And this order they give that first according to the order of Nature is humanity in it self and of it self namely without any praejacent matter and then man by Humanity and that he falls under a name and afterwards the species in reason and that therefore all men being destroyed humanity as it is a species that falls under a name and is a being of reason which reason hath found out by the sinilitude and likelinesse of men cannot subsist for it depended of men which are not but for all this that humanity by which men were doth not cease to be which humanity falls not under the name of species as names are imposed by the motion of reason but is the truth of that species that falls under a name whereupon though the image be destroyed the truth remains in it self And all these deny that the thing is nothing but as it falls under a name for in that manner as it falls under a name Logick and reasonable discourse considers of them and accordingly they do logically enquire into the nature of the thing and commend this way of so doing but they rest not there because reason or Logick is onely conversant about the images of the forms But they that labour Theologically to look into matters beyond the power of the name turn themselves to samplars and Ideas And beyond these I think there can no more wayes of inquisition be given If thou that art a Philosopher hast read other thou mayest peradventure know them but this I think Phil. Thou doest wonderfully handle all Sects of Philosophers both Peripateticks and Academicks Id. All these and what differences of wayes soever may be imagined are easily agreed when the mind lifts it self up to infinity For as this Oratour can more at large inform thee by what he hath heard of me the infinite form is the one onely and most simple which shineth in all things as the most adequate samplar of all and every thing formable Whereupon it shall also be most true that there are not many separate samplars and Ideas of things which infinite form no reason can reach therefore being unspeakable it is not comprehended by all names imposed by the motion of reason And so the thing as it falls under a name is the image of its unspeakable proper and adequate samplar There is therefore one unspeakable word which is the precise name of all things as by the motion of reason they fall under a name which unspeakable name after its manner shineth in all things being the infinite nominability of all names and the infinite word of all things possible to be by word expressed so that every name is the image of the precise name And this was all which they all laboured to say though peradventure it might have been better and clearlier spoken for they all necessarily agreed that there is one infinite power which we call God in which all things must needs be complicated Nor did he mean any other thing that said humanity as it fals under a name is the precision of truth then that unspeakable infinite forme which while we looke upon the forme of man we call the precise samplar thereof that so the unspeakable whilest we look upon the images thereof may be named by the name of all things and one most simple samplar according to the specificall differences of things exemplified and by our reason formed may seeme to be many samplars CHAP. III. How the Philosophers are to be understood and accorded of the name of God and precision how one precise name being known all are known of the sufficience of things knowable and how the conception of God and our conception do differ Phil. THou hast wonderfully explained that saying of Hermes Trisimegistus that God may be called by the names of all things and all things by the name of God Id. Do but complicate this word To name into the coincidence of the highest by thy understanding and all things will be plain for God is the precision of every thing and therefore if we had precise knowledge of any one thing we must necessarily have the knowledge of all things So if the precise name or one thing were known then would the names of all things be known because precision cannot be on this side God Hereupon he that could reach on precision might reach God who is the truth of all things that may be knowne Orat. Declare thy self I pray thee concerning the precision of a name Id. Thou knowest Orator how we forge mathemeticall figures out of the power of the minde And therefore when I would make tryangularity visible I make a figure in which I make three Angels that in that figure so habituated and proportioned triangularity may appear whehewith the name is united which let it be supposed to be a Trigonus I say then if Trigonus be the precise name of a tryangulare figure then I know the precise names of all polygones or many corner'd figures for then I know that the precise name of a quadrangulare figure ought to be a Tetragone and of a five corner'd figure a Pentagone and so forward And by the knowledge of one name I know the figure named and all polygones that may be named and the differences and concordances of them and whatsoever else in this point may be known In like manner I say that if I knew the precise name of one worke of God I should know all the names of all the workes of God and whatsoever might be known And seeing the name of God is the precision of every name nameable it is apparant that in that name alone all and every thing may be knowne Orat. This thou hast after thy fashion palpably explained Phil. Thou hast laid down a strange way Idiot to accord all the Philosophers for when I seriously consider I cannot but agree with thee that their meaning was no otherwise then thou sayest by this which none of them all could deny that God is infinite in which onely saying are complicated all things that thou hast said wonderfull is this sufficience of all things knowable or that may be any wise delivered Descend more particularly to the treatise of the mind and say supposing that the calling of the mind mens be from the reason of measuring what wilt thou have the mind it self to be Id. Thou knowest how Divine simplicity complicates all things of this complicating simplicity the mind is the image it then thou shalt call this Divine infinite simplicity mind it shall be the samplar of our mind If thou call the Divine mind the universality of the truth of things thou shalt calours the universality of the likenesse of things that it may be the universality of notions The conception of the Divine mind is the production of things the conception of our mind the notion of things If the Divine mind be absolute entity then the conception thereof is the creation of beings and the conceptions of our mind the
it doe most liberally communicate it selfe to all things a being infinitely good yet can it be received in nothing as it is because in another thing it is otherwise received And being it cannot be received in any thing but after another manner it is yet received after the best manner that may be but unmultipliable infinity is better explicated in a various reception for great diversity doth better expresse unmultipliablenesse from whence it is that wisedome being in divers formes diversely received brings it to passe that every forme called to Identity is partaker of wisedome as well as it can that some things partake it in a certain spirit exceedingly distant from the first forme which scarce gives an elementall being others in a more formed spirit which gives a minerall being others in a yet more noble degree which gives a vegetable life others in a higher which gives a sensible life after that in such a one as gives an imaginative power then a rationall and lastly an intellectuall life and this is the highest degree that is the nearest image of wisedome And this onely is the degree that hath aptitude or fitnesse to lift it selfe up to the taste of wisedome because in those intellectuall natures the image of wisedome is the lively intellectuall life the power whereof is of it selfe to show or put forth a vitall motion which motion is by understanding to go forward to its proper object which is absolute truth that is eternall wisedome and that going foreward being to uunderstand is also to taste intellectaully for to apprehend by the understanding is by a certaine most welcome taste as well as it can to attains and reach to quiddity for as by the sensible taste which reacheth not the quiddity yet in outward things there is a certaine pleasant sweetnesse perceived by the sense which sweetnesse is from the quidditie So by the understanding there is tasted in the quidditie an intellectuall sweetnesse which is the image of the sweetnesse of the eternall wisedome which is the quidditie of quiddities and an unproportionable comparison of one sweetnesse to another Let these things that have beene said suffice for this short time that thou mayest know that wisedome is not in the art of oratory or in great volumes but in the separation from these sensible things and in the turning to the most simple and infinite forme and that thou mayest understand how to receive it in a Temple purg'd from all vice and by fervent love to cleave unto it untill thou mayest taste it and see how sweet that is which is all sweetnesse which being once tasted all things which now seeme great will grow vild and base unto thee and thou wilt be so humbled that no arrogance or any other vice will remaine in thee because with a most chaste and pure heart thou wilt inseparably adhere unto wisedome once tasted choosing rather to forsake this world and all things else that are not it then it and living with unspeakeable gladnesse thou wilt dye and after death eternally rest in it by a most amorous embracement which the ever blessed wisedome of God it selfe vouchsafe to grant both to thee and mee Amen The end of the first booke of the Idiot The second Booke of the Idiot Wherein the Speakers are The Author The Idiot The Oratour Author IT happened that the Romane Oratour after the words he had heard from the Idiot concerning wisedome was exceedingly stricken with admiration and went unto him whom when he had found lurking about the Temple of Eternity he thus spake unto him Orat. O man most desired and looked for help my weaknesse that I may with some ease feed upon those difficulties which transcend my mind and understanding otherwise it will little avail me to have heard from thee so many high Speculations Id. There is no difficultie more easie than to contemplate divine things where the delight coincides with the difficultie But tell me what is it thou desirest Orat. That thou wouldest tell me how seeing God is greater than can be conceived I ought to frame my conception of him Id. As thou wouldst do of conception Orat. Explain thy self Id. Thou hast heard how in every conception he that is unconceivable is conceived there comes therefore a conception from a conception to him that is unconceivable Orat. How shall I then make a more precise conception Id. Conceive precision for God is absolute precison it self Orat. What is then to be done by me when I purpose to frame a right a conception of God Id. Turn thy self unto rectitude or rightnesse Orat. And when I labour to frame a true conception of God what must I then do Id. Then bend thy mind upon Truth it self Orat. What if I mean to make a just conception Id. Turn thy self to justice Orat. And when I seek to make a good conception what must I then do Id. Lift up the eyes of thy mind unto Goodnesse Orat. I wonder whither it it that thou sendest me in all these cases Id. See how easie the difficultie is in divine things that it always offers it self to the seeker in the same manner that it is sought for Orat. Without doubt there is nothing more wonderfull Id. Every question concerning God presupposeth the thing questioned and that must be answered which in every question concerning God the question presupposeth for God although he be unsignifiable is signified in every signification of terms Orat. Declare thy self more at large I pray thee for I am so transported with wonders that I can scarce hear what thou sayest Id. Doth not the question whether a thing be or no presupprose the Entitie Orat. Yes Id. Therefore when it is demanded of thee whether God be or whether there be a God answer that which is presupposed namely that he is because that is the Entitie presupposed in the question So if any man shall ask thee what is God considering that this question presupposeth a quidditie to be thou shalt answer that God is absolute quiddity it self And so of all things Nor need there be any hesitation or doubt in this for God is the absolute presupposition it self of all things which after what manner soever are presupposed as in every effect the cause is presupposed See therefore Oratour how easie Theologicall difficulty is Orat. Certainly this is a very grrat and yet a stupendious facility Id. Nay I say unto thee that God is infinite facility it self and it doth not agree to God that he should be infinite difficulty for it must needs be as thou shalt hear anon of crooked and straight that difficulty passe into facility if it ought to agree to the infinite God Orat. If that which in every question is presupposed be in divine matters an answer unto the question then of God there can be no proper question because the answer coincides with it Id. It is a very good inference and add unto it that God being infinite straightnesse and absolute necessity a
doubtfull question reacheth not him but all doubt is in him certainty whence we also infer that any answer unto any question concerning God is not a proper and precise answer for precision is not more than one and infinite which is God for every answer partakes of the absolute answer which is infinitely precise But what I said unto thee how that in Theological questions the presupposed is the answer must be understood in the same manner that the question is made and so taking it this is sufficiencie because whereas in God neither the question nor the answer to the question can reach precision therefore after the manner wherein the question approacheth to precision in the same manner the answer presupposeth And this is our sufficiencie which we have of God knowing that precision inattingible cannot by us be reached but after some manner that partakes the manner of absolute precision Among the which being divers and manifold that partake the onely manner of precision the foresaid manner comes nearest unto absolute facility and is our sufficiency because we cannot reach any other which is easier and truer Orat. Who would not be amazed at the hearing of these things For whereas God is absolute incomprehensibility thou sayest that comprehension comes so much the nearer unto him by how much the manner thereof doth more partake of facility Id. He that doth with me behold how absolute facility coincides with absolute incomprehensibility cannot choose but say as I do Whereupon I do constantly affirm that by how much the universal manner to all questions formable of God shall be more easie by so much more true and more convenient it is as position or affirmation agrees to God Orat. Make this somewhat more plain Id. That is as we admit some things may be spoken of God affirmatively for in that Divinity which denies all things of God we must speak otherwise because there the truer answer is to every question a negation yet by that means or manner we are not led to the knowledge what God is but what God is not There is moreover a consideration of God as neither position nor ablation that is neither affirmation nor negation agrees unto him but as he is above all position and ablation and then the answer is to deny affirmation negation and copulation As in case it should be demanded Whether God be according to the way of position it must be answered out of that which is presupposed to wit that he is and that the very absolute presupposed Entity Bat according to the way of ablation or negation it must be answered that he is not when by that way none of all those things that may be spoken can agree to him that is unspeakable But by the way which is above all position and ablation it must be answered that he is neither to wit absolute Entity nor that he is not nor both together namely that he is and is not but that he is above all And now I think thou understandest what I mean Orat. I understand now that thou wouldest say that in words using divinity where we admit speeches of God and the power of language is not utterly excluded there thou hast brought the sufficiency of difficult things into the facility of the manner of forming truer Propositions concerning God Id. Thou hast well apprehended it for if I would lay open unto thee the conception which I have of God my speech if it must stand thee in stead must needs be such as hath significative words that so in the power of the word which is alike known unto us both I may lead thee to that which is sought and that which is now sought is God And therefore this is Sermocinal or word-using Divinity whereby I endeavour by the power of language to lead thee to God the easiest and truest way that I can Orat. Let us now I pray thee return to those things that were formerly premised by thee and explain thou them in order In the first place thou saidest that the conception of conception seeing God is the conception of conception is the conception of God Now is it not the mind which conceiveth Id. Without the mind there is no conception Orat. Seeing then to conceive belongs to the mind certainly to conceive an absolute conception is nothing else but to conceive the Art of the absolute mind Id. Go on for thou art in the way Orat. But the art of the absolute mind is no other thing then the form of all things formable So I see how the conception of conception is nothing else but the conception of the Idea of divine Art If I say the truth tell me so Id. Thou speakest exceeding well for absolute conception can be nothing else but the Ideal form of all things which can be conceived which is the equality of all things formable Orat. This conception as I think is called the word of God or the reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. Howsoever it be called by learned men in that conception are all things As we say that those things which without reason foregoing come not into being are formerly in reason and all things which we conceive to be have a reason of their being that they may be after the manner in which they are and no otherwise Therefore he that looks with a profound mind into the simplicity of absolute reason which by way of priortity complicates all things in it self he makes a conception of conception by it self or absolute conception and this was the first thing that I premised Orat. Enough of this now go on to shew how the conception of absolute precision it a more precise conception of God Id. I am not now at leisure to repeat the same thing in every particular neither do I see it to be so seasonable for thee considering that by one the way is opened for thee to all But take it notwithstanding very briefly Precision straightnesse truth justice goodnesse of which thou hast heard are the same thing Yet do not beleeve that I mean as all divinity is circular one of the attributes verified of another as we say that from the necessity of Gods infinite simplicity the greatnesse of God is his power and back again his power is his greatnesse and so of all those things that are by us attributed to the essence of God But these things of which I now speak we find by experience do coincide in our ordinary talk For when we hear any body expresse a thing as it is indeed presently one sayes that the expresser did it precisely another rightly another truly another justly another well And thus we find it true in our dayly speech Neither doth he who said he did it precisely and rightly mean any other thing then he that said he expressed it truly justly and well And this thou grantest in thy self to be true when thou markest how he that said neither more nor lesse than he ought to have said hath
thee to shew how infinite straightnesse or rightnesse is the samplar Id. This thou clearly discernest by thy self that infinit rightnesse hath it self so or is of the same habitude to all things as an infinite line if there were any such hath it self to all figures for if infinite rightnesse which is necessarily absolute were contracted to a line being contracted it must needs be found the complication precision rightnesse truth measure and perfection of all figurable figures Therefore absolute rightnesse being considered absolutely and uncontractedly to any line or any other thing whatsoever is likewise absolutely the samplar precision truth measure and perfection of all things Orat. These things are no wayes subject to doubt onely shew how an infinite line is the precision of all figures thou toldest me Yesterday how an infinite circle is the samplar of all figures and I understood it not and willing to be more clearly informed of it I came unto thee again and now thou sayest an infinite line is precision which I lesse understand Id. Thou hast heard how an infinite line is a circle so a triangle quadrangle Pentagone so all infinite figures coincide with an infinie line Hereupon an infinite line is the samplar of all figures which can be made of lines because an infinite line is an infinite act or form of all formable figures And when thou lookest upon a triangle and liftest thy self up to an infinite line thou shalt find it the most adequate samplar of this triangle after this maner consider an infinite triangle this infinit triangle is neither greater nor lesse than the aforesaid triangle For the sides of an infinite triangle are infinite and an infinite side being the greatest in which the less coincides is neither greater nor lesse than the given side So then the sides of an infinite triangle are neither greater nor lesse than the sides of the given triangle So neither the whole triangle is greater or lesse than the given triangle wherefore it must needs be that an infinite triangle is the precision and absolute form of a finite triangle But the three sides of an infinite triangle must of necessity be one infinite line because there cannot be many infinite lines So it would come to passe that an infinite line is the most precise samplar of the given triangle and as I have said of a triangle so likewise of all figures Orat. O wonderfull facility of difficult things I see now that all these things do most evidently follow the position or granting of an infinite line namely that it is the samplar precision rectitude truth measure or justice goodnesse or perfection of all figures figurable by a line And I see that in the simplicity of its straightnesse all things figurable are complicitely most truly formally and precisely without all confusion or defect infinitely more perfectly than be they can figured Id. Blessed be God who hath used me a most ignorant man as an instrument such as it is to open the eyes of thy mind for the beholding him with admirable easinesse after the manner that he hath made himself visible unto thee for when thou transferrest thy self from straightnesse contracted to a line to absolute infinite straightnesse then in that straightnesse thou shalt see complicated every thing formable and the kinds of all things as I have said before of figures And thou shalt further see how straightnesse it self is the samplar precision truth measure or justice goodnesse or perfection of all things which are or can be and the precise and unconfounded actuality of all things that are or are possible to be made so that to whatsoever kind or thing being thou turnest thine eyes if thou lift up thy mind to infinite straightnesse thou shalt find it the most precise and no way defective exemplar truth thereof As put the case thou see a man which is straight and a true man thou shalt see that he is nothing else but that straightnesse truth measure and perfection So contracted and terminated is a man And if thou consider his straightnesse which is finite and lift up thy self unto infinite straightnesse thou shalt straight see how infinite and absolute straightnesse can be neither greater nor lesse than that straightnesse contracted to a man whereby the man is a straight and true man but is the truest justest and best precision thereof So infinite truth is the precision of finite truth and absolutely infinite the precision measure truth and perfection of every thing finite And as we have said of a man so understand of all things else Thus now thou hast that which is granted us to contemplate in eternall Wisdome that thou mayest behold all things in a most simple rectitude most truly precisely unconfusedly and perfectly though in an Aenigmatical mean without which the vision of God cannot be in this world until he shall grant that without any shadow he shall be made visible unto us And this is the facility of the difficult things of wisdome which according to thy fervour and devotion God vouchsafe to make every day more clear both to thee and me untill he translate us into the glorious fruition of the truth there to remain eternally Amen The end of the Second Book of the Idiot The Third Book concerning the Mind Wherein the speakers are The AUTHOUR The PHILOSOPHER The ORATOUR The IDIOT CHAP. I. How the Philosopher came unto the Idiot to learn something of the nature of the Mind How the Mind is of it self the Mind and by its Office the Soul and hath its name from measuring Authour WHen many people from every part flocked to Rome because of the Jubile with wonderfull devotion it was reported that a certain Philosopher the chiefest of all that then lived was found upon the bridge whom the passengers did much admire A certain Oratour very desirous of knowledge sought for him carefully and knowing him by the palenesse of his face his long robe and other things that shewed the gravity of a contemplative man he courteously saluting him demanded Orat. What cause is it that holds thee fixed in this place Phil. Admiration Orat. Admiration seemes to be the spur of all men that desire to know any thing And therefore I cannot but imagine seeing thou art accounted the chief among learned men that it is some great cause of admiration that makes thee so attentive Phil. Thou sayest well my friend for when I see innumerable people passe by from almost all climates in so great presse I do wonder at so great a Uniformity in the faith of them all in so great diversity of bodies For though there be no one of them like another yet there is one faith of them all which from the ends of the earth hath brought them hither with so great Devotion Orat. Certainty it must needs be the gift of God that Idiots do more clearly see and reach by faith than Philosophers by reason for thou knowest how great enquiry he hath need of that doth
by another and for another reason and one tongue hath proper names and another more barbarous and remote therefore I see that where the propriety of names is capable of more or lesse there the precise name is not known Phil. Thou makest haste to high matters Idiot for according to what thou seemest to say therefore are names â—esse proper because they are imposed at pleasure as seemed good to every one that imposed them by the motion of reason Id. I would have thee understand me more profoundly than so for although I confesse that every name is by the comming of the form unto the matter united to the thing it being true that the form gives the name that so names are not from the giver but from Eternall and the imposition is free yet I do not think that there is any other than a congruous name imposed although it be not a precise one Phil. Explain thy self I pray thee that I may know what thou meanest Id. Very willingly and now I turn my self to this art of spoon-making And first I would have thee know that I do without any haessitation affirm that al human arts are certain images of the infinite divine art I know not whether it seem so to thee or no. Phil. Thou requirest high matters and I think it not fit to answer them publickly Id. I wonder if ever thou readest any Philosopher that is ignorant of this that appears so plainly of it self For it is manifest that no humane art ever reached the precision of perfection and that every humane art is finite and bounded for one art is bounded or limited in its bounds and another in anothers and every one is different from the rest and no one doth complicate all Phil. What doest thou infer from this Id. That every humane art is finite Phil. Who doubts it Id. And it is impossible there should be many infinite things really distinct Phil. I confesse that likewise for the one of them would be bounded or determined by the other Id. If then this be so is not the onely absolute beginning infinite For before a beginning there is no beginning as appears by it self lest the beginning should be principiated Therefore Eternity is onely infinity it self or the absolute beginning Phil. I admit it Id. Therefore the one and onely absolute Eternity is infinity it self which is without beginning wherefore every finite principiated thing is from the infinite beginning Phil. I cannot deny it Id. Therefore every finite Art is from an infinite Art And so it must needs be that an infinite Art is the samplar beginning middle end measure standard truth precision and perfection of all Arts. Phil. Proceed to that which thou makest haste unto for no man can dissent from thee in these Id. I will therefore out of this Art of Spoon-making apply symbolical examples that the things I shall say may be made more sensible Phil. I pray thee do so for I see thou holdest the way to those things after which I labour Ant. Then the Idiot taking a Spoon in his hand thus proceeded Id. A Spoon befides the Idea of our mind hath no other samplar For although a Carver as a painter do draw examples from things which he goeth about to figure yet so do not I that of wood make Spoons and of clay little dishes and pots For I do not in these imitate the figure or shape of any naturall thing whatsoever for such forms of Spoons dishes and pots are perfected by mans art alone and therefore my art is rather perfecting than imitating created figures and in this liker unto infinite Art Phil. This pleaseth well enough Id. Suppose then that I would explicate my art and make sensible the form of Spoonnesse by which the Spoon is constituted which though in its own nature it be by no sense attingible as being neither white nor black nor of any other colour sound smell taste or touch yet if I will labour to make it sensible in that manner that it may be done Whereupon by the divers motions of the instruments which I use I do bore and make hollow the matter that is wood untill in it the due proportion arise wherein the form of spoonnesse doth conveniently appear Whereupon the truth and precision of spoonnesse which is unmultipliable and incommunicable cannot by any instrument or any man be made perfectly sensible And in all spoons nothing but the simple form it self after a divers manner more in one and in another lesse but in none precisely And although the wood it self takes the name from the comming of the form that as soon as that proportion ariseth in which spoonnesse appeareth it is called a spoon that so the name may be united to the form yet the imposition of the name was at pleasure because another might have been imposed And though it be at pleasure yet it is not another and quite divers from the natural name united to the form but the naturall name shines after the comming of the form in all the divers names by whatsoever divers nations imposed The imposition of the name therefore is done by the motion of reason for the motion of reason is about things which fall under sense whose discretion concordance and difference reason makes So that there can be nothing in reason which was not first in sense So therefore reason imposeth names and is moved to give one name to one thing and another to another But because the form in its truth is not found among those things about which reason is conversant therefore reason ends it self and determines in conjecture and opinion Whereupon generals and particulars genera species as they fall under names are Entia rationis beings of reason which reason made to it self out of the concordance and difference of sensible things in that respect being by nature after the sensible things whereof they are the similitudes the sensible things being destroyed those cannot remain Whosoever therefore thinks that nothing can fall into the understanding that falls not into reason he also thinks that there can be nothing in the understanding that was not first in the sense and consequently he must necessarily say that the thing is nothing but as it falls under a name and his study is in every inquisition deeply to search after the quid nominis quiddity of the name And this enquiry is very pleasing unto man because it discourseth by the motion of reason This man would deny that forms in themselvs in their truth separated are otherwise thaÌ„ as they are beings of reasoÌ„ would make no account of samplars and Ideas But they that admit something to be in the intelligence of the mind which was not either in sense or reason as for example The exemplar and incommunicable truth of forms which shineth in the sensible things they say that the samplars or Ideas do by nature go before the sensible things as the truth goes before the image
likenesse of beings for those things that agree to the Divine mind as to infinite truth agree to our mind as the nearest image of truth If all things be in the Divine mind as in their precise and proper truth all things are in our mind as in the image or similitude of their proper truth to wit notionally for knowledge is by likenesse All things are in God but there the samplars of things all things are in our mind but here the similitudes of things As God is the absalute entity which is the complication of all things that are so our mind is the image of that infinite entity which is the complication of all images no otherwise then the first picture of an unknown King is the samplar of all other copies that are painted according to it for the knowledge or face of God descends not but in the mentall nature whereof truth is the object and further it descendeth not but by the mind so that the mind is the image of God and the samplar of all the images of God after it self Therefore look how much all things after the simple mind do partake of the mind so much do they also partake of Gods image so that the mind of it self is the image of God and all things after the mind no wayes but by the mind CHAP. IV. How our mind is not the explication but a certaine image of the eternall complication how those things that are after the mind are not such an image How the mind is without notions and yet hath a conere ate judgement and why the body it necessary for it Phil. Hou seemest out of the great fulnesse of thy mind as though thou meantest that as the infinite minde is the absolute formative power so the finite minde is the conformative or configurative power Id. I doe indeed for that which is to be said cannot conveniently be expressed therefore is the multiplication of speech very profitable Now marke further than an image is one thing and an explication another for equality is the image of unitie for from unitie once ariseth equalitie Therefore is equality the image of unitie yet is not equality but plurality the explication of unitie therefore is equally the image of the explication of of unity not the explication So doe I meane that the minde is the most simple image of the divine minde amongst all the images of divine complication And so is the minde the first image of that divine complication which by his simplicity and power complicateth all images of complication For as God is the complication of complications so the minde which is the image of God is the image of the complication of complications and after the images are the plurality of things which explicate the divine complication As number explicates unity motion rests time eternity composition simplicity time the present greatness a point motion a moment inequality equality diversity identity and so of the rest From hence gather the admirable power of our minde for in the vertue thereof is complicated the assimulative power of the complication of a point by which it finds in it self a power wherein it assimulates it selfe to every greatnesse So also because of the assimulative power of the complication of unity it hath power to assimulate it selfe to every multitude And so by the assimulative power of the complication of now or the present it hath power assimulate it selfe to all time and so by the assimulative power of th complication of rests to all motion and of simplicity to every composition and of identity to all diversity and of equality to all inaquality and of conjunctionto every dis-junction And by the image of the absolute complication which is the infinite minde it hath power by which it can assimulate it selfe to every explication and many such things thou seest of thy selfe may be said which our mind hath because it is a certaine image of the infinite simplicity which complicateth all things Phil. It seemeth then that onely the mind is the image of God Id. So it is properly because all things that are after or beneath the mind are not the image of God but only ly so far forth as the mind shineth or appeareth in them as it more shineth in perfect living wights then in imperfect ones and more insensible things then in vegetables and more in vegetables then in minerals so that creatures that want the mind are rather explications then images of the Divine simplicity although according to the shining or appearing of the mentall image in explication they do diversly partake of the image Phil. Aristotle said there was no notion concreate or made together with the minder or soul because he likened it to a smooth and shaven table but Plato saith there were notions concreated with it yet that for the moles and weights of the body the soul forgot them what do'st thou thinke to be the truh Id. Undoubtedly our mind was by God put into this body to the profit and advantage thereof and therefore it must needs have from God all that without which it could not acquire that profit and advantage it is not therefore credible that there were notions concreated with the soul which it lost in the body but because it hath need of a body that the concreated power may proceed unto act As the visive power of the soul cannot see actually except it be stirred up by the object and that cannot be but by the representing of multiplied specis by then esn of the organ and so it hath need of the eye Even so the power of the mind which is the comprehensive and nationall power cannot porceed to its opperations except it be stirred up by sensible things which it cannot be but by the mediation of sensible phantasmis Therefore it hath need of an organicall body and such an one without which it could not be stired up In this therefore Aristotle seems to have thought aright that there are no notions of the soul concreated from the beginning which it lost by being incorporated But because it cannot profit if it want all udgement as a deaf man can never profit to become a lutenist because he hath in himself no judgement of harmony by which he may discerne whether he do profit therefore our soul hath a concreated judgement without which it could not profit This judging power is naturally concreated with the mind by which of it self it judgeth whether discourses be weak strong or concluding Which power if Plato called a concreated notion he was not out of the way at all Phil. How clear is thy delivery which every man that hears is forced to assent unto These things must be diligently marked for we plainly find a spirit in our mind speaking and judging this good that just the other true and reprehending us if we decline from the just which speech and judgement it learned not and therefore it is connate or concreate Id. By this we
prove that the mind is that power which though it want all notionall form yet being stired up can assimilate it self to every form and make notions of all things like after a manner to a sound eye which is in darkness and never saw the light for it wanteth all actuall notion of visible things yet comming into light and being stirred up it assimilates it selfe to the thing visible that it may make a notion Ora. Plato saith that judgement is then required when the sence ministers contrary things at once Id. He spake subtilly for when the touch confusedly finds hard and so ft or heavy and light one contrary in another then there is recourse to the understanding that it may judge of the quiddity of both so confusedly perceived that there are many things discreet So when the sight confusedly sees great and little is there not need of the discretive judgement of the understanding what is great and what little but if the sence were of it self sufficient there would no recourse be had to the judgements of the understanding as in the sight of that which is light when there is nothing presented which is contrary to it CHAP. V. How the minde is a living substance created in the body and of the manner how whether ther reason be in bruit beast and how the living minde is the description of the eternall wisdome Phil. ALmost all the Peripateticks say that the understanding which thou seemest to call the minde is a certain power of the Soul and that to understand is an accident what sayest thou to it Id. The minde is a living substance which we finde by experience doth inwardly speak and judge in us and which of all spirituall powers that we finde in our selves is more then any other power assimulated and made like to the infinite substance an absolute forme The office of the mind in this body to quicken it and from hence it is called the soul wherefore the minde is a substantiall forme or a power that after its fastion complicates in it selfe all things and by quickning the living soul whereby it animates the body complicates the vegetative and sensitive life and the power discoursive and intellectual and intelligible Phil. Wilt thou have the minde which thou confest to be also the intellectuall soul to have been before the body and afterwards incorporated as Pythagoras and the Platonists meane Id. In nature not in time for I compared it as thou hardest to the sight in darknesse now the sight was not actually before the eye but onely in nature wherefore because the minde is a certaine divine seed that by its own power doth notionally complicate the Samplers of all things therefore is it by God from whom it hath this power in asmuch as it received its being at the same time placed and in a convenient earth where it may bring forth fruit and of it selfe notionally explicate the university of things otherwise this seminall power had been given it in vaine if there had not been given withall oppertunity to break into act Phil. Thou speakest weightily But I much desire to heare how this is done in us Id. The divine manners or waies are never to be reached precisely yet wee make guesses and conjectures of them some more cleare and some more darke ones I thinke this similitude which I will tell thee sufficient For thou knowest that the fight by its owne proper nature doth not discern but in a certaine Globe and confusedly perceives the obectacle meeting it within the speare of its motion the eye which objectacle is generated by the multiplication of the species of the object into the eye Therefore if the sight be present in the eye with out discretion as in infants where the use of discretion is wanting then the minde comes so to the sensible soul as discretion to the sight by which it judgeth between colours And as this visive disc etion is found in perfect brute living wights as in Dogs that know their owne masters by sight and is by God given unto the sight as the perfection and forme of seeing so unto mans nature besides that discretion which is found in bruits there is given a higher power that is unto annimall discretion ust as that is to the sensible power so that the minde is the forme of the annimall discretion and the perfection thereof Phi. Exceedingly well and sweetly but me thinks thou drawest somewhat near the oppinion of the wise Philo that said there was reason in beasts Id. We finde by experience that there is in brute beasts a descretive discourse without which their nature could not well subsist Whereupon their discourse because it wants the forme namely the understanding or minde is confused for it wants judgement and knowledge and because all discretion is from reason therefore Philo seemes to have said as he did not without reason or absurdly Phil. Declare I pray thee how the minde is the forme of the discoursing reason Id. I have already told thee that as the sight seeth and knoweth not what it seeth without discretion to informe enlighten and perfect it so reason syllogyzeth and knoweth not what it syllogizeth without the minde but the mind enforms enlightens and perfects raciocination or discourse that may know what it syllogizeth as if an Idiot not knowing the power of words should read some booke reading proceeds from the force of reason for he readeth by running through the difference of letters which he compounds and devideth and this is the worke of reason and yet bee knoweth not what he reads and let there be another which reads and knowes and understands what hee reads This is a certaine similitude of reason confused and reason formed by the minde for the minde hath the descretive judgement of the reasons which reason is good and which is sophisticall so that the minde is the discretive forme of reasons as reason is the discretive forme of sences and imaginations Phil. From whence hath the minde this judgement for she seeme to give judgement of all things Id. It hath it from hence because it is the image of the Samplar of all things for God is the Samplar of all things Therefore whereas the Smplar of all things shineth in the minde as the truth in the image it hath in it selfe that where it looketh and according to which it giveth judgement of outward things as if there were a living Law written that Law because living would read in it self the things that are to be judged Right so the minde is a living description of the eternall and infinite wisdome but in cur minds from the beginning that life is like unto one that is a sleepe untill it be stirred up by admiration proceeding from sensible things to be moved then by the motion of its intellectual life it finds described in it self that which it seeketh But thou must understand that this description is a resplendance or shining of the Samplar of all things after
appear as I said that the proportion befitting a spoon being broken the form cannot remain because it hath no place for proportion is as it were the aptitude of the specular surface to the resplendence of the image which not abiding the representation ceaseth Behold how the infinite unity of the samplar cannot appear but in an apt proportion and that is in number For the eternall mind doth act as a musitian which would make his conception sensible for he takes many voices and brings them into a proportion agreeing to that harmony that in that proportion the harmony may sweetly and perfectly appear when it is there as in its place and the respendence of the harmony is varied according to the variety of the proportion that is fit for it and the harmony ceaseth when the aptitude of that proportion ceaseth From the mind therefore is number and all things Phil. What is there not a plurality of things without the consideration of our mind Id. Yes but it is from the Divine mind wherefore as in regard of God plurality of things is from the Divine mind so in regard of us plurality of things is from our minds for onely the mind numbers and the mind taken away there is no discrete number For in that the mind doth singularly and particularly understand one and the same thing we when we consider it say it is one thing in that it doth singularly understand one thing and that once it is in truth the equality of unity But when it understands one thing singularly and by multiplying it we judge the things to be more in saying two because the mind understandeth that which is singularly one and the same thing twice or by doubling it And so of the rest Phil. Doth not a ternary consist of a binary and a unity and we say that number is a collection of singulars how doest thou then say that it is of the mind Id. Those wayes of speaking must be referred to the way of understanding because to collect is no more then to take one and the same common thing and multiply it about the same things Therefore when thou seest that without the multitude of the mind a binary or ternary is nothing thou seest well enough that number is from the mind Phil. How is the plurality of things the number of the Divine mind Id. Because from that the Divine mine understands one thing so and another thing otherwise the plurality of things ariseth Therefore if thou look narrowly into it thou shalt find the plurality of things to be nothing but the Divine minds manner of understanding So I conjecture one may without blame say that the first samplar of things in the mind of the Creator is number This appears by the delight and beauty that is in all things which consisteth in proportion as that in number Hereupon number is the principall step leading unto wisdome Phil. The Pythagoreans said so first then the Platonists whom also Severinus Boetius imitates Id. Likewise say I that the samplar of the conceptions of our mind is number for without number it can do nothing If there were no number there would neither be assimilation notion discretion nor measure For without number things cannot be other and other or discrete nor can it be understood how one thing should be substance another quantity and so of the rest Therefore seeing number is the manner of understanding nothing can be without it understood For the number of our mind being the image of the Divine mind the samplar of things is the samplar of notions And as unity is before all plurality and this unity uniting is the uncreated mind in which all things are one after one plurality the explication of the power of that unity which power is the entity of things the equality of being and the connexion of entity and equality and this is the blessed Trinity So in our mind is the image of that Divine Trinity for our mind is likewise a unity uniting before all plurality by the conceptible mind and after that unity that unites all plurality is plurality which is the image of the plurality of things as our mind is the image of the Divine mind and plurality explicates the power of the unity of the mind which power is the image of entity equality and connexion Phil. I see that by number thou reachest to marvellous things Go too therefore because Saint Dionisius saith that the essences of things are incorruptible canst thou demonstrate this by number Id. When thou considerest that number is made of the multitude of unities and that alterity doth contingently follow multiplication and markest the composition of number to be of unity and alterity the same and divers even and odd divisible and indivisible And that the quiddity of all things had its beginning from being the number of the Divine mind then thou mayest after some fashion reach unto it how the essences of things are incorruptible as unity whereof is number which unity is entity And how things are so or so by alterity which is not or the essence of number but accidentally following the multipliciation of unity So alterity is of the essence of nothing for alterity pertains to destruction because it is division from whence is corruption and therefore it cannot be of the essence of the thing Thou seest moreover how number is no other thing then the things numbered From whence thou mayest conclude that between the Divine mind and things there mediates no number which hath any actuall being but the number of things are the things themselves CHAP. VII How the minde of it selfe workes out the formes of things by way of assimilation and reacheth absolute possibilitie or matter Phil. TEll me I pray thee doest thou thinke our minde is a harmonie or a number moving it selfe or a composition of the same and divers or of an essence divisible and indivisible or an entelechia for such manner of speaking the Platonists and Peripateticks use Id. I doe believe that all they which have spoken of the minde might use these or the like speeches moved by those things which they did experimentally finde in the power of the minde for they found the judgement of all harmonie to bee in the minde and that the minde out of it selfe fashioneth notions and that it so moves it selfe as a living discretive number would of it selfe proceed to make discretions And againe they found that it proceeds in any particular collectively or distributively either according to the manner of simplicity and absolute necessity or of absolute possibility or necessity of complexion or determinately or of a possibility determinate or because of the aptitude of a perpetuall motion Because of these and the like experiments it is probably to be beleeved they said those or the like things of the minde or soul For to say that the minde is of the same and divers is to say it is of unity and alterity after the same manner
that a number is compounded of the same in regard of the common or universall of that which is divers in regard of singulars or particulars which both are waies of the minds understanding Phil. Go on I pray thee to declare how the minde may be said to be a number moving it selfe Id. I thinke no man can deny but that the minde is a certaine divine living number excellently proportioned to the resplendence of manifesting and shewing of the divine harmony and complicating every sensible rational and intellectual harmony and whatsoever can be better expressed about this matter Insomuch that every number proportion and harmony which proceeds from our minde doth as little reach or come near our minde as our minde doth to the infinite minde For the minde though it be a divine number yet it is so a number that it is a simple unity by its own power putting forth its number So that look what proportion there is between God and his workes the same there is between the workes of the minde and the minde it selfe Phil. There are very many that would have our minde to be of the divine nature and most meerly conjoyned to the divine minde ld I doe not think they meant any otherwise then as I have laid although they had another manner of speaking For between the divine minde and ours there is the same difference that there is between doing and seeing for the divine minde by conceiving creates but ours by conceiving assimilates in making notions or intellectual visions The divine minde is a power making things to be but ours an assimilative power Orat. I see that the Philosopher hath not time enough to satisfie himselfe and therefore I have kept silence a long time I have heard many and very pleasing things yet would I faine heare further how the minde of it selfe puts forth the formes of things by way of assimulation Id. The minde is so assimilative that in the sight it makes it selfe like visible things and in the hearing to audible things in the taste to things tastable in the smell to things odorable in the touch to things tangible in the sense to things sensible in the imagination to things imaginable and in the reason to reasonable things For the image in the absence of sensible things is as some sense without the discretion of sensible things for it conformes it selfe to sensible things absent but confusedly and without discerning of state from state But in reason it conformes it selfe to things with discerning of state from state In all those places our minde is carried in the spirit of the Arteries vvhich being stir'd up by meeting vvith species multipli'd from the objects to the spirits assimilates it selfe by the things to the species that by assimilation it may give judgement of the objects Whereupon that subtile spirit of the Arteries which is enlivened by the minde is so by the minde conform'd unto the similitude of the species which was objected to the motion of the spirit As soft wax is by a man having the use and art of the minde configured unto the thing then presently presented to the work-man for all configurations whether in the art of carving painting or hammering cannot be done without the mind for it is the mind which terminates all things Therefore if we could imagine a piece of wax inform'd by the minde then the minde being within it would configure it or make it like to every figure presented unto it as now the minde of the Artificer being applied from without labours to doe So likewise of clay and every flexible or fashionable thing So in our body the minde according to the various flexiblenesse of the spirits of the Arteries in the Organs makes divers configurations subtile and grosse and one spirit is not configurable to that to which another is because the spirit in the optick nerve cannot be met withall and incountred by the species of sounds but onely by the species of colours therefore is configurable to the species of colours and not of sounds and so of the rest There is likewise another spirit which is configurable to all sensible species which is in the Organ of the imaginative power but after a grosse and indiscreet or undistinguished manner And there is another in the Organ of the ratiocinative or discursive power which is configurable to al sensible things discretly and clearly And all these configurations are assimilations to sensible things when thy are done by the meanes of corporall spirits though never so subtile wherefore when the minde makes these assimilations that it may have the motions of sensible things and so is drownned in the corporall spirit then it acteth as the soul animating a body by which animation the power of a living wight is constituted And hereupon the soul of brute beasts makes the like assimilation after its manner though more confused that it may after its manner attaine to notions But our power of the minde from such notions as these so elicited drawn out by assimilation makes Mechanick arts physicall and logicall conjectures and reacheth things in the manner whereby they are conceived in the possibility of being or matter and in the manner whereby the possibility of being or matter is determined by the forme Wherefore seeing that by these assimilations it reacheth none but the notions of sensible things where the formes of things are not true but shadowed with the variablenesse of matter therefore all such notions are rather conjectures then truth for this cause I say that the notions which are reached by rationall assimilations are uncertain because they are rather according to the images of formes then the truths Afterwards our minde not as drowned in the body which it animates but as it is the minde of it selfe yet in possibility of being united to the body while it lookes unto its immutability makes assimilation of formes not as they are drowned in the matter but as they are in and of themselves and conceives the immutable quiddities of things using it selfe for an instrument without any organicall spirit As whilst it conceives that a circle is a figure from whose center all the lines drawne to the circumference are equall after which manner of being a circle without the minde cannot be in matter for it is impossible there should be given in matter two equall lines and it is lesse possible that such a circle should be figured and therefore a circle in the mind is the Samplar and measure of the truth of a circle in the pavement So wee say that the truth of things in the minde is in the necessity of complexion to wit after the manner that the truth of a thing requireth as we have said of the circle And because the minde as in it selfe and abstracted from matter makes these assimilations therefore it assimilateth it selfe to abstracted formes And according to this power it shewes or puts forth certain mathematicall sciences and finds its power to bee
that it can assimilate it selfe to things as they are in the necessity of complexion and make notions and it is stirred up to these abstractive assimilations by the Phantasmes or images of formes which it layes hold on by the assimilations made in the Organs As by the beauty of an image one is moved to enquire the beauty of the Samplar and in this assimilation the minde is as if absolute pliablenesse abstracted from Wax Clay Mettals and all other flexible things were living by a mentall life that it could of it selfe assimilate it selfe to all figures as they subsist in themselves and not in the matter for such flexibility in the power of its living flexibility that is in it selfe would behold that the notions of all things are in as much as it could conforme it selfe to all things And because the minde is not yet satisfied with this because it sees not the precise truth of all things but in a certain necessity determined to every thing as one thing is so and another thing so and every thing compounded of its parts and it sees that this manner of being is not the truth it selfe but the participation of truth that one is truly so and another thing truly otherwise which alterity cannot agree to the truth in it self in its selfe considered in its owne absolute and infinite precision whereupon the minde looking to its simplicity to wit as it is not onely abstracted from matter but incommunicable to matter or after the manner of a forme not unible useth this simplicity as an instrument that it may assimilate it selfe to all things not onely abstractedly but also in its simplicity incommunicable to matter And after this manner it beholdeth all things in its simplicity as if it should see all greatnesse in a point and a circle in the center and there it sees without all composition of parts and not as this is one thing and that another but as all things are one and one all things And this is the beholding of absolute truth as if one could after the last-before-spoken manner behold how entity it selfe is in all beings variously participated And if after this he could in the manner of which we now speak above participation and all truth simply behold absolute entity it selfe such a one might truly above the determinate necessity of complexion now see all things which earst hee saw in varietie without it in absolute necessity most simply without number greatnesse and any alterity And in this highest manner the minde uses it selfe as it is the image of God and as God which is all things shineth in it namely when as the living image of God it doth with all its power turne it selfe to its Samplar And in this manner it sees all things one thing and it selfe the assimilation of that one thing by which it frames notions of the one that it is all things and so makes Theologicall speculations where as in the end of all notions it sweetly resteth as in the most delectable truth of its life of which manner there can never be enough said but these things which I have thus spoken without curiosity and after a plain manner thou maist by thy elegant stile make more polite and wel-come to the reader Orat. I had no desire but to beare what I have heard which thou hast plainly declared and that will be to them that seek the truth elegance enough Phil. I pray thee declare further how the mind reacheth indeterminate possibility which we call matter Id. By a certain counterfeit way and a contrary manner whereby it passeth from a necessity of complection to an absolute necessity for seeing how all bodies have to be formed by corporiety taking that away it seeth all it law before it as a certaine indeterminate possibility And those things which before it saw in corporiety distinct and determinate as being in act now it seeth confused and indeterminate inpossibility And this is the manner of universality by which all things are seen in possibility yet it is not the manner of being because it is not power-being or posse esse CHAP. VIII How it is the same thing to the mind to conceive to understand notions and to make assimilations And how sensations are made according to the naturalists Phil. ENough of this least we exceed our purpose now tell me if in or to the mind to conceive be to understand Id. I have said that the mind is the power of conceiving so that being stirred up it moveth it self by conceiving till it understand Wherefore understanding is the perfect motion of the mind Phil. When is it said to conceive Id. When it makes the similitudes of things or if thou hadst rather say notions or kinds differences species proper and accident For God created in the soul the power of conceiving and the mind doth the things aforesaid yet are all these one and the same thing the power of the mind conception similitude notion kind and species And although we do not call it the same thing to understand and to conceive yet whatsoever is understood is conceived and whatsoever is conceived is understood but onely that which is actuall is understood and not conceived Phil. How meanest thou that Id. To conceive is nothing but to comprehend either after the manner of matter or form or some other way but that which is actually is said to be understood that is the property of it is comprehended by the mind The mind is also said to understand by which it is moved and the beginning of the motion is rather called passion the perfection of it understanding But as a disposition and habit are the same considering a disposition tends to perfection and after perfection is a habit so the passion of the mind and the understanding are one and the same thing Phil. Yet the understanding doth not seeme to say or imply perfection Id. Thou sayest well properly the mind is said to understand when it is moved although it be not called unstanding but after perfection Phil. Are therefore all these one and the same to wit the power of conceiving conception similitude notion passion and understanding Id. They are so the same that the power of conceiving is not any of them because it is called a power from an aptitude which it hath from its creation a conception from the imitation because it imitates the matter or forme namely in that it comprehends after the manner of the matter or form of the compound And in what respect it is called conception in the same also it is called the similitude or notion of the thing and these names are truly predicated one of another and every one of them is called understanding Phil. I wonder how conception can be called understanding Id. Although the conception be called from imitation and understanding from perfection yet it is perfection which is the cause why understanding is called conception for then doth the mind conceive when the understanding
from the variablenesse of matter and are not materially but mentally whereof already sufficiently Phil. I wonder seeing as thou sayest Idiot the minde is the measure of things why it is carryed to the measure of things with so great desire Id. That it may reach its owne measure for the minde is a living measure which by measuring other things reacheth its owne capacity For it doth all things that it may know it selfe But though it seeke the measure of it selfe in every thing yet it finds it not but where all things are one thing there is the truth of its precision because there is the adequate Samplar thereof Phil. How can the minde make it selfe the adequate Samplar of so divers things Id. As an absolute face might make it self the measure of all faces for when thou considerest that the minde is a certaine absolute measure which can be neither greater nor lesse being uncontracted to quantity And furthermore that it is a living measure measuring by it selfe as though aliving paire of compasses should measure by themselves then thou reachest how it maks it self a notion measure or samplar that it might in all things reach it selfe Phil. I doe understand the like in a compasse which is of no determinate quantity because a compasse yet is extended and contracted that it may be like the things determinate But tell me doth the minde assimilate it selfe to the manners of being Id. Yea to all of them for it conformes it selfe to possibility that it may measure all things possibly so to absolute necessity that like God it may measure all things unitedly and simply so to the necessity of complexion that it may measure all things in their proper being and unto determinate possiblity that it may measure all things as they existe For it measures symbolically by way of comparison as when it useth number and Geometricall figures and accomodates it selfe to the likenesse of such things Wherefore to him that looks narrowly into the matter it appeares that the minde is a living and uncontracted similitude of infinite equality CHAP. X. How the comprehension of the truth is in multitude and magnitude Phil. LEt it not bee grievous unto thee to continue thy disourse untill night my deare friend that I may still injoy thy presence for to morrow I must of necessity bee gone and therefore I pray thee expound unto me that saying of the learned Boetius what he meanes when he saith that the comprehension of the truth of all things is in multitude and magnitude Id. I think that in multitude he had relation to discretion and in magnitude to integrity or wholnesse For hee doth rightly comprehend the truth of a thing which discerns or distinguisheth it from all other things and he also reacheth the integrity or wholnesse of a thing beyond which or short of it the whole being of a thing cannot subsist Therefore learning or discipline in Geometry determines the whole being of a Triangle so that it cannot be either beyond or on this side either more or lesse In Astronomy it determines the whole being of motion by the doctrine or discipline of greatnesse is had the terme and measure of the whole being of things as by that of number the discretion of things for number doth much availe to distinguish the confusion of things that are common likewise to collect the termes and communion of things But greatnesse is available to comprehend the terme and measure of the whole being of things Phil. If magnitude doe distinguish the integrity from all things there is then nothing knowne unlesse all things be knowne Id. Thou sayest the truth for the part is not knowne except the whole be knowne for the whole measureth the part For when I doe cut a Spoon out of the wood by parts one piece after another while I fit every part I looke to the whole that so I may make a well proportioned Spoon so that the whole Spoon which I have conceived in my minde is the Samplar which I have an eye unto while I frame every part thereof And then can I make a perfect Spoon when every part keeps its due proportion in order to the whole likewise also ought every part compared to part to observe its integrity or wholenesse Therefore it must needs be that to the knowledge of one Spoon there proceeds the knowledge of the whole and of the parts thereof Wherefore if God who is the Samplar of the universe be not known there is nothing of the whole university of things known and if the university bee not knowne it is manifest that nothing can be knowne of the parts thereof So that the knowledge of God of al things must go before the knowledge of any thing in particular Phil. Tell me further I pray thee why he saith that without the Quadrivium or four wayes in one no man can righty philosophize Id. For the reason aforesaid for because in Arithmetick and musick is contained the power of numbers from whence is had the description of things and in Geometry and Astronomy is contained the Doctrine of greatnesse from whence flowes all the comprehension of the whole being therefore can no man Philosophize without the quadrivium Phil. I wonder whether he meant that all that is is either greatnesse or multitude Id. I doe not think he did but that all that is falls under greatnesse or multitude because the demonstration of all things is made according to the power of the one or the other for magnitude terminates multitude discerns Therefore the definition which terminates and includs the whole being hath the power of magnitude and pertaines unto it and the demonstration of definitions is necessary according to the power of magnitude but division and the demonstration of divisions according to the multitude moreover the demonstrations of syllogismes are made according to the power both of multitude magnitude For that of two propositions the third is concluded it is of multitude but that it consists of universals and particulars it is of magnitude Hee that had more leasure then we have might also deduce from hence how quantities and qualities the other predicaments which give us the notice of things descend from multitude but how this is done it is hardly known CHAP. XI How all things in God are in a trinity and likewise in our minde and how our minde is compounded of the severall manners of comprehending Phil. THou spakest somewhat above of the trinity of God and the trinity of the mind I pray thee declare how all things are in God in trinity and likewise in our minde Id. You Philosophers doe affirme that the ten most generall kinds doe contain all things Phil. Yes without doubt Id. Doest-not thou as thou considerest them in act see that they are divided Phil. Yes Id. But when thou considerest them before the beginhing of being without division what else can they be but eternity for connexion is before all division Therefore it
must needs be that before all division they were united and knit together But connexion which is before all division is most simple eternity which is God Furthermore it cannot be denied that whereas God is perfect and perfect is that whereunto nothing is wanting hereupon it followeth that the universitie of things is in perfection which is God But the highest perfection requireth that it bee simple and one without Alterity and diversity and therefore all things in God are one Phil. It is a plain and pleasant demonstration thou makest but shew how in trinity Id. This were to be handled in another place that it might be spoken of more clearely but since I have determined to deny thee nothing to my utmost power take it thus Thou hast already heard that from eternity all things in God are God Consider therefore the university of things in time and being that nothing impossible is made doest thou not see that the universitie might have been made from eternall Phil. My minde assents unto 't Id. Therefore in thy minde thou seest all things in that their may-be-made or posse fieri Phil. Thou sayest well Id. And if they could have been made there must needs be something that could make them before they were a posse-facere before a posse-fieri Phil. There was Id. So before the temporall university of things thou seest all things in him that could make them Phil. I doe see them so Id. Well then that the unversity of things which thou considerest with the eye of thy minde in the absolute could-be-made and the could-make might come into being was there not necessary a bond knot or connexion betweene them both the could-be-made and the could-make or else that which could-be-made by him that could-make had never been made Phil. Thou sayest exceeding well Id. Thou seest then before all temporall existence all things in the knot or bond proceeding from the absolute could-be-made and the absolute could-make but these three absolutes are before all time simple eternity And therefore thou seest all things in simple eternity after the manner of a Trinity Phil. Most sufficiently Id. Marke then diligently how the absolute could-be-made and the absolute could-make and the absolute knot are but one infinitly absolute and one deity And that could-be-made is in order before could-make for every making presupposeth that it could be made and could-make hath what it hath namely that it could-make from could-be-made and the knot or band from them both Therefore whereas order saith that could-be-made precedes therefore is unity attributed unto it in which unity is precedence unto could-make is attributed equality which presupposeth unity from both which is the bond or knot and let these things if so it seem good be sufficient of this matter Phil. Onely one thing more and that is whether God do understand as three and one Id. The eternal mind understandeth all things in the unity of unity equality and the bond of both for how should God understand even in eternity without all succession without entity the equality of entity and the knot of both which are Trinity in unity Not that God pretermits something after the manner of matter or understands by succession as wee do but his understanding being his standing essence is necessarily in a Trinity Thil. Now add unto it whether it be so also in our mind after the manner thereof Id. I hold for certaine that all things principiated or begun hold in themselves the likenesse of their principle or beginning and that therefore in all things is found a trinity in unity of substance after the likenese of the true Trinity and unity of substance of the eternall beginning In all things therefore which are principiated there must needs be found the could-be-made which descends from the infinite power of unity or absolute entity the could-make which descends from the power of absolute equality and the composition of both which descends from the absolute bond Whereupon our mind the image of the eternal mind in that eternal mind as the similitude in the truth labours to find out its own measure For our mind is to be considered as a high power in regard it is the similitude or the Divine mind in which mind of ours to be able to be assimilated to be able to assimilate and the knot of both are in essence one and the same thing Therefore cannot our mind except it be one in Trinity understand any thing no more then the Divine mind For first whilest it moves it self that it may understand it premises something in the likenesse of couldbe made or matter whereunto it joyns another in the likenesse of could-make or forme and then in the likenesse of that which is compounded of them both it understands And whilest it comprehends after the manner of matter it akes kinds whilest after the manner of forme it makes differences and whilest after the manner of the compound it makes species or individuals So also whilest it understands after the manner of a proper passion it makes things proper whilest after the manner of something adventitious makes accidents And it understands nothing except it knit it together by some manner of matter premised another manner of forme comming upon it and the manner of the compound And in this succession wherein I said some things are premissed after the manner of matter and forme thou feest our mind understandeth after the similitude of the eternall mind for the eternal mind understands all things together and after all manner of understanding without succession But succcession is a descent from eternity whose image and smilitude it is therefore it understands in succession whilest it united to the body which is subject to succession For this is attentively to be noted that all things as they are in our mind are together in matter in forme and in the compound Thil. The things thou speakest are very delightfull but that which thou saidst last was so attentively to be noted I pray thee expound more plainly Id. Very willingly Look upon this nature which is an animal or living wight for sometimes the minde comprehends it as it is a Genus or kind and then it consider the nature of a living wight as it were confusedly and unformedly after the manner of matter sometimes it considers it as it is expressed by the name of humanity and that is after the manner of formes sometimes after the manner of the thing compounded of that kind or Genus and the differences that come unto it and being so in the mind it is said to be in connexion So then that matter and that forme or rather that similitude of matter and forme and that which is considered after the manner of the compound is one and the same notion and one and the same substance As when I consider an animal as matter and humanity as forme coming upon it and the connexion of them both I say that matter that forme and that connexion
nature precedes the intelligence but degenerates into intelligence when it goes back from the divine simplicity in which all things are one and will behold all things in it self as every thing hath a proper being distinct from another afterwards the mind doth more degenerate when by the motion of reafon it comprehends things not in it self but as the forme is invariable matter where it cannot hold the truth but declines into an image Now Aristototle who considered all things as they fall under names imposed by the motion of Reason makes Reason the Elenment or beginning and peradventure he saith that Reason by discipline which is done by names ascends unto intelligence afterwards higher unto intelletibility And therefore he makes reason the Element to the ascent of the intellest as Plato made intellectibility to the ascent thereof And so there seem to be no difference between them save in the manner of considering Phil. Be this so But tell me why all the Philosopers say that every understanding is of substance and accident how is this true of God and the first matter Id. The understending concerning God is an inflexion from the understanding of this name Ens or being because the being of not being that is being imparticipably understood is God And this understanding is the same with that which is of substance and accident but another way that is inflexly considered Wherefore the understanding conserning God comprehends all understandings of substance and accidents but is simple and one but the understanding which had ot the first matter is a certain bending from that which is had of a body for if thou understand abody un-bodily that is without all corporeal formes thou understandest the same thing which signifies a body but after another manne because un-bodily which is without doubt the understanding of the matter Phil. Doest thinke that the celestiall mind 's created according to their intellectuall dgrees have also indelible notions Id. I thinke some Angells intellectible as those of the highest orders some intelligentiall as of the second some rationall as of the third and that in every order there are likewise so many degrees that there are in the whole nine degrees or quires and that our mindes are so beneath the lowest degrees of such spirits and above every degrees of corporall nature that they are as it were the connexion of the university of things the terme of perfection of the lower nature and the beginning of the higher For I thinke that the mindes of the blessed spirits that are without bodies doe in rest possesse invariable notions and such as are not by any oblivion to be defaced because of the presence of the truth which incessantly offers it self by way of object And this is the happinesse of those spirits that have attained the fruition of the Samplar of things But our minds because of their informitie doe often forget the things they knew though there remaine the concreated aptitude to know them again For although they cannot without a body be stirred up to an intellectuall progresse yet because of their carelessenesse aversions from the object and distractions to divers and sundry things and because of the bodily troubles they lose their notions For the notions that we get here in this variable and unstable world according to the conditions thereof are not confirmed For they are as the notions of Schollers and learners that begin to profit but are not yet brought to the Mastery But the notions here acquired when the minde proceedeth from the variable world to the unyariable are likewise translated to the invariable mastery For when particular notions pass into the perfect mastery they cease to be variable in the universall mastery which before were particularly fluid and unfrable So we are in this world docible or to betaught in the other we are Masters CHAP. XV. How our minde is immortally and imorruptible Phil. IT now remaines that thou speak what thou thinkest of the immortality of our minde that being instructed concerning it asmuch as may be in one day I may rejoyce that I have profited in so many things Id. They that make the intellectabilitie the element or beginning of the descent of the understanding doe not think that the minde depends of the body And they that make reason the beginning of the ascent of the understanding and intellectability the end doe not admit that the mind dies with the body But I cannot imagine that they who have any taste of wisdome would ever deny the immortality of the mind as I have already as things came then into my mind made it plaine to the Orator So he which considers that the beholding of the mind reacheth to that which is invariable and that by the mind forms are abstracted from variability and are translated into the invariable region of the necessity of complexion he cannot doubt but the nature of the minde is free from all variability For it attracts to it selfe what it abstracts from variability for the invariable touch of Geometricall figures is found not in pavements but in the minde And as long as the soul enquires and seekes through Organs that which it finds is variable but that which it finds when it seekes by it selfe is stable cleare bright and fixed and consequently not of the nature of things variable which it reacheth by sense but of things invariable which it findeth by it selfe Moreover the demonstration of the immortality of the minde may be hunted out by number for being a living number that is a number numbering and every number incorruptible in it selfe although considered in variable matter it seeme variable the number of our minde cannot be conceived corruptible how then can the Author of an incorruptible numbe seeme corruptible Nor can any number evacuate the power of the mindes numbering Therefore whereas the motion of Heaven is numbered by the minde and time is the measure of motion time it selfe shall never evacuate the power of the mind but that it shall abide as the terme measure and determination of all things measureable The instruments of the heavenly motions proceeding from the minde of man doe plainly shew that motion doth not so much measure the minde as the minde measures motion so that the minde by its intellective motions seemes to complicate all successive motion the mind puts forth of it self the discursive motion so it is the form of moving seeing then whatsoever is dissolved is dissolved by motion how should then the forme of moving be dissolved by motion The minde being the intelluali life moving it selfe that is putting forth its life that is its understanding how can it chuse but live alwaies A motion moving it self how can it ever faile for it hath life intimately conjoyned by which it is alwayes living even as asphear which is alwaies round by a circle compact unto it If the composition of the minde bee the same with a number compounded of it selfe how is it possible to
be resolved into that which is no minde So if the minde be the coincidence of unity and alterity as number how is it divisible seeing that in it divisibility coinsides with indivisible unity if the minde doe complicate the same and divers as understanding divisibly and unitively how shall it be destroyed If number be the manner of the minds undestanding and in its numbring explication coincide with complication how shall it faile for that power hat in explicating complicates as it is manifest the minde doth cannot bee made lesse for hee that numbers explicates the power of unity and complicates number into unity for a denary is a unity complicated of ten so hee who numbereth doth both explicate and complicate The minde is the image of eternity but time the explication And the explication is alwayes lesse then the image of the complication of eternity Now he who notes the jndgement of the minde concreated with it by which it judgeth of all reasons and that reasons are from the minde sees that no reason can reach to the measure of the minde Our minde therefore remaines unmeasurable infinible and in terminable by any reason which onely the uncreated minde measureth terminateth and boundeth as the truth doth its living image which is of it in its and by it How should the image perish which is the respendence of incorruptible truth unlesse the truth should abolish and put out its shining brightnesse and resplendence As therefore it is impossible that infinite truth should withdraw it s communicated resplendence because it is infinite goodnesse so it is impossible that the image thereof which is nothing but the conmunicatd resplendence of it should ever faile as it is impossible that when the Sun by his shining hath made day it should ever cease to be day till the Sun leave shining The Christian religinon likewise which hath this yeare brought this innumerable people to Rome and thee Philosopher into a vehement admiration of them which hath alwaies appeared in the world though in diversity of manners proves that the immortality of our minde is naturally implanted in us as the humanity of our nature for we have no more certaine knowledge that we are men then that wee have immortall mind when the knowledge of both is the common assertion of men And these things thus spoken by an Idiot I pray thee take in good part and if they be not such as thou upon the Orators undertaking didst think to have heard yet some thing there may be which peradventure may bring thee some helpe to higher things Ora. I have beene during all this holy and sweet talke much admiring thy minde that hath so profoundly disputed of the minde And now I finde by a most assured tryall that the minde is the power that measureth all things I thanke thee Idiot both on mine owne behalfe and on the behalfe of this stranger the Philofopher whom I brought who I hope will goe away much comforted Phil. I doe not thinke that ever I lived an happier day then this I know not what will follow I thanke thee Crator and thee Idiot whom I know to be a very speculative man praying that cur mindes being stirred up with a wonderfull desire by these dayes conference may be happly brought to the fruition of the eternall mind The end of the third Book of the Idiot The fourth Booke concerning statick Experiments OR Experiments of the Ballance Wherein the Speakers are The Author The Idiot The Oratour Autbour THat Roman Oratour did much frequent the company of the Idiot that he might sometimes heare the conception of the man which were alwaies welcome unto him Upon a time as the Oratour commended the Ballance the rule of justice and an instrument right necessary for the Common-Wealth hee was thus answered by the Id. Although nothing in this world can reach precision yet wee finde by experience the judgement of the Ballance one of the truest things amongst us and therefore it is every where in request but till me I pray thee seeing it is not possible that in the same bignesse there should be the same weight if the things be of a divers Original whether hath any man yet written of the axact and experimentally tryed differences of weights Ora. Not that I have either read or heard Id. I wish that some body would give the world such a consignation I should esteeme it above many volumes of other Books Orat. I thinke no man could doe it better then thy selfe if thou wouldest undertake it Id. It were an easie manner for any man to doe for my part I have no leasure Orat. Tell me the profit of it and the meanes how to doe it and I will see what I my selfe or some other at my entreaty can doe at it Id. By the difference of weighty I thinke wee may more truly come to the secret of things and that many things may be known by a more probable conjecture Ora. Thou sayest true for so I remember a certaine prophet saith Pro. 16.11 The weight and the Ballance are the judgements of that Lord who hath created Wisd 11.17 all things in number weight and measure who Prov. 8.28 weighed the fountaines of waters and the greatnesse of the Earth in a Ballance as the wise man saith Id. If therefore a like measure of the water of one fountain be not of the same weight with the like measure of the water of another certainely the judgement of the Ballance will in this case better shew the diversity of the nature of the one and the othery then any other instrument Orat. T is true And Vitruvius writing of Architecture bids us chuse such a place to dwell in as bath light and airy waters and avoid them places whose waters are heavie and earthy Id. As then the water of the same fountains seeme to be of the same weight and nature so the waters of divers fountaines seeme to be of divers weights and natures Orat. Seeme saiest thou As though they were not so indeed Id. I confesse that the time may alter them though sometimes nor possibly to be perceived for without question the water hath one weight at one season and another at another As likewise there is one weight of the water neare the fountain or head another farther off But these differences being scarce persceptible are accounted as nothing Orat. Dost thou thinke it is in all other things as thou sayest it is in weter Id. Yes truely for the same greatnesse of whatsoever things are divers never hath the same weight Therefore there being one weight of blood and another of the Urine and of both these one in a sound man and another in a sick man one in an old man another in a young man one in a German another in an African were it not very convenient for a Physitian to have-all these differences noted Orat. Nay more then that for by these weights consigned me might makg himselfe admirable Id. For I