Laws provide against ills quae frequentius accidunt It is true when the words of a Law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening and do to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt But it is no reason when the words of a Law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently because it happens but seldom For By that Reason if Lands be given to a man and the Heirs of his body his warranty should not barr the Issue in tayl within the meaning of the Statute because there his warranty must always fall upon the Issue in tayl but if given to him and the Heirs females of his body it should barr because it falls less frequently upon such Heir female which is absurd 7. The Statute further commands That the Donors Will be observ'd according to the form of his Gift expressed in his Charter which was that if the Donee died without Issue the Land should retorn to the Donor or his Heirs Therefore such alienation is forbid which hinders the retorn of it according to the Charter and consequently alienation with warranty is forbid I add That the makers of the Statute well understood the use of restraining the Donees warranty from hurting the Donor or the Issue in tayl but not possibly the use of restraining his Lineal or Collateral warranty which were terms then useless and unknown and therefore not in their prospect at all I shall now a little resume my former reasoning for more clearing of this point If immediately after the Statute de Donis Tenant in tayl had made a Feoffment in Fee with warranty which descended upon the Issue in tayl if it had been demanded Whether that warranty barr'd the Issue in a Formedon in the Descender it had been an unintelligible Answer to have said in that Age That it did not barr the Issue in tayl because it was a Lineal warranty for that had been to answer an Ignotum per multò ignotius than which nothing is more irrational But the clean Answer had been That the Donees power of Alienation was restrained in general by the Statute de Donis and therefore his Alienation by warranty and consequently his warranty could not barr the Issue in tayl In like manner if Tenant in tayl had been with the Remainder over soon after the Statute as then it might be and he had made a Feoffment in Fee with warranty and dyed and the warranty had descended upon him in the Remainder If it had been demanded then Whether that warranty did barr him in the Remainder It had been an Answer not to be understood to have said That it did barr him because it was a Collateral warranty But the right Answer had been That it was the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir and was not restrained within the Statute de Donis and therefore must bind him in the Remainder of Common Course So as the Doctrine of the binding of Lineal and Collateral warranties or their not binding is an Extraction out of mens brains and Speculations many scores of years after the Statute de Donis And if Littleton whose memory I much honour had taken that plain way in resolving his many excellent Cases in his Chapter of warranty of saying the warranty of the Ancestor doth not bind in this Case because it is restraind by the Statute of Glocester or the Statute de Donis and it doth bind in this Case as at the Common Law because not restrain'd by either Statute for when he wrote there were no other Statutes restraining warranties there is now a third 11 H. 7. his Doctrine of warranties had been more clear and satisfactory than now it is being intricated under the terms of Lineal and Collateral for that in truth is the genuine Resolution of most if not of all his Cases For no mans warranty doth bind or not directly and a priori because it is Lineal or Collateral for no Statute restrains any warranty under those terms from binding nor no Law institutes any warranty in those terms but those are restraints by consequent only from the restraints of warranties made by Statutes Objections On the other side was urg'd Sir Edward Coke's Opinion upon Sect. 712. of Littleton and his Comment upon the Statute de Donis which is but the quoting of his Littleton where his words are The warranty of the Donee in tayl Cok. Litt. Sect. 712. which is Collateral to the Donor or him in Remainder being heir to him doth bind them without any Assets For though the Alienation of the Donee after Issue doth not barr the Donor which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet the warranty being Collateral doth barr both of them because the Act restrains not that warranty but it remaineth at Common Law These words may have a double meaning though the alienation of the Donee doth not barr the Donor which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet the warranty being Collateral doth barr If the meaning be That the warranty is a thing Collateral to the Alienation against which provision was made and therefore the warranty was not restrained but the Alienation was By the same reason and in the same words it may be said The Alienation of the Donee doth not barr the Issue in tayl which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet his warranty which is a thing Collateral to the Alienation doth barr because it remains at Common Law So as this Reason concludes equally That the Lineal warranty of Donee in tayl should barr his issue as that his Collateral warranty should barr the Donor Another meaning of his words may be having first asserted that the Collateral warranty of the Donee doth barr the Donor descending upon him and giving the reason of it he gives no other but this For though the Alienation of Donee in tayl doth not barr him yet the warranty being a Collateral warran y doth barr him which is idem per idem and the same as if he said The Collateral warranty of Donee in tayl doth barr the Donor and him in Remainder for the warranty being Collateral doth barr both of them which is no reason of his Assertion but the same Assertion over again And where it follows For the Act restraineth not that warranty viz. the Collateral no more doth the Act restrain the Lineal warranty in express terms or by any Periphrasis more than it doth the Collateral but restrains all power of Alienation in prejudice of the Issue or Donor and consequently the power of Aliening with warranty to the hurt of either 2. The second thing objected was Littleton's own Authority in the same Sect. 712. his words are He that demandeth Fee-tayl by Writ of Formedon in Descender shall not be barr'd by Lineal
the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir the last Cestuy que use in the Case could nor can have any benefit of this warranty because William the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir could not nor can warrant to himself but as to William and his Heirs the warranty is clearly extinct The Argument And as to the first Question I conceive the Law to be that the warranty of William the Tenant in tayl descending upon Elizabeth and Sarah the Demandants his Heirs at Law is no barr in the Formedon in Reverter brought by them as Heirs to William their Grandfather the Donor though it be a Collateral warranty I know it is the perswasion of many professing the Law That by the Statute of Westminster the second De donis conditionalibus the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl shall be no barr in a Formedon in the Descender but that the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl is at large as at the Common Law unrestrain'd by that Statute Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon Section 712. Sect. 712. of Littleton A lineal warranty doth not bind the right of an Estate tayl for that it is restrain'd by the Statute de donis Conditionalibus And immediately follows A lineal warranty and assets is a barr of the right in tayl and is not restrain'd But the reason why the warranty of Tenant in tayl with Assets binds the right of the Estate tayl is in no respect from the Statute de donis but is by the Equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir for the Lands of his Mother if the Father leave not Assets to descend in recompence And therefore it was conceived after the Statute de donis was made That if Tenant in tayl left Assets to descend in Fee-simple his warranty should bind the right of the Issue in tayl by the equity of that preceding Statute of Glocester Whereas if the Statute of Glocester had not been the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate tayl by the Statute de donis with Assets descending than it doth without Assets For the better clearing therefore of the Law in the Case in question I shall preparatorily assert some few things and clear what I so assert without which the truth of the Conclusion I hold will not appear so naked to the Hearers as it should Ass 1. The first is That at the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown For though what we now call a Collateral and a lineal warranty might be in speculation and notionable at the Common Law as at this day a Male warranty or a Female warranty may be yet as to any effect in Law there was no difference between a Lineal warranty and a Collateral but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind And this as it is evident in it self so is it by Littleton whose words are Litt. Sect. 697. Before the Statute of Glocester all warranties which descended to them who are Heirs to those who made the warranties were barrs to the same Heirs to demand any Lands or Tenements against the warranties except the warranties which commence by disseisin Therefore if a Question had been at the Common Law only Whether in some particular Case the Ancestors warranty had bound the Heir It had been a sensless Answer to say it did or did not because the warranty was Lineal or Collateral for those warranties were not defined at the Common Law nor of use to be defined But the proper Answer had been That the warranty did bind the Heir because it commenc'd not by disseisin for every warranty of the Ancestor but such descending upon the Heir did bind him So if after the Statute of Glocester Tenant by the Courtesie had aliened with warranty had it been demanded if the Heir were barr'd by that warranty it had been an absurd Answer That he was not because it was a Collateral warranty of his Father without Assets For all Collateral warranties of the Father were not restrained but his warranty in that Case which could be no other than Collateral was restrained by the Statute Therefore The adequate Answer had been That the Fathers warranty bound not in that Case without Assets because the Statute of Glocester had so restrained it My second Assertion is Ass 2. That the Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring him in the Remainder in tayl by his warranty descending upon him 1. For that the mischief complained of and remedied by the Statute is That in omnibus praedictis casibus therein recited post prolem suscitatam habuerunt illi quibus Tenementum sic conditionaliter datum fuit hucusque potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum exhaeredandi exitum eorum contra voluntatem Donatoris But the warranty of the Donee in tayl descending upon him in the Remainder who regularly claims by purchase from the Donor and not by descent from the Donee in tayl could be no disinheriting of the Issue of the Donee claiming by descent from him against which disinheriting only the Statute provides which is evident by the Writ of Formedon in the Descender framed by the Statute in behalf of such Issue of the Donee whom the Statute intends 2. The Statute did not provide against Inconveniences or Mischiefs which were not at the time of making the Statute but against those which were But at the making of it there could be no Remainder in tayl because all Estates which are Estates tayl since the Statute were Fee-simples Conditional before the Statute upon which a Remainder could not be limited So is Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon the Statute de Donis The Formedon in Reverter did lye at Common Law Cok. part 2. f. 336. but not a Formedon in Remainder upon an Estate tayl because it was a Fee-simple Conditional whereupon no Remainder could be limited at Common Law but after the Statute it may be limited upon an Estate tayl in respect of the Division of the Estates 3. The Statute formed a Writ of Formedon in the Descender for the new Estate tayl created by the Statute and mentions a Formedon in the Reverter as already known in the Chancery for the Donor for whom the Statute likewise intended to provide but formed or mentioned none for the Remainder in tayl And the Cases are common in Littleton Litt. Sect. 716 718 719. and in many other Books that the warranty of Donee in tayl is Collateral to him in the Remainder in tayl and binds as at the Common Law But thence to conclude That therefore the warranty of the Donee in tayl shall barr the Donor of his Reversion because it is a Collateral warranty also is a gross Non sequitur for the Donees warranty doth not therefore barr
case of Rebutter the Warranter himself impleads him and in a Voucher he must make his title appear to be warranted Ergo in a Rebutter But he needs not have like Estate in the Land upon a Rebutter as upon Voucher which is for the reason given of recovering in value And the only reason why the person who is to warrant impleading the Tenant of the Land shall not recover but be rebutted by the warranty is because if he should recover the Land the Tenant who is intitled to the warranty must recover in value from him again and therefore to avoid Circuit of Action he shall not recover but be rebutted and barr'd as is most reasonable I shall therefore first make it appear by all ancient Authorities That the Tenant in possession shall not rebutt the Demandant by the warranty without he first make it appear that the warranty did extend to him as Heir or Assignee To prove this are full in the point Hill 8 E. 3. f. 10. tit garranty pl. 48. New Edit f. 283. b. num 28 The Book of 8 E. 3. f. 10. of the Old Edition Hillary Term tit Garranty pl. 48. where upon a great Debate it was rul'd That the Tenant must shew how he was entitled to the warranty and how it extended to him and accordingly did so before his Plea was admitted by way of Rebutter 10. E. 3. f. 42. b. New Edit f. 391. b. num 42 Another Book full in the point is 10 E. 3. f. 42. b. of the Old Edition where in like manner the Tenant was forc'd to shew how the warranty extended to him upon Debate and it is remarkable in that Case That his shewing the Deed of warranty to him whose Assignee he was and the Deed of Assignment to himself was not enough but he was compell'd to plead orally as the manner then was That William who had the warranty assign'd to him by his Deed there shew'd forth and the reason given that the Deed of Assignment could not speak and make his Plea and was but Evidence of the truth of his Plea But in that very Case when it was replyed That he was not Tenant by the Assignment of William but by disseisin of the Plaintiff it was not permitted without traversing the Assignment of William For if he were once intitled to the warranty what Estate soever he had when impleaded he might rebutt though he could not vouch Which Case proves fully both my Positions That a man cannot rebutt without shewing how the warranty extends to him 2. That so doing he may whatever Seisin he hath at that time be it by Disseisin or Abatement c. or otherwise 22 Ass pl. 88. A third Case is when the Tenant being impleaded pleaded the warranty of the Demandants Father to one A. and bound him and his Heirs to warrant to A. his Heirs and Assigns and that he was Assignee of A. and demanded Judgment In that Case because he did not plead that he was Assignee of A. by Deed the Plea was disallow'd which since hath been thought not necessary but à fortiori if he had pleaded no Assignment at all from A. by Deed or without Deed to intitle him to the warranty his Plea had been necessarily disallowed My next Assertion is That the Tenant in possession setting forth how the warranty extends to him needs not set forth by what Estate or Title he is in possession To this I shall cite three Books full in the point 6 E. 3. f. 7. old Edit new Edit 6 E. 3. f. 187 Num. 16. 10 F. 3. f. 42. cited before old Book 45 E. 3. But in all these Cases it is to be noted That the Tenant rebutting though he was in possession of another Estate than that to which the warranty was annex'd yet constantly shew'd how the warranty was deriv'd to him which Sir Edward Coke observ'd not either in Lincoln Colledge Case or his Littleton but cites in Lincoln Colledge Case the Case of 45 E. 3. 45 E. 3. f. 18. and some others I shall mention after to shew a man may rebutt being in of another Estate than that which was warranted which is true but not without intitling himself to the warranty That the Law of rebutting stands upon the difference I have taken besides the Authorities urg'd will be evident for these Reasons As a warranty may be created so may it be determin'd or extinguish'd various ways 1. It may be releas'd as Littleton himself is Sect. 748. 2. It may be defeasanc'd as Sir Edward Coke upon that Sect. 748. 3. It may be lost by Attainder Sect. 745. 4. It may be extinguish'd by Re-feoffment of the warranter or his Heirs by the Garrantee or his Heir In all these Cases if the warranty be destroy'd it cannot be rebutted for there cannot be an accident to a thing which is not and rebutting is an accident incident to a warranty And therefore if the warranty have no being there can be no rebutter Why then admit A. warrants Land to B. and his Assigns during the life of B. after B. releases this warranty to A. and then Assigns to C. C. is impleaded by A. and pleads generally that A. warranted to B. for his life and that B. is still living if C. could rebutt A. by this manner of pleading without shewing when B. assigned to him so to derive the benefit of the warranty to himself A. could never have benefit of the Release of the warranty because it could not appear whether the warranty were releas'd before or after the assignment if before then the warranty is gone and cannot be rebutted but if after it may So if A. binds him and his Heirs to warrant to B. his Heirs and Assigns B. dyes his Heir releases the warranty and dies and then the Heir of the Heir assigns The Tenant is impleaded by A. If he may rebutt by his bare possession without shewing how the warranty extended to him A. can have no benefit of his Release before any assignment was made for the Demandant cannot be suppos'd to know the time of the assignment and consequently cannot know how to plead the Release until the time of the assignment appear which is most consonant in reason with the Authorities before urg'd Another reason is That constantly in elder times when the Tenant pleaded a warranty to rebutt he concluded his Plea that if he were impleaded by a stranger the Demandant was to warrant him which could not be without shewing how the warranty extended to him for he was not to warrant him if impleaded by a stranger because he had possession of the Land only Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case cites the Book of 38 E. 3. f. 26. as adjudg'd to prove that the bare possession of the Land is sufficient for the Tenant to rebutt for that the Assignee may rebutt a warranty made only to a man and his Heirs If that were so it were to his purpose but there is
no such Case in 38 E. 3. f. 26. but the Case intended is 38 E. 3. f. 21. and he quotes the folio truly in his Littleton But the Case is not That an Assignee may rebutt or have benefit of a warranty made to a man and his Heirs only but that a warranty being made to a man his Heirs and Assigns the Assignee of the Heir or the Assignee of the Assignee though neither be Assignee of the first Grantee of the warranty shall have like benefit of the warranty as if he were Assignee of the first Grantee which hath been often resolv'd in the old Books To the same purpose he cites a Case out of 7 E. 3. f. 34. 46 E. 3. f. 4. which doth but remember that of 7. as adjudg'd That the Assignee of Tenant in tayl might rebutt the Donor whence he infers as before that the Tenant in possession might rebutt without any right to the warranty But the Inference holds not from that Case The Case of 7 E. 3. was That Land was given in tayl and the Donor warranted the Land generally to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns the Donee made a Feoffment in Fee and died without Issue and the Donor impleading the Feoffee was rebutted because he had warranted the Land to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee of the Donee and therefore rebutted not because he had a bare possession But this Judgment of 7 E. 3. Sir Edward Coke denies and perhaps justly to be Law now because the Estate tayl being determin'd to which the warranty was first annex'd the whole warranty determin'd with it But however the Case no way proves what it is alledg'd for in Lincoln Colledge Case That a man may rebutt without ever shewing the warranty extended to him for the Feoffee did in that Case shew it So in the Case 45 E. 3. f. 18. the Feme who rebutted shew'd she was Grantee of the warranty To this may be added That what is delivered as before in Lincoln Colledge Case is neither conducing to the Judgment given in that Case nor is it any Opinion of the Judges but is Sir Edward Coke's single Opinion emergently given as appears most clearly in the Case To conclude When the Feoffees were seis'd to the use of William Vescy for his life and after to the use of the Defendant his wife for her life and after to the use of the right Heirs of William Vescy And when by Operation of the Statute of 27 H. 8. the possession is brought to these uses the warranty made by William Vescy to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroy'd For if before the Statute the Feoffees had executed an Estate to William for life the Remainder to his wife for life the Remainder to his right Heirs The warranty had been extinguish'd by such Execution of Estate and releas'd in Law for it could be in none but in William and his Heirs who could not warrant to himself or themselves By Littleton Sect. 743. for his Heirs in such Case take not by Purchase but Limitation because the Freehold was in him with a Remainder over to his right Heirs and so hath as great an Estate in the Land as the Feoffees had and then the warranty is gone by Littleton Litt. Sect. 744. And now the Statute executes the possession in the same manner and the warranty is in none for the time present or future but extinct If the warranty had been to the Feoffees their Heirs and Assigns it might have been more colourably question'd Whether the mean Remainder were not an Assignee of the Feoffees and so to have benefit of the warranty but the warranty being to the Feoffees and their Heirs only no Estate remaining in them no Assignee can pretend to the warranty 2. William Vescy could by no possibility ever warrant this Estate to the Defendant during his life and where the warranty cannot possibly attach the Ancestor it shall never attach the Heir as by Littleton's Case If a man deviseth Lands in Fee to another with warranty for him and his Heirs his Heirs shall not be bound to the warranty because himself could never be And though in that Case the Estate to be warranted commenc'd after the death of the Warranter and here the Remainder to the wife is in being before his death yet the reason differs not for himself could no more warrant this by any possibility than that and his Heir might as equally warrant the Estate devis'd as this Next Justice Jones in Spirt and Bences Case cites a Case 7 Eliz. the same with this Resolution resolved in the Common Pleas That the mediate Remainder could not be warranted In this Case if the Feoffees before the Statute had either voluntarily or by coercion of the Chancery after the death of the first Cestuy que use for life executed the Estate of the mean Remainder such person in Remainder could have no benefit of the warranty being but an Assignee of the Feoffees because the warranty was only to them and their Heirs No more can the person in Remainder here whose Estate is executed by the Statute be warranted more than if such Estate had been executed by the Common Law There are another sort of persons who may rebutt and perhaps vouch who are neither Heirs nor formally Assignees to the Garrantee but have the Estate warranted dispositione instituto Legis which I conceive not to differ materially whether they have such Estate warranted by the Common Law or by Act of Parliament The first of this kind I shall name Ass p. 9. 35 is Tenant by the Courtesie who as was adjudg'd 35 Ass might rebutt the warranty made to his wives Ancestor yet was neither Heir nor formal Assignee to any to whom the warranty was granted nothing is said in the Book concerning his vouching but certainly the wives Heir may be receiv'd to defend his estate if impleaded by a stranger who may vouch according to the warranty or may rebutt as the Case of 45 E. 3. f. 18. is But this difference is observable also where such a Tenant rebutts it appears what claim he makes to the warranty and so the Inconveniences avoided which follow a Rebutter made upon no other reason than because he who rebutts is in possession of the Land warranted A second Tenant of this kind is the Lord of a Villain 22 Ass p. 37. and therefore the Case is 22 Ass That Tenant in Dower made a Lease for life to a Villain which in truth was a forfeiture for making a greater Estate of Freehold than she had power to make and bound her and her Heirs to warranty the Lord of the Villain entred upon the Land in her life time and before the warranty attach'd the Heir who had right to enter for the forfeiture the Mother died and the Heir entred upon the L. of the Villain who re-entred and the Heir brought an Assise The L. of the Villain
pleaded the warranty and that the Heir if a stranger had impleaded him was bound to warrant the Estate and therefore demanded Judgment if the Heir himself should implead him 1. It is there agreed if the warranty had attach'd the Heir before the Lords entry the Heir had been bound but quaere 2. By that Book it seems the Lord impleaded by a Stranger might have vouch'd the Heir if the warranty had attach'd him before the Lords entry But in this Case it appears the Lord was no formal Assignee of the Villains for this warranty must be as to an Assignee for the Estate warranted was but for life and the Lords Estate was only by order of the Law A third Case of this nature is Where the Ancestor granted Lands to a Bastard with warranty but how far the warranty extended as to the Heirs or Heirs and Assigns of the Bastard appears not in the Case the Bastard died without Issue and consequently without Heir the L. by Escheat entred upon whom the Heir entred the warranty of his Ancestor having not attach'd him before the Bastards death for it seems this was in a Case where the Heir might have entred in his Ancestors life time so avoided his warranty as in the former case of the L. of a Villain by the Book the warranty having not attach'd him during the Bastards life the Lord by Escheat could have no benefit of it but if it had attach'd him he might ut videtur In this Case if the warranty were to the Bastard and his Heirs only it determined he dying without Issue and then there could be no Rebutter or Voucher by the Lord by Escheat if the warranty had attach'd the Heir but if it were to him his Heirs and Assigns then the Lord whose title is by the Act and Disposition of the Law and not as Assignee in the per had notwithstanding the benefit of this warranty quod nota These Cases are mentioned in Lincoln Colledge Case and in Spirt and Bences Case in Cr. 1. and in both places admitted for Law Nor seems this very unreasonable That the warranty being an incident to the Estate warranted should accompany it where the Law dispos'd the Estate and Land warranted to all intents 2. In many Cases the Law disposing the Estate if the warranty attended it not the disposition made by the Law were in vain for without the warranty the Estate may be necessarily avoided Such persons who come to the Estate dispositione Legis are not properly in in the post but they modally have the Estate by consent both of the Warranter and Garrantee because they have it by the Act of Law Statute or Common to whose dispose every man is as much consenting and more solemnly than he is to his own private Deed. And after this way if the two last Cases be Law the Cestuy que use having his Estate by operation and appointment of the Statute of Uses of 27 H. 8. may have the benefit of the warranty attending the Estate though he be no formal Assignee or Heir to the Feoffees to use Many other Estates are of this kind as Tenant in Dower if endowed of all the Land warranted An Occupant Tenants by the Statute of 6 R. 2. c. 6. where the Feme consents to the Ravisher Tenant by 4 5 P. M. because the ward consented to her taking away without the Guardians consent Lands warranted which after become forfeited to the King or other Lords c. Quaere in the Cases of 22 Ass p. 37. 29 Ass p. 34. Whether notwithstanding the warranty had descended upon the Heir while the Lands were in the possession of the Villain in the first Case and of the Bastard in the second Case before any entry made by either Lord the Lands could have rebutted or vouched by reason of those warranties being in truth strangers to the warranty and not able to derive it to themselves any way But if after the warranty descended upon the Villain or Bastard the Villain or Bastard had been impleaded by the Heir and had pleaded the warranty against the Heir and had Judgment thereupon by way of Rebutter then the Lords might have pleaded this Judgment as conclusive and making the Villains Title or Bastard good against the Heir and the Heir should never have recover'd against the Lords And this seems the meaning of the Book 22 Ass p. 37. if well consider'd Though in Spirt and Bences Case no such difference is observ'd Caetera desiderantur The Court was in this Case divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Archer for the Demandant and Justice Wylde and Justice Atkins for the Tenant CONCERNING PROCESS Out of the COURTS at WESTMINSTER INTO WALES Of late times and how anciently Memorandum These Notes following were all wrote with the proper hand of the Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan and intended to be methodised by him in order to be delivered in Court A Man taken upon a Latitat in England 10 Jac. Bolstrode part 2. f. 54 55. Hall and Rotherams Case puts in two Welch men for his Bayl Judgment passing against him it was a Question Whether after a Capias ad Satisfaciendum issued against the Principal who was not to be found Process might issue into Wales which must be by Scire Facias first against the Bayl whereupon Mann the Secondary of the Kings Bench informed the Court that it had been so done in like Cases many times But the Court was likewise informed that Brownloe Chief Pronotary of the Common Pleas affirmed they did not then use to send such Process into Wales but only Process of Outlawry But Mann affirming that their Course was otherwise in the Kings Bench the Court awarded Process into Wales against the Bayl and said If the parties were grieved they might bring their Writ of Error 1. This Award of the Kings Bench hath no other Foundation to justifie it than Mann 's the Secondaries Information That the like had been often done which was his own doing possibly and never fell under the Consideration of the Court. 2. The Court weighed it no more than to say The parties grieved might have a Writ of Error which by the way must be into the Parliament for it concerned the Jurisdiction of the Court which the Act of 27 Eliz. for Errors in the Exchequer Chamber excepts and upon that ground any injustice might be done because the party wronged may have a Writ of Error 3. Brownloe the Chief Pronotary of the Common Pleas and a most knowing man affirm'd no such Process issued thence into Wales and but only Process of Outlawry So as this awarding of Process into Wales upon the usage of that Court affirmed by Mann is counter'd by the contrary usage of the Common Pleas affirmed by Brownloe Therefore that Book and Authority is of no moment to justifie the issuing of a Scire facias into Wales 11 Jac. Bolstrode part 2. f. 156 157. Bedo v. Piper The next Case