Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n
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A56223
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Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses
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Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.
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1642
(1642)
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Wing P412; ESTC R21815
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39,600
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50
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have too much wrong done them for what is more plain then this That the Venetians live more happily under their conditionate Duke then the Turks do under their most absolute Emperours Neverthelesse if we consider the noble Trophees of Rome which it gained under Consuls and conditionaâ—e Commanders we may suppose that no defect at all could be in that popular and mixt government And our neighbours in the Netherlands are a good instance for they being to cope with the most Puissant and free Prince of Christendom being but the torn relique of a small Nation yet for their defence would not put themselves under a Dictatorian power but they prepared themselves for that so terrible encounter under the Conduct of a Generall much limitted Neither have those straitned Commissiâ—ns yeelded any thing but victories to the States and solid honour to the Princes of Orange and what more the mightiest Monarchs of our age have atchieved or enjoy'd besides the filling of a phantasticall humour with imaginary grandour I speak not this in favour of any alteration in England I am as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage but I know there are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such I desire to be most studious of In some things I know t is dangerous to circumscribe Princes but in others there may be great danger in leaving them to their pleasure and scarce any hope at all of benefit and amongst other things the choice of publike Officers if the State have at least some share therein with the King what considerable inconvenience can happen thereby to the State or King is not in me to foresee but if it have no share experience sufficient teacheth us what great disasters may happen And so for the disusing and dissolving of Parliaments if the Parliament divide some part of that power with the King I see great good but no harm at all that can ensue either to weaken the Crown or disturb the subject thereby But it will be said in the next place If this disables not the King from protecting the Subject yet it diminishes his own Right and leaves him but the shadow of Royalty This is grounded upon a great mistake for some men think it a glorious thing to be able to kill as well as to save and to have a kinde of a Creators power over Subjects but the truth is such power procures much danger to ill Princes and little good to any for it begets not so much love as fear in the subiect though it be not abused and the fear of the subject does not give so perfect a Dominion as love Were Hannibal Scipio c. the lesse honoured or beloved because they were not independent surely no they were the lesse feared and for the same cause the more honoured and beloved Or were Alexander Pyrrbus c. the more honoured or beloved because they were independant I believe the contrary and that they had lived more gloriously and died lesse violently if a more moderate power had rendred them lesse insolent in their own thoughts and lesse feared in other mens Was Caesar the private man lesse successefull in his Warres or lesse dear in all his souldiers eyes or lesse powerfull in his Countrey-mens affections then Caesar the perpetuall Dictator No if the Imperiall Throne of the World added any thing to Caesar 't was not excellence nor true glory 't was but the externall complements of pomp and ostentation and that might perhaps blow up his minde with vanity and fill the people with 〈◊〉 it could not make Caesar a nobler gallanter greater Caesar 〈◊〉 he was I expect no lesse then to be laught at at â—ourt and to be hâ—ld the author of a strange paradox by those men which stick not to say That our King is now no more King of Scotland then he is King of France because his meer pleasure there is not so predominant in all cases of good and evill whatsoever but I regard not those fond things which cannot see in humane nature what is depraved in it and what not and what proceeds from vain and what from true glory and wherein the naturall perfection of power and honour differs from the painted rayes of spurious Majesty and Magnificence To me the Policy of Scotland seems more exquisite in poynt of prerogative then any other in Europe except ours And if the splendor and puissance of a Prince consist in commanding religious wise magnanimous warlike subjects I think the King of Scotland is more to be admired then the King of France and that he is so to the meer ingenuity of Government I ascribe it But some will allow That to follow the pattern of Antoninus freely and voluntarily as he did is not dishonourable in a Prince but to be under any Obligation or Law to do so is ignoble And this is as much as to say That Law though good yet quateâ—â—s Law is burthenous to mans nature and though it be so but to corrupted nature in asmuch as it retains from nothing but that which nature in its purity would it self restrain from yet corrupted nature it self is to be soothed and observed I have done with this point 't was spoken in honour of Hen. 7. That he governed his subjects by his Laws his Laws by his Lawyers and it might have been added his subjects Laws and Lawyers by advice of Parliament by the regulation of that Court which gave life and birth to all Laws In this Policy is comprized the whole act of Soveraignty for where the people are subject to the Law of the Land and not to the will of the Prince and where the Law is left to the interpretation of sworn upright Judges and not violated by power and where Parliaments superintend all and in all extraordinary cases especially betwixt the King and Kingdom do the faithfull Offices of Umpirage all things remain in such a harmony as I shall recommend to all good Princes The Parliament conceives that the King cannot apprehend any just fear from Sir John Hotham or interpret the meer shutting of Hull gates and the sending away of Arms and Ammunition in obedience to both Houses to be any preparation for Warre and Invasion against him at York and therefore they resolve to raise Forces against those Forces which the King raises to secure himself from Sir John Hotham The King hereupon charges the Parliament of levying Warre against Him under pretence of His levying Warre against them This is matter of fact and the World must judge whether the Kings preparations in the North be onely sutable to the danger of Sir John Hotham or no and whether the Parliament be in danger of the Kings strength there or no Or whether is more probable at this time that the King is incensed against the Parliament or the Parliament against the King or that the King is more intentive to assayl the Parliament or the
all men which neither Kingdom Parliament King nor all the Royallists can oppose What a strange unlathomable machination and work of darknesse is this But this is said to be done by cunning force absence or accident If it be by cunning Then we must suppose that the Kings party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty And that all the Parliament except some few are luld-a-sleep by Mercuries Minstrelsie or that some diabolicall charme has closed up all their various eyes If it be by force Then we must suppose that our Aristocraticall heads carry about them great store of that Serpents teeth which yeilded heretofore so sudden and plentifull a harvest of armed men being but cast into the furrows of the earth Though their armies have been hitherto invisible yet we must suppose That they are in a readinesse to rise upon the first Alarum beaten If it be by absence then we must suppose That this Aristocraticall machination is easily yet to be prevented for t is not a hard matter to draw a full apparence together and that we see has been done lately by the order of the House it self Nay we see t is not the House but the opposite part that desires to scatter and divide and draw away and as much as in them lyes to hinder a full assembly And therefore This is not the way If it be by accident Then we must be contented to expect and have a little patience Fortune is not alwayes constant to one certain posture nor do the Celestiall bodies confine themselves to one unaltered motion The Parliament requests of the King That all great Officers of State by whom publike affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell The King takes this as a thing maliciously plotted against him as a proposition made in mockery of him as a request which He cannot yeeld to without shewing Himself unworthy of that trust which Law reposes in Him and of His descent from so many great and famous Ancestors He conceives He cannot perform the Oath of protecting His people if He abandon this power and assume others into it He conceives it such a Flowre of the Crown as is worth all the rest of the Garland not to be parted with all upon any extremity of conquest or imprisonment nor for any low sordid considerations of wealth and gain whatsoever He conceives That if He should passe this He should retain nothing but the Ceremonious Ensignes of Royalty or the meer sight of a Crown and Scepter nay the Stock being dead the Twigs would not long flourish but as to true and reall power He should remain but the outside the picture the signe of a King Could this be If all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty the substance of the request seems to be no more but this That it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments rather then His own meer understanding or any inferiour Councellors in those things which concern the liberties and lifes of the whole people And how could this request seem equall to a demanding of the Crown to a dethroning of the King and to a leaving of the Kingdom destitute of protection if Parliaments were not supposed mortall enemies to Princes and Princes not supposed but openly declared enemies to Parliaments if the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himself of Majesty and devesting himself of Power Ordinary reason cannot suggest otherwise hereupon but either Parliaments affect not Kings nor their own good nor would make good elections or else Kings affect not Parliaments nor the Kingdoms good and therefore they oppose such elections meerly because they are good but let us observe the Kings reasons against Parliamentary elections For first He conceives them prejudiciall for the people Secondly Dishonourable to himself Man is by nature of restlesse ambition as the meanest vassall thinks himself worthy of some greatnesse so the most absolute Monarch aspires to something above his greatnesse Power being over obtained by haughty mindes quickly discovers that it was not first aimed at meerly to effect Noble actions but in part to insult over others and ambitious men thirst after that power which may do harm as well as good nay though they are not resolved to do harm yet they would be masters of it Qui nolunt occidere quenquam Posse volunt And yet let this power be added the minde still remains unfilled still some further Terrestriall omnipotence a sharing with God and surmounting above mortall condition is affected Our Law has a wholesome Maxime That the King may onely do that which is just but Courtiers invert the sense of it and tell him That all is just which he may do or which he is not restrained from doing by Law Such and such things Princes ought not to do though no Law limited them from doing thereof but now those things which by nature they abhorre to do yet they abhorre as much to be limited from That disposition which makes us averse from cruelty and injury we account a noble and vertuous disposition but that Law which shall restrain us from the same is stomacked at and resisted as a harsh bit to put into our mouths or bonds upon our arms Antoninus Pius is greatly renowned for communicating all weighty affairs and following publike advice a dapprobation in all great expedients of high concernment and he was not more honourable then prosperous therein Had he been a meer servant to the State he coulâ— not have condescended further and yet if he had done necessarily what he did voluntarily the same thing had been in the same manner effectuall for t is not the meer putting or not putting of â—aw that does after the nature of good or evill Power then to do such an evill or not to do such a good is in truth no reall power nor desired out of any noblenesse but rather windy arrogance and as it is uselesse to men truely noble so to men that love evill for evill ends t is very dangerous What will Nero more despise then to condescend as Antoninus did yet 't were more necessary that Nero were limited then Antoninus for excessive power added to Nero's cruelty serves but as Oyl poured upon flame When Princes are as potent as vicious we know what Ministers swarm about them and the end is That as vast power corrupts and inclines them to iâ—l Councells so they perish at last by Councellors worst of all T is pretended that Princes cannot be limitted from evill but they may be disabled from doing good thereby which is not alwayes true and yet if it were the people had better want some right then