Certain Sense of Words For Criticks do very frequently ground the Sense of Words upon Etymologies or the Derivation of them from other words Or else on the Sense in which some few learned Writers do take them both which are Fallacious Rules to know their Sense certainly The former because the Reason why the word was Impos'd and the Sense it self of those words are many times Different Notions For example a Stone as some of them tell us is in Latin nam'd Lapis a laedendâ— pedes but the Notion or signification of that word is the very Substance it self of such a Body Nor is the latter Rule competent to give us the true Meanings of those words that express Natural Notions first because those Learned Men use to speak Learnedly or Rhetorically with Tropes and Figures and affect to deliver their thoughts neatly and finely with quaint Phrases Allusions Metaphors and other knacks of Language all which are so many Deviations from the Natural manner of Expression Common to all Mankind and consequently Unsuitable to our Natural Conceptions Besides that a Few Authors suffice the Criticks to build their Observations upon All which falls infinitely short of that Certainty and Plainness which the Common and Constant Vse of the Generality of Mankind or the Vulgar affords us 8. Equivocal Words are either Simply and Absolutely such which we call Equivocal by chance or Relatively which we call Equivocal by design Absolutely when there is no kind of Reason or Ground why the same word should have two different senses as when Far in English signifies a great way in Latin Bread-Corn or any word in one Language happens meerly casually to have a different Signification in another In which sort of Equivocation there can be no danger to Science those two Senses of the Word being so vastly disparate Relatively when there is some kind of Ground why the same word should be transferr'd from one Notion to another And this may be done for two different reasons One when it is referr'd to another for some Connexion with them as Cause and Effect as when the word Healthful which properly belongs to an Animal is transferr'd to Meat because it is the Cause of Health in the Animal and to Vrine because it is an Effect of its Health and therefore a Natural Sign of it Or as when we say there is much Art in such a Picture or Poem it means the Effect of Art for Art in proper speech is to be found only in the Understanding of the Artificer The other Reason of the words being Transferr'd from one to another and consequently Referr'd back to it again is when this is done for some Proportion or Resemblance between them As when we say of a good Governour that he is the Pilot of the Common-wealth to steer it into a safe Harbour and preserve it from splitting upon the Rocks of Division Where the word Pilot which in the First and Proper Meaning signifies a Director of a Ship is transferr'd to a Governor because he does the same in Proportion in a Common-wealth which the other does in a Ship Thus Tranquility which is properly said of the Sea in a Calm is Transferr'd to a State or Kingdom because its Peaceable Condition resembles or bears a kind of Proportion to the Undisturb'd Quiet found in a Calm Sea 9. Words Transferr'd to another for some Proportion or Resemblance between them are call'd Metaphors or Metaphorical and the best Metaphors are when the thing from which 't is Transferr'd is Eminent under that Notion we intend to express As when we call a Valiant Man a Lyon and a Meek man a Lamb because Courage and Mildness are Eminent in those Animals A Continu'd Metaphor is call'd an Allegory As in the Example lately given the word Pilot steer harbour splitting and Rocks are all Metaphors and therefore the whole speech is Allegorical 10. There is no Danger nor Detriment to Science that such words are us'd in Common Speech or Loose Rhetorical Discourses but they are exceedingly pernicious to it when we are treating of Dogmatical Tenets and searching for Truth out of the Words of Written Authors For since those Metaphors however they be True while understood to be meant in Proportion and Resemblance onely yet are Literally Tals and in delivering Doctrines or Dogmatical Tenets only Litteral Truth is aim'd at and if the Reader happen to take a Metaphorical Expression for a Literal one he will most certainly embrace an Errour for a Truth or if he takes a word Literally meant for a Metaphor he will take a Truth for an Errour hence it must Needs be most pernicious to Science not to distinguish between the Metaphorical and Literal sense of the words but mistake one for the other And therefore unless some Certain Rule be Establisht by which we may be ascertain'd when Written Words are to be taken Literally when Metaphorically 't is impossible to be Certain of any Truth meerly by those Written Words 11. Those Words which are Transferr'd from Corporeal to Spiritual Natures are by far more highly Metaphorical than can be any Transferr'd from one Body to another and therefore the Misunderstanding them must needs be very destructive to Science For since Corporeal and Spiritual are the First Species of Ens and the Division of that Genus into those Species is made by the Contradictory Differences of Divisible and Indivisible it follows demonstratively that whatever except the precise Notion of Ens is properly Affirm'd of Body must be properly Deny'd of Spirit and therefore the words Transferr'd from Bodies to Spirits which are in Different Lines are far more Improper than those which are Tranferr'd from one Body to another they being in the same Line and so less Disparate Corol. II. Hence is confirm'd the former docâ—rine that Spirits are not in place nor are Themâ—elves or their Spiritual Actions Subject to Time â—r Commensurable to it c. Since all these may â—roperly be said of Bodies and therefore must â—roperly be deny'd of Spirits Corol. III. From the two last Sections it folâ—ows evidently that no Dogmatical Tenet can be â—rov'd from Books that treat of Spiritual Natures â—r of such considerations as belong to them unless â—ome Certain Rule be first Establisht by which the Reader may know when the words are to be taken â—iterally when Metaphorically in this or that place â—nce a Mistake in this may make the Reader emâ—race a Falshood for a Truth or a Truth for a Falsâ—ood in matters of greatest Importance For exâ—mple this Proportion God is mov'd by our prayâ—rs is Literally False for to be Moved is to be Chang'd and God is Esseâ—tially unchangeable Wherefore it is only True in a Metaphorical â—ence and the Word moved is a metaphor of the last sort viz. of Words transferr'd to anoâ—her for some Proportion or Resemblance between them and so the true sense is this God tho' Unmov'd in himself yet acts in the same manner towards him that prays to him as
purpose are his many Distinctions of his Propositions especially those he calls Exponibiles Let but the Learner know certainly and liquidly what are the Subject and Predicate in any Proposition which is easie to be discover'd by the Copula that is to come between them and unite them and have a care that the words that express them are Univocal he will be furnish'd with means to see the Form of Connexion which is Essential to a Proposition and is onely Conducive to Science which wholly consists in the Connexion of Terms His chief Misfortune is that he does not seem either at the beginning or in the Process of his Book to know at least to build upon this Truth and stand to it that our Notions or as the Moderns have taken a Toy to call them Ideas are the very Natures of the Things in our Understanding imprinted by Outward Objects without which no Stability of those Notions or Ideas can be with Evidence asserted nor any Solid knowledge possibly be had of our Predications nor the true Ground of Truth or Falshood be understood nor consequently ean there be any Firmness in our Judgments or Discourses Whence I could wish that every Beginner were at first well instructed and settled in this point for without this all will be but Loose and Ungrounded Talk in the Air. And tho' I lose Credit with our late Wits I must avow that Aristotle's dry Assertion that Anima intelligendo fit omnia tho' it may seem to some a wild Paradox has more Solid Sense in it were it rightly understood and is more Useful to true Philosophy than all the other Maxims that do not proceed upon it and suppose it which yet I see the Goodness of Nature intimates to many and forces them to ground their Discourses on it Practically even tho' while they speculate they deny it or at least seem to doubt of it or disregard it Observing therefore this great want under which Philosophy which is the Study of Truth labours I have out of my true Zeal of improving Science and beating down Scepticism the profest Patron of Ignorance and covert Parent of all Irreligion hazarded the Opinion of Singularity in endeavouring to write and publish a Demonstrative Logick at least I have given such Reasons quite thorough it as I judg'd to be Clear and Conclusive in every piece of it that has any Influence upon Scientifical Knowledge What my Reader may expect from me is this I begin with our Natural Notions the Bottom-Ground of all our Knowledge I show them to be the very Natures of the Things whose Metaphysical Verity being Establish'd by Creative Wisdom does consequently give Stability and Solidity to all our Discourses that are built on them I distribute those Natural Notions under those several Common Heads and manifest why there must be so many and no 〈◊〉 show how their Definitions are to be fram'd which make our Conceptions of the◠〈◊〉 and Distinct. I lay Rules to escape 〈◊〉 Snares which Equivocal Words lay 〈…〉 way while we are Discoursing I show â—he Reason of all Truth and Falshood in Connected Notions or Propositions Which if Self-evident and Identical have Title to be First Principles as from many Heads I demonstrate I trace Nature in all those nice and Immediate steps she takes to generate Knowledge in us at First Coming to those Propositions that need Proof and the Way of Proving them I lay open the Fundamental Ground of the Force of Consequence which gives the Nerves to every Act of True Reasoning and of the Certainty and Evidence of every Conclusion which we rightly inferr To perform which I manifest that there can be but One Necessary or Natural Figure of a Syllogism and but Four Moods of that Figure I lay down and fix the Fundamental Laws of Concluding I evidence the Nature of that Third Notion or Middle Term by the Connexion of which with the Two Terms of the Thesis to be Proved they must inevitably be joyn'd with one another and so the Thesis it self must be rightly Concluded and therefore Infallibly True I show how to find out a Middle Term fit for our purpose and thence prepare the way for Demonstration I lay open how every Truth must have at the Bottom an Identical Proposition and every Errour a Contradiction as their First Principles and how they may be reduced to those Principles of theirs To do which tho' more laborious is the best Way of Demonstrating I manifest thence how one Truth is in another and what strange Consequences follow thence Also how Middle Terms Proper for Demonstration may be taken from all the Four Causes To clear better the Notion of Science I treat of the Natures of Opinion and Human Faith their Grounds and how the Former of these two last Deviates from Right Reason and when the Later does or does not Then I consider the Effects issuing from all sorts of Proof viz. Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty And to put in Practise my self what I do persuade and recommend to others I add Seven Demonstrations of the most Considerable Theses in divers Sciences And lastly I lay open the Ways and Methods of Disputation and detect the weak Stratagems and inefficacious Attacques of Fallacies or Paralogisms This is the Summ of my Endeavours in common But besides these many particular Knowledges light in on the by and as I hope very Useful ones which it would be tedious to enumerate The Manner I use to carry on the Scheme of my Doctrin is not to propose my Conceptions Magisterially or to expect any one should assent to the least Tittle of what I say upon my Word But I offer my Reasons for every Paragraph I advance if it can be conceiv'd to need any by doing which I speak to the Reason of my Readers and withall I expose my self to the Severe Examination of the most Acute and Iudicious Wits of which I doubt not there are Multitudes in those Seminaries of Learning our two Famous Universities to whom I humbly dedicate this small Present I neither strive to ingratiate my self by my Style nor to surprize any by Plausible Discourses much less to Impose upon their Understandings by Voluntary Suppositions I draw now and then divers Useful Corollaries and some that will seem I doubt not Paradoxical that so I may carry on my Doctrine to farther Consequences and show withall to what Unthought-of Conclusions Reason will lead us if we follow her close and home Nor am I asham'd to declare openly that I hold that the Chief End of Science is to beget Virtue and not onely to raise us to Higher Contemplation but also to comfort and strengthen Divine Faith in us and to make it more Lively and Operative Whence I have taken occasion to excite my Reader 's Devotion out of the Reflexions on divers Points that seem'd of themselves to be but Dry Speculations making account that Good Thoughts arising upon the Spot but of Truths newly Clear'd to our
than this which is or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks I shall dare to affirm that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies as I have shown at large in my Appendix And indeed how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it as may be seen hereafter p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence Open Prevarications and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature Nor can we need any greater Confirmation that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it than to observe that neither Cartesius himself nor Regius Rohault Regis Le Grand nor any of that School I have met with have as I must think been Able to give us any Light of it since they neither Attempt nor Mention it which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they acknowledge all their Three Elements and consequently all Nature was made These few Particulars omitting innumerable others I have thought fit to hint to show that the Method to Science which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit That which gives it most Credit is that his Suppositions granted he proceeds consequently in the subsequent parts of it which are purely Mathematical But what signifies that if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles nor Nature in his Physicks which he cannot pretend to do unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter upon which all depends A Task I say again his Followers neither will ever attempt nor can possibly perform by his Principles as is shown at large in my Appendix Yet it must be confess'd that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence Quaint Wit and Unusual Remarks For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader make the Authours pass for Curious men and bear a fine Appearance of Truth till they come to be scann'd Exactly and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms Which done it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science Farther I must declare for the Honour of our English Genius that tho' we do not match the French in the Finery Gayity and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions a Talent in which they are very Excellent any more than we do in our Outward Garb and Dress yet that there are more Solid Productions well built Truths and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise Entituled An Essay concerning Human Understanding than as far as I have observ'd is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science which is the Way of Experiments or Induction Concerning which not to repeat what I have occasionally by way of Reason alledg'd against it in my following Book I need say no more but that Matter of Fact shows evidently that this Method alone and Unassisted by Principles is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science For what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists has been Demonstrated by Experiments since the the time that Great man Sir Francis Bacon writ his Natural History The very Title of which laborious Work shows that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method For if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ we shall find that it is as he calls it meerly Historical and Narrative of Particular Observations from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense To aim at Science by such a Method may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes and decoy him farther but he still falls short of his End What man of any past or of our present Curious Age did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches as that Honour of our Nation the Incomparable Mr. Boyle yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature as far as that Way could carry him he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy nor could with the utmost Inquisitiveness practic'd by so great a Wit arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no And certainly we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge whether in such a Space there be Something or Nothing which of all others should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable Lastly we may observe that when an Experiment or which is the same a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect into which we may certainly refuâ—d it which and onely which is the Work of SCIENCE For Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles Cartesius according to his the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby and his most Learned Master Albius whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles according to theirs So that after all the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect and explicating it right must be Decided by way of Reason that is by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid and onely He or They who can approve their Principles to be such can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes or to have Science how 't is done and however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles and make out their Title to them can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE But to leave other Men's Failings and Return home to my Self To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason so magnify'd by other Speculaters I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly and perhaps it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions for which yet I shall hope the Reasons I have given there for that
procedure will bear me out and justifie me For the same inducement I have very frequently drawn my Arguments from Metaphysicks being well assured that such Mediums do make the Dicourses built on them approach nearest to Self-evidence Nor do I fear it should be objected that in a Logical Treatise I bring such Instances and Corollaries as entrench upon and make an In-road into divers other Sciences Rather I must profess that I held it a precise Duty in my Circumstances because Logick or the Art of Reasoning being a Common Instrument to attain all Science I was to show how it was upon occasion to be Apply'd to as many of them as I could so I do not make unreasonable Excursions to hunt for them in Foreign Subjects but that they light Naturally in my way Lastly I thought it became a Lover of Peace and Union among Christians to endeavour they should not wrangle about Equivocal Words so their Meanings be justifiable In a word 't is Connexion of Terms which I onely esteem as Proper to advance Science Where I find not such Connexion and the Discourse grounded on Self-evident Principles or which is the same on the Metaphysical Verity of the Subject which engages the Nature of the Thing I neither expect Science can be gain'd nor the Method to Science Establish'd But this done I make account both the one and the other may be hoped for How well I have behav'd my self in attempting this is left to the Iudgment of those who are the Proper Umpires in such Matters I mean your selves Your True Honourer and Humble Servant I. S. THE METHOD TO SCIENCE BOOK I. LESSON I. Of Notions or the very First Ground on which all Science is built 1. WE experience that Impressions are made upon our Senses and that those Impressions are Different according to the different Nature of the Objects that imprint them 2. We experience also that those Impressions do not stay in the Outward Senses but reach the Soul and affect it 3. Every thing being received according to the nature of the Subject that receives it and the nature of the Soul being a Capacity of Knowledge hence those Impressions must so affect the Soul as to cause some kind of Knowledge in her how rude and Imperfect soever it may yet be 4. The Impressions from Objects that affect the Senses and by them the Soul do carry the very Nature of those Objects along with them and imprint them in the Soul which Prints or as it were Stamps as received in the Understanding we call Notions 5. Wherefore Notions are the First and Rudest Draughts of Knowledge being most Simple and Naturally wrought in the Soul by the strokes of occurring Objects without any Industry or Active Concurrence on our part 6. That these Notions are the very Natures of the Thing or the Thing it self existing in us intellectually and not a bare Idea or Similitude of it appears hence evidently that when we say interiourly or judge A Stone is hard we do not intend to affirm That the Likeness or Idea of a Stone is hard but the very Stone it self And were it not so the Proposition would be false for the Similitude of a Stone in our Mind is not Hard whereas yet we are well assur'd that Proposition is True 7. Again we experience that we consider judge and disâ—ourse of the very Thing it self and of its very Nature which these being Interiour or Immanent Acts bred and perfected within our Soul we could not do unless the Objects of those Acts or the very Things themselves were there 8. Lastly It cannot be deny'd but that we have in our Soul the full and compleat Sense of this Proposition and Notions of every distinct part of it viz. There is in me the Idea or Likeness of a Stone Therefore there is in me something signified by the word Stone not only distinct from Idea and Likeness but moreover Relatively Opposite to it as the thing Represented is to that which represents it which can be nothing but the very Stone it self 9. Nor need it cause any Wonder that the same Ens or Thing may have diverse Manners of Existing one Corporeal the other Intellectual or Spiritual since the Thing v. g. Peter abstracts even from Existence it self for 't is not found in the Notion or Meaning of that word that the Thing signified by it Exists or not Exists much more then does the Notion of Thing abstract from that is is Indifferent to all Manners of Existing 10. The words Notion Simple Apprehension Conception and Meaning are all synonymous terms They are called Notions because they are the Parts or Elements of Knowledge which put and consider'd together make Cognition wâ—ich is Proper and Compleat Knowledge They are call'd Simple Apprehensiâ—ns to distinguish them â—rom Judgments which are compounded of more Notions and belong to the second Operation of our Understanding Or rather because by them we simply or barely Apprehend that is say hold of or take into us the thing about which we aâ—terwards Judge or Discourse They are call'd Meanings because they affect the Mind which only can mean or intend or else in relation to the Words whose Meanings they are They are called Conceptions in order to the Power which impregnated by the Object conceives or as it were breeds them as the Embryo's of Knowledge Lastly they are said to be the Natures of the Things because as was shewn they are such essentially and formally in nothing differing from them but only that they connotate a new Manner of Existing which is Extrinsecal to the Thing and to the Nature or Essence of it The word Idea is the least proper because it seems to signifie a bare Similitude unless the Users of it would express themselves to take it in that sence in which we take the word Notion here or as we use to understand it when we say that the Idea's of all things were in the Divine Intellect before they were created that is their very Essences 11. Notions are called Simple Apprehensions not from the Fewness of the words that express them nor from their not having any Grammatical Composition or Syntax in them but from the nature or manner of this Operation of our Understanding For since as was said they are called Simple Apprehensions because by them we simply or barely apprehend or lay hold of the Nature of the Thing intellectually it matters not how many or how few the words are so we do no more than meerly Apprehend or Take the Meaning of the Words or the Notions into our Minds without Judging or Discoursing of them Whence we may have a simple Apprehension of a long Sentence nay of a whole Sermon or a great Book as long as we do not set our selves to Judge or Discourse of the Truth or Falshood of what 's said or writ but purely to Apprehend the Sence or Meaning of the Speaker or Writer 12. Notions being the Natures of the Things in
a good Man here who is properly Mov'd would act towards one that Petitions him Corol. IV. Hence also is demonstrated that all the Names and Words we can use when we speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper For since we can no other wise name or speak of a thing but as we Conceive it and all our Conceptions are Notions taken from Natural Objects and onely said of them with Propriety and no otherwise said of Created Spirits but onely Metaphorically and that God's Infinite Perfections do far more excel Created Spirits than those Spirits do Bodies it follows that all the Names and Words we can make use of to speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper as may be farther shewn in Metaphysicks 12. The Word Ens as apply'd to Substantial and Accidental Notions is of the former sort of Equivocal words and Analogically spoken of them that is first and properly of Substance and Secondarily or Improperly of Accidents For since as was shewn above Ens signifies Capable of being and none of the Accidents is of itself Capable of Being but onely comes to have some Title to Existence by the Substance from whose Being they have entirely all the Being they have and that Its being it follows that the word Ens must be Analogically said of them that is Properly of Substance and Improperly of Accidents 13. Since it appears from what is said hitherto that the Equivocation of words is most highly Prejudicial to Science it is one necessary part of of the Method to Science to detect the Snares it lays in the way of our Discourse that we may avoid them And this may be done 14. First by observing the Explication we make of the Word that is apply'd to different Notions that so we may know which is the proper Signification of it For by doing this we shall certainly find that the less proper Notion when the word is explicated will still include the Notion of the Proper one and bear up to it As if we would Explicate the word Strong as 't is spoken of Ale or Wine we shall be forced to say if we be put to express our selves Literally and tell what it means that as he is call'd a Strong Man who is able to overthrow his Enemy so we call Wine or Beer Strong when it is able to overpower our Brain Or if we call a man Hard-hearted it would be explicated thus that his Humour is as Hard and Inflexible considering the Temper of a Rational Creature which ought to be mov'd by Reason as Hard things which are very difficult to bend are among Natural Bodies for which reason they sometimes call such men Stony-hearted or Iron-hearted in both which we see that Strength is properly in Man and Hardness in such Bodies as Stone or Iron and improperly in Wine or the Heart And the same may be observ'd in the word Pilot apply'd to a Governour in Moved apply'd to God in Healthful to Meat or Urine Thus the word Religious Honour Worship or Respect is first and properly apprehended as belonging or Due to God the sole End and Author of all Religion and Analogically or Improperly to Holy Persons either on Earth or in Heaven as his Servants and to Sacred Books Pictures and Churches as either Causing Exciting Increasing or Belonging to the Religious Honour due properly to Him Alone Whence Religious Honour given to any other things cannot be Explicated but in Reference to God the only proper Object of Religion which therefore will be found Included in the Explication of that Religious Honour which is given to any thing else And yet what Endless Squabbles Contests and Animosities has this one Equivocation produced while Passionate or Ignorant men will needs take the word Religious when spoken of those Different things to be Vnivocal which is most clearly Analogical 15. The next way is to observe the Notions any way Connected in our Common Speech with that Word whose Equivocalness we doubt of that is to consider the Causes Effects Antecedents Consequents Contraries its Superiour and Inferiour Notions its Circumstances c. For if some or any of these do not agree to the Meaning of any Word when spoken of more things or found in diverse Contexts then we may be sure 't is spoken in diverse Senses and is Equivocal and then by the foregoing Rule we may certainly come to know its proper Signification So in the Notion of Religious Honour apply'd to God as properly due to him and Adoration of him the chief part of which is an humble Acknowledgment of him to be our Creator Redeemer Sanctifier the Supreme Lord of Heaven and Earth the Searcher of Hearts and Judge of all our Actions c. none of these are possible to be Connected or Agree to any of the other Improperly called Objects of Religious Worship So when we stile any Eminent Person for Learning a Great Man we shall easily find it is Equivocal and Improper because Greatness means in Proper Speech much of Quantity and has that Common Head for its Genus whereas a very Little Man in Quantity may be Great in the sence in which we meant it 16. The Third way is to attend to what True Science or Faith teach us For since one Truth cannot contradict another therefore we may be assur'd that in case we be Certain that what the Writer meant is True his Words must be taken in that sence which is Agreeable to True Science or Faith Hence when it is said that God made two Great Lights the Sun and the Moon it being Evident by Science that Other Stars are incomparably Greater than the Moon hence the words Great Lights in that place cannot be meant of Great in it self but as to their Appearance to us But care is to be taken that we have true Science of the thing exprest by such words and that the Subject be not such as exceeds our pitch of Knowledge 17. The Context may help much to give us the right Notion of the Words especially when the Literal Truth is aim'd at Axioms and evident Principles are laid and the Discourse is perfectly Connected or Coherent For in that case the Symmetry found in the parts of the whole Discourse forbids any word to be taken in a wrong signification as we experience in Mathematicks and other Close Discourses 18. The Intention of the Author and the Argument and Scope of the Book avail much to direct us to the right sense of those words in it which are most Material and Significant For the Notions meant by such words are as it were the steps which lye level all the way and lead to the End at which the Author aim'd them and therefore cannot easily permit a Deviation from their true Sence or suffer their Meaning to be mistaken 19. The Words in which Laws are conceiv'd are best interpreted by the Common Practice of those
or Extremes of a Proposition whence all Truth is said to consist in the Connexion of the Terms and if the Terms be not found to cohere the Proposition is justly held to be False 6. Since Propositions may be both in the Mind and in Words and the Meanings of the Words are the same with our Notions it follows hence so the words be not Equivocal that Mental and Verbal Propositions are the same thing so that it is in reality all one to treat them under either of these Considerations Therefore in regard we must use Words in our Discourses concerning Propositions and many times Artificial ones we shall treat of them indifferently as taken in either condition and sometimes use the Word Judgments sometimes Propositions as it lights Only let it be remember'd that Judgments are onely in the Mind Formally and Truly and in Verbal Propositions only as in Signs of the Mental ones Tho' even taking them as in our Understanding they have even there their Subject Copula and Predicate as well as when they are Pronounced or Writ in Words Corol. I. Hence is deduc't that the rude Vulgar nay even Children who cannot Speak or Discourse may have Mental Propositions and Consequently what answers to Subject Copula and Predicate in their Understandings tho' they cannot Reflect or Distinguish them and as it were dissect and Anatomize their own Thoughts and Inward Acts as do Men of Art For Example when a Clown Knows or Judges that there is such a place as London or a Child that what it sees is Milk they have in their Minds the True tho Rough draught of these two Propositions London is Existent and this is Milk and consequently of what corresponded to the several parts of those Propositions after a Natural manner tho they cannot yet lick their rude Embryo Judgments into Form or bring them to a perfect shape by distinguishing in them these several parts Corol. II. Hence also tho' we cannot know the precise time in which Children begin to judge yet we may be assured it must be as soon as they have Cognition or Knowledge of Common and Familiar Objects and of their Agreeableness to their own Nature And first of all of that which is next to them and most Knowable Viz. that themselves exist as will be seen hereafter The reason is because Judgments are the Immediate Effects resulting out of Knowledge and therefore as soon as they know any object is Agreeable or disagreeable to them or that it Exists they cannot but Judge so after their dull fashion 6. To proceed As the Metaphysical Verity of which onely our Notions are capable is taken from the Things and Consists in their being truly what they are so the Formal Verity of our Judgments must be also taken from the Thing 's being such as we Iudge it to be Whence Truth is by some defin'd to the Conformity of the understanding to the Thing wherefore when we affirm the Thing to be This or That or to be such or such the true Meaning of that Affirmation is that what corresponds to both those Notions of the Subject and Predicate is found or exists in the same Thing or Being and were not this so it would be False to affirm that one of them is the other 7. Wherefore the meaning of the word is which is the Copula is this that those Words are Fundamentally Connected in the same Thing and Identify'd with it Materially however those Notions themselves be Formally Different provided they be not Incompossible for then the Proposition must for the reason now given be necessarily False As when we say a Stone is Hard the Truth of that Proposition consists in this that the Nature of hard is found in that Thing or Suppositum call'd a Stone and is in part Identify'd with it however the Notions of Stone and Hard be Formally Distinct. Or which is the same it is as much as to say that that Thing which is Stone is the same thing that is Hard. 8. The Copula is has alwayes the sense now given except when we are to Speak of Nothings which the adequate Object of our understanding being Ens we are forc'd to apprehend as Things even when at the same time we Judge them to be otherwise As when we say Imaginary Species a Chimera and yet even then it expresses a kind of Identity of the two Nothings and affirms them to be the same Nonsense and that to put a Space or Quantity to be no Quantity or to put a Non-Ens to be Ens is Contradictory and ridiculous And indeed these kind of Propositions are in effect no more than to say that Non-Ens Non est Ens or What is not Capable of Being cannot be 9. The Copula is is the most proper to give us a Clear Intellectual Light and by consequence to fix our Judgment First because the Notion of is or Actual Being is impossible to admit any Explication and therefore 't is self-known as any one may evidently experience if he goes about to Explain it for he will find that he must be forc'd to put is or some word that imports Actual Being in its Explication which makes the Explication to be none but leaves it as obscure as it was before nay more Obscure than formerly by adding other Notions more Obscure than it self was For example Ask what it is to be or Exist all that can be said of it is that 't is Esse extra Causas where Esse being the same with Existere we vainly endeavour to explicate the same thing by its self and to make it look like an Explication we add extra Causas which two Notions are less Clear than Esse it self was 2dly The Notion of is is most Determinate of its own nature and so most Fixt of it's self and therefore most proper to fix the Judgment 3dly Because all other Notions having some Potentiality and Indifferency in them are as it were wavering between two or more Notions call'd Differences Whereas the Notion of is having none is only Absolutely Steady Immoveable or Undeterminable to any other Notion Lastly Because hence in Literal and not Figurative Speeches the word that expresses this Notion can never be Equivocal since 't is impossible to distnguish it into this or that sence all Distnguishing or Differencing Notions being evidently more Formal Actual and Determinate than the Notion to be Distinguisht which is in this case Impossible 10. To proceed There being as was said a Real Relation between those Notions which are the Subject and Predicate the later being really in the understanding as That which is said of the Former and the Former that of which 't is said and Relation being necessarily compleated and actually such by the Act of a Comparing Power it follows that every Judgment is a Referring or Comparing one of those Notions to the other and by means of the Copula of both of them to the same Stock of Being on which they are engrafted or
we can have no occasion to Speak of False Judgments but in order to the avoiding them which is easily done if we settle the Knowledge of the True ones hence that which concerns us is to treat of True Judgments or Truths and in the first place of Those Propositions or Judgments that are the First Truths which we call First Principles Again since alâ— Propositions are either Evident or Inevident and Inevident or Obscure ones cannot avail us in our quest of Science it follows that only Evident Propositions are to be treated of or made use of by those who aim at Scientifical Knowledge Wherefore since all Propositions or Judgments that are Evident must either be Self-evident or made evident which is done by way of Proof and these Latter must depend on the Former for their Eviâ—dence we are therefore to begin with the Former which are Self-evident 2. All First Principles as being the First Truths must be Self-evident Propositions This is manifest from the very Terms For being the First they can have no other before them out of whicâ— they may be Deduc'd or made Evident or into which their Evidence if lesser may be Resolv'd Wherefore they must either not be Evident at all which would destroy all Possibility of any Evidence or they must be Self-evident 3. Our Knowledges may either be consider'd according to the Order by which they are Generated in us at first or according to the Dependance of one Truth on another and the Resolving them finally into First and Self-evident Principles The Former of these is the way that Nature takes to instill Useful Knowledges into us when as yet we know nothing the Later is the Method which Art makes use of to polish and promote those Rude and Short Knowledges had from Nature then to link many of those Knowledges together and lastly to render them Exact and Evident by Resolving them into First or Self-evident Principles to do which we call to beget Science or to frame a Science of them The Former comes by Experience Unreflectingly the Later is attain'd by Study and Reflexion And 't is of this Later sort of Knowledge and its First Principles we intend to treat in this and the next Lesson reserving the Former Consideration of how and in what manner Knowledge is first Generated till Lesson IV. 4. The Self-Evidence belonging to First Principles consists in this that the two Terms must be Formally Identical For since as was shewn above the Terms in every Ordinary and Inferior Proposition nay in every Conclusion that is True must be materially the same and so the Proposition it self materially Identical it follows that the Terms of the First Principles which ought to be more evident than They as being Self-evident must be Formally Identical 5. The Terms of the First Principles must noâ— only be Formally Identical in sense or be the same Formal Notion but it is moreover most convenient that they be such in the Expression also thâ—â— is 't is fit that the Subject and Predicate in those Propositions should be the same Word taken in the same sence For since First Principles must be the most Evident and the most Clearly Expressive oâ— Truth that can be imagin'd and not liable to the least Mistake and Words are subject to Equivocation which is apt to breed Mistake Obscurity and Error hence First Principles should not only be Formally Identical in sense as when we say Hoâ—â— est Animal Rationale but it is most Convenient they should be such in Expression too as Homâ— est Homo Idem est Idem sibi ipsi Quod est est c. For then whatever Distinction in case of Ambiguity affects the Predicate must also affect the Subject and so the Proposition will not only remain still most Formally but also most Evidently iâ— every regard Identical Note That tho' this be most Convenient yet it may suffice that the Terms when explicated are reducible to the same Formal Expression by the same Word as when we say A Whole is Greater than a part For a Whole being that which consists of Parts and a thing being that of which it consists hence a Whole is All its Parts that is is one part and more than one part whence the Proportion is reducible to this what 's more than a part is more than a part which is not onely most Formally but besides most Evidently Identical 6. This Proposition Self-Existence is Self-existence is of it self most Supremely Self-Evident â—or if the meaning of the word self which is â—oyn'd with Existence be but understood and that the Addition of this word to Existence be not meant â—o signify any the least Composition in it but the most â—imple and most Uncompounded Actuality that can â—e imagin'd then the same Formality in every respect is predicated Intirely of the same and so 't is also most perfectly Self-evident And 't is most Suâ—remely such because it expresses the Existence of â—he Deity which is Infinitely more Simple and more necessarily it self than any Created Exiâ—tence can be Again since every thing the more Potential it is is more Confused that is less distinct and less Intelligible and the more Actual it is the more Intelligible and the Divine Nature which â—s meant by Self-Existence is a most infinitely Pure Actuality it follows that this proposition Self-Existence is Self-Existence is of its self the most supremely Self-evident Proposition that can be Imagin'd 7. This Proposition what is is or Existence is Existence is the most Self-evident Proposition that can be imagin'd to be taken from Created things For since Existence is the most Evident Notion that can be found amongst all our Notions that can be had from Creatures that Proposition must needs be the most Evident and consequently amongst Self-evident ones the most Self-evident in which not only the Notion of the Copula but of the Subject and Predicate too is Existence Again since the Clearness of all Truths whatever depends on the Connexion of the Terms by the word is it follows that unless the Nature or Notion of Existence be first immovably Fix'd or Establish'd to be Coherent with its self that is unless this Proposition What is is or Existence is Existence be Self-evident no Proposition whatever could be Absolutely Certain Clear or Coherent and so there would be no possibility of any Truth Certainty or Evidence in the World Lastly since both the Essences of things and the Existence they have are in the Divine Understanding and the Essences which are only Capacities of Being belong to things as they are Limited or apt to be Created that is belong to them according to the Notion of Creatures which being only Potential as to Being they can have no Claim thence to actual Being or Existence but meerly by the Free Gift of Him who is Essential Being hence the Nature of the Existence of Creatures and their being such is taken purely from God's side and holds entirely of him Whence it is most
expresly or by consequence Included in some part of the Definition the Formality of one is in some part the Formality of the others as the Notions of Ens Corpus Mixtum Vivens Sensituum are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and integrate the Definition Note that the Genus must be Immediate because otherwise it confounds the Intermemediate Notions with the Species and so gives a less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd Hence Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly or in part speak the Notion or Nature of Animal Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Difference of Ens and Vivens 12. Hence Dichotomy or a Division made by two Members is the best For in such a Division the Parts if rightly exprest may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible that is not-Divisible of Animal into Rational and Irrational that is not-Rational of Number into Odd and Even or not-Odd For since there can be no Middle between Contradictories it is Evident there can be no more Members than Two and consequently that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole 13. The Whole Definition and All the Members of a Division that is rightly made if taken together may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration For both of these taken together are Equivalent to the Whole Notion Defin'd and Divided and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word as by Man Animal c. v. g. Every Rational Animal is capable of Science Every Clown is a Rational Animal therefore Every Clown is Capable of Science What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion All Number is either Even or Odd therefore All Number is capable of Proportion 14. Out of what has been proved 't is seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science For since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing and therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg such as Science ought to be from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented and this as has been shown is done by Definitions it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science 15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this when two Notions by being Remote seem in a manner Disparate and so the Proposition is Obscure we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally Identical appears in both of them Which done all farther disquisition ceases and the Point is demonstrated For example If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable we shall find that the word Laudable signifies deserving to be spoke well of and Practical Self-Evidence as well as Reason telling us that our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Mankind to express their thoughts that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of and that what 's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks or to true Reason deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good that is thought well of To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Disposition to Act according to True Reason it comes to appear that Virtuo and Laudable have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical and that this Proposition Virtue is Laudable is full as Certain as that What 's according to right Reason is according to right Reason or what 's Laudable is Laudable which seen perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of Virtue is Laudable that is 't is the Proposition Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated Note hence that in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles Rigorous Definitions do not alwayes need but Explications of the two Notions or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms may serve so they be True and Solid since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the Inferiour Truths and the Notions that compound them into Superiour ones For which reason also Practical Self-evidence or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts through Converse with those Natural Objects is sufficient For this is a Solid Knowledg tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape Whence it may Suffice oftentimes without Framing the Demonstration coucht in these Discourses into a Syllogistick Method unless the Form of the Discourse be Deny'd 16. Hence follows that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them For since all Truths are therefore such because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing or to its being what it is which is express'd by an Identical Proposition it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them 17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction and is grounded on it For since all Truths as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing are grounded on the things being what it is and so have an Identical Proposition for their Bases therefore for the same reason every Error being a Dis-conformity to the Thing or a Deviation from its being what it is must be Grounded on this as its first Principle that the Thing is not what it is which is a perfect Contradiction 18. Hence follows necessarily that if Art and Industry be not wanting Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evidâ—nt or an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction For since these as has been prov'd are the Basâ—s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Falshoods and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods that is from Identical Propositions or Contradictions it follows that either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known or be Knowable or Provable to be such or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Propositions or to Contradictions as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity Corol. I. Hence follows that all Learning being Knowledge those Men only ought to be accounted Absolutely speaking True Schollars or perfectly Learned who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour that is thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute By which it will appear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned by the Generality meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors Since the Former know the Truth of the Things or of the Subjects discours'd of
Erronious or False But what 's True cannot be False therefore a Fallible Testimony cannot be a Ground or Reason to prove a Thing no better Attested to be True Note that this Proposition what is True cannot be False does hold in all Truths but those which are in materia contingenti as when we say to day it Rains this Proposition may be False to morrow when it is Fair because the Matter or Subject viz. the Temper of the Air on which it is built is Alter'd But this Exception has no place in Speculative Truths which Abstract from such Contingency and are grounded on our Natural Notions or the Natures of things and their Metaphysical Verity which cannot Alter 22. Therefore no Fallible Testimony can deserve Assent to what it Attests or says For since a Fallible Testimony may attest a Falshood and Falshoods do deprave the Understanding and to Assent to a Falshood is a certain and Actual Depravation of it and therefore to Assent to a thing that may be false is to hazard to deprave it and none ought to hazard such an Injury to his Soul especially when there is no necessity of doing himself that harm or of Assenting in such a Case both because GOD and Nature have furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending till we have Evidence as also because no Outward Force can impel us to Assent nor any Interiour Force but that of Clear Evidence and a Motive that may be False as Fallible Testimony may cannot lay Claim to Clear Evidence either of it's self or of its Grounds It follows that such a Testimony cannot deserve our hazarding to embrace an Error nor consequently to make us Assent upon its Attestation LESSON X. Of Disputation and Paralogisms DIsputation must be fitted to the Occasions and to the Ends we aim at which may be either to clear Truth by combating our Adversary with down-right Reason or only to gain a Victory over the Defendant by Stratagem The manners of Disputing may be shown by putting Four Cases or Circumstances which vary the Method of it 1. When the Defendent holds a False Thesis the way to convince him will not be Difficult if the Doctrin deliver'd above be well consider'd and dexterously made use of For if a fit Middle Term be taken and rightly placed the Conclusion will necessarily follow against him so that he will be certainly overthrown and his Cause lost But if the Disputant be so Skilful as to Reduce his Discourse to Identical Propositions he will not have the face to own his Position any longer the First Lights of Nature standing so Evidently against him 2. To know in what Mood we are to frame our Syllogism we must take the Proposition which is Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet and by the Certain Rules given as above it will be easie to know in which of the Four Moods such a Conclusion is to be prov'd For Example suppose the Defendent holds that Some Body is Unchangeable you must take and prove the Contradictory to it viz. No Body is Unchangeable which being an Universal Negative and withal the Proposition which is to be the Conclusion it can only be prov'd in Celarent as Ce-No Divisible thing is Unchangeable but la-Every Body is a Divisible thing therefore rent-No Body is Unchangeable 3. The same Method must be taken if the Defendent absolutely denies any of the Premisses of the First Syllogism or any of the Succeeding ones or if by Distinguishing he alters the more Universal or Ambiguous Proposition to a more Determinate one Only you must not now take the Contradictory to it as you did at first for then it was your Adversary's Proposition which you were to disprove now 't is your own which you are to prove and therefore you must take your Measures now from it self For example if he Denies the Minor which was an Universal Affirmative you must prove it in Barbara thus Every Quantitative thing is Divisible but Every Body is a Quantitative thing therefore Every Body is Divisible 4. Besides the having a Middle Term and knowing in what Form to argue some other Rules must be Observ'd 1. Get an Exact Notion of the Terms of the Proposition under debate that is consider well in what Common Head they are and how defin'd which is the same as to look attentively into the Nature of the Thing For this will best furnish you with Proper Mediums 2. Agree before-hand with the Defendent about the Meaning of the Words which express those Terms which is the most Solid way of Stating the Question and of avoiding Wordish Distinctions 3. See the Mediums be Proper or Immediate otherwise not being well connected they cannot Conclude certainly although the Form be right 4. Take heed of Equivocation of Words For otherwise you will hazard to be carry'd aside from the True State of the Question and lose sight of the true Nature of the Thing by mistaking one Notion for another and so you will be certainly non-plust And the longer you dispute the farther still you will err 5. Observe well the Doctrin of Dividing right and be sure that each Member of the Distinction he brings has in it the true Notion of the Term Divided or Distinguisht Otherwise he will baffle and confound you with impertinent Distinctions introduce a new Question and put you besides your Argument For example if he distinguishes Space into Real and Imaginary and obtains of you to admit Imaginary Space for one kind of Space which is in reality Nothing he will defeat your Argument and put you to fight against the Air while by getting you to admit Non ens for Ens he may answer or say any thing You have lost all your strength when you forego Nature and suffer your Natural Notions to be perverted The same may be said of the Distinction of Ens into Positivum and Negativum which is plainly to distinguish Ens into Ens and Non Ens. 6. When the Defendent grants any thing then to lay up in careful memory his own Concessions and make use of them against him to force him to admit Truth or retract For otherwise he may perhaps in the beginning of the Dispute yield candidly to diverse things which afterwards when he finds himself pincht and reduced to streights he will flatly deny 7. To be true to your Cause and to seek the Victory of Truth over Error rather than your own over your Adversary that is to hold him still to the Point and to pursue the Eviction of that and not leaving that pursuit to catch the Adversary at advantages and follow on that game to show him Weak and Self-contradictory tho' it is not amiss to hint and then wave it as is the less-laudable way of those who fall to argue ad hominem Yet if the repute of the Person happens to weigh more with his Followers than the Strength of his Reasons and that he is held Obstinate and to want Candour it may be a Duty to Truth and
now may Walk hereafter An Example of the later may be this Two and Three are Even and Odd. Five is Two and Three Therefore Five is Even and Odd. Where the Major is False unless Two and Three be taken Divisively whereas in the Minor they are taken Conjoyntly Or it may be said that Five are not Two and Three formally but only materially In which sense Aristotle said that Bis tria non sunt sex 16. The Seventh Fallacy is when the Opponent argues à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter Which kind of Fallacy is the Erroneous Principle that begets the Vice of Pride and therefore is peculiar to all Proud People For the sin of Pride does not consist in Knowing what Endowments any one truly has or Esteeming himself as having such Endowments for this is a Truth and did he not know it and what degree of Perfection it adds to him he would neither strive to perfect himself nor know how much he is particularly bound to Love and Thank GOD who bestow'd on him those Accomplishments or Advantages above others But Pride as all other Vices have has a Lye for it's Principle and consists in this that a Proud Person over values himself and Preferrs himself Absolutely before all others that is Concludes himself to be the very Best or Better than others and to deserve more Esteem than they because he is Good or Estimable secundum quid or in some particular which is far short of rendring him so highly Estimable Thus some self-conceited Lady Esteems or Concludes her self to be the Best Woman in all the Country because she has a New-fashion'd Gown or is Finer Handsomer or Richer than others Thus a King or Lord preferrs himself absolutely before all others because he has more Power or can reckon up more Titles than others can Thus a Great Scholar who is Proud values himself absolutely to be Better than those who are Unlearned Whereas a Poor Ignorant Ragged Beggar who has more Virtue or Love of GOD in him has more Intrinsick Worth in him and is absolutely speaking more Valuable than any or all of them notwithstanding their Gayness Beauty Riches Knowledge Honour and Power All the rest are but only Good secundum quid and he is for his Sanctity Good and Valuable simpliciter 17. Thus much concerning those Fallacies that are worth noting if indeed any of them do much deserve it For I cannot discern but that if the Rules for Distinguishing our Notions of Predicating one of them of another and lastly the Right Methods of Arguing both as to the Matter and Form of Syllogisms were observ'd Exactly there is nothing in them that can require the treating of them so elaborately or making such a pother about them as Authors do The Agreeing with our Adversary about the Meaning of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd forestalls those Fallacies of Ignoratio Elenchi and that of Begging the Question The Doctrin given above how to detect the Equivocation of Single Words will prevent any advantage that can be taken from the Ambiguity of the Terms and the Rules of Predicating by shewing how a word that is Univocal taken single may become Equivocal by being joyn'd to Different Subjects will defeat all Stratagems that lurk secretly in such Propositions as is seen in the First Fallacy § 9. The Doctrin of using only such Middle Terms as are either Essential or Proper Causes and Effects renders Ineffectual the Fallacy ex Accidenti as also those of Non causa pro causâ and à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter The Common Doctrin concerning Division viz. that it's Members be Adequate to the Notion Divided makes void and insignificant that Fallacy call'd mala Enumeratio partium In a word let but the Rules given here be warily observ'd and it will scarce be possible the Defender of Truth should be circumvented by any Fallacious manner of Arguing but it will either be seen that the Terms are Ambiguous or which generally happens it will be found that the Syllogism has Four Terms and so is no Legitimate Syllogism The subtlest of them seems to be the First For the single word Animal seems to be taken in the same sense both in the Major and Minor and has the same Definition in both places and yet by reason of the Different Subjects it is not Predicated in the same sense but according to Different Parts of it's Intire Notion or Signification whence the Syllogism has Four Terms in sense that is in reality or in our Mind where Syllogisms are only Properly and Formally however the Word Animal be the same materially 18. The Syllogism which is imply'd in every Practical Judgment of a Sinner has Four Terms or else one of the Premisses which he grants to himself is False and therefore both It and the Action that proceeds from it is a Deviation from Right Reason and a Perversion of Human Nature v. g. Justice is to be done That Satisfaction be taken of my Enemy who injur'd me is Justice Therefore That Satisfaction is to be taken by my self of my Enemy is to be done or I may revenge my self Where the Major is True so is the Minor but when the injur'd person comes to conclude instead of the true Conclusion Therefore that Satisfaction be taken of him that injur'd me is to be done which abstracts from Who is to take that Satisfaction or Revenge whether Himself or the Magistrate who is the Overseer of the Laws and the Proper Revenger of Injuries his Passion and not Right Reason coggs in a Fourth Term not found in the Premisses viz. Satisfaction is to be taken by my self And the same may be observ'd in the Practical Judgment of any other Sinner whether their Sin be Theft Incontinency Rebellion c. Corol. III. Hence all Right Reasoning which causes Science and Truth is also of its own nature the Parent of Virtue and can dictate nothing but what tends to True Morality As on the contrary all False Reasoning does naturally and necessarily beget Error and by means of Error leads to Vice APPENDIX THE Grand Controversy Concerning Formal Mutation Decided In favour of the Peripatetick School 1. THE main Hinge on which the greatest Contests between the Peripateticks and Anti-Peripateticks turn is Whether or no there be that Composition and Division in Natural Bodies call'd Formal and consequently FORMAL MUTATION The Corpuscularian Philosophers and Atomists deny there is any Mutation in the Thing it self either in the Whole or any Part of it and they affirm that there is only an Extrinsecal Application of Particles Figur'd Mov'd and Plac'd in various manners and consequently that the whole Contexture of Natural Bodies is a meer Mechanism On the contrary the Peripateticks by which word I do not mean the Common School-men but those who take pains to understand Aristotle either by his own Books or by his First Interpreters do grant some kind of Particles and Minima