cannot joyn 'em to the sound Moreover several Nations having given different Names to Things even to those that are most apparent and simple as are those which are the Objects of Geometry they could not discourse in the same manner of the same Truths if discourse were nothing but a Connexion of names by the word Est it is And since it appears by this variety of words that the Arabians for example sake do not agree with the English about the same signification of Names so could they never agree in judgment or discourse if their Discourse depended upon that Covenant Lastly when we say that the signification of words are Arbitrary or ad placitum we stick deep in Equivocation For it is true that it is a thing altogether Arbitrary to joyn this Idea to that Sound rather then another But Ideas are not Arbitrary things that depend upon our Fancy more especially those that are evident and distinst Which that we may make manifest we say that it would be very ridioulous to think that real Effects could depend upon things purely Arbitrary Now when a man has concluded by his Reason that the Iron Axel that passes through the two Mill-stones of a Corn-Mill could turn a about without turning the lower Mill-stone if being round it pass'd through a round hole but that the same Axle could not turn without turning the upper Mill-stone if being square it were fastn'd in a square hole of the upper Mill-stone what he has undertaken to prove undenyably follows And by consequence this Discourse is not a Connexion of Names according to a Covenant entirely depending upon the Fancy of men but a solid and conclusive Judgment of the Nature of Things by the consideration of Ideas which men have been pleas'd to denote and signifie by certain Names Thus much as to what we understand by the word Idea we are now to say something concerning their Original And now the Question is whether our Ideas proceed from the Senses and whether that common Maxim be true There is nothing in the Intellect which was not first in the Sense This is the Opinion of a Philosopher of Great Reputation in the World who begins his Logic with this Proposition Every Idea derives it's Original from the Senses He confesses however that all Ideas are not the same in our Senses as they are in the mind But he pretends that they were at least form'd out of those that past through our Senses either by composition as when out of the separate Ideas of Gold and a Mountain we make a Mountain of Gold or by Amplification and Diminution as when out of the Idea of a Man of Ordinary Stature we make a Giant or a Pigmee or by similitude and Proportion as when out of the Idea of a House we have seen we make the Delineations of a Structure that we have not seen And thus saith he we apprehend God who is above the reach of Sense under the shape of a venerable Old Man But according to this Doctrine it would follow that all our Ideas tho' relating to no particular Object that ever approach'd our Senses must be all Corporeal and represent nothing to us but what has past at least by parts through our Senses and consequently that we can conceive nothing but by the help of Images like those which are form'd in the Brain when we see or imagine Bodies But tho this Opinion be maintain'd by other School Philosophers as well as himself I shall not scruple to affirm that it is very absurd and as contrary to Religion as to true Philosophy For to speak nothing but what is evident what is there that we conceive more distinctly then our thoughts themselves What proposition clearer then this I think therefore I am However we can never be certain of the truth of this Proposition unless we understand distinctly what it is to Be and what to think Neither is it to be requir'd from us to explain these terms any farther because they are such that Men so clearly understand that a copious explanation would but render 'm more obscure If then it cannot be denied but that we have in our selves the Ideas of Entity and Thought I ask through what door of the Senses they enter'd into the Mind Are they Ideas of Light or Colours to enter through the Sight Are they shrill or deep sounds to make way through the Ear Are they Odoriferous or noisom to enter the Smelling Are they savory or nauseous to enter the Taste hot or cold soft or hard to glide through the Feeling If it be said they were form'd of other sensible Images let 'em demonstrate what those sensible Images are from vvhence these Ideas of Entity and Thought proceeded as also hovv they were form'd whether by Composition or by Amplification by diminution or proportion for if they cannot answer agreably to Reason it must be taken for granted that the Ideas of Entity and Thought are far from any way deriving their Original from Sense but that our Soul is endu'd with a Faculty to form'em of her self though it may happen sometimes that she may be incited to make use of something that strikes the Sence As a Painter may be induc'd to paint a Picture for the price that is promis'd him and yet it cannot be said that the picture drew its Original from the Money But what the same Authors add that the Idea which we have of God draws its original from Sence because we apprehend him under the Idea of an Old-Man is a thought unworthy any other then the Anthropomorphites and which confounding the true Ideas that we have of Spiritual things with the false Imaginations that we conceive of those Sublimites out of an evil custom of imagining all things amiss whereas it is as absurd to pretend to imagine that which is not Corporeal as to hear Colours and see Sounds To refute this opinion we need no more then consider that if we had no other Idea of God then of a venerable Old-Man all those other Judgments which we make of that Idea ought to appear false to us that are contrary to that Idea for we are naturally induc'd to believe that our judgments are false when we clearly see that they are contrary to the Ideas which we have of things Otherwise we shall never be able to conclude certainly that God does not consist of parts that he is Incorporeal Omnipresent and Invisible when all those Ideas are no way agreeable to that of a venerable Old Man And if God had at any time ever appear'd in that form it does not presently follow that we should have no other Idea of him but that for so we should have no other Idea of the Holy-Ghost then that of a Dove because he once appear'd in that Shape as God in the same manner might be conoeiv'd to be a Sound because the sound with which the Name of God is pronounc'd awakens the Idea of God in our Minds It is therefore
or Negation there are several important remarks to be made upon the nature of Incident Propositions which make one part of the Subject or Attribute of those that are complex'd according to matter 1. It has been already said that Incident Propositions are those whose Subject is the Pronoun Who as Men who are created to know and love God or Men who are Pious where the Term Men being taken away the rest is an Incident Proposition But here we must call to mind what has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first Part. That the additions of Terms complex'd are of two sorts the one may be call'd simple Explications when the addition alters nothing in the Idea of the Term in regard that what is added agrees generally with the term in its full extent as Men who are created to know and love God The other may be call'd Determinations for that what is added to the term not agreeing with it in its full extent restrains and determines the Signification as in the second Example Men who are Pious From whence it follows that there is a Pronoun Who Explicative and a Pronoun Who Determinative Now when the Pronoun who is Explicative the Attribute of the Incident Proposition is affirm'd of the Subject to which the Pronoun who refers tho' it be but incidently in respect of the total Proposition so that the Subject it self may be substituted to the Pronoun who as in the first Example Men who were Created to know and love God For we might say Men were created to know and love God But when the who is Determinative the Predicate of the Incident Proposition is not properly affirm'd of the Subject to which the who refers For if in this Proposition Men who are Pious are Charitable we should put the word Men in the place of who by saying Men are Pious the Proposition would be false for this would be to affirm the word Pious of Men as Men. But in the other Proposition Men who are Pious are Charitable we affirm neither of Men in general nor of any Man in particular that they are Pious but the Understanding joining together the Idea of Pious with that of Men and making an entire Idea judges that the attribute of Charitable agrees with the entire Idea And therefore the entire Judgment which is express'd in the Incident Proposition is only that by which our Understanding Judges that the Idea of Pious is not incompatible with that of Men and so they may be consider'd as join'd together and afterwards we may examine how they agree together being thus united Many times there are Terms that are doubly and trebly Complex'd being compos'd of several parts of which every one is separately complex'd and so we may meet with several Incident Propositions and of several sorts the Pronoun of the one being Explicative and the other Determinative as in this Example The Doctrine that places Soveraign Happiness in the pleasures of the Body which was taught by Epicure is unworthy a Philosopher The attribute of this Proposition is Vnworthy a Philosophyer and all the rest is the Subject and so the Proposition is a Complex Term that includes two incident Propositions The first That places Soveraign happiness in the pleasures of the Body where the Pronoun is determinative for it determines Doctrine in general to be that which affirms Soveraign Felicity to consist in the pleasures of the Body whence it would be an absurdity to substitute the word Doctrine to the Pronoun by saying Doctrine places Soveraign Happiness in bodily Pleasure 2. The second incident Proposition is which was taught by Epicurus and the Subject whereto the Pronoun which refers is the whole complex Term The Doctrine which places Soveraign happinness in bodily Pleasure which denotes a singular and individual Doctrine capable of divers accidents as to be maintained by several persons tho' in its self it be determin'd to be taken always after the same manner at least in this precise case as it is extended And therefore it is that the Relative of the second Incident Proposition which was taught by Epicurus is not determinative but only Explicative so that the Subject to which the Pronoun refers may be substituted in the place of the pronoun by saying The Doctrine which places Soveraign happiness in bodily Pleasure was taught by Epicurus 3. The last remark is that to judg of the nature of these Propositions and to know whether it be determinative or explicative it behoves us to mind rather the Sence and Intention of him that speaks then the Expression alone For there are many times complex'd Terms that seem uncomplex'd or less complex'd then indeed they are for that one part of what they enclose in the mind of him that discourses is altogether understood and not express'd as has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first part where we have shown that there is nothing more usual in discourse then to signify singulars by general words for that the Circumstances of discourse make it appear that there is a singular and distinct Idea join'd to that common Idea which answers to the word that determines it to signifie only one thing I said that this was generally known by the Circumstances as in French the word Roy or King signifies Lewis XIV But there is yet a Rule that may serve us to judg when a common Term retains a general Idea and when it is determin'd by a distinct and particular Idea though not express'd When it is a manifest Absurdity to apply a Predicate to a Subject retaining a general Idea we must believe that he who made that Proposition has depriv'd that Subject of its general Idea Thus if I hear a Man say the King has commanded me such a thing I am assur'd that he has not left the word King in its general Idea for a King in general gives no particular Command If a Man should say to me The Brussells Gazet of the 24th of January 1662. is false as to what was transacted at Paris I should be assur'd that there was something more in the mind of him that spoke then what was express'd in those Terms For those words are not sufficient to make me judge whether the Gazet be true or false So that the Relator must have in his thoughts some piece of News Distinct and particular which he judges contrary to the Truth as if the Gazet had related that the King had made a hundred Knights of the Order of the Garter Also in such judgments as are made of the Opinions of Philosophers when we say that the Doctrine of such a Philosopher is false without expressing distinctly what that doctrine is as the Doctrine of Lucretius touching the Nature of our Soul is falfe it necessarily follows that in such sorts of Judgments they who make 'em do mean a distinct and particular Opinion under the general words Doctrine of such a Philosopher And so such sorts of Propositions dissolve into others like
false tho we may oppose certain Instances wherein they may stray from the Truth but to be satisfy'd if they may be extended from others beyond their just limits that they ought not to be taken too rigorously according to the Letter 2. OBSERVATION There are some Propositions that ought to pass for Metaphysically Universal tho they may admit of Exceptions that is when those Exceptions are exotic and such as according to common use are not comprehended in those Universal Terms As when I say All Men have two Arms. This Proposition ought to pass for true according to ordinary use And it would be but mere brangling to oppose against it that there have been Monsters who were Men though they had four Arms. It being plain that there was nothing intended concerning Monsters in these general Propositions and that the only meaning of the Assertion was that according to the order of Nature all Men had two Arms. In like manner it may be said that all Men make use of words to express their thoughts but that all Men do not make use of writing Nor would it be a rational Objection to contradict the truth of the Proposition by instancing dumb People because it is evident though the sence be not express'd in words that it was not meant of such as had a natural impediment to make use of sounds either clude it will not be amiss to speak of another sort of Knowledge which ofttimes is no less certain nor less evident in its manner then that which we draw from Authority For there are two general ways by which we know a Thing to be true The first is the knowledge which we have by our selves whether we have attain'd it by Observation or Ratiocination whether by our Sences or by our Reason which may be generally term'd Reason in regard the Sences themselves depend upon the judgment of Reason or Knowledge the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools for all manner of knowledge of an object drawn from the same object The other way is the Authority of Persons worthy of credit who assure us that a thing is so Tho of our selves we know nothing of it Which is call'd Faith or Belief according to the words of St. Austin for what we know we owe to reason for what we believe to Authority But as this Authority may be of two sorts either from God or Men so there are two sorts of Faith Divine and Human. Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error because that God can neither deceive us nor be deceiv'd Human Faith is of its self subject to error for all Men are Lyars according to Scripture And because it may happen that he who shall assure us of the certainty of a thing may be deceiv'd himself Nevertheless as we have already observ'd there are some things which we know not but by a Human Faith which nevertheless we ought to believe for as certain and unquestionable as if they were Mathematically demonstrated As that which is known by the constant relation of so many Persons that it is morally impossible they should ever have conspir'd to affirm the same things if they were not true For example Men have been naturally most averse from conceiving any Antipodes nevertheless though we never were in those places and know nothing of any Antipodes but by human Faith he must be a Fool that does not believe ' em And he must be out of his wits who questions whether ever there were any such Persons as Caesar Pompey Cicero or Virgil or whether they were not feigned Names as Amadis de Gaul True it is that it is a difficult thing to know when Human Faith has attain'd to this same assurance and this is that which leads Men astray into two such opposite Deviations So that some believe too slightly upon the least report Others ridiculously make use of all the force of their wit to annul the belief of things attested by the greatest authority when it thwarts the prejudice of their understanding And therefore certain Limits are to be assign'd which Faith must exceed to obtain this assurance and others beyond which there is nothing but uncertainty leaving in the middle a certain space where we shall meet with certainty or uncertainty as we approach nearer to the one or the other of these Bounds Now then if we do but compare the two general ways by which we believe a thing to be true Reason and Faith certain it is that Faith always supposes some Reason For as St. Austin says in his 122. Epistle and in several other places we could never bring our selves to believe that which is above our reason if reason it self had not perswaded us that there are some things which we do well to believe tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'em Which is principally true in respect of Divine Faith For true Reason teaches us that God being truth it self he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Mysteries whence it appears that though we are oblig'd to captivate our Understanding in obedience to Faith as saith St. Paul yet we do it neither blindly nor unreasonably which is the original of all false Religions but with a knowledg of the Cause and for that it is but a reasonable Act to Captivate our selves to the Authority of God when he has given us sufficient Proofs such as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents which oblige us to believe that he himself has discovered to Men the Truths which we are to believe As certain it is in the second Place that divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Understanding then our own Reason And that upon this Dictate of Reason it self that the more certain is to be prefer'd before the less certain and that is more certain which God assures us to be true then that which Reason perswades us when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us then the nature of our own Reason to be deceiv'd CHAP. XIII Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith THE most customary use of sound Judgment and that faculty of the Soul by which we discern Truth from falshood is not employ'd in speculative Sciences about which so few Persons are oblig'd to spend their time and yet there is no occasion wherein it is more frequently to be made use of and where it s more necessary then in that Judgment which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men. I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad worthy of applause or reproof for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity but of judging of the Truth or Falshood of human Events which may only be referr'd to Logic whether we consider 'em as past as when we only endeavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not or whether we consider 'em as being to come
belongs to Reason to make the choice Who chuse aright are they who are indu'd with an equal poise of Wit such as make a wrong choice are they whose Judgments are deprav'd wherein consists the chiefest and most Important difference between the faculties of the Understanding And therefore it ought to be the most principal Study of a Man to form and shape his Judgment and to render it the most exact that possible may be the main aim to which his utmost diligence ought to tend To this end we must make use of Reason as the Instrument to acquire Knowledg and on the other side we ought to make use of Knowledg to perfect Reason Truth of Understanding being Infinitely of greater value than all speculative Knowledg by means of the most solid and certain Sciences Which ought to be a caution to all men of Prudence not to engage farther in those speculations than while they serve to that end and only to make tryal of those Studies not to employ therein the whole force of their Wit For if the diligence of Men do not tend to this end they will not find the study of the speculative Sciences such as Geometry Astronomy and Physick to be other than a vain amuzement or that they be much more to be valued than the Ignorance of those things which at least has this advantage that it is less troublesome and does not puff Men up with that sottish vanity which they ascribe to themselves from the knowledg of those fruitless and barren Sciences The hidden secrets and misteries of those Arts are not only of little profit but altogether useless if Men consider 'em only in themselves and for themselves For Men were not born to employ their time in measuring Lines in examining the proportion of Angles or considering the different motions of Substance Their Souls are too lofty their Life too short their time too precious to busy themselves about such petty Objects But they are obliged to be just to be upright to be judicious in all their discourses in all their actions and in all affairs which they undertake Which Care and Industry is so much the more necessary by how much this one rare perfection exactness of judgment is to be admired above all others for every where we meet with none but wandring Understandings uncapable of discerning Truth who in all things take a wrong Course who satisfy themselves with corrupted reasons and fain would impose the same upon others who suffer themselves to be led away with the smallest Experiences who are always in excesses and extremities who want sufficient staidness to preserve themselves constant to the Truths which they know as adhering thereto rather by hazard then sound and judicious choice or else quite contrary continue so obstinately fix'd in their opinions that they will not so much as listen to those that could undeceive them who boldly decide and determine Arguments which they neither know nor understand and which were never yet understood by any other who make no difference at all between Speaking and Speaking or only judg of the truth of things by the tone of the Voice he that talks smoothly and gravely speaks reason he that cannot readily explain himself and seems to be in a heat must be in the wrong and more then this they know not Which is the reason that there are no absurdities how insupportable soever which do not find their Champions He that has a design to deceive the World shall not fail of Persons as ready to be gull'd and the most ridiculous Fopperies shall meet with Understandings proportionate to their Folly And indeed we ought not to wonder at any thing while we find so many People infatuated with the Fooleries of judicial Astrology and persons of gravity so seriously handling that Subject There is a certain Constellation in the Firmament which some men have been pleas'd to call a Ballance as like a Ballance as a Wind-Mill and all one This Ballance they cry is an Emblem of Justice and all that are born under that constellation shall be upright and just There are three other Signs in the Zodiac which they call the one a Ram the other a Bull the third a Goat and which they might as well have call'd an Elephant a Crocodile or a Rhinoceros Now the Ram the Bull and the Goat are Beasts that chew the Cud and therefore they that take Physick when the Moon is in any of these Constellations shall be in danger to vomit it up again These are strange extravagancies yet as extravagant as they are there are persons that utter 'em abroad for sound ware and others that as easily believe ' em This falshood of the Understanding is not only the Cause of those Errors that are intermix'd in the Sciences but of the greatest part of those faults and Crimes that are committed in Civil Life and Conversation of unjust Quarrels of ill grounded Law-suits of rash advice and of Enterprizes ill contriv'd and worse mannag'd There are few of these miscarriages that have not their source from some Errour or Defect of Judgment 〈◊〉 that there is no Defect which it more concerns a man to Correct in himself then this But as this amendment is greatly to be desir'd and wish'd for so is it equally as difficult to maintain seeing it depends much upon that measure of Intelligence which we bring into the World at our Birth For common Sence is no such Vulgar Quality as men take it to be There are an infinite company of dull and stupid Heads which are not to be reform'd by Instruction but by restraining 'em within those bounds which are proper for their Capacity and hindring 'em from medling with those things of which they are uncapable Nevertheless 't is very true that the greatest part of the fallacious Judgments among men proceed not from this Principle as being rather caus'd by the precipitation of the Brain and through defect of Consideration from whence it comes to pass that they judge rashly of what they only know obscurely and confus'dly The little regard and love of Truth in Men is the reason that they take so little pains the cheifest part of their time to distinguish what is true from what is false They admit into their Breasts all sorts of Discourses and Tenents rather choosing to suppose them to be true then to examine ' em If they understand them not they are willing to believe that others do And thus they load their memories with an infinite number of falsities and afterward argue upon those Principles never considering what they say or what they think Vanity and Presumption also contribute very much to this Miscarriage They think it a shame to doubt and not to know and they rather chuse to talk and determine at a venture then to acknowledge their not being sufficiently inform'd to judge aright Alass we are full of Ignorance and Errour and yet it is the most difficult labour in the World to draw
Instruction another for Flattery another for Reprehension Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to but that it should peirce and run through ' em Nor would any one think it well that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov'd should answer Sir speak lower I hear you well enough For 't is the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof and it is necessary to imprint that Idea in the mind of the Servant which the Master would have it make But sometimes these accessory Ideas are fix'd to the words themselves for that usually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce ' em And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signifie the same thing some are injurious some are mild some modest others impudent some honest others dishonest for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree men have affix'd other Ideas which are the cause of this variety And this observation may serve to discover a peice of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown upon 'em which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives For example if they are accus'd of Ignorance or Imposture presently they cry out for being call'd ignorant and falsifying fellows which is not reasonable because that the words do not signifie the same thing for the Adjective ignorant and falsifiing beside the signification of the offence which they discover they include the Idea of Scorn whereas the Substantives of ignorance and imposture denote the thing to be such as it is without aggravation or extenuation And we might instance other things that would signifie the same thing after such a manner as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the others charge And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of unless some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency Hence also may be understood the difference between a plain and a figur'd Stile and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely when they are express'd by a figure then if they were restrain'd to a plain manner of Speech Which proceeds from hence that figur'd expressions besides the principal thing signifie the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth For example of this half Verse of Virgil Vsque adeone mori miserum est were express'd simply and without a Figure Non est usque adeo mori miserum Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force and the reason is because the first Expression signifies more then the second for it does not only express the thought that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die but it represents also the Idea of a Man as it were provoking death and undauntedly looking it in the face which without question is a great and lively Accession to the signification of the words Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impression in the Hearer for the mind is only instructed by the verity of Ideas but she is not rous'd but by the representation of Affections sivis me flere dolendum est Primum ipse tibi If thou wouldst have me weep it first behoves thy self to grieve But as figur'd stile not only signifies the things themselves but also those affections of the mind which we conceive in meditating and speaking we may judge from thence the use which we ought to make of it and what are the Subjects most proper for it Visible it is that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters meerly speculative which we contemplate with a calm and placid Eye and which produce no motion in the Mind For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul when Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no way mov'd such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature and seem to be a kind of Convulsion For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous then the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts upon all manner of Subjects and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions then upon truths the most weighty and necessary for Salvation On the other side when the Subject of the Discourse is such that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind it is a fault to deliver himself in a jejune and frigid stile and without any manner of motion Therefore Divine Truths not being simply propos'd only to be known but much more to be belov'd reverenc'd and ador'd by Men without doubt the noble elevated and figur'd manner of Elocution observ'd by the Holy Fathers is much more proportionable to the Subject then a flat and meager Stile like that of the Scholastics since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know but also endeavours to raise in us those Sentiments of Love Reverence and Affection which the Fathers had for those Truths when they wrote and which representing to us the Image of that Holy disposition must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us Whereas the Scholastic stile being plain and contenting it self with the Ideas of the Naked Truth is nothing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity which render it not only less profitable but less delightful since the soul it self is more delighted in observing the motions of her affections then in acquiring knowledg Lastly 't is by means of this Observation that we may resolve that famous Question among the Ancient Philosophers whether there be any words to be counted unchast And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoicks who justify'd that we might make use indifferently of any words though impudent and obscene They were of opinion saith Cicero in a Letter which he wrote upon this Subject that there were no words that were either nastie or obscene for they say that the obscenity proceeds either from the things or it is in the words It does not proceed simply from the things because they may be express'd in other words that are not esteem'd so nauseous nor is it in the words consider'd as they are because it happens ofttimes that one word signifies two things and so in one signification it may be nauseous in another well enough approv'd But all this is no more then a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence that those Philosophers did not consider those accessory accidents which the mind adds to the principal Ideas of things for from thence it comes to pass that one and the same thing may be express'd honestly by one sound and lasciviously by another if one of the sounds has
to these Such an opinion that was maintain'd by such an Author is false The opinion that our Soul is Compos'd of Atoms which was taught by Lucretius is false So that these kinds of Judgments always enclose two Affirmations when they are not distinctly express'd The one Primary which relates to the Truth it self which is that it is a great error to believe that our Soul is compos'd of Atoms the other Incident which refers only to the Historical part that this error was generally taught by Lucretius CHAP. V. Of the falshood that occurs in Complex Terms and Incident Propositions WHAT we have already said may serve in answer to one celebrated Question how to know whether there be no falshood but in Propositions and whether there be none in Ideas and simple Terms I speak of falshood rather then of Truth for there is a truth in things that is certain which is their Conformity to the Will of God whether Men think of 'em or not but there can be no falshood of things but as they relate to the understanding of Man or any other understanding subject to errors which judges falsly that a thing is that which it is not The Question is whether this falshood is only to be met in Propositions and Judgments The usual answer is no which is true in one sence however that hinders not but that there may be falshood not in single Ideas but in complex Terms For it is sufficient that something may be judg'd or affirm'd in them either expresly or virtually Which will be more plain if we consider particularly two sorts of complex Terms the one of which the Pronoun is explicative the other of which it is determinative In the first sort of Complex Terms we are not to wonder if we find any falshood For the attribute of the Incident Proposition is affirm'd by the Subject to which the Pronoun relates As in Alexander who is the Son of Philip I affirm though incidently the Son of Philip of Alexander and by consequence there is a falshood in it if it he not so But here we are to make two or three remarks of moment 1. That the fasilty of an Incident Proposition does not blemish the truth of the Principal Proposition For example Alexander who was the Son of Philip overcame the Persians This proposition ought to pass for true though Alexander were not the Son of Philip because the affirmation of the principal Proposition falls only upon Alexander and what is incidently added does not hinder but that Alexander might vanquish the Persians Nevertheless if the attribute of the principal proposition had relation to the incident proposition as if I should say Alexander the Son of Philip was Amintas 's Grandchild Then would it only be that the falshood of the incident proposition would render the principal proposition false 2. Titles that are given to certain Dignities may be given to all that possess that Dignity though what is signify'd by the Title do not at all agree with ' em Thus because the Titles of Holy and Thrice Holy was formerly given to all Bishops we find that the Catholic Bishops at the conference of Carthage did not scruple to give that Title to the Donatist Bishops the most Holy Petelian said it though they knew well that there could be no true Holiness in a Heretic Bishop We find also that St. Paul gives the title of best and most excellent to Festus Governour of Judea because it was the Title usually given to the Chief Governours 3. But it is not so when a Person is the Author of a Title which he gives to another and which he gives according to his own and not the opinion of others or according to popular error for then we may impute to himself the falshood of such proposition Thus when a Man says Aristotle who is the Prince of Philosophers or simply The Prince of Philosophers believ'd that the Original of the Nerves was in the Heart we have no reason to tell him this is false because Aristotle was not the best of Philosophers for it is enough that he has follow'd in this the common opinion though it were false But if a Man should say That Gassendus who is the most Learned of Philosophers believ'd that there was a Vacuum in nature we may with reason dispute the Title which he would give Gassendus and make him responsible for the falshood couch'd in that incident proposition A Man may be also accus'd of Falshood who gives to the same person a Title which is not suitable to him yet not be blam'd for giving him another Title which is less true and less agreeable For example Pope John the XII was neither Holy nor Chast nor Pious As Baronius acknowledges for tho' they who call'd him most Holy could not be tax'd of falshood yet they who call'd him most Chast and Pious were very great Liars though they did it by Incident Propositions as if they had said John the XII the most Chast Pope decree'd such a thing This is what I had to say concerning incident Propositions where the Pronouns Who or Which are explicative as to those other where the Pronouns are determinative as Men who are Pious Kings who love their Subjects certain it is they are not liable to falshood because the predicate of the Incident Proposition is not affirm'd of the Subject to which the Pronoun relates For example should it be said That such Judges as do nothing for favour or reward are worthy of applause it is not therefore affirm'd that there are any such Judges who are so upright Nevertheless I believe there is always in these Propositions a tacit and virtual Affirmation not of the actual Congruity of the Predicate with the Subject to which the Pronoun relates but of the possible Congruity And if there be any deceit in this we may rationally conclude there is a falshood in the Incident Propositions As if it had been said Souls that are square are more solid than those which are round here the Idea's of Square and Round being Incompatible with the Idea of a Soul taken for the principle of Thought I judg that those Incident Propositions ought to pass for false And hence it may be said that the greatest part of our errors proceed For having the Idea of a thing we frequently join to it another incompatible Idea and by that means attribute to the same Idea that which is not suitable to it Thus finding in our selves two Ideas one of the thinking Substance another of the extended Substance it frequently happens that when we consider our Soul which is the thinking Substance we insensibly intermix something of the Idea of the extended Substance as when we imagine that the Soul fills up a space like the Body and that it could not be at all if it were no where which are not Properties that belong to a Body Whence arose that Impious error of the Mortality of the Soul We may read an
this world The wicked are advanc'd to the end that falling from on high their fall may be the greater They can because they think they can Such a Prince was unfortunate because he was not born under such a Planet Under these sorts of Propositions may be also reduc'd those which are call'd Reduplicatives Men as Men are rational Kings as Kings are subject to none but God That these Propositions be true it is requir'd that one of the parts should be the cause of the other whence it comes to pass that both are true for that which is false is no cause nor has it any cause why it should be Yet both parts may be true when the Causal is false Thus a Prince may be unfortunate and born under such a Planet Though it be false that he was therefore unfortunate because he was born under such a Planet Therefore the contradictories of Propositions chiefly consist in this that one thing is deny'd to be the cause of the other Not therefore unhappy because born under such a Constellation RELATIVES Relatives are those that include some Comparison and some Relation VVhere the Treasure is there is the Heart As he liv'd so he dy'd As much as thou hast so much art thou worth Here the Truth depends upon the exactness of the Relation and they are contradicted by denying the Relation It is not true that as he liv'd so he dy'd It is not true that a Man is esteem'd in this world according to what he has OF DISCRETIVES Discretives are those where various Judgments are made and this variety is denoted by the Particles but notwithstanding or words of the like nature either express'd or understood Fortune may deprive me of my VVealth but not my Vertue I endeavour to set my self above things but not to be subjected to ' em They who cross the Seas change only their Country but not their Disposition The truth of these Propositions depends upon the truth of both parts and the separation between ' em For though both parts were true a Proposition of this sort would be ridiculous if there were no opposition between 'em as if I should say Judas was a Thief and yet he took it ill that Mary Magdalen power'd out her precious oyntments upon Christ There may be several Contradictories of a Proposition of this nature as if one should say 'T is not upon Riches but upon knowledge that happiness depends VVhich Proposition may be contradicted several ways Happiness depends upon Riches and not upon knowledge Happiness depends neither upon Riches nor knowledge Happiness depends both upon Riches and Knowledge Thus we see that Copulatives are contradictories of Discretives For these two last Propositions are Copulative CHAP. VIII Of Propositions Compos'd in Sence THere are other compos'd Propositions whose Composition is more conceal'd and intricate which may be reduc'd under four sorts 1. Exclusive 2. Exceptive 3. Comparative 4. Inceptive or Desitive 1. Of EXCLUSIVES Those are call'd Exclusive which denote that a Predicate so agrees with his subject as to agree with that alone and no other Whence it follows that they include two various Judgments and by consequence are composd in sence Which is express'd by the word only or some such like words Or in English There is none but God only who is to be belov'd for his own sake all other things are to be admir'd for the sake of God Only those Riches which thou freely bestow'st shalt thou freely enjoy Vertue only makes Nobility nothing else renders a Man truly noble I know this only that I know nothing said the Academics Lucan speaking of the Druids makes this Disjunctive Proposition compos'd of two Exclusives you know The God and Heavenly Numens you alone Or else to only you they are unknown These Propositions are contradicted three manner of ways 1. By denying that the predicate agrees with the subject alone 2. By affirming it agrees with something else 3. By alleadging it agrees with the one and the other Thus this Proposition only Vertue is true Nobility it may be contradicted 1. That Vertue does not make any one Noble 2. That Birth renders a Man Noble as well as Vertue 3. That Birth ennobles a Man and not Vertue So the Maxim of the Academic's this is only certain that there is nothing certain was variously contradicted by the Dogmatics and the Pyrrhonians For the Dogmatics deny it by maintaining that it is doubly false because there are many things that we know most certainly and therefore it was not true that we were certain that we knew nothing And the Pyrrhonians averr'd that it was false for the contrary reason that every thing was so uncertain that it was uncertain whether any thing was certain And therefore there is a defect of Judgment in what Lucan speaks of the Druids because there was no necessity that only the Druids should be in the truth in respect of the Gods or that they should only be in an error For in regard there were sundry errors concerning the nature of the Gods it might well be that though the Druids had different thoughts concerning the Gods from those of other Nations they were no less in an error then other Nations Here it is also to be observ'd that there are Propositions which are exclusive in sence though the exclusion be not express'd As in this Verse of Virgil where the Exclusion is mark'd out Vna salus victis nullam sperare salutem Thus luckily Translated into French where the Exclusion is understood Le salut des vaincus est de n'en point attendre The safety of the vanquish'd is not to expect it Nevertheless it is more usual in the Latin then French to suppress Exclusions So that there are some passages not to be Translated with all their force without making exclusive Propositions though in the Latin the Exclusion be not mark'd Thus 2 Cor. 10. 17. Qui gloriatur glorietur Domino ought to be thus Translated Whoever rejoices let him rejoice in the Lord. Gal. 6. 7. Quae seminaverit homo haec metet A Man shall reap no more then what he has sown Ephes 4. 5. Vnus Dominus una fides unus Baptismus There is but one God but one Faith but one Baptism Mat. 5. 46. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt quam mercedem habebitis If you love only those that love you what recompence shall ye deserve Seneca in his Troas nullas habet spes Troja si tales habet If Troy has no other hope then this it has none at all As if the Latin had said si tantum tales habet 2. OF EXCEPTIVES Exceptives are those where a thing is affirm'd of the whole subject except some one of the Inferiours of the Subject by adding a Particle of Exception which denotes that what is predicated does not agree with that Inferior Which visibly includes two judgments and renders those Propositions compos'd in sence As if I should say None of the Sects of the