exposed alter some of their Parts and some Worms Feed upon them as Experience has shew'd There is no other difference between those Bodies that are very hard and dry and others unless it be that they are compos'd of very gross and solid Parts and consequently less capable of being agitated and separated one from another by the Motion of those that hit against them for which reason they are looked upon as Incorruptible Nevertheless they are not so by their Nature as Time Experience and Reason sufficiently shew us But as for the Heavens they are Compos'd of the most Fluid and subtle Matter and particularly the Sun And he is so far from being void of Heat and Incorruptible as Aristotle's followers say that on the contrary he is the hottest of all Bodies and the most liable to Change It is he that Heats Moves and Changes all things For it is he who produces by his Action which is nothing but his Heat or the Motion of his Parts all the Novelties we see in the Change of Seasons Reason demonstrates these things But though some may contradict Reason yet no Body can resist Experience For since some have discovered in the Sun by means of Telescopes Spots as large as the whole Earth which have been form'd in it and have been dissipated in a little time It is no longer to be deny'd but that he is more subject to Change than the Earth we inhabit All Bodies are therefore in a continual Motion and Change and particularly those that are the most Fluid as Fire Air and Water next the parts of Living Bodies as Flesh and even the Bones and lastly those that are the most solid The Mind ought not to suppose a kind of Immutability in things because it sees no Corruption or Alteration in them for it is not a proof that a thing is always like unto it self because no difference is observ'd in it or that things are not because we have no Idea or Knowledge of them CHAP. XI Examples of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle THe Faculty of the Mind imagining and supposing Resemblances where-ever it perceives no Visible Differences also engages most Men into Errors which are yet more dangerous in Points of Morality Here are some Examples of them A French Man meets an English Man or an Italian That Stranger has peculiar Humours He has a Niceness of Mind or if you please he is Haughty and Troublesome This will at first induce this French-man to Judge that all English-men or Italians have the same Character of Mind with the Person they have convers'd with He will Praise or Blame them all in General And if he meets with any other he will fancy at first that he is like unto him he has already seen and therefore will suffer himself to be inclin'd to some Affection or secret Aversion towards him In a word he will Judge of all the Individuals of those Nations by this famous proof that he has seen one or many that had certain Qualifications of Mind Because he knew not whether the rest were different supposing them all alike A Religious of some Order commits a fault This is a sufficient Reason for those who know it to Condemn all the Individuals of that Order indifferently They all wear the same Habit and have the same Name they are alike in that This is enough for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy that they are all alike They suppose that they are all alike because not being able to search into their Hearts they cannot see positively whether they differ Calumuiators who study how to Blast the Reputation of their Enemies commonly make use of this and Experience teaches us that it succeeds for the most part And indeed it is very suitable to the Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind For it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities though never so Holy some irregular Persons or such as have Ill Sentiments since in the Company of the Apostles of which Jesus Christ himself was the Head there was a Thief a Traitor an Hypocrite in a word a Judas The Jews without doubt would have been very much to blame to pass an Ill Judgment against the most Holy Society that ever was because of the Avarice and Fault of Judas and if they had Condemned them all in their Hearts because they suffered that Ill Man among them and Jesus Christ himself did not punish him though he was sensible of his Crimes Therefore it is a manifest Fault against Reason and Breach of Charity to pretend That a Community is in some Error because some of their Members were so although the Heads should dissemble it or were the promoters of it themselves It is true that when all the Members will defend an Error or Fault of their Brother the whole Community may be thought Guilty but that seldom or never happens for it seems morally impossible that all the Members of an Order should have the same Sentiments Men therefore should never conclude thus from Particulars to Generals but they cannot Judge simply of what they see they always fly out into Excess A Religious of such an Order is a Great Man an Honest Man they conclude that all the Order is composed of Great Men of Good Men. Likewise a Religious of an Order has Ill Sentiments Therefore all that Order is Corrupted and has Ill Sentiments But these last Judgments are far more dangerous than the first because it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neighbours and the Malignity of Man occasions that Ill Judgments and Discourses held against the Reputation of others make a stronger Impression upon the Mind than advantageous Judgments and Discourses do When a Worldly Man who iudulges his Passions fixes strongly upon his Opinion and pretends in the heighth of his Inclination that he is in the right to indulge it Men Judge reasonably that he is obstinate and he owns it himself as soon as his Passion is over So when a Pious Person who is perswaded of what he says and who has discover'd the Truth of Religion and the Vanity of Worldly Things endeavours according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices of others and reprehends them with some Zeal Men of the World also take him to be an obstinate Man and therefore they conclude that Devout Men are obstinate They Judge moreover that Good Men are far more obstinate than Vain Ill Men because the latter only defending their Ill Opinions according to the different Motions of the Blood and Passions they cannot continue long in their Sentiments They come to themselves again Whereas persons of Piety remain steddy because their Foundation is unalterable and does not depend on a thing so inconstant as the Circulation of the Blood Therefore ordinary Men conclude that Pious Men are obstinate as well as the Vicious Because they are as Passionate for Truth and Virtue as Ill Men are for Vice and Falshood Both speak almost in the same
Philosophers who are obliged by all manner of reasons to enquire into and to defend Truth to speak without knowing what they say and to be satisfy'd with what they do not understand CHAP. III. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate it III. Explanation of the first of these Rules AS long as Men have an Inclination for a Good which surpasses their Power I. Curiosity is natural and necessary and do not possess it they will have a secret propension for whatever looks new and extraordinary They will ever run after such things as they have not as yet considered in hopes of finding what they enquire after and their Mind not being able to satisfie it self wholly without the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made they will ever remain uneasie and in a continual Agitation until it appears to them in its Glory This disposition of Human Minds is certainly very suitable to their Condition for it is infinitely better to be uneasie and in search of the Happiness one does not possess than to remain in a false Repose and to be pleas'd with falshood and a delusive Happiness wherewith Men are commonly deluded We ought to have a sense of Truth and of our Happiness Therefore those Things that are new and extraordinary must excite us There is a certain kind of Curiosity which is not only allowable but absolutely necessary for whereas common and ordinary things can never afford true Felicity and the ancient Opinions of Philosophers are very uncertain It is necessary we should be curious for New Discoveries and always uneasie in the Enjoyment of common Felicities Should a Geometrician give us New Propositions contrary to those of Euclide Should he undertake to prove that that Science is full of Errors as Hobbs endeavour'd to do in a Book written against the Pride of Geometricians I own that there would be no reason to complain of that kind of Novelty because that when we have found out the Truth we ought to stick to it since we are only endu'd with Curiosity in order to find it out Neither are Geometricians often guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geometry They would soon be tir'd with a Book containing nothing but Propositions contrary to those of Euclide for being fully convinc'd of the Truth of those Propositions by unanswerable Demonstrations our Curiosity ceases in that Point Which is an infallible Argument that the only reason of the Inclination of Men after Novelty is because they do not evidently see the Truth of those things they naturally desire to know nor possess Infinite Felicity which they are naturally desirous to possess Therefore it is necessary that Novelty should Excite Men and that they should Love it But however II. Three Rules to moderate Curiosity there are Exceptions to be made and they must observe certain Rules which it is easie to infer from what we have been saying that the Inclination we have for Novelty is only given us in order to seek out Truth and our real Felicity There are Three the first of which is That Men must not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith which are not submitted to Reason The Second That Novelty is not a sufficient Reason to induce us to believe that things are Good or True That is We must not fancy that Opinions are true because they are new nor that any thing can be capable to content us because it is new or extraordinary or because we have not possess'd it before The Third That when we are satisfy'd that Truths are so conceal'd that it is morally impossible to discover them and that Benefits are so little and so inconsiderable that they cannot satisfie us we must not suffer our selves to be excited by the Novelty of them nor to be seduc'd by false hopes But it is necessary to explain these Rules more at large and shew how by a neglect of 'em we fall into an infinite number of Errors We often meet with Minds of very different Humours II. Particular explanation of the first of those Rules Some believe every thing blindly Others will never believe without seeing evidently The first having hardly ever made any use of their Understanding do without considering believe whatever is said to them the others who will trust to nothing but their Understanding indifferently condemn all sorts of Authorities The first are commonly stupid and weak Persons like Children and Women the others are proud and profane Dispositions like Hereticks and Philosophers It is very difficult to find Persons who keep a Medium between those two Extreams and who never look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through a vain Agitation of Mind or who sometimes believe false Opinions without Evidence in things relating to Nature through an indiscreet Deference and low Submission of Mind If they are Persons of Piety who submit to the Authority of the Church in all things their Faith extends sometimes if I may use the Expression even to Opinions that are meerly Philosophical and they often look upon them with the same Respect as is only due to the Truths of Religion A false Zeal makes them too easily condemn those that are not of their Opinion They harbour injurious Suspicions against those that make New Discoveries It is sufficient to be esteem'd by them as Libertines to deny that there are substantial Forms that Animals are sensible of Pain and Pleasure and other Philosophical Opinions which they look upon as Truth without any evident Reason only because they imagin there are necessary Relations between those Opinions and the Truths of Faith But if they are Persons that are too bold their Pride induces them to despise the Authority of the Church they never submit willingly to it They delight in difficult rash Opinions They affect to pass for mighty Wits and upon that account they speak of Divine Mysteries without Respect and with a kind of Haughtiness They despise all as Credulous who speak modestly of certain receiv'd Opinions Finally they are very much inclin'd to doubt of every thing and are directly oppos'd to those who are too easily inclin'd to submit to the Authority of Men. It is obvious that these two Extreams are bad and those who will not admit Evidence in Natural Questions are blameable as well as those who would have Evidence in Mysteries of Faith But yet those who Expose themselves to be mistaken in Philosophical Questions in being too Credulous are without doubt more excusable than the others who run the hazard of falling into some Heresie or other in doubting Rashly For it is less dangerous to fall into a World of Errors in Philosophy for want of examining them than to fall into one Heresie for want of submitting with Humility to the Authority of the Church The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence and is in continual Agitation when it finds none Because Evidence is the Character of Truth Thus the Error of
things which are absolutely necessary to be known to have some Justness and Penetration of Mind And we may say That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infinitely above Matter because he knows that he is which Matter does not know those who know Man are far above Stupid Ignorant Persons by reason that they know what they are which the others do not know But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable because it raises us above others it is much more so because it humbles us before God That Knowledge makes us perfectly Sensible of the Dependence we have on him in all things and even in our most common Actions It plainly discovers the Corruption of our Nature It disposes us to apply our selves to him who alone can cure us to rely wholly on him and not to trust or rely on our selves And thus it gives many Dispositions of Mind which are very proper to submit our selves to the Grace of the Gospel We ought at least to have a Superficial Tincture and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks and of Nature We ought to learn those Sciences in our Youth they disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and hinder it from becoming Weak and Effeminate They are useful enough in Life they incline us towards God the Knowledge of Nature does it of it self and that of the Mathematicks by the Disgust it Inspires in us of the False Impressions of our Senses Virtuous Persons must not despise those Sciences nor look upon them as Uncertain and Useless unless they are certain that they have studied them enough to judge Solidly of them There are many others which they may boldly Despise Let them Condemn the Poets to the Flames Heathen Philosophers Rabbies some Historians and a great Number of Authors which make the Pride and Knowledge of some of the Learned we shall be little troubled at it But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature as being contrary to Religion since Nature being regulated by the Will of God the true Knowledge of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power Grandeur and Wisdom of God For it seems that God has form'd the Universe in order that we should Study it and that by that Study we should learn to Know and to Respect the Author of it So that those who Condemn the Study of Nature seem to oppose the Will of God unless they pretend that Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study It is also Vain for them to tell us That the Knowledge of Men only serves to make them Proud and Vain because those who have the Reputation of having a perfect Knowledge of Man though they often know him Ill are commonly Intolerably Proud For it is evident That no Man can know himself well without being Sensible of his Weakness and Miseries Neither are they Persons of a real and solid Piety that usually condemn what they do not understand III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites but rather Superstitious and Hypocrites The Superstitious out of a servile Fear and through a baseness and weakness of Mind are startled at the sight of a lively penetrating Wit Do but for Example give them Natural Reasons for Thunder and for its Effects and they look upon you strait as an Atheist But the Hypocrites out of a Hellish Malice transform themselves into Angels of Light They make use of the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd by all the World to oppose Truths which are but little known and little valu'd out of private Interest They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth and often in their Hearts Laugh at what all the World Respects they establish in the Opinion of Men a Reputation which is so much the more solid and to be fear'd as the thing they abuse is the more Sacred Therefore those Persons are the strongest and most formidable Enemies of Truth Indeed they are pretty rare but a small number of them is capable of doing a great deal of harm The appearance of Truth and of Virtue often does more mischief than Truth and Virtue do good for one cunning Hypocrite is capable to overthrow what several truly Wise and Virtuous Persons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain and Labour Monsieur Descartes for instance has demonstratively prov'd the Existence of a God the Immortality of our Souls several other Metaphysical Questions a great number of Physical Ones and this Age is infinitely oblig'd to him for the Truths he has discover'd Yet here starts up an * Voetius inconsiderable Man a hot and vehement Exclaimer respected by some People for the Zeal he expresses for their Religion He Writes Injurious Books against him and accuses him of the highest Crimes Descartes is a Catholick he has studied under the Jesuits he has often mention'd them with Reverence That is sufficient for that malicious Man to perswade People that are Enemies to our Religion and easily mov'd in matters so Nice as those of Religion that he is an Emissary of the Jesuits and has dangerous Designs Because the least appearances of Truth upon matters of Faith have more Force upon Peoples Minds than real and effective Truths of Physical or Meraphysical things have which are little valu'd Monsieur Descartes has written about the Existence of God That is matter enough for that Calumniator to exercise his false Zeal upon and to oppose all the Truths his Enemy defends He accuses him of being an Atheist and of teaching Atheism cunningly and secretly like that infamous Atheist call'd Vanino who was Burnt at Thoulouse who Cloak'd his Malice and Impiety by Writing for the Existence of a God for one of the Reasons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy an Atheist is That he did Write against Atheists as Vanino did in order to cover his Impiety Thus it is easie for a Man to oppress Truth when he is seconded by the appearances of Truth and has acquir'd a great Ascendent over weak Minds Truth delights in Mildness and in Peace and as strong as it is it yields sometimes to the Pride and Haughtiness of Falshoods which Dresses and Arms it self with her Appearances Truth is very sensible that Error can never harm it and if it remains sometimes as if it were prescrib'd and in Obscurity it is only to wait for more favourable occasions to show its self for at last it appears for the most part stronger and brighter than ever in the very place where it is oppress'd I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monsieur Descartes that a Man of a different Religion from his that an Ambitious Man who design'd to rise upon the Ruins of Persons that are above him that a Railer without Judgment that Voetius should speak with Contempt of what he neither did nor could understand But I am surpris'd to find that Persons who are neither Enemies to Monsieur Descartes nor to his Religion should entertain Sentiments of Aversion and Contempt against him upon the account of the Calumnies
in almost all parts of the World and that on the Contrary we may boldly say of the other that he hath penetrated into that which appeared most obscure in the Eyes of Men and hath shew'd 'em a sure way to dâ—â—cover all Truths that a limited Understanding can comprehend But without relying on the Opinion that we may have of these two Philosophers and of all others let us still look upon 'em as Men and let not the Aristotelians be displeased if after having walk'd so many Ages in Darkness without being able to make any further Advancement we are willing to see with our own Eyes and if after having been led like blind Men we now remember that we have Eyes and essay to Conduct our selves Let us then be fully convinc'd of this Rule Never to give an entire assent but to things that are evident This is the most necessary of all Rules in a Search after Truth and let us not admit any thing into our Minds as Truth but what appears with the Evidence that this Rule demands We must be persuaded thereof to lay by our Prejudices and it 's absolutely necessary that we be deliver'd from our Prepossessions to enter into the Knowledge of Truth because the Mind must be Purified before it can be Enlighten'd Sapientia prima est Stulitia caruisse But before we finish this Chapter II. Remarks upon what has been said about the necessity of Evidence we must Remark Three Things The first is that I speak not here of Matters of Faith which admit not the same Evidence as Natural Sciences do because we cannot perceive things but by the Idea's which we have of them for God hath only given us those Idea's which are necessary to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things according to which we are created so that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order we must not be surpriz'd if we have not the same Idea's of them for our Souls are created by Virtue of a General Decree by which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us See the Explanations But the Mysteries of Faith have been establish'd only by the Order of Grace which according to our Ordinary way of Conception is a Decree consequent to that Order of Nature We ought then to distinguish the Mysteries of Faith from Natural Things We must equally submit to Faith and Evidence but in Matters of Faith we must not look for such Evidence as is in Natural Things we must not rely upon the Faith that is upon the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be Faithful we must believe things not comprehended by Reason but to be Philosophers we must take nothing upon Trust 'T is universally agreed upon that there are other Truths besides those of Faith in which it would be unjust to demand incontestible Demonstrations such for Instance as relate to History and other things depending upon Mans Will For there are two sorts of Truth Necessary and Contingent I call them Necessary Truths that are Immutable in their Nature and have been Decreed by the unchangeable Will of God all others are Contingent Truths Mathematicks Physicks Metaphysicks and even a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths History Grammar particular Laws or Customs and many other things which depend upon the uncertain Will of Man include only Contingent Truths 'T is requir'd then that the Rule which I have before establish'd be exactly observed in a Search after Necessary Truths whose Knowledge may be call'd Science and we must content our selves with the greatest probability of Truth in History which contains the Knowledge of Contingent Things for one may generally call by the name of History the Knowledge of Languages Customs and even that of the Different Opinions of Philosophers when they are only learn'd by Memory without having had any Evidence or Certainty of them The second Thing to be Remark'd is that in Morals Politicks Medicine and in all Practical Sciences we are oblig'd to content our selves with Probabilities not always but for a time not because it satisfies the Mind but because there is a necessity for it and because if we should defer acting till we were fully assur'd of success we should often loose the opportunity But though there 's a necessity of our Acting yet we should doubtfully rely upon the event of these things we execute and endeavour to make such a progress in these Sciences as that we may in our Affairs act with more certainty for this ought to be the ordinary end of the Study and Employ of all Thinking Men. In fine the third Observation is that we must not absolutely despise Probabilities because it ordinarily happens that many of 'em being join'd together can as strongly convince us as the most evident Demonstrations Of this there are infinite Examples in Physick and Morality So that oftentimes 't is of use to collect a sufficient number of them for Matters which can't be otherwise demonstrated I must confess here that the Rule which I have impos'd is very rigorous that many would rather desire not to Reason at all than to Reason upon these Conditions that they will not move very fast under such Incommodious Circumspections yet they must agree with me that they should proceed surely in following this Rule and that hitherto for having made too much haste they have been oblig'd to turn back again and even a great many Men will agree with me that since Monsteur Descartes hath discover'd more Truths in thirty years than all other Philosophers because he submitted to this Law therefore if many Men would Philosophize as he did they might in time know the greatest part of those things which are necessary for as happy a Life as can be had upon an Earth which God hath Cursed CHAP. IV. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error and that of these there are Five Principal ones II. The General Design of the Whole Work and the Particular Design of the First Book WE have seen that Men are only deceiv'd because they make not that use of their Liberty which they ought to do and because they do not moderate the haste and eagerness of the Will for bare appearances of Truth that Error consists only in a Consent of the Will which is more capacious than the Perception of the Understanding since Men would not be deceiv'd if they only judg'd of what they understand But though properly speaking 't is only an ill Use of Liberty which is the Cause of Error yet it may be said that we have many Faculties which are also the Causes thereof not true Causes but such as may be call'd Occasional ones I. Of the Occasional Causes of these there are Five principal ones All our Modes of Perceiving are so many Occasions of Deceiving us for since our false Judgments include two things the Consent of the Will and the Perception of the Understanding it is very evident that all our Modes of Perception may
Animals were perhaps Created with all those of the same Species which they have and shall Engender to the end of the World We might carry this Thought yet farther and possibly with much Reason and Truth but we think it not safe to search too deep into the Works of God which are altogether infinite not only our Senses and Imagination are limited in their Comprehension but also the pure Mind wholly disengag'd from Matter is too gross and feeble to penetrate into the least of his Works 't is lost and dissipated dazled and affrighted at the sight of what we call an Atome according to the Language of the Senses but the pure Mind has always this advantage above the Imagination and Senses that it knows its own weakness and the greatness of God that it perceives the infinity in which it is lost whereas our Imagination and Senses debase the Works of God and raise in us a foolish Considence which blindly precipitates us into Error Our Eyes beget in us no Idea of all these things that we discover by Microscopes or by Reason we see no less a Body with our Eyes than a Worm in the Skin or a Mite the half of which is nothing if compar'd with our selves A Mite is but as a Mathematick Point in respect of us it cannot be divided but it must be anniâ—â—â—lated Our Sight then does not represent Extension to us as it is in it self but according to what it is in proportion to our Body and because the half of a Mite bears no proportion to our Body and can neither profit nor injure it therefore we can't see it But if our Eyes were made as Microscopes or rather if they were as small as those of Hand-worms or Mites we should judge otherwise of the magnitude of Bodies for without doubt these little Animals have Eyes qualified to see all that is about them as also their own Body in a much larger proportion than we see it if not they would not receive those impressions that are necessary for the preservation of themselves and then their Eyes would be wholly useless To explain these things thoroughly we must consider that our own Eyes are indeed nothing else but Natural Spectacles that their Humours produce the same Effect as the Glasses in Spectacles and that according to the Figure of the Chrystaline Humour and its distance from the Retina we see Objects very differently insomuch that we are certain there are not two Men in the World who see things in the same bigness unless their Eyes were in all respects alike This is a Proposition that must be received by all those that study Opticks viz. That Equidistant Objects appear so much the greater by how much the Image of them is painted greater in the inward part of the Eye Now 't is certain that those Eyes whose Crystaline Humour is more Convex have lesser Images depaiâ—ted in 'em in proportion to their Convexity Those then who are the nearest sighted having the Chrystaline Humour more Convex see Objects in a lesser proportion than old Men who have occasion for Spectacles in Reading or those who have common Convexity and see very well at a distance All these things are easily demonstrated Geometrically and if they were not commonly known we should insist the longer upon them but because many have treated upon these Matters those that would be better inform'd are desir'd to consult Authors upon it Since 't is certain that there are not two Men in the World who see Objects in the same bigness and that commonly the * See the Journal des Scavans du Mois de Janvier 1969. same Person sees the same things greater with one Eye than another 't is plain that we are not to trust to the proportion of things which our Eyes represent to us we must rather consult our Reason which proves that we cannot determine the absolute bigness of Bodies that are about us nor what Idea we ought to have of the Extension of a Foot Square or of that of our own Body so as that this Idea should truly represent it to us for Reason tells us that the least of all Bodies consider'd in it self would not be little since it is compos'd of an infinite number of parts out of every one of which God could form a World which would be but as a Point in respect of all the rest joined together Thus the Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great enough to comprehend the least Extension in the World since it is limited but the Idea of Matter is infinite It is true the Mind can very near apprehend the proportions that are betwixt these Infinites whereof the World is Compos'd that one for Instance is the double of another that a * A French Measure Toise contains 6 Feet yet we cannot form an Idea that represents what these things are in themselves We 'll suppose that the Mind is susceptible of those Idea's which are equal to or which measure the Extension of Bodies that we see for it would be very difficult to perswade Men to the contrary Let us examine then what may be concluded from this Supposition This doubtless that God does not deceive us that he has not given us Eyes like Convex Glasses to enlarge or diminish Objects therefore we must believe that our Eyes represents things as they are It is true God never deceives us but we often deceive our selves in judging of things with too much precipitation for we often judge that Objects whereof we have Idea's do exist and that they perfectly resemble our Idea's yet it frequently happens that the Objects are either unlike our Idea's or else have no Existence at all so that if we have an Idea of any thing it does not follow from thence that such a thing exists much less that it should wholly resemble the Idea we have of it for altho' God produces in us such a sensible Idea of Magnitude when a Toise is before our Eyes it follows not from thence that this Toise hath only the Extension which by this Idea is represented to us For first all Men have not the Sensible Idea of this Toise since all have not their Eyes dispos'd after the same manner Secondly even the same Person has not the same Sensible Idea thereof when it is seen with one Eye and then with the other as we Instanc'd before Lastly it often happens that the same Person hath very different Idea's of the same Objects at different times according as he believes them to be nearer or farther off him which shall be elsewhere Explain'd 'T is then an unreasonable Prejudice to believe that we see Bodies according in their just bigness for our Eyes being only given us for the Preservation of our Body they very well discharge their Office when they cause those Idea's of Objects in us that are proportionate to the bigness of it But that we may the better comprehend how we ought to Judge of the
distinguishes it from Admiration from Desire and Love from a Square a Circle and Motion in fine he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels Now if he had no knowledge of Pain I wou'd fain know how he can have any certainty that what he feels is none of these things We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel when we see Colours or when we have any other Sensation and even 't is most certain that if we knew it not we cou'd know no sensible Object for 't is evident we cou'd not distinguish Water from Wine if we did not know that the Sensations we have of one of them is different from those we have of the other and so of all things we know by our Senses It is true that if I was pressed and required to explain what Pain Pleasure and Colour is c. I cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words but it follows not from thence that if I see Colour or burn my self I do not know at least after some manner what I actually feel Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words as all other things are is III. Objection and Answer because it depends upon the Will of Man to affix the Idea's of Things to such Names as they please they may call Heaven Ouranos Schamajim c. as the Greeks and Hebrews did but even those Men cannot at their pleasure affix their Sensations to Words or even to any other thing they see not Colours altho' they speak of them if they open not their Eyes They relish not Tastes if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain In a word Sensations depend not upon Mans Will and it is only he who hath made them that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Modifications of the Soul and those of the Body so that if any one shou'd desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour I cannot find Words for that but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses the Motions to which Nature unites these Sensations I must take him to the Fire and show him some Pictures This is the Reason why 't is impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red Green Yellow c. For since we cannot make our selves be understood when he that hears us has not the same Idea's as we that speak It is manifest that Colours not being united to the sound of Words or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear but to that of the Optic Nerve they cannot be represented to the Blind since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations let us now see from whence it is that we seek yet to know them and believe our selves ignorant thereof this is without doubt the reason The Soul IV. Why it is we imagine we do not know our own Sensations since Original Sin is become as it were Corporeal by its inclination its love for Sensible Things continually diminishes the Union or Relation that it hath to Intelligible Things It is with great disgust that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it and it immediately ceases to consider them It does all that is in its power to produce some Images in its Brain which represent them and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy that it even thinks it cannot know what it cannot imagine Yet there are many things which not being Corporeal cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images as our Soul with all its Modifications But when our Soul wou'd represent to it self its own Nature and Sensations it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof It seeks it self in all Corporeal Beings and takes it self sometimes for one and sometimes for another one while for Air and then again for Fire or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body Thus being willing to find it self amongst Bodies and imagining its own Modifications which are its Sensations to be the Modifications of Bodies we must not wonder if it Errs and is intirely Ignorant of it self What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations is that it Judges them to be in the Objects and that they are even Modifications thereof and consequently that 't is something Corporeal and which can be Imagin'd It Judges therefore that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them or in some other Modification of a Body but when it finds that which is different from what it feels which is neither Corporeal nor can be represented by Corporeal Images this embarasses it and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations As for those who do not make these vain Efforts See the Explanations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part l. 3. to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations they must consider that neither the Soul or its Modifications are to be known by the Idea's taking the word Idea in its true sense as I have determin'd and explain'd it in the Third Book but only by an inward Sensation So that when they desire the Soul and its Sensations to be explain'd by some Idea's they require what is impossible for all Mankind to give them since Man cannot Instruct us in giving us Idea's of Things but only in making us reflect upon those we already have The second Error we are subject to in respect to our Sensations is our attributing them to Objects as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters The third is V. That we dâ—ceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sâ—nsations of the same Objects our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects For Example we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky takes it to be Blue and the Fields to be Green and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses Many persons will wonder that I shou'd bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable yet I dare affirm they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the manner they have done and altho' I cannot Mathematically demonstrate to them that they are deceived yet I can demonstrate 't is by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived Nay I have sufficient Reasons to be assur'd that they certainly are in an Error To know the Truth of what I advance we must remember what I have already proved viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations and the causes of them for from thence we may Judge that its possible absolutely speaking
receive from the Knowledge of Probabilities which are very agreeable and very sensible because they are built upon Taking Notions In the fifth place that foolish Vanity which makes us covet to be esteem'd Learned For we call those Learned who have Read most The knowledge of Opinions is of more use in Conversation and to be able to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort than the knowledge of true Philosophy which is attain'd by Meditation In the sixth place because Men without any Reason imagine that the Ancients were more enlightened than we can be and that there is nothing farther for us to Search after but what they have already been successful in finding out In the seventh place a certain false Respect intermix'd with foolish Curiosity causes us more to admire Things that are most remote the most ancient and that come from Countreys unknown and even the most obscure Books Clarus ob obscuram Linguam Lueres Thus was Heraclitus heretofore admir'd for his Obscurity Men enquire for old Medals though all defac'd with Rust and preserve as the Apple of their Eye the Lanthorn or Slipper of some ancient Philosophers though almost eaten up with Worms their Antiquity enhaunces their Price Some apply themselves to Read the Rabbies because they wrote in a strange Language very corrupt and very obscure Men have a high Esteem for Ancient Opinions because Time has remov'd 'em at a great distance from us And doubtless had Nimrod wrote the History of his own Reign all the most refin'd Politicks all the Sciences had been contain'd in it even as there are some who discover that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the Secrets of Nature Antiquity is to be respected they crie How could Aristotle Plato Epicurus those Great Men be deceiv'd They never consider that Aristotle Plato and Epicurus were Men as we are and of the same Mould and Shape and that now the World is grown Two thousand years older Veritas filia temporis non autheritatis that it has more Experience that it ought to be more enlighten'd and that it is the Age of the World and Experience that enable us to discover the Truth In the Eighth place because that when a new Opinion or an Author of the time is cried up it seems that their Fame ecclipses ours because it shines too near it but they are afraid of no such Injury from the Honour which they pay the Ancients In the Ninth place because Truth and Novelty can never concur together in Matters of Faith For Men not being willing to make a distinction between Truths that depend upon Reason and those that depend upon Tradition never consider that they ought to be apprehended after a very different manner They confound Novelty with Errors and Antiquity with Truth Luther Calvin and others have introduc'd Innovations and have been mistaken therefore Galileo Harvey and Descartes are mistaken in their Discoveries The Impannation of Luther is new and likewise false therefore the Circulation of Harvey is false because it is new For this Reason it is that they indifferently bestow that Odious name of Innovators both upon Hereticks and new Philosophers The Idea's and Words of Truth and Antiquity of Falshood and Novelty have been joined together There 's no remedy the Common sort never separate 'em and Men of Sense find difficulty enough in it In the Tenth place because we live in a Time wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is still in vogue and because there are none but those that make use of their Judgment who can by Force of their Reason wrest themselves from the Contagion of Depraved Customs When we are in the Throng and the Croud 't is a hard matter not to give way to the Impetuosity of the Torrent that carries us along with it In the last place because Men act only upon tho score of Interest and this is the Reason that even they who deceive themselves and who perceive the vanity of these sorts of Studies cease not to apply themselves to 'em for all that because Honours Dignities and Benefices are annexed to 'em and for that they are always more capable of 'em who excel in those sorts of Studies than those that are ignorant of ' em All these Reasons in my Opinion sufficiently shews us why Men blindly follow the ancient Opinions as True and why without any Judgment they reject the new ones as False In a word why they make none or very little use of their Judgment There are without question a great number of Reasons more particular which contribute to it but if those which we have produced be but attentively consider'd there will be no cause of surprize to see how some People are prejudic'd with the Authority of the Ancients CHAP. V. Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination THis same False and unworthy Respect which Men have for the Ancients produces a great number of most pernicious Effects which it is convenient to observe The first is that want of using their own Judgment does by little and little really disable Men from making any use of it at all For it is not to be imagin'd that they who grow old over the Volumes of Plato and Aristotle make use of their Judgment they commonly spend so much time in the Reading of those Books only to endeavour to know the Sentiments of their Authors and their principal aim is to know certainly what Opinions they held without ever troubling themselves much whither they be consentaneous to Reason or no as we shall prove in the following Chapter Thus the Science and Philosophy which they learn is properly a Science of Memory and not a Science of Judgment They only understand Histories and Matters of Fact not evident Truths and they are rather Historians than true Philosophers The second Effect which the Reading of the Ancients produces in the Imagination is that it puts a strange confusion into all their Idea's who apply themselves to it There are two different ways to read Authors the one very good and very prositable the other very useless and even dangerous 'T is very profitable to read when we meditate upon what we read When Men endeavour to find out by some effect of their Wit how to resolve the Questions which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters before they begin to read them When they digest and compare the Idea's of things one with another In a word when they make use of their Reason On the other side there is no Profit in Reading when Men understand not what they read but 't is dangerous for Men to read and conceive what they read when they never examine it sufficiently to make a good Judgment of it especially if they have Memory enough to retain what they have conceiv'd and do not unwarily assent to what they have read and understood The first way enlightens the Mind it fortifies it and enlarges its Capacity The second contracts
that Belief of the Ancients which cannot be done but by examining the Opinions of several Persons who succeeded each other at different times But in things that depend upon Reason the case is alter'd and there is a necessity for Men to trouble themselves what the Ancients believ'd that we may know what is needful for our selves to believe concerning them Nevertheless I know not through what confusion of the Mind certain People are affrighted if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle but are never mov'd if we speak otherwise in Divinity than the Gospel the Fathers and the Councils It seems to me that they who make the loudest noise against the Novelties of Philosophy which ought to be esteem'd are they that favour and defend Innovations in Divinity with the greatest obstinacy and which ought to be detested For 't is not their Language which we blame as being Authorized by Custom tho' altogether unknown to Antiquity but the Errors which they disperse abroad or which they maintain under the Protection of their confus'd and equivocal Terms In Matters of Divinity we shou'd follow Antiquity because we ought to love Truth and because Truth is found in Antiquity 'T is necessary that all Curiosity shou'd cease whence once we have sound out the Truth but in Matters of Philosophy 't is quire the contrary we ought to love Novelty for the same reason that we ought always to love the Truth we must search after it and have an uncessant Curiosity for it If we thought that Aristotle and Plato were Infallible it wou'd be sufficient for us to apply our selves to understand them but Reason will not permit us to believe it for on the contrary it requires that we shou'd believe them more ignorant than the New Philosophers since the World is now grown older by two thousand Years and has more Experience than it had in Aristotle's and Plato's Days as we have already said and because the New Philosophers may not only know all the Truths which the Ancients have left behind them but may likewise discover many others Nevertheless Reason forbids us to believe these New Philosophers upon their own Words rather than the Ancients It requires on the contrary that we should diligently examine their Thoughts and refuse our Assent till it is impossible for us any longer to doubt the certainty of their Truth without being ridiculously prepossed with their great Learning or other Qualities of their Wit CHAP. VII Of the Prejudices of Commentators THis excess of Prejudice appears much more strange in those who Comment upon any Author because they who undertake that Work which seems in it self beneath a Man of Sense imagine that their Authors deserve to be admir'd by all Men. They also look upon themselves as making but one Person with their Author and with this Conceit Self-love most admirably plays it's part They are cunningly profuse in the Praises of their Authors they set them off with the best advantage and heap Honours upon them well knowing that this Honour will reflect upon themselves And this Idea of Grandeur does not only magniâ—ie Aristotle or Plato in the Minds of many Persons but it imprints also a Respect for all those that have Commented upon them And such a one would never have Deify'd his Author but that he imagin'd himself as it were comprehended in the 〈…〉 I do not believe however that all Commentators praise their Authors in hopes of a Return many would abhor it if they consider'd it they Praise them sincerely and don't think they do it in respect to themselves but Self-love does it for them without their perceiving it Men are not sensible of the Heat which is in their Hearts tho' it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body 't is necessary that they feel it by laying their Hands upon their Breast to be convinc'd of it because that Heat is Natural 'T is the same thing with Vanity 't is so Natural to Man that he is not sensible of it tho' it be that which as I may so say gives Life and Motion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs it does it many times in such a manner as is imperceptible to him A Man must feel handle and search himself to be convinc'd that he is Vain There 's no Man yet has sufficiently been sensible that 't is this Vanity which sets the first Wheel of the greatest part of our Actions a going for tho' Self love indeed knows it well enough yet is that Knowledge to no other end than to conceal it from all Mankind A Commentator then having some Relation and Affinity with the Author upon whom he Comments his Self-love fails not to discover to him the great subjects of Praise in that Author to the end he may reap the benefit of them himself And this is done so dexterously so subtilely and so delicately that it is not to be perceived But this is not a place to discover the Artifices of Self-love Commentators not only Praise their Authors because they are prepossessed with an Esteem for them and because they Honour themselves in Praising them but also because it is the Custom and for that it seems as if there were a necessity of doing it There are some Persons who not having any great value for 〈◊〉 Authors forbeaâ— not however to Comment upon them and that with great Application too because their Employment Chance or their own Capritious Fancy engages them to undertake the Work And these People believe themselves oblig'd to extol after a Hyperbolical manner the Sciences and Authors upon which they Comment tho' the Authors are Impertinent and the Sciences mean and useless And indeed it would be a very ridiculous thing for a Man to Comment upon an Author whom he believes to be Impertinent and seriously to apply himself to write in such a manner as he thought to be of no use He must therefore for his Reputation 's sake praise those Sciences and those Authors altho' both were Contemptible and tho' the fault which he has committed in undertaking an ill Work may be repaired by another fault as bad This is the Reason that Learned Men who Comment upon different Authors frequently contradict themselves For this Reason also it is that almost all Prefaces are scarce ever agreeable to Truth or good Sense If the Comment be upon Aristotle he is the Genius of Nature If they Write upon Plato he is the Divine Plato They never Comment upon the Works of Men without Additions to their Names They are always the Works of Men wholly Divine of Men who are the Admiration of their Age or such as have received from God particular Gifts 'T is the same thing also with the Matter which they treat of 't is always the most Noble the most Sublime and the most useful of all other subjects But that I may not be thought to speak upon my own word see here after what manner a famous
to speak meerly for Talkings sake like many that speak boldly of every thing that comes next 'em they are therefore concern'd to find out Words proper to express as they ought to do their thoughts which are not common Though we have a great Veneration for Persons of Piety Divines Old Men and generally for all those who have justly acquir'd great Authority over other Men nevertheless we thought our selves oblig'd to say this of 'em it often happens that they believe themselves infallible because all other Men hearken to 'em with Respect because they make little use of their Reason in the discovery of Speculative Truths and for that they condemn with too much freedom whatever they dislike before they have seriously consider'd it Not that they are to be blam'd for not applying themselves to many Sciences of little use for they are allow'd both to let 'em alone and to despise them if they think convenient but they are not to judge of 'em rashly as their fancies lead 'em nor upon ill grounded suspitions For they are to consider that the Gravity of their Delivery the Authority which they have acquir'd over the Minds of Men and their common custom of confirming what they say by some Passage of the Holy Scripture will infallibly lead into Error all those that listen to 'em out of Respect and who being incapable throughly to examine things suffer themselves to be surpriz'd by Manners and Appearances When Error hath the appearance of Truth it is oftimes more respected than Truth it self and this false Respect is attended with dangerous Inconveniencies Pessima res est errorum Apotheosis pro peste intellectus habenda est si vanis accedat veneratio Thus when certain Persons either out of false Zeal or out of a Love for their own thoughts have made use of Scripture to establish false Principles of Natural Philosophy or any other Science they have oft been listen'd to as Oracles by Men that have believ'd 'em upon their Words because of that Veneration which they owe to Sacred Authority but it has likewise happen'd so that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have hence taken an occasion to despise Religion So that by a strange Inversion the Holy Scripture has been the Cause of Error to some and Truth has been the Motive and Original of Impiety to others We ought therefore to be careful as the Author above cited well observes how we seek for dead things among the living and never to pretend by the strength of our own Wits to discover in Sacred Scripture what the Holy Ghost hath not thought fit to reveal Ex divinorum humanorum malesana admixtione continues he non solum educitur Philosophia Phantastica sed etiam Religio Haretica Itaque salutare admodum est si mente solâ—ia fidei cantum deatur quae fidel sunt All Persons then who have Authority over others ought to be so much the more cautions in their Decisions by how much they find 'em to be most adher'd to Divines especially ought to take care how they being Religion into contempt through their false Zeal out of vain glory either to exalt themselves or disseminate their Opinions But because it is not for me to tell 'em their Duty let 'em bear St. Thomas Opuse 9. who being interrogated by his General what he thought of some Articles answered him out of St. Austin in the following manner Multum autem nocet alia que ad pietatis Doctrinam non speclant vel asscrere vel negate quasi pâ—â—tinentia ad sacram doctrinam Dicit enim in 5. Confâ—ss cum audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi le caeâ—â— aut stellis de Solis Lunae motibus dixerunt nescientem aliud pro alio sentientem patienter intucor opinantem hominem nec illi obesse video cum de te Domine Creator omnium nostrorum non credat indigna si forte sitûs habitûs Creaturae Corporalis ignoret Obest autem si haec ad ipsam doctrinam Pietatis pertinere arbitretur pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat Quod autem obsit manifestat August in 1. super Genesin ad Litteram Turpe est inquit nimis perniciosum ac maxime cavendum ut Christianum de his rebus veluti secundum Christianas literas loquentem ita delicare quilibet Infidelis audeat ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Coelo errare conspiciens risum tenere vix possit Et non tamen Molestum est quod errans homo videatur Sed quod Auditores nostri ab eis qui foris sunt talia sensisse creduntur cum magno eorum Exitio de quorum salute satagimus tanquam indocti reprehenduntur respumtur Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut haec que communes Philosophi senserunt nostrae Fidei non repugnant neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata Fidei licet aliquando sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur neque sic esse neganda tanquam Fidei contraria ne Sapientibus hujus Mundi contemnendi Doctrinam Fidei occasio praebeatur It 's very dangerous to speak decisively upon Matters which do not belong to Faith as if they did St. Austin tells us in his 5th Book of Confessions When I see says he a Christian that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philosophers concerning the Heavens the Stars and the Motions of the Sun and Moon and would take one thing for an other I let 'em alone in these Opinions and Doubts For I don't see that Ignorance in the situation of Bodies the different ordering of Matter can injure 'em provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee our Lord who art the Creator of us all But it does him an Injury if he is persuaded that these things concern Religion and if he is so bold as obstinately to affirm what he knows not The same Saint explains his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subject in the first Book of the Literal Explication of Genesis in these Terms A Christian must take a great deal of Care that he does not speak of these Things as if they were Holy Scripture for an Infidel who should hear him speak Extravigances that should have no appearances of Truth could not forbear laughing at him so the Christian is only Confounded and the Infidel would be very little Edified Yet what is more mischievous in these Encounters than a Man's being deceiv'd is that these Infidels that we endeavour to Convert imagine falsely and to their inevitable ruine that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments so that they condemn and despise 'em as ignorant Men it is therefore in my Opinion more proper not to affirm the common receiv'd Opinions of Philosophers as Matters of Faith which are not contrary to our Faith although we may sometimes make use of the Authority of Philosophers to make 'em be receiv'd We must not also reject these Opinions as contrary to our Faith that we may give no occasion
to the Wise Men of this World to Dispute the holy Truths of the Christian Religion The greatest part of Mankind are so negligent and void of Reason that they make no distinction between the Word of God and that of Men when they are joined together so that they fall into Error while they approve both and into Impiety while they despise both indifferently Nor is it a difficult thing to see the Cause of these last Errors They proceed from the Connexion of Idea's explain'd in the Eleventh Chapter nor is it necessary to insist any farther upon the Explanation of 'em here However it seems worth our while to say something of Chymists Of those that make Experiments and generally of all those that spend their time in making Experiments They are People that Search after Truth and their Opinions are usually follow'd without any Examination Therefore their Errors are so much the more dangerous because they are imparted to others with so much the more ease 'T is better without question to Study Nature than Books Visible and sensible Experiments are certainly much more evident Proofs than the Arguments of Men. Nor are they to be blam'd who being engag'd by their Profession in the Study of Natural Philosophy endeavour to improve their Skill by continual Experiments provided they apply their Labours to the Improvement of the most necessary Sciences Therefore Experimental Philosophy is not to be found fault with nor they who make it their practise but only their Defects The first is that they are seldom guided in making their Experiments by the Light of Reason but by Chance From whence it comes to pass that they become but little more Learned or Knowing after they have spent much time and Money The second is because they are more Sedulous in Curious and Extraordinary Experiments than such as are most common and familiar Nevertheless the most Common Experiments are the most Simple and therefore they ought first of all to apply themselves to those before they settle to such as are more compounded and which depend upon a greater number of Causes The third is because they prosecute those Experiments that bring in Profit and neglect those that serve to illuminate the Mind The fourth is because they do not accurately enough observe all the particular Circumstances of Time Place and Quality of the Drugs which they make use of though the least of these Circumstances is sufficient to frustrate the Effect which they desire For it is to be observ'd that all the Terms of which the Physicians make use of are Equivocal For Example Wine has as many various significations as there are varieties of Soil different Seasons different Manners of making Wine and different Manners of preserving it so that in general we may say that there are not two Tuns of Wine altogether alike Therefore when a Physician in order to the making such an Experiment says take Wine no body knows but very confusedly what he means Therefore there is very great Caution to be us'd in Experiments nor ought they to attempt Compounded ones till they know the Reason of the more Simple and Common The fifth arises from hence that too many Consequences are drawn from one Experiment Whereas on the contrary we want several Experiments to infer one true Conclusion Lastly the greatest part of Physicians and Chymists consider only the Particular Effects of Nature they never return to the first Notions of Things that compose Bodies Nevertheless 't is most certain that no Man can clearly and distinctly understand the particular Phenomena of Natural Philosophy unless he be Master of the more General Principles and unless he also know something in Metaphysics In a word they often want Courage and Constancy they are terrified and tired with the Labour and Expence There are many other Defects in the Persons before mentioned but it is not our business here to enlarge The Causes of these Defects are little Application and the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapter and because we never judge otherwise of the difference and alterations of Bodies than by the Apprehensions we have of 'em as has been said in the First Book The Third Part. Of the contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations CHAP. I. I. Of our Inclination to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination II. Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination III. What a Strong Imagination is IV. That there are several sorts of it Of Mad Men and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant V. Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to Perswade and Impose HAving Explain'd the Nature of Imagination the Defects to which it is subject and how our own Imagination leads us into Error there nothing more remains for us to Discourse of in this Second Book but of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations and that is of the Prevailing Power which some Men have to engage others in their Errors Strong Imaginations are extreamly Contagious they prevail over those that are weak they make 'em stoop to their own Laws and imprint upon 'em their own Characters Therefore because Men that have particular Idea's and a Strong and Vigorous Imagination most commonly exceed the Bounds of Reason there are few more General Causes of Error than this pernicious Communication of the Imagination For the better understanding what this Contagion is and how it is transmitted from one to another we must consider that all Men have need of one another and that they are made to compose among themselves several Bodies of which the Parts should have a mutual Correspondence one with another for the upholding of which Union it is that God has commanded 'em to be Charitable one toward another but because Self-Love might by little and little extinguish Charity and by that means dissolve the Bond of Civil Society the Almighty judg'd it convenient that Men should be united together by Natural Ties which might subsist when Charity fail'd and which might defend it against the Efforts of Self-Love These Natural Ties which are common to us with Beasts consist in a certain Disposition of the Brain with which all Men are endued to imitate those with whom they Converse to make the same Judgments which they do and to be subject to the same Passions of the Mind to which they are subject And this same Disposition usually unites Men together much more close and firmly than Charity grounded upon Reason which sort of Charity is very rare Unless a Man be endu'd with this same Disposition of the Brain to partake of our Sentiments and our Passions he is incapable of his own Nature to unite himself with us and compose one Body He is like those Stones of an irregular form for which there is no room in a Building because
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
manner to maintain their Sentiments they are alike in that though they differ in the main This is sufficient for those who do not weigh the difference of Reasons to Judge that they are alike in all things because they are alike in that manner which every Body is capable to Judge of Devout Persons are not then obstinate they are only steddy as they ought to be But the Vicious and Libertines are always obstinate though they should not persist one Hour in their Sentiments Because Men are only obstinate when they defend a False Opinion although they should only defend it a little while This is the Case of some Philosophers who have maintain'd Chimerical Opinions which they lay aside at last They would have those who defend constant Truths whose certainty they see evidently to part with them as bare Opinions as they have done with those they had foolishly been prejudic'd with And because it is difficult to have a deference for them in prejudice of Truth as also because the Love we have Naturally for it inclines us to defend it earnestly they Judge us to be obstinate Those Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's obstinately but the others are in the right to defend Truth with Vigour and Steddiness of Mind The manner of both is the same but their Sentiments are different and it is that difference of Sentiment which makes the one constant and the others obstinate THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three First Books IN the beginning of this Book I have distinguished two Parts in the Simple and Indivisible Being of the Soul one purely Passive and the other both Passive and Active The first is the Mind or Understanding the second is the Will I have attributed three Faculties to the Mind because it receives its Modifications and Idea's from the Author of Nature after three different ways I have called it Sense When it receives from God its Idea's that are confounded with Sensations viz. Sensible Idea's occasion'd by certain Motions which pass in the Organs of its Senses at the Presence of Objects I have called it Imagination and Memory When it receives from God Idea's that are confounded with Images which are a kind of Weak and Languishing Sensations that the Mind receives only through some Traces that are produc'd or are stirr'd up in the Brain by the Course of the Spirits Lastly I have called it Pure Mind or Understanding when it receives from God pure Idea's of Truth without any mixture of Sensations and Images with it Not by the Union it hath with the Body but through that it hath with the Word or Wisdom of God not because it is in the Material and Sensible World but because it subsists in the Immaterial and Intelligible one Not to know Mutable things fit for the Preservation of the Life of the Body but to discover unchangeable Truths which preserve the Life of the Mind I have shown in the first and second Book that our Senses and Imaginations are very useful to discover to us the Relation betwixt External Bodies and our own that all the Idea's which the Mind receives through the Body are for the use of the Body that it is impossible clearly to discover any Truth whatsoever by the Idea's of our Senses and Imaginations that those confus'd Idea's serve only to engage us to our Body and through our Body to all Sensible things And lastly That if we would avoid Error we ought not to trust to them I also concluded it Morally Impossible to know by the pure Idea's of the Mind the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and ours That we must not argue according to these Idea's to know if an Apple or a Pear are good to eat but we must judge it by our Taste And although we may make use of our Minds to discover after some confused manner the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and our own yet it is always the surest way to make use of our Senses I will give another Example for we cannot impress too much on the Mind things that are so Essential and Necessary Supposing I would examine which is most Advantageous to be Religious or Rich if I open the Eyes of my Body Justice appears a Chimera I see no Attractives in it I see the Just are Miserable Abandoned Persecuted Defenceless and without Consolation for he that Comforts and Upholds them does not appear to my Eyes and indeed I do not see of what use Justice or Virtue can be but if I turn my Eyes upon Riches I soon perceive their Lustre and am dazled with it Power Grandeur Pleasures and all Sensible Goods accompany Riches I cannot doubt but Riches are necessary to make one Happy So likewise if I make use of my Ears I hear that all Men esteem Riches they speak of nothing but the ways of getting them and they always Praise and Honour those that possess them These two Senses and all the rest tell me That to be Happy I must be Rich And if I shut my Eyes and Ears and ask my Imagination it continually represents to me what my Eyes have seen and my Ears heard as to the Advantage of Riches but yet it will represent these things to me quite after another manner than my Senses did for the Imagination always enlarges the Idea's of those things that have any relation to the Body or which we Love If I will but permit it my Imagination will soon conduct me to an inchanted Palace like those of which Poets and Romances have made such Magnificent Descriptions of and there I shall see such Beauties which would be useless for me to describe This would convince me that the God of Riches who inhabits it is only capable of making me Happy This is what my Body is able to perswade me to for it speaks only for it self it is necessary for its Good that the Imagination should stoop before the Grandeur and Splendor of Riches But if I consider that the Body is infinitely below the Mind that it cannot be Master of it that it cannot instruct it in the Truth nor produce Light in it and that recollecting my self I ask my self or rather since I am neither my own Master nor Light if I draw near to God and in the Silence of my Senses and Passions ask him whether I ought to prefer Riches to Virtue or Virtue to Riches I shall hear a clear and distinct Answer of what I ought to do an Eternal Answer which has always been given is now given and will always be given an Answer which it is not necessary I should explain because all the World knows it either those who read this Book or those who read it not which is neither Greek Latin French or German and which is conceived by all Nations Lastly An Answer which Comforts the Just in their Poverty and which disturbs Sinners in the midst of their Riches I shall hear this Answer and be convinced of it I shall laugh at the Fancies
though there are but very few that do it and Men continually dispute upon Questions of Morality which are the Immediate and Necessary Consequences of a Principle which is so evident as that is The Professors of Geometry daily makes new Discoveries but if they do not bring it to a greater Perfection it is because they have already drawn the most Useful and Necessary Consequences out of their Principles But most Men seem Incapable of concluding any thing out of the first Principle of Morality All their Idea's vanish and are dissipated as soon as they begin to think upon it because they will not do it as they should do and they will not do it because they do not relish it or because they are too soon tired with it after their having relish'd it That Principle is abstracted Metaphysical meerly Intelligible it is not obvious it is not to be imagined and therefore it does not appear solid to Carnal Minds or to Minds that only see with the Eyes Nothing is found in that Principle capable of putting a stop to the Disquiets of their Will and afterwards to fix the Eyes of their Mind to consider it with some Attention What Hopes then of their seeing it as they should do of their apprehending it rightly and of their concluding directly from thence what they should Conclude If Men had but an Imperfect Apprehension of that Proposition of Geometry That the sides of Triangles that are alike are proportionable one to another certainly they would not be great Geometricians But if besides the Confused and Imperfect Idea of that Fundamental Proposition of Geometry they also had some Interest to wish that the sides of Triangles that are alike were not proportionable and that false Geometry were as convenient for their Perverse Inclinations as false Morality they might very well be guilty of Paralogisms as absurd in Geometry as in Morality because their Errors would please them and that Truth would only Puzzle Disturb and Vex them Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindness of those that lived in the former Ages whilst Idolatry reigned in the World or of those that live in our Days and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit of the Light of the Gospel It was necessary for Divine Wisdom to make it self sensible at last to instruct such Men as only consult their Senses Truth had spoken to their Minds for above the space of Four thousand Years but whereas they never look'd Inwardly they did not understand it It was necessary that it should speak to their Ears The Light which directs all Men did shine in their Darkness without being able to expel it they could not so much as look upon it It was necessary that the Intelligible Light should put on a Veil to make it self visible And that the Word should cloath it self with Flesh and that the Wisdom of God which lay conceal'd and was inaccessible to Carnal Men should instruct them in a Carnal way Carnaliter says St. Bernard The Majority of Men Serm. 39. De Natali Domini and particularly the Poor which are the most worthy Objects of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator who are obliged to work for their daily Bread are very Ignorant and Stupid They only Hear because they have Ears and they only see because they have Eyes They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort of Mind there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence of their Senses and Passions They cannot apply themselves to Truth by reason that they cannot relish it Moreover they seldom think of applying themselves to it because Men seldom have any Thoughts of applying themselves to things that do not concern them Their unquiet and unsettled Will turns their Minds continually towards all the Objects that Please and Divert them by their Variety For the Multiplicity and Diversity of Sensible Goods hinder Men from discovering the Vanity of them and still keep them in hopes of finding the real Good they desire in them Thus though the Councils which Jesus Christ as Man as the way as the Author of our Faith gives us in the Gospel are much more suitable to the Weakness of our Understanding than those which the same Jesus Christ as Eternal Wisdom as Inward Truth as Intelligible Light Inspires into the most secret Recesses of our Reason Though Jesus Christ renders those Councils Agreeable by his Grace Sensible by his Example Convincing by his Miracles yet Men are so stupid and so incapable of Reflection even upon things which are absolutely Necessary for them to know well that they hardly ever think on them as they ought Few Men observe the Beauty of the Gospel Few Men conceive the Solidity and Necessity of the Councils of Jesus Christ Few Meditate upon them Few esteem them as their Necessary Food or fortifie themselves with them the Continual Agitation of the Will which is in search of the Taste of Good IV. Second Example The Immortality of the Soul disputed by some Persons not permitting the Mind to be intent upon Truths which seem to deprive it thereof Take another Example It concerns the Impious highly to make a very strict enquiry whether their Soul is Mortal as they apprehend it or whether it is Immortal as Faith and Reason tells us It is a thing of the utmost Consequence for them to know their Eternity is concerned in it and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it Why is it then they do not know it or that they remain in doubt unless it be that they are not capable of the least serious Application and that their unsedate and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to look stedfastly on the Reasons which are contrary to these Opinions which they desire should be true For in fine is it so difficult a task to distinguish the difference there is between the Soul and the Body between what thinks and what is extended Do's it require so great an Attention of Mind to discover that a Thought is neither Round nor Square That Extent is only capable of different Figures and different Motions and not of Thought and Reasoning And consequently that what Thinks and what is Extended are two Beings directly opposite to one another Yet that alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the Soul is Immortal and that it cannot Perish even though the Body were Annihilated When a Substance perishes it is true that the Modes or Manners of Existence of that Substance perish with it If a piece of Wax were annihilated it is certain that the Forms of that Wax should also be annihilated with it because the Roundness for Example of the Wax is in Effect nothing but the Wax it self of such a Shape and therefore it cannot subsist without the Wax But though God should destroy all the Wax in the World it would not therefore follow that any other Substance nor that the Modes of any other Substance were Annihilated All the Stones for example would subsist with
Libertines and of Hereticks proceeds from their doubting of the Truth of the Decisions of the Church because they are not Evident and they hope that the Truths of Faith may be demonstrated Now their Love for Novelty is Irregular since that possessing the Truth in the Faith of the Church they ought not to seek farther Besides the Truths of Faith being far above the reach of their Understanding they would not be able to discover them supposing that according to their False Opinion the Church were guilty of Error But if there are many who deceive themselves in refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church there are as many who are deceiv'd in submitting to the Authority of Men. We must submit to the Authority of the Church because it can never submit Blindly to the Authority of Men because they are always liable to Mistakes What the Church teaches us is Infinitely above the reach of Reason What Men teach us is submitted to our Reason So that as it is a Crime and an Insupportable Vanity to endeavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by our Reason without regarding the Authority of the Church So it is a great Indiscretion and a despicable poorness of Spirit to rely blindly on the Authority of Men in Things which relate to Reason Nevertheless most of those that are esteem'd Learned Men in the World have only acquir'd that Reputation by knowing the Opinions of Aristotle of Plato of Epicurus and of some other Philosophers by Heart by submitting blindly to their Sentiments and by defending them with Obstinacy In order to obtain the Reputation of Learning in the Universities it is sufficient to be acquainted with the Sentiments of some Philosopher Provided they will Swear In Verba Magistri they soon become Doctors Most Communities stick to a peculiar Doctrine which the Members are not allow'd to deviate from What is True in some is often False in others They are sometimes Proud of defending the Doctrine of their Order against Reason and Experience and they think themselves oblig'd to wrest the Truth or their Authors to reconcile them This produces a World of Frivolous Distinctions which are so many by ways that lead Infallibly to Error If any Truth is discover'd even in our days Aristotle must have seen it or if Aristotle be against it the Discovery must be False Some make that Philosopher speak one way others another for all those who pretend to Learning make him speak their Language He is made the Author of all sorts of Impertinencies and few Discoveries are made which are not found Enigmatically in some corner or other of his Books In a word he is ever contradicting himself if not in his Works yet at least in the Mouths of those that teach him For though Philosophers protest and even pretend to teach his Doctrine it is difficult to meet two that agree about his Sentiments For indeed Aristotle's Books are so Obscure and fill'd with such rambling general Terms that one may with some Appearance of Truth impute to him the Opinions of those that are most opposite to his It is easie to make him say whatever one has a mind to in some of his Works because he hardly says any thing in them though he makes a great deal of Noise as Children suppose the Sounds of the Bells to say what they please because they make a great deal of Noise and say nothing I must confess that it seems very Rational to fix and to stop the Mind on some particular Opinions to hinder it from running out into Extravagancies But what then Must it needs be done by Falshood and Error Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the Mind Let Men examine how difficult it is to find Persons of Sense pleased with the reading of Aristotle and that can perswade themselves they have acquir'd any true Science even after having grown old on his Books and it will appear plainly that nothing but Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind and that Disputes Aversions Errors and even Heresies are entertain'd and encourag'd by an Ill Manner of Study Truth consists in Individuality it is not capable of Variety and nothing besides it can reconcile Peoples Minds Falshood and Error only serve to divide and agitate them I do not question but there are some who do verily believe that he they call the Prince of Philosophers is no-wise in an Error and that Real and Solid Philosophy are only to be found in his Works There are some who fancy that though it is Two thousand Years since Aristotle wrote no body has yet been able to discover that he was guilty of any Error and consequently being in some respects Infallible they may boldly follow him and quote him as such But I do not think it worth my while to answer such Persons because their Ignorance is so gross that it only deserves Contempt I only desire them to tell me whether Aristotle or any of his Disciples have ever deduced any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philosophy which may be called his or if they or any of them have done it themselves let them declare it let them explain it and let them prove it and we do engage our selves never more to speak of Aristotle without an Elogy we will no longer say that his Principles are Useless since they have served to prove one Truth but there is no reason to expect it They were long since challeng'd to do it and particularly by Monsieur Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations about Forty Years ago even with a Promise to demonstrate the Falsity of that Pretended Truth And there is no great likelihood to believe that any body will ever presume to do what Monsieur Descartes greatest Enemies and the most Zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy have not hitherto dar'd to undertake Therefore I hope I may presume to say that it is a strange Blindness Poorness of Mind and Stupidity of Spirit thus to submit to the Authority of Aristotle of Plato or of any other Philosopher whatever That People lose their time in reading them when their only Design is to get their Opinions by Heart and those that teach them make their Disciples lose theirs likewise Therefore give me leave to say with St. Austin * Quis tam Stulte curiosus est qui filium suum mittat in Scholam ut quid Magister cogitet discat Aug. de Magistro That those are Foolishly Curious who send their Sons to the College in order to learn the Sentiments of their Master That Philosophers cannot instruct us by their own Authority and if they pretend to do it they are Unjust That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety to Swear their Defence Solemnly And finally those Injustly confine Truth who out of Interest oppose the new Opinions of Philosophy which may be True to preserve those which are sufficiently known to be False or Useless CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the
same Subject I. Explanation of the Second Rule of Curiosity II. Explanation of the Third THE Second Rule that must be observ'd is I. Second Rule of Curlosity That Novelty must never serve as a Reason to believe that things are True We have already said several times that Men must not rest in Error and in the False Felicities they enjoy That it is necessary they should Search after the Evidence of Truth and the real Felicity they do not possess and consequently that they should look after such things as are New and Extraordinary But therefore it does not follow that they should always stick to them nor believe without reason that Opinions are True because they are New and that those are real Felicities which they have not as yet enjoy'd Novelty should only induce them to examine new things with care they must not despise them because they do not know them nor rashly believe that they contain what they wish and hope for But this often comes to pass Men after having examin'd the Ancient and Common Opinions have not discover'd the Light of Truth in them After having had a Taste of the usual Felicities of the World they have not found that Solid Satisfaction in them which should accompany the Possession of a real Good So that their Desires and their Eagerness are not allay'd by the usual Opinions and common Felicities For which reason when they hear any thing that is New and Extraordinary the Idea of Novelty puts them in hopes at first That it is the thing they are in Search of And whereas it is Natural to Flatter our selves and to believe that Things are as we wish they might be their Hopes increase proportionably to their Desires And in fine they Insensibly change into Imaginary Assurances In the next place They joyn the Idea of Novelty and the Idea of Truth so close together that the one never offers it self without the other and that which is most New appears to them to be more True and better than that which is more Usual and Common in which they are very different from those who out of Aversion to Heresie have joyn'd the Idea of Novelty to that of Falseness imagining that all New Opinions are False and Dangerous Therefore we may say that this usual Disposition of the Mind and of the Heart of Men in relation to that which bears the Character of Novelty is one of the most general Causes of Errors for it seldom leads them to Truth whenever it does it is by Chance and good Luck And finally It always directs them from their real Happiness by engaging them in that Multiplicity of Divertisements and False Felicities that the World abounds with And this is the most Dangerous Error into which they can fall The Third Rule against the Excessive Desires of Novelty is II. Third Rule of Curiosity That when we are certain that some Truths are so Mysterious that it is Morally Impossible to discover them and that some Felicities are so Inconsiderable that they can never make us Happy we ought not to suffer our selves to be Excited by the Novelty of them Every body may know by Faith by Reason and Experience that created Goods can never fill the Insinite Capacity of the Will Faith teaches us That all the Things of this World are only Vanity and that our Happiness neither consists in Honours or Riches Reason assures us That since it is not in our Power to bound our Desires and that we are Naturally inclin'd to Love all Felicities we can never be Happy without Possessing that which Includes them all Our own Experience makes us Sensible that we are not Happy in the Possession of those Goods which we do enjoy since we still wish for more Finally We daily see that the Great Felicities which the most Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth are not capable to satisfie their Desires that they are even more Uneasie and more Unhappy than others and that being Seated on the highest Spoke of the Wheel of Fortune they are the more liable to be precipitated and shook by its Motion than those that are underneath them or nearer to the Center For they never fall but from on high their Wounds are always great and all the Grandeur they are attended with and which they annex to their own Being serves only to Swell and Aggrandize them to make them more Sensible of a greater number of Wounds and expose them the more to the Strokes of Fortune So that Faith Reason and Experience convincing us that the Delights and Pleasures of the Earth which we have not as yet tasted could not make us Happy though we should enjoy them We must be very careful according to that Third Rule not to suffer our selves to be Foolishly Flatter'd with vain Hopes of Happiness which increasing by degrees proportionably to our Passion and to our Desires would change at last into a False Assurance For when we have a Violent Passion for any Good we always look upon it to be very great and we perswade our selves Insensibly that the Possession of it will make us Happy Therefore we must resist those Vain Desires since our Endeavours to satisfie them would be in vain But particularly because that by abandoning our selves to our Passions and by employing our time to gratifie them we lose God and all things with him We only wander from one False Felicity to another We always live in False Hopes We dissipate our Spirits and are agitated a Thousand different ways We meet Oppositions every where because the Advantages we seek for are desired by many and cannot be possessed by many For as St. Paul teaches us Chap. 6. to Tim. Those that have a mind to grow Rich fall into Temptations and into a Snare of the Devil and into divers useless pernicious Desires which precipitate Men into the Abyss of Perdition and Damnation for Covetousness is the Root of all Evil. And as we ought not to seek after the Goods of the World which are new because we are assur'd that we shall not find the Happiness we look for neither ought we to have the least Desire of knowing new Opinions upon a great number of difficult Questions because we are inform'd that the Mind of Man is not capable of discovering the Truth of them Most of the Questions that are treated of in Morality and particularly in Natural Philosophy are of that kind and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident of many Books that are daily written upon those Obscure Intricate Matters For though absolutely speaking the Questions they contain may be resolv'd there are still so few Truths discover'd and so many others to know before we can come to those the said Books treat of that we cannot read them without adventuring to lose considerably Yet Men do not regulate themselves thus they do quite the contrary They do not examine whether what is said to them is possible Do but promise them
they have read in Books written by the Enemies of his Person and of his Religion The Book written by that Heretick intitled Desperata causa Papatus sufficiently shews his Impudence his Ignorance and his Passion and his desire to appear Zealous in order thereby to acquire some Reputation among those of his Party Therefore he is not a Man to be credited upon his Word For as there is no reason to believe all the Fables he has Collected in that Book against our Religion so neither is there any to Credit the Injurious Accusations he has invented against his Enemy Rational Men will not suffer themselves to be perswaded that Monsieur Descartes is a dangerous Man because they have read 〈◊〉 in some Book or other or because they have been 〈◊〉 so by Persons whose Piety they have a Respect for It is not lawful to believe Men upon their bâ—re Word when they accuse others of the most Enormous Crimes It is not a sufficient proof to believe a thing because we hear it affirm'd by a Man who speaks with Zeal and Gravity For it is impossible for any Person to relate Falsities and Foolish Stories in the same manner as he would relate good things particularly if he has suffer'd himself to be impos'd upon out of Simplicity and Weakness It is easie to discover the Truth or Falsity of the Accusations that are form'd against Descartes his Writings are Extant and easie to be understood by those that are capable of Attention Therefore I would advise People to Read his Works in order to get better Proofs against him than bare Report and I do not question but after they have read and examin'd them they will no longer Accuse him of Atheism and that on the contrary they will pay him the Respect that is due to a Man who has plainly and evidently demonstrated not only the Existence of a God and the Immortality of the Soul but also a World of other Truths which were unknown until his time CHAP. VII Of the desire of Science and of the Judgments of pretenders to Learning THe Mind of Man has without doubt very little Capacity and Extent and yet he desires to know every thing All Human Sciences cannot satifie his Desires and yet his Capacity is so confin'd that he cannot perfectly apprehend any one particular Science He is in a continual Agitation and desires always to know whether he be in hopes of finding what he looks for as we have said in the preceding Chapter or whether he perswades himself that his Soul and Mind are extended by the vain possession of some extraordinary Knowledge The unruly desire of Happiness and Grandeur makes him study all manner of Sciences hoping to find his Felicity in the Science of Morality and looking for this false Greatness in speculative Sciences What is the reason that some Persons spend all their Life in reading of Rabbi's and other Books Written in Foreign Obscure and Corrupted Languages and by Authors without Judgment and Knowledge But that they perswade themselves that when they are skill'd in the Oriental Languages they are greater and higher than those who are Ignorant of them And what is it that can encourage them in their ingrateful painful useless Labour unless it be the Hope of some Preferment and the Prospect of some new Grandeur Indeed they are look'd upon as extraordinary Men they are Complimented upon their profound Learning People are better pleas'd to hear them than others And though it may be said that they are commonly the least Judicious if it were only for employing all their Life in a very useless Study which can neither make them Wiser nor Happier Nevertheless most People fancy that they have a great deal more Sense and Judgment than others And as they are more Larn'd in the Etymology of Words they also fancy that they are Learn'd in the Nature of Things The same reason induces Astronomers to spend all their Time and Estate to get an exact Knowledge of Things which are not only useless but also impossible to know They endeavour to find an exact Regularity in the Course of the Planets which is not in Nature and to Form Astronomical Schemes to foretel Effects of which they do not know the Causes They have made the Selenography or Geography of the Moon as if People design'd to Travel thither They have already divided it among those that are Famous in Astronomy There are few of them that have not already some Province or other in that Country as a Recompence for their great Labour and I question whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour with him that has so magnificently distributed those Kingdoms among them What is the reason that Rational Men apply themselves so much to this Science and yet remain in gross Errors in respect to Truths which they ought to know unless they Fancy thas it is a great thing to know what passes in the Heavens The knowledge of the Vast Things that passes above seems to them more Noble Greater and more worthy of their great Wit than the knowledge of Vile Abjects Corruptible Things as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion The Nobleness of a Science is deriv'd from the Nobleness of its Objects It is a great Principle Therefore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and incorruptible Bodies is the highest and most sublime of all Sciences And for that reason it appears to them worthy of the Greatness and Excellency of their Mind Thus Men suffer themselves to be blinded by a false Idea of Grandeur which pleases and moves them As soon as their Imagination is struck by it they fall down before that Phantasm they Reverence it it destroys and blinds their Reason which should be the Judge of it Men seem to Dream when they Judge of the Objects of their Passions to have no Eyes and to want Common Sense For in fine where lies the Excellency of the knowledge of the Motions of the Planets and have we not a sufficient knowledge of it already since we know how to regulate our Months and our Years What does it concern us to know whether Saturn is surrounded by a Ring or by a great number of little Moons and why should we Dispute about it Why should any one be proud of having foretold the greatness of an Eclipse which perhaps he has hit better upon than another because he has had more Luck There are persons appointed by the King's Order to observe the Stars let us rely upon their Observations They may reasonably apply themselves to it for they do it out of Duty It is their business They do it with Success for they employ all their Time about it with Art Application and all the Exactness imaginable They want nothing in order to succeed in it Therefore we ought to be fully satisfy'd upon a matter which concerns us so little when they impart their Discoveries to us Anatomy is a very good Study since it is a thing of
we Love him because we know that he is Amiable And that Love is worthy of us because that being Reasonable we ought to Love that which Reason informs us to be worthy of our Love But we Love Sensible Things by a Love that is unworthy of us and which they are also unworthy of For being Reasonable we Love them without any Reason to Love them since we do not clearly know that they are Lovely and on the contrary we know they are not so But Pleasures Seduce us and make us Love them the Blind and Irregular Love of Pleasure being the real Cause of those False Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality CHAP. XI Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Speculative Sciences I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth II. Some Examples THE Inclination we have for Sensible Pleasures being disorder'd is not only the Source of the Dangerous Errors we fall into in cases of Morality and the general Causes of the Depravation of our Manners it is also one of the Principal Causes of the Disorder of our Reason and it engages us Insensibly into very gross Errors but less dangerous upon Subjects that are meerly Speculative because the said Inclination hinders us from having a sufficient Attention for things that do not affect us to apprehend them and to judge well of them We have already spoken in several places of the Difficulty Men find in applying themselves to Subjects that are a little uncommon because the Matter we treated of then requir'd it We spoke of it towards the end of the first Book in showing that the Sensible Idea's affecting the Soul more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind it often applied it self more to the Manner than the Thing it self We spoke of it in the Second because in treating of the Delicacy of the Fibers of the Brain we show'd whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds did proceed Finally We spoke of it in the Third in mentioning of the Attention of the Mind when we were about proving that our Soul had but little Attention to Things that were meerly Speculative but a great deal more to such as affect it and make it Sensible of Pleasure or Grief Our Errors have commonly several Causes which contribute all to their Rise So that we must not imagine that it is for want of Order that we sometimes repeat almost the same things and that we impute several Causes to the same Errors it is because there are really many I speak still of occasional Causes for we have often declar'd that there are no other Real and True but the ill use of our Liberty which we do not always make use of so much as we might as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Work No body ought to blame us if in order to make Men plainly conceive how for Example the Sensible Manner in which things are cover'd does Surprise and makes us liable to fall into Error we have been oblig'd to say before-hand in the other Books that we had an Inclination for Pleasures which seems necessary to be repeated in this which treats of Natural Inclinations and the same of some other things in other places All the Harm it will occasion is that there will be no necessity to say many things here which we should have been oblig'd to explain if it had not been done elsewhere All things that are in Man are so dependant on one another that we find our selves often overwhelm'd under the number of things we are to treat of at one and the same time to explain perfectly what we conceive We are sometimes necessitated not to divide things that are joyn'd by Nature one to another and to proceed contrary to the order we had prescrib'd when that order occasions nothing but Confusion as it happens of necessity on some occasions Yet for all this it is impossible to give others an Idea of all we think of All that we can commonly pretend to is to put others in a way to discover with Pleasure and Ease what we have discover'd with great Labour and Pains And whereas it is Impossible to discover any thing without Attention we must particularly study the Means to make others Attentive 'T is what we have endeavour'd to do though we acknowledge we have perform'd it weakly and we own our Faults the more willingly to the end that the said Confession may excite those who shall read this to render themselves Attentive of their own accord in order to remedy the same and to penetrate to the bottom of these Subjects which without doubt deserve to be well consider'd The Errors into which the Inclination we have for Pleasure and generally for all things that affect us engage us are Infinite because the said Inclination dissipates the Sight of the Mind and it applies it continually on the confus'd Idea's of the Senses and the Imagination and it inclines us to judge of all things rashly by the bare relation they have to us I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth We never see Truth until we see things as they are and we never see them as they are unless we see them in him that contains them after an Intelligible manner When we see things our selves we only see them very Imperfectly or rather we only see our own Sentiments and not the Things we are desirous to see and which we falsely imagine we do see It requires a great deal of Application to see things as they are in themselves because it is now impossible for Man to unite himself to God without Pain and Labour To see things in our selves requires no Application on our part since we feel what touches us even against our Will Naturally we find no anticipating Pleasure in the Union we have with God the pure Idea's of things do not move us Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleasure does neither apply nor unite us to God on the contrary it weans and removes us from him For that Inclination induces us continually to consider things by their Sensible Idea's because those False and Impure Idea's affect us The Love of Pleasure and the actual Injoyment of Pleasure which revives and increases our Love for it removes us continually from Truth to cast us into Error Therefore those that are desirous to draw near to Truth to be guided by its Light must begin by laying aside Pleasure They must carefully avoid whatever affects and agreeably divides the Mind for the Senses and Passions must be silenc'd in order to hear the Word of Truth it being necessary to withdraw our Affections from the World and to condemn all Sensible Things as well for the Perfection of the Mind as for the Conversion of the Heart When our Pleasures are great when our Sentiments are lively we are not capable of the plainest Truths and we do not so much as grant common Notions unless they contain something that is Sensible When our Pleasures or other Sensations are moderate we
create in us a General Diffidence of all our Senses We shall then show that we must not rely upon the Testimony of our Sight to Judge of the Truth of things as they are in themselves but only to discover what Relation they have to the Preservation of our Body that our Eyes generally deceive in all they represent to us in the Greatness of Bodies in their Figures and Motions in Light and Colours which are the only things we see that all these things are not what they really appear to be that all the World is deceiv'd in them and by this Error led into innumerable others We shall begin with Extension and produce those Proofs which incline us to believe that we never see any thing as it is We commonly see Animals with Microscopes Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Extension consider'd in it self much less than a Grain of Sand that is almost Invisible to the naked Eye * Journal des Scavans du 12. Nov 1668. we have even seen some a thousand times yet less These living Atoms walk as well as other Animals Then they have Legs and Feet and Bones in these Legs to uphold them Muscles to move them Tendons and an infinite Number of Fibres in each Muscle and lastly Blood or Animal Spirits extreamly subtile and fine to fill and contribute successive Motion to these Muscles It 's impossible without this to conceive that they Live are Nourish'd and Transport their little Bodies into different Places according to the different Impression of Objects or rather 't is impossible that even those who have employ'd all their Life time in Anatomy and an Enquiry into Nature should represent the number diversity and fineness of all the parts whereof these little Bodies are necessarily Compos'd to make them live and execute all those things that we see them do The Imagination is lost and astonish'd at the sight of so surprizing a Smallness it cannot apprehend nor take hold of such Parts that have no hold for it and altho' Reason convinces us of the Truth of what we have said yet the Senses and Imagination oppose it and often compel us to doubt of it Our Sight is extreamly limited but we must not limit its Object the Idea which it gives us of Extension hath very narrow Bounds but we must not thence conclude that Extension hath the same Bounds it is doubtless Infinite in one Sense and this little part of Matter that is hid from Eyes is capable of containing a World in which there are as many things tho' much less in Proportion as in this great World we Inhabit The little Animals we spoke of have perhaps other little Animals which they devour that are Imperceptible because of their Stupendious Smallness That which is a Handworm in respect of us these Animals are so in respect of it and perhaps there are in Nature yet lesser and lesser ad infinitum in so strange a Proportion as this betwixt a Man and a Handworm We have Evident and Mathematical Demonstrations of the infinite Divisibility of Matter and this is sufficient to incline us to believe that there may be Animals lesser and lesser ad Infinitum altho' out Imagination is lost in the Thought God made Matter only to form Admirable Works thereof and since we are certain there are no Particles whose Smallness is capable of limiting his Power in the formation of those little Animals why do we unreasonably limit and diminish the Idea we have of an Infinite Creator by measuring his Power and Operations by our Finite Understanding Experience has already undeceived us in part by shewing us Animals a thousand times less than a Hand-worm why would we have them to be the last and least of all for my part I see no reason to imagine it on the contrary it 's much more probable to believe that there are some yet much lesser than those we have discovered for indeed those little Animals are not so much wanting for Microscopes as Microscopes for them When we examine the * Principle of Generation Germ in the midst of Winter taken out of the Bole of Tulip either by the Naked Eye or a Convex Glass we very easily discover leaves in it that will become green those that are to compose the Flower of the Tulip that little Triangular part which encloses the Seed and the six little Columns which encompass it at the bottom of the Tulip so that we cannot doubt but the Germ in the Bole of the Tulip contains a whole Tulip It is reasonable to believe the same of the Germ of a Grain of Mustard that of the Kernel of an Apple and generally of all sorts of Trees and Plants although undiscoverable by the Naked Eye nor even with a Microscope and it may be confidently said that all Trees are contain'd in little in the Germ of their Seed It does not appear unreasonable to think that there are an infinite number of Trees in one single Germ since it does not only contain the Tree whose Seed it is but also a great number of other Seeds which may also include in themselves new Trees and new Seeds of Trees which last also may contain other Trees and Seeds as fruitful as the first and thus on ad infinitum So that according to this Opinion which cannot appear impertinent or ridiculous to any but those who measure the Wonders of the Almighty Power of God after the Idea's of their own Senses and Imaginations one might say that in one Kernel only of an Apple there might be Apple-Trees Apples and Seeds of Apple-Trees for almost infinite Ages in the proportion of a perfect Apple-Tree to an Apple-Tree in its Seed and that Nature does only unfold these little Trees by administring a sensible growth to that which is out of its Seed and an insensible but real growth proportionable to their bigness to those which we may conceive to be their Seeds for we cannot doubt but that there may be Bodies small enough to insinuate themselves in the Fibres of these Trees which we may conceive to be their Seeds and by that means to nourish them What we have said of Plants and their Germs may be also applied to Animals and the Germ of which they are produc'd We see in the Germ of a Tulip's Bole an entire Tulip * The Germ 〈…〉 〈…〉 we also see in the Germ of a new laid Egg a Chicken perhaps entirely formed although it has not been hatch'd We discover Frogs in the Eggs of Frogs and other Animals besides even in their Germ upon a Curious Inquisition but when the Eyes of the Body can pierce no deeper the Eyes of the Mind must not be limited * Vâ—â—â— De 〈…〉 M. 〈…〉 being much more extended We suppose then that all the Bodies of Men and Animals which shall be produc'd till the Consummation of Ages have probably been produc'd from the Creation of the World * 〈…〉 I mean the first Female