else to use his own way of arguing would have made use of that more easie and simple way which he might have done by exhibiting or producing the knowledge of these thingâ— more immediately by himself without the concurrence of these outward means which are indeed nothing but useless and ineffectual Conditions Lastly As for the Scriptures he urges in favour of his Opinion I think they do not prove what they were intended for that all our knowledge is from God that he is the Father of Lights and teaâ—hes Man Wisdom that Christ is the true Light that enlightens every one â— c. No Body here denys this but the dispute is not so much about the thing it self as the manner of it that is whether all the Knowledge we arrive at here in this World be only by seeing all things in God accâ—râ—ing to his Hypothesis Monsieur Mâ—lbranch thought perhaâ—s it woulâ— be some â—dvantage to his câ—usâ— if he coulâ— procure it some countâ—nance frâ—m Scripture but when his quotations are so little to the purpose they serve only to create prejudices against it tâ—us others are apt to believe there is but little strength in the cause when Men are forâ—'d to use such inconclusive Arguments in the defence of it Norâ— do I think that those brought by Mr. Norris amount to any necessary Proof St. Iohn he says calls Christ the true Light that is the only Light but may not oâ—her subordinate Lights be also true Lights Is not the light of a Candle a true Light tho' it be inferiour to that of the Sun But however it will not hence follow but that this only true Light may have several ways and methods of giving light to the World besides that of seeing all things in God c. He cites also Io. 17. 17. Sanctifie them by thy Truth thy word is Truth which is not he says meant of the written word but of the substantial and eternal word as appears from the Context but I do not see how any Argument can be drawn from that place unless it be from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which yet doth not always signifie the substantial and eternal word of God but sometimes the preaching of the Gospel as appears from the 20th Verse for all those who shall believe in me through thâ—â—r word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by tâ—e prâ—acâ—iâ—g of the Gospel Laâ—â—ly The Apostle says exprâ—sly 1 Cor. 1. 30. of this divine Word that he is made unto us Wisdom which is exactly according to our Hypothesis that we see all things in the ideal World or divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pa. 222. of Reason and Religion but in answer to this 1. By Wisdom is not here meant natural but divine and evangelical Wisdom 2. The Apostle there speaks of Christ Jesus of Christ more especially as he is made known to us by the Gospel for he is there said to be made to us Righteousness Sanctification and Redemption as well as Wisdom but I suppose he will not say that we see our Sanctification or Redemption that is the ways and methods of these in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or â—deal World or any other ways than as they are reveal'd to us in Scripture 3. May not Christ be made to us Wisdom unless we see all things in the Ideal World I shall here only further observe what Theophylact says upon this place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. non dixit sapienâ—es nos fecit sed factus est nobis sapientia doni largitatem sc. ostendens perinde ac si dicat seipsum nobis tradidit I have now finish'd those short Remarks upon those two Subjects viz. the law of Fashion and innate Notions not only in answer to Mr. Lock but to some other Learned Persons also who seem to favour his Opinion in the second particular and now if any expression herein seems too harsh or not becoming the Character of such great and learned Men though I hope there is not yet if there be any such I do hereby wholly recall it I hope we are all pursuing the same general design viz. the search of Truth and if so then the detection of any error will but be the promoting of the same common end we all aim at for my part I shall think it so as to my self I would not have Mr. Lock think that pa. 88. I do there in the least insinuate that he held the materiality of God or that I went about to draw him into a Controversie wherâ—in he is nothing concern'd I do freely grant that he asserts the spirituality of the divine Essence in the most strict and proper Sense of it I was once in hopes that he was convinc'd of the Certainty of the Souls Immateriality too by what he said pa. 5th of his Answer to some remarks added to his reply to the Learned Bishop of Worcester but what his Opinion herein is at present I know not I shall here only propound these two things to Mr. Locks serious Consideration 1. Whether asserting the immateriality of the Soul be not a good Fence or stop against the inlet of that dangerous Opinion of the materiality of the diviâ—e Essence 2. Whether it be worthy of a Christian Philosopher to make a bâ—re poâ—â—â—biliâ—y the ground of his asserting things of this Nature for I think he is vâ—ry unfortunâ—â—e in his choice who happens upon sâ—câ—â—n Opinion in Philosophy that it is not poâ—â—â—ble for Omnipotence to make good I shall not here enter into that dispute whether Tully held the Soul to be material or immaterial yet this I think must be granted by all who attentively read and impartially consider his 1st Tusculan Question that whatever nature he held the Soul to be of he makes God to be the same But it is not so much to the purpose to consider what Opinions the Heathen Philosophers entertain'd in things of this Nature as what is worthy of a Christian Philosopher to think of ' em FINIS ERRATA PAge 5 Line the last for hunc read huic p. 12 Line 7 for appeâ—l r. appeal'd p. 15 l. 2. for watsoevâ—r r. whatsoever p. 20 l. 19 for concidere r. coincidere p. 24. l. 13 for quit r. quote p. 27 r. misled p. 38 l 15 for the r. that p. 39 l 18 for mâ—asurer r. measure p. 41 placâ— the Figure 199 200 l. 22 in the l. â—bove 21 p. 4 last line r. prevailing p 45 l 22 reâ—d Mâ—n's p. 48 l. 19 r. prâ—cede p. 54 l. 1 r. sepaâ—ation p. 62 l. 25 for moral r. natural p. 65. l. 4 r. God l. 17 r benignity p. 69 l. 13 r. convenient p. 72 l. 2 r. defendi possint p. 77 l 13 r. hankering p. 85 l 18 dele the second not p. 88. l 13 â—or made use of r. câ—â—ryed on p. 8 l. 27 dele the first And p. â—0 l 7 r â—pâ—curuâ—'â— p. â—5 l. 14 after those add to p. 98 l. 1â— r. other p. â—14 l. 6 r. assert p 116 l. 22 r. ingenuouâ— p 134 l. the last r. externâ—l p. 139 l. 5 r. as p. 140 l. the last r. virtutum p. 141 l. 14 dele much p. 154 l. 12 r. inveâ—tigatio p. 158 l 10 r. very p. 160 l 24 r. ante diluvian