What Truth is hath been defined in the precedent Chapter What Evidence is I now set down and it is the Concomitance of a Mans Conception with the Words that signifie such Conception in the Act of Ratiocination for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only to which the Mind suggesteth only the Beginning and followeth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind out of Custom of so speaking though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions and proceed with certain Syllogisms and thereby make always true Conclusions yet are not his Conclusions evident to him for Want of the Concomitance of Conception with his Words for if the Words alone were sufficient a Parrot might be taught as well to know Truth as to speak it Evidence is to Truth as the Sap to the Tree which so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branches keepeth them alive where it forsaketh them they die for this Evidence which is Meaning with our Words is the Life of Truth 4. Knowledge therefore which we call Science I define to be Evidence of Truth from some Beginning or Principle of Sense for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth which are always Conceptions of the Mind Nor can we remember those Conceptions without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses The first Principle of Knowledge is that we have such and such Conceptions the second that we have thus and thus named the Things whereof they are Conceptions the third is that we have joyned those Names in such Manner as to make true Propositions the fourth and last is that we have joyned those Propositions in such Manner as they be concluding and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known And of these two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the former is Experience of Fact and the later of Evidence of Truth as the former if it be great is called Prudence so the latter if it be much hath usually been called both by Ancient and Modern Writers Sapience or Wisdom and of this latter Man only is capable of the former brute Beasts also participate 5. A Proposition is said to be supposed when being not evident it is nevertheless admitted for a Time to the End that joyning to it other Propositions we may conclude something and to proceed from Conclusion to Conclusion for a Trial whether the same will lead us into any absurd or impossible Conclusion which if it do then we know such Supposition to have been false 6. But if running thorow many Conclusions we come to none that are absurd then we think the Proposition probable likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we admit for Truth by Errour of Reasoning or from trusting to other Men And all such Propositions as are admitted by Trust or errour we are not said to know but think them to be true and the Admittance of them is called Opinion 7. And particularly when the Opinion is admitted out of Trust to other Men they are said to believe it and their Admittance of it is called Belief and sometimes Faith 8. It is either Science or Opinion which we commonly mean by the Word Conscience for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience which they never do when they think it doubtful and therefore they know or think they know it to be true But Men when they say Things upon their Conscience are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say It remaineth then that that Word is used by them that have an Opinion not only of the Truth of the Thing but also of their Knowledge of it to which the Truth of the Proposition is consequent Conscience I therefore define to be Opinion of Evidence 9. Belief which is the admitting of Propositions upon Trust in many Cases is no less free from Doubt than perfect and manifest Knowledge for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause so when there is Doubt there must be some Cause thereof conceived Now there be many Things which we receive from Report of others of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of Doubt for what can be opposed against the Consent of all Men in Things they can know and have no Cause to report otherwise than they are such as is great Part of our Histories unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him And thus much of Sense Imagination Discursion Ratiocination and Knowledge which are the Acts of our Power cognitive or conceptive That Power of the Mind which we call motive differeth from the Power motive of the Body for the Power motive of the Body is that by which it moveth other Bodies and we call Strength but the Power motive of the Mind is that by which the Mind giveth animal Motion to that Body wherein it existeth the Acts hereof are our Affections and Passions of which I am to speak in general CHAP. VII Of Delight Pain Love Hatred Appetite Aversion Fear Good Evil Pulchritude Turpitude End Fruition Profitable Vse Vain Felicity Good and Evil mixt Sensual Delight and Pain Joy and Grief IN the eighth Section of the second Chapter is shewed that Conceptions and Apparitions are nothing really but Motion in some internal Substance of the Head which Motion not stopping there but proceeding to the Heart of Necessity must there either help or hinder the Motion which is called Vital when it helpeth it is called Delight Contentment or Pleasure which is nothing really but Motion about the Heart as Conception is nothing but Motion in the Head and the Objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful or by some Name equivalent The Latines have Jucundum à juvando from helping and the same Delight with Reference to the Object is called Love but when such Motion weakeneth or hindereth the vital Motion then it is called Pain and in Relation to that which causeth it Hatred which the Latines express sometimes by Odium and sometimes by Taedium 2. This Motion in which consisteth Pleasure or Pain is also a Solicitation or Provocation either to draw near to the Thing that pleaseth or to retire from the Thing that displeaseth and this Solicitation is the Endeavour or internal Beginning of animal Motion which when the Object delighteth is called Appetite when it displeaseth it is called Aversion in Respect of the Displeasure present but in Respect of the Displeasure expected Fear So that Pleasure Love and Appetite which is also called Desire are divers Names for divers Considerations of the same Thing 3. Every Man for his own Part calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to himself Good and that Evil which displeaseth him insomuch that while every Man differeth from other in Constitution they differ also from one another concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute
when there is it is by Chance which must needs proceed from this That the Brain in Dreams is not restored to its Motion in every Part alike whereby it cometh to pass that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits 4. As when the Water or any liquid Thing moved at once by divers Movents receiveth one Motion compounded of them all so also the Brain or Spirit therein having been stirred by divers Objects composeth an Imagination of divers Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense As for Example the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a Mountain and at another Time the Colour of Gold but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a golden Mountain From the same Cause it is there appear unto us Castles in the Air Chimaera's and other Monsters which are not in Rerum Natura but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces at several Times And this Composition is that which we commonly call Fiction of the Mind 5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination which for Clearness contendeth with Sense as well as a Dream and that is when the Action of Sense hath been long or vehement and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the Sense of Seeing than the rest An Example whereof is the Image remaining before the Eye after looking upon the Sun Also those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the dark whereof I think every Man hath Experience but they most of all who are timorous or superstitious are Examples of the same And these for Distinction-sake may be called Phantasms 6. By the Senses which are numbred according to the Organs to be five we take Notice as hath been said already of the Objects without us and that Notice is our Conception thereof but we take Notice also some Way or other of our Conceptions for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh again we take Notice that is again that is to say that we have had the same Conception before which is as much as to imagine a Thing past which is impossible to the Sense which is only of Things present This therefore may be accounted a Sixth Sense but internal not external as the rest and is commonly called Remembrance 7. For the Manner by which we take Notice of a Conception past we are to remember that in the Definition of Imagination it is said to be a Conception by little and little decaying or growing more obscure An obscure Conception is that which representeth the whole Object together but none of the smaller Parts by themselves and as more or fewer Parts be represented so is the Conception or Representation said to be more or less clear Seeing then the Conception which when it was first produced by Sense was clear and represented the Parts of the 0bject distinctly and when it cometh again is obscure we find missing somewhat that we expected by which we judge it past and decayed For Example a Man that is present in a Foreign City seeth not only whole Streets but can also distinguish particular Houses and Parts of Houses but departed thence he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did some House or Turning escaping him yet is this to remember when afterwards there escape him more Particulars this is also to remember but not so well In Process of Time the Image of the City returneth but as a Mass of Building only which is almost to have forgotten it Seeing then Remembrance is more or less as we find more or less Obscurity Why may not we well think Remembrance to be nothing else but the missing of Parts which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole To see at a great Distance of Place and to remember at great Distance of Time is to have like Conceptions of the Thing for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance the other by Decay 8. And from this that hath been said there followeth That a Man can never know he dreameth he may dream he doubteth whether it be a Dream or no but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self and consequently he can take Notice of nothing but as present whereas to think he dreameth is to think those his Conceptions that is to say obscurer than they were in the Sense so that he must think them both as clear and not as clear as Sense which is impossible 9. From the same Ground it proceedeth that Men wonder not in their Dreams at Place and Persons as they would do waking for waking a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before and remember nothing of how he came there but in a Dream there cometh little of that kind into Consideration The Clearness of Conception in a Dream taketh away Distrust unless the Strangeness be excessive as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt and then most commonly he waketh 10. Nor is it possible for a Man to be so far deceived as when his Dream is past to think it real for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind and in such Order as he useth to do waking and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place were he findeth himself when he awaketh all which may happen I know no {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth or to take it for a Vision CHAP. IV. 1. Discourse 2. The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts 3. Ranging 4. Sagacity 5. Reminiscence 6. Experience 7. Expectation 8. Conjecture 9. Signs 10. Prudence 11. Caveats of concluding from Experience 1. THe Succession of Conceptions in the Mind Series or Consequence of one after another may be casual and incoherent as in Dreams for the most part and it may be orderly as when the former Thought introduceth the latter and this is Discourse of the Mind But because the Word Discourse is commonly taken for the Coherence and Consequence of Words I will to avoid Aequivocation call it Discursion 2. The Cause of the Coherence or Consequence of one Conception to another is their first Coherence or Consequence at that Time when they are produced by Sense As for Example from St. Andrew the Mind runneth to St. Peter because their Names are read together from S. Peter to a Stone for the same Cause from Stone to Foundation because we see them together and for the same Cause from Foundation to Church and from Church to People and from People to Tumult and according to this Example the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any
joyned together by the said Verb is As for Example Man is a living creature or thus Man is not righteous whereof the former is called an Affirmation because the Appellation Living Creature is Positive the latter a Negative because not righteous is Privative 10. In every Proposition be it Affirmative or Negative the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former as in this Proposition Charity is a Vertue the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity and many other Vertues beside and then is the Proposition said to be true or Truth For Truth and a true Proposition is all one Or else the latter Appellation comprehendeth not the former as in this Proposition Every Man is just the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men And the Proposition is said to be false or Falsity Falsity and a false Proposition being also the same Thing 11. In what manner of two Propositions whether both Affirmative or one Affirmative the other Negative is made a Syllogism I forbear to write All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions though necessary is but dry Discourse and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick which if I enter further into I ought to pursue Besides it is not needfull for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick as thereby to discern well enough whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter be well or ill collected Only thus much I say in this Place that Making of Syllogisms is that we call Ratiocination or Reasoning 12. Now when a man reasoneth from Principles that are found indubitable by Experience all Deceptions of Sense and Aequivocation of Words avoided the Conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right Reason But when from his Conclusion a Man may by good Ratiocination derive that which is contradictory to any evident Truth whatsoever then he is said to have concluded against Reason And such a Conclusion is called Absurdity 13. As the Invention of Names hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance by calling to their Remembrance the necessary Coherence of one Conception to another so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into Errour Insomuch that whereas by the Benefit of Words and Ratiocination they exceed brute Beasts in Knowledge and the Commodities that accompany the same so they exceed them also in Errour For true and false are Things not incident to Beasts because they adhere not to Propositions and Language nor have they Ratiocination whereby to multiply one Untruth by another as Men have 14. It is the Nature almost of every Corporal Thing being often moved in one and the same Manner to receive continually a greater and greater Easiness and Aptitude to the same Motion insomuch as in Time the same becometh so habitual that to beget it there needs no more than to begin it The Passions of Man as they are the Beginning of voluntary Motions so are they the Beginning of Speech which is the Motion of the Tongue And Men desiring to shew others the Knowledge Opinions Conceptions and Passions which are in themselves and to that End having invented Language have by that Means transferred all that Discursion of their Mind mentioned in the former Chapter by the Motion of their Tongues into Discourse of Words And Ratio now is but Oratio for the most part wherein Custom hath so great a Power that the Mind suggesteth only the first Word the rest follow habitually and are not followed by the Mind as it is with Beggars when they saw their Pater noster putting together such Words and in such manner as in their Education they have learned from their Nurses from their Companies or from their Teachers having no Images or Conceptions in their Mind answering to the Words they speak and as they have learned themselves so they teach Posterity Now if we consider the Power of those Deceptions of the Sense mentioned Chap 2. Sect. 10 and also how unconstantly Names have been setled and how subject they are to Aequivocation and how diversified by Passion scarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good and what Evil what Liberality what Prodigality what Valour what Temerity and how subject Men are to Paralogism or Fallacy in Reasoning I may in a Manner conclude that it is impossible to rectifie so many Errours of any one Man as must needs proceed from those Causes without beginning a-new from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense and instead of Books reading over orderly ones own Conceptions In which Meaning I take Noste teipsum for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten CHAP. VI 1. Of the two Kinds of Knowledge 2. Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge 3. Evidence defined 4. Science defined 5. Supposition defined 6. Opinion defined 7. Belief defined 8. Conscience defined 9. Belief in some Cases no less from Doubt than Knowledge 1. THere is a Story somewhere of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness wherewith he was born by St. Albane or other Saints at the Town of St. Albans and that the Duke of Glocester being there to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle asked the Man What Colour is this Who by answering It was Green discovered himself and was punished for a Counterfeit for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green and Red and all other Colours as well as any that should interrogate him yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green or Red or by any other Name By this we may understand there be two Kinds of Knowledge whereof the one is nothing else but Sense or Knowledge original as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter and Remembrance of the same the other is called Science or Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions and how Things are called and is derived from Vnderstanding Both of these Sorts are but Experience The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from without and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of Names in Language and all Experience being as I have said but Remembrance all Knowledge is Remembrance and of the former the Register we keep in Books is called History But the Registers of the latter are called the Sciences 2. There are two Things necessarily implied in this Word Knowledge the one is Truth the other Evidence for what is not Truth can never be known For let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well if the same shall afterwards appear false he is driven to Confession that it was not Knowledge but Opinion Likewise if the Truth be not evident though a Man holdeth it yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge all Truth were known which is not so 3.
out-goe whom we would not is Indignation To hold fast by another is to love To carry him on that so holdeth is Charity To hurt ones self for hast is Shame Continually to be out-gone is Misery Continually to out-go the next before is Felicity And to forsake the Course is to die CHAP. X. 1. HAving shewed in the precedent Chapters that Sense proceedeth from the Action of external Objects upon the Brain or some internal Substance of the Head and that the Passions proceed from the Alteration there made and continued to the Heart It is consequent in the next Place seeing the Diversity of Degrees in Knowlege in divers Men to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers Tempers of their Brain to declare what other Causes may produce such Oddes and Excess of Capacity as we daily observe in one Man above another As for that Difference which ariseth from Sickness and such accidental Distempers I omit the same as impertinent to this Place and consider it only in such as have their Health and Organs well disposed If the Difference were in the natural Temper of the Brain I can imagin no Reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses which being equal both in the wise and less wise infer an equal Temper in the common Organ namely the Brain of all the Senses 2. But we see by Experience that Joy and Grief proceed not in all Men from the same Causes and that men differ very much in the Constitution of the Body whereby that which helpeth and furthereth vital Constitution in one and is therefore delightful hindereth it and crosseth it in another and therefore causeth Grief The Difference therefore of Wits hath its Original from the different Passions and from the Ends to which the Appetite leadeth them 3. And first those Men whose Ends are sensual Delight and generally are addicted to Ease Food Onerations and Exonerations of the Body must needs be the less thereby delighted with those Imaginations that conduce not to those Ends such as are Imaginations of Honour and Glory which as I have said before have Respect to the future For Sensuality consisteth in the Pleasure of the Senses which please only for the present and take away the Inclination to observe such Things as conduce to Honour and consequently maketh Men less curious and less ambitious whereby they less consider the Way either to Knowledge or other Power in which two consisteth all the Excellency of Power cognitive And this is it which Men call Dulness and proceedeth from the Appetite of sensual or bodily Delight And it may well be conjectured that such Passion hath its Beginning from a Grossness and Difficulty of the Motion of the Spirit about the Heart 4. The Contrary hereunto is that quick Rangeing of Mind described Chap. 4. Sect. 3. which is joyned with Curiosity of comparing the Things that come into the Mind one with another in which Comparison a Man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected Similitude of Things otherwise much unlike in which Men place the Excellency of Fancy and from whence proceed those grateful Similies Metaphors and other Tropes by which both Poets and Orators have it in their Power to make Things please or displease and shew well or ill to others as they like themselves or else in discerning suddenly Dissimilitude in Things that otherwise appear the same And this Vertue of the Mind is that by which Men attain to exact and perfect Knowledge and the Pleasure thereof consisteth in continual Instruction and in Distinction of Places Persons and Seasons and is commonly termed by the Name of Judgement for to judge is nothing else but to distinguish or discern And both Fancy and Judgement are commonly comprehended under the Name of Wit which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits contrary to that Restiness of the Spirits supposed in those that are dull 5. There is another Defect of the Mind which Men call Levity which betrayeth also Mobility in the Spirits but in Excess An Example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious Discourse have their Minds diverted to every little Jest or witty Observation which maketh them depart from their Discourse by a Parenthesis and from that Parenthesis by another till at length they either lose themselves or make their Narration like a Dream or some studied Nonsence The Passion from whence this proceedeth is Curiosity but with too much Equality and Indifference for when all Things make equal Impression and Delight they equally throng to be expressed 6. The Vertue opposite to this Defect is Gravity or Steadiness in which the End being the great and Master-Delight directeth and keepeth in the Way thereto all other Thoughts 7. The Extremity of Dulness is that natural Folly which may be called Stolidity But the Extream of Levity though it be natural Folly distinct from the other and obvious to every Mans Observation I know not how to call it 8. There is a Fault of the Mind called by the Greeks {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} which is Indocibility or Difficulty of being taught the which must needs arise from a false Opinion that they know already the Truth of that is called in question for certainly Men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the Evidence is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians and what is commonly discoursed of in other Books and therefore if the Minds of Men were all of white Paper they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right Method and by right Ratiocination delivered to them But when Men have once acquiesced in untrue Opinions and registred them as Authentical Records in their Minds it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such Men than to write legibly upon a Paper already scribled over The immediate Cause therefore of Indocibility is Prejudice and of prejudice false Opinion of our own Knowledge 9. Another and a principal Defect of the Mind is that which Men call Madness which appeareth to be nothing else but some Imagination of some such Predominancy above the rest that we have no Passion but from it and this Conception is nothing else but excessive vain Glory or vain Dejection which is most propable by these Examples following which proceed in Appearance every one of them from Pride or some Dejection of Mind As first we have had the Example of one that preached in Cheapside from a Cart there instead of a Pulpit that he himself was Christ which was spiritual Pride or Madness We have had also divers Examples of Learned Madness in which Men have manifestly been distracted upon any Occasion that hath put them in Remembrance of their own Ability Amongst the learned Men may be remembred I think also those that determine of the Time of the Worlds End and other such the Points of Prophecy And the gallant Madness of Don Quixotte is nothing else but
and motive considered in every Man by himself without Relation to otherâ— it will fall fitly into this Chapter to speak of the Effects of the same Power one upon another which Effects are also the Signs by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth Of these Signs some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited as Actions and Gestures especially if they be sudden whereof I have mentioned some for Example look in Chap. 9. with the several Passions whereof they are Signs Others there are which may be counterfeited and those are Words or Speech of the Use and Effects whereof I am to speak in this Place 2. The first Use of Language is the expression of our Conceptions that is the begetting in one another the same Conceptions that we have in our selves and this is called Teaching wherein if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words beginning at something true in Experience then it begetteth the like Evidence in the Hearer that understandeth them and maketh him to know something which he is therefore said to learn but if there be not such Evidence then such teaching is called Perswasion and begetteth no more in the Hearer than what is in the Speakers bare Opinion And the Signs of two Opinions contradictory one to another namely Affirmation and Negation of the same Thing is called Controversie but both Affirmations or both Negations Consent in Opinion 3. The infallible Sign of teaching exactly and without errour is this that no Man hath ever taught the Contrary Not that few how few soever if any for commonly Truth is on the side of a few rather than of the Multitude But when in Opinions and Questions considered and discussed by many it happeneth that not any one of the Men that so discuss'd them differ from another then it may be justly inferred they know what they teach and that otherwise they do not And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers Subjects wherein they have exercised their Pens and the divers Ways in which they have proceeded together with the Diversity of the Success thereof for those Men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the Comparison of Magnitudes Numbers Times and Motions and how their Proportions are to one another have thereby been the Authors of all those Excellencies by which we differ from such savage People as now inhabit divers places in America and as have been the Inhabitants heretofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish for from the Studies of these Men have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for Ornament by Navigation and whatsoever we have beneficial to humane Society by the Division Distinction and Portraicting the Face of the Earth whatsoever also we have by the Account of Times and Foresight of the Course of Heaven whatsoever by Measuring Distances Plains and Solids of all Sorts and whatsoever either elegant or defensible in Building All which supposed a Way what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians Yet to this day was it never heard of that there was any Controversie concerning any Conclusion in this Subject the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the Conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation The Reason whereof is apparent to every Man that looketh into their Writings for they proceed from most low and humble Principles evident even to the meanest Capacity going on slowly and with most scrupulous Ratiocination viz. from the Imposition of Names they inferr the Truth of their first Propositions and from two of the first a third and from any two of the three a fourth and so on according to the Steps of Science mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other side those Men who have written concerning the Faculties Passions and Manners of Men that is to say of Moral Philosophy and of Policy Government and Laws whereof there be infinite Volumes have been so far from removing Doubt and Controversie in the Questions they have handled that they have very much multiplied the same Nor doth any Man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered Two thousand Years ago by Aristotle and yet every Man thinks that in this Subject he knoweth as much as any other supposing there needeth thereunto no Study but that accrueth unto them by natural Wit though they play or imploy their Mind otherwise in the Purchace of Wealth or Place The Reason whereof is no other than that in their Writings and Discourses they take for Principles those Opnions which are already vulgarly received whether true or false being for the most part false There is therefore a great deal of Difference between Teaching and Perswading the Sign of this being Controversie the Sign of the former no Controversie 4. There be two Sorts of Men that commonly be called learned One is that Sort that proceedeth evidently from humble Principles as is described in the last Section and those Men are called Mathematici The other are they that take up Maxims from their Education and from the Authority of Men or of Custom and take the habitual Discourse of the Tongue for Ratiocination and these are called Dogmatici Now seeing in the last Section those we call Mathematici are absolved of the Crime of breeding Controversie and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused the Fault lieth altogether in the Dogmaticks that is to say those that are imperfectly learned and with Passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth without any evident Demonstration either from Experience or from Places of Scripture of uncontroverted Interpretation 5. The Expression of those Conceptions which cause in us the Experience of Good while we deliberate as also of those which cause our Expectation of Evil is that which we call Counselling and is the internal Deliberation of the Mind concerning what we our selves are to do or not to do The Consequences of our Actions are our Counsellors by alternate Succession in the Mind So in the Counsel which a Man taketh from other Men the Counsellors alternately do make appear the Consequences of the Action and do not any of them deliberate but furnish among them all him that is counselled with Arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself 6. Another Use of Speech is Expression of Appetite Intention and Will as the Appetite of Knowledge by Interrogation Appetite to have a Thing done by another as Request Prayer Petition Expressions of our Purpose or intention as Promise which is the Affirmation or Negation of some Action to be done in the future Threatning which is the Promise of Evil and Commanding which is that Speech by which we signifie to another our Appetite or Desire to have any Thing done or left undone for Reasons contained in the Will it self For it is not properly said Sic volo sic jubeo without that other Clause Stet pro Ratione Voluntas And when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to Action then is that Command called a Law 7. Another Use of Speech is Instigation and Appeasing by which we increase or diminish one anothers Passion It is the same Thing with Perswasion the Difference not being real for the Begetting of Opinion and Passion is the same But whereas in Perswasion we aim at Getting Opinion from Passion here the End is to raise Passion from Opinion And as in raising an Opinion from Passion any Premisses are good enough to inforce the desired Conclusion so in raising Passion from Opinion it is no matter whether the Opinion be true or false or the Narration historical or fabulous for not the Truth but the Image maketh Passion and a Tragedy well acted affecteth no less than a Murther 8. Though words be the Signs we have of one anothers Opinions and Intentions because the Aequivocation of them is so frequent according to the Diversity of Contexture and of the Company wherewith they go which the Presence of him that speaketh our Sight of his Actions and Conjecture of his Intentions must help to discharge us of it must therefore be extream hard to find the Opinions and Meaning of those Men that are gone from us long ago and have left us no other Signification thereof than their Books which cannot possibly be understood without History to discover those aforementioned Circumstances and also without great Prudence to observe them 9. When it happeneth that a Man signifieth unto us two contradictory Opinions whereof the one is clearly and directly signified and the other either drawn from that by Consequence or not known to be contradictory to it then when he is not present to explicate himself better we are to take the former for his Opinion for that is clearly signified to be his and directly whereas the other might proceed from errour in the Deduction or Ignorance of the Repugnancy The like also is to be held in two contradictory Expressions of a Mans Intention and Will for the same Reason 10. Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another intendeth thereby to make him understand what he saith if he speak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth understandeth not or use any Word in other Sence than he believeth is the Sence of him that heareth he intendeth also not to make him understand what he saith which is a Contradiction of himself It is therefore always to be supposed that he which intendeth not to deceive alloweth the private Interpretation of his Speech to him to whom it is addressed 11. Silence in him that believeth that the same shall be taken for a Sign of his Intent is a Sign thereof indeed for if he did not consent the Labour of Speaking so much as to declare the same is so little as it is to be presumed he would have done it CONCLUSION THus have we considered the Nature of Man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and Laws are lastly resolved which was my present Purpose FINIS