Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
truth_n	work_n	work_v	worth_n	16	3	8.6467	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A97067	Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.	Wallis, John, 1616-1703.	1643 (1643)	Wing W615; Thomason E93_21; ESTC R11854	114,623	143

whether Appearing and not-Appearing be a Reall or onely Imaginary difference If a Reall difference then will there be somewhat Reall Then which is not Now and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous there will be somewhat Reall afterwards which before was not If Appearing be onely Imaginary what shall I have to help my knowledge Then which I have not Now Ans 2. If you say Things Future are both now Present we Know them so to be but do not Seem to know them or Seem not to Know them Repl. Then I reply as before If we Shall Seem to know them we Doe Seem to know them because Then and Now are all one So that if Succession of Time be only Imaginary Then do we already know whatsoever we shall know whereas Christ himselfe Increased in wisdom Luk. 2. And the Fore-Knowledge of things to come would not be such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as might distinguish between the True and False Gods And thus if I mistake not I have sufficiently shewed though much more might have been added that there is a Reall Succession a Reall Priority of Duration and not onely Imaginary And therefore notwithstanding his first answer the Soule must really cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work or to work Truth if these Workings of truth be the Soules Essence And the soule must be during that Cessation or Errour as truly Non Ens as before its first Production for the precedent and subsequent workings cannot Then give it an Existence as not Then being His second answer to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter toucheth not at all the first Branch of it wherein it is objected That if particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence How is it that the Understanding should not cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant But it is applyed to the second Branch of it viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence then the Soule entertaining a False position should be no more it selfe To which he answers By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon Falshood and that upon this ground Because Falshood is not a Reall Being upon which the Soule can work For its nature being Privative and no Reall Being how can the Soule or Truth work upon Nothing I might answer here That it is not requisite to the Soules Act that its Object should have a Reall being As appears by the Soules apprehending Ens rationis which Apprehension is a positive Act and yet hath no Reall Object For the Object of Intellection is not Reale but Cognoscibile And therefore That Falshood wanteth a reall being is not inough to shew that the Understanding cannot work upon it And this in effect he granteth soon after For it being Objected that the Soule while it pronounceth a False position doth Really act verè agere He replyes That there are in this Action two things a Thinking and a So-thinking To think is a positive Action a good Action But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lyeth in Thinking an Errour which is Nothing and so a Not-thinking When mistaking a man catcheth at a shadow In catching he doth truly Act But to Catch a Shaddow is to catch nothing Now to catch nothing and not to catch to act nothing and not to act is all one So to Think is Reall but to Think Amisse is Nothing and all one with Not-thinking He grants therefore that the Soule pronouncing or Understanding a False position or thinking Amisse doth really Think really Act Now I ask while it doth really Think What doth it think What doth it Act or Vpon what rather Certainly it must either be Falshood or No●hing For what else it should be neither doth his Lordship shew nor can I imagine If it Act upon Falshood the false position then may Falshood be the Object of a Reall act If it act upon Nothing then what hinders but that Falshood although it be Nothing may yet be the Object of this Act Object But he will say If the Soule do act upon Falshood then must it become Falshood that is a Vanity a Ly a Nothing For I conceive ●aith he the Agent it selfe together with the Subject acted upon the Object to be One in the Act. Ans● But this supposition must I deny For if so Then when the Soule acteth upon God by Knowing Loving c then doth it become God And if so why doth his Lordship at the end of his Preamble blame those for mounting too high who confounding the Creator with the Creature make her to be God But for the better clearing of this whole discourse concerning Falshood and Errour in the Souls working I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction which all Know and yet but few Think of when they have occasion to use it The non attendency whereof hath produced much Obscurity much Errour and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects It is to distinguish between Verum Metaphysicum and Verum Logicum between Bonum Metaphysicum and Bonum Morale To distinguish I say Metaphysicall Truth and Goodnesse from Morall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth To distinguish the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Proposition the Goodnesse of Being from the Goodnesse of an Action Now this being premised let us examine the truth of some Tenents which are allmost generally received by all 1 The nature of Evill say they is Privative not Positive Evill is Nothing And why Because Ens Bonum convertuntur and therefore Malum must needs be Non-Ens now Non-Ens is Nothing Be it so Evill is Nothing But what Evill do they mean Evill in Metaphysicks or Evill in Ethicks Goodnesse in Metaphysicks is no other th●n Entity for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between Ens Bonum then a distinction of Reason and therefore Malum in Metaphysicks must be Non Ens. But will they say that Morall Evill is so too If they do then must they say also that bonum Morale is convertible with Ens otherwise their Argument will not hold that All Being is Honesty or Morall Goodnesse and all Morall Goodnesse is Being or Entity I ask therefore whether morall Goodnesse or Honesty ●e the Essence the Entity of a Stone If not then is not every Being Bonum Morale I ask again Whether Silence be not Morally Good at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace Yet to ● Silent or not to speak hath no Metaphysicall goodnesse no goodnesse of Being for it is a mee● Negation There may be therefore Morall goodnesse where there is no Metaphysicall goodnesse no positive Being and there may be Metaphysicall goodnesse goodnesse of Being without Morall goodnesse or Goodnesse of Honesty Now if Malum Metaphysicum a Negation a Non-Ens may be Bonum Morale what shall be the Malum Morale opposite to this Bonum shall that be also a Non-En●● If it

Cognoscibilis and may be known by the Soul And also that all things else are one with God because they are al known by Him And so he falls upon the first of those Errours which he mentions in the ●nd of his Prooemium immediately before the first Chapter which is by mounting too high in the exal●ing of Truth to confound the Creator with the Creature by making her God Neither doth it onely make Truth to be one with God but even all things else being one with Truth to be One with God Again if so how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us not that they are the Same or that the Body is the Soul but as husband and wife each bringeth his part towards the making up of the Compositum At least M● Sadler is mistaken as well as I who is presumed at least to understand his Lor● mind su●●●ciently who ●ells us in his Epistle that Corporall Vnion ●● materialls is sometimes Miscalled Identity which is at best but a ●●ld touch in a point or two But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth which may better sute with at least the first part of his Lordships discourse You may call it Veritas Cognoscendi as well as the former bu● in a different sense There Knowledge was taken in a Passive●●●se ●●●se and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoscib●le or fit to be understood Here you must take it in an Active sense and so Veritas Cognoscendi or the Truth of Knowledge will bee that which makes the understanding Cognoscitivum or fit to conce●ve and apprehend that Cognosc●●li●y which is in the Obj●ct And thu● Truth will be that ●rinciple whereby the Soule is able to ●…hend or conceive that which may be known Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense and that in this sense are both Principia cognoscendi Principles of knowledge but in a severall way You may distinguish them if you please thus Truth of knowing and Truth of being known and veritas cognosce●di may be 〈…〉 both They differ as Colour in the Object from the power of seeing in the Eye The former makes the Object Visible and fit to be perceived the other makes the Eye Visive and fit to discern it If the first were wanting Vision would be hindered because there is nothing Visible Hence it is that the Ayr and Spirituall substanc●● are not seen even by the s●arp●st sight If the latter be wanting ●●● sight is hindered from a desect in the Organ Thus the most persp●●●ous Colou●s are not discerned by a blind Eye whereas the ●ame Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible and actually Discerned by others Thus Veritas cognoscendi in the former sense makes the Object to be Cognoscible Truth in the latter sense gives the Understanding or Soule ability to know it Now if you call the Power of se●ing which is in the Eye by the name of ●●●ate light ●o dis●●●gu●sh i● from Light either in the Object or in the Medium You may also call Reason which is this principle of knowing in the Soule or Understanding by the name of innate Truth or Light And this signification of Truth I conceive to be most sutable to his Lor● meaning But Verum or Truth in this sense is not convertible with Ens For though all Beings have in them Truth wherby they may be Known yet all have not this Truth or Power to know-Know. And thus if you understand it it will not seem so strange a Paradox ●o 〈…〉 th●● Reason which he calle●h Truth is all one with the Vnderstanding and that the Vnderstanding is not distinct from the Soule For this will be granted by all those which affirm that Potenti● non real●ter distinguuntur ab Animâ that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule are not really distinct from the Soule it selfe And these a●e 〈…〉 I mistake not the greater part of ●ound Philosophers And ●●us his Lor● opinion is but the same with theirs in other words Yet may we ●●●ll speak distinctly of these severall Facul●ies as w● do of the Wisdom of God the Power of God the Will of God c. which are as en●●rely one with God as these Faculties can be with the Soule And thus much for explaining the state of the 〈…〉 ● proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor● opinion CHAP. ● Whether the Vnderstanding and Truth understood be One. IN his first Chapter he tells us That Truth that is Reason is enthron d in the Vnderstanding and there appears under a double Notion Th●●●●● the Fountain or Ground-work which is Reason it self We call it saith he the form or substance And then those workings which breathe from thence the Streams issuing from it viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason the effects of a reasonable soule We call them usually actus primus and actus secundus The first of these he begins with proving it to be the Vnderstanding in its Essence The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter His Argument is this What is the Vnderstanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature warming and enlivening the Creature conforming it to the likenesse of the Creator And is not Truth the same If you take Truth in any other acceptation beside that last mentioned I see not how the Argument will hold For if you take it either for the Truth of Being or the Truth of Knowing in the common acceptation for that Essence whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be It may be granted that the understanding is one of those Rays of the Divine Nature somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likenesse of the Creator It will be granted also That the Essence or Truth of every Creature whereby it Is or is Known to be is a Ray proceeding from the same Center though to another point of the Circumference a Stream issuing forth from the same Fountaine of Being and carryes some weak Resemblance some Sparkling of that Primitive Light or Truth that Originall Essence which is in God For thus every Creature hath somthing of God in it Refert quaelibet herba Deum Yet will it not follow from hence That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding For the Argument will prove erroneous as being Affirmative in the second Figure in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded And the Consequence will be the same with this What is the Body of Man but a materiall substance And is not a Stone the same Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone If you take Truth for Reason the Argument will admit of a reduction into an exact Form thus That Ray of the Divine Nature which doth solely or principally expresse Gods Image in Man is the Vnderstanding but Truth or Reason is this divine Ray Therefore Truth