distinct from the Soul or only the Soul it self acting after a certain manner this being almost as obscure as the other and I care not to employ either my own Thoughts or my Readers upon things whereof I have not any clear Conception All that I shall therefore further treat of concerning the Understanding for so I now call our Reason shall be with respect to its Operations by which the Nature of it is best known and whereof we are not only Conscious by way of Sentiment but have also or at least by self-reflexion may have some Notion and Conception by way of Idea 9. Now these are ordinarily supposed to be three Apprehension Iudgment and Discourse By Apprehension meaning the simple view or perception of a thing by Iudgment the joining or separating of Ideas by Affirmation or Negation by Discourse the collecting of one thing from another And upon this threefold ground our Systems of Logick have for a great while proceeded with great Agreement But as Authentick as Time and Consent have made this Division I cannot think it right when I compare it with what by self-reflexion I find to pass within my own Mind For supposing it were true as to the matter of it that is I mean that Judgment and Discourse did really belong to the Understanding which yet the Philosophers of the Carcesian way will by no means allow yet the Form of it must needs be very unartificial and inaccurate For Truth being the general Object of the Understanding and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and the Relation that is between them 't is impossible there should be any more operations of the Understanding than Perception and Iudgment Perception as to the Ideas themselves and Judgment as to their Relation Which Judgment 't is true may be either Immediate or Mediate Immediate when the Relations of Ideas are judg'd of by the very Ideas themselves or Mediate when they are judg'd of by the help and means of some other Idea but then all this is but Judgment still though in two different ways the difference between them being the same as between judging of a thing under the Formality of a Proposition and judging of the same thing under the Formality of a Conclusion These indeed are different ways of judging but still they are both but Judgments and one as much as the other So that in reality that which these Men call Discourse is but a species of Iudgment and if for that reason they will consider it as distinct from Judgment and make it a third Operation they might as well have put in the other species too Judgment immediate and so made a fourth But then this is against the great Fundamental Law of Division which requires that one of the Members ought not to be so included in the other as that the other may be affirm'd of it Which is plainly the Case here this being such a kind of Division as if one should divide a Living Creature into a Plant an Animal and a Man and that because Discourse is as much a Species of Judgment as Man is of Animal And herein though the matter be so clear that I need it not yet I happen to have the Authority of a considerable Philosopher on my side Monsieur Derodon who in these few words expresses his Sense full and home to this purpose The third Operation of the Mind says he is commonly call'd Discourse but is properly the Iudgment of the Consequent as inferr'd from the Iudgment of the Antecedent 10. By this it is evident that supposing the matter of this Division never so true that is that Judgment and Discourse do appertain to the Understanding yet the Form of it is wrong Discourse which is here made a third member of the Division being contain'd under Judgment which is the second as the Species of it But neither is the matter of it true For Judgment and Discourse or to speak more accurately Iudgment whether immediate or mediate does indeed not belong to the Understanding but as will by and by appear to the Will There is but one general Operation that belongs to the Understanding and that is Perception For as I said before Truth being the general Object of the Understanding and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and their Relations all that the Understanding can here have to do will be only to perceive these Ideas and the several Relations that are between them For when this is done then is a thing sufficiently understood to understand a thing being no more than to perceive its Ideas and how they stand related to one another Here is the whole compass and full extent of the Understanding and all that we can possibly conceive by it and he that perceives Ideas and their Relations understands as much of them as is to be understood Whereby it is evident that Perception is the only operation of the Understanding and that it can have no other 'T is true indeed there is variety in this Perception it being either Simple or Complex Simple of the Ideas themselves and Complex of their Relations which latter again is either Immediate or Mediate as was said before of Iudgment but still 't is all but Perception though differently modified which therefore I conclude to be the only Operation that properly belongs to the Understanding 11. But now if all that of right belongs to the Understanding be Perception then 't is most certain that Judgment cannot belong to the Understanding and that because Judgment is not Perception For we are said to judge as we perceive and some are so much in haste that they will judge before they perceive which plainly shews them to be two different things And that they are so this one Argument well considered is a Demonstration that Judgment is a Fallible thing that may be true or false as it happens whereas Perception is always true it being a Contradiction that it should be otherwise For what a Man does not truly perceive he does not perceive at all I conclude therefore that Judgment is not Perception and since Perception is as has been shewn the only operaâ—ion of the Understanding I conclude again that Judgment does not belong to the Understanding It must therefore belong to the Will which is the proper seat both of Judgment and of Errour too And it is nothing else but the Will 's consenting to and acquiescing in the Representations that are made by the Understanding Which agrees well with those weighty and very fruitful Maxims That the Will is the Subject and Principle of all Errour as well as Sin which indeed ought to be voluntary to make it culpable That 't is in our Power to avoid Errour by suspending our Judgment till the Evidence be clear though 't is not in our Power to avoid Ignorance or Non-Perception of many things by reason of the limitedness of our Faculties That the fault of those that err is that their Wills run
Perswasion of the Mind particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent wherein it agrees with some other Acts of the Mind and the more special and peculiar part that limits and Contracts the General and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd is the Motive and ground of this Assent 'T is it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evidence of the thing but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker 3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent Reason and Authority That is we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete that is if we perceive only in part then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary which is what we call Opinion But if the Evidence be full and perfect then we yield a firm and most assured Assent which is generally distinguish'd from the other by the Name of Knowledge which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not Formally Consist in the Assent but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else For to give yet a further Confirmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion let Assent be never so evident the evidence lies in the Perception not in the Assent which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind and can be said no otherwise to be Evident than as 't is an Assent to an Evident thing that is to what we perceive But now Perception and Assent are not only two things but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge which is an Act only of one And indeed to speak the truth Evident Assent as 't is here applied seems to me a mere jumble of Words confusely uniting together in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties one belonging to the Will and the other to the Understanding And how the result of this heterogeneous Composition should be Knowledge I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension And besides after all an Evident Assent when resolv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know and would it not be a Notable Definition of Knowledge to say that it is an Assent to what we know 4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it as consisting purely and wholely in Perception 't is plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge For 't is necessary that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in general which it cannot do if it be Knowledge for that were to pass over into another Kind Knowledge not being Assent but Perception 'T is therefore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also gone upon a wrong ground and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents which are usually reckon'd to be Faith Opinion and Science since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge is most apparently not so as differing from it no less than in the whole kind 5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Second Assent to a thing when the Evidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is supposed not to be so perfect I answer that indeed so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought there is no proper Name that I know of for it When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is complete this has been usually call'd Knowledge but certainly with the utmost impropriety knowledge as appears being quite another thing But by what name to call it or how to distinguish it I proâ—ess I know not Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing for my Thought of it is very distinct but merely because we want a word for it As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to distinguish it from Assent upon Authority in general For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd somewhat if one could tell what as every generical Idea ought to be distinguish'd by a generical Name But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the Deâ—initio instead of the Definitum and express the things at large by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incomplete though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the other which is fitly call'd Opinion whereby we denote the imperfection both of the Evidence and of the Assent 6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all but only upon Testimony or Authority then we call it Faith Which appears to be an Assent of a quite different Nature from the other two For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence and differ only as the Evidence differs and that is gradually as complete differs from incompletâ— But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind as having no Evidence at all but only Authority for its Ground And thus we have here a Threefold Assent though not such as is taught us in the Schools the Account of which in short proceeds thus All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority If the Reason be incomplete then 't is Opinion If complete then 't is another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General But if the Assent be upon Authority only then 't is Faith 7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man then the Assent that is so grounded is Human Faith If of God then 't is Divine Faith Between which two there is this in Common that they both proceed not
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
so from the second and middle Relations result those Truths which are Necessary Eternal and Immutable and which I understand to be nothing else but the Relations of Agreement or Disagreement that are between Ideas 8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths and upon the as much allow'd Supposition that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eternal which therefore I take for granted as a Principle not to decline the trouble of proving it but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent that they are the Relations that are between Ideas I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them because they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Natures and Essences of things as they are in Idea and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ since then they would not be necessary but Contingent Truths which would be contrary to the Supposition And Because these Necessary Truths are the most considerable and principal sort of Truths as being the Ground and Foundation of all Science and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessary and immutable Truth hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas 9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas 'T is true indeed that exactly speaking all Ideas are Divine Ideas even those which we use to call our own it being most Certain as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn that the immediate Objects of our Understandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect in which we see and contemplate all things But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Divine Ideas it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are that is Necessary and Eternal For Necessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations and it being impossible that Relations should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Necessary and Eternal how can their Relations be so 'T is plain therefore that these Ideas must be Necessary and Eternal But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Divine What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections As therefore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves or between them and their Ideas because then they would be of the Order of Contingent not of Necessary Truths For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas those only being sufficiently steddy and Permanent Subjects to sustain such Stable and Immutable Relations And indeed were it not for those Representative Perfections of the Divine Nature which we call Ideas there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations and then there could be no such Relations and if no such Relations then there could be no Necessary Truths and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Capable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty of a God as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World 10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Perfections of God and really identify'd with his Divine Nature and Substance so it must necessarily follow that the Relations that result from them and subsist between them must also be Infinite And then since these Truths do essentially Consist in and in their Reason and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations it no less evidently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too 11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account For I confider again that since Relations do not in reality differ as distinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related these Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves and consequently with the Divine Nature with which these Ideas are identified And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Nature 12. And that indeed it is so may be further and somewhat more directly demonstrated thus That God is the Cause of whatever is besides himself or that whatever is is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Principle Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God But it is not the Effect of God and therefore it can be no other than God himself Now that it is not the Effect of God the many gross Absurdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknowledge For First if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary which is against the Supposition or if it be then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act and so God would be a necessary Agent even ad extra He would also be an unintelligent Agent The Consequence is not to be avoided For if Truth be the effect of God then antecedently to the effecting of it there was no Truth and consequently no Knowledge because there could be nothing known and so God in the production of Truth if indeed he did produce it must be supposed to act altogether in the dark and without any Intelligence Again if Truth be the Effect of God then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God nay upon something created
Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being True Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True as thus Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True The only Reason why he that denies this latter Consequence upon the Supposition or Concession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself being this because in denying the latter Consequence he Supposes the Former Principle which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true 8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other besides what I have even now said to that purpose need only add this further Remarque That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth or since there are Incomprehensible Truths then it seems the Incomprehensibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together or in other words the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain or more evident Maxim than this That that which is when a thing is or would be supposing it were is no Argument that it is not As for Instance Suppose it should be Objected against the Copernican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Sense since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set and Move round about us It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say That supposing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now since Sailing as we do between the Sun and the Stars as a late Writer expresses it not the Ship in which we are but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move And 't is most Certain that if supposing the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move 9. Why just so it is in the present Case when 't is Objected against the Truth of a thing that 't is Incomprehensible by Human Reason 't is a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing since if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehensible And 't is most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible then the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it And therefore since we have proved that there are Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist together we may now with all Rational assurance Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth since the Former would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter And both by Vertue of this most Evident and incontestable Principle That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing can be no good Argument that it is not True 10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things surpass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full Light to the Men of Art and Learning and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he pretends to if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding or Conclude any thing False or Impossible when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth 1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with very bad Consequences and yet not professedly to hold those Consequences because either they do not attend to them or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soliâ—idian Systemes so on the other hand and for the same Reason there are those who take up and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Professedly holding those Principles from which they truly flow and to which if traced to the Head they will infallibly lead them 2. Of this we have a very particular Instance where I confess one would not expect to find it in those of the Socinian Perswasion The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith is because they are above their Reason they cannot Comprehend them Whereby they plainly imply that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehensible which is also a common Maxim among them who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing And whereas 't is only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith in saying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True and so that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just warrant to conclude it
to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
and so much Contested whether true or no can never be made too Clear and sometimes a different though not better Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustration every Reader having his particular Point of View so as that the very â—ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in another I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority and by the advantage of his Light venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point applying my self chiefly to that part of it wherein I think the other Account Most defective 14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible and to be Contrary to Reason is to appear repugnant to some Principle or Conclusion of Right Reason yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distinction since it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehensible and what repugnant and again disputed whether incomprehensible and repugnant be not the same as well as whether that which is above Reason be not also Contrary to it And then we are but where we were before This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and General to be rested in and we must be therefore more minute and particular in our Explanation of it if we would be more Clear 15. However since Generals are to go before and do also prepare the way for Particulars I shall first propose the general Idea of things above Reason and contrary to Reason and then particularize upon that Idea by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is contain'd in it and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Distinction than only to have the Members of it well explain'd For if the Idea of Above Reason be distinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason as the Explanation of them will shew that it is then the Distinction proceeds upon a real Difference is grounded upon the Nature of things and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction 16. By things above Reason then as the Expression is used in this Distinction I conceive to be Meant Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive such as it can and does actually comprehend and that to be absolutely Impossible Or in other words a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be Thus in the General 17. But to be a little more Particular we are to Consider upon the first Part that when we speak of things above Reason the word Reason here as was shewn in the first Chapter signifies the same as Vnderstanding and there being but one only Operation of that namely Perception by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend 't is the same as to say they are such as the Understanding cannot Perceive But then when we say Cannot Perceive 't is to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Proposition as if the thing said to be Above Reason were perfectly unintelligible but only of the Truth of it as was observ'd before concerning Faith And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Consequences and Relations to other Truths for then almost every thing would be Above Reason but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas or the manner of it is not discernible and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively and partly for want of a due and proper Medium whereby to compare them so as to discern their Union in the way of Science and Demonstration 18. 'T is also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible than such as appear contrary to some Principle or some Conclusion of Right Reason This being the more General and Absolute Idea whereof the two other are but Instances and Specifications For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united Which may be either because of the immediate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with themselâ—â—s so as Mutually to Exclude each other as in a Contradiction or because of their inconsistency with some other Truth with which it cannot Comport Or in other words either because one of the Ideas cannot consist with the other by reason of the immediate opposition that is between them or because the Union of both is inconsistent with some Truth or other which therefore will not suffer them to be United Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas cannot stand together and that either immediately by the very inconsistency of the Ideas themselves or mediately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth whether Principle or Conclusion Which Repugnance I take to consist in this that the supposed Principle or Conclusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusion be true as is supposed then such Ideas are not United and indeed are as uncapable of Union that is as impossible as if there were an immediate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason is in short for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it or that its Ideas cannot stand together which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of those Ideas or Mediately by perceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
you say that your Reason is not the Measure of Truth as upon this and the other Considerations there lies a Necessity upon you to Confess how then I pray comes it to be the Measure of your Faith and how come you to lay down this for a Maxim that you will believe Nothing but what you can Comprehend Why if your Reason be not the Measure of Truth and you your selves Care not and I believe are asham'd in terms to say that it is then do you not evidently discern that there is no Consequence from the Incomprehensibility of a thing to the incredibility of it and that you have no reason to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the account of its incomprehensibility And do you not then plainly see that your great Maxim falls to the ground that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But if yet notwithstanding this you will still adhere to your beloved Maxim and resolve to believe Nothing but what you can adjust and clear up to your Reason then I pray Consider whether this will not necessarily lead you back to that Absurd and withal Odious and Invidious Principle and which therefore you your selves care not to own viz. That your Reason is the Measure of Truth 5. But why do you not care to own it Do you not see at the first cast of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profess'd Maxim Or if you do not think fit to own it as indeed it is a good handsom Morsel to swallow why do you not then renounce that Maxim of yours which is the immediate Consequence of it and necessarily resolves into it Why will you whose Pretensions are so high to Reason act so directly against the Laws of it as to own that implicitly and by Consequence which neither your Head nor your Heart will serve you to acknowledge in broad and express Terms Be a little more Consistent with your own Sentiments at least if not with Truth and be not your selves a Mystery while you pretend not to believe any If you do not care to own the Principle then deny the Consequence or if you will not let go the Consequence then stand by and own the Principle Either speak out boldly and roundly that your Reason is the Measure of Truth or if you think that too gross a defiance to Sense Experience Religion and Reason too to be professedly maintain'd then be so ingenuous to us and so Consistent with your selves as to renounce your Maxim of Believing Nothing but what you can Comprehend since you cannot hold it but with that Absurd Principle And which is therefore a Certain Argument that you ought not to hold it 6. And are you sure that you always do I mean so as to act by it that you hold it in Hypothesi as well as in Thesi Do you never assent to any thing but what you can Comprehend Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a pressing Necessity to Subscribe to though at the same time you cannot conceive their Modus or account for their Possibility But you 'l say perhaps these are things of a Physical and Philosophical Consideration and such as have no relation to Religion True they are so but then besides that this visibly betrays the weakness of your ground since if the incomprehensibility of a thing were a good Argument against assenting to the Truth of it it would be so throughout in the things of Nature as well as in the things of Religion I would here further demand of you why you are so particularly shy of admitting incomprehensible things in Religion why is it there only that you seem so stiffly and zealously to adhere to your Maxim of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend Since there are so many inconceivable things or if you please Mysteries in the Works of Nature and of Providence why not in Religion Nay where should one expect to find Mysteries if not there where all the things that are Reveal'd are Reveal'd by God himself and many of them concerning Himself and his own Infinite Perfections And what deference do we pay to God more than Man if either we suppose that he cannot reveal Truths to us which we cannot Comprehend or if we will not believe them if he does Nay may it not be rather said that we do not pay him so much since we think it adviseable to receive many things from our Tutours and Masters upon their Authority only though we do not Comprehend them our selves and justifie our doing so by that well known and in many Cases very reasonable Maxim Discentem oportet Credere But as there is no Authority like the Divine so if that Motto become any School 't is that of Christ. 7. Now 't is in this School that you profess to be Scholars and why then will you be such Opiniative and uncompliant Disciples as to refuse to receive the Sublime Lectures read to you by your Divine and Infallible Master merely because they are too high for you and you cannot Conceive them when at the same time any one of your that is not a Mathematician pardon the Supposition would I doubt not take it upon the word of him that is so that the Diameter of a Square is incommensurable to the Side though he did not know how to demonstrate or so much as Conceive it himself Since then you would express such implicit regard to the Authority of a fallible though Learned Man shall not the Divine weigh infinitely heavier with you and since you would not stick to assent to things above your Conception in Human and Natural Sciences why are you so violently set against Mysteries in Religion whereof God is not only the Authour but in great Measure the Object too 8. You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibility of Quantity there are Incomprehensibilities on both sides it being inconceivable that Quantity should and it being also inconceivable that it should not be divided infinitely And yet you know again that as being parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and without all hesitation to determine which that is but however you know in the general that One of them indeterminately must be true which by the way is enough to Convince you that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the truth of it and you must also further grant that God whose Understanding is infinite does precisely and determinately know which of them is so Now suppose God should Reveal this and make it an Article of Faith 'T is not indeed likely that he will it being so much beneath the Majesty and besides the End and Intention of Revelation whose great Design is the direction of our Life and Manners and not the improvement of our Speculation But suppose I say he should would you not believe it
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. Scrutiny p. 303. l. 17. r. Christian. Books Printed for and Sold by S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil near the Royal Exchange A Collection of Miscellanies consisting of Poems Essays Discourses and Letters in large 8 o. Theory and Regulation of Love a Moral Essay in two Parts To which is added Letters Philosophical and Moral between the Author and Dr. More The 2 d. Edition in 8 o. Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. To which are added Reflections upon a late Essay concerning Humane Understanding Vol. I. the third Edition in 8 o. Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. II. Practical Discourses upon several Divine Subjects Vol. III. Letters Philosophical Moral and Divine to the Reverend Mr. Iohn Norris with his Answers in 8 o. Treatises upon several Subjects Formerly Printed singly now collected into one Volume in 8 o. large An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity in 8 o. large These eight writ by the Reverend Mr. John Norris Rector of Bemerton near Sarum A Treatise of Sacramental Covenanting with Christ. Shewing the Ungodly their Contempt of Christ in their Contempt of the Sacramental Covenanting With a Preface chiefly designed for the satisfaction of Dissenters and to exhort all Men to Peace and Unity in 8 o. An Explication of the Creed the 10 Commandments and the Lord's Prayer with the Addition of some Forms of Prayer Price 1s 6d A Dialogue betwixt two Protestants in answer to a Popish Catechism called a short Catechism against the Sectaries plainly shewing that the Members of the Church of England are no Sectaries but true Catholicks in 8 o. price 2s Poetick Miscellanies in 8 o. price 1s 6d The Christian Monitor the Nineteenth Edition price 3d. having already sold 95 Thousand and those that are charitably disposed may have them for 20s the hundred and so proportionably for a smaller quantity These five writ by the Reverend Mr. Jo. Rawlet An Essay concerning Humane Understanding in four Books the third Edition with large Additions by Io. Locke Gent. Folio Malebranch's Search after Truth compleat in 2 Vol. 8 o. to the 2 d. is added the Author's Defence against the Accusations of M. de la Ville Also the Life of F Malebranch Done out of French by Mr. Sault Christian Conferences demonstrating the Truth of the Christian Religion and Morality By F. Malebranch Practical Discourses on the Pararables of our blessed Saviour By F. Bragge Vicar of Hitchin in Hertfordshire A New Voyage into Italy with necessary Instructions for those who undertake the same by Max. Misson in 2 Vol. Done out of French and illustrated with Sculp The Roman History from the building of the City to the perfect â—ettlement of the Empire by Augustus Caesar. By Sa. Echard the 2 d. Edition with Amendments A full large and general Phrase Book By VV. Robertson A. M. price 5s bound Reflections on the good Tempâ— and fair Dealing of the Animadveâ—ter upon D. Sherlock's Vindication or the Holy Trinity 4 o. price 6d Essays of Michael Seignieur de Montaigne in 3 Books Done into English by C. Cotton Esq in three Vol. A Sermon concerning the Excellency and Usefulness of the Common Prayer By VV. Beveridge D. D. the Eleventh Edition price 3d Those that are Charitably disposed may have them for 20s the hundred His Sermon before the Queen price 6d A new Voyage to the Levant containing remarkable Curiosities in Germany France Italy Malta Turkey by the Sieur de Mont. The second Edition price 5s * See Mrs. Bourignon 's Works at large particularly Vol. 7. Part 2d pag. 193. As also Mr. Poiret 's Oeconomic Divine Vol. 5. p. 338. Luk. 18. 8. Rom. 11. 19 20 21 22. Ioh. 15. 2. 2 Tim. 3. 2 Pet. 2. In the Preface to his Metaphysical Meditat. Philoso contract p. 242. Recherche de la Veritè Liv. 1. p. 10. 2 Tim. 1. 12. 22 â— Q. 1. Art 1. Chap. 7. Artic. 9. Tom. 9. p. 107. 2 Pet. 5. Heb. 11. 1. 2 Thes. 2. 4. Heb. 11. 8. Joh. 〈◊〉 40. Avis Stir le Tableâ—â— du Socinianisme Traité 1. pag. 14 L' Art de Penser p. 432. Cogit Rational de Deo p. 296. Mr. Malebranche * Veritas immortalis est veritas incommutabilis est veritas illud verbum est de quo dicitur in principio erat verbum verbum erat apud Deum Deus erat verbum S. Austin in Psal. 123. Iob 11. 7. Psal. 97. 2. Rom. 11. 33. * I the rather Instance in the Divine Immensity because the Dâ—vout Psalmist does herein partiâ—ularize his Ignorance making it the Subject of his Astonishment rather than his Curiosity Such Knowledge is too wonderful for me it is high I cannot attain unto it Psal. 139. â—erardi de Vries Prasessoris Vâ—tra◠〈◊〉 exercitationes rationales de Deo Divinisque Perfectoinibus Pag. 248. Psal. 4. Le Clerks Physics Pag. 14. 〈…〉 Recherche de la Verité Tom. 2. p. 165. 〈…〉 Psal. 32. 10. 〈…〉 Christianity not Myâ—ter p. 90. Serm. of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith Life of Christ p. 184. 1 Cor. 2. 9 10. 1 Pet. 1. 12. p. 379.