we know all things for that intellectual Light which is in us is nothing else but a participated similitude of that increated Light in which the eternal Reasons are contain'd Now I do not see that this is any acknowledgment at all of our seeing all things in God in that way that Monsieur Malbranch and Mr. Norris explains it that the Soul knows all things that is universals wherin Aristot. did aâ—sert all Science truly so call'd to consist these things we know in their eternal Reasons but he adds by the participiation of which we know all things so that we do not see them under that formality as they arâ— in God but as by participiation these eternal Reasons are deriv'd to us for that intâ—llâ—ctual Light that is in us is nothing but a participated similitude of that inâ—reased Light in which the eternal Reasons are â—ontain'd that is originally in God but derivatively or by way oâ— participation in us so that I am perfectly of Aquinas's Opinion according to this Interpretation which whether it be more true in it sâ—lf or more â—ikely to be Aquinâ—s's mâ—aning is lâ—ft to the Reader to judge But if this Opinion of Monsiâ—ur Malbranch be a truth it has the least appâ—arance of Truth of any in the whole World all our outward Sâ—nsâ—s give Tâ—stimony against it and our inward faculties do not in the least seem to favour it we compare Ideasâ— and disâ—ourse and draw consâ—quences from â—ormer Prâ—mâ—sâ—s just acâ—ording to the mâ—thoâ—s of the other Hypothesis but if it be said that after the use of all these means that notwithstanding we see and know all things in God one might be almost perswaded to think that either God would have made these means under the superintendence of his own Providence effectual to those ends they seem at least design'd for or else to use his own way of arguing would have made use of that more easie and simple way which he might have done by exhibiting or producing the knowledge of these thingâ— more immediately by himself without the concurrence of these outward means which are indeed nothing but useless and ineffectual Conditions Lastly As for the Scriptures he urges in favour of his Opinion I think they do not prove what they were intended for that all our knowledge is from God that he is the Father of Lights and teaâ—hes Man Wisdom that Christ is the true Light that enlightens every one â— c. No Body here denys this but the dispute is not so much about the thing it self as the manner of it that is whether all the Knowledge we arrive at here in this World be only by seeing all things in God accâ—râ—ing to his Hypothesis Monsieur Mâ—lbranch thought perhaâ—s it woulâ— be some â—dvantage to his câ—usâ— if he coulâ— procure it some countâ—nance frâ—m Scripture but when his quotations are so little to the purpose they serve only to create prejudices against it tâ—us others are apt to believe there is but little strength in the cause when Men are forâ—'d to use such inconclusive Arguments in the defence of it Norâ— do I think that those brought by Mr. Norris amount to any necessary Proof St. Iohn he says calls Christ the true Light that is the only Light but may not oâ—her subordinate Lights be also true Lights Is not the light of a Candle a true Light tho' it be inferiour to that of the Sun But however it will not hence follow but that this only true Light may have several ways and methods of giving light to the World besides that of seeing all things in God c. He cites also Io. 17. 17. Sanctifie them by thy Truth thy word is Truth which is not he says meant of the written word but of the substantial and eternal word as appears from the Context but I do not see how any Argument can be drawn from that place unless it be from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which yet doth not always signifie the substantial and eternal word of God but sometimes the preaching of the Gospel as appears from the 20th Verse for all those who shall believe in me through thâ—â—r word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by tâ—e prâ—acâ—iâ—g of the Gospel Laâ—â—ly The Apostle says exprâ—sly 1 Cor. 1. 30. of this divine Word that he is made unto us Wisdom which is exactly according to our Hypothesis that we see all things in the ideal World or divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pa. 222. of Reason and Religion but in answer to this 1. By Wisdom is not here meant natural but divine and evangelical Wisdom 2. The Apostle there speaks of Christ Jesus of Christ more especially as he is made known to us by the Gospel for he is there said to be made to us Righteousness Sanctification and Redemption as well as Wisdom but I suppose he will not say that we see our Sanctification or Redemption that is the ways and methods of these in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or â—deal World or any other ways than as they are reveal'd to us in Scripture 3. May not Christ be made to us Wisdom unless we see all things in the Ideal World I shall here only further observe what Theophylact says upon this place 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. non dixit sapienâ—es nos fecit sed factus est nobis sapientia doni largitatem sc. ostendens perinde ac si dicat seipsum nobis tradidit I have now finish'd those short Remarks upon those two Subjects viz. the law of Fashion and innate Notions not only in answer to Mr. Lock but to some other Learned Persons also who seem to favour his Opinion in the second particular and now if any expression herein seems too harsh or not becoming the Character of such great and learned Men though I hope there is not yet if there be any such I do hereby wholly recall it I hope we are all pursuing the same general design viz. the search of Truth and if so then the detection of any error will but be the promoting of the same common end we all aim at for my part I shall think it so as to my self I would not have Mr. Lock think that pa. 88. I do there in the least insinuate that he held the materiality of God or that I went about to draw him into a Controversie wherâ—in he is nothing concern'd I do freely grant that he asserts the spirituality of the divine Essence in the most strict and proper Sense of it I was once in hopes that he was convinc'd of the Certainty of the Souls Immateriality too by what he said pa. 5th of his Answer to some remarks added to his reply to the Learned Bishop of Worcester but what his Opinion herein is at present I know not I shall here only propound these two things to Mr. Locks serious Consideration 1. Whether asserting the immateriality of the Soul be not a good Fence or stop against the inlet of that dangerous Opinion of the materiality of the diviâ—e Essence 2. Whether it be worthy of a Christian Philosopher to make a bâ—re poâ—â—â—biliâ—y the ground of his asserting things of this Nature for I think he is vâ—ry unfortunâ—â—e in his choice who happens upon sâ—câ—â—n Opinion in Philosophy that it is not poâ—â—â—ble for Omnipotence to make good I shall not here enter into that dispute whether Tully held the Soul to be material or immaterial yet this I think must be granted by all who attentively read and impartially consider his 1st Tusculan Question that whatever nature he held the Soul to be of he makes God to be the same But it is not so much to the purpose to consider what Opinions the Heathen Philosophers entertain'd in things of this Nature as what is worthy of a Christian Philosopher to think of ' em FINIS ERRATA PAge 5 Line the last for hunc read huic p. 12 Line 7 for appeâ—l r. appeal'd p. 15 l. 2. for watsoevâ—r r. whatsoever p. 20 l. 19 for concidere r. coincidere p. 24. l. 13 for quit r. quote p. 27 r. misled p. 38 l 15 for the r. that p. 39 l 18 for mâ—asurer r. measure p. 41 placâ— the Figure 199 200 l. 22 in the l. â—bove 21 p. 4 last line r. prevailing p 45 l 22 reâ—d Mâ—n's p. 48 l. 19 r. prâ—cede p. 54 l. 1 r. sepaâ—ation p. 62 l. 25 for moral r. natural p. 65. l. 4 r. God l. 17 r benignity p. 69 l. 13 r. convenient p. 72 l. 2 r. defendi possint p. 77 l 13 r. hankering p. 85 l 18 dele the second not p. 88. l 13 â—or made use of r. câ—â—ryed on p. 8 l. 27 dele the first And p. â—0 l 7 r â—pâ—curuâ—'â— p. â—5 l. 14 after those add to p. 98 l. 1â— r. other p. â—14 l. 6 r. assert p 116 l. 22 r. ingenuouâ— p 134 l. the last r. externâ—l p. 139 l. 5 r. as p. 140 l. the last r. virtutum p. 141 l. 14 dele much p. 154 l. 12 r. inveâ—tigatio p. 158 l 10 r. very p. 160 l 24 r. ante diluvian
exâ—min'd there are some whose Notions are so iâ—â—ricâ—â—e and their expressions so much out of thâ— common Road that many times they do facere intelligendo ut alij saltem nihil intelligant what I here design therefore in these Papers is clearneâ—s and perspicuity for however deep the pit might be wherein the Ancients plaâ—'d Truth yet I never heard that it was muddy so that what is said of the method of Salvation by the Gospel Rom. 10. 8. may be apply'd generally to all things of a moral Nature the word is nigh thee even in thy Mouth and in thine Heart The learned and judicious Author of the Occasional Papers Paper 1. Pa. 4. tells us that it would be of great Service both to Religion and good Manners to have ill Books as they are publish'd consider'd calmly by Men of Temper I would only propound it further to Consideration whether it might not be convenient also somewhat to enlarge the design and not only take notice of ill Books as he calls them such as either directly or by natural and easie consequence tend to undermine our Faith or corrupt our Manners not only I say to take notice of such but also of the more material mistakes even of good ones the best and wiâ—est Men mâ—y â—ometimes be mistaken in their principlâ—s or dâ—duâ—tions â—rom thâ—m and it is no dâ—sparagement â—or any one to acknowledge it There is one thing further wherein I must beg thy pardon theâ—e Dâ—â—courâ—es want one great ornament of all Compoâ—ures Essays themselves not being excepted that is my transitions are not so soft and well connected as they ought to be this I am very sensible of what the Reason hereof may be I know not whether it be my want of Skill which I rather think nobis non licet esse tà m disertis or want of leisure my other employments not suffering me to apply my Self to these thoughts but at certain intervals or my natural but I confess very culpable indifferency both as to Style and Method however it is if this be any satisfaction to thee I do willingly acknowledge my fault herein Nor must thou expect full and just Discourses upon Each of those Points I here mention neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring herein fully to exhaust a Subject I have no other end or design in these Papers but only the search and defence of Truth and if in any thing I be mistaken and who can seâ—vre himself from mistakes I shall think my self oblig'd to any one who shall with candour and calmness show me my Error Mr. Lock 's Epistle to the Reader examin'd so far as concernes the Law of fashion and innate notions in his second Edition of his Essay of humane understanding WHAT benefit or advantage as to the concernes of truth and usefull knowledge the World may receive by that little difference in Dispute betwixt Mr. Lock and me I know not yet herein I hope we have given an instance of the possibility of manageing a controversie without hard words or unhansome Reflections and if even this was more generally observed it would very much advance the interest of truth however of Love and Friendship in the World among persons of different Opinions I do not in the least question the truth and sincerity of what he there professes that he is always ready to renounce his own and receive the opinion of others according as truth appears on either side yet I hope he will pardon me if I take the freedom to say that the Instance he there gives of altering of his opinion in reference to the last determination of the will of Man doth not seem to come up so fully to his purpose seeing he doth not there so much quit any Opinion of his own to embrace that of anothers as to renounce the common opinion of most tho then believed by him to entertain an Opinion I think purely his own Mr. Lock there complains that his meaning is often mistaken and that he has not always the good Luck to be rightly understood This is a common complaint in such circumstances and I think I may also lay a just claime to a share therein but if I have mistaken his meaning in any thing whatever the cause might otherwise be I do insist upon this in my own vindication that it was not out of any wilful designe And I furthâ—r assure that Learned Man that I never did think my self nor went about to insinuate to others that it was my Opinion of him that he absolutely held no reall difference or distinction betwixt Vice and Vertue I did only ask this question there Whether if Men should place their commendation or blame on that sâ—ide which deserv'd it not whether that would alter the nature of things This I conceiv'd might either set the thing in a clearer light in it self or give him occasion so to do I there also farther appeal'd to himself Pa. 17. of his 1 st Edition where I suppose he did not only declare the sense of the Heathen Phylosophers but his own too upon this Subject when he grounds the reason of Mens keeping their word not upon the approbation of the place Men live in But upon the honesty and dignity of the thing it felf I did also read and consider those other places where he doth positively assert the unchangeable Rules of right and wrong only I must confess I did much wonder how so Learned a Man should go so near as I thought to contradict himself in other places where his expressions seem'd at least to me then to infer the the Rules of Vice and Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature perticularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159. Vertue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publique esteem is vertue But instead of is Virtue in the 1 st Edition it is now is called Vertue in the Second therefore I suppose he say's That the 2d Edition will give me satisfaction in the point and that this matter is now so express'd as to show there was no cause of scruple It may be so exprest now perhaps that there is no cause of scruple tho that I much question but it will not sollow hence that â—here was none but rather the contrary because he has alter'd his Expression in such a materiall point But he tells us That he was there not laying down morall Rules but showing the Original and nature of morall Ideas For my part I dare scarce trust my own eyes against his word I shall here quote part of the Paragraph which he here refers to P. 157. § 6. Of these moral Rules or Laws to which Men generally refer and which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions there seeme to me to be three sorts Here he seemes to me to call 'em morall Rules but whether he meanes the same thing by morall Rules here that he meanes in his Epistle that
exercise oâ— reason Yet by aâ—sistance from the outward senâ—es â— c. Here I cannot but take notice how industriously he endeavous to fix his own seâ—se upon my Words tho ' indeed they will not bear it but certainly here must be some mistake either in him or me as to this particular for in the stating of the Question I sâ—id that the truth and knowledge of these propositions did no way depend upon the evidence of senâ—e or observation therefore methinks I should not presently say that by the assistance of the outward senses wâ— afterward come to the certain knowledge of them in the same sense wherein he seems to intimate it But what if I never sâ—â—d any such thing at all or what I said will not amount to any such sense as he put there upon it He might have done well to have quoted the place then might we better have examined the sense and meaning of it But I think those expressions nor any thing like 'em do no where occur in my Book what comâ—s the nearest is P. 52. I shall transcribe the Words and let the Reader judge These naturall notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and ideots without any assistance from the outward senses or without the help of some previous cultivation For thus reason it felf which yet we say is naturall to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires c. I do not understand that there is any such thing asserted in this place as that which he seemes to make my meaning in the former But I shall have occasion to examine this place again upon the like account But he seemes not to like that expression of the Soules exerting of notions as being a very unintelligible and unfit one in this case misleading Mens thoughts by an insinuation as if those notions were in the mind before the Soul exerts ' em But I have already told him that I do not say that these notions are in the mind from the beginning any other ways than reason it self is and if I did as Mr. Norris very pertinently asks the question How does the Author know but that these naturall impressions may be so ordred that they shall not become legible beâ—ore such a period of time I know not how he would confute it 2 d. I was there dâ—fending innate notions and he opposing 'em it was his part therefore to prove my assertion â—alse but when he barely â—inds fault with this exprâ—ssion of the Souls exâ—rting of notions as if it miâ—ted Mens thoughts c. This is only to suppose it false but not to prove it so He further seems to charge me with some contrariety or inconsistency of expression P. 52. There he charges me with saying that theâ—e naturall noâ—ions exâ—rt themselves as P. 78. That the Soul exerts ' em As to the 1 st P. 52. That these notions exert themsâ—lvâ—s Truly in that place I say no such thing but â—â—â—her the contrary my Words are these â—hese natural notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and ideots Here we may observe that the period is nâ—gative and the negative particle exerts its influence if I may so speak upon the whole sentence But however I say They doe not exert themselves without any assistance from c. Which supposes that with such assistances they do exert themselves but this perhaps is the only instance wherein Mr. Lock doth not seem to deal so ingeniously with me Viz. To charge me with an inconsistency or impropriety of speech only by implication but suppose one who asserts innate notions should say sometimes that they exert themselves sometimes that tbe Soul exerts 'em I think it would not be any such great inconsistency unless Men would be too severely criticall yet this I say that these naturall notions may require or suppose some assistance from the outward senses or some previous cultivation and yet the truth and Knowledge of 'em not depend upon the evidences of sense or observation any more than intuitive knowledge doth But he would have me to explain to my self or others what I mean by the Souls exerting these notions and what that previous cultivation or those other circumstances in order to their being exerted are 1. By the Souls exerting them as it is an act or operation of the Soul I mean the same that I do by all other its acts or operations only the Soul here acts upon different motives and principles and upon different occasions ex gr When the Soul exerts this notion or proposition Snow is white the truth of this she has from sense or experience but in this nihili nullae sunt affectiones there she acts in a more abstracted way of speculation without any notices or assistances immediatly drawn from the sâ—nsâ—s And this I conceive is the wâ—y of his inâ—uitive certainty If he says that this is what he meanes by his sensation and reflection I am very glad of it and shall no ways oppose him And then as to what I mean by that previous cultivation or those other circumstances c. He may observe that I always introduce these exprâ—ssioâ—s with relation or respect to Children going before And so it was P. 52. and 78. So that by that previous cultivation or other circumstances I mean all the previous discipline the Child underwent at School or elsewhere all the benefits and advantages of Education which are commonly requisite in order to reasons coming to a competent exercise of it self So that if I should say that the Soul being so and so qualify'd exerts those notions so as to suppose some footsteps of these truths imprinted or interwoven in the very essentiall constitution of the Soul as such that is as rational I think it an assertion not unreasonable in it self however not possible to be disprov'd or confuted by any one Tho' this is not my way of asserting innate Notions viz. intellectual Notions exclusively of the other which I shall here subjoyn Therefore 2 dly If I say that these Notions are of such a frame or bear such a natural or necessary aâ—reement to the facultys of our Soulâ—s in the free use and exercise of 'em that thâ—y cannot â—ut assent to 'em when fairly propos'd I think this is much what the same with the former especially if we consider that I do not hâ—re suppose the intermediation of any Notices or Ideas drawn â—rom sense in the act of producing them any more than in any act of reason or Speculation whatsoever Now if either of thâ—sâ— two ways if perhaps they be diffâ—rent provâ— reneable then I shall be able to mâ—inâ—â—in my ground for in stating the question I did not confine my self to eitheâ— of 'em parâ—icularly for I said that supposing the Soul so and so quallify'd it then has a native power of finding or framing