Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
truth_n	line_n	page_n	read_v	3,449	5	9.8327	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A52424	Letters concerning the love of God between the author of the Proposal to the ladies and Mr. John Norris, wherein his late discourse, shewing that it ought to be intire and exclusive of all other loves, is further cleared and justified / published by J. Norris.	Norris, John, 1657-1711.; Astell, Mary, 1668-1731.	1695 (1695)	Wing N1254; ESTC R17696	100,744	365

separated us from the Love of God has made the Soul willing to fill that Emptiness which she feels in her self by the Possession of Creatures Whether these Objects are spiritual or Corporal the Desires which we have of them are always carnal in the Language of Scripture For which reasen it is that St. Paul puts Dissentions and Emulations among the Works of the Flesh. So that it is a no less carnal Lust to desire Glory and Reputation and all that serves in order to it than to desire the Pleasures of the Body because these Objects are no more our true good than the other God does no more permit that we should part our Love between him and Reputation between him and the 〈◊〉 of Men than between him and feasting and other Bodily Pleasures For 't is always the Division of a thing which was all due to him 'T is always a Debasement of the Soul which being made for Good stoops beneath and degrades her self in being willing to enjoy a Creature either equal or inferiour to her self God is great enough to be the only and intire Object of our Heart and 't is to injure him to divide it because 't is in effect to declare to him that he does not deserve it all You see here is the Judgment of a whole Society of great Men no less than the illustrious Port Royal of France in as clear and express Terms as can be to our purpose 'T were infinite to appeal to all those Writers who have either directly asserted this Conclusion or occasionally let fall Expressions that favour and insinuate it There is hardly a Book of Morality or Devotion extant whererein Passages of this Nature are not to be found I do not say there are many that offer to deduce this Conclusion from Principles but that it is generally held and upon all Occasions alluded to and glanced at which is enough to shew the irresistible Prevalency of the Truth and to skreen them from the prejudice and imputation of Novelty and Singularity who undertake upon a rational Ground to clear and defend it ERRATA PAge 44. Line 7. dele ● l. 8. read from enjoying pleasures that do very much out-weigh it and is it self an Occasion and Medium to p. 49. l. 9. after pretend add 〈◊〉 p. 50. l. 6. f. that r. than p. 180. l. 15. d. that p. 192. 1. 6. f. the r. this p. 286. l. 5. r. pleases LETTERS Philosophical and Divine TO Mr. IOHN NORRIS With his Answers LETTER 1. To Mr. Norris SIR THough some morose Gentlemen wou'd perhaps remit me to the Distaff or the Kitchin or at least to the Glass and the Needle the proper Employments as they fancy of a Womans Life yet expecting better things from the more Equitable and ingenious Mr. Norris who is not so narrow-Soul'd as to confine Learning to his own Sex or to envy it in ours I presume to beg his Attention a little to the Impertinencies of a Womans Pen. And indeed Sir there is some reason why I though a Stranger should Address to you for the Resolution of my Doubts and Information of my Judgment since you have increased my Natural Thirst for Truth and set me up for a Virtuso For though I can't pretend to a Multitude of Books Variety of Languages the Advantages of Academical Education or any Helps but what my own Curiosity afford yet Thinking is a Stock that no Rational Creature can want if they know but how to use it and this as you have taught me with Purity and Prayer which I wish were as much practis'd as they are easie to practise is the way and method to true Knowledge But setting Preface and Apology aside the occasion of giving you this trouble is this Reading the other day the Third Volume of your excellent Discourses as I do every thing you Write with great Pleasure and no less Advantage yet taking the liberty that I use with other Books and yours or no bodies will bear it to raise all the Objections that ever I can and to make them undergo the severest Test my Thoughts can put 'em to before they pass for currant a difficulty arose which without your assistance I know not how to solve Methinks there is all the reason in the World to conclude That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensations and you have made it as clear as the Day and it is equally clear from the Letter of the Commandment That GOD is not only the Principal but the sole Object of our Love But the reason you assign for it namely Because he is the only efficient Cause of our Pleasure seems not equally clear For if we must Love nothing but what is Lovely and nothing is Lovely but what is our Good and nothing is our Good but what does us Good and nothing does us Good but what causes Pleasure in us may we not by the same way of arguing say That that which Causes Pain in us does not do us Good for nothing you say does us Good but what Causes Pleasure and therefore can't be our Good and if not our Good then not Lovely and consequently not the proper much less the only Object of our Love Again if the Author of our Pleasure be upon that account the only Object of our Love then by the same reason the Author of our Pain can't be the Object of our Love and if both these Sensations be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion for it is as natural to avoid and fly from Pain as it is to follow and pursue Pleasure So that if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is the only Object of our Love be firm and true as I believe they are it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure is not the true and proper Reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love for the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure Or else if nothing be the Object of our Love but what does us Good then something else does us Good besides what causes Pleasure Or to speak more properly the Cause of all our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the only Object of our Love and nothing being Lovely but what does us Good consequently that which Causes Pain does us Good as well as that which Causes Pleasure and therefore it can't be true That nothing does us Good but what Causes Pleasure Perhaps I have express'd my self but crudely yet I am persuaded I 've said enough for one of your Quickness to find out either the strength or weakness of this Objection I shall not therefore trouble you any further but to beg Pardon for this and to wish you all imaginable Happiness if it be not absurd to wish Felicity to one who