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truth_n holy_a scripture_n spirit_n 11,728 5 5.5488 4 true
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A91783 The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick. By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published. Richardson, Alexander, of Queen's College, Cambridge.; Thomson, Samuel, fl. 1657-1666. 1657 (1657) Wing R1378; Thomason E1603_2; ESTC R203419 285,683 519

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but in repect of of testis hence doe we plead so for the truth of the Scriptures We say that we believe that which the Church delivereth because God sayes it to our hearts by his holy Spirit this is divinum The Church of Rome sayes we are to believe it because the Church saith it but that is but humanum ergo not so excellent Again they are not content to make the Church a witnesse of the Scriptures but most absurdly the cause of them But God as he is the Author of them so he is the witnesser by his Spirit and it is one thing to consider God as the cause of them and another to consider him as the testis thereof In divinis testimoniis numerantur non solum deorum oraculi sed etiam responsa vatum fatidiorum Our Author brings divellish examples not divine and he might have done much better if he had brought testimony out of Scripture but the reason why he doth not is this we know Logick is a generall Art of all things whatsoever ergo the Scriptures not being received among all people and he regarding that which was more common in use as the Poets Fables and such like and that which was more generally received ergo he omits the Scripture Now here in the examples following we shall see that these oracula were oracula diabolorum and responsa vatum were of lyers So that we must understand by divinum testimonium that which is divinum in truth and not onely in name for as there are many called Gods and yet but one true God so there are many divine testimonies and yet but one true divine testimony Cicero 3. Catilin Nam ut illa omittam ait Orator visas nocturno tempore ab occidente faces ardoremque coeli ut fluminum jactus c. Strange signes were seen about the time of Catilins conspiracy burning heat flashings appearing in the heaven so that the gods did by them witness these things So when God doth at any time shew forth his justice as he did in Jerusalem by the sword hanging over it and by the strange bringing forth of the lamb by an heifer standing at the Altar to be sacrificed or by comets such like they are testimonies of some judgment to come Deinde paulo post Quo quidem tempore cum Aruspices ex tota Hetruria convenissent c. Here Tully makes many divine testimonies of Catilins conspiracy and of the state of Rome Tandem cum dixisset ut ex Aruspicum responsis ludi facti Jovis signum majus factum conversumque ad orientem tum ait Nonne illud vero ita praesens erat ut nutu Jovis optimi maximi factum esse videatur Tully makes this among the rest a sign of Catalins conspiracy they had made Jupiters image a very little one and therefore they took it down and made it bigger and it was set upon the stool looking toward the Senate even at that time when these fellows of Catalin went through the Town and thereby it did as it were command the Senators to look after these wretched fellows Brevis est illud Tibulli Quod si vera canunt sacris oracula templis Haec illi nostro nomine dicta refer Hoc tibi conjugium pr●mittit Delius ipse Faelix ac alium desine velle virum He would perswade her to marry because Apollo had foretold that it should be fortunate with them CHAP. XXXIII De testimonio humano legis sententiae Testimonium humanum est commune aut proprium KNowing that a humane testimony doth rest upon the artificial arguments it cannot be so strong as divinum is yet it may be true Est commune aut proprium because the more witnesses it hath the stronger it is that which is testified by one man alone is weaker because one man may sooner be deceived than many he may see onely one artificial argument they may see more yea all so that as a divine testimony is to be preferred before an humane so a humane that is common is to be preferred and received before an humane that is proper Commune ut lex illustris sententia Lex a law a rule which is received either by the whole world as the law of Nations or of some peculiar Countries as the laws of a private state and this hath less force in it than the former ergo if the witnesses stand of more together and of one alone still holding all of them prudent vertuous and benevolent we are to receive that which is witnessed by more men sooner than the other Now then where the Church of Rome reasons with us it is not better to go to the Church than to a private man yes but they must be prudent vertuous and benevolent again they must see the artificial arguments of that witness for else if one man shall bring testimony from the word of God we are rather to receive his else we prefer an humane testimony before a divine Again if it be an humane testimony and a humane testimony that we compare together let not a private man stand up to stir with his meer testimony against a whole assembly The reason of the Creed being generally received in all Churches is this because it hath a divine testimony ergo next to the testimony of the Church we are to prefer the common testimony and then the private as it doth not jarr with the common one Illustris sententia For though it be not a law yet is it generally received as notable for truth now he cals it illustris opposing it to obscura which though it may have truth in it yet is it not so famous to be received We say vox populi is vox Dei because all truth comes from him Legis autem non scriptae scriptae testimonium est Pro Milone Est enim judices non scripta sed nata lex quam non didicimus accepimus legimus verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus c. For there are some laws that are customs and they are not written indeed in civil affairs it so comes to pass that we cannot see all but are fain to leave some things to custom yet there may be some laws written in our hearts which we call natural This is witnessed that it is lawful for a man to defend himself by the law of Nature Et ibidem Quod si duodecem tabulae nocturnem furem quoquo modo diurnum autem si se telo defender it interfici impune voluerunt c Why a man may slay his adversary by the Law of the twelve tables which in the night time allows it Sententiae illustres sunt proverbia That is old sayes as they call them because they are generally received are called proverbs ut pares cum paribus facillime congregantur birds of a feather will flye together Sparctam nactus es you have an office look to it This was occasioned thus when they had chosen their King at Sparta
I onely lay things together to remember them Dianoia est cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus aut methodus This very definition tels me that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus and they are both one so that here are deductions of axioms out of axioms which surely belong to syllogistical judgement onely for I do not mean that it is ordering of one axiom before another but a drawing of deductions from their first rules true it is that a former axiom gives light to that which follows but that light is by vertue of syllogistical judgement so that method placing axioms doth indeed need axiomatical judgement as that also needs invention before it can place them but it doth not therefore follow that the doctrine of axioms should be in method Syllogismus est dianoia qua questio cum argumento ita disponitur ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur Syllogismus signifies properly the sum of an account in the species of numeration especially in Addition and summa and syllogismus are the same and the Logicians have borrowed it of the Arithmeticians because though Logick be the first Art in order and nature yet Arithmetick was observed by men before Logick ergo Plato set over his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught among them as Grammar is now taught among us for as for Logick Grammar and Rhetorick they had them by nature ergo they studied the Mathematicks first ergo they called them Mathematicks for the word is general to all Arts and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logick brings demonstrations out of the Mathematicks so that this metaphor syllogismus was a priore to them This syllogismus est dianoia qua questio cum argumento c. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse and here in this rule observe first a question secondly an argument thirdly a disposing of them together fourthly a set or constant position of the arguments and the question Lastly a necessary conclusion from them first if it be a clear truth that ought not to be a question else it should Qu● quaestio What question shall he go ask any body yes a third argument if he will but quaestio here is a law term signifying a commission so that if he doubted he might see at the Law for the truth so that this judgement is a Courtly kind of seeking out truth with two arguments before the judgement seat of a third argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in love with quaestio as that they made it the subject of Logick and divided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum and compositum which is the same with axioma Then there must be an argument he doth not call it tertium argumentum here as he doth afteward but onely argumentum though there are alwayes three arguments because here he considers it in respect of the whole question not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Invention and argumentum must be brought indeed as an evidence or witness rather than as a Judge for I my self am the Judge thereof Cum argumento Therefore here saith Kickerman must argumentum come in yea here indeed it must come in but it must ergo be taught before for it must be before it can come in ergo to say it must be here taught because it comes in here is fallacia accidentis so that an argument belongs to judgement as it may be disposed not as it may be in it self But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument ergo the doctrine of a question must go before the doctrine of an argument indeed it so fals out here but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make Pigs fly with their tails forward Disponitur He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument that he might know how to use them but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution ergo those maxims as they call them are consecutions from the rules of invention and are prosyllogisms Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not aware whilst he would distribute Logick into a simple conceit a double conceit and into discursus for if disposition be general both to his double conceit and to his discursus then he leaves out two rules the definition and distribution of disposition ergo let us hold the right Ita disponitur because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument consequens in propositione antecedens in assumptione and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed with the third argument alone in the proposition ergo the question as the better man must have the third argument for his companion for he is the Gentleman ergo he saith quaestio cum argumento and ●●t argumentum cum quaestione Again the third argument is for the questions sake ergo it is he that is the more lofty but this is not quaevis quaestio but that quaestio quae ita disponitur ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur He cals it an antecedent ergo a syllogism consisteth of two parts an antecedent and a consequent An antecedent is so called because it goes before and a consequent because it comes after again an antecedent and a consequent are not yoked together as two Oxen as in a copulate axiom but one before another as Horses trace as in a connex hanging upon the former by a necessity of consequence Now this question is so posita cum argumento as that the question doth follow on them two for the third argument never comes into the consequent part Here positum is as it were put case as put case there be an antecedent tum necessarium concludatur Object Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth Yes not but that it may be contingent but he means necessario that is that this consequent will follow necessarily upon the antecedent for the Art or rule of a syllogism as otiosus est amator is contingent Egistus est otiosus is contingent ergo est amator this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent so that necessario goes not with the conclusion but with the inference of the conclusion Nam cum axioma dubium sit quaestio efficitur ad ejus fidem tertio argumento opus est cum questione collocato That is when a matter is to be demurred and staid upon quaestio efficitur as before ad ejus fidem c. what is that that is ad ejus fiat dictum that is that you may build upon this truth tertio argumento opus est so that fides properly belongs to the will and to the resolution of the will which is the extremity of reason so that fides is in the will ergo
belongs to Divinity for when the Lord assures man by his Spirit that he is reconciled unto him his will saith presently fiat dictum so that the third argument must give testimony of the honesty of the parts of the question which two parts entring into the band the controversie is ended Collocato here he tels us in general of the placing of the argument but when it is to be placed and where we shall hear hereafter Syllogismi antecedens partes duas habet propositionem assumptionem He doth not define antecedence and consequence for there is antecedence and consequence in an argument as the cause is before the effect c. and in an axiom and also here ergo they are voces ambiguae ergo are not to be defined here Propositio assumptio Propositio is oftentimes used generally for axioma but it names an axiom onely as it is used in a syllogism and to use it more generally is to abuse it or at least to use a catathristical synecdoche assumptio belongs hither onely Propositio est prima pars antecedentis qua questionis faltem consequens cum argumento disponitur We have heard of a question and an argument which is a third in respect of the two in the question but he cals it not a third before because in a composite it is disposed with the whole question not with the parts then the dispositio of the argument cum quaestione is not at random but so as there will be an antecedent and a consequent which antecedent being put the consequent will follow of necessity that is the inference of the conclusion will follow of necessity so that necessity here follows upon the inference of the conclusion not upon the conclusion Now the parts of the antecedent are the proposition and assumption for so it is requisite that every syllogism stand of three parts because they play at three hands and there must be two parts of the antecedent because the argument being but one can play but twice namely with the two parts of the question and therefore if it should play the third time it must play with it self and thence it is that it never comes into the conclusion now in a composite syllogism there is silently contained the antecedent part of the question in the assumption though it be not exprest Now the common Logicians call the proposition the major propositio and the assumption the minor propositio and the reason of it is this because the majus extremum namely the consequent part of the question was put in proposition and the minus extremum in the assumption for as touching a composite syllogism Aristotle did not teach one word of it Now Ramus keeps these terms propositio and assumptio and he had reason for use hath taken up these words in good Authors for these things as in Tully Cornelius Agricola and other Logicians that follow the more pure latine and there is reason for it for that which they call propositio there is a thing propounded to him with whom we dispute and then the former being granted I do assume as it were out of the bowels of the proposition the assumption so the Greeks call propositio Prothesis and assumptio Hypothesis though I find some of them that call the proposition thesis whereas the question is the thesis Now propositio is that which is propounded and carrieth a shew of truth with it ergo we seldom deny the proposition but rather the assumption or else distinguish of it ergo our chiefest care must be of the assumption to discern truth and falshood in that Est prima pars antecedentis As if he should say that the disposition of the question with the argument must have a proposition and that must be placed first so that that which we shall hear of more particularly hereafter here we hear it more generally namely that it must be prima pars Qua questionis saltem consequens c. In this proposition there is a disposition of the question with the argument saltem consequens he speaks this because whether our syllogism be simple or composite the consequent part of the question is in the proposition He saith saltem because the whole question is in the proposition of a composite syllogism ergo the consequent part therefore observe this generally in every proposition there is the consequens quaestionis disposed with the antecedent therefore whereas we heard before that a syllogism was qua quaestio cum argumento c. here we hear that propositio est qua quaestionis saltem consequens cum argumento disponitur Assumptio est secunda pars antecedentis quae assumitur e propositione Assumptio the second part of the antecedent part is called assumptio because adsumitur it is taken to the proposition for the proposition being setled we take the assumption out of it being more general I was wont to compare the proposition to a Cow and the assumption to her Calf that is taken out of of her and goeth by her side Est secunda pars antecedentis Propositio is before for in the question the consequent part is more general or at least equal to the antecedent quatenus it is an axiom by reason whereof the proposition that contains the consequent part of the question with the third argument is more general than the assumption and it is the principal namely the third argument as si Socrates est animal est substantia at si Socrates est homo est animal ergo again here lies another reason qua assumitur è propositione ergo the proposition must be more capacious or at least equal as where the proposition and assumption shall be reciprocal for we cannot take two out of one Assumitur Because when the proposition shall be granted then I will take my assumption out of it so that this is generally to be observed that the assumption is taken out of the proposition this is the dianoia of it qua aliud axioma ex alio deducitur it is as a case of boxes where one is taken out of another now if the assumption be not taken out of the proposition then it is not ad idem ergo baculus stat in angulo Syllogismi autem pars consequens est quae complectitur partes quaestionis eamqueconcludit unde complexio conclusio dicitur So that we must take heed that we have not more in the conclusion than the parts of the question for as it was a fallace if the assumption were not taken out of the proposition so is it also here if any thing come into the conclusion beside the question If there should be any other thing it would be either an heterozetesis when the question is not concluded as the Schools say it is not adrem or else apoluzetesis i. concluding many questions in one ergo an heterozetesis and apoluzetesis erre against this rule Eamque concludit The third argument can never come into the conclusion in a simple