that generally we are not so Sensible of Goods as of Harms because the Former thro' the Generous Bounty of GOD's Good Providence are of so many kinds surrounding us on all sides that they are Common and Quotidian whereas the Later are Seldom and as it were Casual Whence These are Remarkable and apt to strike our Apprehensions smartly and fâ—rce us to take notice of them which Those being Ordinary and Customary do not To breed then a due Reflexion what Good those First Truths now spoken of laid up in our Minds do us we will consider what Universal Mischiefs their proper Opposites Contradictions would do to all our Knowledge and what a Malignant Influence they would have not only to pervert all our Actual Knowledge but to destroy our very Power of knowing any thing Let us suppose then that those two Propositions What is is not and A Thing is not what it is which are the proper Contradictories to those Chief Identicals What is is and A Thing is what it is to be both of them True Would it be possible in that Case to speak a Word of Truth or to Discourse at all but instead of speaking consequently to talk a Hotch-potch of Incoherent Nonsense For we cannot Affirm any thing to be True but by means of the Copula is in whose Connecting or Identifying Sense all Truth most Formally consists Wherefore if that Word or the Notion it signifies were Chimerical and might be the same with is not then since there can be no Middle between them all we affirm might be False And since the Subject we speak of must either be some Thing or some Mode of Thing all that we speak of that Thing would go to wrack and be False in case the Subject of our Discourse or Speech were not Distinguish'd from all other Things or Modes that is if it were not it self only but Another all the while Since then the Contradictories to these two Identicals now spoken of have such an Universal Influence that they constantly set up Errour and destroy Truth 't is manifest that Identical Propositions their Contradictory Opposites do for the same reason of their own nature tend to abet Truth ' and destroy Errour and therefore they are deservedly entitled to be the Rule of Truth the Influence they have over all Truths being full as Universal as Contradictions their Opposites have to induce Errour 16. But nothing can more victoriously confute or more unanswerably convince an Adversary than to shew that he must be forc'd for his own Interest to admit the Truth of that Tenet which he opposes Ask then a Cartesian how he knows any Particular Truths or which is the same how he knows that such Predicates or Attributes do belong to such a Subject He will answer Because he finds those Predicates in the Idea he has of such a Thing or such a Nature Very good replies the other But how shall we know that the Idea you have of that Thing is not Chimerical and involves in it many other Things as well as That Which if it does your Discourse applying it to That Thing only must needs be Incoherent and False Your only Answer in this Case can be This That each Idea you have is Distinct from all other Ideas and has its Metaphysical Verity and Unity peculiar to it self or which is the same is its self only which is an Identical Proposition and speaks or expresses the Metaphysical Verity of each Idea you have Now say I hence appears evidently that this Truth viz. Every Idea is it self only or no other which is an Identical Proposition is the very First Truth you can have and that on it depends Fundamentally your whole Doctrine by way of Ideas For if this be False 't is most Evident that your Ideas can give you no Distinct Knowledge of any Thing or Mode of Thing that is they could enable you to know Nothing at all 17. You will say perhaps it is not Needful to put lay or propose so expresly those Identicals they being so very Clear of themselves to all Mankind I reply 1. That this comes over to me as to what relates to their Clearness and Self-Evidence and abets my Position 2. That certainly That is most needful on which as was now shewn all depends You must then have those Identicals in your Mind at least Understood and Presuppos'd tho' you express them not 3. You must be forc'd to express them if you come to discourse rigorously and reduce your Thesis to the First and Self-evident Truths without doing which especially if you hap to encounter with a Sceptick nothing can be finally Decided or Concluded 4. The Point is That 't is most Needful to express them nay Unavoidable when the Question Which is the First Truth that can be which gives Light to all others is in Agitation as is our Case at present You must be forc'd to confess that the Truth of these Identicals is Antecedent to all the following Knowledges you can have by your Ideas that thence you can know Nothing unless this be Presuppos'd and Foreknown and that therefore it influences all your Future and Dependent Knowledges after its Fashion and gives and secures to them all the Strength Distinction and Evidence they have Whence is clearly inferr'd that the Self-evident Light which appears in such First Truths ought to be made by the Cartesians themselves the Rule of Knowing whatever other Truths they can pretend to know by their Ideas that is the very First Rule of all others that is the Only one For none can be in Proper Speech a Rule unless it be the First all others being regulated by that which is the First So that It and only It is the Rule all the rest Ruled And certainly it will appear Evident to all Mankind that what is most Self-evident as all Identicals are were there nothing else should be the Rule of Knowing all other Truths which are not so Evident as They. Be pleas'd Sir to reflect upon that Proposition by which you notifie or express to us your Rule of Knowing viz. That which I clearly and distinctly see to be True is True Consider how many Words are in this Proposition and that each Word has its Proper or Peculiar Idea each of which Ideas must be Distinct from all other Ideas that is each of them must be the same with its self only which make so many Identical Propositions or else none of those Ideas can be possibly able to do you any Service So that 't is manifest your Rule of Knowing depends on the Self-evident Light suppos'd to be in ours Whence 't is Concluded that yours is not the First Ratio Cognoscendi the First Rule or First Truth but Ruled by ours Grounded on ours and Subsequent in the Order of Knowing to ours 18. I do not expect that such high Speculations will please every Body But I hope it will plead my Pardon that I could not avoid it In so Nice a Point
constituting this Perception to be your Rule you begin at the wrong End For seeing this Perception is an Act and that the Object specifies every Act and makes it such as it is the Object or Thing must be True in it self and by being in it self True it thence makes our Judgment when we rightly conceive it to be True also This Distinction then in our present Case is altogether Frivolous and the alledging it Preposterous 3. To Perceive is an Act of the Understanding and the same as To Know and to Perceive Clearly and Distinctly is the same as to know perfectly Whence follows that to say I know that to be True which I clearly and distinctly Perceive to be so is the very self-same Sense as to say What I know to be True I know to be True or I know what I know Which is a good Confident Saying and moreover True too But nothing can be more ridiculous than to make Knowing the Rule of Knowing or a Rule to make a Thing True to us To say A Thing is because it is or I know it because I Know it is more like a Woman's Reason when she is Fix'd and Wilful than a Rational Man's or a Philosopher's 39. The Ingenious Mr. Le Grand seems to go more charily to work by putting his Rule of Truth Dissert pag. 86 in these Terms Illud omne Verum est quod clarè distinctè percipitur He does not say quod percipitur esse Verum but barely quod percipitur Which Words do not tell us whether he speaks of our Perception by the First Operation of our Understanding simply Apprehending a Thing or of the Second which is express'd by a Proposition But this still falls into the same For if he means the Former then since Simple Apprehensions have neither Truth nor Falsity in them being no more but barely what 's meant or signify'd by the Words it cannot follow that what I clearly and distinctly thus perceive is therefore True For I simply apprehend and this clearly and distinctly too the Meaning of these Words A Triangle has four Corners yet t is far from being True being a plain Contradiction He must mean then that I am to perceive the Sense or Meaning of those Words to be Connected which is done by putting them into a Proposition and then his Rule must run thus Whatever Simple Apprehensions I see clearly and distinctly to be Connected in a Proposition that Proposition is True Which is that very Rule which we advance and the Cartesians would avoid Only we say That to make this a Rule we must see the Parts of it Self-connected or Self-evident for all other Connexions are made by the Terms being Connected by means of a Third which is the same as to be Deduced or Prov'd But these Connexions being all of them Conclusions they cannot pretend to be Rules or Principles since they must depend on such Rules as shew those Conclusions must follow Again If he means as he must if he means any thing that his Rule is That we must see those Simple Apprehensions which we call the Terms Connected in a Proposition then we must see or clearly perceive that that Proposition is True And then his Principle must run thus Whatever Proposition I clearly and distinctly perceive to be True is known by me to be True Wherefore since to perceive thus is to know and that as appears by Cartesius's Words there cited he speaks of what 's Verum mihi as the Effect of his Principle that is of what I know to be True join these two together and this Principle or Rule does manifestly amount to this That which I know to be True I know to be True which is a most prodigious Rule of Knowledge and yet this is most evidently the Sense of it in case to Perceive means to know and Verum mihi means that which I know to be True which I think is Undeniable by any Man of Common Sense And I wonder how the Great Wit of Cartesius could imagin that any thing could be True to Him unless he first saw it to be True in it self which it has from its Grounds unless he makes account that a Thing may be True to him which in it self is False Which makes those two Truths fall out and contradict one another which I ever took to be very good Friends This makes me wish that the Ingenious Mr. Le Grand who tells us here p. 92. that there goes more to a Rule than to a Truth had told us in what a Truth and in what the Nature of a Rule consists which we plainly deliver by affirming that a Truth consists in the Connexion of the main Parts or Terms of any Thesis and a Rule in the Self-Connexion of them by Formal Identity whence such Rules become Self-evident to all Mankind and able to impart their Light to all other Truths whatever But this shews the Genius of the Cartesian Writers They take what 's uppermost and descant very prettily and gentilely upon it which being Obvious and Facil does mightily please the Fancy of the Readers But they go not to the Bottom of any Question They rake the Surface of the most Difficult Points but they never dig deep into it to find out the Ground and Foundation on which Truth is built And I hope the Reasons I have alledg'd both here and elsewhere will satisfie my Readers that it is not the ridiculous Motive of Pique or Humour which makes me give this Character of their Way of Writing but meerly the Duty I owe to Truth which obliges me to do it Thus worthy Sir I have us'd the best Reason I was Master of in examining exactly and understanding rightly your Rule of Truth and I have endeavour'd to stop all the Startingholes by which the Cartesians may think to evade the Force of my Arguments Which done I presume I may take my leave of this Point and apply my Discourse to what follow'd next at our Interview 40. My Design at the beginning of our Conference was to convince you that Truth consisted in the Connexion of the Terms in those Speeches we call'd Propositions which evinc'd I made account I could easily prove that the very First Truths which were to give Light to all others or be the Rule of Truth were such Propositions as were Self-connected and therefore Self-evident How your over-acute way of Doubting defeated my Intentions and stop'd my Progress is seen above Sorry to have been put out of that Direct Road which I saw was the only Right one and without settling which all our Discourse would be Unconnected Talk to no purpose I was casting about how to get into it again But a Learned and Judicious Friend of ours who was present suggested that Cogito ergo sum was pretended by you to be a First Principle and he prest earnestly it might be thorowly examin'd that we might see whether it had in it the nature of a First Principle or no.
as is the Settling the First Rule of all Knowledge or what is the very First Self-evident and most Firmly-Grounded Truth no Speculation resolving all Dependent Truths into that which is Absolutely-Independent as the Rule of all Truth must be can be too Accurate or laid too Deep 'T is not then any Humour of mine or a kind of Trial of Skill which mov'd me to this very Abstracted and Metaphysical Way of Discoursing but it was the very Nature of the present Subject that forc'd me upon it 19. Nor was it any Care of over-reaching your Acuteness nor the Desire of Opposing the Rule of Knowing Truth introduc'd by the Great Cartesius which put me upon this Unusual piece of Doctrine I had above twenty Years ago upon some Hints given me by that Second Aristotle the profoundly-Learned Albius apply'd my Speculative Thoughts to dig very deep into this Subject to find out the Immoveable Center of all Truth and I had begun to write a very Speculative Treatise shewing how to reduce every Truth into an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction which I saw lay hid at the Bottom of every Truth and Falshood This I say was an Old Design of mine before I thought of Opposing any or of being Oppos'd by any I foresaw also while I was writing my Method that it being more easie to be Witty than to be Solid Identical Propositions would be look'd upon by very Ingenious Men who were not thorow-Speculators as Sapless Useless and Insignificant Wherefore I did there take some Occasions which lay in the Track of my Thoughts while I was settling the Grounds to True Science to clear those First Truths from such Unworthy Misapprehensions To this End I demonstrated there B. 3. Less 1. § 3. That all the Force of Consequence in which consists our Rationality can only be built upon such Propositions I shew B. 2. L. 2. in what their Self-evidence consists What is the First of them and their several Sorts and Degrees I set my self to Demonstrate by many Arguments from § 11. to the End of that Lesson that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions and § 19. that plain Reason teaches us it must be so Which evinced it follows that whoever denies these to be Useful must with the same Breath affirm that all First Principles are Useless and good for nothing which is a strange Position Nay since there is an Order in Truths and therefore all Second Principles have their Force from the First it follows that we can have no Use of Second Principles if the First be Useless and so we must talk ramblingly and at random all our Lives without any Principles at all I manifest the same L. 3. by Instances fetch'd from the Mathematicks and other Sciences and shew what Use is to be made of them which is not to make them either of the Premisses in a Syllogism but to avail our selves of them in a higher nature I shew B. 2. L. 2. § 18. that even plain Uncultivated Nature makes the Vulgar recurr to them as their First Principles when they would express that which is decisive of the Dispute and Undeniable I prove that all Middle Terms which are Proper are built upon the same Ground with them I endeavour B. 3. L. 3. §§ 16 17 18. to evince clearly that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Reducible to them and I attempt to shew Less 4. the Way how to reduce Inferiour Truths to those Highest ones All which if I have fully prov'd especially that All First Principles are Identical Propositions which bears all along with it and is concluded there by divers Demonstrations on which I dare venture my whole Cause that they are impossible to be solv'd then I may safely presume I have evinc'd that the Intelligibility and Light of Identical Propositions is most Self-evident the Ground on which they are built most Solid and the Usefulness or Influence of them upon all other Truths most Universal And therefore that they are every way qualify'd to be the First and Only Rule of Knowing all Truths whatever 20. To comprehend better the Evidence of this Discourse let us imagine a Man devested of the Knowledge of Identical Propositions and then let us consider whether he could know any thing at all or what he is good for To instance in one of them Let us suppose him Ignorant that A Thing is what it is or a Cartesian that Each Idea is it self and no other and Common Sense will tell every one that such a Man could know nothing nor make any Judgment or Discourse concerning any Thing or Idea either since that Thing or Idea he would Judge or Discourse of is perhaps all the while for ought he knows Another Whoever would see farther the Use of Identical Propositions brought to Practice may please to observe how they are serviceable in many places of my three Treatises here mention'd Not by proposing them first and then Deducing and Arguing from them as some may mistake but by Reducing the Truth of my Discourses up to those Standards of all Truth and by shewing these to be engag'd in the Patronage and Support of my Thesis by which means they smartly clinch the Force and Evidence of my Arguments by bearing up to them and relying on them 21. It was a well-aim'd Reach of Speculation in Mr. Locke Essay concerning Humane Understanding B. 2. Ch. 32. § 2. where he says that the Metaphysical Verity of Things contains in them a Tacit Proposition Which I would understand not to be meant of that Verity as it is in the Thing it self but as it is in our Understanding where only Propositions are or can be For since this Metaphysical Verity is not a Natural Notion imprinted directly by our Senses it can only be known by Reflexion The Mind then careful to be well assur'd of the Subject of which it is to Judge or Discourse without which Pre-assurance it could do neither reviews it heedfully and steadily and then says of it within it self 'T is this and no other Which is an Identical Proposition in Substance tho' for a Reason we shall give shortly we put it afterwards into an Expression more formally Identical Why the Soul does this springs hence because being naturally made to see Truth and no Truth in the First and Proper Signification of that Word being possible to be had without Affirming or Denying hence 't is Natural and Necessary that when it comes to review the Object in order to see its Truth or Falshood it should put it into the Frame of an Identical Proposition only which kind of Speeches are capable to Affirm or Deny And this is that I mean when I use to say as I do frequently that the Nature of the Soul is Comparative or Relative For when a Proposition is molded in the Mind the Predicate of it is Compar'd or Related to the Subject in order to see their Agreement or
and sounded to the bottom nothing will be found to support its Truth but it will appear Plain Bald Nonsense en cuerpo On the other side it lights so that Discourses that are Solid and built all along on Evident Principles only which can clear the Truth of the Point do want the other sort of Clearness which consists in Explicating to recommend them to the Liking of the Reader And this happens for Two Reasons One because Principles do consist of Few Words or Notions and those too such as are General or Universal ones which do not admit such varying the Phrase or Smooth Explications to make them more Knowable their Clearness consisting only in the greater Simplicity of those General Terms and their Close Connexion The Second Reason is that those Writers who endeavour to look deep into the Foundation and Principles on which Truth is Grounded and are not satisfy'd with Skimming over Questions superficially do not care to avail themselves by Explications and the Way of Smooth Expressions but quite dis-regard them and judge them only Luke-warm Words in their present Circumstances because they neither conduce to the Attainment of Science nor to Settle and Clear the Truth of the Thesis which such Men see can only be done by the Strict and Evident Connexion of their Notions To apply this Discourse I intreat you Sir to consider whether the Former Sort of Clearness be not that which the Cartesians affect the Second that which we take and pursue I shall hope that whoever peruses my METHOD to SCIENCE with an Attentive and Indifferent Eye will easily observe that I first put my Thesis and then endeavour to establish it by rigorous Proofs drawn from the Nature of the Thing or Subject treated of in those respective Places And that the Cartesians do not use to take any such Method but place their Hopes of recommending their Tenets to the Reader 's Approbation in their Explications Which makes it so difficult for a Logician to find where their Arguments lie hid or where they press of which with just Reason I so often complain 36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating or rather of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs As for the other part of your Method which is your putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously upon what you have propos'd to them I lik'd that as ill as I did that of Explicating And my Reason is because unless Men take Principles along with them to guide their Thoughts right and keep an Attentive Eye to them while they thus Meditate 't is to be fear'd their long Meditating will by its frequent Dints so imprint and fix what you have told them in their Brain and at length make it sink so deep into their Minds that whether it be Right or Wrong it will stick there as daily Experience shews us Custom a Second Nature having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding to imbue us with False Impressions by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable especially Ingenious Explications as was shewn lately too often serving for Reasons to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick 37. But the main Objection I make is That this Method of yours quite overthrows the Rule of Truth which you intended to establish by it For this Rule being that upon which all all our Knowledge of Truth depends must be so very Clear of it self above any thing we can add to its Highest Evidence that it cannot possibly need any Explication nor Meditation neither Nor consequently can any stronger Argument be brought to Demonstrate that this Rule of yours is not the Right one than 't is to confess or pretend that it stands in need of or even can admit Assistance or Light either from the one or the other For if it can need any Explication it follows that it must be something Obscure And if it can need Poring and Meditating upon it ere it be admitted or can be known then 't is far from being most Self-evident Both which utterly destroy the Nature of such a Rule For since we must know all other Truths by It its Evidence must be the First Thing to be known and therefore the Knowledge of its Truth must antecede the Knowlege of all other Truths whatsoever and be Clearer than They. Which being so manifest I wonder what Thoughts or Considerations our Explicating or Meditating can suggest that can do this First Rule of Truth any Service or give it any Advantage since all others being more Obscure than It they may indeed could they affect it impart to it their own greater Obscurity and make it less Clear and Intelligible than it was but can never make it Clearer as having no greater but far less Clearness themselves Lastly As this pretended Necessity of Explicating and Meditating quite degrades yours from being the Genuin First and consequently the Right Rule of Knowing Truth so it abets ours and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule since the Self-evidence of those First Truths express'd by Identical Propositions which is our Rule is such as is both Impossible to be Explicated and Impossible to need Meditating to clear it to us but at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind it discovers it self fully to all Mankind to be most True and withall begets forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity 38. Perhaps it will be alledg'd notwithstanding what I have said above That this Clear and Distinct Perception is not pretended to be a Rule of Truth in it self so that it establishes Truth Fundamentally but of Truth to us or as the Schools phrase it quoad nos that is a Rule whereby we may know what 's Truth what not And it seems that it cannot be deny'd to be such a Rule in regard 't is Evident that we must Assent or hold a Thing True when we see clearly and distinctly it is so nor ought we to Assent or hold it to be True unless we do clearly and distinctly see it to be so I answer That this Pretence is already fore-stalled in divers places of my former Discourse where it was shewn by many Instances that even in the Opinions Learned Men held this Guiding our Thoughts and Judgments by what appears to us a Clear and Distinct Perception is Uncertain and Fallacious Whence in the Thesis constituting this to be your Rule there is tacitly involv'd a False Supposition vâ—z That that Perception on which we solely rely is Unmistakable by us For if we may mistake it to be really a Perception thus qualify'd when it is not then our Assent may be Erroneous and how can an Erroneous Judgment in any Sense be True to us or make us know a Thing to be True If I am to draw a straight Line and the Rule by which I guide my self be sometimes Straight and sometimes Crooked how is it a RULE to me in that Action or Draught 2. In
that it requires no more to Decide it than a Fair Stock of Clear and Penetrative Natural Reason in which your Discerning Genius besides what Acquisition may have added to it is well known to be Abounding and no way Deficient To perform this there needs no Sedulous and Tedious Turning over all the Books writ by both Parties or Scanning the Force of their Arguments Providence would be wanting to Mankind were there no other Way than this left us to know where Truth is to be found Nor would Man's Life be long enough for such an Endless Task I know not what Untoward Ways Men who love much Talk have fram'd to themselves and introduced into the World But certainly the GOD of Truth who envies not to Mankind his Best Natural Perfection Exact Knowledge or True Science has furnish'd us with a more Compendious and more Sure Method if we will but follow it Which is to examin which Party what Book what Discourse has Right PRINCIPLES and which not If two Mathematicians follow their Principles and yet differ in their Conclusions we may be sure the Pretended Principles of one of them are no Principles at all And the same for the same reason holds in all other Sciences But how shall we know who has True or Right Principles Most easily by Examining the FIRST PRINCIPLES either Side pretends to For if the First Principles may be Fallacious and consequently None then the Second Principles which depend on the First can be none neither and so they will be unavoidably convinc'd to have no Kind of Principles at all Nor is it possible for any Man to be Ignorant whether the First Principles or First Truths which are to be the RULE of knowing all other Truths be truly such because These must be Self-evident most Firmly Grounded Unmistakable and necessarily Assented to by All Mankind as is demonstrated in the Following Treatise and indeed is Evident by Common Reason Again If either Side would pass upon us Gratuitous or Unprov'd Supposisitions for Principles or decline the Way of Connexion of our Simple Apprehensions in which all Truth formally consists and without which all Discourses must be necessarily Incoherent Lastly If the RULE of Knowing Truth which One Party assigns be such that even Learned Men may be Mistaken and Deceiv'd while they think they follow it in all these Cases I say 't is Incontestably Evident that that Party are no Philsophers nor can know any thing at all if Nature be not Kinder to them than their own Unprincipl'd Doctrine You see Sir by this time that a Gentleman endow'd with a far less Perfection of Understanding than your self is Master of may by these Tests determin who are True Philosophers who not As also how all Controversies in Philosophy may be easily Decided how all Occasions of Wrangling about particular Tenets may be avoided and lastly how the Fiercest Opposers if they really seek after Truth may be Reconcil'd and Satisfy'd 'T is the Business of this following Paper to let you into the Certain Knowledge what Kind of Propositions are the First Principles and the Rule of Knowing all Truth whatever The First Step we take into our Inmost Thoughts we meet with and discover these Primary Truths whose Self-Evidence is the Earliest Light that dawns to our Soul as soon as over her Power of Knowing awakens into Action 'T is a Subject tho' most Necessary and of the highest Influence yet neglected by Writers hitherto Two or three have indeed spoken of it but none I know of has handl'd it professedly and at large Tho' it be Dry and requires Chawing ere it becomes Nutritive yet I dare presume it is Solid and not at all Windy Even Seeds when first planted are Dry which yet hinders them not from yielding a Large Increase afterwards The First Principles are the Seeds of all Truths which by how much their Roots are laid Deeper so much Higher they Rear and Extend their Branches The Present I offer you is Small but the Little it contains as far as concerns this Subject is wrought entirely out of Natural and Reflected Reason without being beholding at all to the Dishonourable Task of Transcribing as some Pieces I could name are I dare undertake that the Reasons produc'd here are so firmly Grounded that they can fear no Opposition but Drollery the last Effort of Nonplust Reason You will not expect Fine Language in a Matter that cannot bear it Self-Evidence is so brightly Luminous that nothing can make it more Glossy Nor is all the Eloquence in the World able to do these First Truths any Service at all All Attempts to burnish or varnish them do instead of doing this dawb and hide them as Painting does a Perfect Beauty The Sum is The whole Controversie now agitated is this Whether of these two Philosophies abovesaid is built on more Evident Principles or has a more Self-evident and Unmistakable RULE of Knowing And your Steady and Equally-poiz'd Iudgment is requested to hold the Scales What the Trifle I here send you wants in Worth is I am sure abundantly supply'd by the sincere Respects which are at the same time presented you by Much Honoured SIR Your ever Devoted and Very Humble Servant I. S. Honoured SIR 1. I Give you many Thanks for your kind Visit. Had you known how welcome it was I am confident you would have accepted my kind Invitation and have gratify'd my Request that you would repeat it often But your exceeding Modesty and Civility did it seems fear that might be a Trouble which I do heartily assure you was esteem'd by me as a high Favour Of which I thought I could give you no better Testimony than by letting you see that I am not willing that small Scantling of your Conversation you then allow'd me should be lost Wherefore I thought it not amiss to give you a Rehearsal of it as far as my Memory reaches at such a Distance and withal my Sentiments of the several Particulars then touch'd upon what my First Thoughts of them were then and my Second Thoughts since Not debarring myself the Liberty of adding some farther Reflexions that occurr'd to me while I was writing this Paper because the Treating of many Things confusedly ere any one was concluded made the Tenour of our Conference Uneven and Shatter'd For in Discoursing of Principles a Slow Pace is the Surest and when Wit is too Nimble it hazards to lame Reason and Iudgment to keep pace with it 2. I must confess Dear Sir That when I heard you discourse you did it so ingeniously in the Cartesian Way of Wit which consists in Explicating and Doubting and seems to exclude Proving that I did not see how the Great Cartesius himself could have defended his Doctrine better For he could not have Doubted more scrupulously than you did nor I think have Explicated himself more ingeniously You guarded his Doctrine so warily that it was scarce possible to attack it Tho' that I may not flatter you I
be said of a Proposition both as to its Pâ—â—â—s and the Connexion or Identity of its two Terms the Subject and Prâ—â—icate in which consists its Truth Aâ—â— which I hope I have shewn very parâ—â—cularly in the Second and Third Books of my METHOD to SCIENCE Moreover Because I saw your Prejudice against our Way was taken from the Insignificant Iargon of some of our School-men I take leave to add that let others talk as superficially of those Matters as they please and disparage the true Way of Art by mis-managing it and making it look Phantastick yet I am not conscious to my self that I have any thing in my Method but what is entirely built on the Nature of the Thing in hand I mean Notions Propositions and Rational Discourses found in the Minds of all Mankind Which Way of Building on the Nature of the Subject of which we are speaking is the only Ground that can give Solidity to any Discourse At least I am sure that if I have any Argument there which has any other Fountion I shall renounce it as swerving from my Method and my Intention And I do candidly here declare that I am oblig'd either to bring a more Solid Proof for that Point or I ought not to expect it should be well receiv'd by any Man of Learning Which being so I have that good Opinion of your Equity that you will not therefore discard a Way which is thus willing to approve it self to be Solid and to subsist by Arguments built on the Firm Ground of the Nature of the Thing because some slight Understanders of it have us'd it triflingly Nor would you think it reasonable that the Cartesian Hypothesis should be quite rejected upon no other Reason but because you think some late Writers have not done it the Right they ought 6. In order to your Clear and Distinct Perception which you therefore judg'd to be the Rule or Test of all Truth because we cannot but Assent to that as True which we Clearly and Distinctly see to be so I make these Preliminary Remarks 1. That this is the main Hinge of all the Cartesian Hypothesis which persuades them to place the Ground of Truth within their own Minds and its Productions and not in the Things themselves 2. That this is the most Ingenious and Plausible Conception which the Great Wit of Cartesius ever advanc'd and therefore it most deserves Clearing Which is indeed one main Reason why I strain'd Courtesie a little in publishing this Paper 3. That the Plausibility of it lies chiefly in this That every Man must grant the Truth of that Proposition as it lies For Who can deny but that what I see to be True is True This being full as Evident as that I cannot see what is not This then is a plain Truth and might deserve the Name of a Subordinate Rule were it Certain or prov'd first that we could not possibly be Mistaken in thinking we have a Clear and Distinct Perception of a Thing when we have it not Mr. Le Grand confesses this may happen when the Will is Byass'd or Men are Unskilful and how frequent is that And we shall give many Instances afterwards how we are deceiv'd in many other Occasions 4. That this Clear and Distinct Perception the Cartesians so much speak of and value themselves upon tho' the Expression be New is no more in reality but Perfect Evidence of an Object For the seeing any Object Clearly is the seeing it Evidently nor can we see It evidently if that Object or It be Confounded with others and not seen to be Distinct from them Wherefore this Phrase of Clear and Distinct Perception is a meer Amuzement and being New makes the Readers apt to conceit that it is a lately-found-out Discovery of some unheard of Thing or some New Method of which all former Philosophers were hitherto ignorant whereas 't is the self-same with Perfect Evidence of some Particular Object which all the Learned Part of Mankind have ever us'd before Cartesius was born nay have allow'd and held also That no Man could refrain from Assenting that the Thing or Mental Proposition is True when with Perfect Evidence It is seen to be so Wherefore this last Point will not I hope break Squares between the Cartesians and me for thus far we agree in our Meanings however I except against the Novelty of the Expression which would seem to intimate something Extraordinary in the Method you pretend to have first found out and introduced and which by your Carriage you seem to appropriate to your selves as singularly yours 5. These Things being so it follows that the First Rule of our Knowledge of all Truths whatever must be Common to all Knowing Natures in the World It must also be the most Evident that can be or Self-evident so that none can disagree dissent or be Deceiv'd in it but must See and Assent to it in despite of any Weakness of the Understanding or any Byass or Obliquity of the Will as we shall see hereafter our Rule is and must be And the Reason is because this Rule being that by means of which a Creature made for Knowledge is capable of knowing any thing it follows that if it lay in any Man's power to be Ignorant of this Rule or to dissent from it or be deceiv'd in it it would be in his power not meerly to pervert but utterly to destroy and unmake the Nature given him by God and of Cognoscitive or Capable of Knowledge make it Uncognoscitive or Incapable of Knowing any thing which the Natures of Things being fix'd by God's Wisdom to be what they are 't is as impossible for any Man to do as it is for him to put off his own Individuality and not be the same Person he is 7. These Notes premis'd I come closer to examine your Rule of Truth You say If you Clearly and Distinctly see that a Thing is True you do thence certainly know it to be so I allow the Conditional Proposition for 't is Impossible to see that which is not to be seen or â—o know that to be True which is not-True The only Question then is Whether this be a Rule of Truth Mr. Le Grand very rationally granting p. 92. there goes more to constitute a Rule of Truth than to be True In order to the Clearing of which I ask Was it True before you saw Clearly and Distinctly it was True Or Did it become True by your seeing it as you phrase it Clearly and Distinctly to be True If it were True before you thus saw it to be True then 't is unavoidable there was Another Rule or Reason for that Truth which anteceded your Seeing it to be such and therefore your Clear and Distinct Perception could not be the Rule of Knowing that Truth being Subsequent to it And if you say it became True by your Seeing it Clearly and Distinctly then it was not True before and then you saw that to be True
which was not True that is you saw it to be otherwise than in Effect and Reality it was And consequently that pretended Sight or Perception is so far from being A Rule of Truth that it is a palpable Errour and Mistake and therefore all the Judgments issuing from it must be False Which instead of Constituting it A Rule of Truth would make it indeed A Rule of Falshood 8. To make this yet plainer please to reflect that this Clear and Distinct Perception is such an Act of your Understanding and that all Acts have their being such from the Object of those Acts. For the Faculty or Power of Understanding was of it self Indifferent and Indetermin'd to All and Every Particular Act And since nothing that is Indetermin'd nor any Act in Common can Be it follows that the Being and being such of each Act depends formally on the Object and is such in particular as that Object which informs the Power is Wherefore when you see a Thing to be True that which you saw thus Clearly and Distinctly True must have been thus True before you saw it to be so Whence we ask What was that which made the Object you perceiv'd-to-be-true to be True Or What was the Rule of Truth to that Object that was True ere you saw it to be such Must not the Object be such ere you can know it to be such Or Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to be such before you can Clearly and Distinctly Perceive it to be such If not then you must say you can know what is not to be known or Clearly and Distinctly perceive what is not Clearly and Distinctly to be perceiv'd Which is a perfect Contradiction 9. For Instance Since Truth is no where to be found but in such Speeches as Affirm or Deny that is in Propositions let us put some Proposition which you thus Clearly and Distinctly perceive to be True and therefore as was lately demonstrated must have been True before you saw it to be so Does it not clearly follow that Either that Truth must have been made Evident by Another and that again by Another and so in infinitum by which means nothing at all could ever be seen to be True or else there must have been some First kind of Truths whose Noon-day Evidence imparts Evidence to others and is it self Visible or if you please Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to all Mankind and forces them at first sight to Assent to its Verity Now if some such First kind of Truths can be found which by their Absolute Self-Evidence do as Objects of our Understanding Power necessarily determin the Understandings of all Mankind to Assent and do withall influence All our other Truths and our Knowledge of them then our Act of Perception being clearly Excluded from being the Rule of Truth these First Truths have all the Requisites that can be imagin'd for a Ratio cognoscendi Veritatem or a Rule of Truth since they self-evidently manifest to us their own Truth and by it give us Light to know all others Let us pursue then the Quest of these First Truths Our Discourse because it concerns and antecedes all other Knowledges and all particular Truths must necessarily be fetch'd from the Deepest Grounds and therefore must needs be very Speculative But I know I speak to him whose Piercing Wit will easily comprehend it Only I beseech you so far to bend your Byass which you must needs have contracted by your Long and Steady Meditating on your Way of Ideas till you reduce any Obliquity that may have prepossess'd your good Judgment to a Rectitude or Indifferency and then I cannot doubt but I may do you some Service even perhaps against your Will For Evidence if Clear and well penetrated does oft-times force Assent whether the Will repugns or no. 10. The Ideas or Essences of each Piece of the World's Fabrick were in the Mind of the Divine Architect ere they were made Again Since he did not make them by the Hand of some Bungling Journey-man who might perhaps deviate from his Pattern or Model but immediately by his own Infinite Wisdom and Power it cannot be doubted but that each Part of the Creation was fram'd exactly according to the Archetypes of those Unchangeable Ideas and therefore was perfectly Establish'd in its respective Essence or Nature as those Original Ideas were that is they were fix'd to be what they are by an Inerrable Hand in which consists that which we call their Metaphysical Verity Wherefore since all Truth Originally Primarily and most Fundamentally consists in this Metaphysical Verity of Things it being the Immediate Effect of the Divine Wisdom it follows that the First Formal Truths that can be in our Minds which consequently are the Rules or Principles to all others must be those which speak express or Affirm this Metaphysical Verity or that the Things are what they are Which kind of Self-evident Propositions can therefore be no other than those we call Identical This is most Evident and Incontestable For since this Metaphysical Verity which next to the Divine Maker of all Things from whom it immediately proceeded is the Ground and Cause of all Truth does consist in this That Things are Fix'd in their Essences or are what they are 't is Impossible to speak this Truth or make it a Formal Truth by affirming or Denying that is by putting it into a Proposition but by Affirming that they are what they are which is most evidently an Identical Proposition 11. Hitherto then it is undiscernable how it can with any Shew of Reason be deny'd that the Self-Evidence that so visibly shines in Identical Propositions bids fair towards their being the First Rule of Knowing all Truths or which is the same the First Principle to all other Knowledges For 1. There cannot be any so great Clearness or Evidence as is Self-Evidence nor so Close Connexion of the Terms in any Proposition or Speech that expresses Truth as is Perfect Identity or Self-Connexion consisting in this That the Thing or Mode of Thing spoken of is what it is or is its self 2. 'T is Impossible any thing else can be so Solid or so Firmly Establish'd being immediately built on the Unchangeable Metaphysical Verity it self or rather being It spoken and express'd Which Verity as was shewn is imprinted in the Essences of every Created Thing by the Immediate Hand of Essential Truth Whence it is so nearly ally'd to that Infinite Truth it self that it is remov'd but one Degree from it 3. By reason of this Connatural and Immediate Descent from that Brightest and most Glorious Luminary of all Knowledge the Father of Lights who is Candor Aeternae Lucis and Infinitely Intelligible it forces the Assent of all Mankind to its Verity Insomuch that no Disease can so pervert a Rational Being which has the least Use of Reason as to deny it or doubt of it nor suspend their Judgment concerning it Nor can the highest Passion of the most Profligate Wretch
living hurry his Understanding into the Admittance of such a Folly No Scepticalness can call the Truth and Certainty of it into Question No Whimsical Speculation can inveigle any Man into a Conceit that it can be False No Opposition can make head against it since whatever can be alledg'd to overthrow it must needs appear to be less Evident than It and therefore Unable to shock it No subtil Distinction can impair its Truth or pretend it is True in One Respect but not in Another since it is Impossible to distinguish the Copula is the Notion of Existence being so perfectly Simple and most Formal or Indivisible that it can admit of no Distinction into Divers Formalities according to One of which it may be True according to Another False Nor can it prejudice any such Proposition to Distinguish its Subject or Predicate since whatever Distinction can fall here upon the Subject must fall upon the Predicate too both of them being the self-same Notion By which means the Identicalness and Self-evidence of the Proposition will be still the same after the Distinction is given as it was before So that 't is Impossible to imagin that any thing can be propos'd which can in any Regard or in any Degree vye with Identical Propositions either in being so Solidly Grounded or so perfectly Clear Undeniable Unmistakable and plac'd above the reach of any possible Attack Nor did Cartesius himself amongst all the Evident Things he call'd into Doubt in the least Question the Evidence and Truth of such Propositions formally express'd Nor could he have done it without utterly Destroying at the same time the Certainty of all he could have said nay even of his own First Principle too as will be seen hereafter From all which Considerations any One of which might suffice I may Safely and Evidently conclude that in point of Evidence of its Truth and Stability of its Grounds nothing can be any way comparable to the Light which strikes the Eye of our Understanding by its steady Rays emitted from these Self-evident or Identical Propositions Which goes very far to the Entitling These and These only to be the Rule of Knowing all Truths or the First Principles to all Science in whatever particular Subject not excepting even Metaphysicks it self 12. Notwithstanding all that has been so fully evinc'd hitherto I have as yet done but half my Business or rather the better half is still left behind For a First Rule or First Principle requires Another Quality peculiar to it self to compleat its Notion besides its being thus Solidly Grounded and thus Supreamly Evident which is That All other Truths or Knowledges must be Rul'd or Principl'd by It It must have an Universal Influence over all other Knowledges and impart its Light to them The former Qualities will I believe be granted to Identical Propositions by every Attentive Considerer who knows what belongs to Logick or Reason reflecting on it self and is withall but meanly vers'd in Metaphysicks This later Qualification will be deny'd by many perhaps by most nay will be fancy'd and abetted by very Few For every one's Genius does not lead him to speculate so deep and there are scarce any who have propos'd this highest and nicest Point much less handl'd it at large tho' divers have given the Grounds whence it must follow The Reason of this General Dis-like of Identical Propositions is because they have such a Dry Meen and Contemptible Aspect so unlikely to give us the least kind of Instruction or Light to know any thing but their own Insignificant Selves that nothing seems more Ridiculous than for any Man who is to teach others even to propose such Insipid Sayings as a Means much less as a Rule to gain the Knowledge of any Truth whatever nor is it Discernable how we can come to know any thing or work out any new Knowledges by making use of such Blunt Tools I think I have said the worst against them that the keenest Adversary can alledge It remains then to shew how I can clear them of this Disgraceful Character or make out that they have such a General Influence over all other Truths as is pretended 13. I demand then of my Opposers whether it be not Fundamentally necessary in all Discourses about whatever Truth to attend still and keep an Eye directed to the Nature of the Thing or Subject about which we are Discoursing and to take special Care we do not deviate from it I do not think any Scholar living attending to his Natural Thoughts or Common Sense will deny this For if any Discourse makes the Thing be otherwise than it is it must necessarily be False and expose the Author of it to speak manifest Contradictions Now I do no more but this while I make Self-evident or Identical Propositions to be the First Rules or First Principles of all other Knowledges All I do is to keep a heedful Eye to the Nature of the Thing and its Metaphysical Verity Only because it is manifest to every Reflecter that all our Discourses are made up of Propositions nor can a Rule or Principle be express'd but by such Forms of Speech nor is the Comparative or as I may say the Compositive Nature of our Soul satisfy'd till it has brought the Object it would Discourse about into some Formal Truth her only Perfection in this State which is express'd by a Proposition Hence we become forc'd to put the Nature of the Thing or its Metaphysical Verity into such a Frame of Speaking so to fit it for Discourse which 't is Impossible to do but that Speech or Proposition whether we will or no must be an Identical one 14. As for their seeming so Ridiculous and Dry this happens because of their most perfect Simplicity having as little Composition in them as is possible or rather none at all but what is in the Form of Expression I doubt not but your Acute Judgment is well aware that the first Stamina in what kind soever are and must be the most Simple and therefore such that should Nature stop her Course there and proceed no farther they would be the most Insipid and Useless Things in Nature And yet from such Simple Beginnings or to use Virgil's Expression tenues orsus all the most Perfect Productions in Whole Nature have their Rise Nor could any Work of hers ever arrive at Maturity or attain to that Admirable Frame it afterwards grows up to unless it had had at first such a Simple and Shapeless Origin The same happens in the First Stamina of all our Succeeding Knowledges They are so Simple and have such an Odd Bald and Unfledg'd Appearance that we know not what to make of them when we regard them only in themselves or what Use they are of in the Acquisition of Science yet without such Simple Beginnings fore-laid in our Knowing Power no Distinct Knowledge at all could be had of any other Thing as will most Clearly appear shortly 15. We may observe
Disagreement without which nothing can be known to be in proper Speech True or False In which Position Mr. Locke perfectly agrees with me Now setting aside Extrinsecal Denominations which are not at all found in the Thing but meerly tack'd to it by our Consideration this Comparing is either of the Mode to the Thing and seeing in general how it affects it as is seen in the two last Predicables of Porphyrius which because Modes are not Distinct Things and yet differ vastly from the Formal Notion of the Thing it self of which they are Modes can only be Connected with it Materially or as Belonging to the Thing as their Subject Or else the Mind compares the Thing to what 's Formal or Essential to it And this either in the Whole as is found in our Identical Propositions for which reason I am forc'd to make a Sixth Predicable in which the Whole is predicated entirely and formally of the Whole Or else in Part when some Part of the Essence or Nature of the Whole Thing is Predicated or Compar'd to it diversly as is seen in Porphyrius's Three First Predicables call'd Genus Species and Difference which do all of them in part belong to the Essence These Notes borrow'd from Logick and premis'd 't is here farther to be Noted that all those Comparisons or Relations the Soul makes in whatever Proposition is done by that Relation call'd Identity as is manifest from the Copula Est. Wherefore to review what we said lately the Predicates belonging to the two last Predicables of Porphyrius are Referr'd only according to Material Identity or only as found to belong to the same Thing and not as Essential to it The three former are related or Compar'd as Identify'd Formally to the Thing yet still so as but several Parts of its Essence The 6th is when the Whole Thing is Compar'd Related to or Identify'd with the Whole Thing and this Entirely or according to all that is in the Thing And this Way of Comparing or Relating the Whole Thing to its Self is that Relation of Identity which is the most Essential most Formal and most Expresly such of all other and is only found in those Propositions we call First Principles Which Propositions being for the Reasons given most Fully and Properly such we do therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 call Identical 22. Whence may be seen that the Virtue of Identical Propositions threads or runs thorow all those Propositions that are Essential and collaterally those also whose Predicates are immediately and necessarily Connected with the Essence For since the Parts are found in the Whole and all Identification in part is a Part of the Identification of the Whole Thing with its self it follows that Propositions or Truths in which the Predicate is but Part of the Whole are in Reality but Parts of our Identicals Nor is this all but the Force of every Consequence too is Grounded on them in which consists all our Rationality as was shewn above Whence Mr. Locke in his Essay B. 4. Ch. 2. § 7. shews very Judiciously that every Step we take in true Demonstrations is made by Intuitive or Self-evident Knowledges 23. Whence 't is Evident that even your Rule will force you tho' contrary to your Intention to come over to us and will oblige you to guide your selves by Connexion of Terms which is our Way however you strive to avoid it You say that when you Clearly and Distinctly see a Proposition to be True it must be so And we say you can never see a Proposition to be True but when you see its two Extremes or the Subject and Predicate Connected You will alledge you see it in your Idea But as is shewn above there are three Parts in a Proposition which have each of them a Distinct Idea in regard the self-same Idea which is of the Subject cannot be the Idea of the Predicate for this would throw you upon Identical Propositions which is our Rule And the Idea of the Copula is most evidently quite Different from the other Two being precisely That which Affirms or Denies which neither of the other does This being so I beseech you to reflect that Truth which is the Thing in question cannot consist in these Ideas singly consider'd for taken thus they are all of them Simple Apprehensions which can neither be True nor False It remains then that you must confess Truth can be only in those Ideas put together or Connected nor can they be Connected but by that which only is apt to Connect or Identifie them viz. by the Copula Est for these three Parts cannot be fram'd into one Speech by any other manner but by putting the Word Est between them Wherefore 't is Evident that you cannot pretend to see clearly and distinctly that any Proposition is True which is your Rule to know Truth but by seeing its said Terms Connected or Identify'd I see not how you can even in your Way of Ideas deny this Clear Discourse And if you grant it we are thus far Friends Only we add that to make such Connexions the RULE to all others you must allow them to be Self-Connexions or Identical which is our Position So that which way soever you wriggle to avoid our Rule the Light of Common Reason or Natural Logick will force you into it whether you will or no. 24. As for the Dryness of Identical Propositions which goes not down with some Men of Fancy I have this to add that That which is objected to them as Scandalous and Opprobrious is in reality a Great Commendation to them For this Conceit of their Dryness springs from their seeming too Obvious Whereas were not the very First Principles and the Rule of Knowing all Truths thus most Plain Easie and Obvious but needed the least Reflexion or Consideration they would be utterly unfit to be what they ought to be First Principles and Self-evident Nothing pleases the Palate of such Gentlemen which is not New or such as they knew not before Not Reflecting in the mean time that nothing is New but Conclusions lately Deduced and that all First Principles must be as Old as Nature or Mankind it self Nor could they be the Rule of Truth which must oblige all Mankind to see their Evidence and Assent to their Verity were they otherwise 25. How pretty a Delusive Faculty is this Fancy of ours and how apt if we be not aware to decoy us every Step into Errour by Customary Appearances which by striking often upon it would fool our Reason Our own Thoughts and those of others do in all our Conversations use to come to us clad in Words Whence it happens that 't is very hard liquidly and clearly to strip the Sense from those Words and to consider It and nothing but It. If a Man says Every Thing is Distinct from all other Things none is apt to smile at him or impute it as Ridiculous or Foolish But if he says A Thing is its self Witty
them to be Similitudes Which Mr. Le Grand denies and is so at variance with himself that he puts them to be many several sorts of Things and those Inconsistent with one another and so makes them to be Chimeras This Inconsonancy of those Writers with one another and with their own selves makes it very Dubious that there are any such Things as these Ideas at all at least 't is Evident that they who ground all their Doctrine upon them do not know what they are and therefore they build all their Hypothesis on they know not what And if this be so then the Immediate Object of their Clear and Distinct Perception is perhaps a Non-Entity or at least such an Entity as no Man living nor themselves neither knows what to make of it 28. Again This Object which you Clearly and Distinctly see to be True must be some Mental Proposition for nothing can be Formally True but some Speech that Affirms or Denies Now say we 't is most incontestable that the First Proposition we can make of a Thing is to affirm its Metaphysical Verity or to say 'T is this or its self and no other For the Subject being the Basis of all our Thoughts we must fix it certainly Clearly and Distinctly ere we can with Certainty say any thing else of it This Proposition then say we is such that our Understanding no sooner opens its Eye to take a View of it but it must assent to it because of the Self-evident Identification of its Terms whose Self-Evidence we do therefore make our Rule It remains then that you shew us some Truth or Proposition which is before this which we think to be the First and which both makes it self thus Visible and also by its Self-evident Light gives Clearness and Intelligibility to all other Truths and lastly which is so Firmly Grounded that it may be a Solid First Principle and not an Aery and Phantastick Conceit You must then we say produce and shew us some other Proposition than that you have brought hitherto which tells us your Clear and Distinct Perception is your Rule for this you see is already by many Unanswerable Arguments thrown out of doors and shewn Unfit to be a Rule And till you do this you ought not to be offended if we tell you friendly and plainly that you have no Rule of Truth at all 29. Thus much for the Immediate Object of your Clear and Distinct Perception As for the Act it self I beseech you Sir consider on what a Sandy Foundation you would build all Truth What signifies yours or mine or any Man's Iudgment that he Clearly and Distinctly sees a Truth or that he must Assent or may not Assent to it What signifie these I say to the Truth of the Thing Must Truth be built on Men's Iudgments or their Manner of Conceiving What 's True is Infallibly such and this by virtue of its Grounds Is our Iudgment or Manner of Conceiving such a Certain Ground or Infallible How many Instances is the World full of to prove those Perceptions of ours tho' judg'd by us most Evident to be Fallacious A Passionate Man highly Injur'd and bent upon Revenge judges it most Evident that he ought to take his Private Satisfaction And you can do no more but verily Iudge you have this Clear and Distinct Perception that such or such a Proposition is True I am to presume that those Cartesians who stigmatiz'd me with the Ignominious Note of being Impious against God c. judg'd they did Clearly see I was thus wicked for otherwise they left their own beloved Rule to blacken me which is too high a Malice for any Man to charge them with And yet no Man living as far as my self or my Friends can discern did think so but themselves for 't is hard to conceive that if others had thought so none of them should have that Zeal for God's Honour as to object it or reprehend me for it Nor am I to doubt but they thought they clearly and distinctly saw that when I said Annihilation was Impossible I did by that Doctrine set upon God himself And yet tho' the Learned Albius maintain'd the same in his Metaphysicks 50 Years before no Friend ever admonish'd him that by saying so he had fallen into a Wicked Errour Nor any of his Opposers who were very Learned Men tho' they gather'd many Propositions out of his Books which seem'd to sound ill did ever object This whereas had they judg'd it Impious they would not have spar'd him but have laid load upon him for it But it seem'd they all wanted this Gift of Clear and Distinct Perception which is peculiar to the Cartesians To come to other Instances How frequently are People mistaken in thinking they have a Clear and Distinct Perception or Perfect Evidence Prejudice Faction and Education work this ill Effect and make Men absolutely judge they see most Evidently they are in the right People far gone in the Spleen or a deep Melancholy do Assent and Judge perhaps more Firmly than you do that they see Clearly twenty Ridiculous Fooleries to be True High-flown Enthusiasts judge the same Pious Women and Prudent in other Things if much given to Introversion judge they see clearly and distinctly nay far more lively than we do many strange Things in their Imaginary Visions and Revelations insomuch that they would pawn their very Souls for their Truth which yet are oft known by their Effects to be meer Illusions of Fancy From all which Errours and Inconveniences our Rule is Free For who can out of Humour Precipitancy Fancy Disease or any other Casualty whatever be deceiv'd in Judging that Identical Propositions are True This then unanswerably concludes ours to be the Genuin Rule of Truth in regard this must be such as all Men must be forc'd to Assent to unanimously Agree in it nor can ever hap to be Deceiv'd in it by any Chance whatever Since otherwise the whole Nature of those Men would be Depraved and good for nothing as having no Rule by which to know any Truth whatever Nay it must be such as may be produc'd openly by the Asserters of any Truth that by alledging It they may be able to convince others that what they maintain is a Real Truth and not some Phantastick Conceit of their own without which their Clear and Distinct Perception is Invisible and so can satisfie no Man nor clear themselves from being Self-conceited but to argue like Phanaticks who pretend they discern Things by an Inward Light which none can see but themselves nor they themselves make it visible to others Of which more hereafter 30. I beg of you once more the Point being of great Importance that this Question concerning your Rule may be rightly stated and understood None doubts but that if we clearly know a Thing to be True it is True otherwise it would follow that we may know what is not or which is the same may know that which is
not to be known The only Question then is Whether we may not be Mistaken in Iudging we know it when indeed we do not know it but only fancy it Which is a Thing so Common amongst all Mankind that not very many escape this Fault of Overweening Wherefore ere you can pretend that this Rule of yours is Useful and a Certain Means to know Truth you should first prescribe us some Self-evident Rule how we may know assuredly that our Iudgment that we do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing is not a Mistake For otherwise we are often apt to think we do most certainly know a Thing when we have only a Lively Apprehension or Fancy of it Besides which this Rule must have Force upon all Mankind that we may easily make it out to others that we do indeed and really know and not meerly presume we know when perhaps we do not Otherwise it will neither give others nor our selves any Certainty that what we imagin we know is True This is the true Difficulty and against this I do not discern any effectual Provision made by you nor how you can make any without having recourse to the Self-evident Connexion of the Terms in an Identical Proposition This Self-evident Connexion we can produce openly to every Man's Eye whereas you cannot produce your pretended Clear and Distinct Perception to any Man And it being when thus produced by us impossible not to be seen and acknowledg'd by any Man who has any Use of his Intellectual Faculty 't is able to give perfect Satisfaction to our selves and to others also that we neither are nor can be Mistaken in our Judgment that we do really and indeed Know it and not only Deem it You see Sir where the Difficulty pinches That can never be a Certain Rule to me or to any Man which I can never be sure I make use of Now 't is evident by what is said here I cannot be assur'd I do clearly and distinctly know unless my Judgment that I do so be secur'd from Mistake For if I be mistaken in that Judgment and do not clearly and distinctly know your Rule affects not me at all nor am I a jot the better for it or nearer the Knowing any Truth by it But which is yet worse 't is Evident from this Discourse that there needs another Rule of Knowing Antecedent to yours to guide my Iudgment that I do clearly and distinctly know and do not mistake or rashly presume I know as we experience the Generality of Mankind does Which evidently concludes that the Proposition by which you express your pretended Rule of Knowing may indeed be a Truth in case you do really know but can never be a Rule of Truth to you me or any Man For this must be First known or Self-known to all Mankind or otherwise it needs another Antecedent Rule to make it Useful and so it is Ruled and no Rule Here it is then that the Point sticks and here 't is like to stick for any thing I can imagin in behalf of the Cartesians 31. I am apt to apprehend that your Acute Wit will object that some few of those Instances I alledg'd formerly of Men who verily judg'd they clearly and distinctly knew such and such Things to be True and yet were mistaken in thus Judging do fall short of Concluding I mean those that concern'd People in Diseases which you may with some reason think are known to be plain Deviations from Nature by an easie Criterion viz. by the Standard of Mankind who have the right Use of their Reason Which I shall not contest with you nor had I brought such as these but that I see your Writers bring the same against the Certainty of our Senses as that Icterical People see all Things Yellow and such like which are solv'd by the same Criterion But what are these to many others which I there alledg'd and could press farther were it sutable to the Brevity I had intended To force that Objection home what shall we think of Speculative Men and Great Philosophers nay of many Great Mathematicians who thought they had most certainly Squar'd the Circle They are held to be Men in their perfect Wits nay they are held to be Candid too and moreover Learned and which is more both Sides offer Demonstrations for their Tenet and have oft-times great Multitudes that follow them and embrace their Doctrine Can it be deny'd but that such very Learned Acute and Ingenious Men do verily Judge that they clearly and distinctly see their Doctrine to be True And yet we are certain that since they contradict one another one Side must needs be in an Errour in that Judgment We will bring it yet nearer home and lay it even at our own Doors 32. I do not doubt but your self for I cannot suspect your Candour does verily judge that you clearly and distinctly perceive or which is the same have Perfect Evidence that your Way of Ideas is the True Way to Science And I on the other side am as fully persuaded as that I live that I do clearly and distinctly see it is so far from being the Way to Science that it is perfectly Groundless and leads to Innumerable Errours That you are thus persuaded seems very Evident to you for which I am very willing to take your Word And that I am thus fully persuaded I do Clearly and Distinctly see the Contrary besides my faithful Asseveration I believe Indifferent Men will think I have given sufficient Testimony by bringing so many pretended Demonstrations against your Way and hazarding my Credit by vouching them to be Conclusive which therefore are so many Sure Gages for my Sincerity when I declare this to be my Sentiment Add that these Demonstrations are not like Flashes of Wit coin'd by my own Brain for then perhaps I might for some by-end of Applause or some such Foolery have falsly pretended they were my true Thoughts But they are all built upon the Nature of the Thing or Subject in hand which being Establish'd to be what it is 't is beyond the Wit or Power of Man to make marr alter or deface it and should I go about to disguize or mis-represent it 't is easie for any Adversary to shew I speak Contradictions and expose me to open Shame for my Confident Ignorance For what is against the Nature of the Thing makes that Thing to be what it is not which is a plain Contradiction This then being so manifest that I may convince you by your own Method Why ought not you by your Way of Doubting of every thing that has any Shew or Possibility of Falshood or any Uncertainty to lay aside and renounce your Rule of Truth as Uncertain and Fallacious since we do both of us follow it to our power and yet since we contradict one another so Diametrically one of us is notwithstanding in a vast Errour Here is Matter of Fact then against the Usefulness of your Rule and that
too as Certain and Evident as that one or both of us is not the worst sort of Hypocrites that is belies himself and his own Thoughts Whereas I believe no Man that knows either of us had ever such a bad Opinion of us I could press this Topick much farther but I had rather leave it to your Sincere and Deliberate Consideration 33. The Rule by which we are to know Truth ought therefore as was said in such a manner oblige all Mankind to Assent that it should be apt of it self to compose all Differences in Opinion by Applying and Bearing up to it Whereas yours can compose none at all but contrariwise engages Learned Men in an Endless Wrangle We both grant That if we see a Thing clearly to be True it is True since Common Sense tells every Man that none can see what is not to be seen Nor is there any such Mystery or Mastership in advancing this obvious Position or for magnifying Cartesius so highly for inventing it since I think no Man living ever deny'd it The Question is Which of us has this True Evidence which you call Clear and Distinct Perception You will say you have it and I want it I shall reply that I have it and you want it You will blame some Defect in my Understanding or some untoward Byass or Propension of my Will both which according to Mr. Le Grand p. 93. can make one deceiv'd in thinking that he evidently perceives And I on the other side think I may with equal Justice blame yours And so we may come to lay the Fault either on the Weakness of one another's Understanding or the Depravedness of his Will which naturally leads Men to pelt one another with Rash Iudgments and hard Words But since we can neither of us see one another's Thoughts or discover to others how Clear they are which is your Way both sides will still remain as far from Conviction and the Point from Decision as at first for any thing your Rule helps either of us And if we set aside Propositions and Discourses and the shewing that their Terms are Undeniably Connected and therefore Themselves certainly True which is not yoâ—â— Way how I beseech you shall Men ever come to a Final Conclusion by dint of Reason without being put to it to avail themselves by Ill Words and Passion which I fear by proceeding upon your Rule for you pretend not to have produced any Connexion of Terms has been such a Stickler of late to uphold the Cartesian Cause 34. This seem'd to me so Odd a Procedure that I begg'd the Favour of you to acquaint me how or by what Means you would make others know you had indeed this Clear and Distinct Perception or how you could prove you had it but by making use of Propositions and Discourses the Force of which consists only in Affirming Denying or Inferring that is in the Connexion or Inconnexion of the Terms As I remember your Answer was by Explicating to them clearly the Point and desiring them to Meditate upon it Which Way you seem'd to magnifie very much I could have alledg'd that you could not have propos'd or us'd even this Way without making use of Propositions and Discourses But letting you proceed I barr'd Explications if they were brought as it here seem'd to evacuate any Need of Proof For Explicating as contradistinguish'd to Proving amounts to no more but a kind of Rhetorical Persuasive made up of Similitudes Parallels Allusions and such little sorts of light Witty Fancies which may serve and are made use of in a manner equally to abet Errour as well as Truth Indeed if the Terms of the Question be Dubious Explications are needful and very requisite lest otherwise we level our Argument at a wrong Thesis But if the Point in question be rightly understood by both Parties it must either be Prov'd if it be not Self-evident and needs no Proof or it must remain for ever Uncertain and Undecided I should be glad to know whether or no you would go about to convince such a Man by Grounds and Principles If you say you would and that you think you can do this then you wrong your Cause exceedingly by waving the Mention of such Strong Supports as Principles and Grounds and Recurring to and Relying on such Unsteady Feeble Reeds as Explications If you say you cannot evince your Thesis by Principles then all your Explications tho' never so Witty are confessedly Unprincipl'd and Groundless If you pretend your Explications do involve Proofs in them 't is clearly for the Interest of your Cause to make use of the Argumentative part of such Discourses and leave out the Explicative For 't is certain that the Argument if a good one subsists upon some Solid Principle whereas an Explication may be without any at all It will therefore to any considering Man be a strong Prejudice against the Cartesians and make Men apt to think they have no Grounds or Principles at all that they do not much pretend to them much less build their Discourses on them or reduce them to them but seem to abdicate them while they place their chief Support in Explications In a Word Let the Position be first Prov'd to be True or all Explications are Frivolous For to what purpose is it to stand Explicating a Falshood The nature of all Explications is to give us the Sense of the Thesis propos'd but let it be first Prov'd and Seen that it bears good Sense for 't is a very sleevless Task to stand Explicating Nonsense 35. On this Occasion it were not amiss to note here a certain manner of Writing very frequent amongst some Modern Philosophers which is apt to lead the Generality of Learners into very great Errours We do all of us naturally affect Knowledge and therefore we love to read Authors that are Clear or write clearly as being very Knowable or Intelligible But now Clearness is of Two sorts The one makes Clear the Thoughts of the Writer The Other makes Clear the Truth of the Point he writes of The One expresses clearly his own Meaning when he says thus The Other manifests clearly that he says True when he says thus The Former is perform'd by means of Rhetorick and Witty Expressions The Other can only be done by Solid Principles and by True Logick But it too often happens that those Readers who have not a Strong Bent to see Truth and with a steady Aim pursue it and It only are so well appay'd with the Clear Expression of an Author in delivering his own Mind which cannot but be very Pretty and Taking being generally neatly clad that they are at unawares Decoy'd to think the Thing it self is Clear when 't is only the Sentiment of the Author which is render'd so Evident especially if there be also some slight Shew of Coherence which seldom wants if the Writer be a Man of Parts And yet perhaps all this while were that Discourse strip'd of its Superficial Gayity
I was something troubled to relinquish the Method I had prefix'd to my self without which I saw the Nature of a First Principle could not be settled nor shewn However I yielded to his Request I allow'd then that Cogito ergo sum was a True and Evident Consequence as are a thousand such others viz. Dabito ergo sum Scribo ambulo dormio nay Somnio ergo sum c. which is what with Unattentive Considerers give it all its Credit and makes them look upon us as Unreasonable Men who as they apprehend do question this Consequence or call it into Doubt But they are quite mistaken there is no Body that doubts it is an Evident Consequence but there is a very wide Difference between a Consequence and a Principle or rather if it be a Consequence tho' never so good it can never be a First Principle because the Premisses which induced that Consequence were before it and that Truth on which all force of Consequence is grounded as was noted above is before either of them What we affirm then is that it is not a First Principle nor could be so to Cartesius when he propos'd and made use of it as such And I addrest my self to show it had not in it the nature of such a Principle nor could with Reason be pretended such by Cartesius himself 41. To prove this I alledg'd that it is an Inseparable Property or rather Essential to First Principles that they must manifest themselves to be such by their own most perfect Self-Evidence whereas Cartesius was forc'd to use very many prolix Antecedent Discourses to prove all else to be Dubitable and because they were so he went on Enquiring farther till he could find something that could not be Doubted which he conceiv'd was Cogito ergo sum from which he came to Conclude that this was the First Principle Whence I alledg'd that therefore those Antecedent Discourses of his which prov'd all else to be Doubtful were the Reasons or Arguments whence he drew his Conclusion that this was the First Principle Now I think this as Plain Reason as plain can be that No Man can evince a thing to be the First in any kind whatever but because there is nothing before it in that kind And from this consideration I prove my Allegation clearly because had not those many and large Antecedent Discourses to prove all else to be Doubtful been True his Conclusion viz. that This is the First Principle could not have follow'd or been True neither For in case the Senses had not been thus Fallacious as still to deceive us perhaps Science might have been had from the Things without us affecting those Senses nor had there been any need to recur to the Operations of our own Mind to seek for the Ground of all Truth there because we might have had it from the Things in Nature This being so how many Propositions did he use all along to prove that our Senses might all decieve us that we know not certainly whether we sleep or wake that Mathematical Demonstrations might be all Erroneous c. All which Antecedent Propositions by the plain Rules of Logick ought to be more Evident and more Certain than the Conclusion he gather'd or inferr'd thence viz. that Therefore This and only This being Indubitable and Certainly Known is the First Principle Add that this being Plain Sense his own Discourse overthrows the Establishment of his First Principle For since he had not this First Principle of his till he had found it nor did he find it till he found all else to be Doubtful it will be ask'd How and in virtue of What First Principle he became while he was in quest of it more Certain that all other things were Doubtful than he was of the Conclusion he inferr'd thence viz. that Cogito ergo sum being impossible to be Doubted of was his First Principle Wherefore if he guided himself by no Indubitable or First Principle all along in those Antecedent Discourses which were in reality his Premisses that Conclusion of his cannot in any Logick follow nor be Certainly True nor ought to be Embrac'd especially by such a Philosopher as he was who professes Doubting of ever thing till he came at his First Principle that can be in the least Dubitable 42. In Reply to this Discourse of mine which is grounded on the Supposition that Cartesius guided himself by Reason in settling his First Principle and on the plainest Rules of Logick that the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion the former of which I suppose you will grant the latter is obvious to Common Sense you brought an Ingenious Explication by way of Similitude or Parallel which I see are to supply the place of Arguments and Answers too in the Cartesian way It was this Suppose I see a Man making great Holes in the Ground or throwing aside Rubbish and that I ask him what he is doing He tells me he has an Intention to Build and to lay Foundations for that End and is making Way for it Now this Action of his looks like an idle business if we consider it alone but if we regard his farther Intention of Building it is a Wise and Necessary Preparative And yet this Antecedent Action of preparing to lay a Foundation does not give strength to the Building which is an Action quite different from it but the Building depends on the Foundation it self and on nothing else And therefore it follows by way of Parallel that the Antecedent Discourses of Cartesius need not be Connected with that First Principle as Premisses to inferr it must be such since they serv'd only to remove the Rubbish or the Pretended Knowledge of Things by means of the Senses which encumber'd the Mind with Prepossessions and so to make way to lay that First Foundation of Science I think I have done your Parallel all the Right you can expect Wherefore I come now to examine what Force it bears and what Strength such a way of Discoursing has in it which I the rather do that I may inform those Readers who take such kind of Similitudes for Reasons how easily and how frequently they are deluded by such Unsteady Inconclusive and Illogical Methods 43 First then 't is so certainly known that Similitudes do not use quadrare per omnia or as they say run on four Feet that it is grown Proverbial which lays a great prejudice upon that Way in common 2. Similitudes drawn from Material Things to Immaterial are particularly liable to this Defect They may indeed oft times serve to illustrate some Truth as fit Metaphors to sute with our Fancy but then they presuppose the Truth which they are to illustrate to be known some other Way Whence unless this be done first all they can do is to explicate we know not what which destroys the nature of an Explication for Explications are not intended to put the Truth of the Point but suppose it 3. All the Actions of our
Soul are or ought to be Rational and have a Dependence on one another by the way of Reason gathering Subsequent Truths from those which preceded Now I think 't is impossible to be contested by any Man who has read Cartesius's Meditations but that his Discourses which anteceded his finding out this First Principle of his are reducible to this Enthymem For these and these Reasons there can no Certainty be had as to Speculative Knowledges by any Information had from Outward Objects affecting the Senses therefore it ought to be sought for in some Interiour Act of our Mind which is most Comprehensive and Peculiar to it which he concieved was Cogitation and thence he laid this First Principle Cogito ergo sum Which being so it follows necessarily that the Laying this for his First Principle depended on the Goodness of the Reasons he had why our Senses were not to be trusted nor could give us our First Notions whence by reflecting on their Metaphysical Verity we might have those Self-evident and First Truths of ours This I say was evidently the Tenour of his Discourse because did not those Reasons of his against the Sufficiency of our Senses to give us this Information conclude but that notwithstanding all those Reasons could prove the Senses might still imprint on our Mind those First Notions his Consequent would not have follow'd Nor could he have had any Ground for recurring to the Interiour Act of Cogitation for his First Principle in regard it had been given to his Hand by means of the Senses as was now declar'd 4. It being then evident that the Substance of those antecedent Discourses was summ'd up in the Enthymem now mention'd 't is manifest that this Explication of yours falters in the main Particular in which it ought to sute and resemble For in case those Impressions on our Mind could have been made by means of the Senses as aforesaid then those Impressions or Notions being the Immediate Foundation on which is built all our Knowledge could not be call'd or resembl'd to Rubbish nor compar'd to a Hole to lay the Foundation for the Holes were already made in those Inlets our Senses which were Pervious to the Effluviums affecting the Seat of Knowledge and thence the Soul So that your Similitude is in effect the Begging the whole Question and can have no Force at all but by our Granting it which I see plainly we shall never have Reason to do Rather unless this Petitio Principii which is tacitly involv'd in this Parallel be yielded by us or prov'd by you it makes against your selves For by Denying all such certain Information from the Senses you will be found not to remove the Rubbish in order to lay the Foundation but to stop up the Way to the laying any and to damm up all the Holes by which the Materials could come into our Minds where only such a Foundation could have been laid At least you see your Explication amounts to nothing and that your Similitude is lame in all its Legs and has not one Sure Foot to stand on Which will I hope sufficiently inform others that this Way of Explicating so mightily affected by Cartesius and his Followers is utterly Insignificant I shall hope too that this Paper will light into the hands of some Readers who are so Intelligent as to discern that this Explicative Way is taken up to avoid the Way of Rigorous Proof which is so Unfriendly to a Doctrine that wants Principles 44. Whence I should give this Advice to all Aristotelians that whenever the Cartesians would obtrude upon them their Ingenious Explications they would demand of them smartly by what Grounds they know or will prove to others that what they explicate is True without doing which in the first place no Explication ought to be admitted It may serve for a kind of Currying Favour with weaker Understandings but it can never improve any Intelligent Man in Solid Knowledge nor make him one Jot the Wiser 45. After this we came to argue that other Objection of mine That First Principles of all others must be most Clearly and Distinctly Known because they ought to be of all others most Knowable there being no others before them by means of which they might come to be better Known Now Cartesius himself expresly confesses that when he had found this First Principle he did not yet sufficiently understand what Ego the Subject in that Principle meant Whence I inferr'd that therefore Cogito ergo sum could not be to him a First Principle This is enforc'd because the Subject is the Principal and most Substantial Part in every Proposition And since in ordinary Things when we do not well know what we talk of plain Sâ—nse tells us 't is a Folly to talk at all much more is it Disallowable in Philosophical Matters where Exact Truth is aim'd at and most of all in First Principles which must be most Self-evident You seem'd to think an Obscure Knowledge of the Subject was sufficient But how an Obscure Knowledge can be either Clear or Distinct much less superlatively such Or how a Proposition whose Principal Part is neither Clear nor Distinct should notwithstanding it self as here it must be most Clear and Distinct is I believe past any Man's Comprehension 46. However I let your smooth Explication slide without pressing my Discourse too forcibly For it had been something Rude at so Civil a Visit in my own Chamber to push Things forward too rigorously or to seem to affect the Victory of a Confutation But our Friend urg'd me to bring some one Argument that might decisively conclude the Point It came into my Mind waving what I had objected elsewhere to alledge against it that A First Principle must be some One Determinate Proposition whereas it was Evident that this Principle of yours had in it Two and those very Different ones For Cogito is a Speech that Affirms which Logicians call a Proposition and involves in it all the Three Parts that compleat such a Speech being clearly the same as Ego sum Cogitans as Sum for the same Reason implies Ego sum Existens which is evidently a Proposition too and Distinct from the other Your Answer was That notwithstanding the manner of Expression they made or amounted to but One Proposition and signify'd no more but Ego sum re Cogitans But I reply'd That this was the First Proposition and hence I aâ—k What becomes of the Later Ego sum Existens since the Predicate Existens is a quite different Notion from the Predicate Res Cogitans Add that to prove himself Existent was the sole Scope Cartesius aim'd at in laying this Principle as appears by his Words immediately following viz. Nondum tamen satis intelligo quisnam sim Ego ille qui jam necessario sum He does not pretend to have evinc'd that he was Res Cogitans but only necessarily Existent To enforce this the more I alledg'd that the Illative Particle Ergo
did shew plainly that there were Two Propositions of which the One was an Antecedent the Other a Consequent But you would not allow that Ergo in that place had an Illative Signification nor as far as I could discern any at all for I am sure if it has any it can have no Other I remember you bestirr'd your Wit as dexterously as any Man could in such a Cause to bring off Cartesius but 't is beyond the Power of Wit or Art to do it unless the most pregnant and significant Words which Rational Creatures can use must for his sake lose their Signification Which is such an Injury to the rest of Mankind who would be at a strange Loss to discourse or understand one another were this admitted that it will never be allow'd by other Philosophers who are Dis-interessed and have not that Passionate Concern for Cartesius as some others seem to have I remember Mr. Le Grand tells us he has spoke to some Exceptions made against this Principle formerly and perhaps this may be one of them But as I could not light on that Book of his so I clearly see this Particular is so manifest that 't is impossible for any Man in such a Case as this to answer to the purpose 47. And thus ended our Discourse In which if you had any Disadvantage it proceeded hence that you would needs undertake to defend Cartesius's Logick Whereas nothing is more Evident than that in the far greatest part of his Meditations not to speak of some other pieces of his he regarded no Rules of Logick at all but meerly follow'd the Current of his own Ingenious Thoughts in gliding smoothly and gentilely from one Thing to another as his First Design led him and in putting his Conceptions Clearly I mean according to the First sort of Clearness mention'd above § 35. The Summ is this Without Propositions we cannot speak and without Illative Particles we cannot make use of our Rationality both which notwithstanding you do not seem very willingly and heartily to admit Had I been of your Party I should have advis'd you to have flatly deny'd all Syllogisms Inferences Antecedents Consequents and in a Word all Logick and all kind of Connexion and then it had been impossible for any Man to Attack you or bring any Argument against you I add nor you any for your selves 48. The Generality of Mankind I wish I might not say of Philosophers too being much govern'd by Fancy I am to expect such a High Speculation as is the foregoing Discourse will scarce find a Civil Entertainment amongst such Gentlemen However I hope it will not displease them if on this Occasion I ask them some few pertinent Questions leaving the Resolving them to themselves 1. Whether there be not such Propositions as those I call Identical 2. Whether Mathematicians and some others who treat of Philosophy in a Mathematical Method have not propos'd such before me and made use of them 3. Whether such Propositions are not the most-firmly-Grounded and the First of all others 4. Whether they are not Self-evident and force the Assent of all Mankind 5. Whether we can be Deceiv'd in Iudging them Self-evident as we may and often are in Judging that we Clearly and Distinctly know a thing to be True 6. Whether they have not an Universal Influence in their Way over all Truths especially all Deduced Truths since 't is Demonstrable that all the Force of Consequence is Grounded on them 7. Whether all these Qualifications being shewn to be found in the Self-evident Knowableness of Identical Propositions this Clearest Light or Intelligibility which so necessarily appears in them ought not with just Right entitle Them to be held the RULE by which to know all other Truths Lastly Whether this Self-evident Connexion of the Terms of a Proposition found in them which is Producible openly be not a Clear Means to shew to others that we do not mistake when we judge them Self evident and True since all Mankind that sees them Produc'd must think the same of them we do And whether on the other side it can possibly be shewn to others that our selves do Clearly and Distinctly know a Thing to be True without producing finally some Proposition that is Unmistakable and Self-evident to Every Man When they have duly weigh'd each of these Particulars and the Proofs brought for them I appeal from their Fancy to their Reason whether I have not done a Just and Necessary Duty to Philosophy in endeavouring to settle the Rule of Truth upon so Solid and Evident a Basis and whether I could have been less Speculative in such a High Subject as requires a Deep Inspection into the very Center of all Truth whatever even to the Resolving it Finally and Connaturally into Essential Truth it self If these Considerations do not acquit me upon either Account I cannot but think my self Unjustly Condemn'd and I hope the whole Court of Philosophers who are Impartial and Sincere will judge the same 49. To clear me from Singularity in this Uncommon Method of Philosophizing I could farther alledge that Mr. Locke in his Essay B. 4. ch 1. § 4. gives us this Doctrine that The First Act of the Mind is to perceive its own Ideas and that One of them is not Another that is that each of them is its self only which is an Identical Proposition That this is so Absolutely Necessary that without it there could be no Knowledge no Reasoning no Distinct Thoughts at all Which sufficiently expresses it to be the First Truth or RULE of TRUTH which influences all other Truths since without it nothing at all could be known That a Man infallibly knows that the Ideas of White and Round are the very Ideas they are That this is the First Agreement or Disagreement that is the First Truth the Mind perceives in its Ideas That Men of Art have for ready Application in all Cases reduc'd this into those General Rules What is is c. In all which as he does in divers other main Speculative Points he so perfectly agrees with me that tho' I did not proceed on my own Grounds I need no more but these of his to draw such Immediate Consequences thence as would establish and abet my Thesis Indeed it did not lie in the Way of that very Learned Man's Speculation to reflect on the Universal Influence Identical Propositions have over all Truths and all Knowledges whatever and therefore his Dis-like of them afterwards chap. 8. can be thought to relate only to their apprehended Uselesness Tho' even there § 2. he acknowledges an Excellent Use of them too where he says that What is is may serve sometimes he might have said Always when it needed to shew a Man the Absurdity he is Guilty of when by Circumlocution or Ambiguous Terms he would in particular Instances deny the same Thing of it self because no body will so openly bid Defiance to Common Sense as to affirm Visible and Direct Contradictions
Velocity against another can be able to drive that other before it or move it in the least but GOD takes that Occasion to put it into Motion At this rate one need not fear his Head-piece tho' a Bomb were falling upon it with all the Force that Powder can give it for it would not so much as break his Skull or singe his Hair of GOD did not take that Occasion to do it The most Natural Agents with him are not so much as Instruments but only Occasions of what is produc'd by them So that a Man might freely pass through the Fire or jump down a Precipice without any Harm if GOD Almighty did not take that Occasion to burn him or dash out his Brains 52. Coming to Cartesius whom he calls the Great Master and Deliverer of the Philosophers from the Tyranny of Aristotle and the First World-Maker of our Century he lays the Blame at his door of all this presumptuous Pride of his Followers and their Fantastick Philosophy and animadverts severely upon divers of his odd Placita As that there is always the same Quantity of Motion in the World So that if all the Men and Animals in the World were Moving which most part of them can do when they please yet still there would be no more Motion in the World than there is in the Night-time when they are at Rest and what Motion they had when they were Moving must be communicated to the Aether when they are at Rest. And whereas Cartesius ' s Skill in Geometry gave those Contrivances of his Witty Fancy all their Credit this Author assures us p. 15. that from the beginning to the end of his Principles there is not one Demonstration drawn from Geometry or indeed any Demonstration at all except every Thing illustrated by a Figure be a Demonstration for then indeed there may be enow of such Demonstrations produc'd in his Philosophical Works Now in case this be so then it seems Explications by Figures do serve Cartesius and his Followers for Demonstrations in Geometry as well as Explications by Words serve them for Demonstrations or Proofs in other Sciences He adds that His great Fault was that he made no Use at all of Geometry in Philosophy Nay that His whole System was but one continual Blunder upon account of his Negligence in that Point That Galileo and Kepler have by the Help of Geometry discover'd Physical Truths more worth than all Cartesius's Volumes of Philosophy He confutes his Vortices by Mr. Newton's Principles who shews it impossible upon many Accounts that the Earth and other Planets should move in a Vortex With which most Consummate Geometrician I believe none of the Cartesians will be willing or able to grapple or contend And were Cartesius now alive perhaps he would have as much admir'd Him as Himself in his Life-time was admir'd by others He subjoins that His Notion of a Vortex being ruin'd the whole Cartesian System must of necessity fall to the Ground And that World whose Origination he pretended to have deduced from Mechanical Principles must be a wild Chimera of his own Imagination He affirms that Cartesius's Discourse about the Motion of the Moon is so notoriously False that there is no Almanack-maker but can demonstrate the contrary Farther That the Cartesians pretend to give a true Account of all the Phaenomena in Nature whilst they understand so very little that they have not given us an Explication of any one Thing And that Cartesius has blunder'd so much in the easiest and most abstract Things in Nature that of the Seven Rules he has given of the Laws of Motion there is but One of them True Lastly He affirms that Cartesius's Fancy of Making a World by Mechanical Principles has given the Ignorant Atheists for so are says he most of that Persuasion some plausible Pretences for their Incredulity without any Real Ground Where the the Parenthesis lays such a Blemish on the greater Part of the Followers of Cartesius and on his Doctrine as occasioning it that as I have charitably endeavour'd in divers places to wipe off that Aspersion and have taken their part so I am sorry to see now that 't is beyond my Power to do it I must own that there have been many Vertuous Persons Cartesians but I am not so well vers'd in their Catalogue as to to know whether they or the Athèists of that Persuasion do make the Major Part. These are his present Objections against Des Cartes and by what I have read of this Learned Author I know no Man more likely to make good what he has charged upon him than He is 53. You see Sir how much it behoves the Cartesians to look to their Hits if they have any and to arm themselves against such brisk Attacks tending to the Overthrow of all their Hypothesis by way of Geometry which I have attempted to do by way of Logical Physical and Metaphysical Principles For if this Opposition to Cartesius by Geometrical Arguments should come to be a Confutation then since Mr. Le Grand tells us his Physicks is but a Part of the Mathematicks his Credit as a Philosopher will sink utterly as I am inform'd the Esteem of his Doctrine does by large degrees in both the Universities or rather it is quite vanish'd out of one of them already 54. For my part let them come off with the Geometricians as well as they can I will not give them much Trouble but do sincerely declare that if they can bring any one Evident Principle either in Logick Physicks or Metaphysicks which they will vouch to have the Nature of a Principle in it and prove that it abets any Point of their Doctrine as 't is distinguish'd from ours I will cross the Cudgels for the next Comer and promise never to oppose them more Fairer Offer was never made nor any Method ever propos'd that shews a greater Sincerity of the Proposer in pursuing Truth nor that can be more Decisive of a Philosophical Contest in which half a Sheet of Paper will do the Business as well as whole Volumes You see Sir I allow my Adversaries a large Field out of which they may please to pick and cull what they like best or judge they can best prove If they know of any thing that grows there which will bear the Test and can approve it self by Principles to be an Evident Truth they have Free Liberty and a fair Occasion to do Right to themselves and oblige the World and withall they will do Me an Especial Favour for which I shall not be Ungrateful in making me by their Confutation see a Truth I never knew before This very Compendious Method I say will shorten Disputes avoid all shew of Wrangling which is grateful to no Man and finally conclude the whole Cause Or if this does not please them and that it agrees not with their Genius to stand bringing Evident Proofs then let them but meerly name or put down Categorically any one Principle