came afterwards through consideration of the Thing or Object to judg it True it became determin'd and how but by a Notion the most determinative of any other viz. that of being or is wherfore since to put in her at the same time a Judgment of its possibility to be False puts her to be indetermin'd and this in order to the same This Position puts the Soul to be at once determinate and indeterminate as to the same which states are as vastly distant as actual Being and not-actual Being can remove them Nay this monstrous Thesis makes the Soul Indeterminate to either side that is to Truth as well as to Falshood even after it had suppos'd her determin'd to Truth For to judg a Point possible to be False puts the Judgment Potential or Indetermin'd as to the Falshood of it and False signifying not-true possible to be False must signifie possible to be not True and so include Potentiality or Indetermination to Truth also in regard were it actually True it could not be Possible to be not True or not it self The Soul must then be Indeterminate to either that is neither judg it true nor false even after she was supposed to judg it true in case she can then judg it possible to be false and consequently this Position of Faith's possibility to be false cannot without highest contradâ—ction stand with a hearty conceit that Faith is True To think to escape the force of this Argument by alleadging the respect to different Motives or that the Understanding was not perfectly but partly determin'd is in our case frivolous For I ask was it determin'd enough by any Intellectual or Rational Motives to judg the thing is if not what made it judg so when those Motives could not Is it not evident it must be some weakness or some blind motive in the Will not Light of Understanding But if it were determin'd enough to judg the thing is or is true 't is also enough for my Argument and Purpose § 8. Especially the force of this Argument will be better penetrated when it shall be well consider'd in what Truth and Falshood formally consist and that taken rightly they are certain Affections or Dispositions of our Understanding For that is not to be called True by me which is not True to me not is any thing True to me but when 't is seen by me to be so in the Object and to be thus seen by me is the Object to inform and actuate my Understanding Power as 't is Judicative whence that Power as 't is thus actuated gains a Conformity to the thing it self in which consists the precise nature of Truth However then Truth come from the Object which is the ground or cause of it yet 't is formally no where but in the Understanding or Judgment as appears evidently from this that Truth is found in Propositions now Propositions are not in the thing formally though when true they are deriv'd hence but in the mind only and significatively in words Truth then is that whereby I am true or veracious when I say interiourly the Thing is or is thus and thus wherefore the Truth of any Point is not had till this Actuation or Determination of my Power by the Object which as it's Formal Cause makes this Conformity to it be put And this put to think that at the same time or at once the mind can be unactuated undetermin'd potential or disconformable to it is too gross a conceit to enter into the head of any man endued with the common Light of Reason Whoever then affirm's Faith or those Propositions which express Faith possible to be false he is convinc't by the clearest Light of Reason in case the desperation of maintaining the Truth of Faith for want of grounds drives him not to say any thing but that he speaks candidly what he thinks not to judg or say from his heart His Faith is indeed True having never experienc't in his Soul for want of Principles to put it there that the Object or Ground of his Faith hath wrought in it that Conformity to the thing in which Truth consists and consequently that when he professes Points of Faith to be Truths he either by a fortunate piece of folly understands not what he sayes or collogues and dissembles with God and the world for honour or some other Interest § 9. 'T is hence farther demonstrated that the Position we impugn destroys the Notion of Metaphysical Unity consisting in an Indivision or Indistinction of any Notion Nature or Thing in it self and a Division or Distinction of it from all other For according to this Tenet Truth or the Conformity of our Understanding to the Object put by our joynt supposition that the Proposition of Faith is true may possibly be Disconformity or Falshood and this Determinate State Indeterminate which makes the mind as having in it One Notion that is indeed that One Notion capable to admit into its bowels Another not only disparate but Opposit that is One possible to be not One but Another § 10. The same is demonstrated concerning Metaphysical Verity For this Position makes the self-same mental Proposition or Disposition of the Understanding we call Truth possible to be Falshood that is Possible not to be the same with it self which subverts all Metaphysical Verity that is the Foundation or ground of all Formal Verity or Truth in the World § 11. The same injury demonstratively accrues to Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness For it makes that Conformity of the mind to the thing which is Truth and so the Good or Perfection of the Understanding to be at once possible to be Falshood that is possible to be not good but harmful and destructive to it § 12. I make no question but my Adversaries will think to elude the force of these three last Demonstrations and perhaps of some others by alleadging that they deny absolutely Truth can possibly be Falshood and that they mean only that though the Points of Faith appear now upon considerable Motives to be True yet those Motives secure it not from being absolutely False but not so that they can really be both And I grant this would be a good Answer in case they did not affirm Points of Faith to be really True upon which Supposition taken from the common Language and Sentiments of all that profess Christianity even theirs too as Christians I proceed but only profest they were Likely to be True for then it would be so far from following that Truth could be Falshood or that the same Points could be both true and not true at once that in that case it would follow they ought to affirm they were neither True nor False since likely to be True and True indeed are no more the same than a Statue which is like a man is the same with a man But if all Christians be bound to profess and themselves actually do so that their Faith is indeed
True then let us see how they will avoid the consequences of my former discourse when they assert it withall Possible to be False For it is that very individual judgment they make concerning a Point of Faith or an Act of Faith which they must affirm to be True or a Truth that is conformable to the thing and 't is of the self-same Judgment though call'd by them a Truth of which they affirm that 't is possible to be False or disconformable to the Object And this is not so meant as if it should become so afterwards either by some Alteration of that Judgment into another or of the thing to which it is Conformable but that even that very self-same Judgment while they speak and hold it after their Fashion True may even then possibly be False from which 't is evident that for want of solid Grounds to settle Poinâ—s of Faith in their Soul as Truths they hold them indeed only Likelihoods whose Nature 't is to be Possible to be Fâ—lse and yet forc't by the natural sense and language of Christianity which 't is dishonourable to them too palpably to contradict they become oblig'd to profess them Truths whose firm Grounds make them Impossible to be False though at the same time they affix to them the proper badg of Likelihoods Possibility of Falshood Whence by confounding the purest and solidest nature of Truth 's Gold with other Notions of so base an alloy that it cannot admit any mixture with them all Principles which are to support the true Natures or Beings of things are by consequence attacqu't and could their Position stand would quite be overthrown Fourth Eviction § 1. THe very first Principle of all Truth cannot escape the pernicious Attempts of this Erroneous Tenet 'T is this Quicquid est dum est impossibile est non esse or The same thing cannot both be and not be at once For in Faith-Propositions especially those in which Existent is the Predicate as the Trinity is c. 't is the same to say the Proposition is True as to say the Subject is Existent and the same to say it may be False as to say 't is Possible to be not Existent or that it may not be and our Adversaries relate not this to a several circumstance of time in which they may be conceiv'd to agree to the Subject successively for their sense is that this Proposition a Trinity is c. may for any thing they know even now possibly be False while they pronounce it true Since then to affirm a thing Existent and yet Possible to be not Existent at the same time is to say directly that it may be and may not be at once 't is most manifest that either they must not say a Trinity is Existent or else 't is not possible not to be Existent at the same time that is if indeed that Point of Faith be True they must withall affirm it Impossible to be False as also that they who affirm both profess to hold direct Contradictories So that while these men go about to violate the Sanctuary of Faith whose solid Nature is so built that 't is intrinsecally repugnant to Falsity they by consequence subvert the Ground-work and Bottom-Principles of all Truth So wisely did that best Master of Mankind settle his Doctrin that we cannot call into question that which makes us Christians without renouncing all that makes us Men. § 2. I foresee my Adversaries will still object that I mistake them and impose upon them to relate their Discourse to the real Being of the thing as it stands in the thing it self whereas they intend it only to mean the thing as standing under Notion or consider'd according to divers Motives they either have or may have to perswade or disswade them as to the Verity of it and in plain terms that they mean only this that Faith is not so conveniently proposed to them but that the grounds of it for any thing appears evidently are possible to be False I answer that I also speak of the thing as standing under Notion else how could I put it in Propositions and discourse from the nature and contradictoriness of those Propositions as I do all along But yet lest my Notions should be aiery and empty I am careful to take them from the nature of the thing and to rate the Truth of my Propositions from the Conformity they have to the Object as in it self and the force of my Motives from the relation they have to First Principles and then I am sure to discourse and speak solidly The same I expect from them Whence I ask them whether they assent to this Proposition A Trinity is Existent that is judg it really and indeed True or not If not I argue not against them at present but leave them to be confuted by the natural Sentiments and punsh'd by the abhorrence of all that profess themselves Christians even their own party of whom I have so good an Opinion that they will heartily abominate that man who shall make any difficulty to profess and maintain that there is indeed a Trinity or that his Faith is True But in case they do assent indeed to this Proposition A Trinity is or judg it True then I contend farther that they must be forc't likewise to affirm it to be so in the thing in it self as they predicate that is there is found in the same Thing or Being what corresponds to the Notion of Trinity and the Notion of Existent which put and that they thus judg it to pass in the Thing I affirm that out of the formal Opposition between Existent and not-Existent and their Incompossibility in the same subject which they cannot but know it follows necessarily that they must judg it Impossible it should be not-Existent or that that Proposition should be false at the same time they judg it true and the thing existent nor ever afterwards unless the thing whence it 's Truth is taken be Alterable I will endeavour to explain my self a little clearer if I can As real existence so ultimately determines and actuates the Thing in which it is that it excludes while there all possibility of real non-Existence so Intellectual or Iudg'd Existence exprest by the word is so ultimately determines and actuates the Soul as to its Judging Power that it excludes whiles there all Possibility of judg'd non-Existence in such sort that the Soul being by Nature fram'd a Capacity of Truth 't is no less Impossible it can judg a thing may be and may not be at once than 't is that a thing should at once be and not be in reality Again I affirm that 't is equally impossible the Motive which in case she acts rationally convinces the Soul the Thing is should consist with a Possibility of it 's not Being as 't is that the Soul can at once judg it to be and not to be or that the thing can both be and not be
natural and proper sense in which all mankind takes it for what in reality and indeed is so which I affirm to be sufficient for my purpose or to ground all those Arguments which I bring thence to evince the Impossibility of Faith's Falshood But I fear the Objecter confounds the First operation of our understanding with the Second that is our simple Apprehension or Meaning of the word Truth or True with the Propositions or Judgments made concerning it For not only weak people judg many things True which stand under no Certain Grounds but even solid men when the Concern of the Point is sleight and no circumstance awakes them into a heedfulness and as it were engages their Honesty to speak rigorous Truth oftentimes carelesly and unconcernedly admit Things for Truths which are far short of having Grounds elevating them to an Impossibility of Falshood and indeed are far from being judg'd Truths even by themselves while they seem to admit them for such nay more though they sometimes use them as Truths when the weight is not much whether they be so or no as when in a Rhetorical Discourse or even in a solid one for Illustration sake we make use of the Story of the Phoenix or such like or when in ordinary conversation we relate many passages abetted by no certain Authority but taken upon the account of rumour perhaps invented by witty humour the Truth of which it were in those circumstances Imprudent and Impertinent to discountenance but to let them go with a kind of Transeat or a valeant quantum valere possunt Yet in both cases what the solid man out of unconcernedness passes and what the vulgar man out of weakness judges as a Truth both the one passes the other judges to be in reality and indeed so whence both of them have the genuine simple Apprehension or meaning of the word Truth and the same all other men have however the one misapplies it the other permits it to be misapply'd in Propositions Nor will any distinction of Truths morally speaking probably Truths c. serve the turn for Truth as was said speaks the Conformity of the Judging Power to the Thing that is a Real disposition of the mind which therefore either is or is not in the same manner as the Wall is either white or not white not admitting for it's difference probably or not-probably any more than Being does But as it is impossible but the Wall if it be not white must necessarily be not-white or have some other disposition in it which is not-whiteness so 't is impossible but the minde if not Conformable to the Thing or True must be Un-conformable or not-True meaning not-True negatively not privatively so as to signify False and consequently in stead of that Conformity it must have some other Disposition in it whatever that Disposition be Objection II. In some places of this foregoing Treatise Objective Truth is confounded with that disposition of the understanding or Conformity of it to the Thing call'd Formal Truth or Truth in us Answer The clearing this requires the making an exacter discovery into the nature of Truth To do which we will begin our explication with noting that our understanding hath two Operations omitting the third Discourse as not pertinent to our present purpose viz. Simple Apprehension and Iudgment The result or Effect of the first is call'd a Notion Concerning which Philosophers discourse thus that when I apprehend what is meant by the word Man or have that Notion in me Mans nature is both in the Thing and in my Conception for 't is impossiole my Conception being an imminent Act I should conceive what is not in my Conception or that my Act of conceiving should be intrinsecally determin'd to be this but by what is intrinsecal or in it What is meant then by the word Man has two states one in the thing as existent out of me the other in the thing as existent in me as the self-same figure is in the Seal and the Wax Yet neither of these different States enters into the Notion I have of Man but meerly what is common to the Thing under either State which is what answers to the definition for both Man taken as in himself is a rational Creature and also what I conceive or mean by the word Man is rational Creature though the words rational Creature express neither the being in my Minde nor out of it but abstract from either By this means my Mind concieving Man gains an Unity of form with the Thing out of it or a Conformity to it which Disposition wants nothing to be call'd Truth but that 't is incapable of grounding Affirmation or Negation the bare meaning of the word Man neither implying is nor is not Whence Truth and Falshood are usuall said to be incompetent to the first Operation of our Understanding We will make way to the Second Operation of our Understanding by another Instance of the first Imagin then there is propos'd to my Eye a Round Pillar which it affects and by it my Brain and so my Understanding it cannot fail to beget there a simple Apprehension and consequently a Notion of what is directly imprinted which is that Thing with as many of its qualifications as were apt to be convey'd in by means of that sense confusedly blended together as also by my Experience that it affects or is affecting me of it's Existence Moreover as Occasion or indeed Nature guides me I may have distinct or abstracted notions of Pillar Roundness and Existence nay more of Pillar and Roundness as exercising or actually having the same existence or which is all one of what is meant by this Proposition the Pillar is round that is of what corresponds to those three distinct notions put now in a frame of a Proposition and so immediately apt to express Truth or Falshood and yet not proceed to behave my self affirmingly or denyingly or judg any thing concerning them but meerly to conceive what is meant by those words Way being thus orderly made towards the Second Operation of the Understanding by disposing the separate notions in a fitting posture by the First nature seems to require It should supervene and so the Understanding sets it self to judg whether those Extream or distant notions exhibited by the First in the posture of Connexion be indeed connected or no the standard or measure of which is to be taken from the Thing Now in self-evident Propositions and First Principles the Understanding guides it self by that imbred or nature-taught Principium Intellectûs The same is the same with it's self In deduc't Propositions by the same Principle fundamentally or originally and immediately by this Those notions which are the same with a Third are the same with one another But in our present Instance Experience alone suffices to inform the understanding supposing the obvious knowledg of what Pillar and Roundness are and that a Pillar is a Thing whereas Roundness without Pillar is
stand to it and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it For example tell him he believes there was a K. Iames because those who pretended to live then have told us so but what if they were mistaken His answer would in likelihood be to this purpose what a God's name were they blind in those dayes that they could not see who was King then Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrableness in such a point in case they had eyes which nature taught him men generally have Insist farther Perhaps they were not mistaken but had a mind to cozen all England that came after them Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply To what purpose should they all make fools of every body Which words though rudely exprest yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing as far as 't is built on Nature For first it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose end or reason Next his Interrogatory way is in his rude style equivalent to a Negative and so it signifies there could be no reason for it and lastly his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given that the thing could not be done which involves necessarily a knowledg of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded and also of that Principle no Effect can be without a due Cause both perfectly suppos'd and held by him though not exprest in his rude Enthymeme From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is and that 't is distinguish'd from Experience in this that Experience is onely found of what uses to make the Minor in this virtual discourse but Practical Self-evidence is of Conclusions deduc't as it were from a common maxim naturally known as the Major and a Minor for the most part experientially or else Practically known which joyn'd with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists make up that virtual discourse Again it differs from Science in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium identifying the two Extreames and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which beget Evidence whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion than sees it Secondly 'T is collected that this Practical Self-evidence is notwithstanding True Knowledge though perhaps it be the sleightest kind of it in which 't is differenc't from Opinion built on probabilities For seeing such Assenters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledg of the natures of diverse things in common which make the Minor as also by Nature of all the Principles of our Understanding which countervail the major and force the Consequence it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence and cossequently 't is it self a True Knowledg likewise Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum and shew by what means 't is possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True or the same the Apostles taught by the Churches Testimonie because they know the Inerrableness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily And lastly 't is collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned is Demonstrable to the Learned in regard These are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledg which the other 's incultivated Reason would give no account of Objection V. That first Principle Every thing while it is is necessarily what it is seems to be often times misapply'd particularly Evict 2. § 11. 13. to Truth at present whence the Arguer would conclude that 't is Impossible that a thing should be also at present False Which is true if it be meant of Objective Truth but then it seems to miss the Question But the consequence holds not in case the Discourse be of Formal Truth that is of Truth in us or of Truth to us that is of Certainty for none pretends that his Judgment can at the same time be Conformable and Disconformable to the thing which speaks those inrintsecall Dispositions call'd Truth and Falshood in us or that himself can be Cetrain or Uncertain of it at once which expresses Truth and Falshood to us this being put those Motives which only he had at present in his Understanding able to prove the Point true and false both or at once whereas what is pretended by the Objecter is only this that though upon present Motives he now judges it True and Certain yet afterwards upon other Motives he may come to see it False Answer I mean in those places Truth to us or Certainty But the Objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world or as if True False Certain and Uncertain could be relative to one person only First then my Position is that whoever puts a thing True to himself yet possible to be False to another puts no less a capacity of the thing 's being at once thus True and False though in several Subjects than as if it were in one Subject onely Next he supposes each of those different Judgers to have possibly just Grounds for so judging since he puts in one Motives sufficient to evince the Truth of the thing in the other possible ones to conclude it's Falsehood For our Question is not to what degree weak Souls can miscarry in assenting but what degree of strength is found in the Motives to Faith which the Objecter as a Christian that is as a Holder that Points of Faith are Truths must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it True and yet as himself contends leaves it still Possible to be False that is proveable by other Grounds to be so for else the word False cannot mean False to us or in the Subject as is pretended that is he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason held by one True by the other False Now 't is the Impossibility of such opposite Grounds I constantly maintain or that the Grounds of Faith are Impossible to be False Thirdly hence I go farther and urge that if those different Motives can oblige justly one man to hold Faith True the other to hold it False then putting them in the same man it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the Contradiction and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my Third Eviction I know it will be readily answe'rd that this will not follow because the Motives being disparate the more probable one would when in the same subject over-power the other and so hinder the opposite Assent But I desire it may be consider'd that Intellectual Motives or Reasons have their power to
FAITH VINDICATED FROM Possibility of Falshood OR The Immovable Firmness and Certainty of the Motives to Christian Faith Asserted Against that Tenet which denying Infallibility of Authority subverts Its Foundation and renders It Uncertain Desistes adversus alios dicere caeterùm ita pro Veritate loquêris ut ea quae dicuntur argui refellique non possint Dionys. Areopag Epist. 6. LOVAIN A. D. MDCLXVII Introduction THough nothing be more natural than that all who deny the Certainty of the Rule of Faith should deny also the Certainty of Faith it self since the Certainty of this later depends on the Certainty of the former and it is impossible the Conclusion should be held Certain unless the Premisses be held so too yet the conceit which the Generality of those who call themselv's Faithful or Christian have of their Faith and consequently the nature of that kind of Assent is such that nothing can sound more horridly and blasphemously to their ears than bluntly and without disguise to say That all their Faith may possibly be a Ly for any thing any man living absolutely knows For a certain goodness of Rational Nature has fixt this apprehension in them that since the World is made for the Salvation of Mankind it is unsuitable to the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence which has furnisht us with means of Certainty for our inferiour concerns that the Principles on which Eternity depends should fall short of that Certainty and consequently of strength and efficacy to move carry us on to a steady pursuit of that greatest and in comparison onely Interest Notwithstanding so unresistible is the force of this evident truth that whoever has deserted the Catholick Church and her Rule of Faith Tradition can have no absolute Certainty of Faith that is indeed no true Faith for that truly is Faith which the Generality of those who use the Word mean by it that the more intelligent amongst them conscious of the manifest weakness of their Grounds are necessitated in their Controversies when they should defend their Faith in plain terms to disgrace and betray it chusing rather candidly to confess it to be all a possible Falshood than to undertake that impossible performance to maintain that it is an Absolute Truth I cannot resemble this Natural Conceit of the perfect Certainty of Faith inbred as it were in the Generality of those who have had even a glimmering of Christianity to any thing so well as to the apprehension the former World had of a Godhead For as natural Instinct forc't those who had not light to know the True God to affix the Notion of a Deity to some false one as some eminent Heroe the Sun Thunder Fire nay there was nothing so ridiculous but they would make a God of it rather than forgoe the tenet of a Soveraign Power so deeply rooted in them by Nature so our modern Misbelievers rather than they will relinquish their Opinion that Faith and the means to know the way to Heaven is absolutely-Certain springing naturally from the conceit they have that God has a Providence for the Salvation of Mankind chuse to misplace the notion of the Certain means to know God's will or Rule of Faith in the most unlikely things imaginable as in a ridiculous whimsy of Fancy little better than a Dream nay sometimes in a dream it self or in the motion of some hypocondriacal vapour as do the Fanaticks others in other things seemingly wiser as in their opinions of some men they esteem Good and Learned in meerly their being educated thus by Parents who confess they have relinquish'd what themselves had been educated to in Interpretations of words by Grammatical skill which were writ long ago and in dogmatical points where every word is capable of equivocalness nay which is indeed as mad as the most extatick of them all to affirm that such words are so plain to every Reader that none can miss the right sense of them All which though plainly confuted by this Principle which Nature teaches the rudest that That can never be a way which many follow to their power and yet the greater part are misled joyn'd to their plain Experience that many followers of these wayes exceedingly differ yet so prevalent is the force of the other Truth that they will wink at this later to embrace that insomuch that none of those I except Seekers by what name soever they are call'd as not being pretenders to Faith but were they ask'd whether they be not as Certain of their Faith as that they live would readily and heartily answer affirmatively I mean those of every sort who follow meerly the Guidance of uncorrupted nature in this affair Notwithstanding as in the Pa gan World There were found many Witty men who out of Unacquaintance with the True Godhead and the Unworthyness of the False Gods then in vogue or out of a conceit of many misgovernments in the world speculated themselves out of their natural notions and went about to deny absolutely there was any God at all so it happens that amongst those who have deserted the Catholick Church there are found diverse men of speculative and searching brains who out of Unacquaintance with or at least their sleightly penetrating the nature of the Catholick Rule of Faith the Living Voice and Practice of the Church or TRADITION and withal seeing the Vanity and manifest Inability of their own pretended Rules to ascertain them absolutely their Faith is True joyn'd with the experienc't Disagreement in Faith amongst diverse Pretenders to it would speculate themselves out of their Natural Christianity and deny any Absolute Certainty at all of Faith or the way to Salvation contenting themselves with a Probability in the Grounds 't is built on miscall'd by them Moral Certainty confessedly consistent with a Possibility of Falshood Which kind of Grounds permits that perhaps all may chance to be shown to morrow a meer Illusion and a bold Lye and all the Christian World hitherto to have been possibly led by the nose by a False Impostùre nay to have held that Imposture Most Sacred and preferr'd the adhering to it before all the Goods Life or Nature could bestow How near this wicked Tenet approaches to Atheism appears hence that 't is next to the Denial of a God-head to deny that in proper speech we know Him or the Way to Him Yet this is the very Position of those who put a Possibility of Falshood in Faith since none can truly be said to know that to be true which he sees and acknowledges may not be true at the same time This Seed of Infidelity sown when the Rule of Faith was renounc'd first dar'd to appear publickly above Ground in the writings of Mr. Chillingworth and the L. Falkland and though had it been propos'd barefac't in another occasion it could have hop'd for no welcome Reception even amongst the Generality of the Protestants themselves who were made believe ever since their Breaking from the Church their Faith
else by seeing that they are each of them the same with a Third whence follows that unless that Third Notion can fail to be the same with it self those two Notions which are the same with it cannot possible fail to be the same with one another The former is called Self-Evidence this later Evidence by deduction Both are built immediately upon this grand Verity that The same is the same with it self wherefore unless it be seen that the Truth of that most Self-Evident Axiom is engag'd in their Patronage they cannot be even known to be True and if it be seen that it is thus engag'd they must needs be known impossible to be false since 't is most manifestly impossible that First Principles should be false or that the same should not be the same with it self Wherefore either Points of Faith need not be known to be Truths or else they must by Reflecteâ—s at least be known impossible to he false § 3. The same is evinc't from the nature of the Subject in those Propositions which affirm the Truth of any point of Faith For if we look narrowly we shall find that the Subject in those is either formally or in effect a Proposition it self as when we say This Proposition Christ is really in the Sacrament is true That God is one and three is true c. Where the Subjects are manifestly these Christ is really in the Sacrament God is one and three or a Trinity is A Proposition then being a Speech apt to express Truth or Falshood nay necessarily determin'd to do the one excepting those which speak of a future Contingent it follows that who ever is bound in reason to affirm that the Proposition expressing the point of Faith is True is bound likewise to affirm 't is impossible to be false if taken in the same sense he means it that is indeed if taken for the same Proposition since 't is impossible Truth should be Falshood Either then Christ's followers are not oblig'd to affirm the Points they profess are true which thwarts the Sentiments of the Christian part of mankind or else they must necessarily be oblig'd withall to affirm them impossible to be false § 4. The same is concluded from the nature of the Copula is whose office being to connect or identifie the notions of the Subject and Predicate that is to express that what is meant by those two notions is to be found in the same Thing or that they have one common stock of Being its proper signification is Being or Existence not absolutely as if it meant that either of the Terms exists in Things but comparatively or conditionally as it were that that Being which belongs to one of the Terms is the same Being with that which belongs to the other or that by the same Being whereby one of the Terms is the other is also Now then this kind of Expression or Signification being such as has no latitude between it and its utmost Opposit or Contradictory is not it being the most uncompounded notion that is and not capable to be mingled with any alloy or participation of its Opposit as it happens in Contraries it follows that who holds the Truth of the Proposition or which is all one the Identification of the two Terms exprest by the Copula is must hold it absolutely and the Opposite to be impossible to be false nothing being more impossible than that is and is not should both be true at once or that the same thing should be the same and not the same in the same respect that is should be true and not be true And hence it is that though distinctions use to fall upon the Equivocalness of the two Terms yet no man that knows what Logick meant ever distinguisht the meer Copula its simplest notion not admitting any possible division § 5. Our Argument from the Copula is particularly strengthen'd from the nature of the Predicate in the Propositions we speak of I mean in such Speeches as affirm such and such Points of Faith to be True For True means Existent in Propositions which express onely the An est of a thing as most Points of Faith do which speak abstractedly and tell notwherein the nature of the Subject it speaks of consists or the Quid est So that most of the Propositions Christians are bound to profess are fully exprest thus A Trinity is Existent a Christ God-and-man is Existent c. and the like may be said of those Points which belong to a Thing or Action past as Creation was Christs Crucifying was c. For Existent is the Predicate in these too onely affixt to another difference of time and 't is equally impossible such Subjects should neither have been nor not have been or have been and have not been at once as it is that a thing should neither be nor not be at present or both be and not be at present Regarding then stedfastly the nature of our Predicate Existent we shall find that it expresses the utmost Actuality of a Thing and as taken in the posture it bears in those Propositions that Actuality exercis'd that is the utmost Actuality in its most actual state that is as absolutely excluding all manner or least degree of Potentiality and confequently all Possibility of being otherwise which is radically destroy'd when all Potentiality is taken away This Discourse holding which in right to Truth I shall not fear to affirm unconcern'd in the drollery of any Opposer to be more than Mathematically demonstrative as shall be shown more particularly hereafter it follows inevitably that who so is bound to profess a Trinity Incarnation c. is or was Existent is also bound to profess that 't is impossible they should be not-Existent or which is all one that 't is impossible these points of Faith should be false § 6. The same appears out of the nature of distinction or division apply'd to our Predicate Existent as found in these Propositions For could that Predicate bear a pertinent distinction expressing this and the other respect or thus and thus it might possibly be according to one of those respects or thus consider'd and not be according to another that is another way consider'd But this evasion is here impossible for either those distinguishing Notions must be more Potential or antecedent to the Notion of Existent and then they neither reach Existent nor supervene to it as its Determinations or Actuations which Differences ought to do nor can any Notion be more Actual or Determinative in the line of Substance or Being than Existent is and so fit to distinguish it in that line nor lastly can any determination in the line of Accidents serve the turn for these suppose Existence already put and so the whole Truth of the Proposition entire and compleat antecedently to them 'T is impossible therefore that what is thus affirm'd to be True should in any regard be affirm'd possible to be false the
vast Oceans on either side America to overswell the Continent and so destroy it they are forc'd to confess interiourly America may for any thing they know possibly not be whence they are forc'd to suspend as to its Existence and only Assent to it's extream Likelihood of existing § 4. The use I make of this discourse at present is this that though Likelyhoods have a great latitude yet Assent being the terminus of those Inclinations towards it which gradually exceed one another consists in an Indivisible as does the notion of is on which either seen or deem'd to be seen 't is built and to which it goes parallell That all Acts falling short of Assent to the Existence of a thing advance no farther than great Assents to it's Likelihood and fall under the head of suspensive Acts as to that things Existence as the Soul will discover upon reflexion and that when we mistake one for the other 't is for not distinguishing well the great resemblance between assenting as to outward Action and as to the speculative Truth as also between assenting to the extream Likelihood of a thing and assenting to its Existence That whensoever we see the Possibility of a things being False or not-Existent which in our case is all one we cannot have an Assent to it's Existence but to the likelihood of it only and suspend as to its Existence or actual being and that therefore they who acknowledg that notwithstanding all the Means used and all the Grounds it has Faith may possibly be false to us cannot be held to assent to the Existence or Truth of those points but to suspend concerning their truth and to assent only to their likelihood to be true Which whether it be a sufficient disposition to denominate such persons Christians will easily and best be determin'd by the vulgar of Christianity who possess the genuin and natural meaning of the word Faith untainted with the frantick conceits sprung from such speculations as are taken out of Fancy not as they ought from the nature of the Thing § 5. The same Argument may be made from the nature of firmly Holding as was from Assent and the self-same discourse mutatis mutandis since 't is most Evident none can firmly hold a thing to be true which he sees and acknowledges that is holds may be False however he may hold it Very likely to be True § 6. The same is evinc'd from the notion of knowing which word I take here abstractedly unconcern'd what kind of knowledg it be provided it be True and proper knowledg and not abusively so call'd For since nothing can be known to be but what is nor known to be such but what is such again since Christians if they have either Honesty or Wit in them must some way or other know points of Faith to be true whose truth they esteem themselves bound to profess and stand to even with the loss of their lives it follows those points must be what they are known to be that is True and consequently unless knowledg can be Ignorance impossible not to be or to be False § 7. What hath been said of Assent and Holding and Knowing may also be discours'd from the notion of Certainty for this has the same nature with the former as it is a determination of the Understanding I mean Intellectual determination is the common Genus to them all and they differ only in this that Knowledg and Certainty are proper Effects of Evidence whether sprung from the thing or from the Attester nor can they be where there is wanting the Intellectual Light issuing from that First Principle of all Evidence so oft spoken of whereas Hâ—lding or Assenting can proceed from the Blindness of Passion or from Ignorance as well as from the clear Sight of the Understanding Now that the Nature of Certainty consists in an Intellectual Determination thus originiz'd and consequently when put excludes all possibility of being otherwise which is the point I aym to evince appears partly from the Etymology and most evidently from the Use of the Word For Certus signifies Determinate As then when the matter spoken of restrains that word to Volition it signifies an Absolute Determination of Will or Resolution as certus â—undi so when we are speaking of the Ground of Intellectual Certainty and say the thing is Certain we intend to express full as much as when we say the thing is which speaks Ultimate Determination and Actuality in the Object consider'd in it self and in like Manner when the same word is intended to signifie Formal Certainty in Us or that Disposition of the Understanding whereby it is said to be Certain it must necessarily signifie unless contrary to the nature of Words it's most formal Notion be less rigorous then those which are less formal a Determinate state of the Understanding or an Intellectual Determination Whence as a thing is then Certain or Determinate when it is so the Understanding is then Determin'd according to it's Nature or Certain when the Thing is seen to be as it is which immediate Effect of the other is impossible but by virtue of the first Principle of Evidence making that clear discovery and This engaged all Intellectual Potentiality or Possibility of not being seen to be is totally and formally that is most absolutely excluded The true and genuine Notion then of Certainty imports an absolute impossibility that that judgment which so fixes and determines the Understanding should be an Errour or False Since nothing can be seen to be but what really is § 8. Again since Determination in any kind is the Terminus of all Indetermination in the same kind and so beyond it it follows that Certainty or Intellectual Determination is plac'd beyond all possible degrees of Indetermination of the mind or Uncertainty Certainty therefore is not attain'd till all possible degrees of Uncertainty and consequently Possibility of Falshood to us or Errour be transcended and overcome Faith then must be deny'd to be Certain if it be put Possible to be False §9 And as my former Discourse has endeavour'd to display the Nature of Certainty from its Genus and Difference which compound it's Definition so the same will be still more satisfactorily evinc't from observing the Language of Mankind when they use the word Certain For that being most evidently the signification of a word which the intelligent Users of that word intend to express by it if by divers sayings of theirs we can manifest that they meant to signifie such a Conception by that Word that will infallibly be the true meaning of it and that Conception will have in it the true Nature of Certainty Let us observe then attentively what is at the bottom of their hearts when they use these and the like familiar Discourses which naturally break from them How frequent is it when any one asks another Is such a thing true and the other replies I verily think it is he returns
can be seen to be unless it be we can frame an Inerrable Judgment that when we see that First Principle engag'd for the Identity of those two Notions 't is engag'd for it and so they identify'd that is we must know Infallibly that that Proposition is true This I say in case it be a True Certainty and not an only deem'd or mistaken one yet even then there is a deem'd Infallibility and the person that mistakingly judges himself certain of a thing judges withall that he cannot be mistaken hic nunc in that particular which manifests that the Notion of Certainty is the same with that of Infallibility however it may be misapply'd Again since the natural use of words gives it not to be nonsence to say I am Infallibly Certain of such a thing 't is plain that the Notion of Infallibly is not disparate from the Notion of Certain or incompetent to it it must then be either Tautological or else be a different yet appliable Notion and so apt to difference or distinguish it but it cannot be this later for then the Notion of Certain ought in all Reason and Logick admit with equal sense the opposit difference Fallibly which we experience it does not nothing being more absurd and foolish than to say I am fallibly certain of a thing 'T is clear then that infallibly is not fit to difference the Notion of Certain or not a different Notion from it but the same sense reiterated in another word for aggravations sake as when we say I saw it with mine own eyes or such like that is if we consider it calmly we shall find that that malignant word Infallibility which so bewonders our Opposers amounts to no more but true Certainty and has the self-same Notion with it § 16. Fourthly it appears that seeing what may be otherwise how unlikely soever needs but a lucky chance to be so they who say Faith may possibly be False instead of establishing it subject it to Chance and Contingency and confess it has no Grounds so to secure it but a greater Wit than has been formerly may possibly shew it to be False that is may subvert all the Grounds it now stands on So that these men are convinc'd not to settle Faith upon any firm Grounds or on the Nature of the thing but to hang it on Humane Wit that is on the Wit of the present Christians maintaining its Plausibility and possibly on the fortunate want of an acuter Wit than any now extant who when he shall arise may perhaps outwit them and shew all their Faith to be a ridiculous foolery § 17. Lastly speaking of Truths 't is perfect Nonsense to say they can possibly be False since 't is a direct contradiction Truth should be Falshood as is evident in Predications of past or future things viz. in these Christ has dy'd the Resurrection will be the former of which if once True has been and so cannot have not been the Circumstance of Time being gone in which only it could not have been and the later if once put to be true that is to stand under certain or unimpedible Causes is Impossible to be False or not to succeed So that 't is the greatest madness and folly in the world to put either of these possible to be False if they be once rightly judg'd Truths and indeed I fear rather that they who judg the later possible not to be subject them to impedible Causes and so make them or at least their Grounds as to our knowledg Future Contingents which have neither determinate Truth nor Falshood Speaking then of those Propositions or Points of Faith which predicate de praesenti it will be found by the Considerer that they are all in a matter which is unalterable and above Contingency and in case this were not their very Determination to the present frees them from being other than they are for the present Every thing while it is being necessarily what it is There is no shadow therefore of Ground for a man who affirms Points of Faith to be Truths to affirm withall they may possibly be False All I can imagine in their behalf to excuse them from speaking palpable Contradictions is this that perhaps they may mean our Discourse while in viâ to find out these Truths was impedible and so there was then a possibility they might not become seen to be True that is might be no Truths to us But the Question returns Whether in the end of our weighing their Motives we discover them to be Truths or no If not why do we so asseverantly affirm they are and why are we bound by Religion to profess them to be so or if we come to discover they are Truths how are we so stupid as not to discover withall that they cannot possibly be Falshoods § 18. My last Argument from Logick shall be this that there is no way left to prove Faith or perswade it to another that acts according to perfect Reason in case it that is its Grounds as to our knowledg can possibly be False And that this is so is not so much evident from any particular Consideration in Logick as from the whole Nature of Artificial Discourse or Disputation For in case the Premisses be but Morally Certain as they call it or possible to be false that is if the two Terms be not seen to be connected these Propositions may nay ought to be deny'd by the Respondent whose Office and Right it is to grant nothing but what is Evident lest he ensnare himself but to put the Arguer to prove them What then must the Opponent or Arguer do Must he bring a Syllogism consisting of Premisses only morally Certain or possible to be false to make the other good What will it avail since these Premisses are also deniable for the same reason and so in infinitum that is nothing at all can possibly be concluded finally till Grounds impossible to be false be produced which put the Conclusion may be such also Wherefore unless Faith have Grounds impossible to be False and consequently able to shew It such also none can Rationem reddere Fidei give a true Reason of their Faith but such an one at best as in due right of Dispute is â—â—deniable at pleasure Whence Faith is rendred both unmaintainable or indefensible in it self and unperswadable to others that guide themselves by perfect Reason For however all who discourse of Religion when they would convert any to Faith use not to pin their Motives to Syllogistical Form Yet since no Reason in the case of convincing the Understanding is allowable but what will bear the test of true Logick and this assures us there 's no concluding any thing at all without relying finally on Premisses or Grounds impossible to be False it follows that how finely and quaintly soever these men talk unless they produce such Grounds they can conclude nothing at all and all their importunate Perswasions which
are not reducible to these Grounds nay are made use of by Persons who declare against having any such Grounds for Faith signifie just as much as if they should say I beseech you Sir be so good natur'd as to believe me though to tell you true I acknowledg sincerely neither can I bring nor can there possibly be brought any Ground able to make good what I say or any undeniable Premisses to force my Conclusion Third Eviction § 1. THus far Logick Let 's see next what Nature and Metaphysicks say to the Point in which Quest yet we must not leave Logick's Assistance And first these Sciences assure us that as all Capacity of different Beings springs from First Matter so all Capacity of contrary Determinations arises from what we call Potentiality or Indifferency in the Subject Now the Subject in our present case is not so much our meer Faculty of Understanding as the Points of Faith it self in our Soul or the judging Power of our Soul consider'd precisely as affected with these Points for 't is these or our judging Power taken meerly as conversant about These that is our Judgments which our Opponents must affirm True yet Possible to be False Since therefore both the Points themselves and our Judgments consist formally in Affirmation and Negation that is in is and is not which are indivisible and constituted such by a Formality the most formal and actual that can be as hath been shown they can have as such no Indifferency or Potentiality in them to the contrary neither Natural nor Metaphysical nor consequently Possibility of Falshood § 2. The Position of our Adversaries is still render'd more absurd by this Consideration that even in Nature where there is the greatest Potentiality that is viz. First Matter the Subject is not yet capable of opposit Qualities at once but successively at least in the same part Whereas their Position is not that Faith which is now True is possible to be False afterwards upon the Alteration of some Contingent Matter but that 't is Possible now to be False or possible to be now False for any thing any man knows that is the understanding may have possibly Truth and Falshood in it at once and as to the same Part or Point § 3. But 't is still far more irrational in regard these seeming Contraries True and False apply'd to the Propositions we speak of have in them the perfect nature of Contradictories it being necessary that in those which speak de praesenti one should be exprest by is existent the other by is not existent as 't is in those which speak preteritly and futurely that one should be exprest by hath been or shall be the other by hath not been or shall not be To think then they can at once be True and False is to judg that Contradictories may be verified of the same or that both sides of the Contradiction may be true § 4. Again Truth being a Conformity of the mind to the Thing and Falshood a Disconformity to say a Proposition is True and yet possible to be False is to say that the mind consider'd as judgingly conversant about that Proposition may be at once Conformable and Disconformable to the same thing Too wild a Position to be introduc'd into a rational nature by any thing but such a wilful and blind passion as must first actually corrupt and in fine tend to destroy the very nature it self § 5. And to void this Thesis from all possible evasion here can be no different Respects according to which these Affirmations and Negations may be made so to avoid Contradiction but all such Respects are excluded both out of the nature of the Predicate in most of those Propositions as hath been shewn Evict 1. § 5. as also out of the nature of the Points of Faith which standing in the abstract descend nor to nor meddle with subsuming Respects but have their Notions compleated in the common words which express them And lastly because Truths and Falshoods are not capable of Distinctions and Respects For however a Proposition taken into Consideration and scanning whether it be true or no may admit Respects and Distinctions and so be affirm'd to be in this regard True in that False yet what is once accepted to be True cannot in any Respect afterwards be affirm'd possible to be not True or False For example this Proposition An Ethiopian is white is distinguish'd by Respects to several parts and in regard to his Teeth 't is true to his skin 't is false But after those Respects have distinguish'd the Ambiguity of it and so by dividing it into two Propositions settled one to be True the other to be False there can be no further use of Respects or Distinctions which are to antecede to Truth and Falshood by clearing the doubtfulness of Propositions and can have no place after the Truth is once acknowledg'd or supervene to it He then that once acknowledges Points of Faith to be Truths can have no Assistance from recourse to this and the other Respect to evade a Contradiction when he affirms they may be False § 6. Again 't is particularly opposite to the nature of a Soul to have such an Act in her as to judg a thing True yet possible to be False at the same time For our Soul as to her Judging Power is essentially a Capacity of Truth whence the First Principles which ground all Truths are so connatural to her that she cannot but embrace them and judg them true Nothing therefore being more opposit to Truth than a Contradiction it follows that nothing is more impossible to be receiv'd or subjected in the Soul according to her Judging Power than a Contradiction that is no implicatory or contradictory Act can settle there Now to judg a Proposition or Point to be true is to judg the thing to exist just as it affirms and to judg it Possible to be False is to judg it Possible not to exist as it affirms and this not in order to different times but the same that is to judg a Proposition or Point true yet possible to be false is the same as to judg the thing actually is and yet perhaps is not at the same time and this as appears by our former Discourse not to be avoided in our case by difference or diversity of Respects Wherefore since such an Act is not possible to be in the Judging Power of the Soul 't is most manifest that he who holds one side of the Contradiction cannot possibly hold the other that is he who holds Faith may be False cannot hold that 't is True and that if it be held and profest to be True it ought also to be held and profest Impossible to be false § 7. Moreover the Soul antecedently to its being inform'd by the Object was indifferent and undetermin'd to judg it True or False that is to be or not to be but when it
will never the sooner discover her face nothing being to be found but what will still appear Possible to be False the Practical Conclusion naturally following hence will be this to fix there where it lights most advantageous to their temporal Interest in the same manner as men addict themselves to this or that Trade cry it up and maintain it stoutly to be Truth because 't is Creditable to the Profession though they judg all the while it may be a falshood and because they see their Faith can have no Certain or Firm Grounds undertake to make it good that Faith it self needs have none by the best assistances plausible Rhetorick seemingly-probable reasons weak or mis-us'd Testimonies and voluntary Cavils and Mistakes can lend them And in a word since they are not in circumstances to settle any thing to laugh heartily at those who go about it and to endeavour very politickly to pull down every thing which any Intelligent Reader will manifestly see by this establishing Treatise compar'd to their performances to have been the Effects of my Adversaries labours § 14. The Unnaturalness of this Tenet will perhaps be brought nearer home and so be better penetrated even by our Opposers themselves if we reflect how wickedly it would sound from the mouth of Preachers if after a Sermon exhorting and pressing the Faithful to the Love of Heaven or particularly to stand stedfast in their Faith they should in the close to prevent in their Auditors the misunderstanding some overstraining Expressions add an ingenuous caution That they should not for all that adhere to Faith as if it could not be False nor work for Heaven as if there were any absolute Certainty of the being of any such a Thing Is it not manifest this in our case honest-dealing Profession would enervate the force of all the Motives they had proposed and prest And if so is it not as evident that all the efficacy of Christian Preaching springs naturally from the Impossibility that Faith should be False For 't is not only the Unseasonableness of this Profession but the Impiousness of it which would so scandalize the Hearers and either avert them from the Preacher or make them cold in Virtue 'T is clear then that all the forceable Application of Christian Motives to the hearts of the Generality of the Faithful is grounded on the Impossibility of Faith's Falshood and that therefore he who holds the opposite Tenet and would be honest should either leave off Preaching for which this Tenet makes him unfit or else use much caution while he preaches least by implying the perfect Certainty of Faith while he practises Assentation to That he becomes Injurious to Truth and consequently to It too if it be True § 15. But to conclude it has bin no less the Practice of the Governours of the Church or Ecclesia docens to oblige the Faithfull to beleeve what they recommended to them as the Doctrine of Christ and his Apostles Nay Mr. whitby in his late Treatise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 page 53 54. asserts the same of the Church of England as to their Creed or Fundamentals Which had Faith been held by the Governors and the Governed Possible to be False had signify'd just thus much as if the Governours should say You shall believe it though we know it may be false or You shall believe us telling you the Apostles taught it though both we and the Authority we trusted for it may be deceiv'd for any thing we know And as if the persons governed should answer We will believe you though we know you may be in the wrong and the Point it self false which is in effect the same as if they should profess they are resolv'd to believe them let it prove what it will right or wrong True or False So strange a Tyranny in the Imposers or Commanders and Slavery in the Believers or Obeyers as is impossible in either to consist with Humane Nature had not both of them the Obeyers at least been verily perswaded those Commanders had such Motives to propose as should have been able to oblige Assent without which all Command of an Interiour Act of the Soul is Nonsence and Folly Oh but will a witty Atheist say Humane Policy might have made the Governours conceal the Cheat by which means the ignorant govern'd were frighted into a belief of any thing Very likely indeed that amongst so many millions and of those many Saints by our Adversaries own Confession all should persist and be true Conspirators in so unnatural a Confederacy or that in so free an admission of all sorts of prudent people to any kind of knowledg as is practic'd in Christendom insomuch that there are found many thousands of the Governed equal in Parts and Learning to divers of the chief Governours and superiour to very many of them all should so camely permit themselves and the world to be abus'd in a Point no less important than their very Manhood 'T is then above Policy and Force and only atchievable by the Natural strength of the Motives to oblige such Multitudes and so qualify'd to Christian Faith and these Motives must have been Impossible to be False none else being able to subdue the Understandings of such a great portion of Mankind to hold their Proposals true or justifie all the Church-Governours in all Ages from a most unjust and most unnatural Tyranny Divers Principal Objections Answer'd TO mistake every passage voluntarily is so in fashion and so continually pursu'd as the best method to answer Discourses which proceed by the way of Principles that perhaps it were not imprudent to forestall such Blinds and prevent such mis-representers from raising their light and aiery dust by acting our selves if we can the part of an Opponent after a solider manner than we are to expect from those prevaricating Discoursers besides nothing more clears a Point than to manifest that such Objections which aim at the Root of it quite lose their force while levell'd against it I recommended this foregoing Discourse when I had finisht it to the perusal of divers of the most judicious and impartial Friends I could pick out courting their severest candour to acquaint me with its defects Their most pertinent and most fundamental Exceptions I present the Reader with which I have strengthen'd as well as I could and added divers of mine own protesting that did I know my self or knew where to learn of others more forcible and efficacious ones I should not have declin'd the proposing them nor have fear'd to oppose the Invincibleness of the Truth I here defend against the strongest Assaults of the most Ingenious most rational and most acute Discoursers Objection I. The word Truth is both in the Postulata and all over this Treatise taken in too Metaphysical a Rigour in which sense it may perhaps be deny'd that Faith is True or that the Generality of Christians do so esteem it Answer I take that word in the plain
none but onely an Affection or determination of a Thing both known by plain Nature whatever som Schoolmen speculate For these put meer Experience teaches us that that thing which is call'd Pillar is the same thing which is call'd Round or which is all one that in this Proposition The Pillar is round the two extream notions are indeed that is with a Conformity to the Thing identifi'd or that that Proposition is True But to return home to our purpose 'T is clear that Pillar and Roundness Existing by the same existence or in the same Thing are found in the thing after it's manner and in my Judgment or Soul as apt to judg after it 's that is judgingly But Truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of Being as was discourst formerly in the parallel case of Notions but purely and adequately consists in the Unity or Community of Form which my Judgment has with the Thing by having which in her the Soul gains a Conformity to it In this Common Form consider'd as in the Thing consists it's Metaphysical Verity or it 's Being what it is and this Verity consider'd as apt to stamp or imprint it self on my Iudging Power is call'd Objective Truth as receiv'd in me and fashioning or conforming my said Power to the Thing as in it self and so making my Judgment True 't is call'd Formal Truth This declar'd I deny that I any where confound Objective Truth with Formal or what 's in the Thing with what 's in me as in me for that were to identifie those two most vastly and most evidently different States A Supineness too gross for any attentive Discourser to fall into I conceive then what the Objecter would alledge is that I confound those Truths spoken of with Truth to us or quoad nos as the Schools speak For though what 's Truth to us must needs be Truth in it self and in us in regard we cannot know that to be which is not yet what 's Truth in it self or Truth in us is not therefore Truth to us in regard one may upon probable nay improbable or even False Grounds light upon a right judgment in which case his mind as judging is conformable to the thing or True yet still that thing is not true to him in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such or to make him see it to be true Truth then to us is the same with our Sight of it that is with Certainty or Determination of our Understanding by force of Intellectual Motives and this indeed I often seem to confound with Truth in the two former Acceptions but I therefore seem to do it because I am loath to transcribe and apply so often my Postulata and suppose my Judicious Reader bears them in mind Which if he pleases to understand as subjoyn'd to those Discourses it will follow that what is so in the thing it self or perhaps in us if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly profest and held so and consequently by my later Postulatum necessary to be known to be so all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it True to us that is Certain You will say why is it not enough for God to provide that our Acts of Faith be indeed True in us since so they would perfect our Understandings by conforming them to the thing and guide us right but they must also be True to us or be known to be True I answer for two Reasons One because God's Government of Mankind would by this means be preternatural obliging him to hold profess and dye for professing the Truth of those Points which he knows not to be such The other Reason is because every Act of Faith as exercis'd would perpetually involve an Errour in case the Motives to those Assents were not conclusive of the Truth of those Points For however one may light by hap-hazard or through weakness on a Truth from an Inclusive Motive yet since 't is impossible a rational Creature should assent but upon some Motive good or bad hence every Assent practically implies 'T is true for this reason Wherefore if the Reason grounding such Assents be unapt to conclude the Truth of the thing that Judgment necessarily involves a Falshood or Errour however it be otherwise conformable to the thing abstractedly consider'd Truths then being bastard illegitimate and monstrous both the Intellectualness and Supernaturalness of that Virtue call'd Faith make it scorn to own such defective Prâ—ductions Objection III. The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken onely from the Judgments of Learned Men though then that be indeed the meaning of the word Faith which the Generality of Christians mean by it yet the Truth of this Proposition Faith is possible to be False must be judg'd of by the Sentiments of the most Learned Divines the Generality at least the Best of which and Catholicks amongst the rest grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledg and consequently Faith it self to be Possible to be False Answer That Maxim is to be understood of those Propositions which require some Speculation to infer them in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men taken precisely as men of Skill because generally 't is Practically-self-evident to them that such Speculative men differ oft times in their Sentiments and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right yet if they are to act in such affairs they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgments of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest and then their proceedure is laudable because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae or that lies in the power Whence Learned men who have ability to judg of the Reasons those Speculaters give behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action meerly upon their Judgments without examining the Reasons they alleadge in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositions in which 't is either self-evident or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be connected with the Subject as 't is for example in this Man is a rational Creature or this which is palpably consequent from the former Man is capable of gaining Knowledg for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters perhaps Certainer And with the same Evidence the Predicate Possible to be False must necessarily be seen to be connected with Faith by all those who esteem themselves oblig'd by Gods Command to profess and dye for the Truth of those Points they believe Besides they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will that their Assent of Faith is to be Immoveable or adher'd to all their lives that is such as cannot be
had the Word of God for its Basis which they honestly understood to have the same Certainty as if God himself had spoke it yet being drest up by their plausible Rhetorick and advanc'd in a circumstance when they were confuting the Papists the middle sort of Protestant Readers at unawares let it pass as meritorious to their party and the wiser sort embrac'd it both as a real Truth and also as making best for the Interest of their Cause when they would oppugn us what disservice soever it did tot he Common Cause of Religionor Christianity For they were not at all sollicitous so strangely did faction transport them so they could in their conceit overthrow the Infallibility of the Catholick Church though they reduc'd all Faith into Incertainty and all the Grounds on which 't is built into a tottering Contingency It seem'd to threaten a Mischief considerable enough to Christianity that such a pernicious Tenet should be publickly own'd in Controversy to taint the wiser sort of Readers with Atheism in which it hath been too successful but it grew intolerable when it durst take the boldness to appear in Sermons pronounc'd in very Honourable Assemblies and afterwards publish'd in Print where under the Title of The Wisdom of being Religious and a great many seeming shows and I heartily think very real Intentions of impugning Atheism by an ill-principled and in that circumstance imprudent and unnecessary confession in equivalent Terms of the possible falshood of Faith nay even as to the chiefest and most Fundamental point the Tenet of a Deity Religion receives a deep wound and Atheism an especial Advantage as may perhaps more particularly be shown hereafter I envy not that Sermon and some other Productions of Mr. Tillotson their Authour their due commendations though he be my Adversary I acknowledge that in his clear Method or disposition of his matter and the cleanness of his style which fit him for an Excellency in Preaching he hath few Equals and that had he good Principles he would deliver them as intelligibly as any man I know onely I could wish he had right Principles to Ground his discourse without which he can never make a Controvertist but must needs undermine the solid Foundation of Christianity if he undertake to meddle with the Grounds of it even while he goes about to defend it What I am on this occasion chiefly to reflect on is my own obligation which is the boldness of owning and publishing the Incertainty of Christian Faith being come to the height to assert it's Absolute Firmness and Certainty in the best manner God shall enable me and his Providence seems to require it of me at present In regard 't is expected I should reply to Mr. Tillotson 's pretended Answer to Sure Footing whose first Principle in that Reply seems to be this that what he deems the Rule of Christian Faith and consequently that Faith it self is possible to be False for by virtue of this Position which he defends p. 118 and in diverse other places implies and builds on he more oppugns my discourse than by any other Thesis whatever The contrary to which if I evince then the Protestants own confession that they have no Absolutely-Certain Ground or Rule of Faith confutes them without more ado and concludes them to have relinquish'd its onely right because its onely truly certain Rule TRADITION Yet were it not my chief design to establish the Absolute Truth of Christian Faith in it self by all the Arguments I can imagin and not meerly to confute Protestant Controvertists I needed not take the pains thus to multiply Demonstrations or even alledg so much as one For since whatever they pretend seemingly to Antiquity or Authority of Fathers by their voluminous quotations yet they will finally and heartily stand to nothing in contests about Faith as Conclusive but their own Interpretations of Scripture Which being so weak a Ground that every dayes Experience shows it's Failings an ordinary Probability is abundantly enough to overthrow their Discourses whose very Principle is not onely Improbable but evidently a False one Whence the meanest Catholick writer cannot fail to have the advantage over their Best in a Prudential man's Esteem because he cannot possibly miss of a Medium more probable than is their main Ground I declare then that my Chief End in this Treatise is to settle Christian Faith or to demonstrate that it must be truly or Absolutely Certain and that my applying it now and then to my Opposers is onely a Secundary Intention and meerly Occasional Ere I fall close to my Proofs that Faith cannot possibly be False to avoid Equivocation in the words I declare that by the word Faith I am not sollicitous whether be meant our Act of Faith or the Points of Faith that is the Object of that Act but judg that distinction wholly Impertinent in this present discourse and the reason is because I cannot affirm a Point True or False but as it stands under Motives able to make me judge assent or beleeve 't is such or such which Motives if they be such as are able to convince that the Point cannot but be so then my Iudgment or Assent tothose Points thusconcluded that is my Act of Faith cannot but be True because it depends intirely on Grounds Impossible to be False viz. those Motives But if those Motives are not of such a nature as is absolutely Conclusive the thing is then both the Thing Object Point or Proposition of Faith as being onely Knowable by virtue of them may be otherwise and also my Act of Faith or Belief of those Points may be a wrong or erroneous Iudgment that is both of them may be False To ask then if Faith can possibly be False is to ask whether the Motives laid by God's Providence for Mankind or his Church to embrace Christian Faith must be such as of their own nature cannot fail to conclude those points True and to affirm that Faith is not possible to be False is equivalently to assert that those Motives or the Rule of Faith must be thus absolutely Conclusive Firm and Immovable Hence is seen that I concern not my self in this discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly diverse persons penetrate those motives or how they satisfy or dissatisfy some particular Persons since I onely speak of the Nature of those Motives in themselves and as laid in Second Causes by Gods Providence to light Mankind in their way to Faith to which the dimness of eye-sight neglect to look at all or looking the wrong way even in many particular men is Extrinsecal and Contingent Lastly to avoid Mistake and Confusion I declare that there being two sorts of Questions one concerning the Existence of a thing call'd An est viz. whether there be any Certainly-Conclusive Rule of Faith or no and the other about what is the Certain or truely-Conclusive Rule of Faith call'd Quid est I am not now discoursing about the later that was the work
upon him with this pressing demand I but are you certain of it may not you be mistaken Which clearly intimates that that Disposition call'd Certainty is beyond all Inclinations Motions or indeterminate Tendencies of the Understanding making it verily think 't is true which speaks the next remove as it were from a certain Assent and consequently that 't is an absolute determination and fixure of the Soul that 't is true As also that Certainty elevates the Soul beyond hazard of mistake Again many times when one is smartly questioned if he be Certain of a thing not daring upon better reflexion pretend to Certainty he replies warily in a moderate word which diminishes and falls short of the other that he is Morally certain of it which evidences that the Notion of Certainty is in point of fixing or determining the Understanding beyond that counterfeit Certainty call'd Moral Certainty Wherefore since all Moral Certainty as they call it how great soever though it be penetrated perfectly according as 't is in its own Nature is seen to consist with a Possibility to be otherwise True Certainty which exceeds it must needs include an Impossibility to be otherwise Faith then is not in true speech Certain unless it be Impossible to be False § 10. Again let an Overweener after his mistake becomes Visible be challeng'd with it we find that in common speech we use these or the like words You said or thought You were Certain of it but You see You are mistaken Is it not Evident that the word Certain excludes a possibility of being otherwise since his being Certain of it formerly is deny'd purely upon this score because he was mistaken which shews that the true notion of Certain is inconsistent with mistake that is that Certainty implyes Unmistakableness or which is all one Inerrability hîc nunc in the present affair Whereas had the notion of Certainty admitted a Possibility not to be as he judg'd he had not been so mistaken in judging that Certain which by actually happening not to be was shewn afterwards Possible not to be To think to evade by alledging that it was not meant his mistake consisted in judging that Certain or Impossible not to be which was Possible not to be but in judging that would be which afterwards hap'd not to be is meerly Childishness and Folly amongst Men who hold that things are carry'd on by the course of Cause and Effect and that things therefore happen because a Cause puts them or not happen because no Cause puts them To judg then a thing would not be is the same amongst Intelligent Men as to judg there would be no Cause to make it be and if there would be none such 't is most evident it could not be or was Impossible to be in this order of the world Such answers are fit for men who are led more by Sounds than Sense and who think a different word will gain them an Escape though that word signifies the same thing as the former 11. The same will appear from the Absurdity which palpably discovers it self in any Expression that modifies the true Notion of Certain with a Contingency as if one should say 't is Certain per adventure or 't is fallibly Certain The Nonsence of which shews that the true Notion of Certainty implies an Oppositness to all Contingency or an Impossibility to be otherwise You 'l ask what then must be said of the Phrase Moral Certainty where Certainty seems to admit an allay of Contingency I answer 't is evident even hence and from all my former Discourse that the word Certainty is there us'd Catachrestically or abusively for some great Likelihood and its Epithet means such a degree of it as is found generally in humane exteriour actions which depend on Free-will and are contingent as being Particulars and speaks not proper Certainty as 't is meant to signifie that perfect Intellectual Determination whose Principles and Causes being high Truths are unalterable Whence Moral Certainty how high soever it be exalted and triumph in an empty name is in reality Uncertainty and the highest degree of Moral Certainty is the lowest degree of Uncertainty truly so call'd that is of that which expresses an Intellectual Indetermination § 12. Thus much from the use of the word which when it falls naturally and unaffectedly from the tongue of the Speakers is a proper Effect of the Notion or meaning in their Souls that is of the Signification of that word whence 't is an apt Medium to demonstrate that Notion its proper Cause à posteriori § 13. From this Discourse follows first that since speaking of the present and the same in proportion holds of other differences of time 't is the same to say The thing is certain as to say the thing is and to say the thing is speaks Indivisibility the Notion of Certainty too consists in an Indivisible By which is not meant that one Certainty may not be greater than another both from a greater Perfection in the Subject and a greater certifying Power in the Object but that Certainty in the way of being generated in the Soul is either there all at once or not at all in the same sort as there is no middle between is and is not or half-beings of them which are the formal Expressers of Certainty Whence again appears that what we abusively call Moral Certainty is indeed none at all because it reaches not that Indivisible or Determinative Point in which True Certainty consists § 14. Secondly since true Certainty is caus'd in us by seeing the thing is and this cannot be seen but by virtue of Principles especially that chief one A thing is the same with it self which Principles being Truths cannot possibly be False it follows both that what is Certain cannot possibly be False and that what can possibly be False subsists upon no Principles Whence all Moral Certainty as they call it as also all high Probabilities which confessedly may possibly be false are convinc'd to subsist upon no Principles and they who acknowledg they have but Moral Certainty and high Probabilities for their Faith or Opinion confess they have no Principles which in true Language deserve that name to ground them but at best certain likely Topical Mediums that oft prove true or hold for the most part which may serve for a talking kind of Discourse or Exteriour Action but are flat things and useless when Truth is to be concluded § 15. Thirdly it follows that true Certainty of any thing is the self-same with Infallibility or Inerrability as to the same thing For Certainty is not had till it be seen that that First Principle A thing is the same with it self is engag'd for the identification of the two Notions which make up the Proposition we are Certain of that is for the Truth of that Proposition Wherefore since we can have Infallible Assurance of the Truth of that First Principle as also of this that nothing
of the word Knowledg to mean Scientifical Knowledg 't is neither my Tenet nor Interest but will leave it at large for any that are concern'd to explicate how this Knowledg is bred provided they leave the true Nature of Knowledg and do not abusively call that Knowledg which in reality is when look'd into no Knowledg Hence I argue Since 't is impossible any one should know what is not to be known and what is not is not to be known it follows that the Object of Faith is and so here being no contingency in the Matter Impossible not to be and consequently Faith or the Belief of it impossible to be False § 3. Nor am I affraid of those canting Distinctions without sense that 't is Morally a Knowledg or that they know it to be True morally speaking For if it be expended what is meant by these words Morally a Knowledg it will quickly appear that as True Knowledg can onely be an Effect of the Thing 's Being so this Counterfeit Knowledg call'd Moral falling short of the other can onely be the Product of the Thing 's Likelihood to be and so can onely have for its Object the Thing 's Likelihood which whether it be enough to specifie and terminate an Act of Christian Faith I appeal to the constant Expressions of all who are generally call'd and reputed Christians and challenge my Adversaries to produce one Expression of theirs which sounds thus dwindlingly and feebly as if it meant onely some high likelihood or their apprehension of it as no more but such Observe but the Life and Energie of their words in such occasions as that of Iob Scio quod Redemptor meus vivit and that of S. Paul Scio cui credidi certus sum c. and we shall find their Understandings so perfectly possest of the Object 's Existence not deeming onely its Likelihood that they seem rather to want words to express their Absolute Certainty of it Oftentimes indeed they deny Faith to be Evidence or Science and affirm it to be Obscure but what 's this to the purpose while all Relyance on Authority is obscure and Certain Knowledg can be had by means of Authority as appears in diverse Instances of Humane Faith § 4. Particularly waving the former we will reflect on some places more expresly assertive of our Position as that of the Prince of the Apostles Acts 2. 36. Certissimè sciat ergo omnis Domus Israel c. Where about to bring them to Faith he exprest it to be A most certain Knowledg and this Attainable by the whole House of Israel which must mean the Generality at least § 5. I add omitting many others two of his Fellow-Apostle Paul The first Col. 1. 23. Si tamen permanetis in Fide fundati stabiles et immobiles à spe Evangelii Now how any one can be founded or grounded in Faith if Faith be Possible to be False that is Eviction 2. § 14. have no Foundation Principles or Grounds it self how any one can be Stable and Immoveable in a Persuasion which very Persuasion and its Grounds may not only be moved but overthrown subverted as must inevitably follow if it be possible to be False I expect to be inform'd by Mr. Tilletson and Mr. Stillingfleet Do these words sound onely an Exclusion of Actual Doubt or Suspicion of it at present which Protestant Writers make sufficient to an Act of Faith or rather does it not mean that which of its own nature is such as can admit no Possible Cause of Doubt at any time for the future Let them dispense a while with pursuing their affected Gaynesses in the Out-sides of words and take the pains to look into their Meanings and then if they can make out that Groundedness Stability and Immobility can consist with Possibility of falshood I shall promise them my utmost endeavour to hold Contradictions with them for in that case those would be the onely Truths § 6. The second shall be that most emphatical one of the same Apostle Licèt nos aut Angelus de coelo annuntiaverit vobis praeter id quod accepistis Anathema sit Though we or an Angel from heaven should preach to you otherwise than you have receiv'd let him be Accursed Which were a very rude and unreasonable carriage especially for us Christians now adays were Faith Possible to be False and so short of the credit due to so Incomparable Authorities For since 't is known that many things which have seem'd that I may use Mr. T 's words morally impossible to be False have prov'd to be actually and indeed False and 't is granted that 't is always possible to be so but it was never heard that an Apostle of Iesus Christ or an Angel from heaven could or at least did at any time preach False 't is most manifest that nothing which was Possible to be false can with any reason sustain it self against the force of their Authority and that Faith which ought to do so must be Impossible to be False § 7. From the Language and Sense of the Saints and Christians of former times let us come nearer home and see how unsuitable 't is to the Notions and Expressions of present Christianity to say Faith is possible to be False Now the Possibility of Faith's Falshood is built on the Contingency of the Motives which are to ground it for were there no Contingency in them but that their Causes were so laid that 't were impossible they should not be Conclusive they could not possibly fail of being able to conclude and so Faith would of its own nature be Impossible to be False Considering then the Nature of Contingency whether Speculatively in it self or Practically in Instances wherein 't is found we may observe that it implies a certain kind of Proportion between the frequency of Effects on the one side and the Seldomness on the other which we usually express by Ten to one a Thousand to one c. If then Faith be Possible to be False its Nature will bear nay oblige us to express the probable degree of its Likelihood in such kind of Language and that we assert it to be likely in such a proportion but not-likely in a higher for example it would be perhaps wise and agreeable to the Nature of the Thing as thus propos'd to say v. g. 'T is a hundred to one there is a Trinity a Heaven or a Hell but 't is not a Thousand to one that there are any such things Or if any contend I have assign'd too-small an over-proportion to Faiths Likelihood yet at least he must grant that in a greater it would inevitably follow that such language ought in True speaking be used when we are to express the degree of Faith's Firmness Wherefore it being experientially manifest that nothing sounds more ugly to a Christian ear than to say that 't is so many to one Faith is True but not so many more 't is evident that
bind the Understanding to Assent not from their relation to other extrinsecall Proofs corresponding or discorresponding with them but from the Truth of the Premisses on which they intrinsecally depend and the Goodness of the Consequence and finally by virtue of their being built on first or self-evident Principles If then the Motives one man has at present be sufficient of their own nature to oblige him acting according to right reason to judg Faith True who ever has humane Reason ought to assent upon them and if Faith be still possible to be False that is False to us that is be possible to be shown False or possible that others may have just ground to hold it so put those Grounds also in the same man and since they must be convictive of humane understanding they ought to have their formal Effect where they are that is convince it of Faith's Falshood too which however absurd yet 't is the genuine and necessary sequel of this Source of Absurdities viz. That Faith and its Rule may possibly be False How the force of this Discourse is avoidable but by alledging that no man acting according to right reason has just grounds to hold his Faith True to us or can ever have just Grounds to hold it False to us which is to deny the Possibility of Faith's Falshood to us the Opposers own position I profess my self utterly unable to discern Now he that holds these Positions is a perfect Sceptick or a Pyrrhonian as to matters of Religion since he puts an absolute desperateness of knowing the Truth on either side in that matter or subject Objection VI. When 't is said that Faith and its Rule may be False the Arguer misunderstands it to mean that we assert it may actually and indeed be shown so whereas 't is only meant by those words that 't is Possible to be False for any thing we know or for any thing the Grounds of Faith as to our knowledg evince or force to the contrary Answer I know not what Possibility to any thing means if it be not a relation to its being actually and indeed nor a Possibility of being False to us but a Possibility of being actually and indeed such that is of being actually shown so to us And all this must be forcibly admitted by him who puts no proper or necessary Causes in the Thing nor consequently Conclusive Motives in mens Understandings why this Faith now profest should necessarily be the same Christ and his Apostles taught 'T is indeed a different thing to say it may be so and to say I do not know but it may be so But he who maintains that Faith may possibly be False if he be honest knows what he maintains to be True otherwise certainly he were very wicked who would thus disgrace or diminish Faith if he did not know his Position to be a Truth whence follows that such a man must not onely say I know not but it may be False but he must if he will speak out what he thinks be oblig'd to say I know it may be False however he be loath to declare Categorically and sincerely his Tenet in so odious a Point or hazard his credit with the Generality of Christians whose Sentiment he contradicts so expresly Objection VII 'T is enough that Faith be as Certain as that the Sun will rise to morrow that America will not be drown'd as that there was a Henry the Eighth c. which are onely Morally Certain and enough for humane action since they exclude Actual Doubt or leave no suspicion of doubt behind them which as Mr. Stilling fleet tells us App. p. 76. is the highest actual Certainty which the mind of any reasonable man can desire In the same manner as it is Certainty enough for me to use my house that I am morally certain it will not fall on my head though I have no Absolute Security but it may And this kind of Certainty seems more suitable to Mankind being more easily penetrable by the Generality than the other rigorous and over-straining Certainty which seems more fit and proper for the higher sort of Speculaters than for a world of men which comprehends capacities of all degrees and sorts and the greatest part of them perhaps of little Learning Answer The Objecter must prove that all those Instances are only-Morally-Certain or Possible to be False e're he alleadge them for such That of Henry the Eighth which does indeed oblige the understanding to belief I affirm to be Practically Self evident and demonstrable and so Impossible to be False As for the rest they are utterly unfit to parallel Faith's Certitude being all of material things whose very Essence is to be mutable whereas Points of Faith being Truths and in matters not subject to Contingency are essentially incapable of being otherwise than they are that is still Truths So that far easier is it that all material nature should undergo all the Changes imaginable than that any such Truth can not be it self or the Principles on which 'c is built in us desist to be True or Conclusive In particular I would askâ— whether it be enough for Faith to be as Certain to us Christians as it was to those immediately before the Flood that the whole world should not be drown'd which exceeds the case of America's possible destruction or as it was to those after the Flood that the Sun should never stand still or go back or lastly as it is that a house of whose Firmness none had actual doubt should fall If so then the Standing of the Sun in Ioshuah's time and it's Retrogradation in Ezekiah's show the unparallelness of these Instances You 'l say these were both miraculous But this alters not the case first because it was never heard nor can it be held by any sober man that even Miracle can make such Truths Falshoods or those Motives which are of their own nature able to conclude the Truth of any such Points Inconclusive or Invalid Next because if the Motives to Faith and so Faith it self are Possible to be false for any thing we know 't is Impossible to give a satisfactory Answer to a Deist demanding how in case they should prove indeed False we can be assur'd Gods Goodness to Mankind will not step in even miraculously to discover the vanity of so universal an Illusion and the Abuse of Falshoods so absurdly imposing upon the world as to obtain the highest repute of Sacred and Divine Truths Concerning the last Instance of the Moral Certainty of a houses standing which hath been objected to me by learned Protestants as sufficient to make me act as steadily and heartily as if I had a Demonstration that it would not possibly fall besides the General Answer that Points of Faith are Truths which renders the case unparallel I reply that the two houses the one in Holborn the other in Kings Street which of late years a third in Cock Lane which of late days fell when
none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it else surely they would never have staid in them inform us sufficiently to what a changeable tottering and ruinous condition Christian Faith would be reduc'd by these Principles and Parallels No fewer than three Houses fell in the compass of a short time and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an Event therefore may an Atheist say Down falls Christian Faith too whose Foundation was by this Doctrin but Parallel for strength to the other or if it fall not in so long time it has only something better luck not better grounds than had the three Houses As for the objected Unsuitableness of such a Certainty as I require 't is reply'd that nothing is more natural for the Generality of Mankind than to be led by Authority nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the Infallibleness and Veracity of exceedingly vast and grave Authorities relating matter of Fact as we experience in their beleef that there was a Q. Elizabeth and such like to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining as the Obiecter imagins Which being so I make account that God both in his power and wisdom could in his Goodness would render the Authority of his Church the Ground and Pillar of Truth as evident to all her Children both as to its Inerrableness and Veracity as the other nay incomparably more it being in every regard so requisit Objection VI. If the Motives to Faith must be Impossible to be False to us they would necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith wherefore they would of themselves oblige the Understanding to assent and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the Will which yet both Councils Fathers and Catholick Divines with one consent require Nay more were not such a pious affection put Acts of Faith would not be Free Answer If Experience teaches us that even assent to Humane Sciences though Evident from Intrinsecal reasons Comprehensible by our Understanding and purely Speculative is not to be acquir'd without an affection to see Truth as is evident from the carriage of meer Scepticks who having entertain'd a conceit of it's hopelesness come thence to want Love or Affection for it and so never come to see it how Conclusive soever the reasons be Much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to Divine and Supernatural Truths which are Obscure in themselves as depending upon Authority Incomprehensible to our natural reason and Practical that is obligingly-Efficacious to break out into Christian Action or Love of Heaven above all sublunary things as True Faith must be The First obstacle of the three mention'd has this difficulty that the beams of Truth which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our Understanding more naturally penetrate it more deeply and to stick in it more immovably than those which are reflected to us from the Knowledg of another such as are Points of Faith besides the new difficulty of seeing the Veracity of the Attester which how evident soever it be yet it puts the Understanding to double pains whereas Evidence had from the Thing is but a single labour and so less confounding and distracting the thought The Second Obstacle Incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the Understanding and retard Assent nay even to deter it from considering them as Truths The Atheistical temper of the world which could not subsist were Metaphysicks duly advanc'd sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter the reason whereof is because it being natural that our Fancy be in act while our Understanding is so and there being not Proper Phantasms the onely agreeable ones to material men who are not strong enough to guide their Judgments purely by Principles and Connexions of Terms which sute to such abstracted Conceptions but Metaphorical ones onely which the Understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones even while by necessity 't is forc't to make use of them Hence the life of a Christian as such being to serve God in Spirit and Truth and so the Objects and Principles of his new Life for the most part and principally Spiritual ones it comes to pass that for this very regard alone there will need a great love of Truth and Spiritual Goods to make the Understanding appliable to them or even admit a consideration of them I was told by a worthy Friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man but a great hater of Metaphysicks and mentioning a Spirit he in a disgust broke out into these words Let us talk of what we know By which expression 't is manifest that he mistook the Question An est for Quid est But what makes for my purpose is that the unknowableness of the Essence or nature of a Spirit to us in this State obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know Spiritual things to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being much more to conceit it But incomparably more needful is such an Affection when to the Spirituality of those points there shall be added an Incomprehensibleness nay if onely those points be consider'd an Incredibleness when no Parallel can be found in Nature nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and it's possibility nay when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural Causes whence all our other Knowledges have their Stability Then I say if ever there is requisit an Affection for the Nobleness and Excellency of those high Spiritual Objects to make us willing to hearken to any Authority proposing them how evident soever the Motives be for the Credibleness of that Authority The third Obstacle follows taken from the End for which Faith is essentially ordain'd that is from what it essentially is viz. a mover of the Will to Virtue and Goodness or a Practical Principle Now nothing is more evident than this Truth that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting or even attending candidly and calmly to these Reasons how clear soever they be which make against any beloved Interest whence there needs a contrary affection to these other to remove the mists those passions had rais'd and purge the Eye of the Mind that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before though in it self most visible How much more not only requisite but even necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrin of Christian Faith containing Principles which enjoyn a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to Flesh and Blood nay even of Livelihood and Life it self 'T is most manifest then that a Plous
or the clearness of the Proposal of it which only can oblige connaturally the Understanding to conceit it as it ought and consequently the Will to love it accordingly in which conceiting and heartily loving not onely the Intending and Commanding part of the Action is plac'd in our case as it happens in our acting for material Goods but also the Executive and Assecutive Parts of it Not the same sleightness of Motive therefore or Moral Certainty will here serve the turn but true Certainty or Impossibility of Falshood is requir'd this being the best and properest to beget a hearty lively steady and all-over-powering Affection for Heav'n and such as may as it ought make Christians practically repute all other things as Dung in comparison of That § 9. But the main consideration which forces the Certainty of Faith and the Motives which are to beget it that is of the Rule of Faith above those which ground our Action of pursuing Temporary Goods is the unconceivable Mysteriousness of the Points of Faith Truths exalted above the ordinary Course of Nature as far as Heav'n is above the Earth Many of them looking so odd and uncouth to our course Humane Reason unrefin'd by Faith that as they seem'd of old to the Greeks Foolishness so still they are acknowledgedly most unsuitable to the grossness of Fancy by which the Generality of the world especially those who are yet unelevated by Christian Principles are led and confessedly above Reason insomuch as it costs the best Wits of Christianity no small pains to maintain them not to be Contradictory or Impossible to be True Putting then the Motives of Faith and consequently Faith it self Possible to be False the only seeming Certainty I might say the confest want of Certainty of the Motives to believe would be so counterballanc'd by the Incredibleness and seeming Contradictâ—riness of the Thing or Object or rather indeed overballanc'd in the Conceit of all those who are yet to embrace Faith that there would be no over-plus of weight left to incline them to hold those Points True rather than False much less to make them absolutely hold they are Certain Truths And he that shâ—uld assert the contrary I wonder how he would go about to prove it or by what Standard he would measure whether is the greater of the two counterpos'd Unlikelihoods viz. that the possibly false Motive of Faith should hap to be actually such or that the seeming-Impossibility in the Objects should chance to be a real one For 't is not enough to say here that we are in reason to expect the Divine Nature should be exceedingly exalted above its Creatures and incomprehensible and therefore we are not to measure his Perfections by the ordinary Rules found in Creatures but think it reasonable he should infinitely exceed them For however this has weight in Points of Faith which concern the Divine Nature and its Perfections as in it self yet here it will not serve the turn in regard Faith teaches us many other Points seemingly repugnant to the Divine Nature it self and most strangely debasing and vilifying it as that God infinitely happy in himself should be expos'd to injurious Bufferings Scourgings and an ignominious Death for a Creatures sake that in comparison of him is a meer Nothing and that Omniscience and Omnipotence could not invent and practice some easier and more honorable way to work the End they intended and lastly that it should beseem Infinite Goodness that a Person superlatively innocent should be so severely punisht to do an undue favour to those who were enormously wicked This consideration then necessitates plainly the Impossibility of Faith's being false for else 't would be irrational to believe it And lastly it shews the case of Christian Interiour Acts utterly unparallel to that of Acting Exteriourly for sensible and material Goods which one may apprehend to be attainable and also comprehend the Way to attain them without puzz'ling his Understanding with any unconceivable mysteriousness in the business to check his Assent E're I leave this Point I must desire the Reader to reflect well on the condition those persons are in who are yet to embrace Faith They have no Light but their pure Natural Reason and to this are propos'd for Objects to the one side the Motives to Faith or the Authority in our case that God has spoke it on the other the strangeness of the Mysteries Let then those persons understandings no better elevated go about to scan the profound Mysteries of Faith 't is clear and I think confest by all they must needs seem to them Impossible to be True which therefore nothing but a Motive of its own nature seemingly Impossible to be false can conquer so as to make them conceit them really True But this Motive or this Rule of Faith is confest by our Adversaries Possible to be false nor it being a fit and proportion'd Object for Humane Reason is there any thing to make it seem better than it is or Impossible to be false 't is then against all reason to believe were Faith and its Grounds Possible to be false the Motives of Dissent being in that case evidently greater than are the Motives of Assent § 10. Again since 't is incomparably more easie to throw down than to build or less difficult for the Understanding to comprehend an Objection than 't is to lay orderly in the Soul a severely-connected frame of Discourse forcing the Truth of a Point particularly when those Points are utterly unsuitable to Fancy and even exalted above Reason and so lie open to very plausible and easily penetrable Objections on which disadvantage or disproportion to weak Judgments that is indeed a high excellency on the Object 's side Atheists ground their drollery against the Mysteries of our Faith It follows that were not the chief motives to Faith or Rule of Faith practically self-evident and so Impossible to be False there would be considering the rudeness and unelevatedness of the Generality of those who are to come to Christian Faith and the unsuitableness of the Mysteries to their fancyled Understandings greater Temptations and more plausible that is to them stronger motives laid to make them dissent to those Mysteries than to make them assent The motives to Faith then must be Practically self-evident and so Faith it self must be Impossible to be False Seventh Eviction § 1. PErhaps the Language and Practise of Christianity expressing most manifestly their sentiments may give to some a more natural and penetrable satisfaction that 't is Impossible Faith should be false than all the Speculative and Scientifical Proofs hitherto deduc'd § 2. For their Language then I onely hint to the memory of my prudential Readers for to transcribe them were endless all those Expressions so frequent in Scriptures Fathers Councils and the mouths of the Faithful to these very days viz. That Faith is the Knowledg of God his Will and of revealed Truths Nor will I streighten the signification