Beneficence preserved and kept up amongst Mankind Now in order to discover these same Laws of Right and Property whereby every man is to know what is truly his own I lay down this general Rule as a thing most reasonable That Whereas originally every Mans Right and Title to every thing may be esteemed equal God having given us all the Creatures in common and not by any act of his divided to each Man his several Property If there be any apparent or but probable ground why such or such a particular thing should be the Property of one Man rather than of another that ought so to determine the matter as to oblige all other Men quietly to yield and suffer him to enjoy and use that same thing whatever it be as his own For where the Ballance stands exactly even a small matter is enough to turn the Scale to one side Now in these following Cases there seems to be great Reason for determining a Property in a thing to particular persons viz. 1. When a Man is the first that takes actual Possession of a thing and converts it to his own use For such a Possession is an addition to his general Right beyond what any other Man who never was in Possession can pretend And why should I part with my Possession to any other or he demand it from me except he were able to make out a better Title than I to the thing in dispute 2. When a Man takes Possession of a thing which is actually rejected and deserted by him who last had the Right to and Possession of it For his Case seems to be much the same with his who first takes Possession of a thing 3. When a thing is given or in Exchange made over to another by him who had before a just Right thereto for it is highly reasonable that every Man should have liberty to dispose of his own 4. When a Company of People do by an Agreement make a Partition of what was before in Common amongst them all it is reasonable that every Man should acquiesce in that share which upon such a Division shall fall to his Lot 5. When a Man takes care and pains to produce and rear any thing for his own use or profit it is reasonable that he and not another Man against his Consent should enjoy the benefit of his own Labour And lastly where a Society of People do submit their Properties unto a legislative Power which is erected amongst them it is reasonable that herein they should always be concluded and determined by the Laws of that Community of which they are Members And if there be any other Rules for determining the Rights of Men to particular things it is most evident that due care must be taken to keep and observe them or else farewel all Order and Society 30. Where Fidelity is wanting Society cannot be truly kept and preserved I therefore conclude that every man is obliged faithfully to perform whatever he Promises except the person to whom the Promise is made do freely acquit and discharge him from it But if a Man promises to do a thing which is sinful he ought not to keep such a Promise as that as I have already shewn in the Case of an Oath 31. And the same Reasons which oblige us to hurt no Man to yield to every Man his Right and to keep our Promises do plainly shew that he who wrong fully hurts another or deprives him of his Right or breaks his Promise made to him ought as far as he is able to make full Restitution and Satisfaction to the person whom he has thus injured For he that makes a Breach in humane Society is doubtless obliged as far as he can to repair it 32. Where a Proposition is literally false and yet spoken with no manner of intention to deceive another it is not to be called a Lye But he who asserts any thing for a Truth with an intent to make another believe it which is or for ought he knows may be false he only is to be esteemed a Lyar. Now some have doubted whether the sin of a Lye consists in the bare Untruth or only in the Injustice of it and from thence have been inclined to believe that such a Lye as does no hurt to any one not draws any manner of evil consequence after it is not to be looked on as a sin and so much the less if it be told with a real design only to do Good or prevent Mischief The Niceties of this Controversy I leave to be discussed by others But since humane Society cannot be upheld without in many cases a dependence upon one anothers Veracity I may surely venture thus far to conolude viz. That not only such a Lye as tends to the damage of another but also such a Lye however otherwise innocent as gives occasion to render a Mans Truth suspected in other cases is to be reputed unlawful if for no other Reason yet at least fore this because it is injurious to humane Society And the same Reason will hold as strongly against all mental Reservations and equivocal Expressions For what is humane Society at any time the better for the literal Truth of what a Man says if others who are therein concerned do not understand his true meaning by the words which he speaks to them 33. It is highly reasonable that every Man should have such an Esteem and Respect shewed him as may be proportionable to his Virtues and good Qualities And as it is proper enough for a Man by lawful ways to assert his own Reputation whenever it is unjustly aspersed so he ought to take especial care in the management of all his Words and Actions that he may not seem to exalt or magnifie himself or to despise or undervalue others beyond what is not only just and true but also necessary either for the bringing about something that is good or the preventing something that is evil For there is scarce any thing that gives greater disgust or helps to render a Man more odious to the World than an over-forwardness to praise and magnifie himself and to undervalue others if he be not necessitated thereto by some very just Reason And on the contrary there is scarce any thing which reconciles a Man more to the Favour and Good Will of People than when he is not over apt to ascribe much to himself but is ready to give the utmost Honour and Respect to all others that in reason can be thought due I conclude therefore that Pride is a Sin and Humility a Duty because the former tends to disturb but the latter strengthens and confirms humane Society 34. What is incumbent upon him to do who has done wrong to another I have just now shewn But if another Man wrongs or any way endeavours to Injure me As it is lawful for me so for every Man to stand upon my defence and use my utmost endeavours to save my self from Wrong or recover that
as hoping only for his sake to be accepted who is represented as our only Mediatour and Intercessour with God Whosoever therefore offers to joyn the Merits Mediation or Intercession of any Saint together with Christ Jesus either to strengthen his hopes of Salvation or to make his Devotions more surely to be accepted by God as he seems to distrust the Mediation of Christ as if alone it were imperfect and insufficient so he acts not only without any Warrant from but even contrary to the plain tenour of the Holy Scriptures 13. That it is absurd to attempt and impossible to make any bodily or visible Picture or Image to represent God who is both incorporeal and invisible is most evident beyond doubt or denyal And when any such Representations are made with that design and exposed to the view of the People the natural consequence of them must needs be to beget wrong Notions of God in the Minds at least of the more ignorant sort For such as any thing is represented to them such they will be apt to conceive it in all points to be My Reason therefore alone would sufficiently conclude that it is unlawful to make any sort of Picture or Image to represent God altho he had not so positively forbid it in the Holy Scripture nor so expressly declared himself a jealous God in that particular 14. In all Cases where one man may deceive another to his great damage it is reasonable that he who apprehends such danger should not depend upon another man except he first has good security given him of his Truth and Fidelity Now many times the best or indeed the only security which can be given in such cases is a solemn Appeal to Almighty God who is the Searcher of all Hearts and the Punisher of all Wickedness as expecting and freely offering one's self to his Wrath and Vengeance in case he prevaricates in what he asserts or promises And this is what we call by the Name of an Oath And since he who takes an Oath I mean with due seriousness and consideration does therein make an evident acknowledgment of some of the principal Attributes of God viz. his Omniscience Justice Truth and Power it follows that an Oath duly taken is an act of Honour and Reverence towards God and consequently is not in its self unlawful or evil But if an Oath be taken rasbly or unadvisedly or unnecessarily or in trivial cases it is a lessening and undervaluing of the Divine Majesty which ought always to be treated with the profoundest Reverence and consequently sinful and unlawful And this is all that I can conceive to be forbidden by our Blessed Saviour Mat. 5. 34. Nor can I apprehend that that place contains an universal prohibition of all swearing whatsoever For besides that the very Context in the preceding Verse does most evidently limit the discourse to such Oaths as are purely voluntary and therefore altogether unnecessary There is neither Reason nor Precedent to induce any one to believe that our Saviour would universally forbid any thing which has nothing of Evil or Malignity in its nature And some even of the best of Men not only before but since the coming of Christ and even the Blessed Angels themselves we are assured in Scripture have sworn upon some occasions with great solemnity Nor do the Holy Scriptures in other places where mention is made of the taking of an Oath speak of it as a thing unlawful or forbidden or any way universally evil in its self but altogether the contrary Nor did our Blessed Saviour that we can find design to deprive Princes or Magistrates of any part of that lawful Power which they had over their Subjects before his coming who every where were invested with a Right of exacting an Oath from Them when it should be necessary either for the peace and security of the Common-wealth or for the ending of Differences between private parties And as for that passage of St. James 5. 12. which is by some urged against swearing in any case whatsoever It being no more but a recapitulation of our Saviours words which were just now mentioned needs no other Answer than what I have already given But since the very nature and design of an Oath is to invoke God that thereby a Man may give assurance to another of his truth and fidelity it follows that to affirm any thing upon Oath beyond what the Man who swears knows to be true or not to perform what he has upon his Oath promised is a sin And since he who imposes upon another by doubtful and equivocal words does as much deceive him as he who speaks a down-right Falsity from hence it will follow that such a deceitful Oath is altogether as contrary to the nature and design of an Oath and consequently as unlawful as a false one But altho an Oath lays an obligation upon a Man to do whatever he has sworn yet if a Man swears to do any thing which is a sin and contrary to some former Obligation under which he indispensably lyes to God or Man he can not in this case be obliged to keep his Oath but is bound to repent of it For besides that it is not reasonable that any mans own act should free him from any Obligation under which he lyes to another it is plain that an Oath can neither alter the nature of a sin nor make it lawful to commit it And since the design of an Oath in its own nature is to oblige him to performance that takes it and since the Name of God ought never unnecessarily to be invoked it follows that where a Man ought not to keep an Oath he ought not on any account to take it 15. According to the Customs of different places there have divers Ceremonies and Forms of words been introduced in the taking of an Oath some of them grounded upon Reason and others taken up through mistake in imitation Thus probably whereas it may have been a Custom in some places in an Oath to invoke the Vengeance of God upon ones head from hence likely might arise that Form of swearing by the Head and in imitation thereof by the Hand or other parts of the Body And whereas it was usual to take solemn Oaths in extraordinary cases in the Temple or at the Altar and with us at this time laying the Hand upon the Holy Scriptures from hence might arise the Forms of swearing by the Temple the Altar the Bible c. But here it must be noted that the nature of an Oath being for assurance and consisting therefore altogether in the intention of the parties viz. as well of him who requires it as of him who gives it He may be said really and truly to snear not only who makes use of such a Form and Ceremony as is accustomed or prescribed in any certain place but he who any ways signifies to another an intention to oblige himself under the penalty of God's Wrath and Vengeance
the Scripture To this I might answer That there are several Passages in the Scripture it self which do give us to understand that the whole Law and Will of God as far as it is needful for Man to know them are contained in those holy Writings as the Protestant Divines do sufficiently make appear in the Management of this Controversie against the Papists But waving this I think it is enough to say That it is not indeed impossible in it self but that Jesus might have made known other Particulars of Doctrine and of the Will of God besides what is consigned to us by the Scripture And if any Man can effectually prove that any such Doctrine or Precept was delivered by him I think that whosoever is convinced of the Proof ought to believe that Doctrine and obey that Precept which appear to be so delivered But he that does his hearty and sincere Endeavour to find out the Doctrine and Will of God delivered to Man by Jesus and is not able with all his Diligence to discover any more of it than what is recorded in the Scripture if he faithfully keeps and observes as much of it as he is able there to discover it is plain that God requires no more from him § 14. and therefore certainly will not punish him for want of any thing farther XXXIII Secondly It may be objected That in Reading these Books there do appear to be some Passages which are in themselves absurd and contrary to the plain Dictates of every Man's Reason and Understanding and some which are irreconcileable with one another Now that the Doctrine of Jesus is certainly true must be allowed because it is confirmed by God That both parts of a Contradiction cannot be true is acknowledged by all Men And no Man I think can own that for a Truth which is contrary to the plain Dictates of his Reason and Understanding which to every Man is and must be the Standard of all Truth whatsoever For there can be no Reason why any Man receives and owns any thing for a Truth but only because he apprehends it to be conformable unto the plain and self-evident Notions which are already planted in his Mind Here then it may be demanded how it canbe possible that these Scriptures should contain the true and uncorrupted Doctrine and Religion of Jesus To this I answer First That I cannot find any appearance of a Contradiction throughout the Holy Scriptures in any Point of Doctrine or Rule of Manners but what is so easie and obvious to be reconciled that no Man I think of Candour and Ingenuity but would be ashamed to object it Secondly And as for those few seeming Discordances which do occurr in the Circumstances of some Historical Narrations though I perhaps am not able to reconcile them yet it may be that the things themselves may not be absolutely irreconcilable But suppose they were yet it is no derogation to the Truth of the History as to the main substance of it or of the Doctrine contained in the holy Scriptures that some of the Sacred Writers have been mistaken in the Relation of some small and inconsiderable Circumstances There are several Historians and Chroniclers which give an Account of the Life and Reign of many of our Kings of England and although they differ in many Circumstances of things yet this was never made an Argument to doubt of the Truth of the main History wherein they all agree And why may not the Scripture-Historians be as favourably censured as all other Historians in the World are Thirdly There are many things which are above my Reason and Understanding which I cannot comprehend in my Mind nor frame a clear and distinct Notion of which yet I cannot say are contrary to my Reason Because though they are above my reach yet I do not find that they do contradict any of those plain and self-evident Principles which are implanted in my Understanding For Example I am not able distinctly to apprehend how the smallest Particle of Matter which can be assigned is yet in it self capable of being for ever divided so that no part of Matter though ever so small can ever be so much as convinced to be absolutely invisible And yet this is so far from being contrary to my Reason that my Reason it self does fully satisfie me that the thing is so though I am not able to comprehend the manner of it The same thing also may be said concerning the necessity of some thing being without any Beginning of which see § 5 6. Now if I meet with any thing in Scripture which is thus above my Reason but not contrary to it I cannot refuse my Assent unto it I mean always upon a Supposition that the Words do appear evidently to carry such a Sense For I cannot conclude such a thing to be impossible Because I do not find it contrary to my Reason though above it And if it be a thing in my Apprehension possible I must believe it to be true when I find that God has declared it so to be Other things again there are which are directly contrary unto those self-evident Notions and Principles which my Reason finds to be connatural with it self For Example That a Part is equal to the Whole and such like Absurdities Now if any such Propositions as these which are contrary to my Reason should occurr to me in Scripture I cannot possibly believe them to be true in a Literal Sense for that were to renounce the clear Dictates of my Reason and Understanding upon which the Certainty of all things which I believe or know is ultimately built and without which I could have no Certainty of the Being of God or the Truth of any Religion and therefore I must needs understand them to be meant figuratively And that Figure which best agrees to such Words according to the most common Custom of Speech and is most conformable to common Sense and Reason I think is always to be preferred I never read any Book to my knowledge but in it I found many Expressions which taken literally and strictly were absurd and ridiculous but taken figuratively as 't is evident they were intended did contain very good Sense and Meaning Since then the Holy Scriptures were written in such Words and Expressions as were commonly used among Men in Speaking and Writing why should we think that strange in them which is so usual in all other Books XXXIV Thirdly It may be objected That this Doctrine which I have taught leaves every Man entirely to his own Reason and Understanding to find out the true Religion and the Way to Heaven Now since there is so great a difference between the Notions and Sentiments of different Men it must needs follow that all Men being left wholly to themselves there must necessarily be great Variety and even Contrariety of Opinions among them concerning Religion And if God requires no more from every Man but to do his best Endeavour and to chuse
least that what I have here done may move some more able and Judicious Person to take the Work in hand and supply those Defects of which I have been guilty THE CONTINUATION OF A Gentleman's Religion Being the Second PART 1. THE Holy Scriptures being the only authentick Record that I am able to find of the Christian Religion I take it for granted that they do express Divine Matters really and truly as the things are in themselves And therefore I cannot but believe that all the Doctrin therein delivered is most-certainly true altho many times I am not able to understand the Design and. Meaning of some Expressions and Passages which do occur therein I think it indeed to be very proper that Men of any reasonable Learning and Prudence should modestly offer their Thoughts to the World in order to the explaining of such Places of the Scriptures as appear to be abstruse and difficult But he who speaks his own Words and not those of Scripture can therein only offer his own Apprehensions to which no Man can be obliged to subscribe any farther than as he is in his own Reason convinced of the Truth of them and their Consonancy with the Scriptures 2. I do not apprehend that an implicit Faith is due to the Church of Rome which challenges it Part 1. § 21. much less sure to any other Church which does not require it When therefore any Church much more when any private Men do offer me any Doctrin of Religion in their own Words I think I ought to consider First Whether what they say is intelligible For tho we may be obliged to believe such things as are above our Understanding to comprehend Part 1. § 33. yet it is impossible for any Man to give an explicit Assent to any Form of Words if he does not Know the meaning of them Secondly Whether it is agreeable to the self-evident Principles of Reason for If I apprehend it to be otherwise it is impossible for me to believe it Part 1. § 33. Nor must any Text of Scripture be interpreted above the Level of plain and self-evident Reason whatever the literal Sense may seem to be And Thirdly whether the Truth of it can be proved by any solid Argument either from Reason or Scripture for tho a Doctrin be both intelligible and possible yet still it may be false and therefore is not to be believed except it can be proved These Rules I have endeavoured strictly to observe in the Trial of those Doctrins which I am now about to propose and I desire my Reader carefully to make use of the same in the Examination of all that I shall offer unto him But here I must desire him to take notice that I do fuppose him to be well acquainted with the Holy Scriptures and also with the common Arguments upon which the several Parties of Christians do ground and maintain their Opinions And therefore for his Ease as well as my own I shall save my self the Labour of mentioning such Arguments and Places of Scripture as are usually brought to prove those Points which are generally acknowledged by all Christians and even in those Points which are controverted between different Parties I shall ordinarily think it enough to hint at some of those Texts and Arguments which are used on either side of which I can scarce suppose any Man to be ignorant that is but moderately acquainted with the Principles of Christianity and the several Parties that profess it 3. To believe what God makes known and to do what he commands is what all Men call Religion But things that are impossible 't is certain that God requires from no Man Part 1. § 14. When therefore Damnation is denounced in Scripture against those who receive not the Gospel it must needs be understood only of them in whose Power it was to have received it and not of such who are invincibly ignorant either for want of Capacity John 9. 41. or of the means of Knowledge Joh. 15. 22. But for a Man who has both the Capacity and Means of Knowledge through Negligence to continue in Ignorance of God's Will my Reason tells me is a very great Sin besides all those Places of Scripture which do require us diligently to seek after Knowledge 4. That there is a God is sufficiently to be proved from our own Reason and Observation But fully to comprehend his Nature or declare in all Points what he is is by all allowed to be impossible to us 5. That God never had a Beginning I think I have sufficiently concluded Part 1. § 6. And if the holy Scripture had not told me that he is from Everlasting to Everlasting yet my own Reason would have inferred that he is subject to no Decay nor ever shall have an Ending 6. The Nature of every Material Being seems necessarily to imply a Possibility of having its Parts disjoyned and separated one from another and consequently of being dissolved and destroyed And theresore I conclude that the eternal God does not consist of Matter and that Being which is intelligent and does not consist of any material Parts I call a Spirit And this is what I mean when I say that God is a Spirit As for those Expressions the Eyes of the Lord the Arm of the Lord and such like which do occur sometimes in Scripture and seem to imply Bodily Parts it is manifestly obvious that they must be purely metaphorical 7. Our Experience does sufficiently testifie that whatsoever is visible to us is ever material Since therefore God does not consist of Matter I conclude that he is invisible to Mortal Eyes as the Scripture positively declares him to be And all those Texts which seem to say that he has been seen by Man I think must of necessity be interpreted some other way viz. either 1. Of an Angel appearing in a glorious and majestatick manner Or 2. Of the eternal Son of God assuming a Bodily Appearance as after he took our Nature upon him Or 3. Of some visible and extraordinary Signs and Tokens that the invisible God was there present in an extraordinary Manner Or 4. Of those mystical and Hieroglyphical Representations which God has sometimes been pleased to make of himself not to the Senses but to the Imagination and Understanding of his Prophets in their extatick Dreams and Visions 8. Amongst all those things which I can conceive possible to be done i. e. to imply no Contradiction I can find nothing which to me appears more difficult than what God has already done in the Structure of the Universe And therefore I conclude that God can do whatsoever in its self is possible to be done which is what I mean when I say that he is Almighty Nor is there any one sure who will venture to say that God can do such things as imply a Contradiction either in themselves or to his own Nature and Attributes 9. That God who made all things should be ignorant of any thing appears to
but short and imperfect is confessed on all sides It is also very evident that no Language whatsoever will afford us variety of Words sufficient to express all the Diversities and Peculiarities of our Thoughts so as to secure them from the Mistakes of Ignorance or Misapprehension and the Cavils of Perverseness but that after all our Care our most cautious Expressions will sometimes be liable to be misinterpreted to a contrary or at least wrested to a different meaning from what we intended And therefore the most Acute and Judicious Writer will probably find himself much mistaken if he at any time hopes so to handle any Controversie as to satisfie every Man But since upon the strictest Examination which I have been able to make I am my self fully convinced of the Truth of what I have concluded in this Dispute I will now with God's Assistance try whether I can express my Thoughts with so much clearness and prove them with such sufficient Arguments and pertinent Instances as may give some Satisfaction to others also And that I may the more effectually do this I shall endeavour to proceed as near as I can in such a Method as is always used in Mathematical Demonstrations 4. This word Doctrine is but another Term for a Propesition and what a Proposition is or when it is said to be true or false certain probable or doubtful I need not spend time to explain 5. Reason is that faculty in Man for I meddle not with the Knowledge of Angels whereby he apprehends things and their Attributes or Properties and frames a Judgment concerning what he apprehends And also from those Judgments which he makes draws sometimes more immediate or more remote and distant Consequences 6. The Truth of some Propositions is so very plain that as no Man in his Senses can deny them so is it impossible to find out any thing which is more plain whereby to prove them And such Propositions as these I call self-evident Such for Example are That all the parts of a thing taken together are equal to the whole That both parts of a Contradiction cannot be true at the same time and the like 7. When the Truth of a Proposition does not immediately appear by its own light but yet the Proposition can beyond question be proved from other Propositions which are self-evident such a Proposition as this I term to be built upon Reason alone Such for instance are That two Triangles having equal bases and being contained between the same parallel Lines are equal and all other Propositions which are capable of being demonstrated or clearly proved from the bare Principles of Reason 8. Where the possibility of a Proposition i. e. that it implyes no Contradiction can be evidently proved from the Principles of Reason alone but yet the actual Truth and Reality of it cannot the same way be made appear such a Proposition as this I call reconcilable to Reason Thus for Example That an Oak should grow up to its full and usual Stature in an hour is as possible that is to say as free from Contradiction as that it should do the same in an hundred years for all growth is motion and the swiftness of motion may be for ever increased but that ever this was actually so cannot be proved by any Arguments drawn from Reason 9. Where any Proposition either immediately in it self or mediately in its Consequences does plainly contradict any other Proposition which is either self-evident or built upon Reason such a Proposition as this I term to be contrary to Reason such for Example is this Proposition That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to three right Angles and such like 10. Where a Proposition is in it self true but we are unable clearly to apprehend or frame a Notion or Conception of the things contained under the terms of it such a Proposition I term to be above Reason And a Proposition may be either wholly and altogether above our Reason when we can frame no manner of Conception of the things spoken of or else but partly above it when some Notions of the things we have but those very obscure and imperfect Thus the Doctrine of Light and Colours is wholly above the Reason of a Man born blind who can frame no manner of Notion of these things from the Description which others make of them because he is altogether destitute of proper Organs to receive any Impression from the things themselves But the same Doctrine would not be so much above the Reason of a Man who had some faint and confused glimmering of Sight tho' still much more above his Reason than it would be if he were endowed with the saculty of clear and distinct Sight as other Men commonly are 11. To know is to give assent to a Proposition when it evidently appears to be built upon Reason But when the Truth of a Proposition is assented to not upon Arguments drawn from the Reason or the Nature of the thing but upon account of the Veracity and Authority of the Person or Persons who affirm it such a Proposition as that is said to be believed Furthermore If a Man understands not the meaning of a Proposition and yet believes that it contains a Truth in it because of the deference he pays to the Person who speaks it this I call an implicit belief And properly speaking the Object of such a belief is not the Truth of the Proposition it self but only the Veracity of the Speaker But where a Man understands the meaning of the Proposition which he believes this I call an Explicit Belief 12. No Man can possibly believe or give his Assent to any Doctrine or Proposition which appears to him to be contrary to Reason see Sect. 9. For to own a Proposition to be self-evident or built upon Reason and yet at the same time to believe another which mediately or immediately is contradictory to it is absolutely impossible 13. If a Proposition be reconcilable to Reason Sect. 8. and the Truth of it also testified by such Persons whose Veracity is beyond all doubt or exception such a Proposition cannot but be believed by any one unto whom it comes so testified For if it be reconcilable to Reason then it may possibly be true Sect. 8. and if I am actually convinced of the Veracity of the Person or Persons who relate it I cannot choose but believe that it is True From whence I think it evidently follows that Revelation or the Testimony of another may justly be looked upon not only as a means of Information but also a motive of Perswasion whatever a late Author says to the contrary 14. But that which is most material in this present Controversie is what I am now going to make appear viz. That a Man may have most sufficient and cogent Arguments to give his Assent to such Propositions as are not only in part but wholly and altogether above his Reason Sect. 10. For the clear and plain
evincing of which I shall crave leave to make a Relation of a Conference which once I had with a blind Man to whom when I understood that he had been quite blind from his Infancy and never could remember to have seen the least glimmering of Light I had the Curiosity to put several questions I asked him first of all Whether ever he had endeavoured to frame any Notion or Conception of Light or Colours of which I suppose he had often heard mention to be made in common Discourse To which he answered me That he had often endeavoured it with the greatest Application of his Mind that possibly he could And to that end and purpose he had made it his Business to ask all the questions he could think of whereby to get Information but all to no purpose for that he was still altogether as ignorant of the Nature of Light and Colours and as unable to frame any Conception of them as if he had never before heard the Names of them He told me moreover that he was a long time before he would or could believe that other Men had any faculty at all which he wanted For says he I was sensible of no Defect or Imperfection in my self but believed my self to be altogether as perfect as all other Men with whom I conversed and therefore when they told me that I was blind and talked to me of Light and Colours I apprehended for a great while that they did it only to impose upon me But are you now convinced said I that you are blind and that other Men have the faculty of Sight which you want Yes replied he I am fully satisfied and convinced of it How can that be said I. when you can frame no manner of Notion of Light or Colours which are the Objects of Sight Thus answered he I was convinced of it They would put me at a distance from them and yet would tell me every thing that I did as whether I stood or sate or held up my Hand or let it down or the like Whereas I could not not discover any thing which they did except I were close to them and felt them carefully with my Hands Now by this continued he I am fully convinced that other Men have a faculty which I want whereby they can discover and distinguish things at a distance which they call Sight And I am told by all Men that there is something called Light which is diffused through the Air and is the Instrument whereby they are enabled to exercise this faculty and also that the Colour and Shape of things are the Objects upon which the same is employed But although I can by my touch distinguish between the different shapes of some things and so can frame a Notion of Shape Yet what Light is or what Colours are I have not the least Conception although I am as I have told you sufficiently convinced that some such things there are Now this Relation being for the substance of it true to my own Knowledge or at least as every Man will own it to be possible and rational it will evidently follow without any farther proof that this Man had very good and unquestionable grounds to believe some things that were altogether above his Reason for what Sight Light or Colours were he was utterly uncapable of framing or receiving any Idea But yet that there were such things and that all he heard Men discourse about them was not meer Fiction as he for some time apprehended was plainly proved to him by such Arguments as every reasonable Man must allow to have been abundantly sufficient to move his Assent Nor was this Assent of his which he gave unto these things a bare implicit Belief Sect. 11. as if he had been told that something did Exist which was called Blictri but was altogether ignorant of what was signified by that word as Mr. Toland speaks For aithough it was absolutely impossible for him to frame any direct Notion or Conception of the things themselves yet by those analogous Representations which were made to him of them he well might be and was accordingly not only fully convinced that what was spoken concerning them was not insignificant Nonsense but also enabled to frame some sort of representative Conception of them which is more than a Man can do of Blictri of which he hears only the sound but knows not the Signification For supposing a Man at the very time of his Birth to be utterly deprived of his Organs of Sight yet by the use of his other four Senses he may well conceive what a faculty of Sensation is and how a sensible quality or the small Particles of Matter flowing or rebounding from a Body and striking upon the proper Organ of Sense do make such a peculiar Impression upon it as to affect our Understanding with some particular Knowledge of the Body it self whereby we are enabled to distinguish it from other Bodies And as he can directly apply all this to the Senses of Hearing Smelling Tasting and Touching of which he may be as good or a better Master than other Men So by way of Analogy from these Senses he will be able to make some imperfect sort of Representation to himself what sort of thing Sight is and what Light and Colours are though directly and particularly he knows no more of them than if he had never heard of them Sir Kenelm Digby in his Treatise of Bodies Chap. 28. tells us of a Spanish Noble Man who was born so absolutely deaf that if a Gun were shot off close by his Ear he could not hear it and yet was taught to speak very distinctly and by the motion of any Mans Mouth so perfectly to understand what he said as that he would not lose a word in a whole days Conversation Now the Doctrine of Sounds and Musick must of Necessity have been as much above this Mans Reason as that of Light and Colours was above the blind Mans of whom I but now spoke and yet there might very good Assurance have been given to the one that there was such a Sense as Hearing and such a thing as a Sound as well as there was unto the other in the case of Light and Colours 15. And now to apply what has been said to the Controversie concerning the Trinity and Incarnation of our Saviour And here the Issue which I am now trying presupposes these three things First That the Texts of Scripture which are brought to prove the Truth of these Doctrines are sufficient for the purpose for which they are alledged if we interpret them according to the natural Order and usual signification of the Words and Expressions of them Secondly That the Doctrines themselves are not contrary to Reason as not implying any Contradiction see Part 2. Sect. 22. But Thirdly That they are altogether above our Reason because we cannot frame any Notion or Idea of that particular Union and Distinction which is between the Three Persons of the